GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESHversusP.B. VIJAYAKUMAR AND ANR.

A                 GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
                                         v.
                        P.B. VIJAYAKUMAR AND ANR.

                                  MAY 12, 1995

B              [R.M. SAHA! AND SUJATA V. MANOHAR, JJ.]

          Service Law

          Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate Service Rules: Rule 22-A (2 ).

c          Public Services--Recruitment-Posts equally suited to men and
    women-Provision for preference to women-Extent of at/east 30% of posts
    in each category of backward classe:r-Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
    T1ibes quota-Held not violative of A1ticle 16-Ru/e held within the ambit of
    Article 15(3}-Held it was not reservation in the nonnal sense-Concept of
D   rese1vation explained.

          Constitution of India, 1950:

         Articles 15 and 16-lnterpretation of-Article 15(3) should be read
    hannoniously with Article 16-Power conferred under Article 15(3}-Held
E   cannot be whittled down by Article 16.

         A1ticle 15(3)-0bject and Scope of-Expression ''4ny special provision
    for women"-Contemplates affinnative action as well as reservation.

        With a view to providing reservation to women in public services to a
F specified extent, the State of Andhra Pradesh introduced Rule 22-A in
  Andhra Pradesh State Subordinate Service Rules under proviso to Article
  309 of the Constitntion of India. Sub-rule (2) of the said Rule provides that
  in the matter of direct recruitment to posts for which women and men are
                                                                                  ..
  equally suited, other things being equal, preference shall be given to women
  and they shall be selected to an extent of atleast 30% of the posts in each
G category of O.C., B.C., S.C. and S.T. quota. Respondent-I challenged the
  validity of this rule on the ground that it was violative of Articles 14 and
  16(4) of the Constitution as it had seriously affected all male unemployed
  persons in the State of Andhra Pradesh. A single Judge of the High Court
  upheld the validity of Rule 22-C while a Division Bench upheld sub-rules (1)
H and (3) but struck down last portion of Rule 22-A(2) as unconstitutional in
                                       462
                        GOVf. OF AP. v. P.B. VIJAYAKUMAR                           463

     so far as it provided that "women shall be selected to an extent of at least A
     30% of the posts in each category of O.C., B.C., S.C. and S.T. quota". State
     of Andhra Pradesh preferred appeals before this Court.

            On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the State cannot
     make any reservation in favour of women in relation to appointments or
     posts under the State, because Article 16(2) read with Article 16(4) ex-             B
     pressly permits reservation in favour of any backward classes of citizens
     but it contains no such provision for reservation in favour of women.

            Allowing the appeals, this Court.

           HELD : 1. The judgment of the High Court in so far it strikes down
                                                                                          c
     the second part of Rule 22·A(2) of the Andhra Pradesh State and Subor-
J    dinate Service Rules is set aside and Rule 22-A(2) is upheld as valid.
                                                                       [473-E]

             2. Rule 22-A(2) does make certain special provisions for women as            D
      contemplated under Article 15(3). It provides for preference being given to
      women to the extent of 30% of the posts, other things being equal. This is
      clearly not a reservation for women in the normal sense of the term. It is a
      Rule for a very limited affirmative action. It operates, first of all, in respect
      of direct recruitment to posts for which men and women are equally suited.
      Secondly, it operates only when both men and women candidates are equally           E
      meritorious. This is an express condition of Rule 22-A(2), thus limiting its
      application. It is not the intention of the Rule that it would apply only if all
      the candidates have not merely the same number of marks in the selection
      test but are also born on the same date, or have identical marks in the
      qualifying diploma or degree examination. The preference contemplated               F
      under the Rule will come into operation at the initial stage when in the
      selection test for the post in question, candidates obtain the same number
      of marks or are found to be equally meritorious. The said Rule prescribes a
    . minimum preference of 30% for women, clearly contemplating that for the
      remaining posts also, if women candidates are available and can be selected
      on the basis of other criteria of selection among equals which are applied to       G
      the remaining candidates, they can also be selected. The 30% rule is also not
      inOexible. In a situation where sufficient number of women are not avail ..
      able, preference that may be given to them could be less than 30%. This rule
      is within the ambit of Article 15(3), nor is it in any manner violative of
      Article 16(2) or 16(4) which have to be read harmoniously with Articles             H
    464                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A 15(1) and 15(3). [471-B, 471-H, 472-A-B-G-H, 473-A-B]

           3. Resenation normally implies a separate quota which is resened
    for a special category of persons. Within that category appointments to the
    reserved posts may be made in the order of the merit. !'levertheless, the
    category for whose benefit a resenation is provided, is not required to
B   compete on equal terms with the open category. Their selection and
    appointment to resened posts is on their inter se merit and not as
    compared with the merit of candidates in the open category. The very
    purpose of resenation is to protect this weak category against competition
    from the open category candidates. It is lack of opportunity which has led
C   to social backwardness, not merely amongst what are commonly con-
    sidered as the backward classes, but also amongst women. Resenation,
    therefore, is one of the constitutionally recognised methods of overcoming
    this type of backwardness. Such resenation is permissible under Article
    15(3). Rule 22-A(2), however, does not provide for this kind of resenation
    for women.
D
        4. Both resenation and affirmative action are permissible under
  Article 15(3) in connection with employment or posts under the State. Both
  Articles 15 and 16 are designed for the same purpose of creating an
  egalitarian society. For that purpose it is necessary that Article 15(3) be
E read harmoniously ·· ith Article 16 to achieve the purpose for which these
  Articles have been framed. [473-C-D]

          Indra Sawhney & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1992] Supp. 3 SCC
    217, relied on.

F        5. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation to the
  citizens of this country. There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the
  ambit of Article 15 (1) employment under the State. At the same time Article
  15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3)
  go together. In addition to Article 15(1), Article 16(1), however, places
G certain additional prohibitions in respect of a specific area of State activity
  viz. employment under the State. These are in addition to the grounds of
  prohibition enumerated under Article 15(1) which are also included under
  Article 16(2). There are, however, certain specific provisions in connection
  with employment under the State under Article 16. Therefore in dealing
  with employment under the State, it has to bear in mind both Articles 15
H and 16 - the former being a more general provision and the latter, a more
    GOVT. OFAP. v. P.B. VIJAYAKUMAR [SUJATA V. MANOHAR,J.] 465

specific provision. Since Article 16 does not tonch upon any special            A
provision for women being made by the State, it cannot, in any manner
derogate from the power conferred upon the State in this connection under
Article 15(3). This power conferred by Article 15(3) is wide enough to cover
the entire range of State activity including employment under the State.
[468-E-F-H, 469-A-B]
                                                                                B
      6. The object of Article 15(3) is to strengthen and improve the status
of women. An important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating
job opportunities for women. To say that under Article 15(3), job oppor-
tunities for women cannot be created would be to cut at the very root of the
underlying inspiration behind this Article. Making special provisions for       C
women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part
of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3), is not whittled
down in any manner by Article 16. [469-C-D)

       7. 'Any special provision for women" in Article 15(3) which the State
may make to improve women's participation in all activities under the           D
supervision and control of the State can be in the form of either affirmative
action or reservation. The same phraseology linds a place in Article 15(4)
which permits reservation for the advancement of any backward class of
citizens or of Schednled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. Since Article 15(3)
contains an identical special provision for women, Article 15(3) would also
include the power to make reservations for women. [469-F, 470-C]                E
     The State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairaja11, [1951] SCR 525 and
M.R. Balaji & Ors. v. State of Mysore, [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 439, relied on.

      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2532-33
~~                                                                              F
    From the Judgment and Order dated 18.11.88 of the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh in W.P.Nos. 276/85 & 16915 of 1986.

     K. Lakshmi Narasimha, S.C. for Andhra Pradesh, G. Prabhakar for
the Appellants.                                                                 G
      In - person for the Respondent.

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      MRS. SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J. The Government of Andhra                       H
    466                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A Pradesh in the year 1984 decided that women were not getting their due
    share of public employment. It decided to take certain remedial measures.
    On 2.1.1984 it issued G.O.Ms. No. 2, General Administration (Services-A)
    Department stating policy decisions taken by the State Government in
    respect of reservations for women in public services, to a specified extent.
    Pursuant to this policy decision, Rule 22-A was introduced in the Andhra
B   Pradesh State and Subordinate Service Rules under the proviso to Article
    309 of the Constitution of India. It reads as follows :-

            "22-A: notwithstanding anything contained in these Rules or Spe-
            cial or Ad-hoc Rules -

c           (1) In the matter of direct recruitment to posts for which women
            are better suited than men, preference shall be given to women;
            (G.O.Ms.No. 472, G.A. dated 11.10.1985) :

                Provided that such absolute preference to women shall not
D            result in total exclusion of men in any category of posts.

             (2) In the matter of direct recruitment to posts for which women
             and men are equally suited, other things being equal, preference
             shall be given to women and they shall be selected to an extent of
             at least 30% of the posts in each category of O.C., B.C., S.C. and
E            S.T. quota.

             (3) In the matter of direct recruitment to posts which are reserved
             exclusively for being filled by women they shall be filled by women
             only."

F        Sub-rule (2) of this Rule is the subject matter of challenge before us.
  The challenge is by the respondent No. 1 who, at the time of filing of the
  petition before the High Court, was a law student in Andhra University,
  Waltair. We are informed that he is not a practicing lawyer. At the material
  time, however, he had registered his name in the District Employment
G Exchange, Visakhapatnam. He filed a writ petition before the Andhra
  Pradesh High Court challenging the above Rule on the ground that it was
  violative of Articles 14 and 16(4) of the Constitution and had seriously
  affected all male unemployed persons in the State of Andhra Pradesh. A
  single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the validity of Rule
  22-A. In appeal before the High Court, however, a Division Bench has
H struck down a portion of Rule 22-A(2) as unconstitutional while upholding
   GOVf.OFA.P.v. P.B.VDAYAKUMAR[SUJATA V.MANOHAR,J.] 467

sub-rules (1) and (3) of Rule 22-A. The portion of sub-rule (2) which is       A
struck down is the last portion of that sub-rule containing the words "and
they shall be selected to an extent of at least 30% of the posts in each
category of O.C., B.C., S.C., and S.T. quota".

      Does sub-rule (2) of Rule 22-A violate Article 14 or 16(4)? Article
14 which provides that the State shall not deny to any person equality B
before the law, has been the subject matter of interpretation in a number
of cases before this Court as well as the High Courts. Applications of this
principle of equality has often proved more difficult in practice then was
anticipated. It has, however, been commonly accepted that the equality
clause requires that only persons who are in like circumstances should be C
treated equally. Where persons or groups of persons are not situated
equally, to treat them as equals would itself be violative of Article 14. As
a necessary fall out of this principle, classification among different groups
of persons and differentiation between such classes is permissible provided
(1) the classification is founded on intelligible differentia between the D
groups and (2) such differentia have a rational nexus with the objects
sought to be achieved by the statute. Article 15, however, prohibits dif-
ferentiation between classes on certain grounds. It prohibits the State from
discriminating against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste,
sex, place of birth or any of them. Clause (3) of Article 15 provides that
nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any special E
provision for women and children. In other words, while Article 15(1)
would prevent a State from making any discriminatory law (inter alia) on
the ground of sex alone, the State, by virtue of Article 15(3), is permitted,
despite Article 15(1), to make special provisions for women, thus clearly
carving out a permissible departure from the rigours of Article 15(1).        F

       Article 16(2) provides that no citizen shall, on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them,
be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or
office under the State. The ambit of Article 16(2) is more limited in scope G
than Article 15(1) because it is confined to employment or office under the
State. Article 15(1), on the other hand, covers the entire range of State
activities. At the same time, the prohibited grounds of discrimination under
Article 16(2) are somewhat wider then those under Article 15(2) because
Article 16(2) prohibits discrimination on the additional grounds of descent
and residence apart from religion, race, caste, sex and place of birth. For H
    468                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A our purposes, however, both Articles 15(1) and 16(2) contain prohibition
    of discrimination on the ground of sex.

        The respondent before us has submitted that if Article 16(2) is read
  with Article 16(4) it is clear that reservation of appointments or posts in
B favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State,
  is not adequately represented in the services under the State is expressly
  permitted. But there is no such express provision in relation to reservation
  of appointments or posts in favour of women under Article 16. Therefore,
  the respondent contends that the State cannot make any reservation in
  favour of women in relation to appointments or posts under the State.
C According to the respondent this would amount to discrimination on the
  ground of sex in public employment or appointment to posts under the
  State and would violate Article 16(2).

          This argument ignores Article 15(3). The inter-relation between
D Articles 14, 15 and 16 has been considered in a number 0£ c,ases by this
  Court. Article 15 deals with every kind of State action in relation -t6 the
  citizens of this country. Every sphere of activity of the State is controlled
  by Article 15(1). There is, therefore, no reason to exclude from the ambit
  of Article 15(1) employment under the Stale. At the same time Article
  15(3) permits special provisions for women. Both Articles 15(1) and 15(3)
E go together. In addition to Article 15(1) Article 16(1), however, places
  certain additional prohibitions in respect of a specific area of state activity
  viz. employment under the State. These are in addition to the grounds of
  prohibition enumerated under Article 15(1) which are also included under
  Article 16(2). There are, however, certain specific provisions in connection
F with employment under the State under Article 16. Article 16(3) permits
  the State to prescribe a requirement of residence within the State or Union
  Territory by parliamentary legislation; while Article 16(4) permits reserva-
  tion of posts in favour of backward classes. Article 16(5) permits a law
  which may require a person to profess a particular religion or may require
  him to belong to a particular religious denomination, if he is the incumbent
G of an office in connection with the affairs of the religious or denominational
  institution. Therefore, the prohibition against discrimination on the
  grounds set out in Article 16(2) in respect of any employment or office
  under the State is qualified by clauses 3, 4, and 5 of Article 16. Therefore,
  in dealing with employment under the State, it has to bear in mind both
H Articles 15 and 16 - the former being a more general provision and the
    GOVT. OF AP. v. P.B. VUAYAKUMAR [SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J.] 469

latter, a more specific provision. Since Article 16 does not touch upon any A
special provision for women being made by the State, it cannot in any
manner derogate from the power conferred upon the State in this connec-
tion under Article 15(3). This power conferred by Article 15{3) is wide
enough to cover the entire range of State activity including employment
under the State.
                                                                                 B
       The insertion. of clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is a
recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been .
socially and economically handicapped. As a result, they are unable to
participate in the socio-economic activities of the nation on a footing of
equality. It is in order to eliminate this socio-economic backwardness of C
women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective
equality between men and women that Article 15{3) is placed in Article
15. Its object is to strengthen and improve the status of women. An
important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job oppor-
tunities for women. To say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for D
women cannot be created would be to cut at the very root of the underlying
inspiration behind this Article. Making special provisions for women in
respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of
Article 15{3). This power conferred under Article 15{3) is not whittled
down in any manner by Article 16.
                                                                                 E
       What then is meant by "any special provision for women" in Article
15{3)? This "special provision", which the State may make to improve
women's participation in all activities under the supervision and control of
the State can be in the form of either affirmative action or reservation. It
is interesting to note that the same phraseology finds a place in Article        F
15{4) which deals with any special provision for the advancement of any
socially or educationally backward class of citizens or Scheduled Castes or
Scheduled Tribes. Article 15 as originally enacted did not contain Article
15(4). It was inserted by the Constitution First Amendment Act, 1951 as a
result of the decision in the case of 17ie State of Madras v. Champakam
Dorairajan, [1951] SCR 525 setting aside reservation of seats in educational     G
institutions on the basis of caste and community. This Court observed that
the Government's order was violative of Article 15 or Article 29{2). It said:-

        "Seeing, however, that clause (4) was inserted in Article 16, the
        omission of such an express provision from Article 29 cannot but H
    470                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A           be regarded as significant."

  The object of the First Amendment was to bring Articles 15 and 29 in line
  with Arti'cle 16(4). After the introduction of Article 15(4), reservation of
  seats in educational institutions has been upheld in the case of M.R. Balaji
B & On" v. State of Mysore, [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 439 and a number of other
  cases which need not be referred to here. Under Article 15(4) orders
  reserving seats for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward
  Classes in Engineering, Medical and other Technical colleges, have been
  upheld. Under Article 15(4), therefore, reservations are permissible for the
  advancement of any backward class of citizens or of Scheduled Castes or
C Scheduled Tribes. Since Article 15(3) contains an identical special
  provision for women, Article 15(3) would also include the power to make
  reservations for women. In fact, in the case of Indra Sawhney & Ors. v.
  Union of India and Ors., (1992] Supp. 3 SCC 217 this Court (in paragraph
  846) rejected the contention that Article 15(4) which deals with a special
D provision, envisages programmes of positive action while Article 16(4) is a
  provision warranting programmes of positive discrimination. This Court
  observed :

            "We are afraid we may not be able to fit these provisions into this
            kind of compartmentalisation in the context and scheme of our
E           constitutional provisions. By now, it is well settled that reservations
            in educational institutions and other walks of life can be provided
            under Article 15( 4) just as reservations can be provided in services
            under Article 16(4). If so, it would not be correct to confine Article
            15(4) to programmes of positive action alone. Article 15(4) is wider
F           then Article 16(4) inasmuch as several kinds of positive action
            programmes can also be evolved and implemented thereunder (in
            addition to reservations) to improve the conditions of SEBCs,
            Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, whereas Article 16(4)
            speaks only on one type of remedial measure, namely, reservation
            of appointments/posts."
G
    This Court has, therefore, clearly considered the scope of Article 15(4) as
    wider than Article 16(4) covering within it several kinds of positive action
    programmes in addition to reservations. It has, however, added a word of
    caution by reiterating M.R. Balaji (supra) to the effect that a special
H   provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and
   GOVf.OFA.P.v. P.B.VIJAYAKUMAR[SUJATA V. MANOHAR,J.] 471

appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable A
limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the
maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is
worded similarly.

       In the light of these constitutional provisions, if we look at Rule
22-A(2) it is apparent lhal lhe Rule does make certain special provisions B
for women as contemplated under Article 15(3). Rule 22-A(2) provides for
preference being given to women to the extent of 30% of the posts, other
things being equal. This is clearly not a reservation for women in the normal
sense of the term. Reservation normally ii;nplies a separate quota which is
reserved for a special category of persons. Within that category appoint- C
ments to the reserved posts may be made in the order of the merit.
Nevertheless, the category for whose benefit a reservation is provided, is
not required to compete on equal terms with the open category. Their
selection and appointment to reserved posts is independently on their inter
se merit and to as compared with the merit of candidates in the open
category. The very purpose of reservation is to protect this weak category D
against competition from the open category candidates. In the case of Indra
Sawhney (supra) while dealing with reservations, this Court has observed
(at paragraph 836) :-

        "It cannot also be ignored that the very idea of reservation implies E
        selection of a less meritorious person. At the same time, we
        recognise that this much cost has to be paid, if the constitutional
        promise. of social justice is to be redeemed."

These remarks are qualified by observing that efficiency, competence and
merit are not synonymous and that it is undeniable that nature has en- F
dowed merit upon members of backward classes as much as it has endowed
upon members of other classes. What is required is an opportunity to prove
it. It is precisely a lack of opportunity which has led to social backward-
ness, not merely amongst what are commonly considered as the backward
classes, but also amongst women. Reservation, therefore, is one of the G
constitutionally recognised methods of overcoming this type of backward-
ness. Such reservation is permissible under Article 15(3).

       Rule 22-A(2), however, does not provide for this kind of reservation
for women. It is a Rule for a very limited affirmative action. It operates,
first of all, in respect of direct recruitment to posts for which men and H
    472                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A   women are equally suited. Secondly, it operates only when both men and
    women candidates are equally meritorious. This is an express condition of
    Rule 22-A(2), thus limiting its application. In other words, it contemplates
    a situation where, in the selection test - whether it is written or oral or
                                                                                    -
    both, a certain number of men and women candidates have got an equal
B   number of marks. If the number of posts to which these equally situated
    men and women can be appointed are limited, and all of them cannot be
    appointed, then preference to the extent of 30% is required to be given to
    women. This is clearly an affirmative action of preference to the extent of
    30% for women. To give an illustration, supposing there are in the merit
    list, at a certain point in the order of merit, 20 candidates - men and
C   women, who have secured equal marks. There are only ten posts which
    have to be distributed amongst these 20 candidates. In such a situation, 3
    out of these 10 posts will be given to women while the remaining 7 posts
    will have to be alloted among the remaining 17 candidates. In such a
    situation if there are any departmental rules for giving preference they will
D   operate. For example such rules at times provides that a person who is
    older in age will be preferred, all other thing being equal. J:his kind of ,
    preference may have nothing to do with merit. It may be merely an
    administrative guideline to select from amongst those who are equally
    meritorious. Sometimes educational qualifications are looked at to find out
E   the marks obtained by the candidates in the examination. It could be that
    the examination taken by different candidates i3 of different institutions or
    universities and is taken at different times. Nevertheless, these marks are
    looked at to select some candidates out of a group of equally meritorious
    persons. These norms for selection out of equally meritorious persons, do
F   not come into play under Rule 22-A(2) for giving preference to women.
    The phrase "other things being equal" does not refer to these other norms
    for choosing from out of equally meritorious persons. For example, it
    would be somewhat starting to find men and women who have not merely
    got the same number of marks in the selection test but are also born on
    the same day in the same year. It is not the intention of Rule 22-A(Z) that
G   it would apply only if all the candidates have not merely the same number
    of marks in the selection test but are also born on the same date, or have
    identical marks in the qualifying diploma or degree examination. The
     preference contemplated under Rule 22-A(2) will come into operation at
     the initial stage when in the selection test for the post in question, can-
H    didates obtain the same number of marks or are found to be equally
          GOVT. OFA.P. v. P.B. VUAYAKUMAR[SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J.] 473

      meritorious. Rule 22-A(2) prescribes a minimum preference of 30% for A
      women, clearly contemplating that for the remaining posts also, if women
      candidates are available and can be selected on the basis of other criteria
      of selection among equals which are applied to the remaining candidates,
      they can also be selected. The 30% rule is also not inflexible. In a situation
      where sufficient number of women are not available, preference that may B
      be given to them could be less then 30%.

            We do not, however, find any reason to hold that this rule is not
      within the ambit of Article 15(3), nor do we find it in any manner violative
      of Article 16(2) or 16(4) which have to be read harmoniously with Articles
      15(1) and 15(3). Both reservation and affirmative action are permissible C
      under Article 15(3) in connection with employment or posts under the
      State. Both Articles 15 and 16 are designed for the same purpose of


-     creating an egalitarian society. As Thommen, J. has observed in Indra
      Sawhney's case (supra) (although his judgment is a minority judgment),
      "Equality is one of the magnificent cornerstones of Indian democracy''. We
      have, however, yet to tum that corner. For that purpose it is necessary that D


-     Article 15(3) be read harmoniously with Article 16 to achieve the purpose
      for which these Articles have been framed.

             In the premises, the judgment of the High Court in so far as it strikes
     . down the second part of Rule 22-A(2) is set aside and Rule 22-A(2) is E
       upheld as valid. The appeals are accordingly allowed. In the circumstances,
       there will be order as to costs.

      T.N.A.                                                  Appeals allowed.




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