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Supreme Court of India

GURDIAL BATRAversusRAJ KUMAR JAIN

Citation
1989 INSC 203
Decided
18 July 1989
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

Temporary sale of televisions alongside the permitted repair business does not amount to a change of user under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, and therefore does not justify eviction.

Summary

The appellant rented premises in Jalandhar to operate a cycle and rickshaw repair shop, but also sold televisions there temporarily for about seven months. The landlord sought eviction under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, alleging a change of user. The Rent Controller rejected the eviction, holding that the temporary TV sales did not constitute a different use, but the appellate authority reversed this decision and ordered eviction, which the High Court upheld. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the ancillary TV sales amounted to a statutory change of user under the Act, likening the provision to Section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act. Relying on precedent that a small, non‑prejudicial alteration in use does not trigger eviction, the Court held that the TV sales were an allied business and not a change of user. Consequently, the eviction order was set aside and the original controller’s decision restored.

Issues considered

  • Whether the tenant's temporary sale of televisions constitutes a change of user of the premises within the meaning of Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
  • Whether a small, non‑prejudicial alteration in the use of leased premises can justify eviction under the statutory provision.

Legislation cited

Subjects

evictionchange of userleaserent restrictioncommercial premiseslandlord-tenantstatutory restriction

Judgment

                                          GURDIAL BATRA
                                                                                               A
                                                v.
                                          RAJ KUMAR JAIN

                                             JULY 18, 1989

                       [RANGANATH MISRA AND KULDIP SINGH, JJ.]                                 B

                       East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949: Section
                13 (2) (ii) (b). Eviction-Premises let out for cycle and rickshaw repair-
                Business of selling televisions also carried on temporarily side by side-
                Whether change of user.
                                                                                               c
     t-·             Transfer of Property Act, 1882: Section 108(0) Change of user of
            •   premises-Prejudice to the interest of landlord-Whether necessary.


                      The appellant had taken the premises on rent from the respondent
                                                                                               D
                landlord for running a cycle and rickshaw repairing shop. In the rent
                note there was no stipulation that the appellant would not do any busi-
                ness in the shop except the cycle or rickshaw repairs. Along with the
                repair business the appellant temporarily carried on sale of televisions
                also in the premises. The landlord filed an application for eviction
                under section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
                                                                                               E
                Act, 1949 alleging that the tenant had put the premises to different use.

•                     The Rent Controller rejected the application by holding that the
                temporary sale of televisions did not constitute user for a purpose other
                than that for which the premises was leased. On an appeal filed by the
                lljndlord the appellate authority granted eviction by holding that the
                                                                                               F
                statutory condition was satisfied. The appeal filed by the tenant against
                the decision of the appellate authority was dismissed by the High Court.
                Hence this appeal by the tenant.

                      Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of eviction,
                                                                                               G
                      HELD: Letting of a premises can broadly be for residential or
    '--.(       commercial purpose. The restriction which is statutorily provided in
        '       section I3(2)(ii)(b) of the Act is obviously one to protect the interests of
                the landlord and is intended to restrict the use of landlord's premises
                taken l>y the tenant under lease. It is akin to the provision contained in
                sect!on IOS(o) of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with the obliga-        H

                                                    423
    424                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1989] 3 S.C.R.

A tions of a lessee. A house let for residential purpose would not be avail-
  able for being used as a shop even without structural alteration. The
  concept of injury to the premises which forms the foundation of clause
  (o) is the main basis for providing clause (b) in section 13(2)(ii) of the
  Act as a ground for the tenant's eviction. [426H, 427A-B]
B
          The landlord parts with possession of the premises by giving a
    lease of the property to the tenant for a consideration. Ordinarily, as
    long as tbe interest of the landlord is not prejudiced, a small change iii
    the user would not be actionable. In the instant case, the premises was
    let out for running of a repair shop. Along with the repair business,
    sale of televisions was temporarily carried on. This did not constitute a
C   change of user within the meaning of section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act so
    as to give a cause of action to the landlord to seek eviction of the
    tenant. [427E, F]

          Mohan Lal v. Jai Bhagwan, [1988] 2 S.C.C. 474, applied.
D
          Des Rajv. Sham Lal, A.I.R. 1980 P & H 229, held inapplicable.

         Moti Ram v. State of Mahdya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1594;
    Maharaj Krishan Kesar v. Milkha Singh, Civil Appeal No. 1086of1964
    decided on November IO, 1965 (S.C.); Dupport Steel Ltd. v. Sirs,
    [1980] 1 All. E.R. 529; U.P. Naing v. Burma Oil Co., A.I.R. 1929 P.C.
E
    108; Raghavan Pillai v. Sainaba Beevi, [1977] Kerala L.T. 417 and
    Dattatraya v. Guiab Rao, [19781 Maharashtra L.J. 545, referred to.

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2873                    •
    of 1987.
F
        From the Judgment and Order dated 5.8.1987 of the Punjab &
    Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No. 2209 of 1979.

         Harbans Lal, S.K. Mehta, Dhruv Mehta and Aman Vachher for
    the Appellant.
G
        Rajinder Sachhar, K.C. Dua and Ms. Manju Chopra for the
    Respondent.

          N.S. Das Behl, (Not present)

H         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                          GURDIAL BATRA v. R.K. JAIN [MISRA, J.]                   425

                 RANGANATH MISRA, J. This is a tenant's appeal by special
    '1"    leave challenging his eviction from a business premises located at
                                                                                          A
           Jallandhar.

                 Under a rent note (Exh. A-1), the appellant had taken the pre-
           mises on rent from the respondent-landlord. The use to which the
           premises was intended to be put was running of a cycle and rickshaw            B
           repairing shop. As far as relevant, on the allegation that the tenant had
           put the premises to different use, an application for his eviction was
           made under s. 13(2)(ii)(b) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
           Act, 1949.
     '
     ~I
~




                  The Controller found that the appellant had continued the busi-
           ness of repairing of cycles and rickshaws but side by side had for a           c
     ~     period of about seven months been selling televisions in the premises
           but he stopped the same as it was not viable. According to the Control-
           !er, this did not c<!.nstitute user for a purpose other than that for whicl]
           the premises was leased and he accordingly rejected the petition. The
           appellate authority at the landlord's instance held that the statutory         D
           condition was satisfied and granted eviction. The High Court when
           moved by the tenant declined to interfere.

                  The short question that arises for consideration is whether there
    J       has been a violation of the terms of tenancy by using the premises for a
            purpose other than that for which the premises had been leased. The           E
            tenant did not dispute that he had taken the premises for running a
            repair shop of cycles and rickshaws. In his statement he said that he
•           had commenced the business of selling the televisions side by side in
            view of the slump in the cycle and rickshaw repairing business. He also
            accepted the position that he had not obtained the consent of the
    ~       landlord when he started the TV business. The landlord has accepted
          · the position that in the rent note it was not written that the respondent
                                                                                          F

            would not do any business in the shop in dispute except the cycle or
            rickshaw repairs. On t)lese facts it has now to be decided as to whether
            the premises has been used for a purpose other than that for which it
            had been leased.
                                                                                          G
                 Reliance was placed on the Full Bench decision of the Punjab
           High c0 urt in Des Raj v. Sham Lal, AIR 1980 P & H 229 where the
    ~      question for consideration was as to whether when the lease was for
           the purpose of a shop without anything more specific, user thereof as a
           godown amounted to change of user. The High Court in course of the
           discussion in the judgment rightly drew the distinction between resi-          H
    426                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [1989] 3 S.C.R.

    dential and non-residential premises and also classified non-residential
A
    buildings into known categories like shop, godown, restaurant, cinema,
    hotel etc. In course of the discussion the Full Bench referred to the
    decision of this Court in Moti Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR
    1978 SC 1594 and came to the conclusion that when the letting out
    purpose was location of a shop and it was exclusively used as a
B   godown, it amounted to a change of user. Not much of support is
    directly available for the resolution of the present dispute from that
    judgment. Reliance was also placed on a decision of this Court in the
    case of Mohan Lal v. Jai Bhagwan, [1988] 2 SCC 474 where the very
    provision of the East Pun jab Act was considered in a case of eviction.       '



                                                                                  '
    The decision of this Court in the case of Maharaj Kishan Kesar v.
    Milkha Singh, (C.A. No. 1086/64 decided.on November 10, 1965) was
c   referred to therein. That again was a decision under the very Act and
    the dispute related to the allegation of change of user when petrol was
    sold as an allied business of the avowed purpose of locating the work-
    shop. The Court found that location of a petrol pump could not be
    regarded as not being a part of motor workshop bu~ess. Rightly, our
D   le;uned brother Mukharji, J. indicated that the ratio in Mciharaj
    Kishan Kesar's case did not provide any guideline of general nature.
    What was said in para 9 of his judgment is perhaps useful. Our learned
    Brother quoted the observations of Lord Diplock, J. in Duport Steels
    Ltd. v. Sirs, [1980] 1 All ER 529 and said:

E               "While respectfully agreeing with the said observations of
                Lord Diplock, that the Parliament Legislates to remedy
                and the judiciary interprets them, it has to be borne in mind
                that the meaning of the expression must be found in the felt
                necessities of the time. In the background of the purpose of
                rent legislation and inasmuch as in the instant case the
F               change of the user would not cause any mischief or detri-
                ment or impairment of the shop in question and in one
                sense could be called an allied business in the expanding
                concept of departmental stores, in our opinion, in this case
                there was no change ofuser which attracted the mischief of
                section 13(2)(ii)(b). "
G
    On that conclusion, the order of eviction was reversed.

          Letting of a premises can broadly be for residential or commer-
    cial purpose. The restriction which is statutorily provided in
    s. 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act is obviously one to protect the hiterests of the
H   landlord and is intended to restrict the use of the landlord's premises
                   GURDIAL BATRA v. R.K. JAIN (MISRA, J.]                 427

    taken by the tenant under lease. It is akin to the provision contained in    A
    s. 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with the obligations
    of a lessee. That clause provides: 'The lessee may use the property and
    its products, if any, as a person of ordinary prudence would use then if
    they were of his own; but be must not use or permit another to use the
    property for a purpose other than that for which it was leased .... ' A
    house let for residential purpose would not be available for being used      B
    as a shop even without structural alteration. The concept of injury to
    the premises which forms the foundation of cl. (o) is the main basis for
    providing cl.(b) ins. 13(2)(ii) of the Act as a ground for the tenant's
    eviction. The Privy Council in U Po Naing v. Burma Oil Co., AIR
    1929 PC 108 adopted the same consideration. The Kerala. High Court
    has held that premises let out for conducting trade in gold if also used     c
    for a wine store would not amount to an act destructive of or perma-
    nently injurious to the leased property (1977 Ker. LT 417). Similarly,
    the Bombay High Court has held that when the lease-deed provided
    for user of the premises for business of fret work and the lessee used
    the premises for business in plastic goods, change in the nature of
    business did not bring about change of user as contemplated in               D
    s. 108(0) of the Transfer of Property Act (1978 Mah. LJ 545).

          The landlord parts with possession of the premises by giving a
    lease of the property to the tenant for a consideration. Ordinarily, as
    long as the interest of the landlord is not prejudiced, a small change in
    the user would not be actionable.                                            E

          In this case, the premises was let out for running of a repair shop.
•   Along with the repair business, sale of televisions was temporarily
    carried on. We do not think this constituted a change of user within the
    meaning of s. 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act so as to give a cause of action to
    the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant.                                 F

         The appeal is allowed and the order of eviction passed by the
    appellate authority and affirmed by the High Court is vacated and the
    order of the Controller is restored. Parties are directed to bear their
    own costs throughout.
                                                                                 G
    T.N.A.                                                   Appeal allowed.


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