Holding

The Court held that res judicata does not apply, suppression of facts is not material for dismissal, the merger doctrine is not a bar in these circumstances, and prior determinations on subsequent purchasers do not preclude fresh adjudication, exercising Article 142 to issue comprehensive directions.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined a massive batch of land‑acquisition disputes involving the Government of NCT of Delhi and its agencies versus private landowners, notably M/s BSK Realtors LLP. The core issues were whether the dismissal of a civil appeal by one authority in the first round barred other authorities from filing fresh appeals (res judicata), whether the non‑disclosure of earlier litigation constituted a material fact warranting dismissal, whether the doctrine of merger barred the present appeals, and whether prior determinations on subsequent purchasers precluded reconsideration. The Court held that res judicata did not apply because the co‑respondents had no conflicting interests, that suppressed facts were not material enough to dismiss the appeals, and that the merger doctrine is not absolute, especially where public interest is at stake. It further affirmed that earlier rulings on subsequent purchasers do not bar fresh consideration and invoked its Article 142 powers to extend acquisition timelines, dispense with certain procedural requirements, and issue detailed directions for Groups A and B.1, while remitting fraud‑related Group E cases to the High Court. Ultimately, all civil appeals and miscellaneous applications were disposed of with specific directives and some appeals dismissed as infructuous.

Issues considered

Whether the dismissal of a civil appeal by one appellant in the first round operates as res judicata against another appellant in the second round
Whether suppression of the first round of litigation by the appellants constitutes a material fact inviting outright dismissal of the appeals
Whether the doctrine of merger bars the civil appeals in the present case
Whether the previous determination of the rights of subsequent purchasers precludes the same issue from being reconsidered between the same parties

Legislation cited

Constitution of India
Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfers) Act, 1972s. 3, s. 4, s. 5
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 4(1)
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013s. 11, s. 13, s. 14, s. 16, s. 17, s. 18, s. 19, s. 20, s. 21, s. 24(1)(a), s. 24(2), s. 25, s. 28, s. 29, s. 30, s. 31, s. 34
Supreme Court Rules, 2013s. 21, s. 33

Subjects

Land AcquisitionRes judicataInterest reipublicae ut sit finis litiumSalus populi suprema lex estoPublic interestDoctrine of mergerArticle 142 of the Constitution of IndiaElements of Public interestBalancing the interest of the public exchequerPublic infrastructureBalancing public with private interestFraud by LandownersConcealment and suppression of material factsSubsequent purchase transactionsSection 24(2) of the 2013 ActSection 4(1) of the 1894 Act

Judgment

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1159 : 2024 INSC 455

Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr.
v.
M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 6604 of 2024)
17 May 2024
[Surya Kant, Dipankar Datta and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
a) Whether the dismissal of a civil appeal preferred by one appellant
in the first round operates as res judicata against the other appellant
in the second round before this Court; b) Whether suppression of
the first round of litigation by the appellants constitutes a material
fact, thereby inviting an outright dismissal of the appeals at the
threshold; c) Does the doctrine of merger operate as a bar to
entertain the civil appeals in the present case; d) Whether the
previous determination of the rights of subsequent purchasers in an
inter se dispute precludes the same issue from being reconsidered
between the same parties.

Headnotes†
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 – Whether the dismissal of a civil
appeal preferred by one appellant in the first round operates
as res judicata against the other appellant in the second round
before this Court:
Held: In the lead matter before this Court or for that matter the
other appeals, the co-respondents before the High Court, namely,
GNCTD and DDA did not have conflicting interests – Inter se them,
neither was there any disputed issue, nor could have the High
Court possibly adjudicated on any such issue – Before this Court
too, in the first round, there was no issue on which GNCTD and
DDA were at loggerheads – In the light of this, in accordance with
the legal principle, the applicability of res judicata is negated – Res
judicata, as a technical legal principle, operates to prevent the same
parties from relitigating the same issues that have already been
conclusively determined by a court – However, it is crucial to note
that the previous decision of this Court in the first round would not
operate as res judicata to bar a decision on the lead matter and the
1160 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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other appeals; more so, because this rule may not apply hard and
fast in situations where larger public interest is at stake – In such
cases, a more flexible approach ought to be adopted by courts,
recognizing that certain matters transcend individual disputes and
have far-reaching public interest implications. [Paras 23 and 25]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 – Whether suppression of the first
round of litigation by the appellants constitutes a material
fact, thereby inviting an outright dismissal of the appeals at
the threshold:
Held: Law is well settled that the fact suppressed must be
material in the sense that it would have an effect on the merits
of the case – The concept of suppression or non-disclosure of
facts transcends mere concealment; it necessitates the deliberate
withholding of material facts—those of such critical import that
their absence would render any decision unjust – Material facts,
in this context, refer to those facts that possess the potential
to significantly influence the decision-making process or alter
its trajectory – This principle is not intended to arm one party
with a weapon of technicality over its adversary but rather
serves as a crucial safeguard against the abuse of the judicial
process – Nevertheless, this Court has carefully considered the
orders issued during the first round of litigation, which are alleged
to have been suppressed – Despite reviewing these orders,
there are no compelling reason to dismiss the appeals based
solely on the prior dismissal of appeals filed by some other appellant/
authority. [Paras 30 and 31]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 – Does the doctrine of merger operate
as a bar to entertain the civil appeals in the instant case:
Held: The concept of public interest need not be viewed narrowly
only on the yardstick of loss to public exchequer and that these
are the cases where public at large has acquired interest in the
public infrastructures already complete or in process of completion,
this Court is satisfied that if the doctrine of merger is applied
mechanically in respect of Groups A (deals with M.A.s filed by
the appellants-authorities primarily pleading change in law and
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1161

Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.

seeking recall of the judgments and orders of this Court dismissing
the Civil Appeals and/or Review Petitions in the first round) and
B.1 (includes cases where Civil Appeals were dismissed in the
first round, and now an SLP (now Civil Appeal) is pending before
this Court in the second round) cases, it will lead to irreversible
consequences – This Court is satisfied that the element of disparity
between Groups A and B.1 cases visà-vis cases falling in Group
C is liable to be eliminated and this can only be done by invoking
extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India so
that complete justice is done between the expropriated landowners,
the State and its developing agencies and most importantly the
public in general who has acquired a vested right in the public
infrastructure projects. [Para 41]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 – Delhi Lands (Restrictions on
Transfers) Act, 1972 – Whether the previous determination
of the rights of subsequent purchasers in an inter se dispute
precludes the same issue from being reconsidered between
the same parties:
Held: Group E cases deal with allegations regarding fraud
by landowners by suppressing subsequent sale transactions,
ownership title disputes, etc – It is settled that transfer of land in
respect of which acquisition proceedings had been initiated, after
issuance of Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, is void
and a subsequent purchaser cannot challenge the validity of the
notification or the irregularity in taking possession of the land –
Also, the structure of the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfers)
Act, 1972 clearly indicates that any subsequent sale of the specified
land without prior permission from the competent authority is not
allowed, and if such sale is done through concealment, it amounts
to fraud – The law with respect to “who” can invoke section
24(2) of the 2013 Act has been well settled after the decision of
this Court in Shiv Kumar wherein it was held that subsequent
purchasers do not have the locus to contest the acquisition and/
or claim lapse of the acquisition proceedings – Coming to the
specifics of each case qua subsequent purchasers or disputes
regarding the title of the subject lands, this Court has clarified
the scope of inquiry in Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal and
others – As far as the concealment of material facts regarding
1162 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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subsequent sale transactions, earlier round of litigations etc. are
concerned, it is noted that the landowners and affected parties
are under no obligation to either confirm or deny the allegations
levelled against them – Nor this Court has directed the appellants
to furnish original records or documents to substantiate their claim
of concealment and suppression of material facts – Engaging in
a factual inquiry at such an advanced stage of the legal process,
especially without providing adequate opportunities to all parties,
may not be fair – The cases listed in Group E involve complex
questions of fact and this Court being the Court of the last resort,
ought not to be involved in such elaborate factfinding exercise –
Therefore, deem it appropriate to remit these cases to the High
Court for proper adjudication on points of law as well as facts.
[Paras 42, 44, 45, 46, 48]
Doctrine/Principles – Res judicata – discussed.
Doctrine/Principles – Doctrine of merger – Exception:
Held: This Court takes notice of the exception carved out by this
Court in Kunhayammed, to the effect that the doctrine of merger
is not of universal or unlimited application and that the nature of
jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or
subject matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid
shall have to be kept in view – The exception that has been carved
out in Kunhayammed, will only be permissible in the rarest of
rare cases and such a deviation can be invoked sparingly only –
However, among such exceptions, the extraordinary constitutional
powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of
India, which is to be exercised with a view to do complete justice
between the parties, remains unaffected and being an unfettered
power, shall always be deemed to be preserved as an exception
to the doctrine of merger and the rule of stare decisis. [Para 33]
Public Interest – Land Acquisition – Elements of Public interest:
Held: a) While balancing the interest of the public exchequer against
that of individuals, there are many other interests at stake, and
it might not be possible to undo the acquisitions without causing
significant cascading harms and losses to such other interests;
b) Since development projects have either begun or most of the
acquired lands have already been deployed for essential public
projects such as hospitals, schools, expansion of metro, etc., the
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1163

Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.

effect of non-condonation of delay would go beyond mere financial
loss to the exchequer and would extend to the public at large;
c) It would be like unscrambling the egg if compensation paid
would have to be clawed back or possession taken would have
to be reversed; d) In many cases, the development projects might
also have to be undone – The reversal of possession of even a
small plot lying on projects such as an under-construction metro
corridor would be practically impossible; e) These are the cases
where rights are vested to the public at large given the public
infrastructure that has come up on a large number of acquired lands;
f) The fresh acquisition, if so is required to be done by the State,
would be at the expense of delaying the construction of critical
public infrastructure in our national capital – When balancing public
with private interest, the comparative interest on the landowners
would be nominal as compared to the public at large; and g) The
multiplicity of contradictory judicial opinions on section 24 (2)
of the 2013 Act has made the present set of circumstances sui
generis – The constant flux in the legal position of law has posed
significant challenges for the State and its authorities. [Para 40]

Case Law Cited
Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal [2020] 3 SCR 1 :
(2020) 8 SCC 129 – followed.
State of Gujarat and Others v. M.P. Shah Charitable Trust and
Others [1994] 3 SCR 163 : (1994) 3 SCC 552; Mathura Prasad
Bajoo Jaiswal and Others v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy [1970] 3
SCR 830 : (1970) 1 SCC 613; S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P)
Ltd v. State of Bihar and Others [2004] 3 SCR 56 : (2004) 7 SCC
166; Arunima Baruah v. Union of India and Others [2007] 5 SCR
904 : (2007) 6 SCC 120 – relied on.
Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal and Others Civil Appeal No.
6798 of 2024 arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 26697/2019; Pune
Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Mistrimal Solanki [2014]
1 SCR 783 : (2014) 3 SCC 183; Govt (NCT) of Delhi v. Manav
Dharam Trust and Another [2017] 4 SCR 232 : (2017) 6 SCC
751; Shiv Kumar and Another v. Union of India and Others [2019]
13 SCR 695 : (2019) 10 SCC 229; Kunhayammed and Others.
v. State of Kerala and Another [2000] Supp. 1 SCR 538 : (2000)
6 SCC 359; Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal
Solanki (2020) SCC OnLine SC 1471 – referred to.
1164 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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Ranjana Bhatia v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and another (2014) SCC
OnLine Del 2151; Sparsh Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India
and Others (2014) SCC OnLine Del 6659 – referred to.
Munni Bibi (since deceased) and Another v. Tirloki Nath and Others
AIR (1931) PC 114 – referred to.

List of Acts
Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013; Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfers) Act, 1972;
Constitution of India; Supreme Court Rules, 2013.

List of Keywords
Land Acquisition; Res judicata; Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium;
Salus populi suprema lex esto; Public interest; Doctrine of merger;
Article 142 of the Constitution of India; Elements of Public interest;
Balancing the interest of the public exchequer; Public infrastructure;
Balancing public with private interest; Fraud by Landowners;
Concealment and suppression of material facts; Subsequent sale
transactions; Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013; Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6604 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.01.2016 of the High Court of
Delhi at New Delhi in WPC No.7442 of 2015
With
C.A. Nos. 6605, 6606, 6607, 6608, 6610, 6611, 6612, 6613 and
6649 of 2024, M.A. No. 277 of 2023 In C.A. No. 8492 of 2016, M.A.
…. D.No. 39901 of 2022, M.A. No. 278 of 2023, M.A. ... D.No. 674
of 2023, M.A. ... D.No. 3577 of 2023, M.A. No. 346 of 2023, M.A. ...
D.No. 5711 of 2023, C.A. No. 542 of 2016, C.A. Nos. 6614, 6615 and
6650 of 2024, Conmt. Pet.(C) No. 189 of 2019 In C.A. No. 2690 of
2017, C.A. Nos. 6651, 6616, 6618, 6652, 6619, 6653, 6620, 6621,
6622, 6623, 6624, 6625, 6626, 6627, 6628, 6654 and 6655 of 2024,
Slp(C) D.No. 21746 of 2022, C.A. Nos. 6629 and 6656 of 2024, M.A.
... D.No. 39898 of 2022, M.A. ... D.No. 40951 of 2022, M.A. ... D.No.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1165

Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.

42177 of 2022, M.A. ... D.No. 1215 of 2023, M.A. ... D.No. 1713 of
2023, M.A. No. 1888 of 2023 In C.A. No. 352 of 2023, C.A. Nos. 6630,
6631, 6632 and 6633-6634 of 2024, M.A. No. 806 of 2020 in C.A. No.
2690 of 2017, C.A. Nos. 6981, 6635, 6636, 6637, 6638, 6639, 6640,
6641, 6642 and 6643 of 2024, SLP(C) D.No. 18142 of 2022, C.A.
Nos. 6658 and 6644 of 2024, SLP(C) D. No.19142 of 2022, C.A. No.
6659 of 2024, SLP(C) D. No.19687 of 2022, C.A. Nos. 6660, 6648,
6661, 6662, 6647 and 6663 of 2024, SLP(C) D. Nos. 20104 and
20203 of 2022, C.A. Nos. 6645, 6664 and 6646 of 2024 and M.A. ...
D.No. 32991 of 2023.
Appearances for Parties
R. Venkataramani, Attorney General, Ms. Aishwariya Bhati, K
M Nataraj, A.S.Gs., Ms. Rachna Shrivastva, Sanjay Poddar, V.
Chitambaresh, Gopal Sankaranarayanan, C.A. Sundaram, Dhruv
Mehta, Ashish Dholakia, Jayant Mehta, Vinay Garg, Ravinder Sethi,
Kailash Vasdev, A.K Panda, Sr. Advs., Atul Kumar, Ms. Sweety
Singh, Ms. Archana Kumari, Rahul Pandey, AVS Kadyan, Chintan
Singhal, Ms. Sonali Jain, Abhishek Pandey, Raman Yadav, Kartikay
Aggarwal, Ms. Sujeeta Srivastava, Ms. Monika, Ms. Poornima Singh,
Ms. Manisha Chava, Ms. BLN Shivani, Rustam Singh Chauhan,
Ms. Niharika Ahluwalia, Ms. Sonakshi Chaturvedi, M/s. Saharya &
Co., Varun Punia, Ms. Manika Tripathy, Ashutosh Kaushik, Rony
John, Ms. Astha Tyagi, Nishit Agrawal, Ms. Prachi Bajpai, Chandra
Prakash, Ms. Shalini Chandra, Ashwani Kumar, Kedar Nath Tripathy,
Ram Naresh Yadav, Ms. Malvika Kapila, Ms. Tanwangi Shukla, Nitin
Mishra, Ms. Sunieta Ojha, Ms. Vasudha Priyansha, Vineet Malhotra,
Mohit Paul, Vishal Gohri, Ms. Rangoli Seth, Ms. Sanjleena Lal,
N. Balraj, Soumik Ghosal, Pankaj Bhagat, Ms. Trisha Chandran,
Vishal Sinha, Ms. Prerna Raman, Zafar Inayat, Ms. Rohini Musa,
A. Gupta, M. C. Dhingra, Sumit Bansal, Udai Bir Singh Kochar,
Utsav Garg, Mrs. Madhavi Yadav, Ms. Prashi Tyagi, Vikrant Yadav,
Yashraj Singh Deora, Priyesh Mohan Srivastava, Abhishek Singh,
Ms. Sonal K Chopra, Bharat Arora, Manikya Khanna, Raghav Bhatia,
Sharath Sampath, Aprit Kumar Singh, Tarun Mehta, Aditya Krishna,
M/s. Vedya Partners, Siddharth Batra, S.K. Raout, Chinmay Dubey,
Ms. Shivani Chawla, Ms. Archna Yadav, Rhythm Katyal, Ashutosh
Chugh, Pratyush Arora, Kunal Yograj Verma, Jasbir Singh Malik,
Ms. Chandni Sharma, Ms. Divya Mishra, Manish Paliwal, Udaibir
1166 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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Singh Kochar, Parv Garg, Pawas Kulshreshtha, Karandeep Singh
Rekhi, Puneet Sharma, Mahesh Prasad, Ms. Aashi Gupta, Shambu
Prasad, Sher Singh, Alok K. Prasad, B.L. Shivhare, Rajesh Singh
Chauhan, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Ms. Sushma Suri, Ranjit Kumar
Sharma, Rajeev Ghawana, Neelaksh Sharma, Vikalp Chandela,
T.V.S. Raghavendra Sreyas, Siddharth Vasudev, Ms. Kiran Ahlawat,
Prithvi Pal, S K Rout, Dr. N. Pradeep Sharma, Ganesh Singh,
Priyonkoo Anjan Gogoi, Amit Acharya, Mayank Gupta, Ms. Sristhi
Jain, Onkar Prasad, Ms. Shruti Vaibhav, Aman Mehrotra, Pramod
B. Agarwala, Chandra Bhushan Prasad, Gagan Gupta, Udaibir
Kochar, R.B. Singh, Mohit Kumar Gupta, Arvind Kumar Gupta,
Vikas Kumar, Mukesh Kumar Verma, Vikas Gupta, Vivek Gupta,
Lav Kumar Agrawal, Nikhil Tyagi, Ajay Marwah, Vinay K. Shailendra,
Jagjit Singh Chhabra, Saksham Maheshwari, Abhimanyu Bhandari,
N.S. Vasisht, M.P. Bhargava, Ms. Rooh-e-hina Dua, Sahib Kochhar,
T. Mahipal, Ms. Charu Ambwani, N S Vasisht, Ms. Jyoti Kataria, M
P Bhargava, Aashu Tyagi, Varun Kapur, Mehmood Umar Faruqui,
Bankey Bihari, Rajender Pd. Saxena, N.P. Sahni, Vineet Sinha, V.S.
Tomar, Rabin Majumder, Rajiv Ranjan Dwivedi, Ms. Rashmi Malhotra,
Ravi Bharuka, Aman Mohit Hingorani, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Ms.
Smita Maan, Vishal Maan, Aditya Singh, Aakash Sehrawat, Ms.
Sunita Sharma, Hariom Singh R., Shalinder Saini, Ms. Mitali Gupta,
Ishaan Sharma, Ms. Sambhaavi Sharma, Govind Kumar, Ms. Shagun
Sabharwal, Mrs. Sunita Sharma, Balendu Shekhar, Anukalp Jain,
A.K Kaul, Rohit Pandey, Amrish Kumar, Gurmeet Singh Makker,
Nachiketa Joshi, Pratyush Shrivastava, Prashant Rawat, Rajan
Kumar Chourasia, Annirudh Sharma-ii, Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, Ms.
Sakshi Kakkar, Ms. Jyoti Mendiratta, Rakesh Kumar-I, Ms. Arti
Singh, Mukul Kumar, Ms. Prachi Bajpai, Krishan Kumar, Dharamraj
Ohlan, Ms. Charu Nagpal, Krishan Kaushik, Chirag Singhal, Mukesh
Kumar, Vishwa Pal Singh, Dr. Rajeev Sharma, Prashant Sharma,
Dharmendra Sharma, Vipin Kumar Sharma, Raghuvir Sharma, Ms.
Devjani Deka Bharali, Ms. Meena Hasan, Anil Kaushik, Aishwary
Jaiswal, Tarun Johri, Anil Kumar Panwar, Rajinder Juneja, Gaurav
Singh, Advs. for the appearing parties.
Petitioner-in-person
Respondent-in-person
Applicant-in-person
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1167

Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment
TABLE OF CONTENTS*

A. PREFACE........................................................................... 5
B. BRIEF RESUME OF FACTS .......................................... 7
C. JUDICIAL TRAJECTORY ............................................... 11
D. CATEGORIZATION OF CASES ...................................... 13
E. SUBMISSIONS ................................................................ 18
F. ANALYSIS ....................................................................... 24
F.1 Res judicata................................................................ 24
F.2 Suppression of material facts by appellants.............. 28
F.3 Merger......................................................................... 31
F.4 Allegations of fraud committed by landowners........... 38
G. CONCLUSION.................................................................. 41
ANNEXURE 1.......................................................................... 53

1. In view of the reasons assigned in the judgment pronounced by
Hon’ble Surya Kant, J., speaking for the three of us minutes before
in Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal and others,1 delay in
presentation of all the Special Leave Petitions (“SLPs”, hereafter)
under consideration stands condoned except those mentioned in
Group B.2, which have been rendered infructuous as discussed
later in this judgment, and Group D which we have directed to be
de-tagged for separate listing.
2. Special leave is granted in all the SLPs except those in Group B.2
and Group D.
A. PREFACE
3. We are confronted with a peculiar situation where the Latin maxim
“interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” (it is in the interest of the State

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
1 Civil Appeal No…………of 2024 arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 26697/2019
1168 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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that there be an end to litigation) notwithstanding, it is the State
itself that has initiated a second round of litigation before this Court
after culmination of the first round and sown the seeds for days’ of
hearing engaging our attention to erudite arguments from learned
counsel on both sides. We are now tasked to decide on which side
the Court should lean.
4. The quest for primacy between private interest and public interest
has been a matter of debate for years together; the scales, however,
seem to have tilted, ever so slightly, in favour of the latter. Yet,
between the devil and the deep sea, we endeavour to construct
a bridge—a ‘setu’—to strike a harmonious balance for the greater
good; all, while adhering to the enduring Latin dictum “salus populi
suprema lex esto”, a principle that reinforces the paramountcy of
the people’s welfare as the supreme law.
5. There is one other aspect which needs emphasis. Justice, alone
of all virtues, implies a notion of duty. As Judges of this Court,
we are duty-bound to not only uphold the law but also ensure its
consistent application. In navigating through the crisis, chaos, and
confusion presented by the several sets of appeals before us, we
are committed to ensure consistency, clarity, and coherence and
strike a delicate, yet, necessary balance to arrive at a harmonious
resolution. In the course of rectifying the aftermath of rulings and
overrulings, and grappling with complexities surrounding questions
of limitations, maintainability, merger doctrine, etc., our commitment
to justice remains resolute.
6. With these prefatory words, we now proceed to decide the various
sets of appeals before us.
B. BRIEF RESUME OF FACTS
7. While there are multiple civil appeals, which we are tasked to
decide, a particular SLP2 was referred to a Bench of three Judges
by a Bench of two Judges vide order dated 21st July, 2022. In view
of grant of leave by us, this would be treated as the lead matter.
8. We place on record that it is pursuant to the said order dated 21st
July, 2022 that all these appeals have been listed before us, in
deference to orders made by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India.

2 Diary No. 17623/2021
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1169

Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.

9. Before delving deep into the intricacies presented by these civil
appeals, it would be apposite to trace the factual trajectory of the
lead matter culminating in the present stage:
a) The facts are noticed from the Civil Appeal3 arising out of the
Writ Petition4 instituted before the High Court of Delhi (“High
Court”, hereafter) by the first respondent, M/s BSK Realtors
LLP. Land acquisition proceedings had been initiated under
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“1894 Act,” hereafter) to
acquire several parcels of lands. Land belonging to M/s BSK
Realtors LLP comprised in Khasra No.623(5-10) measuring 5
bighas 10 biswas in Chattarpur village also formed part of the
proceedings. The High Court vide its judgment and order dated
11th January, 2016 allowed the writ petition. In so allowing,
it relied on the decision of this Court in Pune Municipal
Corporation and another v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki
and others5 and similar line of decisions. It was held in Pune
Municipal Corporation (supra) that if any one of the two
ingredients of section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (“2013 Act”, hereafter) was attracted,
i.e., either the physical possession of the land was not taken
or the compensation was not paid, as the case may be, the
acquisition proceedings under challenge would be deemed to
have lapsed. As a matter of fact, the High Court found all the
ingredients of section 24(2) of the 2013 Act as interpreted by
the Supreme Court to be satisfied despite Award No.15/87-
88 dated 5th June 1987 and hence, declared the acquisition
proceedings to have lapsed.
b) Aggrieved thereby, the beneficiary of the acquisition proceedings-
Delhi Development Authority (second respondent herein)
(“DDA”, hereafter), carried such judgment and order in appeal
praying for it to be set aside. After granting leave, a Bench of
two Hon’ble Judges of this Court vide judgment and order dated

3 GNCTD & Anr. v. M/S BSK Realtors LLP & Anr., Diary No. 17623/2021
4 W.P. (C) No. 7442/2015
5 (2014) 3 SCC 183
1170 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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31st August, 2016 dismissed the Civil Appeal.6 It was observed
that the issue, in principle, had already been adjudicated against
DDA in a previous judgment and order of a co-ordinate Bench
of this Court in a related matter.7 DDA was granted extension by
a period of one year to avail the liberty of initiating acquisition
proceedings afresh under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. This
marked the culmination of the first round of litigation.
c) However, on 06th March, 2020, the decision in Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) was overturned by a Constitution Bench
of five Hon’ble Judges in Indore Development Authority v.
Manoharlal and others [5-Judge, lapse] 8 holding that land
acquisition proceedings lapse only when the twin conditions
are met, i.e., non-payment of compensation to the landowners
together with failure of the State to take physical possession
of the acquired lands. Leveraging this, Government of NCT of
Delhi (first appellant herein) (“GNCTD”, hereafter) approached
this Court through a SLP9 (the lead matter) wherein M/s BSK
Realtors LLP and DDA were impleaded as the first and second
respondents, respectively. It was contended on behalf of
GNCTD that the judgment and order dated 11th January, 2016
rendered by the High Court ought to be reconsidered in view
of Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra).
d) A preliminary objection qua the maintainability of the SLP was
raised by M/s BSK Realtors LLP. The first contention in line
with the doctrine of merger was that the order of the High
Court dated 11th January, 2016 had merged with the order
dated 31st August, 2016 of this Court whereby the civil appeal
at the instance of DDA was dismissed. Such dismissal, M/s
BSK Realtors LLP further contended, was after grant of leave
and by a speaking order upon hearing all the parties involved.
M/s BSK Realtors LLP also contended that the order dated
11th January, 2016, upon its merger with the order dated 31st
August, 2016, ceased to exist and GNCTD being a party to the

6 Civil Appeal No. 8670/2016
7 Civil Appeal No. 8477/2016 arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 8467/2015
8 [2020] 3 SCR 1 : (2020) 8 SCC 129
9 Diary No. 17623/2021
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1171

Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.

civil appeal filed by DDA, the same would disentitle GNCTD
from initiating a new round of litigation to have the order dated
11th January, 2016 reversed on the specious ground that the
decision in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) has been
rendered after dismissal of the civil appeal of DDA, overruling the
decision in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra). Accordingly,
it was submitted that the SLP not being maintainable deserved
outright dismissal.
e) Observing that the issue requires deeper examination, a
Bench of two Hon’ble Judges, vide the said order dated
21st July, 2022, directed that the matter be placed before a
three-Judge Bench. The relevant portion of the said order is
extracted hereunder:
“According to the land-losers, rejection of challenge to
the declaration of lapsing at the instance of Authority
or State, would dis-entitle the other (i.e., Authority
or State) to maintain successive petition against the
same judgment; and especially where in the earlier
round leave to appeal was granted by this Court and
the appeal had been disposed of after hearing all
concerned. In other words, the doctrine of merger is
being invoked to buttress this preliminary objection.
On the other hand, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned
Additional Solicitor General is relying on the
observations/dictum of the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Indore Development Authority vs.
Manoharlal & Ors. reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129 to
contend that the effect of the declaration or conclusion
recorded therein is to efface all the orders passed in
the concerned special leave petition or civil appeal
following the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation
& Anr. Harakchand Misirmal Solanki & Ors. reported
in 2014 (3) SCC 183 — which has been expressly
overruled and as noted in paragraph 365 of the
reported decision. (Indore Development Authority).
It is urged that the effect of such overruling is to
efface all the orders, including passed by this Court
relying on Pune Municipal Corporation (Supra).
1172 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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[…]
Suffice it to observe that these matters require
deeper examination, for which the same need to be
placed before the three Judge Bench for hearing on
17.08.2022.”
(underlining ours, for emphasis)
10. As observed above, it is by virtue of this order that we now have
the occasion to decide the issue raised by parties on both the sides.
C. JUDICIAL TRAJECTORY
11. Having noticed the facts in the lead matter, we must at this stage
acknowledge the predicament of being faced with a peculiar dusty
situation where we are tasked not only to clear our path to adjudicate
a similar issue on separate fronts but also to ensure that the law on
this matter settles the dust so raised. This exercise would necessitate
harmonising the different routes that we are bound to traverse to
reach the same destination. Hence, notwithstanding the expense
of reiterating the foregoing, it is imperative to navigate the broader
judicial trajectory that has brought us to the current stage.
a) Relying upon the decision of this Court in Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) and similar line of decisions, the High Court
vide various judgments and orders, allowed writ petitions filed
by the several affected landowners (“landowners”, hereafter).
b) Discontented, the aggrieved authorities [being the respondents
in the writ petitions including DDA, GNCTD, Land Acquisition
Collector (“LAC”, hereafter), and Land & Building Department
(“L&B”, hereafter)] carried such judgments and orders
independently by way of their respective SLPs impleading the
other, however, as a co-respondent. This triggered the first round
of litigation (“first round”, hereafter) yielding diverse outcomes
which are categorized as follows: first, in some cases, leave
was granted but the civil appeals were subsequently dismissed
(or allowed, in handful of cases); second, in some cases, leave
was not granted and the SLPs were dismissed in limine; and
third, where SLPs/civil appeals are still pending adjudication.
c) Dismissal of the civil appeals/SLPs brought about a quietus.
However, in the light of change in law consequent to the decision
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1173

Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.

in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra), such of the authorities
(DDA, GNCTD, LAC, and L&B) who had not earlier challenged
the judgments and orders of the High Court declaring land
acquisition proceedings as lapsed, approached this Court by
way of SLPs/Miscellaneous Applications (“M.A.s”, hereafter)/
Review Petitions. This triggered the second round of litigation
(“second round”, hereafter), however, with the status of the
aggrieved authorities being transposed. For instance, filing of
SLP by GNCTD impleading DDA as the second respondent in
the lead matter, as noticed above, whereas GNCTD was the
second respondent in the first round initiated by DDA.
d) Upon the appeals being placed before us, we are entrusted
with resolving the issue, or for that matter issues, outlined
later in the judgment.
12. Since the authorities (DDA, GNCTD, LAC, and L&B) jointly harbour
a shared grievance and individually act as appellants in the ongoing
proceedings, they will be collectively denoted as “appellants”
hereafter, notwithstanding the transposition of the authorities as
parties or their status as respondents in the second round. Insofar
as the affected landowners are concerned, they shall be referred to
as “landowners” or “aggrieved parties”, as the context would require.
D. CATEGORIZATION OF CASES
13. Each of the Civil Appeals/M.A.s before us may necessitate separate
directions. We have, therefore, categorised them in six groups based
on varied outcomes in the first round of litigation and their respective
status in the second round of litigation for ease of reference.
14. A brief overview of the groups we have carved out for the facility
of reference is as under:
a) Group A deals with M.A.s filed by the appellants-authorities
primarily pleading change in law and seeking recall of the
judgments and orders of this Court dismissing the Civil Appeals
and/or Review Petitions in the first round.
b) Group B.1 includes cases where Civil Appeals were dismissed
in the first round, and now an SLP (now Civil Appeal, leave
having been granted by us) is pending before us in the second
round.
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c) Cases categorized under Group B.2 encompass the following
scenarios:
i. Four cases where the Civil Appeals of the appellants-
authorities were allowed in the first round and the SLPs,
filed during the pendency of the appeals in the first round,
are pending before us in the second round (present batch).
ii. One case where the appeal, filed by the appellant-authority
subsequent to the SLP pending before us in the present
round, was allowed after granting leave.
d) Group C.1 covers a case where an SLP was dismissed in
limine in the first round, and now an SLP (now Civil Appeal,
leave having been granted by us) is pending before us in the
second round. In this particular case, the land acquisition
proceedings would lapse following the test laid down in
Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) as the twin conditions
under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act are met [non-payment of
compensation to the landowners together with failure of the
State to take physical possession of the acquired lands].
e) Group C.2 covers a case where an SLP was dismissed in
limine in the first round, and now an SLP (now Civil Appeal,
leave having been granted by us) is pending before us in
the second round. In this particular case, land acquisition
proceedings would not lapse following the test laid down in
Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) as the twin conditions
under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act are not met.
f) Group C.3 involves cases where during pendency of the SLP
in the first round, the appellants approached this Court with
a fresh SLP owing to a change in law. While in some cases
both the SLPs (now Civil Appeals) are pending before us in
the present batch, in some cases, the other SLP is pending
separately and is not part of the present batch. There are also
a few cases where there is only one SLP filed and the same
is now pending as a Civil Appeal in the present batch after
grant of leave.
g) Group D are miscellaneous matters which have been tagged
incorrectly with the present batch and they follow separate
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1175

Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.

directions. Group D also involves cases where no notice has
been issued by this Court till date.
h) Cases falling under Group E generally involve allegations
related to subsequent sale transactions by landowners. There
are certain cases where this position is admitted. Some cases
also include allegations regarding the ownership title of the
land in question. Additionally, in a few instances, the appellants
claim that the land in question is vested in Gaon Sabha, a fact
which the landowners and affected parties have suppressed.
These cases require thorough fact-finding, as determined later,
and are therefore addressed separately. Cases categorized
under Group E may overlap with Groups A to C (excluding
Group B.2, which we propose to dismiss as infructuous infra).
As a result, any directions issued under Group E are intended
exclusively for that category alone, and such cases shall be
automatically excluded from the purview of Groups A to C. For
added clarity, it is stated that all cases falling under Group E
are proposed to be remitted to the High Court, regardless of
their classification within the aforementioned categories.
i) We set out hereinbelow in tabular form the cases covered by
the aforesaid groups:

TOTAL
SUB- NUMBER
GROUP DESCRIPTION
GROUPS OF
CASES

GROUP A Not M.A.s filed by the appellants- 2
(M.A.s) Applicable authorities primarily pleading
change in law and seeking recall
of the judgments and orders of
this Court dismissing the Civil
Appeals and/or Review Petitions
in the first round.

GROUP B Group Civil Appeal dismissed in the first 40
(Civil Appeal in B.1 round; SLP pending in the second
first round) round (present batch)

Group Civil Appeal allowed in the first 5
B.2 round; SLP pending in the second
round (present batch)
1176 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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GROUP C Group C.1 SLP dismissed in limine in the first 1
(SLP in first round; SLP pending in the second
round) round (present batch)

• Land acquisition proceedings
would lapse following the test laid
down in Manoharlal [5-Judge,
lapse] (supra) as the twin
conditions under section 24(2)
of the 2013 Act are met [non-
payment of compensation to the
landowners together with failure
of the State to take physical
possession of the acquired
lands].
Group C.2 SLP dismissed in limine in the first 1
round; SLP pending in the second
round (present batch)

• Land acquisition proceedings
would not lapse following the
test laid down in Manoharlal
[5-Judge, lapse] (supra) as the
twin conditions under section
24(2) of the 2013 Act are not met.
Group C.3 SLP from either the first round or 16
both rounds is pending in the present
batch

• Land acquisition proceedings
would not lapse following the
test laid down in Manoharlal
[5-Judge, lapse] (supra) as the
twin conditions under section
24(2) of the 2013 Act are not
met.
GROUP D Group D.1 • Cases filed by landowners; 5
(Miscellaneous
• Cases seeking a different relief;
matters)
• Cases where no notice has
been issued either on delay or
on merits
Group D.2 Cases where no notice has been 11
issued either on delay or on merits
TOTAL 81
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1177

Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.

GROUP E Not Cases where the landowners are 32
Applicable alleged to have committed fraud by
(Suppression
suppressing facts regarding them
of facts qua
being subsequent purchasers and/or
subsequent
the land being vested in Gaon Sabha
purchaser/title
etc.)
Note: Cases categorized under Group E, owing to their distinct facts and
circumstances, may overlap with Groups A to C (excluding Group B.2, which
we propose to dismiss as infructuous). As a result, any directions issued under
Group E are intended exclusively for that category alone, and such cases shall
be automatically excluded from the purview of Groups A to C. For added clarity,
it is stated that all cases falling under Group E shall be remanded back to the
High Court, regardless of their classification within the aforementioned categories.

A detailed table listing each case along with its respective group has
been appended to this order for easy reference.
E. SUBMISSIONS
15. Given the significance of the present exercise, an array of
distinguished counsel from both sides — including the learned
Attorney General, learned Additional Solicitor General, and other
senior counsel — appeared before us. While it may not be necessary
for the purpose of disposal of these appeals to record in detail the
extensive submissions made at the Bar by them, for the sake of
completeness, we propose to provide a concise overview of the
arguments presented.
16. Counsel for the appellants prayed for allowing the civil appeals,
while advancing the following arguments:
On merger, res judicata, and prospective overruling:
a) The doctrine of merger is neither a doctrine of constitutional
law nor a doctrine having statutory recognition. It is merely a
common law doctrine founded on principles of propriety and
does not have universal applicability. Even a speaking order
dismissing the SLP would not attract the doctrine.
b) Law declared by the Constitution Bench in Manoharlal
[5-Judge, lapse] (supra) applies retrospectively from 01 st
January, 2014. Earlier decision of the previous court shall not
operate as res judicata, if the law has been altered.
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c) In the first round, the appellants/authorities were arrayed as
respondents merely as a formality, without being adequately
heard. As a result, the doctrines of merger or res judicata do not
apply and the judgment and order issued by this Court in the
first round is not binding on these authorities. Such a situation
could allow anyone to come forward, get the appeal dismissed,
and conclude the lis forever, which is an undesirable outcome.
d) By virtue of principles flowing from Rule 4 read with Rule 33 of
Order XLI, Code of Civil Procedure (“CPC” hereafter), this Court
possesses ample authority to do complete justice, aligned with
principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. The mere fact
that a petitioner who filed the SLP in the second round was a
party to the first round as a respondent would not warrant the
application of the doctrine of res judicata.
e) Decisions rendered in the preceding round of litigation, solely
relying on judgments that have since been invalidated and
effaced, within a brief timeframe, should not be permitted to
result in a miscarriage of justice under the pretext of the doctrine
of merger. Each case possesses unique and distinct facts, even
if they pertain to a common subject.
f) Any factual claim involved in the present appeals may be
remanded to the High Court to ensure proper adjudication and
prevent miscarriage of justice.
On subsequent purchasers contesting acquisition proceedings:
g) A judgment or decree obtained through fraudulent means is void
and non-existent in the eyes of the law and can be contested
even in a collateral proceeding.
h) Purchasers subsequent to the issuance of a Notification under
section 4(1) of the 1894 Act lack the entitlement to assert the
lapse of acquisition proceedings on any grounds. In cases
where landowners engaged in fraudulent activities by entering
into subsequent sale transactions with prior knowledge of the
Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, such subsequent
purchasers lack entitlement to initiate a case for declaration.
They do not acquire any legal rights in the land, as the sale is
fundamentally void ab initio, thereby disqualifying them from
asserting the lapse of acquisition proceedings or claiming the
land under the policy.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1179

Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.

i) Although the Bench of two Hon’ble Judges in Govt (NCT) of
Delhi v. Manav Dharam Trust and another10 had recognised
the right of the subsequent purchasers, such decision is no
longer good law in view of the same being overruled by a Bench
of three Hon’ble Judges in Shiv Kumar and another v. Union
of India and others11 and such decision having found approval
in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra).
On principles of consistency and public interest
j) The constitutional tenets of consistency, the rule of law, and
the principle of “actus curiae neminem gravabit” embody the
fundamental and foundational principles of justice.
k) The Government and Public Sector Undertakings, acting in the
public interest and with good faith, aim to avoid burdening the
court dockets unnecessarily.
l) However, the appeals at hand present a unique situation not
hitherto dealt with by any judicial pronouncement of this Court
and bearing in mind the gravamen of the appellants’ complaint
and the extent of public interest at stake, the Court may not take
a view which would throw asunder the developmental works
undertaken by the appellants on the acquired lands.
17. Counsel for the landowners and the affected parties urged this Court
to dismiss the appeals at the outset, being devoid of merits. The
following submissions were advanced by them:
On merger:
a) In cases where this Court had previously granted leave and
dismissed the appeal, the doctrine of merger would apply and
the judgment and order of the High Court would stand merged
into the judgment and order of this Court. The judgment and
order of the High Court cannot thereafter be challenged by any
party, as it has ceased to exist. The doctrine applies regardless
of whether the appeal has been dismissed through a speaking
or a non-speaking order.

10 [2017] 4 SCR 232 : (2017) 6 SCC 751
11 [2019] 13 SCR 695 : (2019) 10 SCC 229
1180 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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b) Additionally, whether there has been a discussion of facts in the
judgment(s) of this Court will be immaterial as it has resulted in
a merger with the judgment and order of the High Court where
the facts were discussed.
On res judicata
c) The principles of res judicata and analogous principles embodied
in section 11, CPC and its Explanations clearly apply to the
present appeals. Even an erroneous decision, whether on
facts or law, would bind the parties. The acquiring authorities
(GNCTD, LAP, L&B Department), and the beneficiary (DDA)
share a common interest in the acquisition of land for public
purpose. When either of the parties litigates, one is deemed to
litigate on behalf of all interested parties. Thus, the dismissal
of a civil appeal preferred by one of the authorities, would act
as res judicata against the other authority.
d) The appellants were granted one-year period to commence
fresh acquisition proceedings. With the expiry of this timeframe,
the State’s right has been closed for all intents and purposes.
It cannot now contest this Court’s order and assert a reversal
of the lapse of acquisition proceedings.
On subsequent purchasers contesting acquisition proceedings:
e) None of the appeals has alleged any form of fraud practised
by the affected parties. Legal principles dictate that when
fraud is asserted, it must be expressly pleaded in accordance
with the provisions of Order VI Rules 2 & 4, CPC. The law
does not permit unsubstantiated assertions to be made solely
through oral arguments. The appellants have not succeeded in
establishing that a subsequent sale transaction occurred with
prior knowledge after the Notification under section 4(1) of the
1894 Act. Without evidence of such foresight and dishonest
intention, the claim of fraud cannot be substantiated.
f) The decisions of the High Court in Ranjana Bhatia v. Govt.
of NCT of Delhi and another12 and Sparsh Properties Pvt.
Ltd. v. Union of India and others13 sanctioned subsequent

12 (2014) SCC OnLine Del 2151
13 (2014) SCC OnLine Del 6659
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1181

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purchasers to pursue a declaration of a right that had already
vested in the landowners under the deeming provision of section
24(2) of the 2013 Act. These decisions were given a further seal
of approval by the decision of a Bench of two Hon’ble Judges
of this Court in Manav Dharam Trust (supra). Therefore, the
change in law occasioned by its overruling in Shiv Kumar
(supra) cannot be utilised as a crutch to claim that subsequent
purchasers cannot seek a declaration of lapsing.
g) In any event, the decision in Shiv Kumar (supra) is not good
law and requires reconsideration by a larger Bench of this Court.
F. ANALYSIS
18. Having heard the arguments presented by both sides at length on
different issues, we propose segmenting our analysis accordingly.
The following issues emerge for our consideration:
a) Whether the dismissal of a civil appeal preferred by one appellant
in the first round operates as res judicata against the other
appellant in the second round before us?
b) Whether suppression of the first round of litigation by the
appellants constitutes a material fact, thereby inviting an outright
dismissal of the appeals at the threshold?
c) Does the doctrine of merger operate as a bar to entertain the
civil appeals in the present case?
d) Whether the previous determination of the rights of subsequent
purchasers in an inter se dispute precludes the same issue from
being reconsidered between the same parties?
F.1 Res judicata
19. The first issue we noticed at the start of our analysis stems from the
submission pertaining to res judicata. Counsel for the landowners,
pressing the applicability of the principle of res judicata to the present
appeals, submitted that the dismissal of a Civil Appeal preferred by
one of the appellants in the first round, would act as res judicata
against the other in subsequent round/s of litigation. The appellants
contested the same and submitted that res judicata would not apply
to the current proceedings.
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20. Would the rule of res judicata operate against the co-respondents
before the High Court, namely GNCTD and DDA, and preclude us
from looking into the merits of the present set of appeals, is the
question that we propose to examine and answer now.
21. Nearly a century ago, a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of the Privy
Council in Munni Bibi (since deceased) and another v. Tirloki
Nath and others14 laid down the following three conditions for the
application of res judicata between co-defendants:
“(1.) There, must be a conflict of interest between the
defendants concerned; (2.) it must be necessary to decide
this conflict in order to give the plaintiff the relief he claims;
and (3.) the question between the defendants must have
been finally decided.”
22. In State of Gujarat and others v. M.P. Shah Charitable Trust
and others,15 a Bench comprising two Hon’ble Judges ruled that
the principle of res judicata applies only when there has been a
directly and substantially disputed issue between the parties, which
the court has heard and conclusively resolved. The relevant extract
of the decision is extracted hereunder:
“17. […] For attracting the rule of res judicata between
co-defendants — according to the terms in Section 11 of
the Civil Procedure Code which provision of course is not,
in terms, applicable to proceedings in a writ petition — it
is necessary that there should have been some issue
directly and substantially in controversy between them
which has been heard and finally decided by the court.
Same would be the position, where a plea of res judicata
is sought to be raised between co-respondents in a writ
petition, on the general principles of res judicata. Since the
said basic requirement is not satisfied, the said judgment
cannot be treated as res judicata between the trust and
the Government.
(underlining ours, for emphasis)

14 AIR 1931 PC 114
15 [1994] 3 SCR 163 : (1994) 3 SCC 552
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1183

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23. In the lead matter before us or for that matter the other appeals, the
co-respondents before the High Court, namely, GNCTD and DDA did
not have conflicting interests. Inter se them, neither was there any
disputed issue, nor could have the High Court possibly adjudicated
on any such issue. Before this Court too, in the first round, there was
no issue on which GNCTD and DDA were at loggerheads. In the
light of this, in accordance with the aforementioned legal principle,
the applicability of res judicata is negated.
24. A brief review of the ruling in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and
others v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy16 will also guide us to the
resolution of the second issue on the applicability of res judicata.
In the said decision, the first-instance court and the High Court
rejected an application seeking fixation of standard rent, holding that
the provisions of the Rent Act did not extend to open land, relying
upon an earlier decision. However, this Court later overturned the
said decision, affirming the applicability of the Rent Act to open land
as well. When A filed a fresh application, B opposed it, claiming it
was barred by res judicata. Dismissing this argument and affirming
the application’s viability, a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this
Court observed thus:
“5. But the doctrine of res judicata belongs to the domain of
procedure: it cannot be exalted to the status of a legislative
direction between the parties so as to determine the
question relating to the interpretation of enactment affecting
the jurisdiction of a Court finally between them, even though
no question of fact or mixed question of law and fact and
relating to the right in dispute between the parties has been
determined thereby. A decision of a competent Court on a
matter in issue may be res judicata in another proceeding
between the same parties: the ‘matter in issue’ may be an
issue of fact, an issue of law, or one of mixed law and fact.
An issue of fact or an issue of mixed law and fact decided
by a competent Court is finally determined between the
parties and cannot be re-opened between them in another
proceeding. The previous decision on a matter in issue
alone is res judicata: the reasons for the decision are

16 [1970] 3 SCR 830 : (1970) 1 SCC 613
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not res judicata. A matter in issue between the parties is
the right claimed by one party and denied by the other,
and the claim of right from its very nature depends upon
proof of facts and application of the relevant law thereto.
A pure question of law unrelated to facts which give rise
to a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue.
When it is said that a previous decision is res judicata, it
is meant that the right claimed has been adjudicated upon
and cannot again be placed in contest between the same
parties. A previous decision of a competent Court on facts
which are the foundation of the right and the relevant law
applicable to the determination of the transaction which is
the source of the right is res judicata. A previous decision
on a matter in issue is a composite decision: the decision
on law cannot be dissociated from the decision on facts
on which the right is founded. A decision on an issue of
law will be as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding
between the same parties, if the cause of action of the
subsequent proceeding be the same as in the previous
proceeding, but not when the cause of action is different,
nor when the law has since the earlier decision been
altered by a competent authority, nor when the decision
relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the earlier
proceeding, nor when the earlier decision declares valid
a transaction which is prohibited by law.
[…]
10. A question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot
be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous
decision of the Court. If by an erroneous interpretation
of the statute the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction,
the question would not, in our judgment, operate as res
judicata. Similarly, by an erroneous decision if the Court
assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under
the statute, the question cannot operate as res judicata
between the same parties, whether the cause of action in
the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise.
11. It is true that in determining the application of the
rule of res judicata the Court is not concerned with the
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1185

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correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment. The
matter in issue, if it is one purely of fact, decided in
the earlier proceeding by a competent Court must in
a subsequent litigation between the same parties be
regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A
mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier
proceeding between the same parties may not, for the
same reason, be questioned in a subsequent proceeding
between the same parties. But, where the decision is on
a question of law i.e. the interpretation of a statute, it will
be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the
same parties where the cause of action is the same, for
the expression ‘the matter in issue’ in Section 11 of the
Code of Civil Procedure means the right litigated between
the parties i.e. the facts on which the right is claimed or
denied and the law applicable to the determination of that
issue. Where, however, the question is one purely of law
and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of
the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort
to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision
will not be precluded from challenging the validity of that
order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure
cannot supersede the law of the land.”
(underlining ours, for emphasis)
25. The law, as we noticed aforesaid, aptly resolves the first issue. Res
judicata, as a technical legal principle, operates to prevent the same
parties from relitigating the same issues that have already been
conclusively determined by a court. However, it is crucial to note
that the previous decision of this Court in the first round would not
operate as res judicata to bar a decision on the lead matter and the
other appeals; more so, because this rule may not apply hard and
fast in situations where larger public interest is at stake. In such
cases, a more flexible approach ought to be adopted by courts,
recognizing that certain matters transcend individual disputes and
have far-reaching public interest implications.
F.2 Suppression of material facts by appellants
26. Counsel on behalf of the landowners have contended that the
conduct of the appellants disqualifies them from seeking any relief.
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They assert that the appellants filed the present appeals, specifically
under Group B.1, without disclosing that civil appeals filed by another
appellant/authority against the same impugned order has already
been dismissed. Furthermore, this action is deemed as providing an
inaccurate declaration under Order XXI Rule 3(2) of the Supreme
Court Rules, 2013.
27. Before addressing the aforesaid contention, we may refer to the law
laid down in this regard.
28. A Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of this Court in S.J.S. Business
Enterprises (P) Ltd v. State of Bihar and others17 held that a fact
suppressed must be material; that is, if it had not been suppressed,
it would have influenced the merits of the case. It was held thus:
“13. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a
litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief.
This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts
to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by
deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material
one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would
have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be
a matter which was material for the consideration of the
court, whatever view the court may have taken […]
14. Assuming that the explanation given by the appellant
that the suit had been filed by one of the Directors of the
Company without the knowledge of the Director who almost
simultaneously approached the High Court under Article
226 is unbelievable (sic), the question still remains whether
the filing of the suit can be said to be a fact material to the
disposal of the writ petition on merits. We think not. […]
the fact that a suit had already been filed by the appellant
was not such a fact the suppression of which could have
affected the final disposal of the writ petition on merits.”
29. Further, a Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of this Court in Arunima
Baruah v. Union of India and others18 following the aforesaid
dictum, held thus:

17 [2004] 3 SCR 56 : (2004) 7 SCC 166
18 [2007] 5 SCR 904 : (2007) 6 SCC 120
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“12. It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse
to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression
must be of material fact. What would be a material fact,
suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to
obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts
and circumstances of each case. Material fact would
mean material for the purpose of determination of the
lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether
the same was material for grant or denial of the relief.
If the fact suppressed is not material for determination
of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse
to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite
that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of
the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair
of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed and
the hands become clean, whether the relief would still
be denied is the question.”
30. Law is well settled that the fact suppressed must be material in the
sense that it would have an effect on the merits of the case. The
concept of suppression or non-disclosure of facts transcends mere
concealment; it necessitates the deliberate withholding of material
facts—those of such critical import that their absence would render
any decision unjust. Material facts, in this context, refer to those
facts that possess the potential to significantly influence the decision-
making process or alter its trajectory. This principle is not intended
to arm one party with a weapon of technicality over its adversary
but rather serves as a crucial safeguard against the abuse of the
judicial process.
31. Nevertheless, we have carefully considered the orders issued
during the first round of litigation, which are alleged to have been
suppressed. Despite reviewing these orders, we find no compelling
reason to dismiss the appeals based solely on the prior dismissal
of appeals filed by some other appellant/authority.
F.3 Merger
32. Extensive arguments have been advanced by the parties on the aspect
of applicability/non-applicability of the doctrine of merger, either by
relying upon or distinguishing the decision in Kunhayammed and
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others. V. State of Kerala and another,19 rendered by a Bench of
three Hon’ble Judges of this Court. For the purpose of a decision
on these appeals qua cases under Groups A and B.1, we do not
consider it necessary to opine either way.
33. However, in the light of the settled propositions on the doctrine of
merger and the rule of stare decisis, we respectfully concur with
Kunhayammed (supra) and the decisions that have followed the
same. We also take notice of the exception carved out by this Court
in Kunhayammed (supra), to the effect that the doctrine of merger
is not of universal or unlimited application and that the nature of
jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject
matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be
kept in view. The exception, in our considered opinion, that has been
carved out in Kunhayammed (supra), will only be permissible in the
rarest of rare cases and such a deviation can be invoked sparingly
only. We, however, hasten to add that among such exceptions, the
extraordinary constitutional powers vested in this Court under Article
142 of the Constitution of India, which is to be exercised with a view
to do complete justice between the parties, remains unaffected and
being an unfettered power, shall always be deemed to be preserved
as an exception to the doctrine of merger and the rule of stare decisis.
34. We may now at this stage look back to the Preface of this order where
we have encapsulated our predicament to not only uphold the law
but also to ensure its consistent application. It is our duty to enable
consistency, clarity and coherence and strike a delicate balance
through harmonious resolutions regardless of the crisis, chaos and
confusion created by inconsistent judicial opinions on section 24(2)
of the 2013 Act, making the present batch of lis a sui generis dispute.
35. In this regard, it would be worthwhile to notice the conclusions
recorded in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) and what followed
in the aftermath thereof. The conclusions read as follows:
“Conclusions of the Court
365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune Municipal
Corpn. Is hereby overruled and all other decisions in
which Pune Municipal Corpn.1 has been followed, are also

19 [2000] Supp. 1 SCR 538 : (2000) 6 SCC 359
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overruled. The decision in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential
Assn. cannot be said to be laying down good law, is
overruled and other decisions following the same are also
overruled. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra5,
the aspect with respect to the proviso to Section 24(2)
and whether ‘or’ has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’ was
not placed for consideration. Therefore, that decision too
cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the present
judgment.
366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the
questions as under:
366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case
the award is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of
commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of
proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under
the provisions of the 2013 Act.
366.2. In case the award has been passed within the
window period of five years excluding the period covered
by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall
continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013
Act under the 1894 Act as if it has not been repealed.
366.3. The word ‘or’ used in Section 24(2) between
possession and compensation has to be read as ‘nor’ or
as ‘and’. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings
under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where
due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior
to commencement of the said Act, the possession of
land has not been taken nor compensation has been
paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken,
compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse.
Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has
not been taken then there is no lapse.
366.4. The expression ‘paid’ in the main part of Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of
compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is
provided in the proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not
been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings then
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all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification
for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be
entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions
of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section 31
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled,
interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted.
Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result
in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of
non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five
years or more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to
be paid to the ‘landowners’ as on the date of notification
for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.
366.5. In case a person has been tendered the
compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the
1894 Act, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition
has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or
non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay
is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1).
The landowners who had refused to accept compensation
or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot
claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under
Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to
be treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section
24(1)(b).
366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act
and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing
of inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been
passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the 1894
Act, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided
under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as once possession
has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).
366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a
deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case
authorities have failed due to their inaction to take
possession and pay compensation for five years or more
before the 2013 Act came into force, in a proceeding for
land acquisition pending with the authority concerned as
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on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders
passed by court has to be excluded in the computation
of five years.
366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to
new cause of action to question the legality of concluded
proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a
proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the 2013
Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred
claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor
allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking
possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of
compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate
acquisition.”
36. Soon after the decision in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra) was
pronounced, applications for recall of the judgment in Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra) came to be filed. By an order dated 16th July,
2020 in Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal
Solanki [Recall Order],20 a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges allowed
such applications, thereby recalling the judgment in Pune Municipal
Corporation (supra).
37. The net result of the aforesaid judicial decisions is that the judgment
in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) loses its precedential
value, having been recalled, although the said decision would be
binding inter partes. We are informed that applications to recall the
order dated 16th July, 2020 have since been filed but are yet to be
considered. Be that as it may.
38. At this stage, we may advert to the factual scenario of the cases
in hand. These cases can be, in a way, further categorized as
pre-Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra). On the other hand, the
cases which fall in Groups C, are where SLPs were dismissed
in limine in the first round and/or such SLPs are pending in the
second round. These cases, given the binding nature of the law
laid down in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra), are covered
by that decision against the landowners. It is a totally fortuitous
and an incidental circumstance that one SLP arising out of the

20 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1471
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same acquisition may have been converted into a civil appeal and
dismissed by this Court but another SLP, again arising out of the
same acquisition, either might have been dismissed without granting
leave or is still pending. The necessary consequence is that one
parcel of land stands acquired and vested in the State free from
all encumbrances under the 1894 Act whereas another parcel of
adjoining land stands released on account of the acquisition having
lapsed under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. It is also quite possible
that the parcel of land qua which the acquisition is deemed to have
lapsed already stands utilized fully or partially for the development
of public infrastructure, and on the other hand the parcel of the land
which has vested in the State is still lying unutilized as the public
project is yet to be completed.
39. This piquant situation created not by an act of State and rather
being a consequence of inconsistent judicial pronouncements of
this Court, has led to hostile discriminatory treatment to identically
placed landowners. If not cured, it will lead to unexplained disparities.
Not only this, it would cause a serious crisis and chaos as several
projects of paramount public importance like the construction of
metro, flyovers, schools, hospitals or other public utilities will have
to be halted until the State re-acquires such parcels of land which
are compelled to be released on account of acquisition qua them
having lapsed in the pre-Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra)
era. The consequences are extremely grave and would be totally
detrimental to public interest.
40. The concept of ‘public interest’ need not be elaborately explained by
us here for the reason that we have succinctly explained the same
in our judgment pronounced separately in Tejpal (supra). There, we
have summed up the following elements of ‘public interest’, which
we employ mutatis mutandis in this batch of cases also:
a) While balancing the interest of the public exchequer against
that of individuals, there are many other interests at stake,
and it might not be possible to undo the acquisitions without
causing significant cascading harms and losses to such other
interests;
b) Since development projects have either begun or most of the
acquired lands have already been deployed for essential public
projects such as hospitals, schools, expansion of metro, etc., the
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effect of non-condonation of delay would go beyond mere financial
loss to the exchequer and would extend to the public at large;
c) It would be like unscrambling the egg if compensation paid
would have to be clawed back or possession taken would have
to be reversed;
d) In many cases, the development projects might also have to
be undone. The reversal of possession of even a small plot
lying on projects such as an under-construction metro corridor
would be practically impossible;
e) These are the cases where rights are vested to the public at
large given the public infrastructure that has come up on a
large number of acquired lands;
f) The fresh acquisition, if so is required to be done by the State,
would be at the expense of delaying the construction of critical
public infrastructure in our national capital. When balancing
public with private interest, the comparative interest on the
landowners would be nominal as compared to the public at
large; and
g) The multiplicity of contradictory judicial opinions on section 24
(2) of the 2013 Act has made the present set of circumstances
sui generis. The constant flux in the legal position of law has
posed significant challenges for the State and its authorities.
41. Having held that the concept of public interest need not be viewed
narrowly only on the yardstick of loss to public exchequer and that
these are the cases where public at large has acquired interest
in the public infrastructures already complete or in process of
completion, we are satisfied that if the doctrine of merger is applied
mechanically in respect of Groups A and B.1 cases, it will lead to
irreversible consequences. We are satisfied that the element of
disparity between Groups A and B.1 cases vis-à-vis cases falling
in Group C is liable to be eliminated and this can only be done by
invoking our extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution
of India so that we are able to do complete justice between the
expropriated landowners, the State and its developing agencies and
most importantly the public in general who has acquired a vested
right in the public infrastructure projects. We will do so through the
operative part of this order.
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F.4 Allegations of fraud committed by landowners
42. As stated aforesaid, Group E cases deal with allegations regarding
fraud by landowners by suppressing subsequent sale transactions,
ownership title disputes, etc.
43. The appellants contended that the landowners and affected
parties deliberately concealed crucial facts from the High Court,
including details about previous legal disputes and subsequent
sale transactions. Such concealment constitutes fraud, and as a
result, the landowners and affected parties should not be permitted
to benefit from their own deceptive actions.
44. It is settled law that after the Notification under section 4(1) of the
1894 Act is published, any encumbrance created by the owner does
not bind the State. In such a scenario, a bona fide purchaser of
land for value does not acquire any right, title or interest in the land,
and he is only entitled to receive compensation if not objected to
by the landowner/transferor. Therefore, transfer of land in respect
of which acquisition proceedings had been initiated, after issuance
of Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, is void and a
subsequent purchaser cannot challenge the validity of the notification
or the irregularity in taking possession of the land.
45. We may also refer to the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfers)
Act, 1972 (“1972 Act”, hereafter) which imposes certain restrictions
on transfer of lands which have been acquired. Section 3 prohibits
the transfer of any land acquired by the Central Government under
the 1894 Act. Section 4 mandates obtaining prior permission from
the competent authority for transferring any land intended for
acquisition, following a declaration by the Central Government
under section 6 of the 1894 Act. Section 5 requires the transferor
of a land mentioned in a Notification under section 4(1) to submit
a written application to the competent authority. The structure of
the 1972 Act clearly indicates that any subsequent sale of the
specified land without prior permission from the competent authority
is not allowed, and if such sale is done through concealment, it
amounts to fraud.
46. The law with respect to “who” can invoke section 24(2) of the 2013
Act has been well settled after the decision of this Court in Shiv
Kumar (supra) wherein it was held that subsequent purchasers do
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not have the locus to contest the acquisition and/or claim lapse of
the acquisition proceedings. This decision has expressly overruled
the previous decision of this Court in Manav Dharam Trust (supra)
by recognizing the statutory intention behind the 2013 Act, which
sought to benefit owners of lands who purchased the lands before
the Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act but not for the
benefit of those who have purchased the lands after vesting of
lands with the State. The relevant paragraphs of the decision are
extracted hereunder:
“21. Thus, under the provisions of Section 24 of the 2013
Act, challenge to acquisition proceeding of the taking over
of possession under the 1894 Act cannot be made, based
on a void transaction nor declaration can be sought under
Section 24(2) by such incumbents to obtain the land. The
declaration that acquisition has lapsed under the 2013
Act is to get the property back whereas, the transaction
once void, is always a void transaction, as no title can
be acquired in the land as such no such declaration can
be sought. It would not be legal, just and equitable to
give the land back to purchaser as land was not capable
of being sold which was in process of acquisition under
the 1894 Act. The 2013 Act does not confer any right
on purchaser whose sale is ab initio void. Such void
transactions are not validated under the 2013 Act. No
rights are conferred by the provisions contained in the
2013 Act on such a purchaser as against the State.
26. […] No declaration can be sought by a purchaser
under Section 24 that acquisition has lapsed, effect
of which would be to get back the land. They cannot
seek declaration that acquisition made under the 1894
Act has lapsed by the challenge to the proceedings of
taking possession under the 1894 Act. Such right was not
available after the purchase in 2000 and no such right
has been provided to the purchasers under the 2013 Act
also. Granting a right to question acquisition would be
against the public policy and the law which prohibits such
transactions; it cannot be given effect to under the guise
of subsequent legislation containing similar provisions.
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Subsequent legislation does not confer any new right
to a person based on such void transaction; instead, it
includes a provision prohibiting such transactions without
permission of the Collector as provided in Section 11(4).
28. We hold that Division Bench in Manav Dharam Trust
does not lay down the law correctly. Given the several
binding precedents which are available and the provisions
of the 2013 Act, we cannot follow the decision in Manav
Dharam Trust […].”
47. Counsel representing the landowners have contested the correctness
of the decision in Shiv Kumar (supra) and urged this Court to refer
it to a larger Bench for reconsideration. This was a contention
raised in desperation overlooking that Shiv Kumar (supra) has
been approved by the Constitution Bench in Manoharlal [5-Judge,
lapse] (supra). We are, thus, not impressed by the aforesaid
contention and reiterate that Shiv Kumar (supra) represents the
correct exposition of law.
48. Coming to the specifics of each case qua subsequent purchasers
or disputes regarding the title of the subject lands, we have already
clarified the scope of our inquiry in Tejpal (supra). At the expense
of reiterating, as far as the concealment of material facts regarding
subsequent sale transactions, earlier round of litigations etc. are
concerned, it is noted that the landowners and affected parties are
under no obligation to either confirm or deny the allegations levelled
against them. Nor have we directed the appellants to furnish original
records or documents to substantiate their claim of concealment
and suppression of material facts. Engaging in a factual inquiry at
such an advanced stage of the legal process, especially without
providing adequate opportunities to all parties, may not be fair. The
cases listed in Group E involve complex questions of fact and we
being the Court of the last resort, ought not to be involved in such
elaborate fact-finding exercise. We, therefore, deem it appropriate
to remit these cases to the High Court for proper adjudication on
points of law as well as facts.
G. CONCLUSION
49. The following conclusion has been reached regarding each category
of cases outlined at the beginning:
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a) So far as the cases falling under GROUP A and B.1 are
concerned (for which we have already condoned delay and
have granted leave through para 1 and 2 of this judgment),
we hold that, owing to the exceptional and unprecedented
situation having arisen for the reasons already discussed
elaborately, we do not deem it necessary to draw any distinction
among the cases classified under Group A and B.1 vis-à-vis
cases falling in Group C. Consequently, taking an overall view
of the matter and upon due consideration of the principles
of uniformity, consistency, and public interest involved, we
exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by Article
142 of the Constitution and issue the following directions in
each of the cases that have been dealt with by this judgment
and classified under Groups A and B.1:
i. The time limit for initiation of fresh acquisition proceedings
in terms of the provisions contained in section 24(2) of
the 2013 Act is extended by a year starting from 01st
August, 2024 whereupon compensation to the affected
landowners may be paid in accordance with law, failing
which consequences, also as per law, shall follow;
ii. The parties shall maintain status quo regarding
possession, change of land use and creation of third-
party rights till fresh acquisition proceedings, as directed
above, are completed;
iii. Since the landowners are not primarily dependent upon
the subject lands as their source of sustenance and
most of these lands were/are under use for other than
agricultural purposes, we deem it appropriate to invoke
our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and
dispense with the compliance of Chapters II and III of the
2013 Act whereunder it is essential to prepare a Social
Impact Assessment Study Report and/or to develop
alternative multi-crop irrigated agricultural land. We do
so to ensure that the timeline of one year extended at
(a) above to complete the acquisition process can be
adhered to by the appellants and the GNCTD, which
would also likely be beneficial to the expropriated
landowners;
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iv. Similarly, compliance with sections 13, 14, 16 to 20 of
the 2013 Act can be dispensed with as the subject-lands
are predominantly urban/semi-urban in nature and had
earlier been acquired for public purposes of paramount
importance. In order to simplify the compliance of direction
at (a) above, it is further directed that every Notification
issued under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act in this batch of
cases, shall be treated as a Preliminary Notification within
the meaning of section 11 of the 2013 Act, and shall be
deemed to have been published as on 01st January, 2014
v. The Collector shall provide hearing of objections as
per section 15 of the 2013 Act without insisting for any
Social Impact Assessment Report and shall, thereafter,
proceed to take necessary steps as per the procedure
contemplated under section 21 onwards of Chapter-IV
of 2013 Act, save and except where compliance of any
provision has been expressly or impliedly dispensed with;
vi. The landowners may submit their objections within a
period of four weeks from the date of pronouncement of
this order. Such objections shall not question the legality
of the acquisition process and shall be limited only to
clauses (a) and (b) of section 15(1) of the 2013 Act;
vii. The Collector shall publish a public notice on his website
and in one English and one vernacular newspapers, within
two weeks of expiry of the period of four weeks granted
under direction (f) above;
viii. The Collector shall, thereafter, pass an award as early
as possible but not exceeding six months, regardless
of the maximum period of twelve months contemplated
under section 25 of the 2013 Act. The market value of
the land shall be assessed as on 01st January, 2014 and
the compensation shall be awarded along with all other
monetary benefits in accordance with the provisions of
the 2013 Act except the claim like rehabilitation etc.;
ix. The Collector shall consider all the parameters prescribed
under section 28 of the 2013 Act for determining the
compensation for the acquired land. Similarly, the
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Collector shall determine the market value of the building
or assets attached with the land in accordance with section
29 and shall further award solatium in accordance with
section 30 of the 2013 Act;
x. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, since
it is difficult to reverse the clock back, the compliance of
Chapter (V) pertaining to “Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Award” is hereby dispensed with; and
xi. The expropriated landowners shall be entitled to
seek reference for enhancement of compensation in
accordance with Chapter-VIII of the 2013 Act.
b) The SLPs under GROUP B.2 have been rendered infructuous
as the appeals carried by the appellant-authorities have already
been allowed by this Court and the impugned judgment and
order of the High Court have been set aside after applying
the law laid down in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra). No
question of filing a subsequent SLP against the same judgment
and order by the appellants, therefore, arises. These SLPs
are accordingly dismissed at their threshold.
c) In one case under GROUP C.1 (GNCTD VS. RAMPHAL
SINGH [Diary No.- 19697/2022]), it is an admitted position of
the appellant/GNCTD that neither possession has been taken
nor compensation granted. With the twin conditions under
section 24(2) of the 2013 Act having been met, applying the
principles laid down in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra)
is, therefore, unwarranted in this context. Thus, keeping in
mind the principles of public interest that we have carved out
earlier, it is imperative to invoke our jurisdiction under Article
142 of the Constitution and subject this case to the eleven
directions previously issued for Groups A and B.1.
d) With respect to the SLPs (now civil appeals, leave having
been granted by us) which fall in GROUP C.2 and C.3, the
same are directed against one or the other judgment of the
High Court where acquisition has been declared to have
lapsed under section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act. While doing so,
the High Court has followed the decision of this Court in Pune
Municipal Corporation (supra) case or such other decisions,
1200 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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all of which have since been overruled by the Constitution
Bench in Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra). Since the twin
conditions under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act have not been
met in these Civil Appeals, the land acquisition proceedings
would not lapse following the test laid down in Manoharlal
[5-Judge, lapse] (supra). These Civil Appeals are accordingly
allowed, the impugned judgments of the High Court in each
case are set aside and the acquisition of the landowners’
lands under the 1894 Act is accordingly upheld. This will,
however, not preclude the landowners from recovery of the
compensation amount, if already not paid or to the extent it
is not paid, along with interest and other statutory benefits
under the 1894 Act. Similarly, they shall be at liberty to seek
reference under section 18 of the 1894 Act in accordance
with law. The GNCTD and its authorities are directed to take
physical possession of the lands falling under Group C.2 and
C.3 forthwith, if not already taken and continue uninterruptedly
to complete the public infrastructure projects. We may clarify
that this will not prevent cases within this Group, if any, from
being remanded to the High Court for the specific purpose of
conducting a factual inquiry regarding fraud, as we intend to
do in the subsequent sub-paragraph.
e) For the reasons given in Section F.4 (Allegations of fraud
committed by landowners), the cases listed in GROUP E are
hereby remitted to the High Court for adjudication of the facts
as well as the law as a fact-finding inquiry is necessary to
ascertain the rightful claimant for receiving the compensation.
We hereby set aside the orders of the High Court that were
under challenge in the Civil Appeals/M.A.s and revive the
relevant writ petitions which shall stand restored on the file
of the High Court for this limited purpose on remand being
ordered. We issue the following directions:
i. The Chief Justice of the High Court is requested to
constitute a dedicated bench to decide these writ petitions
in the manner indicated hereafter. The nominated bench
will accord an opportunity to the landowners/subsequent
purchasers, the GNCTD, and the DDA to submit additional
documents on affidavits whereupon such bench shall
embark on an exercise to decide who between the
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1201

Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.

landowner(s) and the subsequent purchaser(s) is the
rightful claimant to receive compensation. The nominated
bench will have the authority to obtain independent
fact-finding enquiry reports, if deemed necessary. The
inquiry could include determination as to whether after
the Notification under section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, any
transfer could have been effected and even if effected,
whether such transfer is permitted by any law. Once
compensation is determined, the relevant authority in
the land acquisition department shall deposit the same
with the reference court. The reference court shall then
invest the deposited amount in a short-term interest-
bearing fixed deposit account with a nationalized bank,
ensuring its periodical renewal until the relevant writ
petition is disposed of by the nominated bench. Release
of the invested amount together with accrued interest to
the rightful claimant will be contingent upon the decision
of the High Court.
ii. The question as to whether the cases in that group will
be eventually covered by the directions issued by us in
exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution
of India or whether such case will be covered in terms
of the direction contained in sub-paras above, will
depend upon and will be decided by the High Court in
accordance with law based upon facts and circumstances
of each case.
50. The above directions however shall not apply to the following
miscellaneous matters (GROUP D) which have been incorrectly
tagged in the present batch. While four of the cases in Group D.1
have been filed by the landowners seeking relief different from the
relief claimed in the appeals filed by the appellants, in one case the
DDA is before us by way of an M.A. These cases shall be listed
separately in the week commencing 22nd July, 2024. The details
of the cases are as follows:
a) DELHI ADMINISTRATION AND ORS. VS. M/S AUTO GRIT
(PETROL PUMP) AND ORS. [C.A. No. 542/2016]: The relief
sought in this Civil Appeal is particularly regarding the release
of the land under section 48 of the 1894 Act.
1202 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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b) RAJENDER SINGH CHAUHAN VS. TARUN KAPOOR AND
ORS. [CONMT.PET. (C) NO. 189/2019 IN C.A. NO. 2690/2017]:
In this Contempt Petition, the contempt petitioner-landowner,
dissatisfied with the DDA’s lack of action in initiating new
acquisition proceedings pursuant to the dismissal of the Civil
Appeal vide judgment and order dated 13th February, 2017,
has filed a contempt petition.
c) DDA VS. RAJINDER SINGH CHAUHAN AND ORS. [M.A.
No. 806/2020]: This M.A. is connected to the case that led
to the contempt petition mentioned earlier in point (ii). In this
M.A., the DDA is seeking a modification of the judgment and
orders dated 13th February, 2017 and 31st July, 2019, whereby
the Civil Appeal and the Review Petition preferred by the
DDA were dismissed, respectively. Although this M.A. could
have been decided based on the directions we have issued
for Group D, since it is connected to the aforementioned
contempt petition and no notice either on delay or on merits
has been issued in this M.A. so far, we deem it appropriate
to separate it and have it heard independently along with the
aforesaid contempt petition.
d) GNCTD VS. SUSHIL KUMAR GUPTA [M.A. No. 1888/2023]:
This M.A. has been filed by the landowner seeking recall of
the judgment and order dated 10th February, 2023 passed by
this Court whereby the Civil Appeal preferred by the GNCTD
against the judgment and order of the High Court was allowed
in view of Manoharlal [5-Judge, lapse] (supra).
e) LAC VS. VIVEK & ORS. [M.A. ...DIARY NO. 32991/2023]:
This M.A. has been filed by the landowner seeking recall of
the judgment and order dated 9th February, 2023 passed by
a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court whereby the
Civil Appeal preferred by the LAC was partly allowed and
the judgment and order of the High Court was set aside and
the same was remanded back to the High Court for a fresh
determination. It is imperative to note that no notice has been
issued, either on delay or on merits.
51. Group D.2 involves the following cases where no notice has
been issued so far by this Court either on delay or on merits. It
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1203

Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.

is, therefore, necessary in the interest of justice to de-tag these
cases for separate listing in the week commencing 22nd July, 2024:
a) DDA VS. GITA SABHARWAL [DIARY NO. 21746/2022];
b) DDA VS. NARENDAR KUMAR [DIARY NO. 674/2023, MA];
c) DDA VS. BAL KISHAN [DIARY NO. 5711/2023, MA];
d) DDA VS. ISHAAQ [DIARY NO. 1713/2023, MA];
e) DDA VS. ABHISHEK JAIN [DIARY NO. 40951/2022, MA];
f) DDA VS. M/S FLASH PROPERTIES PVT LTD [DIARY NO.
42177/2022, MA];
g) DDA VS. SHAKEEL AHMED [DIARY NO. 3577/2023, MA];
h) DDA VS. SURESH KUMAR NANGIA [DIARY NO. 39901/2022,
MA];
i) DDA VS. PHIRE RAM AND ORS. [MA 278/2023];
j) DDA VS. MADAN MOHAN SINGH [DIARY NO. 39898/2022,
MA]; and
k) DDA VS. RAJINDER SINGH DHANKAR [DIARY NO.
1215/2023, MA].
52. The aforementioned civil appeals and miscellaneous applications
are disposed of on the above terms. Pending applications, if any,
shall stand disposed of. No order as to costs.
53. Before parting, we deem it appropriate to provide a cautionary
note that the limited fact-finding conducted by this Court may not
be entirely accurate due to the complex nature of cases involving
subsequent sale transactions, earlier rounds of litigation, land titles,
and status of compensation and/or possession. We accordingly grant
liberty to the parties to approach the High Court if any disputes arise
in future or if further clarification is required, which will decide these
cases based on the principles outlined above, taking into account
the facts and, if necessary, the merits of the case.
54. It is also needless to clarify that the High Court shall proceed to
decide the cases remitted to it as expeditiously as possible, but
subject to its convenience, in accordance with law.
1204 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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ANNEXURE 1
CATEGORY OF CASES IN THE PRESENT BATCH
GROUP SUB- DESCRIPTION CASE TITLE AND NUMBER TOTAL
GROUPS NUMBER
OF
CASES
GROUP A Not M.A.s filed by the 1. DDA VS. PHIRE RAM 2
(M.A.s) Applicable appellants-authorities [MA 277/2023]
primarily pleading change 2. DDA VS. JAI PRAKASH GUPTA
in law and seeking recall of [MA 346/2023]
the judgments and orders
of this Court dismissing the
Civil Appeals and/or Review
Petitions in the first round.
GROUP B Group B.1 Civil Appeal dismissed 1. GNCTD & ANR VS. M/S BSK 40
(Civil Appeal in the first round; SLP REALTORS LLP & ANR.
in first round) pending in the second [DIARY NO. 17623/2021]
round (present batch) 2. LAC VS. MADAN MOHAN SINGH &
ORS. [DIARY NO. 32072/2022]
3. LBD VS. DEEKSHA SURI & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 18130/2021]
4. GNCTD & ANR VS. LATINDER
SINGH & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 19132/2021]
5. GNCTD & ANR VS. ANJU SHARMA
& ORS.
[DIARY NO.10132/2022]
6. GNCTD VS. ANIL MONGA & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 15707/2022]
7. LBD VS. JYOTSNA SURI & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 15710/2022]
8. GNCTD VS. KUSHAM JAIN & ANR.
[SLP(C) NO. 19012/2022]
9. GNCTD VS. RS RETAIL STORES
Pvt Ltd & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 25834/2022]
10. DDA VS. CHANDRALEKHA
SOLOMON & ORS.
[SLP(C) 30127/2015]
11. GNCTD VS. MATRIX INVESTMENT
PVT. LTD. & ANR.
[SLP(C) NO.11394/2016]
12. LBD VS. VIKRAM MADHOK & ORS
[DIARY NO. 22127/2021]
13. GNCTD VS. BODE RAM & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 28216/2021]
14. GNCTD VS. BAKSHI RAM AND
SONS (HUF) & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 3566/2022]
15. GNCTD VS. M/S SANTOSH
INFRATECH PRIVATE LTD. & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 8414/2022]
16. GNCTD VS. EMMSONS
INTERNATIONAL LTD. & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 8556/2022]
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1205

Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.

17. GNCTD VS. SUDARSHAN KAPOOR
& ORS.
[DIARY NO. 10221/2022]
18. GNCTD VS. M/S BGNS INFRATECH
PVT LTD. COMPANY & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 10222/2022]
19. GNCTD VS. BHIM SINGH & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 10474/2022]
20. GNCTD VS. ISHWAR SINGH & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 10475/2022]
21. GNCTD VS. ISHAAQ & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 15577/2022]
22. LBD VS. SIRI BHAGWAN & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 15940/2022]
23. GNCTD VS. HIMMAT SINGH & ORS
[DIARY NO. 16176/2022]
24. GNCTD VS. ALKA LUTHRA & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 27994/2022]
25. LBD VS. M/S PRASHID ESTATE
PVT LTD & ORS.
[SLP (C) NO. 28847/2015]
26. GNCTD VS. SH. ALIMUDDIN & ANR.
[SLP (C) 26525/2015]
27. GNCTD VS. LALIT JAIN & ORS.
[SLP (C) 17207/2017]
28. DDA VS. SURENDER SINGH & ANR.
[SLP (C) 592-593/2020]
29. GNCTD VS. GEETA GULATI AND
ORS.
[DIARY NO. 22388/2021]
30. LBD & ANR. VS. ISHWAR SINGH
AND ORS.
[DIARY NO. 22391/2021]
31. LBD & ANR. VS. PRAVEEN KUMAR
JAIN & ANR.
[DIARY NO. 23612/2021]
32. LBD & ANR. VS. BRAHAM SINGH
[DIARY NO. 24447/2021]
33. GNCTD VS. AMAN SINGH & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 28971/2021]
34. LAC VS. M/S FLASH PROPERTIES
PVT LTD
[DIARY NO. 2404/2022]
35. GNCTD VS. GULBIR SINGH VERMA
& ORS.
[DIARY NO. 4937/2022]
36. DDA VS. HARBANS KAUR & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 10090/2022]
37. LBD VS. SUKHBIR SINGH
[DIARY NO. 15722/2022]
38. GNCTD VS. KRISHNA RAJAURIA
[DIARY NO. 18873/2022]
39. DDA VS. TEJPAL & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 20255/2022]
40. DDA VS. TANVIR BEGUM & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 21620/2022]
1206 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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Group Civil Appeal allowed 1. GNCTD VS. BHIM SAIN GOEL 5
B.2 in the first round; SLP & ORS.
pending in the second [DIARY NO. 18142/2022]
round (present batch) 2. LBD AND ORS VS. SATISH
KUMAR
[DIARY NO. 19142/2022]
3. LBD AND ANR VS. BHAGWAT
SINGH & ORS
[DIARY NO. 19687/2022]
4. DDA VS. OMBIR SINGH & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 20104/2022]
5. DDA VS. MEHAR CHAND
SHARMA & ORS. [DIARY NO.
20203/2022]

GROUP C Group SLP dismissed in limine 1. GNCTD VS. RAMPHAL SINGH 1
(SLP in first C.1 in the first round; SLP & ORS.
round) pending in the second [DIARY NO. 19697/2022
round (present batch)

• Land acquisition
proceedings would
lapse following
the test laid down
in Manoharlal
[5-Judge, lapse]
(supra) as the twin
conditions under
section 24(2) of the
2013 Act are met
[non-payment of
compensation to the
landowners together
with failure of the
State to take physical
possession of the
acquired lands].

Group SLP dismissed in limine 1. GNCTD & ANR. VS. ANJU LATA 1
C.2 in the first round; SLP & ANR.
pending in the second [DIARY NO. 19691/2022]
round (present batch)

• Land acquisition
proceedings would
not lapse following
the test laid down
in Manoharlal
[5-Judge, lapse]
(supra) as the twin
conditions under
section 24(2) of the
2013 Act are not
met.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1207

Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.

Group C.3 SLP from either the first 1. DDA VS. GYAN CHAND & ORS. 16
round or both rounds is [DIARY NO. 32629/2022]
pending in the present 2. DDA VICE CHAIRMAN VS. SHANTI
batch INDIA PVT LTD & ORS.
• Land acquisition [SLP(C) NO. 7215/2017]
proceedings would 3. LAC VS. SEWARAM & ORS.
not lapse following [DIARY NO. 9628/2021]
the test laid down in 4. GNCTD VS. GITA SABHARWAL
Manoharlal [5-Judge, & ANR.
lapse] (supra) as the [DIARY NO. 29469/2021]
twin conditions under
5. VS. GYAN CHAND & ORS.
section 24(2) of the
[DIARY NO. 3812/2022]
2013 Act are not met.
6. DDA VS. SIMLA DEVI & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 20229/2022]
7. DDA VS. YOG RAJ & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 20555/2022]
8. DDA VS. SEWA RAM & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 33077/2022]
9. GNCTD & ANR. VS. ISHAQ (DEAD)
& ORS.
[DIARY NO. 6981/2021]
10. DDA VS. GOPAL SINGH & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 18366/2022]
11. GNCTD & ANR. VS. MADHU &
ANR.
[DIARY NO. 19685/2022]
12. LBD & ANR. VS. NARENDER
SINGH & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 19689/2022]
13. GNCTD VS. SURESH KUMAR &
ORS.
[DIARY NO. 19693/2022]
14. GNCTD VS. GHANSHYAM DASS
& ORS.
[DIARY NO. 19694/2022]
15. GNCTD VS. JYOTI DEVI & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 19724/2022]
16. DDA VS. PARSHOTAM JOSHI &
ORS.
[DIARY NO. 20260/2022]
GROUP D Group D.1 • Cases filed by 1. DELHI ADMINISTRATION & ORS. 5
(Miscella landowners; VS. M/S AUTO GRIT
neous • Cases seeking a (PETROL PUMP) & ORS. [CA
matters) different relief 542/2016]
2. RAJENDER SINGH CHAUHAN VS.
TARUN KAPOOR & ORS.
[CONMT.PET. (C) NO.189/2019 IN
C.A. NO. 2690/2017]
3. DDA VS. RAJINDER SINGH
CHAUHAN & ORS.
[MA 806/2020]
4. GNCTD VS. SUSHIL KUMAR
GUPTA
[MA 1888/2023]
5. LAC VS. VIVEK & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 32991/2023, MA]
1208 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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Group D.2 Cases where no notice 1. DDA VS. GITA SABHARWAL 11
has been issued either on [DIARY NO. 21746/2022]
delay or on merits 2. DDA VS. NARENDAR KUMAR
[DIARY NO. 674/2023, MA]
3. DDA VS. BAL KISHAN
[DIARY NO. 5711/2023, MA]
4. DDA VS. ISHAAQ
[DIARY NO. 1713/2023, MA]
5. DDA VS. ABHISHEK JAIN
[DIARY NO. 40951/2022, MA]
6. DDA VS. M/S FLASH PROPERTIES
PVT LTD
[DIARY NO. 42177/2022, MA]
7. DDA VS. SHAKEEL AHMED
[DIARY NO. 3577/2023, MA]
8. DDA VS. SURESH KUMAR NANGIA
[DIARY NO. 39901/2022, MA]
9. DDA VS. PHIRE RAM & ORS.
[MA 278/2023]
10. DDA VS. MADAN MOHAN SINGH
[DIARY NO. 39898/2022, MA]
11. DDA VS. RAJINDER SINGH
DHANKAR
[DIARY NO. 1215/2023, MA]
TOTAL 81
GROUP E Not Cases where the 1. GNCTD & ANR VS. M/S BSK 32
(Suppression Applicable landowners are alleged to REALTORS LLP & ANR.
of facts qua have committed fraud by [DIARY NO. 17623/2021]
subsequent suppressing facts regarding 2. LAC VS. MADAN MOHAN SINGH
purchaser/ them being subsequent & ORS.
title etc.) purchasers and/or the [DIARY NO. 32072/2022]
land being vested in Gaon 3. LBD VS. DEEKSHA SURI & ORS.
Sabha [DIARY NO. 18130/2021]
4. GNCTD & ANR. VS. ANJU SHARMA
& ORS.
[DIARY NO.10132/2022]
5. GNCTD VS. ANIL MONGA & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 15707/2022]
6. LBD VS. JYOTSNA SURI & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 15710/2022]
7. GNCTD VS. RS RETAIL STORES
Pvt Ltd & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 25834/2022]
8. DDA VS. JAI PRAKASH GUPTA
[MA 346/2023]
9. GNCTD VS. MATRIX INVESTMENT
PVT. LTD. & ANR.
[SLP(C) NO.11394/2016]
10. LBD VS. VIKRAM MADHOK & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 22127/2021]
11. GNCTD VS. BODE RAM & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 28216/2021]
12. GNCTD VS. BAKSHI RAM AND
SONS (HUF) & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 3566/2022]
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 1209

Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s BSK Realtors LLP & Anr.

13. GNCTD VS. M/S SANTOSH
INFRATECH PVT LTD. & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 8414/2022]
14. GNCTD VS. EMMSONS
INTERNATIONAL LTD. & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 8556/2022]
15. GNCTD VS. SUDARSHAN
KAPOOR & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 10221/2022]
16. GNCTD VS. M/S BGNS
INFRATECH PVT LTD. COMPANY
& ORS.
[DIARY NO. 10222/2022]
17. GNCTD VS. ISHAAQ & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 15577/2022]
18. LBD VS. SIRI BHAGWAN & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 15940/2022]
19. GNCTD VS. ALKA LUTHRA & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 27994/2022]
20. GNCTD VS SH. ALIMUDDIN & ANR.
[SLP (C) 26525/2015]
21. GNCTD VS. LALIT JAIN & ORS.
[SLP (C) 17207/2017]
22. LAC VS. M/S FLASH PROPERTIES
PVT LTD
[DIARY NO. 2404/2022]
23. LBD VS. SUKHBIR SINGH
[DIARY NO. 15722/2022]
24. DDA VS. GOPAL SINGH & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 18366/2022]
25. GNCTD AND ANR VS. MADHU &
ANR.
[DIARY NO. 19685/2022]
26. LBD AND ANR VS. NARENDER
SINGH & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 19689/2022]
27. GNCTD AND ANR VS. ANJU LATA
& ANR.
[DIARY NO. 19691/2022]
28. GNCTD VS. SURESH KUMAR &
ORS.
[DIARY NO. 19693/2022]
29. GNCTD VS. GHANSHYAM DASS
& ORS.
[DIARY NO. 19694/2022]
30. GNCTD VS. JYOTI DEVI & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 19724/2022]
31. DDA VS. TEJPAL & ORS.
[DIARY NO. 20255/2022]
32. DDA VS. PARSHOTAM JOSHI &
ORS.
[DIARY NO. 20260/2022]
1210 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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Note: Cases categorized under Group E, owing to their distinct facts and circumstances, may overlap with
Groups A to C (excluding Group B.2, which we have dismissed as rendered infructuous). As a result, any
directions issued under Group E are intended exclusively for that category alone, and such cases shall
be automatically excluded from the purview of Groups A to C. For added clarity, it is stated that all cases
falling under Group E shall be remanded back to the High Court, regardless of their classification within the
aforementioned categories.

Result of the case: Civil Appeals and Miscellaneous applications
disposed of.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan