GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.versusSMT. GOWRAMMA AND ORS.

         GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.                               A
                        v.
              SMT. GOWRAMMA AND ORS.

                       DECEMBER 14, 2007

      [DR. ARI.HT PASAYAT AND P. SATHASIVAM, .JJ.]                      B


      Karnataka Preservation ofTrees Act, 1976: Application by owner
oflandfor permission to cut trees-Conditional permission granted-
While granting transport permits, Government transported some c
portion of timbers to their godowns-Claim of owner for price of
timber transported-Held: Not sustainable in the absence ofchallenge
to the conditions stipulated in permission granted.
      Precedent: Reliance on a decision without looking into the factual
background ofthe case before the Court-Held: Not proper-Decision D
is precedent on its own facts-Observations of Courts are neither to
be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions ofthe statute-These
observations to be read in the context in which they are stated-Judges
interpret words of statutes~Their words not to be interpreted as
statutes- Judgment-Interpretation of                                     E

      The plaintiffs are owners of the suit land. They had grown silver
wood and other varieties of trees on the suit land. The plaintiff applied
for permission for cutting and felling of silver wood and other trees
on the suit land. The defendants granted the permission. In terms F
of the permission, the plaintiffs cut and felled the trees. While issuing
the transport permit to the plaintiffs, the defendant directed issuance
of transport permit and ordered to transfer certain timber to
Government depot. A suit for recovery was filed by the plaintiffs
claiming that they were entitled to the value of the timber transported G
to Government godown at the prevailing rates. The defendants took
the stand that the permission was conditional and there was never
any challenge to the conditional permission granted and after having
accepted the permission by plaintiff with the conditions stipulated,
                                 939
                                                                        H
    940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.


A it was not open to the plaintiffs to lay a claim for the value of the
  trees. The Trial Court dismissed the suit holding that in the absence
  of challenge to the conditional permission, there was no question of
  the plaintiffs making a claim for value of the timber transported. The
  High Court allowed the appeal filed by plaintiffs by placing reliance
B on certain judgment of High Court wherein it was held that in respect
  of reserved trees, the ownership was not with the Government but
  was with the owner of the land. Hence the present appeal;

        Allowing the appeal, the Court

c       HELD: 1. It is an admitted position that the permission was
  granted with conditions. It is also not disputed that PW-I, who was
  examined in support of the plaintiffs case, accepted that the trees
  in question were reserved trees. The Trial Court took note of this
  fact and noted that in the cross-examination of PW-1, he has
D specifically admitted that the Nandi trees are reserved trees.
  Further, the High Court lightly brushed aside the stand of the State
  and its functionaries that in the absence of any challenge to the
  conditions stipulated in the permission granted, it was not open to
  the plaintiffs to claim value of the Timber. The High Court, in the
E impugned judgment, referred to some judgments rendered in writ
  petitions. [Para 8] [944-B-D]

        2.1. Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual
  background of the case before it is clearly impermissible. A decision
  is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features.
F It is not everything said by a Judge while giving a judgment that
  constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding
  a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this
  reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the
  ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents,
G every decision contains three basic postulates : (i) findings of
  material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts
  is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible
  facts; (ii) statements of the principles oflaw applicable to the legal
  problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the
H combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it
      GOVERNMENTOFKARNATAKA v. SMT.GOWRAMMA 941



-    actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and A
     not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from
     the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of
     the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been
     decided is alone binding as a precedent. A case is a precedent and
     binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used B
     by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words
     in Act of Parliament. [Para 9] [944-E-H; 945-A]

         State ofOrissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors., AIR (1968)
     SC 647 and Union of India and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors.,
     (1996] 6 sec 44, relied on.                                             c
           Quinn v. Leathern, (1901) AC 495 (H.L.), referred to.
          2.2. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without
     discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation
     of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts D
     are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the
     statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations
     must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated.
     To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may
     become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but E
     the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret
     statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of
     statutes; their words arc not to be interpreted as statutes.
/"
~
                                                         [Para 10] [945-C-E]

         London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton, (1951) AC 737 at F
     p.761; Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., (1970) 2 All ER 294 and
     Herrington v. British Railways Board, (1972) 2 WLR 537, referred
     to.
         2.3. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact
                                                                           G
     may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases.
     Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not
     proper. [Para 12] [946-B)
         3. There was no challenge to the conditions stipulated and it
     was accepted that the trees were reserved trees. What is the effect H
    942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.


A of this admission, was not examined by the High Court. Therefore,
    looked at from any angle, the judgment of the High Court is clearly               ...
    unsustainable and is set aside. [Para 14] [946-F-G]
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2874 of
    2001.
B
        From the final Judgment and Order dated 13.4.2000 of the High
    Court ofKamataka at Bangalore in Regular First Appeal No. 816 of
    1995.
         Sanjay R. Hegde and Amit Kr. Chawla for the Appellants.
c
         S.N. Bhat, N.P.S. Panwar and D.P. Chaturvedi for the Respondents.
         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
        DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the
D parties.
         2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single
    Judge of the Karnataka High Court allowing the appeal filed by the
    respondents.
E         3. Plaintiffs, who are the respondents in the present appeal filed a
    Suit for recovery of a sum ofRs.1,47,965.20 on the ground that being
    owners of the Trees which were transported to the Government godown
    on the basis of the permission granted by the present appellants, the value
    of the Trees has to be paid by the government.
F        4. The case of the plaintiff, as culled out from the averments in the
   plaint is that they are the owners of the suit schedule property. The plaintiffs
   and their predecessor had grown silver wood, jungle wood and other
  .varieties of trees in the schedule land by spending lot of money and had
   cultivated the said land with coffee crop. In order to regulate the shade
G in the schedule property and also for cutting and felling of silver wood,
   jungle wood and other trees, the plaintiffs had applied for permission for
   cutting and felling of the silver wood, jungle wood and other trees. Before
   granting the felling permission of the said trees, a joint survey was carried
   out by the forest authorities as well as the revenue surveyors. Thereafter,
H
 GOVERNMENTOFKARNATAKA v. SMT.GOWRAMMA 943
               [PASAYAT,J.]
the second defendant granted permission for felling of the trees situated A
in the schedule properties. In terms of the permission, the plaintiffs cut
and felled the trees. While issuing the transport permit to the plaintiffs,
the second defendant had directed issuance of transport permit for a
portion of the trees and ordered to transfer 1050 CFT of timber valued
at Rs.1,31,250/- to an earmarked forest depot. The firewood of22-1/2 B
meters valued at Rs.10,000/- was also transported to the same depot.
Therefore, the claim was made that the plaintiffs are entitled to the value
of the Timber@ Rs.125/- per CFT and At Rs.150/- per CFT at the
prevailing rates. Defendants took the stand that the permission was
conditional and there was never any challenge to the conditional permission C
granted. After having accepted the permission with the conditions
stipulated, it was not open to the plaintiffs to lay a claim for the value of
the trees. The Trial Judge dismissed the Suit, inter alia, holding that in
the absence of a challenge to the conditional permission, there was no
question of the plaintiffs making a claim for value of the timber transported. D
       5. An appeal was filed before the High Court, which, by the
impugned judgment, accepted the stand of the plaintiffs. For granting relief
to the plaintiffs, i.e. the present respondents, reliance was placed on certain
judgments of the High Court where it was held that in respect of reserved
trees, the ownership was not with the Government but was with the owner E
of the land. Accordingly, as noted above, the appeal was allowed.
      6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant-State
submitted that the grant of permission was governed· by the Karnataka
Preservation of Trees Act, 1976 (in short 'the Act'). Permission is required F
for felling of all trees irrespective of whether they are situated in private
or in government land. The permission undisputedly is subject to the
stipulated conditions. There is a provision for preferring an appeal in case
of refusal to grant permission. The permission was granted on 30.3 .1999
and there was a specific condition which stipulated that 27 trees of a
particular variety which are reserved trees are to be transported to the G
Government Nata Warehouse after felling. There was no challenge to the
order in this regard. Since the conditions were not challenged, the High
Court should not have granted relief to the respondents-plaintiffs relying
on certain decisions which were rendered in different context and had no
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     944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.


 A application to the facts of the present case.
        7. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted
  that merely because the trees which were permitted to be cut were
  reserved trees, that did not mean that government was the owner of the
  trees. Reference is made to certain provisions of the Karnataka Forest
B Act, 1963 to contend that the ownership of the Government in respect
  of the trees is restricted only to sandalwood trees.
         8. It is an admitted position that the permission was granted with
   conditions. It is also not disputed that PW-I, who was examined in support
c of the plaintiffs's case, accepted that the trees in question were reserved
   trees. The Trial Court took note of this fact and noted that in the cross-


                                                                                  -
   examination of PW-I, he has specifically admitted that the Nandi trees
  are reserved trees. Further, the High Court lightly brushed aside the stand
  of the State and its functionaries that in the absence of any challenge to
D the conditions stipulated in the permission granted, it was not open to the
  plaintiffs to claim value of the Timber. The High Court, in the impugned
  judgment, referred to some judgments rendered in writ petitions.
        9. Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual
  background of the case before it is clearly impermissible. A decision is a
E precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not
  everything said by a Judge while giving a judgment that constitutes a
  precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the
  principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important
  to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According
F to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three
  basic postulates - (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An
  inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the
  direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law
  applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment
G based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for
  what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio
  and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the
  various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason
  or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone
H binding as a precedent. (See: State ofOrissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra
     GOVERNMENTOFKARNATAKA v. SMT.GOWRAMMA 945
                   [PASAYAT,J.]
    and Ors., AIR (1968) SC 647 and Union of India and Ors. v. A
    Dhanwanti Devi and Ors., [1996] 6 SCC 44). A case is a precedent
    and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used
    by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in
    Act of Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathern, (1901) AC 495 (H.L.), Earl of
    Halsbury LC observed that every judgment must be read as applicable B
    to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality
    of the expressions which are found there are not in.tended to be exposition
    of t11e whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the
    case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority
    for what it actually decides.                                                c
          10. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing
-   as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision
    on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read
    as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken
    out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in D
    which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to
    be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a
    statute; it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy
    discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges
    interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words E
    of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London
    Graving Dock Co. Ltd v. Horton, (1951) AC 737 at p.761, Lord Mac
    Dermot observed:
               "The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating
           the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J as though they were part of an Act F
           of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate
           thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to
           the language actually used by that most distinguished judge."
          11. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., (1970) 2 All ER 294 G
    Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin's speech.... .is not to be treated as ifit was
    a statute definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances."
    Megarry, J in ( 1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: "One must not, of course,
    construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of
                                                                                H
    946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.


A Parliament." And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board, (1972) 2
  WLR 537 Lord Morris said:
                "There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or
           judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and
           it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting
B          of the facts of a particular case."
          12. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make
    a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases
    by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
c        13. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying
    precedents have become locus classicus:
               "Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity
           between one case and another is not enough because even a single
D          significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases,
           one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by
           Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour
           of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case
           falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive."
E              ***                          ***                          ***
               "Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path
           of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side
           branches else you will find yourselflost in thickets and branches.
           My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which
                                                                                      -
F
           could impede it."
        14. As noted above, there was no challenge to the conditions
  stipulated and it was accepted that the trees were reserved trees. What
  is the effect of this admission, was not examined by the High Court.
G Therefore, looked at from any angle, the judgment of the High Court is
  clearly unsustainable and is set aside. The appeal is allowed but without
  any order as to costs.
    D.G.                                                        Appeal allowed.
H