Holding

The High Court’s directions were quashed as they violated natural justice, and the order was vacated without terminating the proceedings.

Summary

The appellant, Gurmej Singh, a police officer who was a deemed witness in a criminal trial, challenged a High Court order directing the State to prosecute him without giving him any notice. The Supreme Court held that such directions violated the principles of natural justice, particularly the rules of audi alteram partem and nemo judex in causa sua. Consequently, the High Court’s directions were set aside and the order was vacated, though the case was not terminated and fresh proceedings could be initiated. The Court reiterated that an order struck down for breaching natural justice does not constitute a final decision on the merits. The appeal was allowed, restoring the appellant’s right to a fair hearing.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court’s directions to prosecute the appellant without notice violated the principles of natural justice.
Whether an order vacated for breach of natural justice results in a final decision on the case.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 342, s. 395, s. 450

Subjects

natural justiceaudi alteram partemnemo judex in causa suacriminal procedureorder vacatedfresh proceedingsSupreme Court of Indiacriminal appeal

Judgment

(2009] 9 S.C.R. 1

GURMEJ SINGH A
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 992 of 2009)

APRIL 28, 2009
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR
)
GANGULY, JJ.]

Administrative Law:
c
Natural justice - Principles of - Interpretation - Held:
Whenever order is struck down as invalid being violative of
principles of natural justice, there is no final decision of the
case and fresh proceedings are left upon - Order challenged
-+' by virtue of its inherent defect is to be vacated, but '·
D
proceedings are not terminated - On facts, accused convicted
u/s.395, 450, 342 /PC - Direction by High Court qua
appellant-investigating officer, who was the main person
involved in the matter but not prosecuted, without issuance of
notice - There was violation of principles of natural justice -
Hence directions by High Court qua appellant not E
maintainable and set aside.
t Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India 1978 (2) SCR 621,
referred to.
' F
Ray v. Local Government Board (1914) 1 KB 160;
General Council of Medical Education & Registration of U.K.
v. Sanckman 1943 AC 627: (1948) 2 All ER 337; Board of
Education v. Rice 1911 AC 179: 80 LJKB 796; Spackman
v. Plumstead District Board of Works 1985 (10) AC 229:54
G,
LJMC 81; Drew v. Drew and Lebura 1855(2) Macg. 1.8;
,J.
James Dunber Smith v. Her Majesty the Queen 1877-78(3)
App.Case 614; Arthur John Specman v. Plumstead District
Board of Works 1884-85(10) App.Case 229; Vionet v. Barrett
1 H

•
..........
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 9 S.C.R.

A 1885(55) LJRD 39; Hookings v. Smethwick Local Bo~rtJ of ~
Health 1890(24) QBD 712; Ridge v. Baldwin 1963(1) WB
569; In re R.N. (An lnfaot) 1967(2) 8617, 530; Fairmount
Investments Ltd. v. Secretary to State for Environment .1976
WLR 1255; Regina v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs Ex
B Parle Hosenba/11977 (1) WLR 766; Bosewel/'s case (1605)
6 Co.Rep. 48-b, 52-a, referred to.

Case Law Reference: ;k.

(1914) 1 KB 160 Referred to. Para 8
c 1943 AC 627 Referred to. Para 8
1911 AC 179 Referred to. Para 9
1985 (10) AC 229 Referred to. Para 10 ·
-
D 1855(2) Macg. 1.8 Referred to. Para-13 ...,.

1877-78(3) AC 614 Referred to. p·ara 13
1884-85(10) AC 229 . Referred to. Para 13

E .1885(55) LJRD 39 Referred to. Pata 13
1890(24) QBD 712 Referred to. Para 13
1963(1) WB 569 Referred to. Para 13
1978 (2) SCR 621 Referred to. Para 13
F
1967(2)· 8617, 530 Referred to. Para 13 I
t
.,.,
1976 WLR 1255 Referred to. Para 13
1977 (1) WLR 766 Referred to. Para 13
G (1605) 6 Co.Rep. 48-b, 52-a Referred to Para 15
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal ,!._

No. 992 of 2009.

From the Judgment & Order dated 08.11.2006 of the High
H
GURMEJ SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 3

Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Appeal No. A
-~
1746-SB of 2005.
WITH
SL.P (Crl.) No. 1623 of 2007.

- SLP (R) ... CRLMP No. 3892 of 2007.
Ranjit Kapoor, AAG (Pub.), Gurminder Singh, D. Mahesh
Babu, K.G. Bhagat, Vineet Bhagat, Manju Bhagat, Monohr
B

Singh Bakshi; Debasis Misra, Vipin Gogia, Jaspreet Gogia,
Sonia Kapoor, S.N. Mehrotra, Falak Mohd., Jaideep Malik, ~jay
Pal, H.M. Singh, Jasneet Kaur, Praveen Kr. Singh, Kaushal c
Yadav, Durgesh Yadav and Kuldip Singh the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Application for impleadment
is rejected. D·
...
2. Leave granted.
··"' 3. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by· a
learned single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court which
gave certain directions qua the present appellant who was the
Investigating officer. One Sanjiv Kumar filed an appeal against E
the judgment dated 17/7/2005 passed by learned Sessions
Judge, Kapurthala, whereby the said accused Sanjiv Kumar
was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 395,
-+
450, 342 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the · IPC').
F
4. The complainant Sukhraj Singh also filed a revision for
payment of compensation. The prosecution version was that the
accused Sanjiv Kumar was posted as ASI in Police Station City
Phagwara. On 23/2/2002 at about 7.30 p.m. he along with 4-5
unidentified persons had committed an offence of trespass by
G
entering into building of M/s. Wadhawan Forex (P) Limited
Phagwara. He allegedly committed dacoity by robbing Sukhraj
),
Singh Director of that Company of the Indian currency and
foreign currency. There were other aspects highlighted by the
prosecution in the trial. We are not concerned with those
H
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 9 S.C.R.

A presently.
1-
5. The present appellant appeared as DW.1 and
~upported the version given in Fl R No.19 dated 23/2/2002
registered by Gurmej Singh Inspector SHO. The High Court was
of the view, while dealing with the appeal of Sanjiv Kumar, that
B it would have been fair and proper to involve the present
appellant and all the persons named in FIR No.19 and to
prosecute them and that if they had been present in the Court .l_
then the witnesses could say whether they were the other
persons or not. It was also observed that when the other
c persons were not challaned or shown then the witnesses could
always say about Sanjiv Kumar ASI and 4-5 unidentified
persons. With these observations and after discussing the
evidence, the High Court upheld the conviction of the accused
-Sanjiv Kumar for offence punishable under Sections 395, 450
~o and 342 IPC. High Court was of the view that the senterwe of
imprisonment imposed on the appellant Sanjiv Kumar was on
the higher side especially when the appellant herein who was
the main person involved in the matter had not been
prosecuted. The Home Secretary of the State and the DGP
E were directed to look into the matter and take steps to
prosecute the appellant herein in the appeals atleast for the
offences for which Sanjiv Kumar appellant has been charged
or at least for preparing false documents involving Sukhraj
Singh and keeping him wrongfully confined. -+-
F 6. Though various points were argued, the main contention .._

made for the appellant was that the observations and directions ;

were given even without issuance of notice to the appellant. In
other words he lfas been condemned without even hearing him.
According to the learned counsel, the basic principles of natural
G justice have been violated. Learned counsel for the State fairly.
accepted that no. opportunity was granted during hearing of the
appeal by the High Court.
"'
...
7. Principles of natural justice are those rules which have
been laid down by the Courts as being the minimum protection
H
"
GURMEJ SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. /5
.\-
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
I

of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that A
may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative
authority while making an order affecting those rights. These
rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice ..

8. What is meant by the term 'principles of natural justice'
B
).; is not easy to determine. Lord Summer (then Hamilton, L.J.) in
Ray v. Local Government Board (1914) 1 KB 160 at p.199:83
LJKB 86) described the phrase as sadly lacking in precision.
In General Council of Medical Education & Registration of U.K.
v. Sanckman (1943 AC 627: (1948) 2 All ER 337), Lord Wright
observed that it was not desirable to attempt 'to force it into any c
procusteam bed' and mentioned that one essential requirement
was that the Tribunal should be impartial and have no personal
-.- interest in the controversy, and further that it should give 'a full
and fair opportunity' to every party of being heard.
D
9. Lord Wright referred to the leading cases on the subject.
The most important of them is the Board of Education v. Rice
(1911 AC 179:80 LJKB 796), where Lord Loreburn, LC.
observed as follows:
E
"Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they
have originated, the practice of imposing upon
-t
departments or offices of State the duty of deciding or
determining questions of various kinds. It will, I suppose
usually be of an administrative kind, but sometimes, it will
involve matter of law as well as matter of fact, or even F
depend upon matter of law alone. In such cases, the Board
of Education will have to ascertain the law and also to
ascertain the facts. I need not and that in doing either they
must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides for that'
). is a duty lying upon everyone who decides anything. But I G
'
do not think they are bound to treat such a question as
though it were a trial.. .. The Board is in the nature of the
arbitral tribunal, and a Court. of law has no jurisdiction to
hear appeals from the determination either upon law or
upon fact. But if the Court is satisfied either that the Board H
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 9 S.C.R.
-r
A -have not acted judicially in the way I have described, or
have not determined the question which they are required
by the Act to determine, then there is a remedy by
mandamus and certiorari".

10. Lord Wright also emphasized from the {)am~ tj@~i~ion
B
the observation of the Lord Chancellor that the Bo~rd q~n ,.\._

obtain information in any way they think best, always giving ft
fair opportunity to those who are parties to the controversy for
correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial
to their view''. To the same effect are the observations of Earl
c of Selbourne, LO in Spackman v. Plumstead District Board
of Worl<s (1985 (10) AC 229:54 LJMC 81), where the learned
and noble Lord Chancellor observed as follows:

"No doubt, in the absence of special provisions as 't
D to how the person who is to decide is to proceed, law will
imply no more than that the substantial requirements of
justice shall not be violated. He is not a judge in the proper
sense of the word; but he must give the parties an
opportunity of being heard before him and stating their
E case and their view. He must give notice when he will
~
. proceed with the matter and he must act honestly and
impartially and not under the dictation of some other +
person or persons to whom the authority is not given by
law. There must be no malversation of any kind. There
would be no decision within the meaning of the statute if
F
there were anything of that sort done contrary to the
essence of justice".

11. Lord Selboume also added that the essence of justice
consisted in requiring that all parties should have an
G opportunity of submitting to the person by whose decision they : .
). .... /

are to be bound, such considerations as in their judgment ought
to be brought before him. All these cases lay down the very
important rule of natural justice contained in the oft-quoted
'' '
phrase 'justice should not only be done, but should be seen to
H be done'.
GURMEJ SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 7
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
12. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal A
of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules
embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed
thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to
be performed under a stat~te.. What particular rule of natural
justice should b§ impliad and what its context should be in a 8
J-. giy~I'\ gf!~~ ffiY§t depend to a great extent on the fact and
c;imum§tances of that case, the frame-work of the statute under
whioh the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial
act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an
administrative order which involves civil consequences must be c
consistent with the rules of natural justice. Expression 'civil
consequences' encompasses infraction of not merely property
or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations, and
non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything
_,,. that affects a citizen in his civil life.
D
13. Natural justice has been variously defined by different
Judges: A few instances will suffice. In Drew v. Drew and
Lebura (1855(2) Macg. 1.8, Lord Cranworth defined it as
'universal justice'. In James Dunber Smith v. Her Majesty the
Queen (1877-78(3) App.Case 614, 623 JC) Sir Robort P. E
Collier, speaking for the judicial committee of Privy council,
1,t~ect the phrase 'the requirements of substantial justice', while
in Arthur John Specman v. Plumstead Distri_ct Board of Works
(1884-85(10) App.Case 229, 240), Earl of Selbourne, S.C.
preferred the phrase 'the substantial requirement of justice'. In F
Vlonet v. Barrett (1885(55) LJRD 39, 41), Lord Esher, MR
defined natural justice as 'the natural sense of what is right and
wrong'. While, however, deciding Hookings v. Smethwick Local
Board of Health (1890(24) QBD 712), Lord Fasher, M.R.
instead of using the definition given earlier by him in Vionet's G
case (supra) chose to define natural justice as 'fundamental
justice'. In Ridge v. Baldwin (1963(1) WB 569, 578), Harman
LJ, in the Court of Appeal countered natural justice with 'fair-
play in action' a phrase favoured by Bhagawati, J. in Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India (1978 (2) SCR 621). In re R.N. (An H
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 9 S.C.R.

A lnfaot) (1967(2) 8'617, 530),Lord Parker, CJ, preferred to
describe natural justice as 'a duty to act"fairly'. In fairmount
Investments Ltd v. Secre(?ry to State for Environment (1976
WLR 1255) Lord Russell ofWillowan somewhat picturesquely
described natural justice as 'a fair crack of the whip' while
B Geoffrey Lane, LJ. In Regina v. Secretary of State for Home
Affairs Ex Parte Hosenb~ll (1977 (1) WLR 766) preferred the A.
homely phrase 'common fairness'.

, 14. How then have the principles of natural justice been
interpreted in the Courts and within what limits are they to be
c confined? Over the years by a process of judicial interpretation
two rules have been evolved as representing the principles of
natural justice in judicial process, including therein quasi judicial
and administrative process.

D 15. They constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing,
having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair-play and
justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country
but is shared in common by all men. The first rule is 'nemo judex
in causa sua' or 'nemo debet esse judex in propria causa sua'
E as stated in (1605) 12 Co.Rep.114 that is, 'no man shall be a
judge in his own cause'. Coke used the form 'aliquis non debet
esse j~dex in propria causa quia non potest esse judex at pars'
(Co.Litt. 1418), that is, 'no man ought to be a judge in his own +-
case, because he cannot act as Judge and at the same time
F be a party'. The form 'nemo potest esse simul actor et judex',
that is, 'no one can be at once suitor and judge' is also at times
used. The second rule is 'audi alteram partem', that is, 'hear
the other side'. At times and particularly in continental countries,
the form 'audietur at altera pars' is used, meaning very much
the same thing. A corollary has been deduced from the above
G
two rules and particularly the audi alteram partem rule, namely Ji.,
'qui aliquid statuerit parte inaudita alteram actquam licet dixerit,
haud acquum facerit' that is, 'he who shall decide anything j

without the other side having been heard, although he may have

H
said what is right, will not have been what is right' (See "'
GURMEJ SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. 9
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

Bosewell's case (1605) 6 Co.Rep. 48-b, 52-a) or in other A
·- words, as It is now expressed, 'justice should not only be done
but should manifestly be seen to be done'. Whenever an order
is struck down as invalid being in violation of principles Qf
natural justice, there is no final decision of the case and fresp
proceedings are left upon. All that is done is to vacate the order B
assailed by virtue of its inherent defect, but the proceedings are
not terminated.
16. Above being the position in law the observations and
directions given by the High Court qua the present appellant
cannot be maintained and stand quashed. C

17. The appeal is allowed.

N.J. Appeal allowed.

-

,_.A.
\