GURU GRANTH SAHEB STHAN MEERGHAT VANARASversusVED PRAKASH AND ORS.

                       [2013) 5 S.C.R. 1042


A   GURU GRANTH SAHEB STHAN MEERGHAT VANARAS
                            v.
               VED PRAKASH AND ORS.
             (Civil Appeal No. 4166 of 2013)
                            MAY 1, 2013
B
      [R.M. LODHA AND SHARAD ARVIND BOBDE, JJ.]

       Evidence Act, 1872 - ss.40 to 43 - Simultaneous
  proceedings in Criminal as well as civil court between same
C parties and in respect of same property - Stay of the
  proceedings in civil court, during pendency of the trial - Held:
  Grant of stay was not correct - Even in case of conflicting
  decisions in civil and criminal courts, such an eventuality
  cannot be taken as a relevant consideration - In the facts of
D the case also there is no likelihood of any embarrassment to
  defendants and the outcome of civil court will also not
  prejudice their defence in criminal case.

      Appellant filed FIR against respondent Nos. 1 to 4,
  alleging that they had executed a false, forged and
E fabricated Will and on the basis thereof, obtained
  mutation order. While the trial was pending against the
  respondents, appellants filed civil suit against the
  respondents, praying for decree for declaration of title,
  perpetual injunction and possession in respect of
F disputed lands above-mentioned.

      Respondents-defendants filed application for staying
  the proceedings in the suit, during pendency of the
  criminal trial. Trial Court dismissed the application.
G Respondents-defendants when approached High Court,
  the Court stayed the proceedings in the suit. Hence, the
  present appeal.

        Allowing the appeal, the Court
H                               1042
    GURU GRANTH SAHEB STHAN MEERGHAT                   1043
         VANARAS v. VED PRAKASH
     HELD: : 1. If the criminal case and civil proceedings A
are for the same cause, judgment of the civil court would
be relevant if conditions of any of Sections 40 to 43 of
the Evidence Act are satisfied, but it cannot be said that
the same would be conclusive except as provided in
Section 41. Section 41 provides which judgment would B
be conclusive proof of what is stated therein. Moreover,
the judgment, order or decree passed in previous civil
proceedings, if relevant, as provided under Sections 40
and 42 or other provisions of the Evidence Act, then in
each case, the court has to decide to what extent it is c
binding or conclusive with regard to the matters decided
therein. In each and every case, the first question which
would require consideration is, whether judgment, order
or decree is relevant; if relevant, its effect. This would
depend upon the facts of each case. No hard and fast
                                                           0
 rule can be laid down and that possibility of conflicting
decision in civil and criminal courts is not a relevant
consideration. [Paras 14 and 19) [1049-F-G; 1051-0-G]
    K. G. Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and Anr. (2002)
s sec 87.: 2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 350 - relied on.                 E
     2. Therefore, the High Court was not justified in
staying the proceedings in the civil suit till the decision
of criminal case. Firstly, because even if there is
possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and crimi_nal F
courts, such an eventuality cannot be taken as a relevant
consideration. Secondly, in the facts of the present case,
there is no likelihood of any embarrassment to the
defendants {respondent Nos. 1 to 4), as they had already
filed the written statement in the civil suit and based on G
the pleadings of the parties, the issues have been framed.
In this view of the matter, the outcome and/or findings
that may be arrived at by the civil court will not at all
prejudice the defence{s) of the respondent Nos.1 to 4 in .
the criminal proceedings. [Para 20] [1051-H; 1052-A-C]
                                                                H
    1044    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013) 5 S.C.R.

A       M.S. Sheriff and Anr. vs. State of Madras and Ors. AIR
    1954 SC 397: 1954 SCR 1229 - followed.

       Mis. Karam Chand Ganga Prasad and Anr. etc. vs.
  Union of India andOrs. 1970 (3) SCC 694; V.M. Shah vs.
B State of Maharashtra and Anr. (1995) 5 SCC 767: 1995 (3)
  Suppl. SCR 79; State of Rajasthan vs. Kalyan Sundaram
  Cement Industries Ltd. and Ors. (1996) 3 SCC 87: 1996 (2)
  SCR 463 - referred to.

                         Case Law Reference:
c
        1910 (3) sec 694             referred to          Para 10
        1995 (3) Suppl. SCR 79       referred to          Para 11
        1996 (2) SCR 463             referred to          Para 13
D       2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 350 relied on                 Para 14
        1954 SCR 1229                followed             Para14

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    4166 of 2013.
E
         From the Judgment & Order dated 24.11.2008 of the High
    Court of Judicature at Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh in Writ
    Petition No. 5836 of 2008.

F        Nagendra Rai, Smarhar Singh, Gopi Raman, Priti Resham
    (For T. Mahipal) for the Appellant.

        Vineet 6hagat, Divya Shukla for the Respondents.

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
        R.M. LODHA, J. 1. Leave granted .

       . 2. The short question for consideration in this appeal by
    special le~ve is whether High Court was justified in staying the
    proceedings in civil suit till the decision in criminal case.
H
    GURU GRANTH SAHEB STHAN MEERGHAT                          1045
   VANARAS v. VED PRAKASH [R.M. LODHA, J.]

      3. It is not necessary to narrate the facts in detail. Suffice   A
it to say that the appellant filed an FIR (P.S. Case No. 8 of
2003) at Dharampura Police Station against respondent nos.
1 to 4 for commission of the offences under Sections 420, 467,
468 and 1209, IPC alleging that they had executed a false,
forged and fabricated will on 02.07.1997 in the name of late           B
Devkinandan Sahay with the intention to grab his property. It
was further alleged that based on the fabricated will, these
respondents had obtained a mutation order dated 24.11.1999
from the Tehsildar, Ajaygarh. On completion of investigation in
the above F.l.R., the challan has been filed against the above         c
respondents and trial against them is goil).9 on in the Court of
Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ajaygarh, Panna (M.P.).

     4. On' 09.02.2004, the appellant brought legal action in
representative capacity against the respondents nos. 1 to 4 by
way of a civil suit in the Court of District Judge, Panna (M.P.)       D
praying for a decree for declaration of title, perpetual injunction
and possession in respect of disputed lands and for annulling
the sale deed dated 14.08.2003 and the mutation order dated
24.11.1999. In the suit, reference of will forged by the
respondent nos. 1 to 4 has been made. The said suit has been           E
transferred to the Court of Additional District Judge, Panna and
bears Civil Suit No. 10A of 2006. The respondent nos. 1 to 4,
who are defendants in the suit, have filed their written statement
on 19.06.2006. The trial court has framed issues on the basis
of the pleadings of the parties on 21.09.2007. On 21.04.2008,          F
the defendants (respondent nos. 1 to 4 herein) filed an
application under Section 10 read with Section 151, CPC for
staying the proceedings in the civil suit during the pendency of
above-referred criminal case.
                                                                       G
    5. The Additional District Judge, Panna, by his order dated
21.04.2008 dismissed the application for staying the
proceedings in the suit.

     6. The respondent nos. 1 to 4 herein challenged the order
of the Additional District Judge in the High Court ih a writ           ,H
    1046     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 5 S.C.R.


A petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The
  Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court by the
  impugned order has set aside the order of the Additional
  District Judge and, as noted above, has stayed the
  proceedings in Civil Suit till the decision of criminal case. It is
B from this order that the present civil appeal, by special leave,
  has arisen.

       7. We have heard Mr. Nagendra Rai, learned senior
  counsel for the appellant, and Mr. K.G. Bhagat, learned counsel
C for respondent nos. 1 to 4.

        8. A Constitution Bench of this Court in M. S. Sheriff & Anr.
  v. State of Madras & Ors1• has considered the question of
  simultaneous prosecution of the criminal proceedings with the
  civil suit. In paragraphs 14,15 and 16 (Pg. 399) of the Report,
D this Court stated as follows:

        "14 ........ It was said that the simultaneous prosecution
        of these matters will embarrass the accused ..... but we
        can see that the simultaneous prosecution of the present
        criminal proceedings out of which this appeal arises and
E
        the civil suits will embarrass the accused. We have
        therefore to determine which should b~ stayed.

        15. As between the civil and the criminal proceedings we
        are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given
F       precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the
        High Courts of India on this point. No hard and fast rule
        can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility
        of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal Courts is
        a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an
G       eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the
        decision of one Court binding on the other, or even
        relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as
        sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration
        here is the likelihood of embarrassment.
H 1. AIR 1954 SC 397.
    GURU GRANTH SAHEB STHAN MEERGHAT                         1047
   VANARAS v. VED PRAKASH [R.M. LODHA, J.]

    16. Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit      A
    often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal
    prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has
    forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand
    that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the guilty
    should be punished while the events are still fresh in the        B
    public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as
    early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another
    reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till
    memories have grown too dim to trust. This, however, is
    not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations obtaining        c
    in any particular case might make some other course more
    expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other
    criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it
    inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a
    prosecution ordered under S. 476. But in this case we are
                                                                      0
    of the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the
    criminal proceedings have finished."

     9. The ratio of the decision in M.S. Sheriff1 is that no hard
and fast rule can be laid down as to which of the proceedings
- civil or criminal - must be stayed. It was held that possibility    E
of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal courts cannot
be considered as a relevant consideration for stay of the
procee~ings as law envisaged such an eventuality.
Embarrassment was considered to be a relevant aspect and
having regard to certain factors, this Court found expedient in       F
M. S. Sheriff1 to stay the civil proceedings. The Court made it
very clear that this, however, was not hard and fast rule; special
considerations obtaining in any particular case might make
some other course more expedient and just. M. S. Sheriff1
does not lay down an invariable rule that simultaneous                G
prosecution of criminal proceedings and civil suit will embarrass
the accused or that.invariably the proceedings in the civil suit
should be stayed until disposal of criminal case.

     10. In Mis. Karam Chand Ganga Prasad and Another etc.
                                                                      H
    1048      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013] 5 S.C.R.


A   v. Union of India and Others2, this Court in paragraph 4 of the
  Report (Pg. 695) made the following general observations, "it
  is a well established principle of law that the decisions of the
  civil courts are binding on the criminal courts. The converse is
  not true." This statement has been held to be confined to the
B facts of that case in a later decision in K. G. Premshanker v.
  Inspector of Police and Another3, to which we shall refer to a
  little later.

       11. In V.M. Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another4,
  while dealing with the question whether the conviction under
C Section 630 of the Companies Act was sustainable, this Court,
  while noticing the decision in M.S. Sheriff1 in para 11 (pg. 770)
  of the Report, held as under:

          "11. As seen that the civil court after full-dressed trial
D         recorded the finding that the appellant had not come into
          possession through the Company but had independent
          tenancy rights from the principal landlord and, therefore,
          the decree for eviction was negatived. Until that finding is
          duly considered by the appellate court after weighing the
E         evidence afresh and if it so warranted reversed, the
          findings bind the parties. The findings, recorded by the
          criminal court, stand superseded by the findings recorded
          by the civil court. Thereby, the findings of the civil court get
          precedence over the findings recorded by the trial court,
          in particular, in summary trial for offences like Section 630.
F
          The mere pendency of the appeal does not have the effect
          of suspending the operation of the decree of the trial court
          and neither the finding of the civil court gets nor the decree
          becomes inoperative."
G       12. The statement of law in V.M. Shah4, as quoted above,
    has been expressly held to be not a good law in K.G.
    Premshanker3 .
    2.   1910 (3) sec 694.
    3.   (2002) s sec a1.
H   4.   (1995) s sec 767.
       GURU GRANTH SAHEB STHAN MEERGHAT                           1049
      VANARAS v. VED PRAKASH [R.M. LODHA, J.]

      13. In State of Rajasthan v. Kalyan Sundaram Cement                  A
 Industries Ltd. and Others5 , this Court made the following
 statement in paragraph 3 (pgs. 87-88):

       "3. It is settled law that pendency of the criminal matters
       would not be an impediment to proceed with the civil suits.         B
       The criminal court would deal with the offence punishable
       under the Act. On the other hand, the courts rarely stay the
       criminal cases and only when the compelling circumstances
       require the exercise of their power. We have never come
       across stay of any civil suits by the courts so far. The High       C
       Court of Rajasthan is only an exception to pass such
       orders. The High Court proceeded on a wrong premise
       that the accused would be expected to disclose their
       defence in the criminal case by asking them to proceed
       with the trial of the suit. It is not a correct principle of law.
       Even otherwise, it no longer subsists, since many of them           D
       have filed their defences in the civil suit. On principle of
       law, we hold that the approach adopted by the High Court
       is not correct. But since the defence has already been filed
       nothing survives in this matter."
                                                                           E
      14. We may now refer to a three-Judge Bench decision
 of this Court in KG. Premshanker. The three-Judge Bench
 took into consideration Sections 40, 41, 42 and 43 of the
 Evidence Act, 1872 and also the decision of this Court in M. S.
 Sheriff' and observed in paragraph 32 of the Report that the              F
 decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff
 case1 would be binding wherein it has been specifically held
 that no hard and fast rule can be laid down and that possibility
 of conflicting decision in civil and criminal courts is not a
 relevant consideration.
                                                                           G
       15. Section 40 of the Evidence Act makes it plain that the
  existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law
. prevents any Courts from taking cognizance of a suit or holding

 5.   (1996) 3 sec s1.                                                     H
    1050     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013) 5 S.C.R.


A   a trial is a relevant fact when the question is whether such Court
    ought to take cognizance of such suit, or to hold such trial.

          16. Section 41 provides for relevancy of judgments passed
    in the exercise of probate, matrimonial admiralty or insolvency
    jurisdiction by the Competent Court. It reads as follows :
8
        "S. 41. Relevancy of certain judgments in probate, etc.,
        jurisdiction.-A final judgment, order or decree of a
        competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial
        admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction which confers upon or
C       takes away from any person any legal character, or which
        declares any person to be entitled to any such character,
        or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any
        specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the
        existence of any such legal character, or the title of any
D       such person to any such thing, is relevant.

               Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof.-

              that any legal character, which it confers accrued at .
        the time when such judgment, order or decree came into
E       operation;

              that any legal character, to which it declares any such
         person to be entitled, accrued to that person at the time
         when such judgment, order or decree declares it to have
F        accrued to that person; ·

              that any legal character which it takes away from any
         such person ceased at the time from which such judgment,
         order or decree declared that it had ceased or should
         cease;
G
               and that anything to which it declares any person to
         be so entitled was the property of that person at the time
         from which such judgment, order or decree declares that
         it had been or should be his property."
H
    GURU GRANTH SAHEB STHAN MEERGHAT                        1051
   VANARAS v. VED PRAKASH [R.M. LODHA, J.]
    17. Section 42 deals with relevancy and effect of                A
judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in
Section 41. It reads as under:

    "S.42. Relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or
    decrees, other than those mentioned in section 41.-              8
    Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned
    in section 41, are relevant if they relate to matters of a
    public nature relevant to the enquiry; but such judgments,
    orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which
    they state."
                                                                     c
     18. Section 43 provides that the judgments, orders or
decrees other than those mentioned in Sections 40, 41 and 42
are irrelevant unless the existence of such judgment, order or
decree is a fact' in issue or is relevant under some other
provisions of the Evidence Act                                       D

      19. In K.G. Premshanker3, the effect of the above
provisions (Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act) has been
broadly noted thus: if the criminal case and civil proceedings
are for the same cause, judgment of the civil court would be         E
relevant if conditions of any of Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied
but it cannot be said that the same would be conclusive except
as provided in Section 41. Section 41 provides which judgment
would be conclusive proof of what is stated therein. Moreover,
the judgment, order or decree passed in previous civil
                                                                     F
proceedings, if relevant, as provided under Sections 40 and
42 or other provisions of the Evidence Act then in each case
the Court has to decide to what extent it is binding or conclusive
with regard to the matters decided therein. In each and every
case the first question which would require consideration is,
whether judgment, order or decree is relevant; if relevant, its      G
effect. This would depend upon th::i facts of each case.

     20. In light of the above legal position, it may be
immediately observed that the High Court was not at all justified
in staying the proceedings in the civil suit till the decision of    H
    1052     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [20131 s s.o.

A criminal case. Firstly, because even if there is possibility of
  conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal courts, such an
  eventuality cannot be taken as a relevant consideration.
  Secondly, in the facts of the present case there is no likelihood
  of any embarrassment to the defendants (respondent nos. 1 to
B 4 herein) as they had already filed the written statement in the
  civil suit and based on the pleadings of the parties the issues
  have been framed. In this view of the matter, the outcome and/
  or findings that may be arrived at by the civil court will not at all
  prejudice the defence(s) of the respondent nos. 1 to 4 in the
c criminal proceedings.

      21. For the above reasons, appeal is allowed. The
  impugned order dated 24.11.2008 passed by the Division
  Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court is set aside. The
  proceedings in the civil suit ~hall now proceed further in
D accordance with law. The parties shall bear their own costs.

    K.K.T.                                          Appeal allowed.