Supreme Court of India
GURPAL SINGHversusHIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
- Citation
- 2012 INSC 544
- Decided
- 27 November 2012
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- S S NIJJAR
Holding
The suspension of the petitioner was wholly unjustified from the date the Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal (27 September 2005), entitling him to full salary, allowances and notional promotion from that date.
Summary
Gurpal Singh, a Judicial Magistrate First Class in Rajasthan, was suspended on 20 December 1985 after being arrested in connection with the murder of an advocate. He was acquitted by the trial court in May 2002 and the CBI's appeal was dismissed by the Delhi High Court on 27 September 2005, but his suspension continued for about 20 years while departmental proceedings were pending. The Rajasthan High Court treated the suspension period as service without salary, denying promotion, and the Supreme Court examined whether the suspension was wholly unjustified at various stages. The Court held that while the suspension could not be said wholly unjustified before the final criminal acquittal, it became wholly unjustified after the appeal was dismissed, and the petitioner was entitled to full salary, allowances and notional promotion from that date. Accordingly, the writ petition was partly allowed, directing the High Court to grant back pay with interest and to consider the petitioner for promotion.
Issues considered
- The legality of continuing the petitioner’s suspension after his acquittal by the trial court and after the dismissal of the CBI’s appeal.
- Whether the suspension period should be treated as service without salary or as full pay under Rule 54 of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951.
- The entitlement of the petitioner to promotion and consequential benefits despite the prolonged suspension.
- The scope of the disciplinary authority’s discretion to continue departmental proceedings after an employee’s criminal acquittal.
Legislation cited
- Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958s. Rule 13, s. Rule 16
- Rajasthan Service Ruless. Rule 54
Subjects
judicial officersuspensionacquittaldepartmental inquiryRule 54promotionback wagesservice lawArticle 32disciplinary proceedings
Judgment
[2012) 11 S.C.R. 126
A GURPAL SINGH
v.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 200 of 2006)
NOVEMBER 27, 2012.
B
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR AND H.L. GOKHALE, JJ.]
Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951:
c r. 54 - Salary and allowances for the period under
suspension - Judicial Officer faced criminal trial - Placed
under suspension pending trial and appeal - Acquittal -
Suspension continued during departmental proceedings after
dismissal of criminal appeal - Held: Suspension of petitioner
cannot be said to have been rendered wholly unjustified upon
0
acquittal by trial court and during pendency of appeal before
High Court - However, in view of findings of trial court and
High Court, petitioner's continued suspension after decision
in criminal appeal was wholly unjustified - Petitioner entitled
E to full pay and allowances from the date of decision in criminal
appeal - Charges in departmental proceedings having not
been proved and petitioner having been exonerated and the
period of suspension having been treated as period spent on
duty, he is entitled to be considered for promotion notionally
from the date when an officer junior to him was promoted and
F allowed all consequential benefits accordingly, with 6%
interest from the date of decision of criminal appeal - Service
law - Judicial officer - Suspension - Costs.
The petitioner, a Judicial Magistrate First Class in
G Rajasthan, was arrested on 20.12.1985, pursuant to a
complaint dated 11.12.1985 made by the wife of an
advocate who was found dead on 24.11.1985. She
alleged that her husband was asking the petitioner to
refund the money which he had taken to get the former
H 126
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 127
FOR RAJASTHAN
appointed as a member of Board of Revenue. By an order A
dated 22.12.1985, the petitioner was suspended w.e.f.
20.12.1985. The criminal trial, which had been transferred
to Delhi, culminated in acquittal of the petitioner on
1.5.2002. The appeal filed by CBI was also dismissed by
the Delhi High Court on 27.9.2005. During the pendency B
of the trial and the appeal, the petitioner remained under
suspension for about 20 years. When the petitioner came
to know that instead of revoking the suspension order,
the High Court was proposing to initiate disciplinary
proceedings against him, he filed the instant writ petition c
for revocation of the order of suspension and for
consequential benefits. In the Inquiry Report dated
27 .2.2008, the petitioner was exonerated of the charges,
and by order dated 26.3.2008, he was reinstated and was
given posting on 12.5.2008. On 30.6.2008, he retired from 0
service on attaining the age of superannuation.
On 24.1.2009, an order was issued by the High Court
to the effect that the period of suspension of the
petitioner would be treated on duty but without salary
except subsistence allowances already paid to him and E
he would not be entitled for any promotion. Consequent
upon the direction of the Supreme Court to pass
appropriate orders under Rule 54 of the Rajasthan
Service Rules, 1951, the High Court passed the order
dated 16.5.2011 stating that the period during which the F
petitioner remained under suspension could not be said
to be wholly unjustified under sub-r. (2) of r.54 and
reiterated its earlier order dated 24.1.2009.
Partly allowing the writ petition, the Court G
'
HELD: 1.1. In order to determine the issue relating to
the entitlement of the petitioner to the salary and other
allowances upon reinstatement, the matter needs to be
examined at the different stages/point of time. The first
H
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 11 S.C.R.
A stage commenced at the time when the petitioner was
initially suspended on 22.12.1985 w.e.f. 20.12.1985. The
petitioner cannot legitimately protest against his
suspension, at the initial stage, when he had remained
in police custody for more than forty eight hours, though
B unfortunately for circumstances for which he was not
responsible. This suspension was naturally continued
when he was facing the trial for murder.The next stage
is when he was acquitted by the trial court on 1.5.2002.
However, it cannot be said that as soon as the trial court
c had acquitted the petitioner, the Rajasthan High Court
was required to forthwith revoke the order of
suspension. Undoubtedly, the petitioner could have been
given a non-sensitive posting, not involving judicial
functions. But, it was not imperative for the High Court
to revoke the suspension, at that stage. It is a matter of
0
record, that the prosecution agency decided to file and,
in fact, filed an appeal which remained pending till it was
decided on 27 .9.2005. Therefore, the conclusions
recorded by the trial court, were not final. They were liable
E to be reversed in appeal by the High Court. Thus, during
the said period/stage, it cannot be said that the
continuance of the suspension of the petitioner was
wholly unjustified. The Rajasthan High Court was placed
in a very piquant situation till the petitioner's acquittal
was reiterated in the criminal appeal. The High Court had
F no option but to place and keep the petitioner under
suspension, The petitioner, who was on a very high
pedestal in society as a judicial officer, was facing a trial
for the offence of murder, a crime of highest moral
turpitude. Therefore, the decision of the High Court to
G continue the suspension of the petitioner can not be said
to be wholly unjustified till his acquittal in the criminal
appeal. [para 32-35] [151-C-F; 153-E-H; 154-A-B-D-E]
Daya Shankar Vs. High Court of Allahabad & Ors.
H Through Registrar & Ors.1987 (3) SCC 1; and C.
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 129
FOR RAJASTHAN
Ravichandran Iyer Vs. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee & Ors., A
1995 (3) Suppl. SCR 319 = 1995 (5) SCC 457 - referred to
1.2. As regards the stage after the dismissal of the
criminal appeal, the acquittal of the petitioner having been
affirmed, it was necessary for the High Court of Rajasthan 8
to take a decis.ion: (a) whether to revoke the order of
suspension and permit the petitioner to perform judicial
functions; (b) whether to hold a departmental enquiry
with regard to the alleged receipt of money by him from
the deceased; (c) as to how the period of suspension was C
to be treated; {d) whether the petitioner was entitled to
full salary, part salary or no salary at all for the period of
suspension. [para 39] [157-C-E]
1.3. It is significant to note that the judgment of the
trial court clearly indicates that the evidence produced D
does not reach even the bare minimum standard required
for establishing the guilt of the petitioner. It disbelieved
the very foundation of the prosecution case. The alleged
motive has been found to be without any basis.The trial
court categorically observed that in the peculiar E
circumstances of the case, the delay in registration of the
FIR was fatal to the case of the prosecution. The trial court
was left with a definite impression that the evidence had
been "doctored". It categorically observed that "the
investigation conducted smack of bias and prejudice under F
influence of certain elements inimically placed vis-a-vis the
accused". These observations would bring the instant
case within the realm of those cases which are often
described as cases of "no evidence". Further, the High
Court dismissed the appeal as having absolutely no G
merit, holding that the prosecution failed to prove, firstly,
that there was any murder and, secondly, that the
accused was the one who committed it. [para 33 and 38]
[152-F-G; 153-A-D; 157-C]
1.4. In view of the findings recorded by the trial court, H
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.(2012] 11 S.C.R.
A and reiterated by the High Court in criminal appeal, the
decision to continue the petitioner under suspension,
thereafter, was rather harsh. It is true that the suspension
of the petitioner was continued as the High Court had
decided to hold a departmental enquiry against the
B petitioner on the charges that he had wrongly extracted
certain money from the deceased. But it is a matter of
record that both the trial court as well as the High Court
had found the entire story with regard to the alleged
receipt of money to be false. The enquiry was founded
c on the same facts and the same evidence which have
had been examined by the trial court as well as the High
Court. In such circumstances, it was necessary for the
High Court to examine the findings of the trial court as
well as the High Court in detail before taking a decision
to initiate departmental proceedings against the
0
petitioner, founded on the same set of facts and the
evidence. It is apparent from the record that no such
examination of the judgment was undertaken by the High
Court. In the case of Corporation of the City of Nagpur, it is
E observed that it may not be expedient to continue a
departmental inquiry on the very same charges or
grounds or evidence, where the accused has been
acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the
charges. [para 27 and 40] [149-B; 157-E-H; 158-A-B]
F Corporation of the City of Nagpur, Civil Lines, Nagpur &
Anr. Vs. Ramchandra & Ors. 1981 (3) SCR 22 =1981 (2)
SCC 714; Commissioner of Police, New Delhi Vs. Narender
Singh, 2006 (3) SCR 872 = 2006 (4) sec 265; and Jasbir
Singh Vs. Punjab & Sind Bank & Ors. 2006 (8) Suppl.
G SCR 62 = 2007 (1) SCC 566 - referred to.
1.5. Even after taking a decision to initiate
departmental proceeding against the petitioner, it was no
longer imperative to continue the petitioner under
H suspension. The petitioner was no longer charged with
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 131
FOR RAJASTHAN
any criminal offence as both the trial court as well as the A
High Court had concluded that the charges against the
petitioner had been concocted. The petitioner had been
subjected to continued suspension since 22.12.1985.
During the period of departmental proceedings, even if
the petitioner was not to be assigned any judicial work, B
the High Court could have conveniently given him
suitable posting on the administrative side. In O.P. Gupta's
case, this Court emphasised that long, continued
suspension affects the government servant injuriously.
Since the order of suspension entitles the government c
employee only to "subsistence allowance", resulting in
penal consequences, it should not be lightly passed. The
court also emphasised that the expression "life" does not
merely connote animal existence or a continued drudgery
through life. [para 30 and 40] [150-E-G; 158-B-D]
D
O.P. Gupta Vs. Union of India & Ors. 1988 (1) SCR 27 =
1987 (4) sec 328 - relied on
1.6. Again it is a matter of record, that even in the
departmental enquiry the charges against the petitioner E
were not proved and he was exonerated of the same.
Thereafter the suspension of the petitioner was revoked
on 26.3.2008, but without giving any direction as to how
the period of suspension was to be treated. It was only ·
subsequently that the matter with regard to regularization F
of his period of suspension was considered by the Full
Court in the meeting held on 29.11.2008 and a resolution
was passed that the period of suspension shall be treated
as period spent on duty, but without salary except for the
subsistence allowance already paid. On the basis of the G
said resolution, the High Court passed the order dated
24.1.2009. So even by order dated 24.1.2009, the petitioner
was granted only part relief. [para 41] [158-E-F-H; 159-A]
1.7. This Court is of the considered opinion, having
regard to the sequence of events, that it would be unjust H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 11 S.C.R.
A to deny the salary to the petitioner with effect from the
date the appeal against acquittal was dismissed by the
High Court of Delhi. Whilst exercising the jurisdiction
under Rule 54, it was necessary for the High Court to
pass a detailed and reasoned order as to whether the
B period of suspension was wholly unjustified. Undoubtedly,
the power under Rule 54 is discretionary but such
discretion has to be exercised reasonably and by taking
into consideration the material relevant to the decision.
Upon acquittal of the petitioner from the criminal charges,
C it was no longer necessary to keep him under
suspension during the pendency of the departmental
enquiry. The High Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction
properly under Rule 54, as directed by this Court in the
order dated 5.4.2011. The suspension of the petitioner
ought to have been revoked upon acquittal by the High
0
Court even during the pendency of the departmental
enquiry. [para 42] [159-C-G]
1.8. In the circumstances, from the time of dismissal
of the appeal by the Delhi High Court, the continued
E suspension of the petitioner was wholly unjustified. The
petitioner is, therefore, entitled to full pay and allowances
from 27.9.2005, i.e. the date of the judgment rendered by
the Delhi High Court onwards. [para 40 and 46] [158-D;
160-H; 161-A]
F
2.1. It is a matter of record that upon exoneration in
the departmental enquiry, the petitioner was reinstated in
service. No punishment was inflicted on him at all.
However, during the pendency of the criminal trial as also
the departmental proceedings, he was not considered for
G promotion, when the cases of persons junior to him were
considered. The High Court erred in directing in the Full
Court , Resolution dated 29.11.2008, and the
communication dated 24.1.2009 that the petitioner shall
not be entitled to any promotion. The petitioner was
H
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 133
FOR RAJASTHAN
entitled to be considered for promotion notionally from A
the date when an officer junior to him was promoted. The
High Court, is, therefore, directed to consider the case of
the petitioner for promotion (if he otherwise satisfies the
requirements as per the rules) from the date when a
person junior to him was considered and promoted to the B
next higher post. The petitioner would be entitled to all
consequential benefits, such as salary and other
allowances by treating him on duty with effect from the
date the appeal against acquittal was dismissed by the
Delhi High Court and after fixing his last pay drawn c
correctly. The consequential benefits shall be paid to him
with 6% interest from the date of dismissal of the appeal
by the High Court on 27.9.2005. [para 45-46] [160-D-F;
161-A-D]
Union of India & Ors. Vs. K. V. Jankiraman & Ors. 1991, D
(3) SCR 790 = 1991 (4) sec 109 - relied on
Shri Manni Lal Vs. Shri Parmai Lal & Ors. 1971 (1) SCR
=
798 1970 (2) SCC 462 , Muhammad Ayoob Khuhro Vs.
Emperor AIR (33) 1946 SINO 121, Robert Stuart Wauchope E
Vs. Emperor (1933) 61 ILR 168, Vidya Charan Shukla Vs.
=
Purshottam Lal Kaushik 1981 (2) SCR 637 1981 (2) SCC
84, R.P. Kapur Vs. Union of India & Anr. (1964) 5 SCR 431,;
The Divisional Superintendent, Northern Railway & Anr. Vs.
R.B. Hanifi (1976) Lab. l.C. 1403, Govind Prasad Vs. Union F
of India, (1980) RLW 258;, Union of India & Ors. Vs. Sangram
=
Keshari Nayak 2007 (5) SCR 896 2007 (6) SCC 704;
Sulekh Chand & Salek Chand Vs. Commissioner of Police
=
& Ors. 1994 (4) Suppl. SCR 119 1994 (3) Suppl.
SCC 674, State of Kera/a & Ors. Vs. E.K. Bhaskaran Pillai G
=
2007 (5) SCR 251 2007 (6) sec 524, Union of India & Ors.
Vs. Lt. Gen. Rajendra Singh Kadyan & Anr. 2000 (1) Suppl.
=
SCR 722 2000 (6) SCC 698; Management of Reserve
Bank of India, New Delhi Vs. Bhopal Singh Panchal 1993 (3)
=
Suppl. SCR 586 1994 (1) SCC 541; Krishnakant H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.
A Raghunath Bibhavnekar Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.
=
1997 (2) SCR 591 1997 (3) SCC 636; K. Ponnamma (Smt.)
Vs. State of Kera/a & Ors. 1997 (2) SCR 1149 1997 (9)=
SCC 36; Dhananjay Vs. Chief Executive Officer, Zilla
=
Parishad, Jalna 2003 (1) SCR 744 2003 (2) SCC 386 ,
B Union of India & Ors. Vs. Jaipal Singh 2003 (5) Suppl.
=
SCR 115 2004 (1) SCC 121, Baldev Singh Vs. Union of
India & Ors. 2005 ('J) Suppl. SCR 961 = 2005 (8) SCC 747;
N. Selvaraj Vs. Kumbakonam City Union Bank Ltd. & Anr.
2006 (9) SCC 172, Banshi Dhar Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr.
=
C 2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 78 2007 (1) SC£ 324, Divisional
Control/er, Gujarat SRTC Vs. Kadarbhai J. Suthar 2007 (2)
SCR 550 = 2007 (10) SCC 561, Union of India Vs. B.M. Jha.
=
2001 (11) scR 661 2001 (11) sec 632 - cited
Case Law Reference:
D
1971 (1) SCR 798 cited para 20
AIR (33) 1946 SINO 121 cited para 20
(1933) 61 ILR 168 cited para 20
E (1976) Lab. l.C. 1403 cited para 20
(1980) RLW 258 cited para 20
1981 (2) SCR 637 cited para 20
F 1988 (1) SCR 27 relied on para 20
(1964) 5 SCR 431 cited para 20
2006 (3) SCR 872 referred to para 20
1981 (3) SCR 22 referred to para 20
G
2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 62 referred to para 20
1991 (3) SCR 790 relied on para 20
2007 (5) SCR 896 cited para 20
H
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 135
FOR RAJASTHAN
1994 (4) Suppl. SCR 119 cited para 20 A
2007 (5) SCR 251 cited para 20
2000 (1) Suppl. SCR 722 cited para 20
1993 (3) Suppl. SCR 586 cited para 24 B
1997 (2) SCR 591 cited para 24
1997 (2) SCR 1149 cited para 24
2003 (1) SCR 744 cited para 24
c
2003 (5) Suppl. SCR 115 cited para 24
2005 (4) Suppl. SCR 961 cited para 24
/
2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 78 cited para 24
2007 (2) SCR 550 cited para 24 D
2007 (11) SCR 661 cited para 24 ·
1987 (3) sec 1 cited para 36
1995 (3) Suppl. SCR 319 cited para 36 E
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No.
200 of 2006.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
F
M.R. Calla, Amit Kumar Singh, P.O. Sharma for the
Petitioner. .
Pa11av Shishodia, Annesh Mittal (for Sunil Kumar Jain) for
the Respondent.
G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. 1. In this petition, under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks a writ
in the nature of Certiorari for quashing the order of suspension H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 11 S.C.R.
A dated 20th December, 1985 by declaring the same to be void-
ab-initio. The petitioner also claims a declaration that the order
dated 24th January, 2009 is void and that the petitioner is
entitled to all benefits for the period of suspension from 20th
December, 1985 till 26th March, 2008, when he was reinstated
B in service.
2. We may briefly advert to the relevant facts on the basis
of which the petitioner claims the aforesaid relief.
3. On 28th December, 1979, the petitioner was selected
C by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (R.P.S.C.) for the
post of Assistant Public Prosecutor Grade II. He served on the
said post till 28th July, 1980. On the very next day, i.e. 29th July,
1980, he was selected for appointment to the Rajasthan
Judicial Service and joined as Judicial Magistrate First Class.
D For sometime, he remained posted at Banswara as Judicial
Magistrate. During this period, his judgments were graded as
above average and integrity as "beyond doubf'. In the inspection
report, it was further remarked that "his behaviour with
members of the Bar, litigants and the persons coming • to the
E Court needs improvement". It appears that he was not on best
of terms with the local Bar, which led to his transfer.
4. On 24th November, 1985, at about 10.30 p.m., a dead
body was found near Ajmer Pulia on the railway track in the city
of Jaipur. The dead body was identified as that of one Mr.
F Suresh Chand Gupta, Advocate. A 'Marag' (death) e;ase was
registered on 24th November, 1985, at Serial No. 35/85 at
Police Station GRP, Jaipur. It appears that the local bar
association of which the deceased was a member protested
that proper investigation was not being conducted about the
G manner in which Mr. Suresh Chand Gupta was found dead on
the railway track. The members of the Bar Association insisted
that his death was result of some foul play. On 11th December,
1985, that is about 20 days after the incident, wife of the
deceased gave a written complaint, alleging that the Petitioner
H
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 137
FOR RAJASTHAN [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
was involved in the murder of her husband. In her written A
complaint, she alleged that her husband had informed her
about three months prior to the incident that the petitioner had
demanded a sum of Rs.1 lac for exercising his influence with
the high-ups, in securing the appointment of the deceased as
a member of Board of Revenue. She claimed that the money B
which was paid to the petitioner was arranged by her deceased
husband by selling a plot of land. He had also borrowed money
from her father and other relatives. lnspite of having paid the
aforesaid money, her husband was not provided any
appointment. Consequently, her husband had been insisting c
that the petitioner return the amount unnecessarily paid to him.
She claimed that the petitioner had agreed to return the money
and asked her husband to meet at a pre-arranged place. Her
husband left home at 5.00 p.m. on 24th November, 1985 and
did not return. She, therefore, concluded that the petitioner must D
have killed her husband on account of the dispute over money.
5. Upon coming to know about the complaint made by the
wife of the deceased, the petitioner himself went to the Police
Station on 18th December, 1985 and offered to join the
investigation. He requested the police to complete the E
investigation as soon as possible, as in the meantime, he has ·
been transferred and had to join at Vallabhnagar. In the
meantime, the local bar association continued the agitation
against the inaction of the police. The lawyers resorted to strike
and the work at the Courts was paralysed for many days to F
come. The situation was so grave that when the application of
the petitioner for anticipatory bail came up for hearing before
the High Court on 20th December, 1985, members of the Bar
Association did not allow the advocate of the petitioner to argue
the case. The petitioner relies on the order passed by M.B. G
Sharma, J. on 20th December, 1985, which is as under:-
"20.12.1985
Mr. M.I. Khan, Public Prosecutor for the State.
H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 11 S.C.R.
A The bail application was fixed for orders at 2.00 p.m.
and the Public Prosecutor had sought time to get the case
diary from the Investigating Officer. I am in the court for last
15 minutes, but the entry to the Court has been blocked
by the advocates and others. It is for the members of the
B August profession to consider how far it is justified. The
advocate for the petitioner could not come to the court
because of that blockade. Hence the case cannot be
taken up. I have no option but to retire to the Chamber. The
case is adjourned to January 2, 1986.
c Sd/- Sharma, M.B."
6. Thereafter, the High Court was closed for winter break
on 21st December, 1985. On 20th December, 1985, the
petitioner was formally arrested and taken into custody by the
D police (CBI, Jaipur). He was placed under suspension on 22nd
December, 1985 w.e.f. 20th December, 1985. Since the
petitioner had already been arrested, the anticipatory bail
application was dismissed as having become infructuous on.
2nd January, 1986. In view of the volatile atmosphere, the
E petitioner apprehended that he would not get a fair trial in the
Criminal Case No. 3/86 pending before the Sessions Judge,
Jaipur against him. He, therefore, approached this Court with
a prayer for transfer of the criminal trial. By Order dated 4th
August, 1986, this Court transferred the trial in the aforesaid
F criminal case to a Court of competent jurisdiction in Delhi.
Thereafter, the trial was duly conducted at Delhi. By judgment
and order dated 1st May, 2002, the petitioner was acquitted
by the Additional Session Judge, Delhi.
7. Upon acquittal by the trial court, the petitioner submitted
G a joining report on 6th May, 2002 to the Registrar General,
Rajasthan High Court. The request made by the petitioner
remained under consideration of the High Court from the said
date. The decision was deferred to await the result of the
appeal, if any, preferred against the acquittal of the petitioner.
H It appears that an appeal was filed by the CBI, which, however,
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 139
FOR RAJASTHAN [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR. J.)
came to be dismissed by a Division Bench of the Delhi High A
Court on 27th September, 2005.
8. The petitioner submitted his joining report on 3rd
October, 2005. However, no action was taken by the High Court.
It was only on 17th November, 2005 that he was directed to B
mark his attendance at the office of the District and Session
Judge, Jaipur. By this time, the petitioner had been under
suspension for a period of 20 years. He, therefore, submitted
another representation on 2nd March, 2006 setting out the
grievances and seeking permission to appear in person before C
the Chief Justice.
9. In the meantime, the petitioner came to know that
instead of revoking the order of suspension, the High Court may
initiate disciplinary proceedings against him. At that stage, the
petitioner was only about 2 years short of the age of D
superannuation. He, therefore, moved the present Writ Petition,
seeking immediate revocation of the order of suspension and
consequential benefits. On 8th May, 2006, it was brought to the
notice of this Court that after filing of the writ petition, the High
Court has initiated the departmental proceedings against the E
petitioner, but no fresh order of suspension has been passed.
It was, therefore, submitted that direction be issued to the High
Court to reinstate the petitioner forthwith. This Court issued
notice on the Writ Petition and also on the application for ex-
parte stay. Subsequently, the matter came up for hearing on F
25th January, 2007 when this Court directed that the matter be
posted for final disposal in the last week of March, 2007. On
4th January, 2008, it WqS submitted on behalf of the respondent
that the enquiry proceedings were in progress against the
petitioner. Therefore, this Court directed the High Court to G
complete the enquiry within a period of eight weeks and submit
its report.
10. The enquiry was duly completed. In the Enquiry Report
dated 27th February, 2008, the petitioner was exonerated of
the charges levelled against him. It was only at that stage, that H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.
A he was reinstated with immediate effect, by order dated 26th
March, 2008. The orders passed by the respondent were
placed on the record of these proceedings with the affidavit
dated 22nd April, 2008 filed by the Registrar (Writs). The
petitioner was, thereafter, given the posting order at Vijai Nagar
B on 12th May, 2008. He retired from service on attaining the age
of superannuation on 30th June, 2008.
11. II appears that the trials and tribulations of the petitioner
did not come to an end, even after retirement. In fact on 24th
January, 2009, an order was issued on the basis of the
C resolution passed by the Full Court in its meeting held on 29th
November, 2008, wherein it was resolved as under:-
"RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT, JODHPUR
D ORDER
No. Est!. (RJS) 15/2009 Date :- 24.01.2009
WHEREAS SHRI GURPAL SINGH, RJS presently
retired was placed under suspension vide this office Order
E No. Est!. (RJS) 199/85 dated 22.12.1985.
AND WHEREAS it was decided that regular
disciplinary proceedings under rule 16 of the Rajasthan
Civil Service (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958
be initiated against Shri Gurpal Singh, RJS presently
F
retired.
AND WHEREAS Hon'ble the Chief Justice in
exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 13 of the
Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control & Appeal)
G Rules, 1958 read with Full Court Resolution dated October
30, 1971 was pleased to order that on account of initiation
of a regular enquiry under rule 16 of Rajasthan Civil
Service (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 the
suspension of Shri Gurpal Singh shall continue.
H
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 141
FOR RAJASTHAN [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR,. J.]
AND WHEREAS Departmental Enquiry under rule A
16 of the Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control
and Appeal) Rules, 1958 was initiated against said Shri
Gurpal Singh vide Memorandum No. Estt. B2(iii) / /2006/
1544 dated 20.04.2006.
B
AND WHERAS in the above departmental enquiry
said Shri Gurpal Singh has been exonerated vide order
No. Est!. (RJS) 25/2008 dated 26.03.2008.
AND WHEREAS, Shri Gurpal Singh has been
reinstated with immediate effect as Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) C
& Judicial Magistrate in the RJS vide order No. Estt. (RJS)
26/2008 dated 26.03.2008.
AND WHEREAS the matter regarding regularization
of suspension period of Shri Gurpal Singh was considered D
by the Hon'ble Full Court in its meeting held on 29.11.2008
and it was resolved as under:-
"Perused office note and relevant record.
RESOLVED that period of his suspension shall be treated
as a period spent on duty, but without salary except E
subsistence allowances already paid to him. However, this
will not effect (sic) his pensionary benefits but he will not
be entitled for any promotion."
NOW THEREFORE, the period of his suspension F
shall be treated as a period spent on duty, but without
salary except subsistence allowances already paid to him.
However, this will not effect (sic) his pensionary benefits
but he will not be entitled for any promotion.
BY ORDER G
Sd/ 24.01.2009
REGISTRAR (ADMN.)"
12. The petitioner, therefore, sought amendment of the writ
petition through I.A. No. 6 of 2009. The aforesaid application H
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 11 S.C.R.
A for amendment was allowed by this Court on 27th February,
2009. After the amendment, the counter affidavit was filed by
the respondents to the amended writ petition. The matter was
heard by this Court on a number of occasions. On 5th April,
2011, this Court passed the following order:-
B
"Having regard to the facts of the case, this Court is of the
opinion that interest of justice would be served if the High
Court is given an opportunity to pass appropriate orders
undef Rufe 54 of the Rules. Therefore, the matter is
remitted to the High Court on its administrative side to pass
c appropriate orders under Rule 54. The High Court shall
issue notice to the petitioner and afford him an opportunity
of hearing by calling upon him to file reply to the notice.
The High Court shall thereafter consider the reply and pass
a reasoned order under Rule 54 of the Rules of 1951. This
D exercise shall be completed as early as possible and
without any avoidable delay but in any case not later than
six weeks from today. The High Court to file the order which
may be passed by it in the present proceedings."
E 13. Pursuant to the aforesaid direction, it appears that a
Committee was constituted by the Rajasthan High Court
(hereinafter referred to as 'Committee') to examine the case
of the petitioner, in terms of Rule 54 of the Rajasthan Service
Rules, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as "1951 Rules") for
F determining "whether his suspension was wholly justified or
wholly unjustified or partly justified and to what extent, he was
entitled for salary and/or full salary during period of
suspension?"
14. In this respect, a notice dated 25th April, 2011 was
G sent to the petitioner by the Registrar (Admn.), directing him to
file a reply, and remain present before the aforesaid Committee
on 5th May, 2011. In response to the said notice, the petitioner
submitted a detailed reply dated 2nd May, 2011 and appeared
before the Committee on 5th May, 2011. Thereafter on 16th
H May, 2011, the Committee passed the following order:
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 143
FOR RAJASTHAN [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.)
"THEREFORE, in the present facts & circumstances A
(Supra), period during which Shri Gurpal Singh remained
under Suspension cannot be said to be wholly unjustified
and sub-rule (2) of R. 54 of RSR in negative form where
the authority has to examine as to whether suspension was
wholly unjustified. However, after going through complete B
material on record (supra), the Court is of the view that in
the given facts & circumstances (supra), suspension of
Shri Gurpal Singh cannot be said to be wholly unjustified
and what he was entitled for under law has been paid to
him in terms of Resolution of Full Court dt.29.11.2008 c
(supra) conveyed vide order di. 24.01.2009."
15. It becomes clear from the perusal of the aforesaid
order that the Rajasthan High Court after giving an opportunity
of hearing to the petitioner, reiterated the Resolution of the Full
Court dated 29th November, 2008, communicated vide order D
dated 24th January, 2009.
16. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at
length.
E
17. Very elaborate submissions have been made by the
learned counsel for the parties. We may, however, briefty notice
the very crux of the submissions .
• 18. Mr. M.R. Calla, learned senior counsel appearing for
the petitioner, submitted that the respondent has to justify the F
suspension order on the day it was passed, i.e. on 20th
December, 1985. Further, since the suspension of the petitioner
had continued for 22 years, 3 months and 7 days, the
respondent would have to satisfy the court that such a prolong
suspension was also justified. Whether or not the order of G
suspension was justified, partly justified or wholly unjustified
would have to be seen in the light of result of not only the trial
in criminal case but also ofihe departmental enquiry where the
petitioner was proceeded against by the department.
According to the learned senior counsel, whilst taking a H
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.
A decision under Rule 54 of the 1951 Rules, the disciplinary
authority was required to keep in mind the outcome of the
criminal trial and the departmental proceeding.
19. Relying on some judgments of this Court, Mr. Calla had
B submitted that an employee who is suspended due to the
pendency of the criminal investigation/trial has to be reinstated
upon acquittal. Further upon reinstatement, he would be entitled
to full salary and allowances for the period he is kept under
suspension. According to the learned senior counsel, an
C acquittal either by trial court or by the appellate court would
relate back to the date on which the order of suspension was
passed. Mr. Calla then submitted that in the facts of this case,
the petitioner was suspended due to the registration of the
criminal case against him. At the time when the petitioner was
acquitted he was entitled to be reinstated. However, since an
D appeal was filed against the acquittal by the CBI, the petitioner
was neither reinstated nor his suspension was revoked. Even
when the aforesaid appeal was dismissed by the High Court,
the request of the petitioner for reinstatement was not
considered. This, according to Mr. Calla, was a second stage
E when the appellant was entitled to reinstatement and to the
payment of full salary and allowances. Mr. Calla further pointed
out that even after acquittal, the appellant was unjustly subjected
to a departmental enquiry. The charges in the departmental
enquiry were based on the facts, which were alleged to be 1he
F motive for the murder. Since the petitioner was acquitted in the
criminal trial, the departmental proceedings against him were
wholly unjustified. Therefore, according to Mr. Calla, the
continuation of suspension was also wholly unjustified.
G 20. Even at this stage, the respondent did not pass any
order under Rule 54 of the 1951 Rules. It was only on the
directions issued by this Court on 5th April, 2011 that the
respondent examined the case under Rule 54 and passed the
necessary order on 16th May, 2011. It was also submitted that
H the order passed on the directions of this Court on 16th May,
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 145
FOR RAJASTHAN [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.)
2011 is contrary to the order passed by the High Court on 24th A
January, 2009. The latter order was passed after the petitioner
was reinstated in service on 26th May, 2008, regarding
regularization of the suspension period of the petitioner; In the
order passed under Rule 54, the High Court had concluded that
the period during which the appellant was kept under B
suspension shall be treated as a period spent on duty, but
without salary except subsistence allowance already paid to
him. Even this order was passed during the pendency of the
present petition. Mr. Calla then submitted that not only the
petitioner has been deprived of full pay and allowances during c
the period of suspension, but even his case for promotion was
not considered with effect from the date a person junior to him
was considered for promotion and promoted.
In support of his submission, Mr. Calla had relied on a
number of judgments which are as under : D
Shri Manni Lal Vs. Shri Parmai Lal & Ors., 1 Muhammad
Ayoob Khuhro Vs. Emperor"· Robert Stuart Wauchope Vs.
Emperor, Vidya Charan Shukla Vs. Purshottam Lal Kaushik"
O.P. Gupta Vs. Union of India & Ors., 5 R.P. Kapur Vs. Union E
of India & Anr. 6 , Commissioner of Police, New Delhi Vs.
Narender Singh 7 , Corporation of the City of Nagpur, Civil
Lines, Nagpur & Anr. Vs. Ramchandra & Ors. 8, Jasbir Singh
Vs. Punjab & Sind Bank & Ors. 9 , The Divisional
Superintendent, Northern Railway & Anr. Vs. R.B. Hanif110, F
1. (1970) 2 sec 462.
2. AIR (33) 1946 SINO 121.
3. (1933) 61 ILR 168.
4. (1981) 2 sec 84.
5. (1987) 4 sec 328. G
6. (1964) 5 SCR 431.
7. c2oosi 4 sec 265.
8. (1981) 2 sec 714.
9. c2001i 1 sec 566.
10. (1976) Lab. l.C. 1403.
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.
A Govind Prasad Vs. Union of India", Union of India & Ors. Vs.
K. V. Jankiraman & Ors. 12, Union of India & Ors. Vs. Sangram
Keshari Nayak 13 , Sulekh Chand & Salek Chand Vs.
Commissioner of Police & Ors. 14, State of Kera/a & Ors. Vs.
E.K. Bhaskaran Pil/ai" 5, Union of India & Ors. Vs. Lt. Gen.
B Rajendra Singh Kadyan & Anr16•
21. Mr. Pallav Shishodia, learned senior counsel on behalf
of Respondent No.1, sought dismissal of the present writ
petition, inter-alia, on the ground of delay. It was pointed out
C that there is a delay of more than 20 years in challenging the
order of suspension dated 20th December, 1985. The learned
senior counsel, in response to submissions of Mr. Calla,
submitted that the initial suspension of the petitioner and further
continuation of the same, during the criminal trial; during
pendency of the appeal against acquittal; and during the
D pendency of the departmental enquiry; was not "only justified,
but imperative," in the view of "sensitive nature of judicial work"
which was being undertaken by him. It was also submitted that
since it is never possible to anticipate the outcome of a criminal
trial or disciplinary proceedings which may eventually lead to
E acquittal or exoneration, as the case may be, suspension of the
• petitioner cannot be termed as "wholly unjustified". In addition,
Mr. Shishodia pointed out that the petitioner was acquitted by
the trial court on "benefit of doubt". Further, dismissal of the
appeal against acquittal does not in any manner affect the legal
F position.
22. It had also been pointed out by Mr. Shishodia that since
there is no allegation of suspension being "mala-fide, vindictive
or otherwise motivated", there remains no reason to interfere
G 11. (1980) RLW 258
12. (1991) 4 sec 100.
13. c2001) 6 sec 704.
14. 1994 Supp (3) sec 674.
15. c2007) 6 sec 524.
H 16. (2000) 6 sec 698.
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 147
FOR RAJASTHAN [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
with the impugned order dated 24th January, 2009, as affirmed A
by the order dated 16th May, 2011. The learned senior counsel
had also submitted that there is no challenge to the order dated
16th May, 2011 in the present writ petition, nor the petitioner
had made a submission that his prosecution by the CBI was
malicious or otherwise vitiated. In the light of aforesaid B
submissions, it was contended that suspension pending
criminal proceedings and/or departmental enquiry was fully
justified. Mr. Shishodia has also argued that the order denying
full pay to the petitioner was passed by the High Court, in
bonafide exercise of its powers and on the basis of well settled c
interpretation of Rule 54 of the 1951 Rules.
23. The learned senior counsel, relying upon a number of
judgments of this Court, had further contended that matters
relating to the grant of salary, promotions and other benefits to
an employee during the period of his suspension are subject D
' to the discretion of the employer. The employer has to strike a
balance between the rights of the employee and the
imperatives of an institution. He submitted that the High Court,
acting in a fair, objective and reasonable manner, has drawn
the line so as to avoid any disproportionate penalty. It has struck E
a balance between the entitlement of the petitioner and
imperatives of the institution charged with public duty of
administration of justice.
24. The learned counsel had further submitted that F
whatever amount was legally due to the petitioner has already
been paid to him. It had been stated that Rupees Twelve Lac
Seventy Three Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Two Only, i.e.
Rs. 12,73,842/-, have been paid to the petitioner under various
heads, like dearness allowance, subsistence allowance, etc. G
Also, the petitioner gets a monthly pension to the tune of
Rupees Twenty Two Thousand Three Hundred Eighty Five
Only, i.e. Rs. 22,385/-.
The counsel relied upon the following judgments to
substantiate his contentions: H
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 11 S.C.R.
A Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi Vs.
Bhopal Singh Pancha/1 7 , Krishnakant Raghunath
Bibhavnekar Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 18 , K.
Ponnamma (Smt.) Vs. State of Kera/a & Ors. 1•, Dhananjay
Vs. Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Ja/na 20, Union of
B India & Ors. Vs. Jaipa/ Singh 21, Baldev Singh Vs. Union of
India & Ors. 22, N. Selvaraj Vs. Kumbakonam City Union Bank
Ltd. & Anr. 23, Banshi Dhar Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. 24,
Divisional Controller, Gujarat SRTC Vs. Kadarbhai J.
Suthar25, Union of India Vs. B. M. Jha 26.
c 25. We have considered the submissions made by the
learned senior counsel for the parties.
26. The only issue that needs to be resolved at this stage
is as to whether the petitioner would be entitled only to the
D subsistence allowance as already paid to him or full salary and
allowances, in view of his acquittal in the criminal case and the
exoneration in departmental proceedings. Related to the
aforesaid issue would be a consequential issue of notional
promotion from the date an officer junior to him was promoted
E in the Rajasthan Judicial Service and the consequential
entitlement to the emoluments on the promotional post, which
in tum would determine the amount of suspension allowance
and the other retiral benefits.
27. In our opinion, it is not really necessary to notice the
F
11. (1994) 1 sec 541.
1s. (1997) 3 sec 636.
19. (1997) 9 sec 36.
20. (2003) 2 sec 386.
G 21. (2004) 1 sec 121.
22. (2005) s sec 747.
23. (2007) 9 sec 112.
24. (2007) 1 sec 324.
25. (2007) 10 sec 561.
H 26. (2007) 11 sec. 632.
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 149
FOR RAJASTHAN [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
ratio in each of the judgments cited, as all of them reiterate A
certain well known principles of law. We may, however, notice
some of the principles highlighted in the judgments cited by the
learned counsel. In the case of Corporation of the City of
· Nagpur (supra), it is observed that it may not be expedient to
continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or B
grounds or evidence, where the accused has been acquitted
honourably and completely exonerated of the charges. At the
same time, it is pointed out that merely because the accused
is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue
the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor is its discretion c
in any way fettered.
28. The same principle is reiterated in the case of
Commissioner of Police, New Delhi Vs. Narender Singh
(supra).
D
29. In Jasbir Singh's case (supra), the appellant was a
confirmed peon in the respondent Bank. On an allegation that
he had forged the signature of a depositor R and fraudulently
withdrawn a certain sum, a departmental proceeding was
initiated against him. A criminal case was also initiated E
simultaneously under Sections 409/201 IPC. He was acquitted
in the criminal case. However, despite acquittal, the
departmental proceedings continued and ultimately ended in
an ex parte report to the effect that the charges had been
proved. The respondent Bank also filed a suit against the F
appellant for recovery of the said sum. The suit was decreed
but the appellate court held that the Bank failed to prove that
the appellant had withdrawn or embezzled the said sum. It was
held that the Bank was not entitled to recover the said amount.
That judgment was not challenged. Thus, the same attained G
finality. However, the writ petition filed by the appellant,
challenging the disciplinary proceedings and the order of
punishment was dismissed by the Punjab and Haryana High
Court. Without taking note of the decision of civil court and
relying on a provision of the Bipartite Settlement, the High Court H
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.
A held that the departmental proceedings could have been
initiated even after the judgment of acquittal in the criminal case.
The appellant employee then filed an appeal in this Court.
Allowing the appeal, this Court held that the respondent
B Bank invited findings of a competent civil court on the issue as
to whether the appellant had committed any embezzlement or
not. Embezzlement of fund was the principal charge against the
appellant in all the proceedings. The respondent Bank failed
to prove any of the charges before any court of law. The
C judgment in civil matter having attained finality, was binding on
the respondent Bank.
It was further observed that in a case of this nature, the High
Court should have applied its mind to the facts of the matter
with reference to the materials brought on record. It failed to
D do so and did not take note of the decision of the civil court. It
could not have refused to look into the materials on record.
Therefore, the impugned judgment was set aside.
30. In O.P. Gupta's case (supra), this Court emphasised
E the principle that any order which would cause adverse civil
consequences, can only be passed upon observance of the
rules of Natural Justice. There is, therefore, insistence upon
requirement of a "fair hearing". It was also emphasised that
long, continued suspension affects the government servant
F injuriously. Since the order of suspension entitles the
government employee only to "subsistence allowance", resulting
in penal consequences, it should not be lightly passed. The
court also emphasised that the expression "life" does not merely
connote animal existence or a continued drudgery through life.
These are all well known principles of law. We only make a
G reference to the same, since the cases have been cited.
31. Similarly the judgments cited by Mr. Shishodia reiterate
the principle that "no hard and fast rule" can be laid down as
to whether on reinstatement the employee is entitled to full back
H wages or no back wages at all. All the cases reiterate the
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 151
FOR RAJASTHAN [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
principle that the facts and circumstances of each case have A
to be examined by the concerned authority. It has to take an
informed decision on the basis of the material on record. These
judgments also reiterate that acquittal of an employee would
not automatically entitle him to reinstatement or to payment of
. full back wages. The power is normally vested with the B
disciplinary authority to hold a departmental enquiry, even upon
conclusion of the criminal trial where the employee is acquitted.
32. We have examined the entire issue keeping the
aforesaid principles in mind. In order to determine the issue C
relating to the entitlement of petitioner to the salary and other
allowance(s) upon reinstatement, the matter needs to be
examined at the different stages/point of time. The first stage
commenced at the time when the petitioner was initially
suspended on 22nd December, 1985 w.e.f. 20th December,
1985. The petitioner, in our opinion, cannot legitimately protest D
against his suspension, at the initial stage, when he had
remained in police custody for more than forty eight hours,
though unfortunately for circumstances for which he was not
responsible. This suspension was naturally continued when he
was facing the trial for murder. E
33. The next stage is when he was acquitted by the trial
court on 1st May, 2002. The observations made by the
Additional Session Judge, Delhi whilst acquitting the petitioner
are as follows:- F
"285. The case in hand does not pass the muster. The
circumstances that can be safely held as duly proved
would include only that there was long-standing friendship
between the accused and the deceased, and discovery of
dead body of the· latter in circumstances indicating G
unnatural death. The prosecution has failed to prove
beyond all reasonable doubts the theory of accused having
taken an amount of Rs. one lakh 20 thousand from the
deceased on the promise of helping him in securing
H
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.
A appointment as Member in Board of Revenue, or upon
failure faced by the deceased in getting the said
appointment refusing to, or haggling over, return of the
said amount of money. The theory of accused having.
returned Rs. one lakh to PW 1 after the incident is suspect.
B There is a inordinate delay in the lodging of FIR which,
seen against the backdrop of claims by all and sundry that
they suspected involvement of the accused from the very
beginning, has ;emained unexplained and is bound to
prove fatal to the case (AIR 1996 SC 607).
c 286. The evidence regarding "last seen" does not inspire
confidence and has rather come out as a fabricated one.
Efforts to cook up evidence in the course of investigation,
for example the recovery of blood stained clothes of the
accused at his instance, coupled with unauthorized
D handling of the material exhibits recovered from the scene
where the dead body had been found, have given the
impression that the same might have been doctored. This
erodes confidence in the prosecution case. The
investigation conducted smacks of bias and prejudice
E under influence of certain elements inimically placed vis-
a-vis the accused. The benefit of doubts arising as a result
must accrue in favour of the accused, since suspicion,
however strong, cannot take the place of proof in the final
analysis."
F
These observations would indicate that the trial court
disbelieved the very foundation of the prosecution case. The
alleged motive has been found to be without any basis. The
judgment of the trial court clearly indicates that the evidence
produced does not reach even the bare minimum standard
G required for establishing the guilt of the petitioner. The theory
of the prosecution that petitioner had demanded or taken
money from the deceased was not supported by any
independent evidence. The trial court also noticed that there
was an inordinate delay in the registration of the FIR, which had
H
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 153
FOR RAJASTHAN [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
to be seen against the backdrop of claims, by all and sundry, A
that they suspected the involvement of the petitioner from the
very beginning. The trial court categorically observed that in the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the delay in registration of
the FIR was fatal to the case of the prosecution. The trial court
also observed that the evidence with regard to "last seen" was B
fabricated and, therefore, did not inspire confidence. It is also
observed that the investigation in the case had not been
conducted fairly. The Trial Court was left with a definite
impression that the evidence had been "doctorecf'. The Court
categorically observed that "the investigation conducted c
smack of bias and prejudice under influence of certain
elements inimically placed vis-a-vis the accusecf'. These
observations, in our opinion, would bring the present case within
the realm of those cases which are often described as cases
of "no evidence". Merely because the Court ultimately used the D
term that prosecution has failed to prove the case "beyond
reasonable doubt" would not raise the stature of the evidence,
produced by the prosecution, in this case from the level of being
thoroughly unreliable.
34. As noticed above, Mr. Calla has submitted that the E
suspension of the petitioner should have been revoked at this
stage. It will not be possible to accept the proposition that as
soon as the trial court had acquitted the petitioner, the
Rajasthan High Court was required to forthwith revoke the order
of suspension. Undoubtedly, the petitioner could have been F
given a non-sensitive posting, not involving judicial functions.
But, it was not imperative for the High Court to revoke the
suspension, at that stage. It is a matter of record, that the
prosecution agency decided to file an appeal against the
judgment and order passed by the trial court, acquitting the G
petitioner. The appeal filed by the CBI was admitted by the
Delhi High Court and remained pending till it was decided on
27th September, 2005. Therefore, the conclusions recorded by
the trial court, were not final. They were liable to be reversed
in appeal by the High Court. Thus, during the said period/stage, H
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.
A it cannot be said that the continuance of the suspension of the
petitioner was wholly unjustified. Merely because the High
Court could have revoked the suspension, would not render the
decision to continue the suspension, wholly unjustified.
8 35. The Rajasthan High Court was placed in a very piquant
situation till the petitioner's acquittal was reiterated by the Delhi
High Court. The High Court, literally, had no option but to place
and keep the petitioner under suspension. It was not as if the
petitioner had unwittingly breached a traffic regulation, which
C may not invite, even a frown from the general public. It was also
not where he may had a minor altercation with someone which
may well be overlooked by a reasonable man, as it would not
involve any moral turpitude. He was facing a trial for the'offence
of murder, a crime of highest moral turpitude. Since time
immemorial, Judges have been placed on a very high pedestal
D in every civilized society. Such high status is accompanied by
corresponding responsibility of a judge maintaining an unusually
high standard of dignity, poise and integrity. There can be no
two ways about it! Therefore, the decision of the High Court to
continue the suspension of the petitioner can not be said to be
E wholly unjustified till his acquittal by the Delhi High Court.
36. At this stage, we may just mention observations of this
Court in two decisions of this Court in relation to the high
standards of behaviour expected from a Judge. For instance,
F in Daya Shankar Vs. High Court of Allahabad & Ors. Through
Registrar & Ors.27, this court observed as under:
"Judicial officer cannot have two standards, one in the court
and another outside the court. They must have only one
standard of rectitude, honesty and integrity. They cannot
G act even remotely unworthy of the office they occupy."
Further, in the case of C. Ravichandran /:fer Vs. Justice
A.M. Bhattachaljee & Ors., 28 again while elucidating the nature
21. (1987) 3 sec 1.
H 28. (1995) 5 sec 457.
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 155
FOR RAJASTHAN [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
of the position held by a judicial officer, this Court observed as A
under:
"21. Judicial office is essentially a public trust. Society is,
therefore, entitled to expect that a Judge must be a man
of high integrity, honesty and required to have moral vigour, B
ethical firmness and impervious to corrupt or venial
influences. He is required to keep most exacting standards
of propriety in judicial conduct. Any conduct which tends
to undermine public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the court would be deleterious to the efficacy
of judicial process. Society, therefore, expects higher C
standards of conduct and rectitude from a Judge ...... lt is,
therefore, a basic requirement that a Judge's official and
personal conduct be free from impropriety; the same must
be in tune with the highest standard of propriety and
probity. The standard of conduct is higher than that D
expected of a layman and also higher than that expected
of an advocate. In fact, even his private life must adhere
to high standards of probity and propriety, higher than
those deemed acceptable for others. Therefore, the Judge
can ill-afford to seek shelter from the fallen standard in the E
society."
37. The decision of the High Court to keep the petitioner
under suspension has to be judged by keeping the aforesaid
standards in mind. Therefore, we are unable to accept the F
submission of Mr. Calla that the suspension of the petitioner
was wholly unjustified after he was acquitted of the criminal
charges by the trial court.
38. We now come to the stage after the appeal against
the acquittal was qismissed by the High Court. It appears that G
a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court re-appreciated the
entire evidence and dismissed the appeal filed by the CBI. In
its judgment, the High Court has clearly held that the prosecution
had failed to prove any motive for the alleged murder. It is
noticed by the High Court that the entire prosecution case is H
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 11 S.C.R.
A based on circumstantial evidence. It is further observed that the
injuries suffered by the deceased were not inconsistent with the
plea that it was a case of accidental death. The High Court also
disbelieved the witnesses of the prosecution with regard to the
de.ceased having been "last seen" alive with the petitioner.
8 Having disbelieved the evidence with regard to the motive and
with regard to the victim being "last seen" alive with the
petitioner, the High Court proceeded to examine the evidence
with regard to the disclosure statement under Section 27 and
the recoveries of incriminating pieces of evidence. Upon
C examination of each issue, the High Court observed that the
facts brought on the record "put a question mark on the
genuineness of the story of the recoveries made". The High
Court disbelieved the recovery of the clothes allegedly
belonging to the deceased. The story of recovery of blood
stains was also disbelieved. Ultimately, the High Court recorded
D the following conclusions:-
"43. In the present case, the major links between the
alleged offence and the accused are entirely non-
existent. The above discourse shows positively that the
E prosecution has failed at every step to bring home the
guilt of the accused. The first step was to prove that it was
a case of murder rather than a case of accident. The
prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that it was a case of murder and not that of an accident.
F 44. The second step was to prove that the accused and
the deceased were last seen together soon before the
incident. The prosecution has also failed to prove this fact
beyond reasonable doubt. Apart from what has already
been stated above an important fact in this case is that
G post-mortem report along with the CFSL report, Ex.PW-
34/DA proves existence of alcohol in the stomach of the
deceased. This tends to support the accident theory.
45. The third step was to prove that the prosecution had
H recovered incriminating articles, either following the
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 157
FOR RAJASTHAN [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
disclosure statement or on its own initiative. The A
prosecution has failed even at doing the same. In this
situation, even if the prosecution is able to prove existence
of motive, the same by itself would not be of any value. The
trial court has disbelieved the story of motive. However, for
us it is not necessary to go into those details. B
46 ............ The prosecution has failed to prove firstly that
there was any mur.der and secondly that the accused is
the one who committed it. There is absolutely no merit in
the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed."
c
39. The acquittal of the petitioner having been affirmed by
the High Court of Delhi, in our opinion, it was necessary for the
High Court of Rajasthan to take a decision: (a) whether to
revoke the order of suspension and permit the petitioner to
perform judicial functions; (b) whether to hold a departmental D
enquiry with regard to the receipt of money allegedly received
by him from the deceased; (c) as to how the period of
suspension was to be treated; (d) whether the petitioner was
entitled to full salary, part salary or no salary at all for the period
of suspension. E
40. It appears to us that given the findings recorded by the
trial court, subsequently reiterated by the High Court of Delhi,
the decision to continue the petitioner under suspension,
thereafter, was rather harsh. It is true that the suspension of the
petitioner was continued as the High Court had decided to hold F
a departmental enquiry against the petitioner on the charges
that he had wrongly extracted certain money from the
deceased. But it is a matter of record that both the trial court
as well as the High Court had found the entire story with regard G
to the alleged receipt of money to be false. The enquiry was
founded on1tl'e same facts and the same evidence which have
had been examined by the trial court as well as the High Court.
In such circumstances, it was necessary for the High Court to
examine the findings of the trial court as well as the High Court
H
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.
A in detail before taking a decision to initiate departmental
proceedings against the petitioner, founded on the same set
of facts and the evidence. It is apparent from the record that
no such examination of the judgment was undertaken by the
High Court. Even after taking a decision to initiate departmental
B proceeding against the petitioner, it was no longer imperative
to continue the petitioner under suspension. The petitioner was
no longer charged with any criminal offence as both the trial
court as well as the High Court had literally concluded that the
charges against the petitioner had been concocted. The
c petitioner had tieen subjected to continued suspension since
22nd December, 1985. During the period of departmental
proceedings, even if the petitioner was not to be assigned any
judicial work, the High Court could have conveniently given him
suitable posting on the administrative side. In our opinion, from
D the time of dismissal of the appeal by the Delhi High Court, the
continued suspension of the petitioner was wholly unjustified.
41. Again it is a matter of record, that even in the
departmental enquiry the charges against the petitioner were
not proved and he was exonerated of the same. It was only at
E that stage that the suspension of the petitioner was revoked.
The petitioner had already moved the present writ petition
immediately after the order of acquittal was upheld by the Delhi
High Court. The enquiry proceedings were completed during
the pendency of the writ petition. Undoubtedly, the order of
F suspension was revoked by the High Court on 26th March,
2008 but without giving any direction•as to how the period of
suspension was to be treated. It was only subsequently that the
matter with regard to regularization of his period of suspension
was considered by the Full Court in the meeting held on 29th
G November, 2008. Even at that stage though the Full Court
passed a resolution that period of suspension shall be treated
as period spent on duty, but it was to be without payment of
any salary except for the subsistence allowance already paid
to him. On the basis of the aforesaid resolution, the High Court
H passed the order dated 24th January, 2009. So even by order
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 159
FOR RAJASTHAN [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
dated 24th January, 2009, the petitioner was granted only A
partial relief. This necessitated the amendment of the writ
petition by the petitioner questioning the legality of the aforesaid
order. It was only at that stage that this Court by order dated
5th April, 2011 directed the High Court to pass appropriate
orders under Rule 54 of the Rules. It appears even at that stage 8
the High Court did not consider it necessary to grant any further
relief to the petitioner.
42. We are of the considered opinion, having regard to the
sequence of events narrated above, that it would be unjust to
deny the salary to the petitioner with effect from the date the C
appeal against acquittal was dismissed by the High Court of
Delhi. We see no cogent reason as to why it was necessary to
continue the suspension of the petitioner during the pendency
of the departmental proceedings. There was no distinction
between the facts or the evidence relied upon in the crimJnal D
trial as well as the department proceedings. This apart, the
petitioner had been acquitted of any involvement in the crime
of murder. Whilst exercising its jurisdiction under Rule 54, it was
necessary for the High Court to pass a detailed and reasoned
order as to whether the period of suspension was wholly E
unjustified. Undoubtedly, the power under Rule 54 is
discretionary but such discretion has to be exercised
reasonably and by taking into consideration the material
relevant to the decision. Upon acquittal of the petitioner from
the criminal charges, it was no longer necessary to keep him F
under suspension during the pendency of the departmental
enquiry. In our opinion, the High Court failed to exercise its
jurisdiction properly under Rule 54, as directed by this Court in
the order dated 5th April, 2011. In our opinion, the suspension
of the petitioner ought to have been revoked upon acquittal by G
the High Court even during the pendency of the departmental
enquiry.
43. This now leads us to the last submission of Mr. Calla
that upon exoneration in the departmental proceedings, the
H
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 11 S.C.R.
A petitioner was required to be considered for promotion from
the date a person junior to him was promoted.
44. In view of the authoritative judgment rendered by this
Court in the case of Jankiraman (supra), the submissions
made by Mr. Calla would have to be accepted. In the aforesaid
8 judgment it was held that:-
"26. We are, therefore, broadly in agreement with the
finding of the Tribunal that when an employee is completely
exonerated meaning thereby that he is not found
C blameworthy in the least and is not visited with the penalty
even of censure, he has to be given the benefit of the
salary of the higher post along with the other benefits from
the date on which he would have normally been promoted
but f<?r the disciplinary/criminal proceedings."
D
45. In this case, it is a matter of record that upon
exoneration in the departmental enquiry, the petitioner was
reinstated in service. No punishment was inflicted on him at all.
However, during the pendency of the criminal trial as also the
departmental proceedings, he was not considered for
E promotion, when the cases of persons junior to him were
considered. In our opinion, the High Court erred in directing in
the Full Court Resolution dated 29th November, 2008, and the
communication dated 24th January, 2009 that the petitioner shall
not be entitled for any promotion.
F
46. We, therefore, partly allow the writ petition. We reject
the submissions of Mr. Calla that the suspension of the
petitioner was rendered wholly unjustified upon acquittal by the
trial court. We also reject the submissions of Mr. Calla that the
G suspension of the petitioner was wholly unjustified during the
pendency of the appeal before the High Court. We, however,
hold that the continued suspension of the petitioner during the .
pendency of the departmental proceedings was wholly
unjustified. The petitioner is, therefore, held entitled to full pay
H and allowances from 27th September, 2005, i.e. the date of the
-
GURPAL SINGH v. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE 161
FOR RAJASTMAN [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
judgment rendered by the Delhi High Court onwards. We further A
hold that the petitioner was entitled to be considered for
promotion notionally from the date when an officer junior to him
was promoted. We, therefore, direct the High Court to consider
the case of the petitioner for promotion (if he otherwise satisfies
the requirements as per the rules) from the date when a person B
junior to him was considered and promoted to the next higher
post. Let such a decision be taken by the High Court within a
period of three months from the date of receipt of this order.
We further direct that the petitioner would be entitled to all
consequential benefits, such as salary and other allowan~s by c
treating him on duty with effect from the date the appeal against
acquittal was dismissed by the Delhi High Court and after fixing
his last pay drawn correctly. The consequential benefits shall
be paid to him with 6% interest from the date of the dismissal
of the appeal by the High Court on 27th September, 2005. The D
enhanced retiral benefits shall be released to him within three
months of the receipt of a copy of this order.
47. Assuming that, the Rajasthan High Court wanted to
conduct its own departmental enquiry after the acquittal of the
petitioner being confirmed by the Delhi High Court, his E
suspension during that period was wholly uncalled for because
of which he unnecessarily suffered and had to litigate further.
We, therefore, award costs of Rs. 25,000/- to the petitioner to
be borne by the respondent High Court.
F
R.P. Writ Petition Partly allowed.
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