GURMEET SINGHversusSTATE OF PUNJAB

                        [2021] 7 S.C.R. 153                            153


                        GURMEET SINGH                                  A
                                 v.
                       STATE OF PUNJAB
                (Criminal Appeal No. 1731 of 2010)
                                                                       B
                          MAY 28, 2021
          [N. V. RAMANA, CJI, SURYA KANT AND
                  ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.]
      Penal Code, 1860 – s.304-B – Death of married woman after
she consumed poison in her matrimonial home – Conviction of            C
appellant-husband by Courts below – Challenge to – Held: On facts,
not acceptable – Death was caused within seven years of marriage
in “otherwise than under normal circumstances” – Consistent and
confidence inspiring testimony of deceased’s father (PW4) about
continuing harassment meted out to deceased on account of dowry        D
– Prosecution having satisfied the necessary ingredients u/s.304B
IPC, the presumption u/s.113-B, Evidence Act took full effect, which
was not rebutted by the appellant – Courts below did not err in
convicting appellant u/s.304-B, IPC as appellant failed to discharge
the burden u.s.113-B, Evidence Act – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.113B.
                                                                       E
       Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 304B and 498A – Plea that conviction
u/s.304B cannot be sustained without any charges u/s. 498A – Held:
Is not tenable – Offences u/s.498A and s.304B, IPC are distinct in
nature – Although cruelty is a common thread existing in both the
offences, however the ingredients of each offence are distinct and
must be proved separately by the prosecution – If a case is made       F
out, there can be a conviction under both the sections.
      Penal Code, 1860 – s.304-B – Conviction under – Necessary
ingredients –Ingredient as to existence of dowry demand “soon before
her death” – Interpretation of – Held: The expression “soon before”
cannot be interpreted to mean “immediately before”, rather the         G
prosecution has to show that there existed a “proximate and live
link” between the cruelty and the consequential death of the victim
– Words and Phrases – Expressions “soon before”, “immediately
before” and “proximate and live link”.
                                                                       H
                                153
154            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 7 S.C.R.


A           Penal Code, 1860 – s.304-B – Guidelines issued by Supreme
      Court in Satbir Singh case relating to trial u/s.304B – Re-iterated.
            Evidence Act, 1872 – s.113B – Presumption of causation –
      Held: Once the necessary ingredients u/s.304-B, IPC stand satisfied,
      a presumption of causation arises against the accused u/s.113-B,
B     Evidence Act and the accused has to rebut this statutory presumption
      – Penal Code, 1860 – s.304B.
            Dismissing the appeal, the Court
            HELD : 1.1. Section 304-B(1), IPC defines ‘dowry death’
      of a woman. It provides that ‘dowry death’ is where death of a
C     woman is caused by burning or bodily injuries or occurs otherwise
      than under normal circumstances, within seven years of marriage,
      and it is shown that soon before her death, she was subjected to
      cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her
      husband, in connection with demand for dowry. Further, Section
D     304-B(2), IPC provides punishment for the aforesaid offence.
      [Para 9][159-D-F]
            1.2. In the present case, admittedly, the marriage between
      the deceased and the accused-appellant took place on 23.11.2004,
      and the death of the deceased occurred in 2008 after she consumed
E     poison in her matrimonial home. Therefore, the first two
      ingredients as to death under otherwise than ‘normal
      circumstances’ within seven years of marriage stand satisfied.
      [Para 10][160-C-D]
            1.3. The next important ingredient which needs to be
F     established is the existence of dowry demand “soon before her
      death”. This court in catena of judgments have held that, “soon
      before” cannot be interpreted to mean “immediately before”,
      rather the prosecution has to show that there existed a “proximate
      and live link” between the cruelty and the consequential death of
      the victim. [Para 11][160-D-E]
G
            1.4. PW4 (Complainant), the father of the deceased, has
      clearly stated that after the marriage the deceased had
      telephonically informed him about the consistent demand of a car
      or equivalent cash by the accused. In 2007, when the complainant

H
             GURMEET SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB                         155


visited India, the deceased had also expressed her unhappiness        A
due to constant harassment. Moreover, when he returned to the
country in July, 2008, the deceased had reiterated the factum of
demands before him. The complainant also stated as to how the
families attempted to mediate the dispute themselves and on
multiple occasions he gave certain gifts to the appellant and his
                                                                      B
family to ameliorate the situation. Another important circumstance
is that the mother of the deceased had informed the father 15-20
days prior to the incident about the continuing harassment of the
deceased on account of dowry. [Para 12][160-F-H]
       1.5. Both the Trial Court and the High Court found the
                                                                      C
evidence of P.W.4 to be reliable and consistent despite a thorough
cross-examination. No evidence was produced by the appellant
to disregard the aforesaid testimony. The testimony of PW4 is
found to be consistent and inspiring confidence by this Court as
well. Taking into account the evidence on record, particularly the
testimony of PW4, it is clear that the prosecution has proved the     D
necessary ingredients under s.304-B, IPC against the accused-
appellant. [Para 13][161-A-C]
       2. Now, that necessary ingredients under s.304-B, IPC
stands satisfied, a presumption of causation arises against the
accused under s.113-B, Evidence Act and the accused has to rebut      E
this statutory presumption. [Para 14][161-C-D]
      3. The defence of the accused that his family and family of
the deceased shared a cordial relationship, and in fact, the
appellant had helped the mother of deceased in getting treatment
of cancer, merits rejection as being untenable. The Trial Court       F
concluded that the accused-appellant, who was working as a
technician in a hospital, has forged the hospital records to prove
the existence of cordial relationship between the families of the
deceased and the accused. The conclusion reached by the Trial
Court is based on a detailed analysis of the evidence on record,
                                                                      G
and does not warrant any interference. The appellant has not
brought to attention any material to suggest that the above finding
of the Trial Court was perverse or without any basis. [Paras 15,
16][161-D-E, 162-D]

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156            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2021] 7 S.C.R.


A           4. The next submission of the appellant was that the
      deceased was suffering from depression owing to the health of
      her mother. However, no evidence has been produced on record
      by the appellant to indicate that the deceased was depressed due
      to the alleged poor health condition of her mother. In fact, no
      evidence was produced to even show that her mother’s health
B
      was deteriorating. [Para 17][162-E-F]
            5. The prosecution having satisfied the necessary
      ingredients under Section 304B of IPC, the presumption under
      Section 113-B, Evidence Act takes full effect in this particular
      case, which has not been rebutted by the accused-appellant. The
C     appellant has failed to make out a case for interference with the
      concurrent opinions of the Courts below, convicting the accused-
      appellant under Section 304-B, IPC. [Para 18][162-F-G]
             6. The plea that without any charges under s. 498A, IPC a
      conviction under s. 304-B, IPC cannot be sustained, is not tenable,
D     as the offences under s. 498-A and s. 304-B, IPC are distinct in
      nature. Although cruelty is a common thread existing in both the
      offences, however the ingredients of each offence are distinct and
      must be proved separately by the prosecution. If a case is made
      out, there can be a conviction under both the sections. [Paras 19,
E     20][162-G-H; 163-D-E]
            7. After perusing the relevant material and the evidence
      available, it is found that the High Court and trial court have not
      committed any error in convicting the appellant under s. 304-B,
      IPC as the appellant failed to discharge the burden under s. 113-
F     B, Evidence Act. [Para 22][164-H; 165-A]
            Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana 2021 AIR 2627;
            Kamesh Panjiyar v. State of Bihar [2005] 1 SCR 903;
            Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, [2000] 3 SCR 662; Rajinder
            Singh v. State of Punjab, [2015] 2 SCR 835 – relied
G           on.
                            Case Law Reference
             2021 AIR 2627          relied on               Para 9
             [2000] 3 SCR 662       relied on               Para 11
H
              GURMEET SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB                             157


        [2015] 2 SCR 835        relied on                 Para 11          A
        [2005] 1 SCR 903        relied on                 Para 19
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1731 of 2010
      From the Judgment and Order dated 15.03.2010 of the High Court       B
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Appeal No. 2298-SB of
2009.
      Rishi Malhotra, Adv. for the Appellant.
       Ms. Jaspreet Gogia, Karanvir Gogia, Ms. Shivangi Singhal, Advs.
for the Respondent.                                                        C
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      N. V. RAMANA, CJI
       1. The present appeal arises out of the impugned judgment dated
15.03.2010 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at               D
Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 2298-SB of 2009, wherein the High
Court dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant herein and upheld
the order of the Trial Court convicting him under Section 304-B, IPC and
sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and a
fine of Rs.5000/-.
                                                                           E
       2. The facts as per the prosecution are as follows: the deceased,
daughter of the complainant was engaged to the appellant in 2004.
Subsequent to the engagement, the complainant left for Abu Dhabi in
April, 2004 and in his absence the marriage between the appellant and
the deceased was solemnized on 23.11.2004.In 2006, a child was born
out of the wedlock. When the complainant returned from abroad in 2007,     F
the deceased informed him that the mother-in-law, father-in-law and the
appellant-husband used to physically assault her pursuant to the demand
of dowry. Allegedly, the complainant gave a gold chain to the accused
persons. The complainant thereafter went abroad and returned to India
on 21.07.2008. The deceased further disclosed that her in-laws were        G
demanding money for the purchase of a car. However, this time, the
complainant failed to fulfill the demand.
      3. On 08.08.2008, the father-in-law of the deceased informed the
complainant that the deceased has consumed poison and lost her
consciousness and was being taken to the hospital. Upon reaching the       H
158             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 7 S.C.R.


A     hospital, the complainant found his daughter to be unconscious. Later
      that day she died.
              4. The Trial Court, vide order dated 03.09.2009 convicted the
      appellant-husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law for the offence under
      Section 304-B and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
B     seven years each and a fine of Rs.5000/- each. In default of payment of
      fine, the accused persons were directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment
      for one year each.
            5. Aggrieved, the accused persons approached the High Court in
      appeal. Vide impugned judgment dated 15.03.2010, the High Court
C     acquitted the father-in-law and the mother-in-law, but upheld the order
      of conviction and sentence passed against the accused-appellant.
      Challenging the aforesaid judgment of the High Court, the accused-
      appellant has approached this Court.
             6. The counsel appearing on behalf of the accused-appellant argued
D     that the Courts below have, as a matter of routine, applied the presumption
      u/s 113B of Evidence Act in the instant case wherein even the basic and
      essential ingredient of Section 304-B, IPC are not satisfied. It was
      submitted that just because the death of the deceased occurred within
      seven years of marriage, by no stretch of imagination can it be said that
      the deceased soon before her death was subjected to cruelty in connection
E     with the demand of dowry. The fact that the deceased was happy with
      the appellant is clearly evident as she lived with him and bore his child,
      and never mentioned any harassment or cruelty being meted out by the
      appellant. Furthermore, the gifts received by the appellant-husband were
      voluntarily given by the complainant and his family. Lastly, without any
F     charges under Section 498A, IPC a conviction under Section 304-B,
      IPC cannot be sustained.
             7. On the contrary, the counsel on behalf of the State argued that
      it was undeniable that the death in the present case has occurred within
      four years of marriage, under suspicious circumstances i.e., due to
G     poisoning. Moreover, fifteen days before the incident, the deceased had
      specifically told her father about the latest demand of money for the
      purchase of a car. Lastly, it was established before the Courts below that
      the accused had forged the medical records of his mother-in-law to show
      cordial relationship between the two families. Therefore, owing to all the
      aforesaid circumstances, the presumption under Section 113B, Evidence
H     Act operates against the accused-husband, which has not been rebutted.
              GURMEET SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB                                159
                    [N. V. RAMANA, CJI]

      8. Heard the counsel appearing for both sides. Section 304-B,           A
IPC, which defines and provides the punishment for dowry death, reads
as under:
      “304-B. Dowry death. —(1) Where the death of a woman is
      caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than
      under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage           B
      and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to
      cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband
      for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall
      be called ‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall be
      deemed to have caused her death.
                                                                              C
      Explanation. —For the purpose of this sub-section, ‘dowry’ shall
      have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition
      Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
      (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
      imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years        D
      but which may extend to imprisonment for life.”
       9. Section 304-B(1), IPC defines ‘dowry death’ of a woman. It
provides that ‘dowry death’ is where death of a woman is caused by
burning or bodily injuries or occurs otherwise than under normal
circumstances, within seven years of marriage, and it is shown that soon      E
before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her
husband or any relative of her husband, in connection with demand for
dowry. Further, Section 304-B(2), IPC provides punishment for the
aforesaid offence. This Court, in the recent judgment of Satbir Singh v.
State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1735-1736 of 2010 summarised
the law under Section 304-B, IPC and Section 113B, Evidence Act as            F
under:
      “i. Section 304-B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the
      legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry
      demand.
                                                                              G
      ii. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the
      necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section
      304-B, IPC.Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable
      presumption of causality, provided under Section 113-B, Evidence
      Act operates against the accused.
                                                                              H
160             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 7 S.C.R.


A           iii. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304-B, IPC
            cannot be construed to mean ‘immediately before’. The prosecution
            must establish existence of “proximate and live link” between the
            dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the
            husband or his relatives.
B           iv. Section 304-B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in
            categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason
            for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring
            “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be
            homicidal or suicidal or accidental.”
C           10. In the present case, admittedly, the marriage between the
      deceased and the accused-appellant took place on 23.11.2004, and the
      death of the deceased occurred in 2008 after she consumed poison in
      her matrimonial home. Therefore, the first two ingredients as to death
      under otherwise than ‘normal circumstances’ within seven years of
      marriage stand satisfied.
D
             11. The next important ingredient which needs to established is
      the existence of dowry demand “soon before her death”. This Court in
      catena of judgments have held that, “soon before” cannot be interpreted
      to mean “immediately before”, rather the prosecution has to show that
      there existed a “proximate and live link” between the cruelty and the
E     consequential death of the victim.[See Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana
      (supra); Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207; Rajinder
      Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477].
             12. Here, the evidence of the father of the deceased (P.W.4)-
      Sarwan Singh, assumes great importance. He has clearly stated that
F     after the marriage the deceased had telephonically informed him about
      the consistent demand of a car or of equivalent cash by the accused. In
      2007, when this witness visited India, the deceased had also expressed
      her unhappiness due to the constant harassment. Moreover, when he
      returned to the country in July, 2008, the deceased had reiterated the
G     factum of demands before him. The witness also stated as to how the
      families attempted to mediate the dispute themselves and on multiple
      occasions the father of deceased gave certain gifts to the accused and
      his family to ameliorate the situation. Another important circumstance
      which comes to our attention is that the mother of the deceased had
      informed the father 15-20 days prior to the incident about the continuing
H     harassment of the deceased on account of dowry. Finally, on 08.08.2008,
               GURMEET SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB                                    161
                     [N. V. RAMANA, CJI]

the father-in-law of the deceased informed this witness about the                  A
consumption of poison by the deceased.
       13. It is necessary to highlight that both the Trial Court and the
High Court found the above evidence of P.W.4- the father of the deceased
to be reliable and consistent despite a thorough cross-examination. No
evidence was produced by the appellant to disregard the aforesaid                  B
testimony. On perusing the testimony of PW4, we are also of the
considered opinion that the same is consistent and inspires confidence.
Taking into account the evidence on record, particularly the testimony of
the father of the deceased, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has
proved the necessary ingredients under Section 304-B, IPC against the
accused-appellant.                                                                 C

       14. Now, that necessary ingredients under Section 304-B, IPC
stands satisfied, a presumption of causation arises against the accused
under Section 113-B, Evidence Act and the accused has to rebut this
statutory presumption.
                                                                                   D
       15. The defence of the accused is that his family and family of the
deceased shared a cordial relationship, and in fact, the appellant had
helped the mother of deceased in getting treatment of cancer. The Trial
Court, after a thorough examination of the evidences- both oral and
documentary, concluded that the accused-appellant, who was working
as a technician in a hospital, has forged the hospital records to prove the        E
existence of cordial relationship between the families of the deceased
and the accused. The relevant observations of the Trial Court on this
point are as follows:
      “Gurmeet Singh accused was working as O.T. Technician. Gurmit
      Singh brought Baksho Devi to the hospital and he examined her                F
      and given Chemotherapy. He has further stated that photo copy
      of the entries in the file are Ex.Dl and she was treated upto
      17.8.2008. This witness in his cross-examination has admitted that
      it is correct that in the entries in the file it is not recorded as to who
      brought the patient. He has also admitted that remarks column of             G
      Ex.Dl is blank and it does not bear his signatures any where. He
      also stated that what treatment was to be given is mentioned in
      the treatment file. He also stated that patient was also treated by
      other doctors. So this witness has stated that the patient was treated
      upto 17.8.08. Ex.Dl is dated 18.8.08. Admittedly Rama Devi has
                                                                                   H
162             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 7 S.C.R.


A           expired on 8.8.08. The case against accused Gurmit Singh was
            registered on 9.8.08. As per the statement of PW-11 SI Dharam
            Pal, accused Gurmit Singh was arrested in this case on 10.8.08.
            The personal search memo of the accused is Ex.P- 26, grounds of
            arrest memo is Ex.P-27 and ground of information memo is Ex.P-
            28 which was prepared by him and signed by accused and ASI
B
            Sukhdev Singh. So, if the accused was in custody since 10.8.08 till
            date, then how he could take her mother-in-law for treatment before
            Dr. K.K. Nayak DW-2 or got her treated from there. So, the
            defence evidence appears to have been crated and the same has
            been manipulated by the accused that he had been getting treatment
C           of his mother-in-law to show that his relations were cordial with
            the family of the victim or with the victim falls to the ground.”
                                                          (emphasis supplied)
             16. The aforesaid conclusion reached by the Trial Court is based
      on a detailed analysis of the evidence on record, and does not warrant
D     any interference. The appellant has not brought to our attention any
      material to suggest that the above finding of the Trial Court was perverse
      or without any basis. Hence, this defence of the appellant merits rejection
      as being untenable.
             17. The next submission of the appellant was that the deceased
E     was suffering from depression owing to the health of her mother. However,
      no evidence has been produced on record by the appellant to indicate
      that the deceased was depressed due to the alleged poor health condition
      of her mother. In fact, no evidence was produced to even show that her
      mother’s health was deteriorating.
F            18. Therefore, the prosecution having satisfied the necessary
      ingredients under Section 304B of IPC, the presumption under Section
      113-B, Evidence Act takes full effect in this particular case, which has
      not been rebutted by the accused-appellant herein. The appellant has
      failed to make out a case for us to interfere in the concurrent opinions of
G     the Courts below, convicting the accused-appellant under Section 304-B,
      IPC.
            19. Lastly, the counsel on behalf of the appellant argued that without
      any charges under Section 498A, IPC a conviction under Section 304-B,
      IPC cannot be sustained. On this aspect this Court in the case of Kamesh
      Panjiyar v. State of Bihar, (2005) 2 SCC 388 held as under:
H
              GURMEET SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB                                163
                    [N. V. RAMANA, CJI]

      “12. …….It is to be noted that Sections 304-B and 498-A                 A
      IPC cannot be held to be mutually inclusive. These
      provisions deal with two distinct offences. It is true that
      cruelty is a common essential to both the sections and that
      has to be proved. The Explanation to Section 498-A gives the
      meaning of “cruelty”. In Section 304-B there is no such explanation
                                                                              B
      about the meaning of “cruelty”. But having regard to the common
      background to these offences it has to be taken that the meaning
      of “cruelty” or “harassment” is the same as prescribed in the
      Explanation to Section 498-A under which “cruelty” by itself
      amounts to an offence. Under Section 304-B it is “dowry death”
      that is punishable and such death should have occurred within           C
      seven years of marriage. No such period is mentioned in Section
      498-A. If the case is established, there can be a conviction under
      both the sections.”
                                                    (emphasis supplied)
       20. Therefore, the argument raised by the counsel on behalf of the     D
appellant cannot be accepted as the offences under Section 498-A and
Section 304-B, IPC are distinct in nature. Although cruelty is a common
thread existing in both the offences, however the ingredients of each
offence are distinct and must be proved separately by the prosecution. If
a case is made out, there can be a conviction under both the sections.        E
      21. Before parting with this matter, we are of the opinion that it
would be beneficial to reiterate the guidelines issued by this Court in
Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana (supra) relating to trial under Section
304-B, IPC:
      “v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304-B, IPC read with        F
      113-B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should be
      careful during conduction of trial.
      vi.It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record
      the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and cursory
      manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to his          G
      defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused
      under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere procedural
      formality, as it based on the fundamental principle of fairness. This
      aforesaid provision incorporates the valuable principle of natural
      justice “audi alteram partem” as it enables the accused to offer
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164             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 7 S.C.R.


A            an explanation for the incriminatory material appearing against
             him. Therefore, it imposes an obligation on the court to question
             the accused fairly, with care and caution.
             vii. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the
             accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel
B            of the accused to prepare his defense since the inception of the
             Trial with due caution, keeping in consideration the peculiarities of
             Section 304-B, IPC read with Section 113-B, Evidence Act.
             viii. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “If, after taking the evidence
             for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the
C            prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers
             that there is no evidence that the accused committed the
             offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal”. Such
             discretion must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of
             best efforts.

D            ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to
             be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must
             move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence evidence’, calling
             upon the accused to present his defense as per the procedure
             provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an invaluable
             right provided to the accused.
E
             x. In the same breath, Trial Courts need to balance other important
             considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In this regard,
             we may caution that the above provisions should not be allowed to
             be misused as delay tactics.

F            xi. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the
             guidelines laid down by this Court while sentencing and imposing
             appropriate punishment.
             xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death
             is increasing day by day. However, it is also observed that
             sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even though
G
             they have no active role in commission of the offence and are
             residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court need to be
             cautious in its approach.”
            22. In light of the above findings, after perusing the relevant material
      and the evidence available, we find that the High Court and Trial Court
H
                 GURMEET SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB                              165
                       [N. V. RAMANA, CJI]

have not committed any error in convicting the appellant under Section         A
304-B, IPC as the appellant failed to discharge the burden under Section
113-B, Evidence Act.The appellant has not brought any material on record
which merits the interference of this Court in the impugned judgment.
      23. Appeal dismissed. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of
accordingly.                                                                   B


Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                                       Appeal dismissed.



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