GURU BASAVARAJ @ BEENE SETTAPPAversusSTATE OF KARNATAKA

                   [2012) 8 S.C.R. 189


       GURU BASAVARAJ @ BEENE SETTAPPA                          A
                             v.
                 STATE OF KARNATAKA
           (Criminal Appeal No. 1325 of 2012)

                    AUGUST 29, 2012
                                                                B
   [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]

     Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 279, 337, 338 and 304-A -
Prosecution under, with s. 187 of Motor Vehicles Act - Motor
accident - Causing simple injuries to many, grievous injuries C
to two and death of one - Trial court convicting the accused-
driver for the offences under /PC and acquitting him for the
offence under Motor Vehicles Act - Accused was sentenced
to SJ for six months and fine with default clause - Appellate
court upholding the conviction but setting aside sentence of    o
fine - Order of appellate court upheld by High Court - On
appeal, held: Conviction justified - Prosecution proved that
the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of
the accused - The sentence awarded by courts below also
does not warrant any interference - Sentence/Sentencing -     E
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - s. 187.

      Sentence/Sentencing - Proportionality in sentence - In
motor accident cases - An appropriate punishment works as
an eye-opener for persons who are not careful while driving
- It is duty of the court to see that appropriate sentence is   F
imposed taking into regard commission of crime and its
impact on social order.

     Compensation - Grant of, uls. 357(3) Cr.P.C. - Held:
Such compensation not to be regarded as a substitute in all     G
circumstances for adequate sentence - Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - s. 357(3) - Sentence/Sentencing.

    Criminal Law - Conviction and sentence - Distinction
between.
                         189                                    H
    190       SUPREME COURT REPORTS          [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A      The appellant-accused was charged for the offences
  punishable u/ss. 279, 337, 338 and 304-A IPC r/w. s. 187
  of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The prosecution case was
  that the accused was<iriving a new tractor attached with
  an old trailer in which goods were loaded alongwith
B many people. The trailer turned turtle resulting in simple
  injuries to many and grievous injuries to 3, one of whom
  succumbed to the injuries. The accused in his statement
  u/s. 313 Cr.P.C. stated that the accident occurred due to
  mechanical f!lilure and not due to rash and negligent
c driving. Trial court acquitted the accused u/s. 187 of the
  Act and convicted him u/ss. 279, 337, 338 and 304-A IPC.
  The appellate court upheld the conviction imposed by the
  trial court, but set aside the sentence of fine for the
  offence punishable u/s. 279 IPC. High Court upheld the
0 order of appellate court.
      In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that
  accident was due to mechanical failure and not due to
  rash and negligent driving; that the accused having been
  acquitted u/s. 279 IPC could not have been punished in
E respect of rest of the offences; and that the age of the
  accused at the time of incident (22 years) and his
  solemnization of marriage to be taken as mitigating factor
  and the sentence of imprisonment to be restricted to the
  period already undergone and the quantum of fine be
F enhanced.

          Dismissing the appeal, the Court

       HELD: 1. On a careful scrutiny of the material brought
  on record, all the courts have placed reliance on
G independent witnesses as well as the testimony of PW-
  10, the Motor Vehicle Inspector. The manner in which the
  accident occurred due to detachment of the trailer from
  the tractor and the distance to which the tractor moved
  vividly reveals that the vehicle in question was driven
H recklessly at a high speed. The plea of mechanical failure
GURU BASAVARAJ @ BEENE SETTAPPA v. STATE 191
             OF KARNATAKA
was not even suggested to the Inspector. What is sought          A
to be emphasised before this Court is that PW-3 has
deposed that the accident occurred due to mechanical
failure. The trial court as well as the High Court has not
accepted the testimony of PW-3 as he is only an
agriculturist while the other technical experts including        s
the Motor Vehicle Inspector have deposed about the rash
and negligent driving. Analysing the evidence in entirety;
the trial judge as well as the appellate judge has returned
the finding as regards the rash and negligent driving. The
analysis of the factual score in this regard cannot be           c
regarded to be perverse and, therefore, not liable to be
unsettled by this Court. [Para 12] [198-C-F, H; 199-A]
     2. There is a distinction between conviction and
sentence. A conviction is the proof of the offence
committed by an accused. It is the proof of guilt of the         D
offence. The punishment component is the sentence. In
the instant case, as the judgment of the appellate court
would show, the view has been expressed that a
separate sentence under Section 279 IPC is not
necessary and, accordingly, the said sentence has been           E
set aside. The reading of the entire judgment makes it
graphically clear that the conviction under Section 279
IPC has not been annulled. It is noticeable that the rash
and negligent driving by the accused that resulted in the
causation of injuries to the persons travelling in the trailer   F
has been proved. There is no cavil that some have been
seriously injured and one person who was grievously
injured breathed his last. Thus, the plea that the appellant
has been acquitted of the offence under Section 279 IPC
does not deserve acceptance. [Para 13] [199-D-E; 200-A-          G
C]
    Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang and Ors.(1995) 2 SCC
513: 1995 (1) SCR 456 - relied on.
    3.1. There has to be a proportion between the crime
and the punishment. It is the duty of the court to see that      H
    192     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A appropriate sentence is imposed regard being had to the
  commission of the crime and its impact on the social
  order. The cry of the collective for justice which includes
  adequate punishment cannot be lightly ignored. [Para 29]
  [206-E-F]
B
       3.2. An appropriate punishment works as ·m eye-
  opener for the persons who are not careful while driving
  vehicles on the road and exhibit a careless attitude
  possibly harbouring the notion that they would be shown
  indulgence or lives of others are like "flies to the wanton
C boys". They totally forget that the lives of many are in
  their hands, and the sublimity of safety of a human being
  is given an indecent burial by their rash and negligent act.
  [Para 28] [206-D]

D      3.3. In a motor accident, when a number of people
  sustain injuries and a death occurs, it c.reates a stir in the
  society; sense of fear prevails all around. The negligence
  of one shatters the tranquility of the collective. When
  such an accident occurs, it has the effect potentiality of
E making victims in many a layer and creating a concavity
  in the social fabric. The agony and anguish of the affected
  persons, both direct and vicarious, can have nightmarish
  effect. It has its impact on the society and the impact is
  felt more when accidents take place quite often because
F of rash driving by drunken, negligent or, for that matter,
  adventurous drivers who have, in a way, no concern for
  others. Grant of compensation under the provisions of
  the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is in a different sphere
  altogether. Grant of compensation under Section 357(3)
G with a direction that the same should be paid to the
  person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of
  the act for which the accused has been sentenced has a
  different contour and the same is not to be regarded as
  a substitute in all circumstances for adequate sentence.
  [Para 26] [205-E-H; 206-A]
H
GURU BASAVARAJ @ BEENE SETTAPPA v. STATE 193
             OF KARNATAKA
     3.4. Two aspects, namely, (i) the age of the accused       A
at the time of the accident; and (ii) his present marital
status, have been highlighted as mitigating factors.
Weighing the individual difficulty as against the social
order, collective conscience and the duty of the court, the
substantive sentence affirmed by the High Court does            B
not warrant any interference and, accordingly, the court
concurs with the same. [Paras 15 and 30) [200-G; 207-D-
E]

     State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC      C
538: 1987 (1) SCR 1103; Sevaka Perumal and Anr. v. State
of Tamil Nadu (1991) 3 SCC 471: 1991 (2) SCR 711 ;
Jashubha Bharatsinh Gohil and Ors. v. State of Gujarat (1994)
4 SCC 353; Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC
82: 2000 (3) SCR 1000; State of Karnataka v. Sharanappa
Basanagouda Aregoudar (2002) 3 SCC 738: 2002 (2) SCR            D
692; State of M.P. v. Saleem alias Chamaru and Anr. (2005)
5 SCC 554: 2005 (1) Suppl. SCR 562; State of Punjab v.
Ba/winder Singh and Ors. (2012) 2 SCC 182; Alister Anthony
Pareira v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 2 SCC 648; State Tr.
P.S. Lodhi Colony, New Delhi v. Sanjeev Nanda 2012 (7)          E
SCALE 120; Rattiram and Ors. v. State of M. P. Through
Inspector of Police AIR 2012 SCW 1772; Siriya alias Shri Lal
v. State of M.P. AIR 2008 SC 2314 - relied on.

    B. Nagabhushanam v. State of Karnataka (2008) 5 SCC         F
730: 2008 (8) SCR 444 - referred to.

                     Case Law Reference:
    1995 (1) SCR 456            Relied on         Para 13
                                Relied on          Para 16      G
    1987 (1) SCR 1103
    1991 (2) SCR 711            Relied on          Para 17
    (1994) 4 sec 353            Relied on          Para 18

    2000 (3) SCR 1000           Relied on          Para 19      H
    194       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A         2002 (2) SCR 692               Relied on           Para 20

          2005 (1) Suppl. SCR 562 Relied on                  Para 21

          2008 (8) SCR 444               Referred to         Para 22

          (2012) 2 sec 182               Relied on           Para 23
B
          (2012) H 2 sec 648             Relied on           Para 24

          2012 (7) SCALE 120             Relied on           Para 25

          AIR 2012 sew 1112              Relied on           Para 27
c
          AIR 2008 SC 2314               Relied on           Para 29

        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 1325 of 2012.

D         From the Judgment & Order dated 21.06.2011 of the High
    Court of Karnataka, Circuit Bench at Dharwad in Crl. Revision
    Petition No. 2284 of 2009.

          S.N. Bhat for the Appellant.

E         Vishruti Vijay (for Anitha Shenoy) for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. Leave granted.

F       2. In this appeal preferred by special leave under Article
  136 of the Constitution of India, the assail is to the judgment
  and order dated 21.06.2011 in Criminal Revision Petition No.
  2284 of 2009 passed by the High Court of Karnataka Circuit
  Bench at Dharwad whereby the High court has concurred with
G the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by
  the learned Addi. Sessions Judge, Hespe! in Criminal Appeal
  No. 58 of 2008 wherein the appellate court had set aside the
  sentence under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
  (for short "the IPC") and affirmed the conviction and sentence
H for offences punishable under Sections 337, 338 and 304 A
GURU BASAVARAJ @ BEENE SETIAPPA v. STATE 195
      OF KARNATAKA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
of the IPC as passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class,         A
Hos pet.

      3. The broad essential facts leading to the trial of the
accused-appellant (hereinafter referred to as 'the accused')
are that on 25.03.2006, about 10.15 a.m., the accused-driver         B
was driving an unregistered new tractor on National Highway
No. 13 at bypass road near the open well of one Golya Naik.
The tractor turned turtle towards the left side and caused simple
injuries to many people who were sitting inside the trailer of the
tractor and grievous injuries to three persons. Injured Kotraiah     C
succumbed to the injuries sustained in the accident. Be it noted,
all the injured persons were travelling along with their goods in
the trailer of the said tractor.

     4. After the accident took place, the concerned police sub-
inspector (PSI) reached the spot, recorded the statement of the      D
injured persons and after returning to the police station
registered an FIR and thereafter proceeded to the spot,
prepared the sketch map, seized the vehicle in question and
sent the dead body for post-mortem. After completing the
investigation, he placed the charge-sheet before the Competent       E
Court for the offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338
and 304-A of the IPC read with Section 187 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988.

    5. The prosecution, in order to substantiate the allegations,
examined 10 witnesses and got a number of documents                  F
marked as exhibits P-1 to P-24.

      6. The accused, in his statement under Section 313
Cr.P.C., denied the incriminating material brought against him
and took the stand that the accident occurred due to mechanical      G
failure and not because of rash and negligent driving. However,
he chose not to adduce any evidence.

     7. The learned Magistrate acquitted the accused of the
offence under Section 187 of the 1988 Act and convicted him          H
    196       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A for the offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and
  304-A of the IPC and sentenced him to pay a certain sum as
  fine and, in default of payment of the same, to undergo simple
  imprisonment for a specific period irt respect of the offences
  under Sections 279 and 337 and Section 338 of the IPC As
B far as the offence under Section 304-A of the IPC is concerned,
  the learned Magistrate imposed the sentence of simple
  imprisonment of six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- and,
  in default, to suffer simple imprisonment of 45 days.

        8. On an appeal being preferred assailing the conviction
C and sentence, the learned appellate Judge basically posed two
  questions, namely, whether the findings recorded by the trial
  court are erroneous and whether the sentence passed by the
  trial court required to be interfered with in appeal. After
  analysing the evidence, the appellate court came to hold that it
D had been proven beyond doubt that the accused being the
  driver of a newly purchased unregistered tractor not only
  overloaded tamarind bags on the old trailer but also allowed
  22 passengers to travel on the loaded trailer and due to his
  negligence, the trailer got detached from the tractor as a
E consequence of which it turned turtle by the side of the road.
  That apart, after detachment of the trailer, the tractor moved up
  to 30 feet which clearly reflected that the tractor was in high
  speed.

F      9. The learned appellate Judge concurred with the view of
  the learned Magistrate that the accident had not occurred due
  to mechanical defect but there was rash and negligence on the
  part of the accused and the same had been established by the
  unimpeachable evidence of independent witnesses. Because
G of the aforesaid view, he answered the first question in the
  negative. As far as the second question is concerned, he
  sustained the conviction in respect of all the offences but set
  aside the sentence imposed for the offence punishable under
  Section 279 of the IPC.

H         10. Questioning the legal sustainability of the conviction,
 GURU BASAVARAJ @ BEENE SETTAPPA v. STATE 197
       OF KARNATAKA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
it is submitted by Mr. S. N. Bhat, learned counsel for the          A
appellant. that all the courts have fallen into grave error by
expressing the opinion that the accident had not occurred due
to mechanical failure, namely, due to non-functioning of the
hydraulic system in a proper manner, and such an expression
of opinion vividly exposits perversity of approach. It is further   B
urged by him that when the appellant has been acquitted of the
offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC, he could not
have been punished in respect of the rest of the offences. The
last limb of submission of Mr. Bhatt is that at the time of the
accident, the appellant was 22 years of age and, in the             c
meantime, his marriage has taken place and, therefore, the
same should be regarded as acceptable mitigating factors and
the substantive sentence should be restricted to the period
already undergone in custody and the quantum of fine be
enhanced.
                                                                    D
     11. Ms. Vishruti Vijay, learned counsel for the State, per
contra, contended that the analysis of the evidence made by
the learned Magistrate as well as by the appellate court are
absolutely flawless and the concurrence thereof by the High
Court, in no manner, can be stated to be perverse. It is put forth E
by him that there is ample evidence on record that the incident
took place due to rash and negligent act on the part of the
appellant and the said finding, being appositely founded on the
material on record, does not warrant any interference by this
Court. Commenting on the submission that the appellant has F
been acquitted under Section 279 of the IPC and hence, he
deserves to be acquitted in respect of the other offences, it is
propounded by Ms. Vishruti Vijay that on a studied perusal of
the judgment of the learned appellate Judge, it is quite clear
that he has maintained the conviction and not imposed a G
separate sentence under Section 279 of the IPC and, for that
reason, he has set aside the sentence but not the conviction.
The learned counsel further submitted that regard being had to
the careless, negligent and callous attitude that has been
exhibited by the drivers who are expected to be professionals, H
    198       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A   the rate of road accidents that has extremely gone high and
    further, in the case at hand, when so many people have been
    injured, some have sustained grievous injuries and a life has
    been lost, lenient delineation would be an anathema to the
    concept of adequate punishment.
B
          12. First, we shall deal with the facet of rash and negligent
    driving of the driver. The learned counsel for the appellant has
    submitted that the vehicle turned turtle due to mechanical failure
    i.e. non-functioning of the hydraulic system in a proper manner.
C   To appreciate the said submission, we have carefully perused
    the material ·brought on record and the analysis made by the
    courts below. On a careful scrutiny of the same, we find that all
    the courts have placed reliance on independent witnesses as
    well as the testimony of PW-10, the Motor Vehicle Inspector.
    The manner in which the accident occurred due to detachment
D   of the trailer from the tractor and the distance to which the
    tractor moved vividly reveals that the vehicle in question was
    driven recklessly at a high speed. The plea of mechanical
    failure as put forth by the accused was not even suggested to
    the Inspector. What is sought to be emphasised before this
E   Court is that PW-3 has deposed that the accident occurred due
    to mechanical failure. The trial court as well as the High Court
    has not accepted the testimony of PW-3 as he is only an
    agriculturist while the other technical experts including the Motor
    Vehicle Inspector have deposed about the rash and negligent
F   driving. Analysing the evidence in entirety, the learned trial judge
    as well as the appellate judge has returned the finding as
    regards the rash and negligent driving. The appellate court, on
    further scrutiny, has found that the evidence on record clearly
    shows that the driver has taken the vehicle to the left side of
G   the road and, in the process, he moved away from the main
     road to the 'kachcha' road and thereby the link between the
    tractor and the trailer got detached. The High Court has opined
     that the accused has not taken care to see that the speed of
    the tractor was within limit so that the trailer could not be
H   detached. In our considered view, the analysis of the factual
 GURU BASAVARAJ @ BEENE SETTAPPA v. STATE 199
       OF KARNATAKA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
score in this regard cannot be regarded to be perverse and,           A
therefore, not liable to be unsettled by this Court.

       13. The next limb of submission of the learned counsel for
 the appellant is that when he has been acquitted under Section
 279 of the IPC, he cannot be punished in respect of the other        B
 offences as the allegation of rash and negligent act cannot be
 treated to have been proven. The aforesaid submission, on a
first blush, may look quite attractive, but on a deeper scrutiny
 of the judgment passed by the appellate court, it melts into total
 insignificance. The learned appellate judge, after due               C
 appreciation of the evidence on record as expected of an
 appellate court, has come to the conclusion that the accused
 was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. After
 ascribing some reason, he has thought it apposite that a
separate sentence should not be imposed under Section 279
of the IPC, and, accordingly, he has set aside the sentence           D
awarded by the trial court. It is apposite to state here that there
 is a distinction between conviction and sentence. A conviction
is the proof of the offence committed by an accused. It is the
proof of guilt of the offence. The punishment component is the
sentence. In Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang and others1 , a             E
three-Judge Bench of this Court, after referring to Section 354
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has stated that every
judgment referred to in Section 353 of the Code, shall, inter alia,
specify the offence of which the accused is convicted and the
punishment to which he is sentenced. This Court, while dealing        F
with the power of the High Court under Section 389( 1) of the
Code, has observed that ordinarily an order of conviction by
itself is not capable of execution under the Code, but it is the
order of sentence or an order awarding compensation or
imposing fine or release on probation which are capable of            G
execution and which, if not suspended, would be required to
be executed by the authorities. It has been further stated that
in certain situations, the order of conviction can be executable
in the sense that it may incur a disqualification. We have
1.   (1995) 2 sec 513.                                                H
    200      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A referred to the aforesaid authority only to highlight that there is
  a distinction between a conviction and a sentence. In the instant
  case, as the judgment of the appellate court would show, the
  view has been expressed that a separate sentence under
  Section 279 of the IPC is not necessary and, accordingly, the
B said sentence has been set aside. The reading of the entire
  judgment makes it graphically clear that the conviction under
  Section 279 of the IPC has not been annulled. It is noticeable
  that the rash and negligent driving by the accused that resulted
  in the causation of injuries to the persons travelling in the trailer
C has been proved. There is no cavil that some have been
  seriously injured and one person who was grievously injured
  breathed his last. Thus, the submission of the learned counsel
  for the appellant that he has been acquitted of the offence under
  Section 279 of the IPC does not deserve acceptance, and,
  accordingly, we, unhesitatingly, repel the same.
0
        14. The last plank of submission of Mr. Bhat is that the
  accused-appellant was a young man of 22 years at the time of
  the occurrence and in the meantime, he has entered into
  wedlock and, therefore, maintaining of substantive sentence
E would be inapposite, and in fitness of things, it should be
  restricted to the period already undergone and the amount of
  fine may be enhanced with the stipulation that it shall be paid
  as compensation to the victims of the accident.

F       15. The aforesaid submission, in our considered opinion,
  requires a careful and cautious examination. What is basically
  sought to be argued on behalf of the appellant is that there are
  mitigating circumstances warranting lenient treatment. As we
  perceive, two aspects, namely, (i) the age of the accused at
G the time of the accident; and (ii) his present marital status, have
  been highlighted as mitigating factors. Before we dwell upon
  whether these two aspects should be regarded as extenuating
  factors to reduce the sentence in a crime of this nature in the
  present social context, we think it apt to refer to certain
  authorities in the field.
H
GURU BASAVARAJ @ BEENE SETTAPPA v. STATE 201
      OF KARNATAKA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
     16. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju2 , while      A
dealing with the concept of adequate punishment in relation to
an offence under Section 304-A of the IPC, the Court stated
that considerations of undue sympathy in such cases will not
only lead to miscarriage of justice but will also undermine the
confidence of the public in the efficacy of the criminal justice   B
dispensation system. It need be hardly pointed out that the
imposition of a sentence of fine of Rs. 250 on the driver of a
Motor Vehicle for an offence under Section 304-A of the !PC
and that too without any extenuating or mitigating circumstance
is bound to shock the conscience of any one and will               c
unmistakably leave the impression that the trial was a mockery
of justice. Thereafter, this Court enhanced the senience to six
months rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1000 and, in
default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months.

      17. In Sevaka Perumal and another v. State of Tamil          D
Nadu, 3 it has been emphasized that undue sympathy resulting
in imposition of inadequate sentence would do more harm to
the justice system and undermine the public confidence in the
efficacy of law.
                                                                   E
     18. In Jashubha Bharatsinh Gohil and Ors. v. State of
Gujarat", the Court, adverting to the new challenges of
sentencing, opined that the courts are constantly faced with the
situation where they are required to answer to new challenges
and mould the sentencing system to meet those challenges.          F
Protection of society and deterring the criminal is the avowed
object of law and that is required to be achieved by imposing
appropriate sentence.

    19. In Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana 5 , this Court
expressed thus:                                                    G

2.   (1987) 1 sec 538.
3.   (1991) 3 sec 471.
4.   (1994) 4 SC 353.
5.   c20ooi 5 sec 82.                                              H
    202        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A         "Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in
          India and the devastating consequences visiting the victims
          and their families, criminal courts cannot treat the nature
          of the offence under Section 304A IPC as attracting the
          benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the PO Act. While
B         considering the quantum of sentence, to be imposed for
          the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving
          of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be
          deterrence."

C       Thereafter, the Court proceeded to highlight what is
    expected of a professional driver:

          "A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the
          automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must
          constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a
D         single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is
          on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and
          should not take a chance thinking that a rash driving need
          not necessarily cause any accident; or even if any accident
          occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any
E         human being; or even if such death ensues he might not
          be convicted of the offence; and lastly, that even if he is
          convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the court. He
          must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is
          convicted of the offence for causing death of a human
F         being due to his callous driving of vehicle he cannot
          escape from jail sentence. This is the role which the courts
          can play, particularly at the level of trial courts, for lessening
          the high rate of motor accidents due to callous driving of
          automobiles."
G       20. In State of Karnataka v. Sharanappa Basanagouda
    Aregoudar, it has been ruled that if the accused are found
    guilty of rash and negligent driving, courts have to be on guard
    to ensure that they do not escape the clutches of law very lightly.

H s.   (2002) 3 sec 738.
GURU BASAVARAJ @ BEENE SETTAPPA v. STATE 203
      OF KARNATAKA [DIPAK MISRA, J.)
The sentence imposed by the courts should have deterrent            A
effect on potential wrong-doers and it should commensurate
with the seriousness of the offence. Of course, the courts are
given discretion in the matter of sentence to take stock of the
wide and varying range of facts that might be relevant for fixing
the quantum of sentence, but the discretion shall be exercised      B
with due regard to the larger interest of the society and it is
needless to add that passing of sentence on the offender is
probably the most public face of the criminal justice system.

     21. In State of M.P. v. Saleem alias Chamaru and Anr.7,
it has been ruled that the object should be to protect society      C
and the avowed object of law is achieved by imposing
appropriate sentence to deter the criminal. It is expected that
the courts would operate the sentencing system so as to
impose such sentence which reflects the conscience of the
society and the sentencing process has to be stern where it         D
should be.

     22. Yet again in B. Nagabhushanam V. State of
Kamataka 6 , the Court, taking note of the fact that the vehicle
was being driven rashly and negligently, opined that six months'    E
simple imprisonment and a direction to the appellant to pay a
fine of Rs. 1,000/- for commission of the offence punishable
under Section 304-A and simple imprisonment for one month
and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- for the offence punishable under
Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be said to be           F
shocking.

     23. Recently, in State of Punjab v. Ba/winder Singh and
Ors., 9 this Court while dealing with the concept of sentencing,
has stated thus:
                                                                    G
      "While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed

7.   (2005) 5 sec 554.
8.   (2008) 5 sec no.
9.   (2012) 2 SC 182.                                               H
    204       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A         for the offence of causing death or injury by rash and
          negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime
          considerations should be deterrence. The persons driving
          motor vehicles cannot and should not take a chance
          thinking that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with
B         leniently by the Court".

          24. In Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, 10
    it has been laid down that sentencing is an important task in
    relation to criminal justice dispensation system. One of the
    prime objectives of the criminal law is imposition of appropriate,
C   adequate, just and proportionate sentence commensurate with
    the nature and gravity of crime and the manner in which the
    crime is done. There is no straitjacket formula for sentencing
    an accused on proof of crime. The courts have evolved certain
    principles: twin objective of the sentencing policy is deterrence
D   and correction. What sentence would meet the ends of justice
    depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the
    court must keep in mind the gravity of the crime, motive for the
    crime, nature of the offence and all other attendant
    circumstances. It has been further opined that the principle of
E   proportionality in sentencing a crime-doer is well entrenched
    in criminal jurisprudence. As a matter of law, the proportion
    between crime and punishment bears the most relevant
    influence in the determination of sentencing the crime-doer. The
    court has to take into consideration all aspects including the
F   social interest and conscience of the society for award of
    appropriate sentence.

       25. In State TR. P.S. Lodhi Colony, New Delhi v. Sanjeev
  Nanda", one of us (K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.), in his separate
G opinion, pertaining to the conception of adequate sentencing,
  has expressed thus:

          "Law demands that the offender should be adequately

    10. (2012) 2 sec 648.
H 11. 2012 (7) SCALE 120.
GURU BASAVARAJ @ BEENE SETTAPPA v. STATE 205
      OF KARNATAKA [DIPAK MISRA, J.)
     punished for the crime, so that it can deter the offender and.    A
     other persons from committing similar offences. Nature
     and circumstances of the offence; the need for the
     sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offence;
     to afford adequate deterrence to the conduct and to protect
     the public from such crimes are certain factors to be             B
     considered while imposing the sentence."

      26. From the aforesaid authorities, it is luminous that this
Court has expressed its concern on imposition of adequate
sentence in respect of commission of offences regard being             C
had to the nature of the offence and demand of the conscience
of the society. That apart, the concern has been to impose
adequate sentence for the offence punishable under Section
304-A of the IPC. It is worthy to note that in certain
circumstances, the mitigating factors have been taken into
consideration but the said aspect is dependent on the facts of         D
each case. As the trend of authorities would show, the
proficiency in professional driving is emphasized upon and
deviation therefrom that results in rash and negligent driving
and causes accident has been condemned. In a motor accident,
when a number of people sustain injuries and a death occurs,           E
it creates a stir in the society; sense of fear prevails all around.
The negligence of one shatters the tranquility of the collective.
When such an accident occurs, it has the effect potentiality of
making victims in many a layer and creating a concavity in the
social fabric. The agony and anguish of the affected persons,          F
both direct and vicarious, can have nightmarish effect. It has
its impact on the society and the impact is felt more when
accidents take place quite often because of rash driving by
drunken, negligent or, for that matter, adventurous drivers who
have, in a way, no concern for others. Be it noted, grant of           G
compensation under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 is in a different sphere altogether. Grant of compensation
under Section 357(3) with a direction that the same should be
paid to the person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason
of the act for which the accused has been sentenced has a              H
    206       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A   different contour and the same is not to be regarded as a
    substitute in all circumstances for adequate sentence.

       27. Recently, this Court in Rattiram & Ors. v. State of M.P.
  Through Inspector of Police 12, though in a different context,
  has stated that criminal jurisprudence, with the passage of time,
8
  has laid emphasis on victimology which fundamentally is a
  perception of a trial from the view point of the criminal as well
  as the victim. Both are viewed in the social context. The view
  of the victim is given due regard and respect in certain
C countries. It is the duty of the court to see that the victim's right
  is protected.

         28. We may note with profit that an appropriate
    punishment works as an eye-opener for the persons who are
    not careful while driving vehicles on the road and exhibit a
D . careless attitude possibly harbouring the notion that they would
    be shown indulgence or lives of others are like "flies to the
    wanton boys''. They totally forget that the lives of many are in
    their hands, and the sublimity of safety of a human being is
    given an indecent burial by their rash and negligent act.
E
         29. There can hardly be any cavil that there has to be a
    proportion between the crime and the punishment. It is the duty
    of the court to see that appropriate sentence is imposed regard
    being had to the commission of the crime and its impact on
F   the social order. The cry of the collective for justice which
    includes adequate punishment cannot be lightly ignored. In
    Siriya alias Shri Lal v. State of M. P13 ., it has been held as
    follows: -

          "Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity
G         must be the object of law which must be achieved by
          imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a
          corner-stone of the edifice of "order" should meet the

    12. AIR 2012 sew 1112.
H   13. AIR 2008 SC 2314.
GURU BASAVARAJ @ BEENE SETTAPPA v. STATE 207
      OF KARNATAKA [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
    challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his "Law          A
    in Changing Society" stated that, "State of criminal law
    continues to be - as it should be - a decisive reflection of
    social consciousness of society". Therefore, in operating
    the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective
    machinery or the deterrence based on factual matrix. By           B
    deft modulation sentencing process be stern where it
    should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to
    be."

     30. In view of the aforesaid, we have to weigh whether the
submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant          C
as regards the mitigating factors deserves acceptance.
Compassion is being sought on the ground of young age and
mercy is being invoked on the foundation of solemnization of
marriage. The date of occurrence is in the month of March,
2006. The scars on the collective cannot be said to have been         D
forgotten. Weighing the individual difficulty as against the social
order, collective conscience and the duty of the Court, we are
disposed to think that the substantive sentence affirmed by the
High Court does not warrant any interference and, accordingly,
we concur with the same.                                              E

     31. Consequently, the appeal, being devoid of any
substance, stands dismissed.

K.K.T.                                       Appeal dismissed.