Holding

The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions under Sections 498A and 306 IPC, holding that the prosecution proved cruelty and the presumption under Section 113A was correctly applied.

Summary

The appellant husband and his mother-in-law were convicted under Sections 498A (cruelty) and 306 (abetment of suicide) of the IPC for the suicide of their wife within eight months of marriage. The prosecution proved that the husband repeatedly demanded Rs.25,000 from the deceased's father, and upon failure, subjected her to physical and mental cruelty, leading her to consume pesticide. The trial and appellate courts relied on Section 113A of the Evidence Act, which permits a presumption of abetment when a married woman commits suicide within seven years of marriage and has been subjected to cruelty. The Supreme Court held that the presumption is not irrebuttable but was correctly applied as the appellants offered no evidence to rebut it, and the testimony of interested family witnesses was deemed reliable after careful scrutiny. Consequently, the convictions under both IPC sections were affirmed and the appeals dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the prosecution established cruelty under Section 498A IPC.
Whether the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act can be invoked to convict the accused of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC.
Whether testimony of interested (family) witnesses can be relied upon in a domestic cruelty case.
Whether the convictions under Sections 498A and 306 IPC are sustainable in view of the evidence.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 113, s. 113A, s. 4
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 114, s. 306, s. 498A

Subjects

Section 498ASection 306Section 113Adomestic crueltyabetment of suicideinterested witnesspresumptionEvidence Actmarried woman suicideSupreme Court

Judgment

24 [2021]
SUPREME COURT 6 S.C.R. 24
REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A GUMANSINH @ LALO @
RAJU BHIKHABHAI CHAUHAN & ANR.
v.
THE STATE OF GUJARAT
B (Criminal Appeal Nos. 940-941 of 2021)
SEPTEMBER 03, 2021
[S. ABDUL NAZEER AND KRISHNA MURARI, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.498A and 306 – Married woman
committed suicide in her matrimonial home within 8 months of
C
marriage, purportedly, by consuming pesticide – Conviction of
appellants (husband and mother-in-law) by Courts below u/ss.498A
and 306 IPC – Challenge to – Held: Prosecution proved that
deceased was harassed with a view to coerce her to meet unlawful
demand of Rs.25,000/- and such harassment was on account of
D her failure to bring said amount from her father (PW-1) who was
financially incapable to meet such demand – Charge u/s.498-A of
cruelty clearly established against the appellants – Defence failed
to adduce any evidence to rebut presumption as to abetment of
suicide u/s.113-A of the Evidence Act – Prosecution successful in
establishing the evidence that deceased was left with no choice than
E
to commit suicide – Conviction u/ss.498A and 306 IPC, affirmed
– Evidence Act, 1872 – s.113A.
Crime Against Women – Domestic cruelty – Witness –
Evidentiary value of close relatives/interested witness – Held: Most
often, the offence of subjecting the married woman to cruelty is
F
committed within the boundaries of the house which in itself
diminishes the chances of availability of any independent witness
– Also, normally no independent or unconnected person would
prefer to become a witness for a number of reasons – Nothing
unnatural for a victim of domestic cruelty to share her trauma with
G her parents, brothers and sisters and other such close relatives –
Law does not disqualify the relatives to be produced as a witness
though they may be interested witness – Penal Code, 1860 –
s.498A.
Evidence – Witness – Interested witness – Appreciation –
H Held: Evidence of an interested witness requires scrutiny with
24
GUMANSINH @ LALO @ RAJU BHIKHABHAI CHAUHAN & 25
ANR. v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT

utmost care and caution – If the evidence of any interested witness/ A
relative on a careful scrutiny by the Court is found to be consistent
and trust-worthy, free from infirmities or any embellishment that
inspires the confidence of the Court, there is no reason not to place
reliance on the same.
Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.113A and 4 – s.4 defines the phrase B
‘may presume’ used in s.113-A – Definition of the word ‘may
presume’ — Meaning and effect of.
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.113A – Applicability – To attract
the applicability of s.113-A, three conditions are required to be
fulfilled :- (i) The woman has committed suicide, (ii) Such suicide C
has been committed within a period of seven years from the date
of her marriage, and (iii) The charged-accused had subjected her
to cruelty – However, the existence and availability of above said
three circumstances are not to be invoked, like a formula, to enable
the presumption being drawn and the presumption is not an
irrebuttable one. D

Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. Whether prosecution has successfully
established the charge of cruelty as laid down in Explanation (b)
of Section 498-A IPC. E
1.1. Most often the offence of subjecting the married
woman to cruelty is committed within the boundaries of the house
which in itself diminishes the chances of availability of any
independent witness and even if an independent witness is
available whether he or she would be willing to be a witness in
F
the case is also a big question because normally no independent
or unconnected person would prefer to become a witness for a
number of reasons. There is nothing unnatural for a victim of
domestic cruelty to share her trauma with her parents, brothers
and sisters and other such close relatives. The evidentiary value
of the close relatives/interested witness is not liable to be G
rejected on the ground of being a relative of the deceased. Law
does not disqualify the relatives to be produced as a witness
though they may be interested witness. [Para 21] [34-G-H]

H
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A 1.2. However, when the Court has to appreciate the
evidence of any interested witness it has to be very cautious in
weighing their evidence or in other words, the evidence of an
interested witness requires a scrutiny with utmost care and
caution. The Court is required to address itself whether there
are any infirmities in the evidence of such a witness; whether
B
the evidence is reliable, trust-worthy and inspires the confidence
of the Court. Another important aspect to be considered while
analyzing the evidence of interested witness is whether the
genesis of the crime unfolded by such evidence is probable or
not. If the evidence of any interested witness/relative on a
C careful scrutiny by the Court is found to be consistent and
trustworthy, free from infirmities or any embellishment that
inspires the confidence of the Court, there is no reason not to
place reliance on the same. [Para 22][35-B-D]
1.3. In the case at hands, PW-1,2,3 and 4, though they are
D related to the deceased, are natural witnesses. There being no
bar in examining the family members or any other person as
witnesses, their evidence is not liable to be discarded on this
ground. The evidence of the aforesaid witnesses is found
consistent without any material contradiction and inspires
confidence. The Courts below have also properly scrutinized
E their evidence prior to taking them into account and there is
nothing unusual in believing their testimonies. [Para 24][37-F-
G]
1.4. From the evidence of the prosecution witness, it is
clear that prosecution has proved that the deceased was
F harassed with a view to coerce her to meet unlawful demand of
Rs.25,000/- and such a harassment was on account of failure by
her to bring the said amount from her father (PW-1) who was
financially incapable to meet such demand. On the basis of the
aforesaid evidence, the prosecution has been successful in
G proving the charge of cruelty under Explanation (b) of Section
498-A IPC. [Para 25][37-G-H; 38-A]
2. Whether the accused can also be held guilty for the
offence punishable under Section 306 IPC (which provides
punishment for the offence of abetment of suicide) with the aid
H of Section 113 A of the Evidence Act. [Para 27][39-A]
GUMANSINH @ LALO @ RAJU BHIKHABHAI CHAUHAN & 27
ANR. v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT

2.1. Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, provides for A
presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman
within seven years of marriage, by her husband or any of his
relative. Explanation added to Section 113-A of the Evidence Act
clearly provides that ‘cruelty’ shall have the same meaning as
in Section 498-A of the IPC. [Paras 13, 14][31-F; 32-B]
B
2.2. To attract the applicability of Section 113-A of the
Evidence Act, three conditions are required to be fulfilled :- (i)
The woman has committed suicide, (ii) Such suicide has been
committed within a period of seven years from the date of her
marriage, and (iii) The charged-accused had subjected her to C
cruelty. From the facts of the case at hands, all the three
conditions stand fulfilled. However, the existence and availability
of the above said three circumstances are not to be invoked,
like a formula, to enable the presumption being drawn and the
presumption is not an irrebuttable one. [Paras 32, 33, 34][41-
C-F] D

2.3. Admittedly, in the case at hands, the evidence clearly
establishes the offence of cruelty or harassment caused to the
deceased and thus the foundation for the presumption exists.
Admittedly the appellants have led no evidence to rebut the
presumption. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, E
it can be safely concluded that the Courts below committed no
illegality in holding that the accused-appellants abetted the
suicide of the deceased. The matter can be viewed from another
angle. The prosecution was successful in establishing the charge
under Section 498-A of cruelty against the appellants from which
F
a reasonable inference can be drawn that the deceased
committed suicide by consuming pesticides. The deceased was
in the custody of the appellant and died within the four walls of
her matrimonial home under suspicious circumstances. [Paras
37 and 38][42-B-D]
G
2.4. Not only a specific charge was framed against the
accused-appellants, on one hand, the defence failed to adduce

H
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A any evidence to rebut the presumption under Section 113-A of
the Evidence Act and on the other hand the prosecution was
successful in establishing the evidence that the deceased was
left with no choice than to commit suicide. No fault can be found
with the Trial Court and the Appellate Court placing reliance on
the evidence in drawing the presumption under Section 113-A
B
particularly, when there was no material brought on record by
the defence to disprove the facts. [Paras 44, 45][45-G; 48-A-B]
3. Both the Trial Court as well as the High Court have
threadbare considered the evidence and have recorded cogent
reasons to come to the conclusion that the prosecution has been
C successful in proving the case against the appellants beyond
reasonable doubt. [Para 46][48-B-C]
Gurjit Singh v. State of Punjab (2020) 14 SCC 264 –
distinguished.
Maranadu and Anr. v. State by Inspector of Police,
D
Tamil Nadu (2008) 16 SCC 529 : [2008] 13 SCR
487 ; Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001)
9 SCC 618 : [2001] 4 Suppl. SCR 247 ; Ramesh Vithal
Patil v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2014) 11 SCC
516 ; Satish Shetty v. State of Karnataka (2016) 12
E SCC 759 : [2016] 3 SCR 145 ; and K. Prema S. Rao
& Anr. v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao & Ors. (2003) 1 SCC
217 : [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 339 – relied on.
Case Law Reference
[2008] 13 SCR 487 relied on Para 23
F [2001] 4 Suppl. SCR 247 relied on Para 31
(2014) 11 SCC 516 relied on Para 39
[2016] 3 SCR 145 relied on Para 40
[2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 339 relied on Para 40
G (2020) 14 SCC 264 distinguished Para 42
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
Nos.940-941 of 2021.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.12.2018 corrected vide
order dated 08.02.2019 of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in
H
GUMANSINH @ LALO @ RAJU BHIKHABHAI CHAUHAN & 29
ANR. v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT

R/Criminal Appeal No.833 of 2000 and final order and judgment dated A
07.03.2019 in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.1 of 2019.
Ms. Akriti Chaubey, Md. Tahir M. Hakim, Ejaz Maqbool, Varish
A. Mansuri, Muhammad Isa M. Hakim, Advs. for the Appellants.
Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, Aniruddha P. Mayee, Advs. for the
Respondent. B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA MURARI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals arise out of final order and judgment of the C
Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad (hereinafter referred to
as ‘High Court’) dated 28.12.2018 corrected vide order dated 08.02.2019
in R/Criminal Appeal No. 833 of 2000 and final order and judgment
dated 07.03.2019 in Criminal Misc. Application (for extension of time)
No. 1 of 2019 filed by the appellants challenging the order of conviction D
against them.
3. By the said judgment, the High Court has dismissed the appeal
filed by the appellant herein challenging the judgment dated 27.07.2000
passed by the Learned Sessions Judge, Vadodara in Sessions Case No.
92 of 1998 convicting the appellant in respect of the offence punishable
E
under Section 306, 498A read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code
(hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’) is confirmed.
4. In brief, the prosecution case is that the marriage of Appellant
No. 1 was solemnized with Tahera (hereinafter referred to as the
‘Deceased’) on 27.04.1997 and after the marriage, the deceased was
residing with both the appellants. The Appellant No.1 was constantly F
asking the deceased to bring Rs.25,000/- from her father (PW-1) in
order to purchase buffaloes as, he was keen on doing milk business.
Due to poor financial condition, PW-1 was not able to satisfy the
demand of Appellant No. 1. Therefore, Appellant No.1 frequently
started beating the deceased, while Appellant No. 2 who was her G
mother-in-law used to pick up quarrel with her on the pretext that she
neither knew how to cook nor do any house-hold work properly. The
deceased committed suicide on 14.12.1997 between 17:00 and 17:30
hours by consuming poison at her matrimonial home for the sole reason
that she was unable to bear the continuous mental and physical cruelty
meted out to her by the appellants in a short span of 8 months. H
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A 5. The PW-1, father of the deceased filed a complaint with Padra
Police Station which was registered as ICR No. 34 of 1997 for the
offences punishable under Section 498A and 306 read with Section 114
of the IPC. After completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed
in the Court of Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Padra, who
committed the case to the Court of Sessions. The case was registered
B
as Sessions Case No. 92 of 1998 and was made over to the Learned
Additional Sessions Judge for trial. Charges were framed and against
the appellants and they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
6. In order to substantiate the case, the prosecution has examined
seven witnesses and all the incriminating evidence was put to the
C appellants while recording their statement under Section 313 of Code
of Criminal Procedure Code, wherein they totally denied the case of
the prosecution.
7. The Trial Court came to the conclusion that the Appellants
subjected the deceased to physical and mental cruelty which lead her
D to commit suicide and convicted the appellants for offences punishable
under Section 498A and 306 of IPC and sentenced them to undergo
Rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and pay fine of
Rs. 500/- as well as two years Rigorous imprisonment and pay fine of
Rs. 500/-.
E 8. Aggrieved by the same, the accused appellants filed an appeal
before the High Court and mainly contended that there was no demand
of money by Appellant No. 1 as he was only asking for loan to purchase
buffaloes in order to start milk business. It was further contended that
the deceased was under medical treatment as she was suffering from
F some mental illness. It was pointed out that only relatives were examined
as witnesses though independent witnesses were available and
therefore, the prosecution case becomes doubtful. It was further
contended that the appellants were not present in the house when the
deceased committed and prayed for the appeal to be allowed and the
conviction of the appellants be set-aside.
G
9. However, the High Court observed that the evidence produced
by the prosecution clearly indicates the deceased was subjected to
mental and physical cruelty by the appellants on the account of
non-fulfillment of demand of Rs.25,000/- and, therefore, the judgment
and order of conviction passed by the learned Trial Court was
H confirmed.
GUMANSINH @ LALO @ RAJU BHIKHABHAI CHAUHAN & 31
ANR. v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]

10. Being aggrieved by the conviction and sentence under Section A
498-A IPC and Section 306 IPC, the accused have preferred these
appeals. Ms. Akriti Chaubey, learned Counsel for the appellants
vehemently submitted that the conviction as recorded by the learned
Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court is not tenable. It is
submitted that the evidence of the material witnesses suffer from major
B
contradictions and there was no demand of any money by the appellant
No.1 because he was only asking for loan to purchase buffaloes with
an intention to start milk business. She further submitted that the
deceased was suffering from some mental illness for which she was
under medical treatment. Her further submission is that only close
relatives were examined as witnesses and there was no independent C
witness.
11. Per contra, Ms. Deepanwita Priyanaka, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the State submitted that there is a concurrent
finding of both the Courts below as such no interference is warranted.
It is further submitted that all the ingredients necessary for conviction D
under Section 306 IPC stands proved with the aid of Section 113-A of
the Evidence Act, 1872 as such the present appeals deserved to be
dismissed.
12. We have considered the rival submissions and also perused
the impugned judgment as also the testimony of the witnesses with the E
aid of learned counsel for the parties.
13. It is undisputed that the suicidal death of the deceased
occurred within a short span of eight months of marriage. Section 113-
A of the Evidence Act, provides for presumption as to abetment of
suicide by a married woman within seven years of marriage, by her F
husband or any of his relative. The said section reads as under :-
“113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married
woman -
When the question is whether the commission of suicide by
G
a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative
of her husband and it is shown that she had committed
suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her
marriage and that her husband or such relative of her
husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may
presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or
by such relative of her husband.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, “cruelty”
shall have the same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860).”
B 14. Explanation added to Section 113-A of the Evidence Act
clearly provides that ‘cruelty’ shall have the same meaning as in Section
498-A of the IPC and thus it would be relevant to extract said section
which reads as under :-
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
C subjecting her to cruelty- Whoever, being the husband or the
relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman
to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to
fine.
D Explanation.- For the purpose of this section, “cruelty”
means-
(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is
likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to
cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health
E (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is
with a view to coercing her or any person related
to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property
or valuable security or is on account of failure by
F her or any person related to her to meet such
demand.”
15. The prosecution case was that the marriage of the deceased
who was the daughter of the complainant was solemnized with appellant
no. 1 around eight months before the alleged incident and thereafter
G she was residing in her matrimonial home along with her husband, the
appellant no.1 and mother-in-law, the appellant no. 2. For about two
months, they had a peaceful life, thereafter the appellant no. 1 started
pressing deceased to bring Rs.25,000/- from her father to purchase
buffaloes as he was interested in starting business of milk. It was
H further stated that the complainant PW-1 was unable to satisfy the
GUMANSINH @ LALO @ RAJU BHIKHABHAI CHAUHAN & 33
ANR. v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]

demand on account of his weak financial condition. When the demand A
of Rs.25,000/- could not be met by the complainant, the appellant no.1
started beating the deceased and appellant no. 2, the mother-in-law also
used to quarrel with her on the pretext that she was not knowing
cooking and was not doing household work properly. On account of
physical and mental cruelty meted out to her during a short span of
B
eight months of marriage, when it became unbearable she committed
suicide on 14.12.1997 between 17:00 and 17:30 hours by consuming
poison at her matrimonial home.
16. Aforesaid complaint lodged by PW-1, the father of the
deceased, was registered vide I-C.R.No. 341 of 1997 for the offences
punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 read with Section 114 of the C
Indian Penal Code.
17. A perusal of evidence of PW-1, Mustufa Chhotubhai Ghori,
the father of the deceased would establish that deceased was married
to appellant no. 1, eight months prior to the alleged incident. He stated
in his testimony that the married life of the two was smooth for initial D
two months, however, after two months of the marriage, the appellant
no. 1 started insisting Tahira (the deceased) to ask for a sum of
Rs.25,000/- from PW-1 to purchase buffaloes for milk business, but he
was unable to pay the said amount as he was earning his livelihood by
running a tea stall and was also indebted. He also stated that since he E
could not fulfill the demand because of his weak financial position, his
deceased daughter was ill-treated and beaten frequently by appellant
no.1. He further stated that the appellant no. 2, the mother-in-law of
the deceased also started quarreling on the pretext that the deceased
could not make chapatti properly nor could she do the household work
and her father has not taught her anything. He also stated that the F
deceased used to share her trauma with her mother (PW-4) who in
turn used to tell her everything. He further stated that the son-in-law
was very suspicious and he did not let Tahira (the deceased) to go alone
to any place and used to beat her. He also stated that lastly appellant
no. 2 came to his house along with the deceased and demanded Rs.500/
G
- from his wife (PW-4), as her husband was to go to Ajmer. He also
stated that in the night at about 1:30A.M., PW-3 his brother, came and
informed about the death of the deceased. In the cross-examination,
his testimony was unshaken. Though during cross-examination, it was
tried to be elicited from this witness that deceased was suffering from
some kind of illness prior to marriage and was undergoing some H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A treatment. The witnesses admitted in the cross-examination that the
deceased was suffering from some pain and his wife used to take her
for treatment and was given medicine. Apart from above, neither the
nature of illness nor the details of the treatment or medication could be
elicited from this witness. As a matter of fact, there was not even a
suggestion by the defence that deceased was suffering from any kind
B of mental illness or undergoing treatment for the same.
18. The evidence of PW-1 stands corroborated by the evidence
of PW-4, Dariyaben Mustufa Ghori, the mother of the deceased, as
well as PW-3 Ahmadbhai Chhotubhai Ghori, the brother of complainant
and PW-5, Hanif Mustufa Ghori, brother of the deceased.
C
19. It is pertinent to mention that much emphasis has been laid
by learned counsel for the appellants on the cross-examination of
PW-1, wherein he stated that even before marriage the deceased was
undergoing treatment and medication. Learned counsel for the
appellants vehemently contended that the deceased was suffering from
D some mental disease and was undergoing treatment and her mental
instability might have resulted in suicide. The argument is not liable to
be accepted inasmuch as neither any evidence was produced by the
defence in this regard nor anything about the illness or medication was
stated by them in their statement under Section 313. The deceased lived
E in her matrimonial home with the appellants for about eight months after
marriage and if she was undergoing any prolonged treatment, it was
not possible for the appellants not to have acquired knowledge of the
said facts.
20. It was next submitted by the learned counsel for the
F appellants that all the witnesses are relative and interested witnesses
and no independent witness was examined by the prosecution to prove
the case, thus, the prosecution case becomes doubtful.
21.Most often the offence of subjecting the married woman to
cruelty is committed within the boundaries of the house which in itself
diminishes the chances of availability of any independent witness and
G
even if an independent witness is available whether he or she would
be willing to be a witness in the case is also a big question because
normally no independent or unconnected person would prefer to become
a witness for a number of reasons. There is nothing unnatural for a
victim of domestic cruelty to share her trauma with her parents, brothers
H and sisters and other such close relatives. The evidentiary value of the
GUMANSINH @ LALO @ RAJU BHIKHABHAI CHAUHAN & 35
ANR. v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]

close relatives/interested witness is not liable to be rejected on the A
ground of being a relative of the deceased. Law does not disqualify
the relatives to be produced as a witness though they may be interested
witness.
22. However, when the Court has to appreciate the evidence of
any interested witness it has to be very cautious in weighing their B
evidence or in other words, the evidence of an interested witness
requires a scrutiny with utmost care and caution. The Court is required
to address itself whether there are any infirmities in the evidence of
such a witness; whether the evidence is reliable, trust-worthy and
inspires the confidence of the Court. Another important aspect to be
considered while analyzing the evidence of interested witness is whether C
the genesis of the crime unfolded by such evidence is probable or not.
If the evidence of any interested witness/relative on a careful scrutiny
by the Court is found to be consistent and trust-worthy, free from
infirmities or any embellishment that inspires the confidence of the Court,
there is no reason not to place reliance on the same. D
23. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Maranadu
and Anr. Vs. State by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu 1, while
considering this issue, has observed as under:-
“Merely because the eyewitnesses are family members their
evidence cannot per se be discarded. When there is E
allegation of interestedness, the same has to be established.
Mere statement that being relatives of the deceased they are
likely to falsely implicate the accused cannot be a ground
to discard the evidence which is otherwise cogent and
credible. We shall also deal with the contention regarding F
interestedness of the witnesses for furthering prosecution
version.
“….Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a
witness. It is more often than not that a relation would not
conceal actual culprit and make allegations against an G
innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of false
implication is made. In such cases, the court has to adopt a
careful approach and analyse evidence to find out whether
it is cogent and credible.
1
(2008) 16 SCC 529 H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A 11. In Dalip Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab (AIR 1953
SC 364) it has been laid down as under:-
“26. A witness is normally to be considered independent
unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to
be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has
B cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to
implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relation would be
the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an
innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and
there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency
to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness
C has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must
be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of
relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure
guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any
sweeping generalization. Each case must be judged on its
D own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what
is so often put forward in cases before us as a general
rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case
must be limited to and be governed by its own facts.”
The above decision has since been followed in Guli Chand
E and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan (1974 (3) SCC 698) in which
Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 614) was
also relied upon.
13. We may also observe that the ground that the witness
being a close relative and consequently being a partisan
F witness, should not be relied upon, has no substance. This
theory was repelled by this Court as early as in Dalip Singh’s
case (supra) in which surprise was expressed over the
impression which prevailed in the minds of the Members of
the Bar that relatives were not independent witnesses.
Speaking through Vivian Bose, J. it was observed:
G
“25.We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of
the High Court that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses
requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an
observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are
women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their
H testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on
GUMANSINH @ LALO @ RAJU BHIKHABHAI CHAUHAN & 37
ANR. v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]

the reason that they are closely related to the deceased A
we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to
many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this
Court endeavoured to dispel in -`Rameshwar v. State of
Rajasthan’ (AIR 1952 SC 54 at p.59). We find, however,
that it unfortunately still persists, if not in the judgments
B
of the Courts, at any rate in the arguments of counsel.”
14. Again in Masalti and Ors. v. State of U.P. (AIR 1965 SC
202) this Court observed: (p. 209-210 para 14):
“14…….But it would, we think, be unreasonable to
contend that evidence given by witnesses should be C
discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan
or interested witnesses.......The mechanical rejection of
such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would
invariably lead to failure of justice. No hard and fast rule
can be laid down as to how much evidence should be
appreciated. Judicial approach has to be cautious in D
dealing with such evidence; but the plea that such
evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot
be accepted as correct.”
15. To the same effect is the decisions in State of Punjab v.
Jagir Singh (AIR 1973 SC 2407), Lehna v. State of Haryana E
(2002 (3) SCC 76) and Gangadhar Behera and Ors. v. State
of Orissa (2002 (8) SCC 381).”
24. In the case at hands, PW-1,2,3 and 4, though they are related
to the deceased, are natural witnesses. There being no bar in examining
the family members or any other person as witnesses, their evidence F
is not liable to be discarded on this ground. From a perusal of the
evidence of the aforesaid witnesses, we find that it is consistent without
any material contradiction and inspires confidence. The Courts below
have also properly scrutinized their evidence prior to taking them into
account and there is nothing unusual in believing their testimonies.
G
25. Thus, from the evidence of the prosecution witness we have
no hesitation to hold that prosecution has proved that the deceased was
harassed with a view to coerce her to meet unlawful demand of
Rs.25,000/- and such a harassment was on account of failure by her
to bring the said amount from her father (PW-1) who was financially
incapable to meet such demand. We find, on the basis of the aforesaid H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A evidence, that the prosecution has been successful in proving the charge
of cruelty under Explanation (b) of Section 498-A IPC.
26. Suicidal death by consuming pesticide stands affirmed by the
evidence of PW-2, Dr. Anand, who was one of the panel members of
doctors who carried out post-mortem of the deceased. He stated in
B his cross-examination that :-
“On 15/12/1997 I was serving as the PMC medical officer
at Gandhi. At noon 3-15 hours the dead body of Tahera
Gumansinh Chauhan was brought to be and the time was
around 3-30 hours. In the panel doctor was Dr. Rolisharan
C and he is at present at the Rajkot Medical College. While
checking the dead body, as for the internal injuries, on the
legs the threads were placed. There was normal injury on
the right thigh. There was no other external injury that could
prove that the death occurred due to beating. Even thereafter,
the stomach was opened and the particular that came out
D had plunging smell. The samples of her intestine, liver, kidney
and blood were obtained and were sent for analysis at the
forensic science laboratory, Ahmedabad, so that the actual
facts could be known. This analysis report was sent by the
forensic department to us. One was sent to police station.
E But I have not received a copy. Therefore, I can give further
deposition if the copy of police is shown to me. I am as on
today shown the mark 8/9 being the papers of the
prosecution and upon seeing I state that, in the intestine of
the deceased the poisonous pesticide Diazinon
Organophosphate was found. This proves that, the death of
F Taheraben had occurred due to consuming of poison. The
panel doctor along with me undertook the post mortem of
deceased. I am shown the mark 8/7 PM report and we both
doctors have prepared the same. The doctor along with me
has signed it in my presence. It has my signature. I identify
G the same. It is given exhibit 17.”
His statement was intact in the cross-examination and nothing
contradictory could be elicited from him.
27. Now, the question that falls for our consideration is the
prosecution having successfully established the charge of cruelty as laid
H down in Explanation (b) of Section 498-A IPC and also the fact that
GUMANSINH @ LALO @ RAJU BHIKHABHAI CHAUHAN & 39
ANR. v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]

the deceased committed suicide by consuming pesticide within seven A
years of marriage, whether the accused can also be held guilty for
the offence punishable under Section 306 IPC with the aid of Section
113 A of the Evidence Act.
28. In the case at hands, the prosecution failed to adduce
any direct evidence to establish that the accused abetted deceased B
into committing suicide. The prosecution has placed reliance on
Section 113-A of the Evidence Act to establish the charge of abetment
against the accused.
29. Section 107 of IPC describes offence of abetment as under:-
“Section 107 of IPC- C

107. Abetment of a thing.—A person abets the doing of a
thing, who—
(First) — Instigates any person to do that thing; or
(Secondly) —Engages with one or more other person or D
persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an
act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that
conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or
(Thirdly) — Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission,
the doing of that thing. E
Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful misrepresentation,
or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound
to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to
cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the
doing of that thing. Illustration A, a public officer, is F
authorized by a warrant from a Court of Justice to apprehend
Z. B, knowing that fact and also that C is not Z, wilfully
represents to A that C is Z, and thereby intentionally causes
A to apprehend C. Here B abets by instigation the
apprehension of C. Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to
or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in G
order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby
facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of
that act.
30. Section 306 of IPC provides punishment for the offence of
abetment of suicide, reads as under:- H
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A “306. Abetment of suicide.—If any person commits suicide,
whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to
fine.”

B 31. This question came up for consideration before a three-Judge
Bench in the case of Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh2. In
pragraph 12 of the said judgment, it has been observed as under :-
“This provision was introduced by Criminal Law (Second)
Amendment Act, 1983 with effect from 26.12.1983 to meet a
social demand to resolve difficulty of proof where helpless
C married women were eliminated by being forced to commit
suicide by the husband or in-laws and incriminating
evidence was usually available within the four-corners of the
matrimonial home and hence was not available to any one
outside the occupants of the house. How-ever still it cannot
be lost sight of that the presumption is intended to operate
D
against the accused in the field of criminal law. Before the
presumption may be raised, the foundation thereof must exist.
A bare reading of Section 113-A shows that to attract
applicabilty of Section 113- A, it must be shown that (i)
woman has committed suicide, (ii) such suicide has been
E committed within a period of seven years from the date of
her marriage, (iii) the husband or his relatives, who are
charged had subjected her to cruelty. On existence and
availability of the abovesaid circumstances, the Court may
presume that such suicide had been abetted by her husband
or by such relatives of her husband. The Parliament has
F chosen to sound a note of caution. Firstly, the presumption
is not mandatory; it is only permissive as the employment of
expression “may presume” suggests. Secondly, the existence
and availability of the above said three circumstances shall
not, like a formula, enable the presumption being drawn;
before the presumption may be drawn the Court shall have
G to have regard to ‘all the other circumstances of the case’.
A consideration of all the other circumstances of the case
may strengthen the presumption or may dictate the conscience
of the Court to abstain from drawing the presumption. The
expression - ‘The other circumstances of the case’ used in
H 2
(2001) 9 SCC 618
GUMANSINH @ LALO @ RAJU BHIKHABHAI CHAUHAN & 41
ANR. v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]

Section 113-A suggests the need to reach a cause and effect A
relationship between the cruelty and the suicide for the
purpose of raising a presumption. Last but not the least the
presumption is not an irrebuttable one. In spite of a
presumption having been raised the evidence adduced in
defence or the facts and circumstances otherwise available
on record may destroy the presumption. The phrase ‘May B
presume’ used in Section 113-A is defined in Section 4 of the
Evidence Act, which says-’whenever it is provided by this Act
that Court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact
as proved, unless and until it is disproved or may call for
proof of it.”
C
32. From the above observations, it becomes clear that to attract
the applicability of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, three conditions
are required to be fulfilled :-
i. The woman has committed suicide,
ii. Such suicide has been committed within a period of D
seven years from the date of her marriage,
iii. The charged-accused had subjected her to cruelty.
33. From the facts of the case at hands, all the three conditions
stand fulfilled. There is no dispute about the facts that the deceased
committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her E
marriage and charged-accused had subjected her to cruelty, as we have
confirmed the findings of the Trial Court as well as High Court that
prosecution has been successful in proving the charge of cruelty under
Explanation (b) of Section 498-A IPC.
34. It is no doubt correct that the existence and availability of F
the above said three circumstances are not to be invoked, like a formula,
to enable the presumption being drawn and the presumption is not an
irrebuttable one, as held by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the
case of Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh (Supra).
35. At this stage, we may also make a reference to Section 4 of G
the Evidence Act, which defines the phrase ‘may presume’ used in
Section 113-A, which reads as under :-
“Shall Presume - whenever it is directed by this Act that
the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as
proved, unless and until it is disproved.” H
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A 36. The above definition of the words ‘may presume’ makes it
clear that whenever the act provides that the Court may presume a
fact, the said fact is to be regarded as proved, unless and until it is
disproved.
37. Admittedly, in the case at hands, the evidence clearly
B establishes the offence of cruelty or harassment caused to the deceased
and thus the foundation for the presumption exists. Admittedly the
appellants have led no evidence to rebut the presumption.
38. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it can be
safely concluded that the Courts below committed no illegality in holding
C that the accused-appellants abetted the suicide of the deceased. The
matter can be viewed from another angle. The prosecution was
successful in establishing the charge under Section 498-A of cruelty
against the appellants from which a reasonable inference can be drawn
that the deceased committed suicide by consuming pesticides. The
deceased was in the custody of the appellant and died within the four
D
walls of her matrimonial home under suspicious circumstances.
39. A two-Judge Bench of this Court, in the case of Ramesh
Vithal Patil Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors.3 in almost identical facts
and circumstances, has observed in paragraph 26 of the judgment as
under:-
E
“Moreover, admittedly the deceased committed suicide within
a period of seven years from the date of her marriage.
Section 113-A of the Evidence Act is, therefore, clearly
attracted to this case. Presumption contemplated therein must
spring in action. This provision was introduced by Criminal
F
Law Second Amendment Act, 1983 to resolve the difficulty
of proof where married women are forced to commit suicide
but incriminating evidence is difficult to get as it is usually
available within the four walls of the matrimonial home.
In this case, the prosecution has led evidence to establish
G
cruelty and harassment caused to the deceased which is
rightly taken into account by the High Court. Thus, the
foundation for the presumption exists. The appellant,
however, has led no evidence to rebut the presumption.
3
H (2014) 11 SCC 516
GUMANSINH @ LALO @ RAJU BHIKHABHAI CHAUHAN & 43
ANR. v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]

Therefore, it can be safely concluded in the facts of this case A
that the appellant abetted the suicide of the deceased.”
40. Reference may also to be made to the following observations
of this Court in the case of Satish Shetty Vs. State of Karnataka4 :-
“Once the prosecution succeeds in establishing the
component of cruelty leading to conviction under Section B
498 A, in our view only in a rare case, the Court can refuse
to invoke the presumption of abetment, if other requirements
of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act stand satisfied. This
proposition is amply supported by the view taken by the
three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of K.Prema C
S.Rao & Anr. Vs. Yadla Srinivasa Rao & Ors.5.”
41. In the case of K. Prema S. Rao (Supra), this Court while
holding that in view of Section 215 Cr.PC ommission to frame charge
under Section 306 IPC has not resulted in any failure of justice and
thus, there was no necessity to remit the matter to the Trail Court for D
framing the charge under Section 306 IPC and direct a retrial for that
charge. It further went on to observe as under:-
“The same facts found in cruel treatment of his wife, make
out a case against him under Section 306 IPC of having
abetted commission of suicide by the wife. The appellant was E
charged for an offence of higher degree causing “dowry
death” under Section 304B which is punishable with
minimum sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment and
maximum for life. Presumption under Section 113A of the
Evidence Act could also be raised against him on same facts
constituting offence of cruelty under Section 498A, IPC.” F
(Emphasis applied)
42.The reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellants on
the judgment of this Court rendered by a two-Judge Bench in the case
of Gurjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab6 is totally mis-founded, as the case
G
is distinguishable on facts. In the said case, this Court found that though
the prosecution was successful in proving the case under Section 498A
of the IPC but the prosecution had failed to prove that the cruelty was
4
(2016) 12 SCC 759
5
(2003) 1 SCC 217
6
(2020) 14 SCC 264 H
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A of such a nature which left no choice to the deceased than to commit
suicide. It was found that the prosecution has failed to place on record
any evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that any act or
omission of the accused instigated the deceased to commit suicide.
There is no material on record to show that immediately prior to the
deceased committing suicide there was a cruelty meted out to the
B
deceased by the accused due to which the deceased had no other option
than to commit the suicide. It may be relevant to extract the following
observations made in the judgment :-
“37. Another aspect that needs consideration is that the cases
wherein this Court has held that the conviction under
C
Section 306 of the IPC was tenable though charge was only
under Section 304-B of the IPC, it was found the charge
specifically stated that the deceased was driven to commit
suicide on account of cruelty meted out to the deceased.
However, in the present case, the charge reads thus:
D
“That you all on 28.9.94 in the area of Village Bohan,
the death of Jaswinder Kaur wife of you, Gurjit Singh
and daughter-in-law of you, Gurdial Singh and Mohinder
Kaur and sister-in-law of Ranjit Kaur, was caused
otherwise than under normal circumstances, you all being
E her relatives, within a period of seven years of her
marriage subjected her to cruelty and harassment for all
in connection with demand for dowry and thereby
committed an offence of dowry death punishable under
section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, and within my
F cognizance.”
38. It would thus be seen, that the charge does not state that
the deceased was driven to commit suicide on account of the
harassment meted out to the deceased. It also does not
mention that the accused had abetted in commission of
G suicide by the deceased. In that view of the matter, we are
of the considered view that the cases wherein conversion is
held to be permissible are clearly distinguishable.”
43. On the contrary, in the case at hands, the following charge
was framed against the accused-appellants vide order dated 29.05.2000
H by the Trial Court :-
GUMANSINH @ LALO @ RAJU BHIKHABHAI CHAUHAN & 45
ANR. v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]

CHARGES A
I, Mr. A.C. Modi, Vadodara District Additional Sessions Judge,
hereby frame charges against both of you the accused that,
The marriage of the accused no. 1 took place with Taheraben
and therefore Taheraben and both accused resided together. The B
accused no. 1 used to undertake milk business, the accused no.
1 asked regularly Taheraben to brin an amount of Rs.25,000/-
from her father, for the purchase of milk. But as Taheraben had
the idea of financial condition of her father, she could not fulfill
the demand. Due to this, the accused no.1 used to time and again
beat up Taheraben. Meanwhile the accused no.2 being the C
mother-in-law of Taheraben, she used to remark that Taheraben
was not doing household work in a proper manner, is not cooking
food properly and thereby in such a manner the accused no. 1
was wrongly incited by the accused no 2 and thus Taheraben
was beaten. In this manner, you both the accused, within a span D
of eight months of marriage, casued mental and physical
harassment to Taheraben, made her life worse, created a situation
whereby she wished for death and due to your such behaviour,
left with no other option, in order to end her life on 14/12/1997
from 17:00 hours to 17:30 hours, Taheraben consumed pesticide
E
at Medhad village, thereby committed suidcide and hence she
died.
In this manner, you both the accused have abetted the suicide
of Taheraben and thereby have committed the crime under
Sections 306, 498-A and 114 of the IPC. F
I hereby declare to held judicial proceedings against you as for
the same.”
44. Thus, it would be seen that not only a specific charge was
framed against the accused-appellants, on one hand, the defence failed
to adduce any evidence to rebut the presumption under Section 113-A G
and on the other hand the prosecution was successful in establishing
the evidence that the deceased was left with no choice than to commit
suicide. A reference may be made to the oral testimony of PW-3, the
uncle of the deceased, the relevant part of his examination-in-chief is
extracted here under:- H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A “After marriage Tahera went to reside at her matrimonial
house. At the matrimonial house of Tahera resided her
husband Gumansinh, father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-
in-law named Madhu. The marriage life of Tahera went
properly for a period of two or two and half months of
B marriage. Gumansinh was suspicious by nature. He did not
let Tahera go alone anywhere. He would go with Tahera due
to his suspicious nature. He did not let her talk with anyone
and would do inquiry as to such things. He would ask
Tahera to bring Rs.25,000 from her father as he wished to
purchase buffaloes and do business of milk. Tahera would
C state that his father has a tea stall and there was debt on
him, how could he give money! Thus, as the amount was
not given, Gumansinh used to beat Tahera, quarrel with
her and thereby physically and mentally harass her. The
mother-in-law of Tahera would state that, Tahera did not
D cook well, she did not do work properly. The mother-in-law
of Tahera would instigate the husband of Tahera and thus
she would create a quarrel between them. I used to go to the
house of my brother Mustufa regularly for my business
purpose. At that place Tahera told these things time and
again, these were told to me by brother and sister-in-law.
E
Tahera had come to meet me for 5-7 times and she also told
me these
things……………………………………………….……………”
“On Monday, Mustufa talked with me that, from Medadh
F that Tahera and her mother-in- law arrived at his house.
The mother-in-law of Tahera asked that they be given
buffaloes while purchasing them from Isamil. Or else an
amount of Rs.5000 be given. But Tahera’s mother denied
doing this. They further stated that, the father-in-law of
Tahera was going to Ajmer and thus an amount of Rs.500
G be given. This amount of Rs.500 was given to Dariyaben
the mother-in-law of Tahera. He further stated on the
phone that the harassment is going on increasing now.
Due to which Tahera had asked that uncle be informed
that she cannot take it anymore, the harassment is going
H on and thus she should be taken.
GUMANSINH @ LALO @ RAJU BHIKHABHAI CHAUHAN & 47
ANR. v. THE STATE OF GUJARAT [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]

On the second day, my mother Sakina, my wife Rashida A
and I i.e., we three persons, went to Medhad in three
wheeler tempo. We meet the mother-in-law of Tahera at
that place. The mother-in-law of Tahera told me that, son
of her elder brother was to be operated and he has to go
to hospital. We asked her to send Tahera with us and she B
replied that the father-in-law of Tahera was to go to Ajmer
due to which she should be returned. Thereafter I brought
Tahera to my house at Bhoj. Tahera remained at my house
for a period of 2-3 days and Tahera told me that
even now she is harassed. Even now Gumansinh is
seeking the amount and he is beating her. Moreover, her C
mother-in-law is even stating that Tahera is not cooking
well and that she does not do work properly. Thus, her
mother-in-law would in some other manner start a quarrel
with her and make Gumansinh beat her. Tahera told me
that, she will not be able to keep up with it, if this goes D
on and that she will not return. The father–in-law of
Tahera was to go to Ajmer and therefore we told Tahera
that these sorrowful days will pass, thereby sent her to her
matrimonial house. I told her that, I will not send her if
further harassment would be kept. I explained her this
E
thing and sent her to her matrimonial house.
She was dropped to her matrimonial house at Medadh by
my son and other two persons in the Tempo. Thereafter
on that very night at 11:00 to 11:30 hours, Fatmaben
being the mother-in-law of Tahera and vikram being the F
son-in-law of Fatmaben along with another one man
arrived at my house. They told me that Tahera consumed
poison and therefore has expired. I told these people to
inform this to her father Mustufa, thereafter I searched
for a vehicle and went to inform this thing to my brother
Mustufa at Fertilizernagar. I also informed this to my other G
brother Usman who resided at Tandalja and also informed
this to others. I told my brother to inform this to all and
went to the house of my brother Musfufa. I informed him
that Tahera has expired in her matrimonial house as she
consumed poison ……………………………………………..” H
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A 45. The testimony of this witness was unshaken during
cross-examination and nothing contrary could be elicited from him, and
thus we find no fault with the Trial Court and the Appellate Court
placing reliance on the evidence in drawing the presumption under
Section 113-A particularly, when there was no material brought on
record by the defence to disprove the facts.
B
46. Both the Trial Court as well as the High Court have
threadbare considered the evidence and have recorded cogent reasons
to come to the conclusion that the prosecution has been successful in
proving the case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
C 47. Having gone through the relevant facts and the reasonings
recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court, we are
not persuaded to take a different view. Thus, we find no reason to
interfere with the impugned judgment. The appeals are, therefore,
dismissed.

D
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeals dismissed.

E

F

G

H