Supreme Court of India

GURBACHAN SINGH AND ANR.versusSHIVALAK RUBBER INDUSTRIES AND ORS.

Citation: 1996 INSC 310
Decided: 23 February 1996
Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
Bench: KULDIP SINGH

Holding

The Supreme Court held that the tenant's alterations materially impaired the value and utility of the premises, thereby justifying eviction under Section 13(2)(iii) of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949.

Summary

The landlords (Gurbachan Singh & Anr.) sought eviction of Shivalak Rubber Industries & Ors. under Section 13(2)(iii) of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949, alleging that the tenants had made extensive unauthorised alterations—removing roofs, walls, doors, converting shops into sheds, stores and residential units, and demolishing a boundary wall—that materially impaired the value and utility of the premises. The tenants denied the allegations, claiming the changes were prior to their tenancy or done with permission, and also raised sub‑letting and rent arrears issues. The Rent Controller and appellate authority held that even if the alterations occurred, they did not amount to material impairment and dismissed the eviction; the High Court affirmed. The Supreme Court held that "impair materially" means a substantial decrease in quality or worth judged from the landlord’s perspective, and that the alterations described unquestionably constituted material impairment, making eviction permissible. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the lower courts' orders set aside, and eviction ordered, with a stay until 30 June 1996.

Issues considered

Whether the tenant's alterations and additions to the demised premises amount to "material impairment" of the value or utility of the building under Section 13(2)(iii) of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
Whether the landlord is entitled to eviction on the ground of such material impairment.
Interpretation of the phrase "to impair materially" and the perspective (landlord vs tenant) for assessing impairment.

Subjects

evictionmaterial impairmentrent restriction actlandlord-tenantunauthorised alterationssub‑lettingvalue and utilitySection 13(2)(iii)East Punjab

Judgment

GURBACHAN SINGH AND ANR. A
v.
SHIVALAK RUBBER INDUSTRIES AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 23, 1996

(KULDIP SINGH AND FAIZAN UDDIN, JJ.] B

East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949, Section 13 (2) (iii) : Tenant
making additions and alterations in the demised premises-Whether matelial
impaimient of the value of the building-Whether tenant liable to eviction.

East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949 : Section 13(2) (iii) : Expres-
c
sions "to impair matelially" and "value" ocurring therein-Meaning of.

Section 13(2) (iii) of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949
makes the tenant of the demised premises liable to eviction where he has
committed such acts as are likely to impair materially the value or utility D
of the building or rented land.

The landlord appellants initiated eviction proceedings on the
grounds of subletting and alterations in the demised premises impairing
materially its value and utility. It was alleged that the tenant-respondents E
had, without written consent and in violation of the terms of tenancy
converted the five shops in the said premises into sheds, store, kothries
for residential purpose, and office by removing the intervening partition
walls and doors, converted the verandah in front of the shops into sheds
by closing it from the front by masonary wo~k, converted the open space
at the back of the premises into a shed with a pucca roof, constructed a F
lintel roof over all the shops by removing their original roof thereby
completely changing the shape of the building, demolished the boundary
wall on the western side to make a passage to the adjoining residential
property of Respondent No. 1, and that instead of carrying on trading
activity in the said premises the respondents had installed machinery and G
started an industry without written consent from the appellants. They also
took the plea that tenant~respondents were in arrears of rent.

The respondents denied all the adverse allegations with regard to
the alterations and additions in the demised premises. They took the stand
that these were made prior to the year 1971 before they were inducted as H
997
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] 2 S.C.R.

A tenant. They however admitted the construction of the shed, which accord-
ing to them was constructed under the terms and conditions of the tenancy
and with permission of the landlords. They further pleaded that the
demised premises were let out for carrying industrial business.

The Rent Controller decided all the issues in faV<~ur of the landlord-
B appellants except those relating to the alleged unauthorised additions and
alterations. He took the view that even if it be accepted that the tenant-
respondents had made the additions and alterations as alleged the same
did not materially impair the value and utility of the demised premises
and that the enclosure of the verandah or replacement of the roof of the
C shops also did not fall within the mischief of the provisions of section 13 (2)
(iii), and dismissed the eviction application. The appellate authority af-
firmed the findings of the Rent Controller. The High Court dismissed the
civil revision in limine.

Allowing the appeal, the.Court.
D
HELD : 1. Both the courts below fell into a serious error in failing
to apply the correct principles in determining whether the additions and
alterations alleged to have been made by the respondents in the demised
premises had materially impaired the value and or utility of the premises.
. r -

E [1006-B)

2. The meaning of the expression "to impair materially" used in
section 13(2) (iii), in common parlance would mean to diminish in quality,
strength or value substantially.· In other words, to make a thing or sub-
stance worse and deteriorate. The word "impair" is a relative term afford-
F ing different meaning in different context and situations. Here in the
context the term "impair materially" has been used to mean considerable
decrease in quality which may be measured with reference. to the antece-
dent state of things as it existed earlier in point of time as compared.to a
later stage after the alleged change is made or affected suggesting impair-
ment. Further, the use of the word "value" in the sub-clause means intrinsic
G worth of a thing. In other words, utility of an object satisfying, directly or
indirectly, the needs or desires of a person. Thus, the ground for eviction
of a tenant would be available to a landlord against the tenant under
section 13(2) (iii) of the Act, if it is established that the tenant has
committed such acts as are likely to diminish the quality, strength or value
H of the building or rented land to such an extent that the intrinsic worth or·
GURBACHANSINGHv. SHIVALAKRUBBERINDS. (FAIZANUDDIN,J.] 999

fitness of the building or the rented land has considerably affected its use A
for some desirable practical purpose. (1006-D-G]

3. The decrease or deterioration, in other words, the impairment of
the worth and usefulness or the value and utility of the building or rented
land has to be judged and determined from the point of view of the
landlord and not of the tenant or any one else. (1006-H] B

Vipin Kumarv. Roshan Lal Anand & Ors., (1993] 2 SCC 614, referred
to.

4. In the present case the removal of the roof of the shops, partition C
walls and the doors, laying of a roof, merging of the verandah with the
shops, closing the doors and opening new doors and windows and convert-
ing the premises altogether, giving totally a new and a different shape and
complexion by such alteration would certainly be regarded as one involving
material impairment of the premises from the point of view of the appellant-
landlords within the meaning of section 13(2) (iii) of the Act. (1008-B-C] D

5. The case, therefore, squarely falls within the mischief of the
provisions contained in section 13(2) (iii) of the Act, which makes the
tenant-respondents liable for eviction from the demised premises. (1008-D]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 514 of E
1994.

From the Judgment and Order dated 2.8.93 of the Punjab & Haryana
High Court in C.R.No. 618 of 1993.

D.V. Sehgal, Ms. Monika Gosain and M.K. Dua for the Appellants. F

E.C. Agrawala, AV. Palli and Mrs. Rekha Palli for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by.

FAIZAN UDDIN. J. This is landlords appeal. directed against the G
order dated August 7, 1993 passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana
at Chandigarh dismissing the appellants civil revision No. 618/1993 in
limine against the judgment dated November 17, 1992 passed by the
appellate authority, ~itsar in rent appeal No. 21 dated December 12,
1988 affirming the order dated November 4, 1988 passed by the Re1.lt H
\
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 2 S.C.R.

A Controller, Amritsar in ~ent application No. 106/81 dismissing the applica- -r-
tion of the appellants s~king eviction of the respondents 1, 1A to 1F from
the premises in suit. ·

2. Karam Singh, late father of the appellants, had purchased the
property at G.T. Road, Chhenartta from the Rehabilitation Department.
B The property consisted of 12 shops with a varandah in front of shops and
. vacant land at the main gate situated between the shops No. 6-S and 7-S.

3. The respondent No. 1, Shivalak Rubber Industries through its
proP.rietor, Dev Raj was inducted as a tenan.t of Karam Singh in shops No.
C 4-S to 6-S together with 10 ft vacant land behind the shops with effect from
May 1, 1958 on a monthly rent of Rs. 28. The respondents No. 1-A to 1-F
are the partners of respondent No. 1-firm. Later, by a rent note dated
October 25, 1965 the respondent No. 1-C Dev Raj obtained shops No. 2-S
and 3-S from late Karam Singh together with 10 ft open land behind the
D said shops and 7 ft wide strip of vacant land with the corresponding length
to shops No. 2-S to 6-S behind/adjoining 10 ft wide strip of land on a
monthly rent of Rs. 30. Thus shops No. 2-S to 6-S with the aforementioned
vacant land were let out to the. respondents No. 1 and 1-A to 1-F. The
owner/landlord Karam Singh expired on July 13, 1972 leaving behind him
the present appellants as his sons and respondents No. 2, 3 and 4 as his
E daughter. Karam Singh has executed a Deed of Will dated June 28, 1972
in favour of the appellants in respect ·of the suit premises by virtue of which
the appellants became the owners/landlords of the respondents No. 1, 1-A
to 1-F. The respondents No. 2 to 4 are iinpleaded as proforma respondents.

F 4. The appellants initiated eviction proceedings against the respon-
dents No. 1, 1-A to 1-F under the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949
on the grounds of sub-letting and alter<_ttions in the demised premises
impairing materially the value and utility of the premises let out to them.
The appellants alleged that the tenant-respondents.have acted in a manner
G which has materially impaired the value and utility of the demised premises
for having made various structural additions and alterations in the demised
premises without the written consent of the landlords and in violation of
the terms of tenancy.It was alleged that the tenant-respondents converted
the shops in the sheds, store, Kothries for residential purpose and office
by removing the intervening walls of the shops, removing the doors of the
·H 5 shops, converting verandah in front of the shops into sheds and closed
J GURBACHANSINGHv. SHIVALAKRUBBERINDS. [FAIZANUDDIN,J.) 1001

the said varandah from the front and opened the shops on G.T. Road by A
brick work. It was further pleaded that the tenant- respondents converted
shops No. 5-S and 6-S with verandah in front of the said shops by masonary
work for manufacturing of rubber goods by making big appurtures in the
walls between the 2 shops. It is alleged that door of shop· No. 2 is alleged
to have been removed and a small window with iron grills has been affixed B
in the front. It is alleged that the verandah is being used as office by closing
the door of shop No. 2 with masonary work and main part of shop No. 2
has been converted into a kothri with its entrance opening in the public
street towards west which is being used as residence by one Jumuna
Prasad, Respondent No. 5 to whom it has been sublet. The full size door
of shop No. 3 is alleged to have been removed and a door measuring 3 x C
7 ft has been installed in front of the verandah. Shop No. 4 has been alleged
to be merged with the verandah by fitting a door in the verandah in order
to make it a godown.

5. The appellants further alleged that the tenant-respondents had
demolished 17 ft long and 5 ft 9 inches high boundary wall existing on the D
western side of the demised land touching the house/kothi of Shri Chander
Muni, respondent No. 1-A, which separated the appellants property from
that of respondent No. 1-A on the western side. It has been allege<l that
the respondents made a passage to the demised land from the kothi of
respondent No. 1-A by fixing one big wooden door and one steel door in E
place of the demolished boundary wall, which opened in the courtyard of
the kothi of respondent No. 1-A. Adjacent to the wooden door a small
triangular shaped kothri with a door opening in the courtyard of the kothi
has also been constructed. A brick stair-case has also been constructed
from over this kothri as an access from the courtyard of the kothi to the
roof of the shed made even the demised land as a direct approach. The F
open space at the back of the shops let out to the respondents has thus
been converted by including the same into the shed with a pucca roof
without the permission of the appellants. It "has been alleged that the
tenant-respondents have constructed· a lintel roof over the shops No. 2-S
to 6-S and mis-appropriated the costly wooden building material used in G
the original roof and thereby completely changed the shape of the building
by closing it from the side of the G.T. Road merging the demised premises
with the residential kothi of respondent No. 1-A situated in the west.

6. Further allegation of the appellants was that the floor of the
demised shops has been totally damaged and the construction of the shed H
1002 ·SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 2 S.C.R.

A at the back of the shops has hampered light and air to the main building
impairing its value and utility. It was also the case of the appellants that
instead of trading activity in the demised. shops the respondent have
installed machinery and started industry of manufacturing rubber goods
without the written consent of the appellants. The appellants also alleged
that the two kothries illegally constructed on shop No. 2 and in the open
B space have been sub-let to one Jumuna Prasad, respondent No. 9 and other
person which afforded additional ground to the appellants to seek eviction
of the tenant respondents. The appellants also took the plea that the ·
tenant-respondents were in arrears of rent with effeet from October, 1981
which they failed to pay.
c
7. The respondents No. 1 and 1-A to 1-F contested the eviction
application filed by the appellants. They took preliminary objection disput-
ing the relationship of landlord and tenant between the newly added
respondents as partners of the firm, respondent No. 1 and for mis-joinder
of parties and causes of action. They also took the plea that the appellants
D
had no locus standi to file the eviction application as they were not the
legal heirs of deceased Karam Singh. The respondents denied all the
adverse allegations with regard to the alleged alterations and additions in
the demised premises. They took the plea that there were two separate
tenancies in respect of two separate premises with separate terms and
E conditions and, therefore, the single application for ejectment from both
the premises was not maintainable. The respondents took the stand that
the alleged additions and alterations were made prior to the year 1971
before they were inducted as tenant and, therefore, they were not respon-
sible for the same. The respondents, however, .admitted the construction
of shed which according to them was constructed under the terms and
F
conditions of the tenancy and with the permission of the landlord. The
respondents pleaded that the 3 shops· No. 4 to 6 were not separate shops
but it was only one unit having only one entrance from the road with 10 ft
space at the back. The respondents also denied any sub-letting by pleading
that Jamuna Prasad was their Chowkidar who was permitted to occupy the
G kothri as a Watchman. Regarding the change of user the respondents
pleaded that the demised premises were let out for carrying industrial
business and it was being used for tf-'.e same purpose.

·8 .. ·After recording the evidence and on evaluation of the oral and
H docu~entary evidence the Rent Controller decided all the issues in favou~
GURBACHANSINGHv. SHIVALAKRUBBERINDS. (FAIZANUDDIN,J.) 1003

of the landlord appellants except issues No. 2, 3 and 4 relating to the A
alleged unauthorised additions and alterations in the demised premises
which are said to have materially impaired the value and utility of the
premises and sub-letting a part of it to respondent No. 9. The Rent
Controller took the view that the first tenancy in respect of shops No. 4-S
to 6~S were created by late Karam Chand in favour of respondent No. 1 B
vide rent note dated May 14, 1958 and the second tenancy was also created
by late Karam Chand in favour of respondent No. 1 through the respondent
No. 1-C in respect of shops No. 2-S and 3-S with 10 ft wide open space
behind these shops and that both the tenancies were consolidated. The
Rent Controller also took the view that by virtue of the Deed of' Will dated
June 28, 1972 executed by the former landlord Karam Chand in favour of C

- his two sons, the appellants herein, they become the owner and landlord
of the disputed property to whom the tenant-respondents were paying rent
which fully establish the relationship of landlord and tenant between the
parties. The Rent Controller, however, took the view that the appellants
had failed to establish that the alleged additions and alterations were made D
by the respondents in the demised premises and at the same time held that
the notice issued to Chander Muni, respondent No. 1-A under Section 269
and 270 of the Municipal Corporation Act no doubt established that in the
year 1981 the respondents started construction of the stair-case and one
room up to the roof level on the vacant land which was let out to the E
respondents alongwith shops. The Rent Controller proceeded further to
take the view that even if for the sake of arguments it is accepted that the
respondents made additions and alterations as alleged in the eviction
petition, in his opinion, the same did not materially impair the value and
utility of the demised premises and, therefore, the respondents are not
F
liable to eviction from the demised premises. The Rent Controller also took
the view that if the shops were converted into shed, store and kothries by
removal of the intervening walls and making appurtures it cannot be said
that the said conversion materially impaired the value and utility of the
demised premises. The Rent Controller further took the view that the
enclosure of verandah on replacement of the roof of the alleged shops also G
did not fall within the mischief of the provisions of Section 13(2) (iii) of
the act. As regards the sub-letting the Rent Controller took the view that
Jamuna Prasad was a Chowkidar of the respondents who was occupying
the kothri as a Watchman of the tenanted premises which does not amount
to sub-letting. On these findings the Rent Controller dismissed the eviction H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 2 S.C.R.

A application. The appeal preferred by the appellants before the appellate
authority also met the same fate as the findings of the Rent Controller were
affirmed and the appeal was dismissed. The civil revision was also dis-
missed by the High Court in limine.

9. Learned counsel appearing for the landlord appellants strenously
B urged that the Rent Controller and the appellate authority both have
mis-read the evidence on record and committed a serious error in law and
the facts ·of the case in recording the finding that the alleged additions and
alterations made by the tenant-respondents do no.t amount to alteration
impairing materially the value and utility of the demised premises within
c the meaning of Section 13(2) (iii) of East Punjab Rent Restriction Act,
1949 (hereinafter as the Act). He submitted that the evidence on record
oral and documentary sufficiently established that the tenant respondents
have drastically changed the nature, character and form of the demised .
premises which has not only impaired materially the value but has also
D impaired the utility thereof. He urged that all the Courts have not con-
sidered the material evidence in a right perspective and the statement of
the witnesses have either been ignored on material aspects or mis-read and
twisted to mean otherwise than what is intended to depose by them which
has resulted into grave injustice. With the assistance of the counsel for the
parties we were taken through the material evidence and the documents
E on record. After perusal of the same and the judgments of the Courts
below we find that the Courts below fell into patent error in taking the view
that they have taken with regard to the nature and character of the alleged
additions and alterations which clearly fall within the provisions of Section
13(2) (iii) of the Act.
F
10. It may be noticed that the Rent Controller had appointed
Ravinder Pal Kaur, AW 4, an advocate to make an inspection of the
premises in question and submit the report. Accordingly, AW 4 inspected
the premises and submitted the report dated October 24, 1981. The
premises were i~spected in the presence of the appellants and respondent
to
G Chander Mani. A reading of the report goes show that the verandha in
front of the shops let out to the respondents was altogether missing which
only indicated that it was enclosed in the manner alleged in the eviction
petition and as deposed by appellant Gurbachan Singh, AW 16 in his
statement. The report further goes to show that the additions and altera-
-
H tions are made in shops No. 2 to 6 and the verandah in front of the said
j GURBACHANSINGHv. SHIVALAKRUBBERINDS. [FAIZANUDDIN,J.) 1005

shops in the manner it is alleged in the eviction petition and that the open A
space at the back of the shop measuring about 17 ft was found covered by
roof. A portion of the boundary wall of the disputed property on the
western side about 20 ft in length was found missing. The Commissioner,
AW 4, also found that the stair case was constructed for the approach and
underneath the said stair-case a kothri was built and one steel and wooden
gates were provided in the boundary wall for approach from the shed to
B
the adjoining property belonging to the respondent Chander Muni. The
demised property was also inspected by an Engineer S.C. Virmani, AW 12
and he also submitted his report Ext. AW 12/1. The said report also
indicated almost the same additions and alterations which are alleged in
the eviction petition. One J oginder Singh, AW 13, a trader was examined C
as a witness on behalf of the appellants. He deposed that he had seen the
industry-respondent No. 1 having gone there for a number of times. He
was taken to the industry by Chander Muni, respondent, in connection with
the construction in the premises. He deposed that he had supplied 7-8
quintals of steel bars for that purpose. After visiting the spot he proved the D
said supply from the account books of his shop dated April 5, 1980 and
August 27, 1980. He also stated that the roof of the shop was relaid with
. R.B. Slabs with the iron steel bar supplied by him. The evidence of the
appellant Gurbachan Singh, AW 16 further established the additions and
alterations made by the ~enant-respondents in the demised premises.
E
11. Apart from the evidence discussed above there is also the
evidence with regard to the issuance of notices Ext. A Wl6/18/19 and AW
11/1, Ext., AW/11, 3 to 6 by Municipal Corporation to respondent Chander
Muni. These notices were issued to Chander Muni under Section 269 and
270 of the Municipal Corporation Act for the unauthofised construction in F
the premises in suit. These notices relate to the year 1981. From the
evidence discussed above it is abundantly clear that the tenant-respondents
had made the additions and alterations in the demised premises as alleged
by the appellants. It may be pointed out that through the Rent Controller
and the appellate authority both have found the additions and alterations
having been made by the respondents in the demised premises but accord- G
ing to them the construction was either by the permission of the appellants
or the same did not amount to the additions and alterations of such a
nature as to impair materially the value or utility of the building and the
rented land within the meaning of Section 13(2) (iii) of the Act. This
finding of the Courts below in respect of the construction no doubt would H
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 2 S.C.R.

A be finding of. fact, but the question whether the alleged additions and
alterations materially impaired the value and/or utility of the premises in
question is a mixed question of law and fact, which has to be determined
on the application of correct principles. We find that both the Courts below
fell into a serious error in failing to applying the correct principles in
determining whether the said additions and alterations materially impaired
B the value and/or utility of the premises. ·

12. Section 13(2) (iii) of the Act which provides a ground for eviction
of tenant reads as under :-

"13(2) (iii).-The tenant has committed such acts as are likely to
c impair materially the value or utility of the building or rented land".

A plain reading will go to show that it contemplates that a tenant is liable
to eviction who has committed such acts as are likely to impair materially
the value or utility of the building or rented land. The meaning of the
D expression "to impair materially" in common parlarce would mean to
diminish in quality, strength or value substantially. In other words to make
a thing or substance worse and deteriorate. The word "impair" cannot ~e
said to have a fixed meaning. It is a relative term affording different
-
meaning in different context and situations. Here in the context the term
"impair materially" has been used to mean, considerable decrease in quality
E
which may be measured with reference to the antecedent state of things as
it existed earlier in point of time as compared to a later stage after the
alleged change is made or affected suggesting impairment. Further the use
of the word "value" means intrinsic worth of a thing. In other words utility
of an object satisfying, directly or indirectly, the needs or desires of a
F person. Thus, the. ground for eviction of a tenant would be available to a
landlord against the tenant under Section 13(2) (iii) of the Act, if it is ,-'
established that the tenant has committed such acts as are likely to diminish
the quality, strength or value of the building or rented land to such an
extent that the intrinsic worth or fitness of the building or the rented land
G has considerably affected its use for some desirable practical purpose.

The decrease or deterioration, in other words the impairment of the worth
and usefulness or the value and utility of the building or rented land has
to be judged and determined from the point of view of the landlord and
not of the tenant or any one else. This Court while dealing with the
H provisions of Section 13(2) (iii) of the Act in the case of Vipin Kumar v.
I GURBACHANSINGHv. SHIVALAKRUBBERINDS. (FAIZANUDDIN,J.) 1007

Roshan Lal Anand & Ors., [1993] 2 SCC 614 expressed the view as follows: A
.... "The impairment of the value of utility of the building is from the
point of the landlord and not of the tenant. The first limp of clause
III of sub-section (2) of Section 13 is impairment of the building
due to acts committed by the tenant and the second limb is of the
utility or value of the building has been materially impaired. The B
acts of the tenant must be such that erection of the wall had
materially impaired the value or utility of the demised premises".

13. In the instant case before us as discussed in the foregoing
paragraphs it is distinctly clear that the tenant-respondents have con- C
structed a lintel roof over all the S shops No. 2 to 6 by removing their
original roof and they not only removed the intervening or partition walls
of the shops but also removed the doors of the 5 shops and converted them
into sheds, store and kothries. They also converted the verandah in front
of the shops into sheds by closing it from the front by masonary work. The D
door of shop No. 2 has been removed altogether and instead a small
window with iron grills has been affixed in the front. The full size door of
shop No. 3 has also been removed and a door measuring 3 x 7" has been
installed in front of the verandah by merging the shop No. 3 into that part
of the verandah. Similarly shop No. 4 has also been merged with the
verandah by remqving the door of the shop and fitting a door in the E
verandah itself in order to make it a godown. Shops No. 5 and 6 have also
been merged with the part of the verandah in front of those shops with
masonary work. The 17 ft long and 5 ft 9 inches high boundary wall existing
on the western si~e of the demised land touching the kothi of Chander
Muni respondent No. 1 A has been demolished so as to facilitate a passage F
from the Kathi of respondent No. 1 A to demised premises by fixing one
big wooden door and another steel door in place of the demolished
boundary wall. A small triangular shaped kothri has also been constructed
and a brick stair case has been raised in order to facilitate. an access from
the courtyard of respondent No. 1 A to the roof of the shed made over the
demised land as a direct approach. G

14. Thus, from the above mentioned facts it is clear that even if it is
assumed that the tenant respondents raised the construction of shed over
the part of the open land of the demised premises with the written consent
of the landlord as may be spelt out from the rent note Ext. A/l, then the H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 2 S.C.R.
\
A rest of the construction, additions and alterations of the 5 shops and the
verandah in front of the said shops of a permanent nature, will certainly .
amount to acts as have or likely to have impaired materially the value or
utility of the building/premises let out to them. The nature of the construc-
tion is relevant consideration in determining the question of material
impairment in the value or utility of the building or the demised premises.
B In the present case the removal of the roof of the shops partition walls and
the doors, laying of a roof, merging of the verandah with the shops, closing
the doors and opening new doors and windows and converting the
premises altogether, giving totally a new and a different shape and com-
-
plexion by such alteration would certainly be regarded. as one involving
C material impairment of the premises affecting its fitness for use for
desirable practical purpose and intrinsic worth of the demised premises
from the point of view of the arpellant-landlords within the meaning of
Section 13(2) (iii) of the Act. The High Court, therefore, fell in patent error
in dismissing the revision in limine without going into the correct legal
D position involved in the case. Having regard to the facts and circumstances
discussed above, we are of the firm view that this is a case which.squarely
falls within the mischief of the provisions contained in Section 13(2) (iii)
of the Act which make the tenant-respondents liable for eviction from the
demised premises.

E 15. Consequently, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed with
costs throughout. The order of the High Court and the judgment and
orders of the Courts below are set aside. The application of the appellant-
landlords for eviction of the tenant-respondents is allowed. It is directed
that the appellants shall be placed in actual physical possession of the
p demised premises after evicting the tenant-respondents therefrom.

16. We are, however, aware of the fact that the respondent-tenants
are running an industry in the demised premises and it may not be possible
for them to immediately vacate the premises. We therefore, in the interest
G of justice direct that the tenant-respondents shall not be evicted from the
demised premises till 30th June, 1996 on furnishing usual undertaking in
this Court within four weeks from today.

P.S.S. Appeal allowed~

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