GURMIT SINGH BHATIAversusKIRAN KANT ROBINSON AND OTHERS

                          [2019] 9 S.C.R. 593                            593


                    GURMIT SINGH BHATIA                                  A
                                  v.
           KIRAN KANT ROBINSON AND OTHERS
               (Civil Appeal Nos. 5522-5523 of 2019)
                           JULY 17, 2019                                 B
        [DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD AND
                        M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
      Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.1, r.10 – Impleadment of
party – Respondent nos. 2 & 3-original plaintiffs filed a suit against   C
respondent no.1-original defendant no.1 for specific performance
of the agreement to sell/contract – During the pendency of the suit
and despite the injunction against the respondent no.1 not to alienate
or transfer the suit property, he executed a sale deed in favour of
appellant – Pursuant thereto, appellant filed an application u/Or.1
                                                                         D
r.10 of the CPC for impleadment as a defendant in the suit – Trial
Court directed the original plaintiffs to join the appellant as a
defendant in the suit – Writ petition – High Court set aside the order
passed by the Trial Court and held that as no relief was claimed
against the appellant, he cannot be said to be necessary or formal
party – On appeal, held: Considering the principle that plaintiff is     E
the dominus litis and cannot be forced to add parties against whom
he does not want to fight unless there is a compulsion of the rule of
law – Also, considering the decision of Supreme Court in the case
of Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, the appellant cannot be impleaded as
a defendant in the suit filed by the original plaintiffs for specific
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performance of the contract against the original defendant no.1 to
which the appellant is not a party and that too against the wish of
the plaintiffs – No reason to interfere with the judgment of the High
Court.
      Dismissing the appeals, the Court
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      HELD: Whether the plaintiffs can be compelled to implead
a person in the suit for specific performance, against his wish and
more particularly with respect to a person against whom no relief
has been claimed by him?

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                                 593
594            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 9 S.C.R.


A           1.1 An identical question came to be considered before
      this Court in the case of Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal and applying
      the principle that the plaintiff is the dominus litis, in the similar
      facts and circumstances of the case, this Court observed and held
      that the question of jurisdiction of the court to invoke Order 1
      Rule 10 CPC to add a party who is not made a party in the suit by
B
      the plaintiff shall not arise unless a party proposed to be added
      has direct and legal interest in the controversy involved in the
      suit. It is further observed and held by this Court that two tests
      are to be satisfied for determining the question who is a necessary
      party. The tests are – (1) there must be a right to some relief
C     against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the
      proceedings; (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence
      of such party. It is further observed and held that in a suit for
      specific performance the first test can be formulated is, to
      determine whether a party is a necessary party there must be a
      right to the same relief against the party claiming to be a
D
      necessary party, relating to the same subject matter involved in
      the proceedings for specific performance of contract to sell. It is
      further observed and held by this Court that in a suit for specific
      performance of the contract, a proper party is a party whose
      presence is necessary to adjudicate the controversy involved in
E     the suit. It is further observed and held that the parties claiming
      an independent title and possession adverse to the title of the
      vendor and not on the basis of the contract, are not proper parties
      and if such party is impleaded in the suit, the scope of the suit for
      specific performance shall be enlarged to a suit for title and
      possession, which is impermissible. It is further observed and
F
      held that a third party or a stranger cannot be added in a suit for
      specific performance, merely in order to find out who is in
      possession of the contracted property or to avoid multiplicity of
      the suits. It is further observed and held by this Court that a
      third party or a stranger to a contract cannot be added so as to
G     convert a suit of one character into a suit of different character.
      [Para 5.2] [600-E-H; 601-A-C]
            1.2 That thereafter, after observing and holding as above,
      this Court further observed that in view of the principle that the
      plaintiff who has filed a suit for specific performance of the contract
H     to sell is the dominus litis, he cannot be forced to add parties
    GURMIT SINGH BHATIA v. KIRAN KANT ROBINSON                           595


against whom, he does not want to fight unless it is a compulsion        A
of the rule of law. In the aforesaid decision in the case of Kasturi,
it was contended on behalf of the third parties that they are in
possession of the suit property on the basis of their independent
title to the same and as the plaintiff had also claimed the relief of
possession in the plaint and the issue with regard to possession
                                                                         B
is common to the parties including the third parties, and therefore,
the same can be settled in the suit itself. It was further submitted
on behalf of the third parties that to avoid the multiplicity of the
suits, it would be appropriate to join them as party defendants.
This Court did not accept the aforesaid submission by observing
that merely in order to find out who is in possession of the             C
contracted property, a third party or a stranger to the contract
cannot be added in a suit for specific performance of the contract
to sell because they are not necessary parties as there was no
semblance of right to some relief against the party to the contract.
It is further observed and held that in a suit for specific
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performance of the contract to sell the lis between the vendor
and the persons in whose favour agreement to sell is executed
shall only be gone into and it is also not open to the Court to
decide whether any other parties have acquired any title and
possession of the contracted property. It is further observed
and held by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if the plaintiff   E
who has filed a suit for specific performance of the contract to
sell, even after receiving the notice of claim of title and possession
by other persons (not parties to the suit and even not parties to
the agreement to sell for which a decree for specific performance
is sought) does not want to join them in the pending suit, it is
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always done at the risk of the plaintiff because he cannot be
forced to join the third parties as party-defendants in such suit.
The aforesaid observations are made by this Court considering
the principle that plaintiff is the dominus litis and cannot be forced
to add parties against whom he does not want to fight unless
there is a compulsion of the rule of law. Therefore, considering         G
the decision of this Court in the case of Kasturi, the appellant
cannot be impleaded as a defendant in the suit filed by the original
plaintiffs for specific performance of the contract between the
original plaintiffs and original defendant no.1 and in a suit for
specific performance of the contract to which the appellant is not
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596            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 9 S.C.R.


A     a party and that too against the wish of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs
      cannot be forced to add party against whom he does not want to
      fight. If he does so, in that case, it will be at the risk of the
      plaintiffs. [Para 5.2] [603-D-H; 604-A-E]
            Robin Ramjibhai Patel v. Anandibai Rama @ Rajaram
B           Pawar (2018) 15 SCC 614 ; Shri Swastik Developers
            v. Saket Kumar Jain 2014 (2) Mh. L.J 968
            – inapplicable.
            Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal (2005) 6 SCC 733 : [2005]
            3 SCR 864 – relied on.
C                              Case Law Reference
      2014 (2) Mh. L.J 968              held inapplicable         Para 3.3
      [2005] 3 SCR 864                  relied on                 Para 4.1
      (2018) 15 SCC 614                 held inapplicable         Para 6
D
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 5522-
      5523 of 2019.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 03.07.2013 of the High Court
      of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in W.P. (227)/856/2012 and order dated
      05.08.2013 in Review Petition No. 169 of 2013 in W.P. (227)/856/2012.
E
             Prashanto Chandra Sen, Sr. Adv., P. S. Sudheer, Rishi Maheshwari,
      Ms. Anne Mathew, Ms. Raj Lakshmi Singh, Kaustab Singh, Ms. Shruti
      Jose, Advs. for the Appellants.
           M. Shoeb Alam, Ujjwal Singh, Gautam Prabhakar, Mojahid Karim
F     Khan, Kunal Verma, Advs. for the Respondents.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            M. R. SHAH , J.
             1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
      and order dated 3.7.2013 passed in Writ Petition No. 856/2012 and order
G
      dated 5.8.2013 passed in Review Petition No. 169/2013 in Writ Petition
      No. 856/2012 by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, by which
      the High Court has allowed the said writ petition preferred by the original
      plaintiffs and has quashed and set aside the order passed by the learned
      trial Court allowing the application preferred by the appellant herein for
H
     GURMIT SINGH BHATIA v. KIRAN KANT ROBINSON                                597
                   [M. R. SHAH , J.]

impleading him as a necessary party to the suit filed by respondent nos.       A
2 & 3 herein – the original plaintiffs, the original applicant – appellant
has preferred the present appeals.
      2. The facts of the case leading to these appeals in nutshell are as
follows:
       Respondent nos. 2 & 3 herein – the original plaintiffs filed a suit     B
against respondent no.1 herein – original defendant no.1 for specific
performance of the agreement to sell/contract dated 3.5.2005 executed
by respondent no.1 – original defendant no.1 in the Court of learned 4th
Additional District Judge, Bilaspur. That during the pendency of the
aforesaid suit and despite the injunction against respondent no.1 herein       C
– original defendant no.1 – original owner not to alienate or transfer the
suit property, respondent no.1 herein – original defendant no.1 executed
a sale deed in favour of the appellant herein vide sale deed dated
10.07.2008. The appellant herein – purchaser who purchased the suit
property during the pendency of the suit filed an application in the pending
suit under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC for impleadment as a defendant           D
in the suit. It was the case on behalf of the appellant herein that he has
purchased the suit property and is a necessary and proper party to the
suit as he has a direct interest in the suit property. That by an order
dated 5.11.2012, the learned trial Court allowed the said application and
directed the original plaintiffs to join the appellant as a defendant in the   E
suit.
       2.1 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by
the learned trial Court dated 5.11.2012 allowing the application and
permitting the appellant herein to be joined as a party defendant in the
suit filed by the original plaintiffs – respondent nos. 2 & 3 herein,          F
respondent nos. 2 & 3 herein filed writ petition No. 856/2012 before the
High Court of Chhattisgarh. By the impugned judgment and order dated
3.7.2013, the High Court has allowed the said writ petition and has quashed
and set aside the order passed by the learned trial Court allowing the
impleadment application preferred by the appellant herein by holding
that as regards the relief claimed against the original defendants and as      G
no relief has been claimed against the appellant herein, the appellant
cannot be said to be a necessary or formal party. That thereafter the
appellant preferred a review application which came to be dismissed.
Hence, the present appeals by way of special leave petitions.
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598            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 9 S.C.R.


A           3. Shri Prashanto Chandra Sen, learned Senior Advocate has
      appeared on behalf of the appellant and Shri M. Shoeb Alam, learned
      Advocate has appeared on behalf of the original plaintiffs.
            3.1 Learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant
      has vehemently submitted that once the learned trial Court allowed the
B     impleadment application submitted by the appellant herein under Order
      1 Rule 10 of the CPC holding that the appellant is a necessary and
      proper party, the High Court, in exercise of powers under Article 227 of
      the Constitution of India, ought not to have interfered with the same.
            3.2 It is vehemently submitted by the learned Senior Advocate
C     appearing on behalf of the appellant that as such the appellant has
      purchased the suit property from the same vendor and, in fact, the
      appellant was prior agreement to sell holder and to protect the interest
      of the appellant the appellant is a necessary and proper party. It is
      submitted that therefore the learned trial Court rightly allowed the
      impleadment application submitted by the appellant.
D
             3.3 Making the above submissions and relying upon the decision
      of this Court in the case of Robin Ramjibhai Patel v. Anandibai Rama
      @ Rajaram Pawar, reported in (2018) 15 SCC 614 and the decision
      of the Bombay High Court in the case of Shri Swastik Developers vs.
      Saket Kumar Jain, reported in 2014 (2) Mh. L.J 968, it is prayed to
E     allow the present appeals and quash and set aside the impugned judgments
      and orders passed by the High Court and restore the order passed by
      the learned trial Court.
             4. The present appeals are vehemently opposed by Shri M. Shoeb
      Alam, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the original plaintiffs. It
F     is vehemently submitted that in fact the appellant purchased the suit
      property during the pendency of the suit and that too in violation of the
      injunction granted by the learned trial Court. It is submitted that as such
      the prior agreement to sell upon which reliance has been placed by the
      appellant is a concocted and forged one. It is submitted that in any case
G     the appellant cannot be impleaded as a defendant in a suit filed by the
      original plaintiffs for specific performance of the agreement to sell/
      contract to which the appellant is not a party. It is submitted that the
      original plaintiffs are the dominus litis and without their consent nobody
      can be permitted to be impleaded as defendant.

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     GURMIT SINGH BHATIA v. KIRAN KANT ROBINSON                                     599
                   [M. R. SHAH , J.]

       4.1 It is vehemently submitted that as such the issue involved in            A
the present case is squarely covered against the appellant in view of the
decision of this Court in the case of Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, reported
in (2005) 6 SCC 733.
       4.2 Insofar as the reliance placed upon the decision of this Court
in the case of Robin Ramjibhai Patel (supra) as well as the decision of             B
the Bombay High Court in the case of Shri Swastik Developers
(supra) by the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
appellant, it is vehemently submitted by Shri M. Shoeb Alam, learned
Advocate appearing on behalf of the original plaintiffs that the said
decisions shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. It is
submitted that in the aforesaid two cases, it was an application by the             C
original plaintiff to implead the subsequent purchaser who purchased
the property during the pendency of the suits. It is submitted that as held
by this Court in the case of Kasturi(supra), it is for the plaintiff/plaintiffs
to implead a particular person/persons as defendant/defendants and if
he/they does not/do not join then it will be at the risk of the plaintiff/          D
plaintiffs. It is further submitted that the plaintiff cannot be forced to
implead any other person, more particularly who is not a party to the
contract, against the wish of the plaintiff. It is submitted that therefore
the aforesaid two decisions, upon which reliance has been placed by the
learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant, shall not
be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. It is submitted that as             E
such the decision of this Court in the case of Kasturi (supra) clinches
the issue and shall be squarely applicable to the facts of the case on
hand.
       4.3 Making the above submissions and relying upon the decision
of this Court in the case of Kasturi(supra), it is prayed to dismiss the            F
present appeals.
       5. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties
at length.
       5.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that the original plaintiffs   G
filed the suit against the original owner – vendor – original defendant
no.1 for specific performance of the agreement to sell with respect to
suit property dated 3.5.2005. It is an admitted position that so far as
agreement to sell dated 3.5.2005 of which the specific performance is
sought, the appellant is not a party to the said agreement to sell. It
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600             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 9 S.C.R.


A     appears that during the pendency of the aforesaid suit and though there
      was an injunction against the original owner – vendor restraining him
      from transferring and alienating the suit property, the vendor executed
      the sale deed in favour of the appellant by sale deed dated 10.07.2008.
      After a period of approximately four years, the appellant filed an
      application before the learned trial Court under Order 1 Rule 10 of the
B
      CPC for his impleadment as a defendant. The appellant claimed the
      right on the basis of the said sale deed as well as the agreement to sell
      dated 31.3.2003 alleged to have been executed by the original vendor.
      The said application was opposed by the original plaintiffs. The learned
      trial Court despite the opposition by the original plaintiffs allowed the
C     said application which has been set aside by the High Court by the
      impugned judgment and order. Thus, it was an application under Order
      1 Rule 10 of the CPC by a third party to the agreement to sell between
      the original plaintiffs and original defendant no.1 (vendor) and the said
      application for impleadment is/was opposed by the original plaintiffs.
      Therefore, the short question which is posed for consideration before
D
      this Court is, whether the plaintiffs can be compelled to implead a person
      in the suit for specific performance, against his wish and more particularly
      with respect to a person against whom no relief has been claimed by
      him?
              5.2 An identical question came to be considered before this Court
E     in the case of Kasturi (supra) and applying the principle that the plaintiff
      is the dominus litis, in the similar facts and circumstances of the case,
      this Court observed and held that the question of jurisdiction of the court
      to invoke Order 1 Rule 10 CPC to add a party who is not made a party
      in the suit by the plaintiff shall not arise unless a party proposed to be
F     added has direct and legal interest in the controversy involved in the suit.
      It is further observed and held by this Court that two tests are to be
      satisfied for determining the question who is a necessary party. The
      tests are – (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in
      respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no effective
      decree can be passed in the absence of such party. It is further observed
G     and held that in a suit for specific performance the first test can be
      formulated is, to determine whether a party is a necessary party there
      must be a right to the same relief against the party claiming to be a
      necessary party, relating to the same subject matter involved in the
      proceedings for specific performance of contract to sell. It is further
H
     GURMIT SINGH BHATIA v. KIRAN KANT ROBINSON                                601
                   [M. R. SHAH , J.]

observed and held by this Court that in a suit for specific performance of     A
the contract, a proper party is a party whose presence is necessary to
adjudicate the controversy involved in the suit. It is further observed
and held that the parties claiming an independent title and possession
adverse to the title of the vendor and not on the basis of the contract, are
not proper parties and if such party is impleaded in the suit, the scope of
                                                                               B
the suit for specific performance shall be enlarged to a suit for title and
possession, which is impermissible. It is further observed and held that
a third party or a stranger cannot be added in a suit for specific
performance, merely in order to find out who is in possession of the
contracted property or to avoid multiplicity of the suits. It is further
observed and held by this Court that a third party or a stranger to a          C
contract cannot be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a
suit of different character. In paragraphs 15 and 16, this Court observed
and held as under:
        “15. As discussed hereinearlier, whether Respondents 1 and 4
      to 11 were proper parties or not, the governing principle for            D
      deciding the question would be that the presence of Respondents
      1 and 4 to 11 before the court would be necessary to enable it
      effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the
      questions involved in the suit. As noted hereinearlier, in a suit for
      specific performance of a contract for sale, the issue to be decided
      is the enforceability of the contract entered into between the           E
      appellant and Respondents 2 and 3 and whether contract was
      executed by the appellant and Respondents 2 and 3 for sale of the
      contracted property, whether the plaintiffs were ready and willing
      to perform their part of the contract and whether the appellant is
      entitled to a decree for specific performance of a contract for          F
      sale against Respondents 2 and 3. It is an admitted position that
      Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 did not seek their addition in the suit on
      the strength of the contract in respect of which the suit for specific
      performance of the contract for sale has been filed. Admittedly,
      they based their claim on independent title and possession of the
      contracted property. It is, therefore, obvious as noted hereinearlier    G
      that in the event, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 are added or impleaded
      in the suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance of the
      contract for sale shall be enlarged from the suit for specific
      performance to a suit for title and possession which is not
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602      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 9 S.C.R.


A     permissible in law. In the case of Vijay Pratap v. Sambhu Saran
      Sinha [(1996) 10 SCC 53] this Court had taken the same view
      which is being taken by us in this judgment as discussed above.
      This Court in that decision clearly held that to decide the right,
      title and interest in the suit property of the stranger to the contract
      is beyond the scope of the suit for specific performance of the
B
      contract and the same cannot be turned into a regular title suit.
      Therefore, in our view, a third party or a stranger to the contract
      cannot be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a
      suit of different character. As discussed above, in the event any
      decree is passed against Respondents 2 and 3 and in favour of
C     the appellant for specific performance of the contract for sale in
      respect of the contracted property, the decree that would be passed
      in the said suit, obviously, cannot bind Respondents 1 and 4 to 11.
      It may also be observed that in the event, the appellant obtains a
      decree for specific performance of the contracted property against
      Respondents 2 and 3, then, the Court shall direct execution of
D
      deed of sale in favour of the appellant in the event Respondents 2
      and 3 refusing to execute the deed of sale and to obtain possession
      of the contracted property he has to put the decree in execution.
      As noted hereinearlier, since Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 were not
      parties in the suit for specific performance of a contract for sale
E     of the contracted property, a decree passed in such a suit shall not
      bind them and in that case, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 would be at
      liberty either to obstruct execution in order to protect their
      possession by taking recourse to the relevant provisions of CPC,
      if they are available to them, or to file an independent suit for
      declaration of title and possession against the appellant or
F
      Respondent 3. On the other hand, if the decree is passed in favour
      of the appellant and sale deed is executed, the stranger to the
      contract being Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 have to be sued for
      taking possession if they are in possession of the decretal property.
      16. That apart, from a plain reading of the expression used in
G     sub-rule (2) Order 1 Rule 10 CPC “all the questions involved in
      the suit” it is abundantly clear that the legislature clearly meant
      that the controversies raised as between the parties to the litigation
      must be gone into only, that is to say, controversies with regard to

H
     GURMIT SINGH BHATIA v. KIRAN KANT ROBINSON                                603
                   [M. R. SHAH , J.]

      the right which is set up and the relief claimed on one side and         A
      denied on the other and not the controversies which may arise
      between the plaintiff-appellant and the defendants inter se or
      questions between the parties to the suit and a third party. In our
      view, therefore, the court cannot allow adjudication of collateral
      matters so as to convert a suit for specific performance of contract
                                                                               B
      for sale into a complicated suit for title between the plaintiff-
      appellant on one hand and Respondents 2 and 3 and Respondents
      1 and 4 to 11 on the other. This addition, if allowed, would lead to
      a complicated litigation by which the trial and decision of serious
      questions which are totally outside the scope of the suit would
      have to be gone into. As the decree of a suit for specific               C
      performance of the contract for sale, if passed, cannot, at all,
      affect the right, title and interest of Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 in
      respect of the contracted property and in view of the detailed
      discussion made hereinearlier, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 would
      not, at all, be necessary to be added in the instant suit for specific
                                                                               D
      performance of the contract for sale.”
        That thereafter, after observing and holding as above, this Court
further observed that in view of the principle that the plaintiff who has
filed a suit for specific performance of the contract to sell is the dominus
litis, he cannot be forced to add parties against whom, he does not want
to fight unless it is a compulsion of the rule of law. In the aforesaid        E
decision in the case of Kasturi(supra), it was contended on behalf of
the third parties that they are in possession of the suit property on the
basis of their independent title to the same and as the plaintiff had also
claimed the relief of possession in the plaint and the issue with regard to
possession is common to the parties including the third parties, and           F
therefore, the same can be settled in the suit itself. It was further
submitted on behalf of the third parties that to avoid the multiplicity of
the suits, it would be appropriate to join them as party defendants. This
Court did not accept the aforesaid submission by observing that merely
in order to find out who is in possession of the contracted property, a
third party or a stranger to the contract cannot be added in a suit for        G
specific performance of the contract to sell because they are not
necessary parties as there was no semblance of right to some relief
against the party to the contract. It is further observed and held that in

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604             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 9 S.C.R.


A     a suit for specific performance of the contract to sell the lis between the
      vendor and the persons in whose favour agreement to sell is executed
      shall only be gone into and it is also not open to the Court to decide
      whether any other parties have acquired any title and possession of the
      contracted property. It is further observed and held by this Court in the
      aforesaid decision that if the plaintiff who has filed a suit for specific
B
      performance of the contract to sell, even after receiving the notice of
      claim of title and possession by other persons (not parties to the suit and
      even not parties to the agreement to sell for which a decree for specific
      performance is sought) does not want to join them in the pending suit, it
      is always done at the risk of the plaintiff because he cannot be forced to
C     join the third parties as party-defendants in such suit. The aforesaid
      observations are made by this Court considering the principle that plaintiff
      is the dominus litis and cannot be forced to add parties against whom
      he does not want to fight unless there is a compulsion of the rule of law.
      Therefore, considering the decision of this Court in the case of Kasturi
      (supra), the appellant cannot be impleaded as a defendant in the suit
D
      filed by the original plaintiffs for specific performance of the contract
      between the original plaintiffs and original defendant no.1 and in a suit
      for specific performance of the contract to which the appellant is not a
      party and that too against the wish of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs cannot
      be forced to add party against whom he does not want to fight. If he
E     does so, in that case, it will be at the risk of the plaintiffs.
             6. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this
      Court in the case of Robin Ramjibhai Patel (supra) and the decision
      of the Bombay High Court in the case of Shri Swastik Developers
      (supra), relied upon by the learned Senior Advocate for the appellant is
F     concerned, the aforesaid decisions shall not be applicable to the facts of
      the case on hand as in both the aforesaid cases, it was the plaintiff who
      submitted an application to implead the third parties/subsequent
      purchasers who claimed title under the vendor of the plaintiff. Position
      will be different when the plaintiff submits an application to implead the
      subsequent purchaser as a party and when the plaintiff opposes such an
G     application for impleadment. This is the distinguishing feature in the
      aforesaid two decisions and in the decision of this Court in the case of
      Kasturi(supra).
            7. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we are
      in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. No
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     GURMIT SINGH BHATIA v. KIRAN KANT ROBINSON                                 605
                   [M. R. SHAH , J.]

interference of this Court is called for. The appellant cannot be impleaded     A
as a defendant in the suit for specific performance of the contract
between the original plaintiffs and original defendant no.1 against the
wish of the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the present appeals stand dismissed.
However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no
order as to costs.
                                                                                B

Ankit Gyan                                                 Appeals dismissed.




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