Holding

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s finding that the landlord failed to demonstrate a reasonable and bona fide need for the premises, given the later construction of a bungalow, and therefore affirmed the setting aside of the eviction decree.

Summary

Gulabbai, the landlord, sued Nalin Narsi Vohra and others for vacant possession of a shop and arrears of rent, claiming the tenants were defaulters and that she needed the premises for her husband’s tax‑consultancy office. The trial court and the Additional District Judge held that the tenants were monthly payers, not defaulters, and that the landlord had a bona fide and reasonable requirement for the premises. On appeal, the Bombay High Court allowed a writ under Article 227, finding that the landlord had acquired a spacious bungalow and therefore no longer needed the shop, setting aside the eviction decree. The Supreme Court examined whether post‑filing evidence could be considered for the bona‑fide requirement under the Bombay Rents Act. It held that the High Court was correct to admit the additional evidence and conclude that the landlord failed to prove a reasonable need, and consequently upheld the High Court’s order setting aside the decree. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the landlord proved a bona fide and reasonable requirement for possession of the premises, especially in view of subsequent acquisition of alternative accommodation.
Whether the tenants were defaulters under Section 12(2) and 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.
Whether evidence and facts arising after the filing of the suit can be taken into account for determining the landlord’s personal requirement.
Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the eviction decree under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947s. 12(2), s. 12(3)(a), s. 12(3)(b), s. 13(1)(a)
Code of Civil Procedures. Order 41 Rule 27

Subjects

evictionbona fide requirementrent controladditional evidenceBombay Rents Actlandlord's personal requirementArticle 227defaulter tenant

Judgment

GULABBAI A
v.
NALIN NARSI VOHRA AND ORS.

JULY 15, 1991

[B.C. RAY AND M. FATHIMA BEEVI, JJ.] B

Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act.
1947-Section 12(2) read with Section 12(3)(a) and Section 13( l)(a)-
Eviction of tenants on ground of bona fide need-Additional evidence
brought on record subsequent to filing of Suit to determine the question
of bona fide need-Held admissible "reasonable requirement"-
,.. Element of need-Necessity for. c

The appellant-plaintiff institnted a Regular Civil Suit in the court
of Joint Civil Judge, J .D., Ahmednagar for vacant possession of the suit
property and also for arrears of rent. It was pleaded by the appellant
that the defendants were in possession of the suit shop on the monthly D
rent and the tenancy commenced from the first day of every month and
ended on the last day of the said month according to English calender.
The plaintiff based his suit primarily on two grounds viz., that the
• defendants had committed default in the payment of statutory rent and
werP thus defaulters and secondly the appellant required the premises
for bona fide need for setting up an office for her hnsband, who is tax E
consultant. It was asserted by the plaintiff that the defendants had
acquired alternative business places both in the vicinity of the suit pre-
mises, being partners of the firms named in the plaint and also else-
where and they no longer required the premises. It was also added that
the suit premises remained mostly locked and no business was carried
'on there; defendants 1 to 3 having shifted from Ahmednagar to Pone F
were doing business there. The defendants denied the allegations con-
tained in the plaint, stating that the suit property was in their possession
since last 20 years at the annual rent of Rs.255.36 ps; that on receipt of
the notice they had sent the rent amounting to Rs.517-92 ps. by Money
Order which the appellant refused being not correctly calculated; then
again the defendants sent Rs.960 by Demand Draft which was also G
refused by the appellant as miscalculated. Thereafter the defendants
_,sent Rs.658.55 ps. by Money Order which was accepted by the appellant.
According to the tenants they are always willing to pay the rent and in
fact fue appellant's husband has been accepting the rent without issuing
any receipt therefor. According to the defendants, the requirement of
the plaintiff was neither bona fide nor reasonable; her husband, an H

941
942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

A Income-Tax and Sales/Tax Practitioner was working with Mr. Gandhi
as one of his partners and also having his own office. Further the
plaintiff was in possession of an area lSft. x 2Sft. on the ground floor
facing towards west, adjacent to the suit premises and also complete
first floor 4Sft. x 15ft.

B The Tiial Court held that the defendants failed to prove that the suit
premises were leased to them at annual rent and as such they were held
to be defaulters as the deposits of rent were not made within the mean-
ing of Si!ctlon 12(3)(a) and 12(3)(b) of the Rent Act. The Trial Court
further found that as the plaintiff has no other accommodation at
Ahmednagar except the suit premises and the partnership of the plaintiff's '
C husband with S.B. Gandhi had been dissolved, the plaintiff reasonably
required the suit premises for the purpose of opening office of her
husband as Tax Consultant. Accordingly the Trial Court decreed the
suit and directed the defendants-ro hand over the vacant possession of
the suit premises within one month of the date of the order. Being
aggrieved, the defendants filed an appeal before the Additional District
D Judge, Ahmednagar. The Additional District Judge, held that the trial
court was right in holding that the defendant No. 1 was paying the rent
monthly and he was a monthly tenant but there were no arrears for the
statutory period in order to hold that the defendants were defaulters for
which their tenancy was liable to be determined. On the question of
bona fide requirement of the appellant, the Additional District Judge
E also considered the application for additional evidence which disclosed
that the plaintiff's husband had purchased a plot and constructed a big
bungalow covering about 2000 sq. ft. and held that it was not known
whether the Municipality bad given permission for habitation and
furthermore the requirement of the plaintiff was especially for conduct-
ing her husband's profession of Tax Practitioner at the required suit
F premises, which is nat for residential purposes. On this reasoning the
Additional District Judge held that the subsequent circumstances have
not much relevance and the requirement of the plaintiff-appellant was a
bona fide and gennine one. Accordingly he atllrmed the decree passed
by the Trial Court.

G The Respondenftenant being aggrieved filed a writ petition under ~

Article 227 of the Constitntion praying for setting aside the decree of_
ejectment passed against him. The High Court, on a consideratig" of
the additional evidences which have been expressly mentioned in the
application for additional evidence, held that the hnsband of the appel-
lant had acqnired a plot in T.P. Scheme No. Ill, Ahmedna~ar and
H constructed a big bungalow thereon during the pendency of the appeal
GULABBAI v. NALIN NARSI 943

and has been residing there. The said premises consisted of a 2000 sq.
A
ft. covered area and the appellant was using the same for residence and
office purpose also. The High Court held that the said bungalow can be
conveniently used for the residence of the plaintiff and her family mem-
ber8 as well as for the purpose of opening of office of Tax Consultant by
her husband. That apart, the entire first floor of the suit premises can
be conveniently utilised for opening the office of Tax Consultant by the B
plaintiff's husband. The High Court therefore on that reasoning al-
lowed the writ petition and set aside the judgments and decrees passed
by the Courts below.

,; Hence this appeal by the appellant-landlord by special leave.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court • c
HELP: The lower Appellate Court, after considering the evi-
deuces held that the defendant are not defaulters as there were no
arrears for the statutory period. Thus, the question of default on the
part of the defendants in the payment of rent was not at all raised nor D
agitated before the Court of Appeal below by the plaintiff. [952F-G]

It is now beyond the pale of any doubt that in appropriate cases
events subsequent to the filing of the suit can be taken notice of and can
be duly considered provided the same is relevant in determining the ques-
tion of bona fide requirement. The High Court was right in duly consi- E
dering the new facts and circumstances that have been brought to the
notice of the Court by the application for additional evidence filed
under Order 41Rule27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. [957H-958A]

In the instant appeal· it has been rightly held by the High Court
after considering the subsequent facts and materials brought out by the F
application for additional evidence that the plaintiff failed to prove
reasonable and bona fide need for her occupation of the suit premises
for the purpose !Jf opening the Tax Consultancy office of her husband,
Amritlal Mntha. Considering the facts and circumstances as well as the
subsequent materials brought out by the application for additional •Vi·
... dence, we have no hesitation in our mind to hold that the aforesaid G
findings arrived at by the High Court is totally unexceptionable and so
04 the same cannot be interfered with in this appeal. [958F-G]
-i
The words "reasonable requirement" undoubtedly postulate that
there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish.
The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in H
944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

A mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing that a
desire. [958E]

M/s. Variety Emporium v. V.R.M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina, [1985]
2 SCR 102; Chandavarkar Sita Raina Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, [1986]
3 SCR 866; Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders,
B [1975] 3 SCR 958; Hasmat Rai & Anr. v. Raghunath Prasad, [1981] 3
SCR 685; Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain, [1987] 1 SCR
275; and Bega Begum and Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan and Ors., [1979] 2
SCR 1;

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4236
c of 1988. •

From the Judgment and Order dated 13.4.1988 of the Bombay
High Court in W.P. No. 1689 of 1987.

V.M. Tarkunde, Mrs. Nandini Gore, Ms. Aditi Chaudhary and
D Mrs. M. Karanjawala (NP) for the Appellant.

Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Shishir Sharma and P.H. Parekh for the
Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
RAY, J. This appeal on special leave is directed against the
judgment and order passed by the High Court at Bombay in Writ
Petition No. 1689 of 1987 allowing the writ petition, setting aside the
judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the
lower appellate court and thereby dismissing the suit filed by the
F plaintiff (appellant in this appeal) for eviction of the tenant-
respondents.

The matrix of the case as appears from the pleadings of the
parties is as follows:

G The plaintiff-appellant, Gulabbai instituted Regular Civil Suit
No. 19 of 1979 in the court of Shri S.S. Patil, III Jt. Civil Judge, J.D.,
Ahmednagar at Ahmednagar for vacant possession of the suit prop-
erty consisting of part of survey No. 3576 in the city of Ahmednagar
and also for the arrears of rent and the costs of the suit. Originally the
said property belonged to the Imarat Company Private Limited. The
H plaintiff purchased the said property from Imarat Company Private
.,
..
GULABBA! v. NALIN NARSI !RAY, J.] 945

Limited bearing numbers on the front side on the eastern as 81 to 83
A
and rear part on the West 89 to 91, for a consideration of Rs.34,000 on
August 12, 1976. At the time of purchase of the premises the said
building had ground floor and a first floor. The purchase was made by
Amritlal Mutha in the name of his wife, Gulabbai, the plaintiff. The
defendants were in possession of a part of the said premises bearing
Nos. 81 to 83 on eastern side whereas the western part on the ground B
floor bearing Nos. 89 to 91 was possessed by the brother of Amritlal
Mutha i.e. kanhyalal Mutha who has been running a provision store
under the name and style of 'Mutha Provision Store' for the last 15
years. The defendant Nos. 1 and 4 i.e. Nalin Narsi Vohra and Mulji
Narsi Vohra are the brothers whereas defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are the
wife and son of the defentant No. 1 respectively. According to the
plaintiff, the defendants are in possession of the suit shop Nos. 81to83 c
admeasuring 21 ft. x 15 ft. on the monthly rent of Rs.21.28 ps. plus
education cess Rs.2.55 ps. The tenancy commences from the first day
of every month and ends on the last day of the said month according to,
the English calendar. Prior to the .P_urchase of the suit. premises, the
defendants were tenants of Imarat Company Private Limited and the D
tenancy is in the name of defendant No. 1 i.e. Nalin Narsi Vohra and
the rent receipts too were in the name of the defendant. No. 1 only.
According to the plaintiff, the original agreement of defendant with
Imarat Company Pvt. Ltd. is to pay rent from month to month. After
i
•;' purchase of the said property, Imarat Company intimated to the
tenant-defendant No. 1 about the said purchase by the plaintiff. It has E
been pleaded by the plaintiff that. the defendant No. 1 assured the
plaintiff after purchase of the suit house, that he would vacate the said
premises. However, the defendants demanded 'Pagadi' amounting to
Rs.25000 in order to vacate the suit premises. It was alleged by the
plaintiff that the defendants were in arrears of rent since 12.8.1975 till
15.12.1977. The plaintiff, therefore, issued a notice dated 15.12.1977 F
of ejectrrient and thereby demanded the rent of the suit premises till
30.11.1977. The defendant No. 1 after receipt of the notice sent
Rs.571.9i ps. by Money Order. But it was refused by the plaintiff as
the rent was not correctly calculated. The defendants again sent Rs.
960 by Demand Draft which was also refused by the plaintiff as mis-
calculated. The defendants sent thereafter Rs.658.55 ps; by Money G
Order which was accepted by the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff
the defendants are monthly tenants and so according to her, defen-
dants are defaulter for non-paying the rent of the suit premises for
more than six months.

The plaintiff also stated that her husband, Amritlal Mutha is a H
.,
'•

,
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991] 2 S.C.R.

Taxation Consultant and the suit premises are required for the
A
purpose of office for her husband as her husband has no other suitable
accommodation except the suit premises to open his office. It has also
been pleaded in the plaint that the defendants no longer require the •
suit premises for the purpose of business because the defendant Nos. 1
to 3 are at present residing at Pune and doing the business at Pune
B under the name 11nd style of 'Ashok and Company' which deals. with
the sale and purchase of machine tools. It has been further pleaded by
the plaintiff that the defendants are in possession of three other
businesses at Nagar which are situated near the suit premises. The
defendants have purchased one shop in front of Kohinoor Cloth Store
in the year 1964 and defendant Nos. 1 to 4 ~re partners in the shop
'Liberty Dresses' which deals with Ready made garments and Hosiery.
c The defendant Nos. 1-to 4 have also purchased the premises for
Rs.13,000 in the year 1972 from Imarat Company Private Ltd. which is
also situated in front of the suit premises. The defendants have also
•
purchased one premises from Imarat Company Private Ltd. In the
year 1974 for Rs.12,000. The defendants have removed the middle
D wall in between the two properties mentioned above and opened a big
shop and are carrying the business of readymade garments and woolen
hosiery called as 'Madura Stores'. It is the case of the plaintiff that the
defendants no more require the suit premises for business purposes
and prayed for an order of eviction of the defendants from tlhe suit
premises on the ground of bona fide requirement. It has also been
E pleaded that greater hardship would be caused to the plaintiff if the
possession of the suit premises be not handed over to her. The
defendants did not hand over the suit premises to the plaintiff after the
receipt of the notice and the instant suit was filed on January 8, 1979.

The defendant-respondent Nos. 1 to 4 filed a written statement
F exhibit 10 denying all the material allegations made by the plaintiff.
According to the defendants, the description of the suit house was not
made properly in the plaint and hence on that ground the suit i1s liable
to iie dismissed. The defendants has stated that the suit property is in
their possession since the last 20 years at the annual rent of R,.. 255.36·
()S. They have further stated that the rent of the suit premises is to be/
G given after every 1 year which the defendants had been regularly pay-
ing to the lmarat Company Pvt. Ltd. The defendants admit that the
suit premises has been purchased by the plaintiff in the year 1975 and
the defendants offered the rent to the plaintiff on several occasions but
the plaintiff refused to accept the same. Ultimately, they sent the rent
by Money Order which was also refused by the plaintiff. Again, in
H order to sh.ow their willingness the defendants sent an amount of
GULABBAI ,v. NALIN NARSI (RAY, .J.] 947

Rs.960 by Demand Draft but it was also refused by the plaintiff. The
A
defendants thereafter have sent Rs.658.58 ps. which was accepted by
the plaintiff on December 27, 1977. Thus, the rent was paid upto
30.11.1977 and again from 1.12.1977 to 30.9.1978, the.defendants paid
the rent of the suit premises to the plaintiff and husband of the plaintiff
accepted the same, but he did not give the receipt of the same. The
defendants further remitted an amount of Rs.2:i8.35 ps ..by Money B
Order to the plaintiff and. it was accepted by the plaintiff. The
defendants submit that tbey were always ready and willing to pay the
rent to the plaintiff but the plaintiff was not accepting the same. The
defendants also replied to the said notice. According to the defendants
the requirement of the plaintiff is neither bona fide nor reasonable.
The defendants further pleaded that the husband of the plaintiff is
Income tax and Sales tax Practitioner and working with S.B. Gandhi as
c
one of his partners and also having his own office which is situated in
Ghas Galli, now called as Shahaji.Road on the first floor and the said
premises is suitable for plaintiff's husband to open his office there. The
plaintiff is in possession of area 15 fts. x 25 fts. on the ground floor
facing towards west, adjacent to the suit premises and also complete D
first floor 45 fts. x 15 fts. The said area is suitable for plainitiff's
husband for his office if he so desires. It has been pleaded by the
defendant No. 1 that greater hardship would be caused to him if pre-
mises are vacated and handed over to the plaintiff. The defendants
submit that they are residing at Ahmednagar and carrying the business
of Ready-made garments in the suit shop. It has been further pleaded E
that accommodation is not easily available.in the Ahmednagar City for
the purpose of business and Kapad Bazar area where the suit premises
exist is the only good market of hosiery and so prayed for dismissal of
the plaintiff's suit.

On the above pleadings ten issues were framed of which the rele- F
vant issues are:

Issue No. 2 : Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant No. 1
is lawful defaulter in payment of monthly rent?

Issue No. 3 Whether the plaintiff proves that she bona fide G
requires possession of the suit premises for the of-
fice of her husband Amritlal?

Issue No. 4 To whom the greater hardship would be caused by
passing the decree for eviction than by refusing to
pass it? H
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S..C.R.

Issue No. 7 Whether the defendant No. 1 proves that suit pre-
A
mises were leased to him at annual rent of Rs.255.36
ps.? \I
•
The Trial Court held with regard to Issue No. 3 that at the time
of purchase there was ground floor and first floor to the suit premises.
B The defendants were in possession of shop Nos. 81 to 83 on the eastern
side and on the western side of the ground floor shops bearing Nos. 89
to 91 were in possession of the brother of the plaintiffs husband,
Kanhyalal Mutha where he had been running a provision store since
the last 13 years. The family of Amritlal Mutha, i.e. husband of the
plaintiff considered of his wife, his 3 children, the eldest son aged •
about 16 years was studying in the 12th standard .in the year 1981. His
c second son aged about 13 years was in 7th standard and 3rd son in 3rd
standard in the year 1981. The plaintiff had been residing on the first
floor of the suit premises, which consisted of 4 rooms, first one bed
room towards west admeasuring 7 fts. x 12 fts. and next room kitchen
admeasuring 7 fts. x 11 fts. and 3rd room admeasuring 7 fts. x H fts.
D which is used for the studies of the children. One other room
admeasuring 15 fts. x 15 fts. was used as a bed room. It has been
found that first floor premises is not sufficient for his office purposes
because he requires at least 25 fts. x 30 fts. area for the purpose of
office in order to keep the records and for the sitting arrangement for
his clients and also for his cabin. It has further been found that the
E ground floor shop Nos. 89 to 91 adjacent to the suit premises i:; not
available for the plaintiff's husband for opening his office as Kanhyalal
Mutha, brother of the plaintiff's husband, has been running ithere
Mutha Provision Store for the last about 15 years, the evidence of
Amritlal is also consistant with the evidence of Kanyalal Mutha on this
point. The Trial Court therefore, found that as the plaintiff has no
F other accommodation at Ahmednagar except the suit premises and the
partnership of the plaintiff's husband with S.B. Gandhi has been dis-
solved, the plaintiff reasonably requires the suit premises for the
purpose of opening of office of her husband as Tax Consultant. The
demand of the plaintiff is, therefore, reasonable and bona fide. H was
also found that the defendant No. 1 was in possession of a number of
G premises which are near the suit premises and the defendants were ;..
carrying on the hosiery business in those premises under the name and
style of 'Liberty Dresses' and 'Madura Stores'. It has been further held
that the defendant No. 1 was shown as partner in the firm Mis Vohra
and Company, 94/97 Budhwar Peth, Pune 2, and the residence of
defendant No. 1 is known as Krishnakripa, Mukund Nagar, Pune-9
H where the suit summons were served on the defendant No. 1. It was
GULABBAI v. NALIN NARSI (RAY. J.( 949

also found that it was evident from exhibit 105 that the son of de-
A
fendant No. 1 and wife of son of defendant No. 1 are the partners in
Mis Ashok and Company and both are residing at 7/3-C-Vanshree
Apartment, Rambag Colony, Sadashiv peth, Pune. It has also been
found that the defendant No. 1 has admitted in his cross-examination
that he has vacated hi~ residential premises at Ahmednagar and he is in
search of other residential accommodation. It was, therefore, held that B
the plaintiff has proved his bona fide requirement of the suit premises
and thus issue No. 3 had been decided in the affirmative.

As regards Issue No. 4, the Trial Court held that except the suit
premises and first floor on- it, no other premises was available to the
plaintiff at Ahmednagar. The Trial Court held further that the first
floor premises is not suitable for the plaintiff's husband to open his c
office and greater hardship will be caused to the plaintiff if the suit
premises be not handed over to the plaintiff than by denying him the
vacant possession of the suit premises. Issue No. 4 was thus held in
favour of the plaintiff. It was further held that the suit eremises were
properly described in the plaint. D

As regards Issue Nos. 2 and 7 it was held that the defendant No.
1 is a monthly tenant and the monthly rent in respect of such premises
is Rs.2 l.28_ps. ph~s education cess Rs.2.55 ps i.e. Rs.23.83 ps. It was
also held that the tenancy commenced from the first day of every
month and ended on last day of-the same month as per the English E
calendar. The Trial Court held that the defendants failed to prove that
the suit premises were leased to them at annual rent of Rs.255.36 and
hence that issue was decided against the defendants. The defendants
were also to be held as def_3c\llters as the deposits of rent were not. made
within the meaning of Section 12(3)(a) and 12(3){b) of the Rent Act.
The Trial Court thus decreed the suit and directed the defendants to F
hand over vacant possession of the suit premises within one month of
the date of order.

Against the said Judgment and decree, the defendant No. 1
Nalin Narsi Vohra filed an appeal being Regular Civil Appeal No. 430
of 1985 in the court of Addi. Distt. Judge, Ahmednagar, The learned G
Additional District Judge held that the Trial Court was right in holding
that the defendant No. 1 was paying the rent monthly and he was a
monthly tenant. It was further held that there are no arrears for the
statutory period in order to hold that the defendants are defaulters for
which their tenancy is liable to be determined. As such the Addi.
District Judge found against the plaintiff holding that the defendants H
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991] 2 S.C.R.

A had not defaulted in payment of rent and there could not be any decree
of ejectment on this ground. The learned Addi. District Judge further
held that there was nothing which shattered the evidence of Amritlal
when he speaks about the bona fide requirement of the plaintiff for •
having the suit property to open his office and the argument that
plaintiff can acquire the premises of Kanhyalal could not be accepted
B as it was neither possible nor feasible in the near future to expect that
Kanhyalal would surrender the premises to the plaintiff. The construc-
tion on the second floor of the suit premises was a temporary one and
as such the same could not be used for residential purposes. The
Addled. District Judge also considered the application for additional
evidence which disclosed that the plaintiff's husband had purchased a
plot at Chahurana Bk. at the T.P. Scheme No. 3 within the municipal
c limit of Ahmednagar and constructed a big bungalow covering about
2000 sq. ft. The Addi. District Judge held that it was not known
whether the Municipality has given permission for habitation and
furthermore the requirement of the plaintiff was especially for con-
ducting her husband's profession of Tax Practitioner at the required
D suit premises, which is not for residential purposes. The suit premises
are situated in Kapad Bazar area where the trading communities have
their shops and business establishments, and is fit for the opening of
Tax Consultant's office. The bungalow constructed by the plaintiff's
husband was not suitable for starting the office of Tax Practiifuner as it
is at a remote place. It was, therefore, held that the subsequent
F. circumstances have not much relevance and the requirement of the
plaintiff was a bona fide and genuine one. As such, the Additional
District Judge affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the Trial
Court. It was further held by the learned Additional District Judge
that there was no possibility of any hardship being caused to the
defendants in case the possession of the suit premises was granted to
F the plaintiff. The Addi. District Judge therefore, dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court.

Feeling aggrieved the respondent-tenant, Nalin Narsi Vohra
filed a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution being
registered as Writ Petition No. 1689 of 1987 in the High Court of
G Judicature at Bombay.

The High Court issued a Rule on the said writ petition and after
hearing the parties and considering the facts and circumstances includ-
ing the evidences on record, the High Court held that in a petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the High Court does not
H generally interfere with regard to the concurrent findings of facts
GULABBAI v. NALIN NARSI [RAY, J.] 951

arrived at by the courts below but in appropriate cases the High Court
A
has jurisdiction.under Article 227 of the Constitution to consider facts
subsequent to the filing of an application for eviction which have a
great bearing on the question of bona fide and reasonable requirement
of the landlord for a decree for eviction of the suit premises. The High
Court has referred to some decisions rendered by this Court in this
respect. It has been held by the High Court that of the subsequent facts B
which are relevant and admissible can be taken into consideration by
the High Court in -Order to come to a finding as to the reasonable and
bona fide requirement of the landlord for passing a decree of eviction
from the suit premises. The High Court has held on a consideration of
the additional evidences which have been expressly mentioned in the
application for additional evidence stating in detail that the plaintiff's
husband, Amritlal Mutha after passing of the decree for eviction under
c
section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House
Rates Control Act, 1947 has acquired a plot being No. 47/lsituated in
T.P. Scheme No. III at Ahmednagar. The total area of the plot is 3025
sq. ft. and after getting the permission from the Municipal Council of
Ahmednagar, the plaintiff's husband constructed a big bungalow D
thereon during the pendency of the appeal and has been residing
there. The said premises consists of a covered area of 2000 sq. ft. and
the plaintiff is using the same for residence and office purpose also.
These facts were not properly considered by the lov•er appellate court
while finding about the reasonable and bona fide requirement of the
plaintiff in passing a decree of eviction of the defendants from the suit E
premises. The High Court held that the said bungalow can be con-
veniently used for the residence of the plaintiff and her family members
~.
as well as for the purpose of opening of office of Tax Consultant by her
husband. That apart, the entire first floor of the suit premises can be
conveniently utilised for opening the office of Tax Consultant by the
plaintiffs husband, Amritlal Mutha. The lower appellate court totally F
failed to consider this aspect of the case. It has, therefore, been held
that:

" ...... Even otherwise the finding is manifestly so unjust
and unsupported by the evidence that its validity cannot be
sustained even in this limited field, more so, since there is G
utter mis-reading of the evidence and non-application of
mind on material features and there is also an error appa-
rent on the face of the record."
The High Court, therefore, allowed the writ petition and made
the rule absolute and set aside the judgments and decrees made by the H
courts below.
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

It is against this judgment and order, the instant appeal on
A
special leave has been filed at the instance of the plaintiff in this court.

Three question were raised before the courts below. The first
question was whether the suit property was properly described in the
plaint or not.
B
On this point, both the Trial Court as well as the lower appellate
court have concurrently found that the suit premises being part of
Survey No. 3576 which was previously owned by one Imarat Company
Private Limited from whom the plaintiff's husband Arnritlal Mutha
purchased for a sum of Rs.34,000 was properly described in the plaint
and the respondents-defendants have been occupying an area admit-
c tedly 20fts. x 15 fts. being shop Nos. 81 to 83 on the eastern side of the
said premises. This finding of the courts below has neither been chal-
lenged before the High Court nor before this Court in the instant
appeal.

D The next point that was urged by the plaintiff in the courts below
was that on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent the
defendant No. 1 was liable to be ejected from the suit premises in
accordance with the provisions of Section 12(2) read with Section
12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Con-
trol Act, 1947 hereinafter to be referred in short as the said Act. On
E this point, the Trial Court held that:

" ...... the defendant by depositing rent for the first time
on 8.6.80, for the period 1.10.78 to 31.12.80 committed
breach of above mentioned ruling and is defaulter within
..
the meaning of Section 12(3)(a) and 12(3)(b) of the Rent
F Act."

The lower Appellate Court, however, after considering the evi-
dences held. that the defendant are not defaulters as there were no
arrears for the statutory period. Thus, the question of default on the
part of the defendants in the payment of rent was not at all raised
G nor agitated before the Court of Appeal below by the plaintiff.

The only question that was agitated with great vehemence by the
learned counsel on behalf of the appellant is about the finding arrived
at by the High Court to the effect that there was no reasonable bona
fide requirement for the plaintiff-appellant to obtain a decree for evic-
H tion of the defendants-respondents from the suit premises for the
GULABBAI v. NALIN NARSI [RAY, J.] 953

purpose of opening of office of Tax Consultant by the appellant's
A
husband, Amritlal Mutha on the ground floor of the said premises.
Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel appearing in support of the case of the
appellant has with great vehemence urged before us that the bungalow
that has been constructed by the appellant's husband within Ahmed-
nagar Municipal area is at a distance of about 1-2 Kms. from the suit
premises whereas the suit premises is situated in the Kapad Bazar area B
where the traders have their shops and establishments and as such the
ejectment of the respondents from the suit premises was necessary for
opening the office of Tax Consultancy in the suit premises by the
• husband of the appellant. It has been further urged in this connection
by Mr. Tarkunde that the bungalow that has been constructed and
comprises of a covered area of 2000 sq. ft. is elltirely necessary for
occupation of the appellant's eldest son, Abhey Amritlal Mutha who
c
passed MBBS in 1988 and obtained certificate of registration. It has
also been subrnitted in this connection that permission to start dis-
pensary and consulting clinic/residence in the said premises has been
obtained from the Town Planner and Chief Officer, Ahmednagar
Municipal Council. It has also been urged with great vehemence by D
Shri Tarkunde that the respondent has not been residing at all in
Ahmednagar but has shifted to Pune as will be evident from the fact
that the summons of the suit were served on the respondent No. I at
his residence at Krishnakripa, Galli No. 3, 3rd Floor, Mukund Nagar,
Pune-411 009. It has been further stated that the respondent No. 1,
Nalin Narsi Vohra has started a business under the name and style of E
Mis Vohra and Company Since February, 1980 at 94/97, Budhwar
Peth, Pune-2. It is a partnership firm business and the partners, are
Nalin Narsi Vohra, Krishnakripa, Mukand Nagar, Pune-9 and Mrs.
Bhanu Ashok Vora, 41/666, Lokamanya Nagar, Pune-30. This busi-
ness has been started since July, 1979 as per the partnership deed and
the copy of the register of firms. It has also been stated that the F
respondent No. 1, Ashok Nalin Vohra also started a business of
machine tools known as Mis Ashok & Company at 94/97, Budhwar
Peth, Pune-2 vide partnership deed dated 12.2.1982. It has further
been urged on behalf of the appellant that the suit premises remained
under lock and key for about ten years and no business was transacted
in tiJe said premises. It has also been urged in this connection that G
besides the suit premises the respondents purchased the Municipal
Premises No. 2733/6 and has been running 'Madura Stores' for selling
ready-made garments. In 1972, the respondent No. 1, Nalin Narsi
Vohra and his brother, respondent No. 4, Mulji Narsi Vohra jointly
purchased the ownership rights from Imarat Company Pvt. Ltd. the
premises No. 2733/9 and open 'Liberty Dresses' therein for sale of H
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

A
hosiery goods. Similarly the respondent No. 1 also purchased another
premises opposite to Kohinoor Cloth Store and after removing the
wall in between two shops, has been running the business of ready-
made garments known as 'Madura Stores'. It has, therefore, been
contended that the suit premises being closed for a period of ten years
and no business being carried on there, the appellant is entitled to get
B decree of ejectment of the respondents from the suit premises under
the provisions of the said Act.

The contention that the respondents kept the suit premises under
lock and key for about ten years without opening the shop, running the
business of ready-made garments therein, has not at all been proved by •
any evidence whatsoever as has been held by the High Court. There-
c fore, this contention is wholly untenable. Moreover the ground of
ejectment on the ground of non-payment of rent for over six months
under Section 12(2) and 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act has not
been mentioned in the eviction suit nor any issue was framed on this
score .
.D
It has been on the other hand contended by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondents that the submissions made in
the application for additional evidence bring further materials before
the lower appellate court on the question that the appellant has
alternative accommodation and as such she did not reasonably and
E bona fide require the suit premises for the opening of the office of Tax
Consultant for her husband, Amritlal Mutha therein. It is convenient
to note in this connection that the statements as well as the subsequent
facts that have been brought to the notice of the court by the applica-
tion for additional evidence under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and filed before the lower appellate court have not
F been controverted at all. As such, the appellant or her husband, Amrit-
lal Mutha did not deny those subsequent facts brought before the court
by the said application. The lower appellate court that admitted the
application for additional evidence failed to consider at all the fact that
a very specious bungalow comprising of about 2000 sq. ft. covered area
had already been built within the Ahmednagar Municipal Area by the
G plaintiff's husband, Amritlal Mutha. After purchasing the plot and
constructing the bungalow during the pendency of the appeal before
the lower appellate court, the appellant with the members of her
family had been residing there and the husband of the appellant had
started the office of Tax Consultancy in that bungalow. The lower
appellate court merely by-passed this relevant fact on the plea that that
H bungalow is at a distance from the Kapad Bazar area where the shops
GULABBAI v. NALIN NARSI [RAY, J.] 955

of the traders are situated. The lower appellate court also did not at all
A
consider whether the first floor of the suit premises as well as the se·cond
floor which though claimed to be a shed, could be conveniently utilised
for the purpose of the said Tax Consultancy Office. The lower appel-
late court simply considered that the second floor being a temporary·
shed could not properly be used for opening the Tax Consultancy
Office and the first floor which consisted of 4 rooms of which 2 are B
used as bed rooms and 1 is used as a kitchen and 1 as study room of the
sons of the appellant, cannot be conveniently utilised for the said
office as there was no space for the same withoot considering at all that
the appellant with members of his family had been residing already in
the spacious bungalow referred to hereinbefore. It has been urged
with great vehemence on behalf of the appellant that both the Trial
Court as well as the Lower Appellate Court having found that the
c
appellant reasonably and bona fide required the suit premises for the
opening of the office of Tax Consultant of the appellant's husband,
Amritlal Mutha, the decree of eviction of the suit premises should not
have been set aside by the High Court under Article 227 of the Con-
stitution by taking into consideration subsequent facts and evidences. D
This submission, in our considered opinion, is without any substance
and same is to be rejected. Reference may be made in this connection
to the decision in the case of Mis Variety Emporium v. V.R.M. Mohd.
Ibrahim Naina, [1985] 2 SCR 102 wherein it has been observed that:

"No authority is needed for the proposition that, in E
appropriate cases, the Court must have regard to events as
they present themselves at the time when it is hearing the
proceeding before it and mould the relief in the list of those
events. We may, however, draw attention to a decision of
this Court in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, (1981] 3
SCR 605 the ratio of which may be stated thus: F

When an action is brought by a landlord for the eviction of
a tenant on the ground of personal I'tquirements, the land-
lord's need must not only be shown torexist at the date of the
suit, but it must exist on the date of the"appellate decree, or
the date when a higher Court deals with the matter. During G
the progress and passage of proceedings from court to
court, if subsequent events occur which, if noticed, would
non-suit the landlord, the court has to examine and
evaluate those events and mould the decree accordingly.
The tenant is entitled to show that the need or requirement
of the landlord no more exists by pointing out such' subse- H
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991) 2 S.C.R.

quent events, to the court, including the appellate court. In
A
such a situation, it would be incorrect to say that as a
decree or order for eviction is passed against the tenant, he
cannot invite the Court to take into consideration subse-
quent events. The tenant can be precluded from so con-
tending only when 3 decree or order for eviction has
B become final. {Pages 606-607).

Justice R.S. Pathak, who concurred with Justice D.A.
Desai and Justice Venkataramiah, expressed the same view
thus:

It is well settled now that in a proceeding for the ejectment
c of a tenant on the ground of personal requirement under a
statute controlling the eviction of tenants, unless the
statute prescribes to the contrary, the requirement must
continue to exist on the date when the proceeding is finally
disposed of either in appeal or revision, by the relevant
D authority. That position is indisputable. {Page 624).

In Chandavarkar Sita Raina Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, [1986) 3 •
SCR 866 it has been observed that:

"In exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Con-
£ stitution, the High Court can go into the question of facts
or look into the evidence if justice so requires it. But it
should decline to exercise that jurisdiction in the absence of
clear cut down reasons where the question depends upon
the appreciation of evidence. It also should not interfere
with a finding within the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal
F or court except where the finding is perverse in law in the
sense that no reasonable person properly instructed in law
could have come to such a finding or there is any mis-
direction in law or a view of fact has been taken in the teeth
of preponderance of evidence or the finding is not based on
any material evidence or it has resulted in manifest
G injustice. Except to that limited extent the High Court has
no jurisdiction."

In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders,
[ 1975) 3 SCR 958 it has been observed by this Court that:

H "For making the right or remedy, claimed by the party just
GULABBAI v. NALIN NARSI [RAY, J.] 957

and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with
the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, A
take cautious cognizance of events and developments sub-
sequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the
rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. On
both occasions the High Court, in revision, correctly took
this view. The later recovery of another accommodation by B
the landlord, during the pendency of the case, has as the
High Court twice pointed out, a material bearing on the
right to evict, in view of the inhibition written into
s. 10(3)(iii) itself. The High Court was right in taking into
~onsideration the facts which came into being subsequent
to the commencement of the proceedings."
c
Similar observation has been made in Hasmat Rai & Anr. v.
Raghunath Prasad, [ 1981] 3 SCR 685.

"It is immaterial that the amendment was sought more
than three years after possession of the portion had passed D
to the respondent. The High Court was bound to take the
fact into consideration because, as is well settled now, in a
proceeding for the ejectment of a tenant on the ground of
personal requirement under a statute controlling the evic-
tion of tenants, unless the statute prescribes to the contrary
the requirement must continue to exist on the date when E
the proceeding is finally disposed of either in appeal or
revision, by the relevant authority. That position, to my
mind, is indisputable. The High Court should have allowed
the amendment."

In Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain, [1987] 1SCR275 F
it has been observed by this Court that:

"Administration of justice demands that any changes
either in fact or in law must be taken cognizance of by the
J. Court but that must be done in a cautious manner of rele-
vant facts. Therefore, subsequent events can be taken G
cognizance of if they are relevant and material."

On a conspectus of all these decisions rendered by this Court, it
is now beyond the pale of any doubt that in approi;riate cases events
subsequent to the filing of the suit can be taken notice of and can be
duly considered provided the same is relevant in determining the ques- H
958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991] 2 S.C.R.

tion of bona fide requirement. Therefore, the High Court was right in
A
duly considering the new facts and circumstances that have been
brought to the notice of the Court by the application for additional
evidence filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure
and in coming to a firm finding that the plaintiff-appellant having
constructed a spacious bungalow where she with the members of her
B family had been residing, there is no reasonable and bona fide require-
ment for the plaintiff to get a decree of ejectment of the defendants
from the suit premises in as much as the first floor of the suit premises
as well as the second floor could be conveniently used for opening the
office of Tax Consultancy of plaintiff's husband who previously
worked with one Mr. Gandhi in a partnership firm which partnership
C had been dissolved after Mr. Gandhi's son came to practice with his
father.

It is also relevant to consider in this connection the observations
of this Court in Bega Begum and Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan and Ors.,
[ 1979] 2 SCR 1 as regards the meaning of the words 'reasonable re-
D quirement and own occupation' as used in Section ll(h) of the Jammu
and Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966. It has been
held that the words 'reasonable requirement1 undoubtedly postulate
that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or
wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be
kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing
E but a desire.

In the instant appeal it has been rightly held by the High Court
after considering the subsequent facts and materials brought out by the
application for additional evidence that the plaintiff failed to prove
reasonable and bona fide need for her occupation of the suit premises
F for the purpose of opining the Tax Consultancy Office of her husband,
Amritlal Mutha. Considering the facts and circumstances as well as the
subsequent materials brought out by the application for additional
evidence, we have no hesitation in our mind to hold that the aforesaid
findings arrived at by the High Court is totally unexceptionable and so
the same cannot be interfered with in this appeal. It will not be out of
G place to mention in this connection that Amritlal Mutha, husband of
the appellant has stated in the additional affidavit filed in this Court
that Dr. Abbey A. Mutha, son of the appellant had purchased a flat on
ownership basis in Co-partnership Society, named Amrita Kunj
Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. situated at 324/5 Shivaji Nagar,
Pune-410005. This, if taken notice of, will affirm the finding of the
H High Court that the appellant failed to prove her bona fide and reason-
GULABBAI v. NALIN NARSI [RAY, J.l 959

able need for the suit premises for opening the Tax Consultancy Office A
for her husband.

Besides the contentions referred to hereinbefore, no other con-
tention has been advanced before this Court. Therefore, this appeal
fails and is hereby dismissed. The judgment and order of the High
B
Court is upheld. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties
will bear their own costs.

Y.Lal Appeal failed.