Supreme Court of India
GURNAIB SINGHversusSTATE OF PUNJAB
- Citation
- 2013 INSC 339
- Decided
- 10 May 2013
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
The conviction under Section 3048 IPC cannot be sustained; the case meets the criteria for Section 306 IPC, so the conviction is converted to abetment of suicide and the sentence is limited to the period already served.
Summary
The appellant Gurnaib Singh was convicted for the death of his young wife Amarjeet Kaur, who allegedly committed suicide after being harassed for a dowry demand of Rs 50,000. The trial court and the Punjab High Court upheld a conviction under Section 3048 IPC (dowry death) and sentenced him to seven years' rigorous imprisonment. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the evidence established the elements of dowry death and found the dowry‑demand testimony to be sketchy and insufficient for a conviction under Section 3048. However, the Court held that the prosecution proved mental cruelty and harassment, satisfying the ingredients of Section 306 IPC (abetment of suicide), and therefore converted the conviction to that offence. Since the appellant had already spent about five years in custody, his sentence was limited to time served and he was released. The Court also criticised the trial court’s haphazard conduct, excessive adjournments, and emphasized the duty of courts and counsel to ensure a fair and expeditious trial.
Issues considered
- The death of the bride was caused by dowry harassment, satisfying the elements of Section 3048 IPC.
- Whether the evidence on record supports a conviction under Section 3048 IPC.
- Whether the conviction can be converted to Section 306 IPC based on proof of mental cruelty and abetment of suicide.
- Whether the trial was conducted in violation of procedural requirements, including improper adjournments.
- Whether the Supreme Court may re‑evaluate evidence under Article 136 of the Constitution when lower courts' conclusions are manifestly erroneous.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 309, s. 313
- Constitution of Indias. Art. 136
- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 2
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 1138, s. 113A
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 3048, s. 306, s. 30+8, s. 498A
Subjects
dowry deathabetment of suicidemental crueltySection 3048 IPCSection 306 IPCSection 498A IPCArticle 136evidence evaluationcriminal trial conductadjournmentspresumption under Evidence Act
Judgment
[2013] 3 S.C.R. 563
GURNAIB SINGH A
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB
(Criminal Appeal No. 744 of 2013)
MAY 10, 2013.
B
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]
CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950:
Art. 136 - Scope of -- Held: When a conclusion is arrived c
at by courts below which is manifestly erroneous and
unsupported by evidence on record, Supreme Court, in
exercise of power under Art. 136, can re-evaluate evidence
and interfere.
PENAL CODE, 1860: D
s.30+8, s.306 read with s.498-A - 'Cruelty' - Abetment
of suicide - Death of a young bride in her matrimonial home
- Conviction and sentence of 7 yrs. RI u/s 304-B by courts
below - Held: Trial court as well as High Court has accepted E
the evidence of prosecution witnesses that there was demand
of dowry - But, an examination of their evidence makes it
evident that they have only made a bald statement that
accused persons were not satisfied with the dowry and were
asking the bride to bring the stated amount a sum of F
Rs.50,0001- - Thus, on the base ofsuch sketchy evidence, it
is difficult to concur with the finding that there was detnand of
dowry by accused-husband and harassment pertained to
such a demand ~ The conclusion on this score is based on
certain a priori notions - However, it has come out in evidence G
that there was ill-treatment by mother-in-law and husband -
Bride was in her early twenties - She was turned out of
matrimonial home on certain occasions - This aspect has
been established beyond doubt - Considering the evidence
'· 563 H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A of prosecution witnesses, it is a case where the bride was totally
insensitively treated with cruelty and harassed because of
which she put an end to her life.
s.304-B, s.306 read with s.498-A - Held: Though charge
has not been framed u/s 306 yet, it is evident that accused
8
were aware that they were facing a charge u/s 304B /PC which
related not to administration of poison but to consumption of
poison by deceased because of demand of dowry and
harassment - It is major offence in comparison to s. 306 which
C deals with abetment to suicide by a bride in the context of
clause (a) of s. 498A - Thus, basic ingredients of offence uls
306 have been established by prosecution inasmuch as death
has occurred within seven years in an abnormal circumstance
and deceased was meted out with mental cruelty -
Accordingly, conviction from one uls 304B is converted to that
D uls 306 - As accused has spent almost five years in custody,
sentence is limited to period already undergone - Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.313.
CRIMINAL TRIAL:
E
Conducting of trial - Adjournments - Held: A criminal trial
has its own gravity and sanctity -- Trial courts shall keep in
mind the statutory provisions and their interpretation by
Supreme Court -- They should not become mute spectators
when a trial is being conducted by allowing the control to
F counsel for parties - They are required to monitor - Besides,
dispensation of criminal justice is not only a concern of the
Bench but has to be the concern of the Bar as well -
Administration of justice reflects its purity when the Bench and
the Bar perform their duties with utmost sincerity - An advocate
G cannot afford to bring any kind of disrespect to fairness of trial
by taking recourse to subterfuges for procrastinating the same
- In the instant case, trial was conducted in an extremely
haphazard and piecemeal manner - Adjournments were
granted on a mere asking - Cross-examination of witnesses
H
GURNAIB SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 565
were deferred without recording any special reason and dates A
were given after a long gap - Court expresses its concern
about the manner in which trial had been conducted -
Administration of justice - Criminal justice - Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - s. 309 - Advocates.
The appellant, his mother and the brother were 8
prosecuted for commission of offence uls 304-B IPC, on
the allegation that the young bride, the wife of the
appellant, was harassed and tortured for dowry by the
accused so much so that she consumed insecticides and
committed suicide. The post mortem report confirmed C
the death because of consuming poison; The trial court
convicted all the three accused u/s 304-B IPC and
sentenced each of them to 7 years RI and a fine of
Rs.10,000/-. The accused filed an appeal against their
conviction whereas the informant filed a criminal revision D
seeking enhancement of sentence. The mother of the
appellant died pending appeal and his brother was
acquitted by the High Court. However, appellant's
conviction was affirmed, but the fine was set aside.
E
In the instant appeal, the question for consideration
before the Court was: "whether the deceased was driven
to commit suicide because of the harassment meted out
to her in connection with demand of dowry."
Allowing the appeal in part, the. Court F
HELD: 1.1 When a conclusion is arrived at by courts
below which is manifestly erroneous and unsupported by
the evidence on record, this Court, in exercise of power
under Art. 136 of the Constitution, can re-evaluate and G
interfere. [para 16] [578·0-E]
=
Alamelu v. State 2011 (2) SCR 147 2011 (2) SCC 385,
=
Heinz India (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. 2012 (3) SCR 898 2012
(5) SCC 443; and Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sar/a Vishwanath H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A Agrawal 2012 (7) SCR 607 =2012 (7) SCC 288 - relied on
1.2. The trial court as well as the High Court has
accepted the evidence of the brother( PW-1), the father
(PW-4) and Numberdar of the village (PW-5) that there
was demand of dowry. However, PW-1 has only made a
8 bald statement that the accused persons were not
satisfied with the dowry and were asking his sister to
bring a sum of Rs.50,000/-. Similar is the testimony of
PWs-4 and 5 and nothing else has been stated by the
witnesses. Thus, on the base of such sketchy evidence,
C in the considered opinion of this Court, it is difficult to
concur with the finding that there was demand of dowry
by the accused-husband and the harassment p~rtained
to such a demand. The conclusion on this score is
based on certain a priori notions. [para 16] [577-G-H; 578-
D A-D]
Satvir Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Another
2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 353 = 2001 (8) sec 633; and Hira
Lal and Others v. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi 2003 (1 ) Suppl.
E SCR 734 = 2003 (8) SCC 80 - referred to.
1.3. However, s.49BA IPC deals with husband or
relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.
Clause (a) of the Explanation to s. 498-A defines "cruelty"
to mean "any willful conduct which is of such a nature
F as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide".
Clause (a) can take in its ambit mental cruelty. There can
be no dispute that in a family life, there can be differences,
quarrels, misgivings and apprehensions but it is the
degree which raises it to the level of mental cruelty. It has
G come out in evidence that there was ill-treatment by the
mother-in-law and the husband. The bride was in her
early twenties. She was turned out of matrimonial home
on certain occasions. This aspect has been established
beyond doubt. Considering the evidence of the
H prosecution witnesses, it is a case where the bride was
GURNAIB SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 567
totally insensitively treated and harassed. The defence A
had tried to prove that she was suffering from depression
and because of such depression, she extinguished the
candle of her own life. The testimony of the doctors cited
by the defence has not been accepted by the trial Judge
as well as by the High Court. They have not been able B
to bring in adequate material on record. that she was
suffering from such depression as would force her to
commit suicide. On a perusal of the evidence of the said
witnesses, the finding recorded on that score is
absolutely impeccable. In view of the same, the evidence c
brought on record that the bride was treated with cruelty
and harassed deserves to be given credence. [para 17-
18) [578-F; 579-A-C and D-F; 580-B-C]
2.1. There is no dispute that no charge was framed
for an offence u/s 306 IPC. However, from the question D
that has been put u/s 313 CrPC, it is clear as crystal that
the accused were aware that they were facing a charge
u/s 3048 IPC which related not to administration of poison
but to consumption of pois9n by the deceased because
of demand of dowry and harassment. It is major offence E
in comparison to s.306 IPC which deals with abetment to
suicide by a bride in the context of clause (a) of s. 498A
IPC. [para 19) [580-D-E]
Gurbachan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 623; F
Shamnsaheb M. Multtani v. State of Kamataka 2001 (1) SCR
514 = 2001 (2) SCC 577, Narwinder Singh v. State of Punjab
2011 (1) SCR 110 = 2011 (2) SCC 47, K. Prema S. Rao and
another v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and others 2002 (3) Suppl.
SCR 339 = 2003 (1) sec 217 - relied on. G
2.2. In the case at hand, the basic ingredients of the
offence u/s 306 IPC have been established by the ·
prosecution inasmuch as the death has occurred within
seven years in an abnormal circumstance and the
deceased was meted out with mental cruelty. Thus, the H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 3 S.C.R.
A conviction from one u/s 3048 IPC is converted to that u/
s 306 IPC. As the accused has spent almost five years
in custody, the sentence is limited to the period already
undergone. [para 23] [582-F-G]
Conducting of criminal trial:
8
3.1. A criminal trial has its own gravity and sanctity.
In the instant case, the manner in which the trial was
conducted, depicts a very disturbing scenario. As is
demonstrable from the record, the trial was conducted in
C an extremely haphazard and piecemea~ manner.
Adjournments were granted on a mere asking. Cross-
exam inations of witnesses were deferred without
recording any special reason and dates were given after
a long gap. The mandate of the law and the views
D expressed by this Court from time to time appears to
have been totally kept at bay. Dispensation of criminal
justice casts a heavy burden on the trial Judge to have
control over the proceedings. It has to be placed on a
proper pedestal and it cannot be left to the whims and
E fancies of the parties or their counsel. [para 24 and 27]
[583-A-C; 584-G-H]
Ambika Prasad and Another v. State (Delhi Admn., Delhi)
2000 (1) SCR 342 = 2000 AIR 718; State of U.P. v. Shambhu
Nath Singh and Others 2001 (2) SCR 854 = 2001 (4) SCC
F 667, Mohd. Khalid v. State of WB. 2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 31
= 2002 (7) SCC 334; Aki/ @ Javed v. State of Delhi 2012 (11)
SCALE 709 - relied on
Ta/ab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar
G and Another 1958 SCR 1226 =AIR 1958 SC 376; Krishnan
and Another v. Krishnaveni and Another AIR 1997 SC 987 =
1997 (1) SCR 511; Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab 2000 (3)
SCR 572 ::. AIR 2000 SC 2017 - referred to.
3.2. It is reiterated that the trial courts shall keep in
H
GURNAIB SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 569
mind the statutory provisions and the interpretation A
placed by this Court and should not become mute
spectators when a trial is being conducted, by allowing
the control to the counsel for the parties. They have their
roles to perform. They are required to monitor. They
cannot abandon their responsibility. It should be borne B
in mind that the whole dispensation of criminal justice at
the ground level rests on how a trial is conducted. It
needs no special emphasis to state that dispensation of
criminal justice is not only a concern of the Bench but
has also to be the concern of the Bar. The administration c
of justice reflects its purity when the Bench and the Bar .
perform their duties with utmost sincerity. An advocate
cannot afford to bring any kind of disrespect to fairness
of trial by taking recourse to subterfuges for
procrastinating the same. This Court expresses its
0
anguish, agony and concern about the manner in which
the trial in the instant case has been conducted. [para 34]
[588-B-E]
Case Law Reference:
E
2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 353 referred to para 12
2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 734 referred to Para 15
2011 (2) SCR 147 relied on para 16
2012 (3) SCR 898 relied on para 16 F
2012 (7) SCR 607 relied on para 16
AIR 1957 SC 623 relied on para 19
2001 (1) SCR 514 relied on para 20 G
2011 SCR 110 relied on para 21
2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 339 relied on para 22
1958 SCR 1226 referred to para 24
H
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A 1997 (1) SCR 511 referred to para 25 ·
2000 (3) SCR 572 referred to para 26
2000 (1) SCR 342 relied on para 28
2001 (2) SCR 854 relied on para 29
B
2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 31 relied on para 32
2012 (11) SCALE 709 relied on para 33
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
c No. 744 of 2013.
From the Judgment & Order dated 15.11.2011 of the High
Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal
No. 1472 of 2001.
D
Abhay Kumar, Pardeep Singh Mirpur, U.P. Singh, Neetu
Jain for the Appellant.
V. Madhukar, MG, Sarajita Mathur, Kuldip Singh for the
Respondent.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Respect of a bride in her matrimonial home glorifies the
F solemnity and sanctity of marriage, reflects the sensitivity of a
civilized society and, eventually, epitomizes her aspirations
dreamt of in nuptial bliss. But, the manner in which sometimes
the brides are treated in many a home by the husband, in-laws
and the relatives creates a feeling of emotional numbness in
G the society. It is a matter of great shame and grave concern
that brides are burnt or otherwise their life-sparks are
extinguished by torture, both physical and mental, because of
demand of dowry and insatiable greed and sometimes, sans
demand of dowry, because of the cruelty and harassment
H meted out to the nascent brides treating them with total
GURNAIB SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 571
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
insensitivity destroying their desire to live and forcing them to A
commit suicide a brutal self-humiliation of "Life".
3. Amarjeet Kaur, a young incipient lady, slightly more than
two scores, daughter of an agriculturist, entered into wedlock
with the appellant sometime in the early part of the year 1996. 8
At the time of marriage, gifts were given as per the social
customs. Sometime after the marriage, the matrimonial home,
as the allegation of the prosecution unfurls, turned out to be an
abode of indifference and harassment because of the demand
of dowry of Rs.50,000/- by the husband and his family from her
parents which could not be met due to their financial condition. C
Shattering the dreams that were harboured in her heart, she
was turned out of her husband's house on many an occasion
and, she was asked to return only if she could bring an amount
of Rs.50,000/- from her parents. On 18.7.1998, Gurlab Singh,
brother of the deceased, mustering courage and expecting that D
his sister would be treated with affection, took her to her
matrimonial home and beseeched the husband and his mother
to keep her as they were not in a position to give more dowry.
Though she was allowed to remain in the matrimonial home,
yet instead of show of affection even by affectation, she was E
showered with taunts and ridicules. On 27.7.1998, about 6.00
p.m., the anxious father, Sukhdev Singh, and the brother went
to the house of the deceased to enquire about the well-being
of the deceased and found her dead body kept in the courtyard
of the house. They were convinced that she had committed F
suicide because of the cruelty meted out to her by the husband
and his relatives and, accordingly, lodged an FIR at Joga
Police Station. After the criminal law was set in motion, the
Investigating Officer carried out the investigation and got the
autopsy conducted on the dead body by a board of doctors G
consisting of three members. The doctors who conducted the
post mortem on the dead body sent the viscera for chemical
examination and, eventually gave their opinion that the cause
of death of the deceased was due to consumption of Organo
Phosphorus, a group of insecticides, which was detected in the H
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A viscera and blood of the deceased. The investigating agency,
after examining the witnesses and completing other formalities
laid the charge-sheet before the competent court, and in due
course, the appellant along with two other accused persons,
namely, Mohinder Kaur, mother of the husband, and Ajaib
B Singh, brother, were sent up for trial for the offence punishable
· under Section 3048 IPC.
4. The accused persons abjured their guilt and claimed to
be tried. The prosecution, in order to bring home the charges,
C examined Gurlab Singh, PW-1, the brother of the deceased,
Sukhdev Singh, PW-4, the father of the deceased, and PW-5,
Numberdar of the village who have deposed about the ill
treatment and demand of dowry. Dr. Rajinder Kumar Garg,
PW-2, Dr. Vijay Sidhana, PW-3, and Dr. Asha Kiran, who had
conducted the post mortem on the dead body of the deceased
D were examined to support the cause of death. That apart,
certain other formal witnesses and the Investigating Officer were
examined to substantiate the prosecution case.
5. The accused persons, in their statements under Section
E 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, denied all the
incriminating circumstances and took the stand that the
deceased was suffering from mental depression since
marriage as she could not conceive and further she used to
suffer fits. On the date of the incident, she suffered fits and was
F taken to the hospital but on the way, she breathed her last and,
accordingly, her body was brought back home. It was also the
stand of the accused persons that the parents of the deceased
were informed and under their pressure, the police had been
compelled to register a case. To substantiate the stance in the
G defence, it examined nine witnesses including Dr. Rajinder
Arora, DW-1 and Dr. J.S. Dhillon, DW-6, who had, as stated,
tr-eated tile deceased for mental illness. Other witnesses were
examined to establish the general behavioural pattern of the
deceased.
H 6. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, by judgment
GURNAIB SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 573
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
and order dated 27.11.2001, convicted all the accused persons A
under Section 304B of IPC and sentenced each of them to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a
fine of Rs.10,000/- each, in default of fine, to suffer further
rigorous imprisonment for one year.
B
7. Being dissatisfied, the convicts preferred Criminal
Appeal No. 1472-SB of 2001 and the informant preferred
Criminal Revision No. 1807 of 2002 seeking enhancement of
sentence. During the pendency of appeal before the High
Court, the appellant No. 3, Mohinder Kaur, the mother-in-law, C
expired, as a consequence of which the appeal stood abated
as against her. The High Court discarded the defence version
that the deceased was suffering from any depression or mental
illness. Appreciating the evidence, it came to hold that the
deceased had committed suicide by consuming poison and
hence, the death was otherwise other than normal D
circumstances; that the deceased was subjected to cruelty in
connection with demand of dowry soon before her death and
the said aspect had been established beyond doubt by the
prosecution; and that the testimonies of Gurlab Singh, PW-1,
Sukhdev Singh, PW-4, and Santokh Singh, PW-5, had E
remained unimpeached despite roving cross-examination; that
Ajaib Singh, the brother of the husband, was a young boy
prosecuting his studies in Class X at the time of the incident
and, therefore, it could not be said that he could have been
involved in any kind of demand of dowry or treating his sister- F
in-law with cruelty. Being of this view, the High Court acquitted
Ajaib Singh but as far as the husband was concerned, it
modified the sentence by setting aside the fine component. As
a fall out of the aforesaid opinion, the appeal was allowed in
part and the revision preferred by the informant paved the path G
of dismissal.
8. We have heard Mr. Abhay Kumar, learned counsel for
the appellant, and Mr. V. Madhukar, learned counsel for the
respondent-State.
H
-
57 4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A 9. Questioning the defensibility of the conviction, it is
submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the
prosecution has not been able to prove that there has been any
demand of dowry or any torture in connection with such demand
and, therefore, the conviction under Section 3048 IPC could
B not have been recorded against the husband. It is urged by
him that the principal ingredients of Section 3048 IPC have not
been brought home inasmuch the prosecution has failed to
establish that soon before the death of the deceased, she had
been subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband and
c his relatives and such harassment was in connection with the
demand of dowry. It is his further submission that the High
Court as an Appellate Court has not scrutinized the evidence
in proper perspective and has returned a finding that there was
a demand of dowry and, hence, the judgment of conviction
warrants a reversal.
0
10. Mr. V. Madhukar, learned counsel for the State-
respondent, resisting the aforesaid submissions, has
contended that marshalling of the evidence by the trial Court
and the reappraisal by the High Court withstand close scrutiny
E and there is no justification to interfere with the concurrent
finding of guilt. Alternatively, it is put forth by him that assuming
that the offence under Section 3048 IPC is not brought home,
still the material on record would justify a conviction under
Section 306 IPC which would not impel this Court to interfere
F with the quantum of sentence.
11. To appreciate the rival proponements advanced at the
Bar, we think it apposite to refer to Section 3048 IPC which
deals with dowry death. It reads as follows:-
G "3048. Dowry Death.· (1) Where the death of a woman
is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise
than under normal circumstances within seven years of her
marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she
was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or
H any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any
GURNAIB SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 575
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry A
death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to
have caused her death.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this sub-section,
"dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of
8
the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever comrpits dowry death shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven
years but which may extend to imprisonm~nt for life."
c
12. To get the said provision attracted, certain ingredients
are to be satisfied. Scanning the said provision, this Court in
Satvir Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Another1 has
stated thus:-
"The essential components of Section 3048 are: (i) Death D
of a woman occurring otherwise than· under normal
circumstances, within 7 years of marriage. (ii) Soon
before her death she should have been subjected to
cruelty and harassment in connection with any demand for
dowry. When the above ingredients are fulfilled, the E
husband or his relative, who subjected her to such cruelty
or harassment, can be presumed to be guilty of offence
under Section 3048. To be within the province of the first
ingredient the provision stipulates that "where the death
of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or F
occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances". It
may appear that the former limb which is described by the
words "death caused by burns or bodily injury" is a
redundancy because such death would also fall within the
wider province of "death caused otherwise than under G
normal circumstances". The former limb was inserted for
highlighting that by no means death caused by burns or
bodily injury should be treated as falling outside the ambit
of the offence."
1. c2001) a sec 633 H
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A 13. In this context, it is apposite to refer to Section 113A
of the Evidence Act, 1872. The said provision is extracted
below: -
"113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a
married woman. - When the question is whether the
8
commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by
her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown
that she had committed suicide within a period of seven
years from the date of her marriage and that her husband
or such relative of her husband had subjected her to
c cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the
other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had
been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her
husband."
D 14. Section 1138, which provides for presumption as to
dowry death, was inserted with a view to fight against the
plague of dowry death. The said provision is as follows: -
"1138. Presumption as to dowry death. - When the
question is whether a person has committed the dowry
E death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her
death such woman has been subjected by such person to
cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such
person had caused the dowry death.
F
Explanation. - For the purpose of this section, "dowry
death" shall have the same meaning as in section 3048
of the Indian Penal Code."
G 15. Interpreting the aforesaid provisions in juxtaposition
with Section 3048 IPC, this Court, in Hira Lal and Others v.
State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi2, has expressed thus: -
"A conjoint reading of Section 1138 of the Evidence Act
H 2. c2003) a sec so.
GURNAIB SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 577
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
and Section 3048 IPC shows that there must be material A
to show that soon before her death the victim was
subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has
to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death
so as to bring it within the purview of "death occurring
otherwise than in normal circumstances". The expression B
"soon before" is very relevant where Section 1138 of the
Evidence Act and Section 3048 IPC are pressed into
service. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon
before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and
only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that c
regard has to be led by the prosecution."
The learned Judges, while proceeding further and
interpreting the expression "soon before", opined thus: -
"The determination of the period which can come within D
the term "soon before" is left to be determined by the
courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each
case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression
"soon before" would normally imply that the interval should
not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned E
and the death in question. There must be existence of a
proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based
on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged
incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale
enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman F
concerned, it would be of no consequence."
16. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles, it is to be
seen whether the deceased was driven to commit suicide
because of the harassment meted out to her in connection with
demand of dowry. The learned trial Judge as well as the High G
Court has accepted the evidence of the brother, PW-1, the
father, PW-4, and PW-5, Numberdar of the village that there was
demand of dowry. The learned counsel for the appellant would
submit that the finding recorded on this score is not based on
the material on record but founded on surmises. To test the H
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A acceptation of the said submission, we have thought it apt to
scrutinize the evidence of PWs-1, 4 and 5. PW-1, brother of
the deceased, has only made a bald statement that the
accused persons were not satisfied with the dowry and were
asking his sister to bring a sum of Rs.50,000/-. Similar is the
B testimony of PWs-4 and 5. That apart, nothing has been stated
by the witnesses. It has been deposed by the father that the
deceased had written two to three letters stating about the
demand of dowry but the said letters have not brought in
evidence. That apart, the brother, PW-1, in cross-examination,
C has refuted the same. It is also noticeable that PW-4 had not
told his other daughters about the demand of dowry which is
expected of a father. Thus, on the base of such sketchy
evidence, in our considered opinion, it is difficult to concur with
the finding that there was demand of dowry by the accused-
D husband and the harassment pertained to such a demand. The
conclusion on this score, we are inclined to think, is based on
certain a priori notions. When such a conclusion is arrived at
which is manifestly erroneous and unsupported by the evidence
or:i record, needless to say, this Court, in exercise of power
under Article 136 of the Constitution, can re-evaluate and
E interfere. This has been so stated in Alamelu v. State3, Heinz
India (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. 4 and Vishwanath Agrawal v.
Sar/a Vishwanath Agrawa/5.
17. Presently we shall dwell upon the other limb of cruelty
F as engrafted under Section 498A. Section 498A deals with
husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to
cruelty. The said provision along with the explanation reads as
follows: -
"498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
G
subjecting her to cruelty. - Whoever, being the husband
or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such
3. c2011) 2 sec 385.
4. c2012) 5 sec 443.
H 5. c2012) 1 sec 288.
GURNAIB SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 579
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for A
a term which may extend to three years and shall also be
liable to fine.
Explanation. - For the purpose of this section, "cruelty"
means -
B
(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is
likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to
cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health
(whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
c
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment
is with a view to coercing her or any person related
to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property
or valuable security or is on account of failure by her
or any person related to her to meet such demand." 0
18. Clause (a) of the Explanation to the aforesaid provision
defines "cruelty" to mean "any willful conduct which is of such
a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide".
Clause (b) of the explanation pertains to unlawful demand.
Clause (a) can take in its ambit mental cruelty. It has come' out E
in evidence that there was ill-treatment by the mother-in-law and
the husband. The bride was in her early twenties. She was
turned out of matrimonial home on certain occasions. This
aspect has been established beyond doubt. There can be no
dispute that in a family life, there can be differences, quarrels, F
misgivings and apprehensions but it is the degree which raises
it to the level of mental cruelty. A daughter-in-law is to be
treated as a member of the family with warmth and affection
and not as a stranger with despicable and ignoble indifference.
She should not be treated as a housemaid. No impression G
should be given that she can be thrown out of her matrimonial
home at any time. In the case at hand, considering the evidence
of the prosecution witnesses, we are disposed to think that it
is a case where the bride was totally insensitively treated and
harassed. It is not that she has accidentally consumed the H
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A poison. She had deliberately put an end to her life. The
defence had tried to prove that she was suffering from
depression and because of such depression, she extinguished
the candle of her own life. The testimony of the doctors cited
by the defence has not been accepted by the learned trial
B Judge as well as by the High Court. They have not been able
to bring in adequate material on record that she was suffering
from such depression as would force her to commit suicide.
On a perusal of the evidence of the said witnesses, we find that
the finding recorded on that score is absolutely impeccable. In
c view of the same, the evidence brought on record that she was
treated with cruelty and harassed deserves to be given
credence to and, accordingly, we do so.
19. There is no dispute that no charge was framed under
Section 306 IPC. Though the charge has not been framed
D under Section 306 yet on a question that has been put under
Section 313, it is clear as crystal that they were aware that they
are facing a charge under Section 3048 IPC which related not
to administration of poison but to consumption of poison by the
deceased because of demand of dowry and harassment. It is
E major evidence in comparison to Section 306 IPC which deals
with abetment to suicide by a bride in the context of clause (a)
of Section 498A IPC. The test is whether there has been failure
of justice or prejudice has been caused to the accused. In
Gurbachan Singh v. State of Punjab6, this Court examined the
F question of prejudice and held as under: -
"In judging a question of prejudice, as of guilt, courts must
act with a broad vision and look to the substance and not
to technicalities, and their main concern should be to see
whether the accused had a fair trial, whether he knew what
G
he was being tried for, whether the main facts sought to
be established against him were explained to him fairly
and clearly and whether he was given a full and fair chance
to defend himself."
H 6. AIR 1957 SC 623.
GURNAIB SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 581
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
20. In Shamnsaheb M. Multtani v. State of Kamataka7, a A
three-Judge Bench, while dealing with the concept of "failure
of justice", has opined thus:-
"23. We often hear about "failure of justice" anc;f quite often
the submission in a criminal court is accentuated with the
8
said expression. Perhaps it is too pliable or facile an
expression which could be fitted in any situation of a case.
The expression "failure of justice" would appear,
sometimes, as an etymological chameleon (the simile is
borrowed from Lord Diplock in Town Investments Ltd. v.
Deptt. of the Environment8): The criminal court, particularly C
the superior court should make a close examination to
ascertain whether there was really a failure of justice or
whether it is only a camouflage.
24. One of the cardinal principles of natural justice is that D
no man should be condemned without being heard, (audi
alteram partem). But the law reports are replete with
instances of courts hesitating to approve the contention
that failure of justice had occasioned merely because a
person was not heard on a particular aspect. However, if E
the aspect is of such a nature that non-explanation of it has
contributed to penalising an individual, the court should say
that since he was not given the opportunity to explain that
aspect there was failure of justice on account of non-
compliance with the principle of natural justice." F
21. In Narwinder Singh v. State of Punjab 9, while
accepting the finding of the High Court that the prosecution has
not been able to establish the charge under Section 3048 IPC
and had, therefore converted the punishment to one under
Section 306 IPC, this Court observed that cruelty or G
harassment sans demand of dowry which drives the wife to
1, c2001) 2 sec 577.
8. (1977) 1 All ER 813.
9. c2011) 2 sec 47. H
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A commit suicide attracts the offence of abetment of suicide under
Section 306 IPC. The Court further observed that mere
omission or defect in framing charge would not disable the court
from convicting the accused for the offence which has been
found to be proved on the basis of the evidence on record. In
B such circumstances, the matter would fall within the purview of
Sections 221(1) and (2) CrPC.
22. In K. Prema S. Rao and Another v. Yadla Srinivasa
Rao and Others10 , the Court, analyzing the evidence, ruled
thus:-
C
"The same facts found in evidence, which justify conviction
of the appellant under Section 498A for cruel treatment of
his wife, make out a case against him under Section 306
IPC of having abetted commission of suicide by the wife.
D The appellant was charged for an offence of higher degree
causing "dowry death" under Section 3048 which is
punishable with minimum sentence of seven years'
rigorous imprisonment and maximum for life. Presumption
under Section 113A of the Evidence Act could also be
E raised against him on same facts constituting offence of
cruelty under Section 498A IPC. No further opportunity of
defence is required to be granted to the appellant when
he had ample opportunity to meet the charge under
Section 498A IPC."
F 23: In the case at hand, the basic ingredients of the offence
under Section 306 IPC have been established by the
prosecution inasmuch as the death has occurred within seven
years in an abnormal circumstance and the deceased was
meted out with mental cruelty. Thus, we convert the conviction
G from one under Section 3048 IPC to that under Section 306
IPC. As the accused has spent almost five years in custody,
we limit the period of sentence to the period already undergone.
24. In spite of our modifying the conviction, we are
H 10. c2003) 1 sec 211.
GURNAIB SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 583
[DIPAK MISRA; J.]
compelled to proceed to reiterate the law and express our A
anguish pertaining to the manner in which the 'trial was
conducted as it depicts a very disturbing scenario. As is
demonstrable from the record, the trial was conducted in an
extremely haphazard and piecemeal manner. Adjournments
were granted on a mere asking. The cross-examination of B
witnesses were deferred without recording any special reason·
and dates were given after a long gap. The mandate of the
law and the views expressed by this Court from time to time
appears to have been totally kept at bay. The learned trial
Judge; as is perceptible, seems to have ostracized from his c
memory that a criminal trial has its own gravity and sanctity. In
this regard, we may refer with profit to the pronouncement in
Ta/ab. Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar and
Another11 wherein it ha.s been stated that an accused person
by his conduct cannot,put a fair trial into jeopardy, for it is the
0
primary and p;uamount duty of criminal courts to ensure that
the risk to fair trial is removed and trials are allowed to proceed
smoothly without any interrupt}on or obstruction.
25. In Krishnan and Another v. Krishnaveni and Another12,
it has been observed that the object behind criminal law is to E
· maintain law, public order, stability <,1s also peace and progress
In the society. The object of criminal trial is to render public
justice, to punish the criminal and to see that the trial is
concluded expeditiously before the memory of the witness fades
out. The Court further proceeded to state that the recent trend F
is to delay the trial and threaten the witness or to win over the
witness by promise or inducement and these malpractices
need to be curbed.
, 26. In Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab 13 , Wadhwa, J., in
his concurring opinion, expressed his anguish pertaining to the G
adjournments sought in a criminal case which is built on the
11. AIR 1958 SC 376.,
12. AIR 1997 SC 987.
13. AIR 2000 SC 2017. H
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A edifice of evidence that is admissible in law and the plight of
witnesses in a criminal trial in the following manner: -
"It has become more or less a fashion to have a criminal
case adjourned again and again till the witness tires and
he gives up. It is the game of unscrupulous lawyers to get
B
adjournments for one excuse or the other till a witness is
won over or is tired. Not only that a witness is threatened;
he is abducted; he is mained; he is done away with; or
even bribed. There is no protection for him. In adjourning
the matter without any valid cause a Court unwittingly
c becomes party to miscarriage of justice."
27. In the present case, as the documents brought on
record would reveal, in the midst of examination of PW-1,
learned counsel for the defence stated that he was not feeling
D well and was unable to stand in the court and the court
adjourned the matter to 8.5.1999 for a period of four weeks.
The said witness was not examined on the adjourned date but
on 7.2.2000 and on that day, after the examination-in-chief was
over, cross-examination was deferred at the instance of the
E learned counsel for the defence. Similarly, when PW-4 was
examined, the case was adjourned on a prayer being made
by the learned counsel for the defence. It is interesting to note
that cross-examination of PW-2 eventually took place on
2.8.2000. On a perusal of the dates of examination-in-chief and
F cross-examination and the adjournments granted, it neither
requires Solomon's wisdom nor Aurgus-eyed scrutiny to
observe that the trial was conducted in an absolute piecemeal
manner as if the entire trial was required to be held at the mercy
of the counsel. This was least expected from the learned trial
G Judge. The criminal dispensation system casts a heavy burden
on the trial Judge to have control over the proceedings. The
criminal justice system has to be placed on a proper pedestal
and it cannot be left to the whims and fancies of the parties or
their counsel. A trial Judge cannot be a mute spectator to the
trial being controlled by the parties, for it is his primary duty to
H
GURNAIB SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 585
[DIPAK MISRA, J.)
monitor the trial and such a monitoring has. to be in consonance A
with the Code of Criminal Procedure.
28. In this context, a useful reference may be made to the
decision in Ambika Prasad and Another v. State (Delhi Admn.,
Delhi)1 4 • This Court, while commenting on the threat meted out
8
to the informant in that case and adjournment sought by the
counsel for the defense to cross-examine the said witness,
opined as follows:-
"At this stage. we would observe that the Sessions
Judge ought to have followed the mandate of Section 309 C
CrPC of completing the trial by examining the witnesses
from day to day and not giving a chance to the accused
to threaten or win over the witnesses so that they may not
support the prosecution."
D
[Emphasis supplied]
Thereafter, the Court took note of the fact that after
examination-in-chief of PW 4 was over on 6-2-1984, the
counsel representing the accused requested the Court that
because of his uncle's demise, he would not be in a position E
to cross-examine the witness and, therefore, recording of further
cross-examination might be adjourned. Thereafter, the witness
was cross-examined in the month of July, 1985. This Court
observed that it was highly improper and even if the request
for adjournment of the learned counsel for the accused was F
accepted, the cross-examination ought not to have been
deferred beyond two or three days.
29. In State of U.P. v. Shambhu Nath Singh and Others15,
the Court, while not appreciating the practice of a Sessions G
Court adjourning the case in spite of the presence of the
witnesses willing to be examined fully, ruled thus:-
14. AIR 2000 SC 718.
15. c2001) 4 sec 667. H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A "We make it abundantly clear that if a witness is present
in court he must be examined on that day. The court must
know that most of the witnesses could attend the court only
at heavy cost to them, after keeping aside their own
avocation. Certainly they incur suffering and loss of income.
B The meagre amount of bhatta (allowance) which a witness
may be paid by the court is generally a poor solace for the
financial loss incurred by him. It is a sad plight in the trial
courts that witnesses who are called through summons or
other processes stand at the doorstep from morning till
c evening only to be told at the end of the day that the case
is adjourned to another day. This primitive practice must
be reformed by the presiding officers of the trial courts and
it can be reformed by everyone provided the presiding
officer concerned has a commitment towards duty."
D 30. In the said case, the Court referred to the conditions
laid down by the legislature under Section 309 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure which deals with the power to postpone or
adjourn proceedings and proceeded to state that the first sub-
section of Section 309 of the Code mandates on the trial courts
E that the proceedings shall be held expeditiously but the words
"as expeditiously as possible" have provided some play at the
joints and it is through such play that delay often creeps in the
trials. Even so, the second limb of the sub-section warrants for
a more vigorous stance to be adopted by the court at a further
F advanced stage of the trial. That stage is when the examination
of the witnesses begins. The legislature which diluted the vigour
of the mandate contained in the initial limb of the sub-section
by using the words "as expeditiously as possible" has chosen
to make the requirement for the next stage (when examination
G of the witnesses has started) to be quite stern. Once the case
reaches that stage, the statutory command is that such
examination "shall be continued from day to day until all the
witnesses in attendance hawe been examined". The solitary
exception to the said stringent rule is, if the court finds th~t
H adjournment "beyond the following day to be necessary" the
·.
GURNAIB SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 587
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
same can be granted for which a condition is imposed on the A
court that reasons for the same should be recorded. Even this
dilution has been taken away when the witnesses are in
attendance before the court. After so stating, the Court held that
in such situations, the court is not given any power to adjourn
the case except in extreme contingency for which the second B
proviso to sub-section (2) has imposed another condition by
providing further that when the witnesses' are in attendance, no
adjournment or postponement shall be granted, without
examining them, except for special reasons to be recorded in
writing. c
31. It is apt to note here that this Court expressed its
distress that it has become a common practice and regular
occurrence that the trial Courts flout the legislative command
with impunity.
D
32. In Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.8. 16, a three-Judge
Bench did not approve the deferment of the cross-examination
of the witness for a long time and, deprecating the said
practice, it observed as follows:~
E
"Unnecessary adjournments give a scope for a grievance
that the accused persons get a time to get over the
witnesses. Whatever be the truth in this allegation, the fact
remains that such adjournments lack the spirit of Section
309 of the Code. When a witness is available and his
examination-in-chief is over, unless compelling reasons F
are there, the trial court should not adjourn the matter on
the mere asking."
33. Recently, in Aki/@ Javed v. State of De/hP 7, the Court,
after surveying the earlier pronouncements, has stressed on the G
compliance of the procedure and expressed its anguish that
the trials are not strictly adhering to the procedure prescribed
1e. c2002) 1 sec 334.
17. 2012 (11) SCALE 709. H
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 3 S.C.R.
A under the provisions contained in Section 231 along with
Section 309 of the CrPC, and further emphasised that such
adherence can ensure speedy trial of cases and also rule out
the possibility of any maneuvering taking place by granting
undue long adjournment for mere asking.
B
34. We have expressed our anguish, agony and concern
about the manner in which the trial has been conducted. We
hope and trust that the trial courts shall keep in mind the
statutory provisions and the interpretation placed by this Court
and not be guided by their own thinking or should not become
C mute spectators when a trial is being conducted by allowing the
control to the counsel for the parties. They have their roles to
perform. They are required to monitor. They cannot abandon
their responsibility. It should be borne in mind that the whole
dispensation of criminal justice at the ground level rests on how
D a trial is conducted. It needs no special emphasis to state that
dispensation of criminal justice is not only a concern of the
Bench but has to be the concern of the Bar. The administration
of justice reflects its purity when the Bench and the Bar perform
their duties with utmost sincerity. An advocate cannot afford to
E bring any kind of disrespect to fairness of trial by taking
recourse to subterfuges for procrastinating the same.
35. Consequently, the appeal is partly allowed and the
appellant be set at liberty if his detention is not required in
F connection with any other case.
R.P. Appeal partly allowed.
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