GOUDAPPA & ORS.versusSTATE OF KARNATAKA

                     [2013] 4 S.C.R. 547


                     GOUDAPPA & ORS.                                 A
                              v.
                   STATE OF KARNATAKA
              (Criminal Appeal No. 229 of 2007)
                       MARCH 11, 2013
                                                                     8
                  [A.K. PATNAIK AND
            CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, JJ.]
     Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302 rlw s. 34, 143 and 148 - Murder
- Of husband, by the wife's father and uncles - Five accused
- Conviction of accused nos. 3, 4 & 5 (appellants) u/s.302 rl        C
w s.34 - Justification - Held: Justified - Deceased was done
to death in furtherance of common intention - The fact that
accused nos.3 and 4 held the deceased and facilitated
accused no. 5 to give the fatal blow and made no effort to
prevent him from assaulting the deceased leads to the                D
irresistible and inescapable conclusion that accused nos. 3
and 4 shared the common intention with accused no. 5 -
Intention of accused no.5 clear from the nature of weapon
used (jambia) and the severity of attack which was in the area
of chest penetrating deep inside up to heart and liver which         E
caused the death of the deceased.

        Penal Code, 1860 - s. 34 - Scope of - Common intention
  - Held: s.34 /PC lays down a principle of joint liability in the
  doing of a criminal act - The common intention is gathered
                                                                     F
  from the manner in which the crime has been committed, the
  conduct of the accused soon before and after the occurrence,
  the determination and concern with which the crime was
  committed, the weapon carried by the accused and from t/le
  nature and injury caused by one or some of them - For
. arriving at a conclusion whether the accused had the common        G
  intention to commit an offence of which they could be
  convicted, the totality of circumstances must be taken into
  consideration.

                               547                                   H
    548      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2013] 4 S.C.R.


A      The relations between the deceased-husband and
  his wife were strained. The prosecution case was that the
  wife's father (accused no.1) and uncles (four other
  accused) murdered the husband in furtherance of
  common intention. The five accused allegedly entered
B the house of the deceased, abused and threatened them
  of dire consequences; whereafter accused nos.3 and 4
  caught hold of the deceased's hands while accused no.
  5 gave jambia blow on his chest. Further allegation was
  that the accused no.1 pelted stone over the door of the
c house whereas accused no. 2 damaged its front door
  with an axe.

       The trial court acquitted accused nos.1 and 2 but
  convicted the other three accused (i.e. the appellants).
  While accused nos.3 and 4 were convicted under Section
D 304, Part II read with Section 109 of the IPC, accused no.5
  was convicted under Section 304, Part II of IPC. The High
  Court, however, held all the accused guilty under Section
  143 and 148 of IPC, and further convicted the appellants
  under Section 302/34 of IPC as well, and therefore the
E instant appeal.

          Dismissing the appeal, the Court

       HELD: 1.1. The house in question is a small house
F and the distance between the place where PWs 1, 2and
  3 were watching TV and the place of occurrence is about
  20 ft. Further, there was an alarm raised by the deceased
  which attracted the witnesses (PWs1, 2 and 3) and, thus
  their claim of being eye-witnesses of the occurrence
G cannot be rejected. [Para 12] [556-G-H]

        1.2. It is the consistent evidence of the prosecution
    witnesses that the deceased was chewing paan and
    came out of the house to spit when accused no.1 abused
    him alleging that he failed to keep his daughter
H
   GOUDAPPA & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                549

whereupon all the accused persons entered the house            A
and the crime was committed. As the dead body was
found 7 ft. inside the front door, there is no inconsistency
in regard to the place of occurrence. [Para 13) [557-D-E]

     2.1. Ordinarily, every man is responsible criminally
                                                              B
for a criminal act done by him. No man can be held
responsible for an independent act and wrong committed
by another. The principle of criminal liability is that the
person who commits an offence is responsible for that
and he can only be held guilty. However, Section 34 of C
the Indian Penal Code makes an exception to this
principle. It lays down a principle of joint liability in the
doing of a criminal act. The essence of that liability is to
be found in the existence of common intention, animating
the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in
furtherance of such intention. It deals with the doing of D
separate acts, similar or adverse by several persons, if
all are done in furtherance of common intention. In such
situation, each person is liable for the result of that as if
he had done that act himself. Section 34 of the Indian
Penal Code thus lays down a principle of joint criminal E
liability which is only a rule of evidence but does not
create a substantive offence. Therefore, if the act is the
result of a common intention that every person who did
the criminal act share, that common intention would make
him liable for the offence committed irrespective of the F
role which he had in its perpetration. The common
intention is gathered from the manner in which the crime
has been committed, the conduct of the accused soon
before and after the occurrence, the determination and
concern with which the crime was committed, the G
weapon carried by the accused and from the nature and
injury caused by one or some of them. Therefore, for
arriving at a conclusion whether the accused had the
common intention to commit an offence of which they
                                                               H
    550    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 4 S.C.R.


A could be convicted, the totality of circumstances must be
  taken into consideration. [Para 16] [558-G-H; 559-A-E]

         2.2. In the instant case, the deceased was done to
    death in furtherance of the common intention of the two
    appellants namely, accused no. 3 and accused no. 4. All
8
    the accused had assembled at one place and the moment
    deceased came out of the house to spit, one of the
    accused started abusing him. They were armed with axe
    and jambia and by catching and immobilizing the
    deceased these two accused facilitated the assault by
C   accused no. 5. Accused no. 5 stabbed the deceased with
    jambia over the left side of the chest and the blow was
    so severe that it penetrated into the heart and liver. The
    fact that these appellants held the deceased and
    facilitated the other accused to give the fatal blow and
D   made no effort to prevent him from assaulting the
    deceased leads to irresistible and inescapable
    conclusion that these two appellants shared the common
    intention with accused no. 5. The intention of accused no.
    5 is clear from the nature of weapon used and the severity
E   of attack which was in the area of chest penetrating deep
    inside up to heart and liver which caused the death of the
    deceased. [Para 17) [559-F-H; 560-A-B]

       Ramesh Singh v. State of A.P. (2004) 11 SCC 305 -
F relied on.

        Ramashish Yadav v. State of Bihar (1999) 8 SCC 555:
    1999 (2) Suppl. SCR 285 and Pandurang v. State of
    Hyderabad AIR 1955 SC 216: 1955 SCR 1083 - referred
    to.
G
         3. The High Court has not committed any error in
    setting aside the judgment of acquittal and holding all the
    accused guilty under Section 143 and 148 of the IPC and
    convicting the appellants under Section 302/34 of the IPC
H
   GOUDAPPA & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                   551


and sentencing them to undergo imprisonment for life              A
with default clause. [Para 20) [561-D-E]

                     Case Law Reference:
    1999 (2) Suppl. SCR 285 referred to          Para 14
                                                                  B
    (2004) 11 SCC 305             relied on      Para 15, 18
    1955 SCR 1083                 referred to    Para 19

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 229 of 2007.                                                  c
    From the Judgment & Order dated 28.07.2006 of the High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No. 59 of
2000 and Criminal Appeal No. 879 of 1999.

    Basava Prabhu S. Patil, B. Subrahmanya Prasad, Anirudh        D
Sanganeria, Venkatakrishna Kunduru, R.D. Upadhyay for the
Appellants.

    Anitha Shenoy for the Respondent.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                    E

     CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J. 1. Appellant No. 1,
Goudappa (Accused No.3), Appellant No.2, Chhannappa @
Ajjappa (Accused No.4) and Appellant No. 3, Mahadevappa
(Accused No.5) aggrieved by their conviction and sentence,        F
have preferred this appeal with the leave of the court.

     2. Altogether five brothers namely, Basappa,
Vipakshappa, Goudappa, Channappa @ Ajjappa and
Mahadevappa were put on trial for offence under Section 143,
148, 452, 341, 302, 427, 504 and 506 read with Section 149        G
of the Indian Penal Code. The trial court acquitted accused no.
1, Basappa and accused no. 2 Vipakshappa of all the charges.
Accused no. 3, Goudappa and accused no. 4, Channappa @
Allappa were, however, held guilty under Section 304, Part II
                                                                  H
    552     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 4 S.C.R.


A read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced
  to undergo simple imprisonment for one year. Accused no. 5,
  Mahadevappa has been convicted under Section 304, Part II
  of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous
  imprisonment for five years. They have, however, been acquitted
B of all other charges.

        3. State of Karnataka, aggrieved by the order of acquittal
  of the aforesaid two accused and conviction of other three only
  under Section 304, Part II, instead under Section 302 of the
  Indian Penal Code and those convicted and sentenced also
C preferred separate appeals before the High Court. Both the
  appeals were heard together and disposed of by a common
  judgment. The High Court by the impugned judgment and order
  has set aside the judgment of acquittal and held all the accused
  guilty under Section 143 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code and
D sentenced them to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/- on each count with a
  default clause. Those three found guilty under Section 304, Part
  II read with Section 109 or under Section 304, Part II of the
  Indian Penal Code simplicitor have, instead, been convicted
  under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced
E to undergo imprisonment for life with default clause.

       4. Matrimonial discord between deceased Channappa
  and Kalavathi, daughter of accused no. 1, Basappa is the cause
  of the crime. All the accused are brothers and reside in Village
F Navalur within Dharwad District of the State of Karnataka.
  Kalavathi was married to deceased Channappa, who was also
  the resident of the same village, houses of both being situated
  within a distance of 100 ft. from each other. Marriage between
  them had taken place on 5th of May, 1996. The relationship
G between the couple was not cordial and, according to the
  prosecution, as usual the elders of the village convened a
  Panchayat in which the father of Kalavathi i.e. accused no. 1
  Basappa wrote an undertaking (Exh. P-6) to counsel his
  daughter and not to blame anyone else, if any untoward incident
  happens. However, this did not bring peace and matrimonial
H
   GOUDAPPA & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                    553
       [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
harmony and Kalavathi left the matrimonial house without            A
informing anybody. This was not liked by her husband,
Channappa and he stopped her entry in the matrimonial house.
All the accused thus nurtured ill-will against him.

      5. According to the prosecution, on 9th of January, 1998
at about 9.30 P.M. the deceased Channappa, his brother              8
Manjunatha (PW-1), mother Siddawwa (PW-2) and grandson
of PW-2, Manjunath (PW-3) were watching TV. The deceased
Channappa at that time was chewing paan and came out of the
house to spit. Accused Basappa started abusing him alleging
that he failed to keep his daughter, whereupon all the accused      C
entered the house and accused no. 3 Goudappa and accused
No. 4 Channappa @ Ajjappa caught hold of the deceased and
accused no. 5 Mahadevappa stabbed him with jambia over the
left side of the chest. The blow was so severe that it penetrated
into the heart and liver. Prosecution has further alleged that      D
accused no. 1, Basappa pelted stone over the door of the
house whereas accused no. 2 Vipakshappa damaged its front
door with an axe. Manjunatha (PW-1), Siddawwa (PW-2) and
Manjunath (PW-3) claimed to have seen the incident.
Manunatha (PW-1) conveyed the message to the Police Control         E
Room and called Dr. Shamsuddin Kasimsab Jamadar (PW-18)
for treatment, but noticing profuse bleeding, he advised to shift
the injured to the Government Hospital. While arrangement to
shift the injured was being made, Shashidhar (PW-24), the
police constable, Manappa Siddappa Arer (PW-27), the Sub-           F
Inspector of Police of Vidhyagiri Police Station and other two
police constables came to the spot and the injured was shifted
to Civil Hospital, Dharwad. He was examined by the doctor and
declared dead. Manjunatha (PW-1) gave report to Manappa
Siddappa Arer which led to registration of Crime No. 14of1998       G
under Section 143, 147, 148, 323, 427, 452, 302, 504 and 506
read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code.

    6. After usual investigation, police submitted the charge-
sheet and all the five accused were ultimately committed to the
                                                                    H
    554     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 4 S.C.R.


A Court of Sessions to face the trial. The trial court framed
  charges under Section 143, 148, 452, 341, 302, 427, 504 and
  506 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. Accused
  pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In order to bring
  home the charge, the prosecution has altogether examined 28
8 witnesses and a large number of documents (Exibits P-1 to P-
  24) and material objects (M.Os. 1 to 14) were exhibited. Out
  of the aforesaid witnesses, Manjunatha (PW- 1), Siddawwa
   (PW-2) and Manjunath (PW-3) claimed to be the eye-witnesses
  of the occurrence. Dr. Rajashekara (PW-6) has conducted the
C post-mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased.
  The defence of the accused is of total denial and they have led
  no evidence. There is consistent evidence of Manjunatha (PW-
   1), Siddawwa (PW-2) and Manjunath (PW-3) that relation of
   Kalawathi, daughter of accused no. 1 Basappa and her
  husband, the deceased Channappa was strained and the
D accused have virtually accepted this part of the prosecution
  story. Manjunatha (PW-1), has stated in his evidence that while
  he along with the other two eye-witnesses, Siddawwa (PW- 2)
  and Manjunath (PW-3) and the deceased Channappa were
  watching TV, all the accused had assembled in the house of
E accused no. 3, Goudappa and were hurling abuses. According
  to this witness, the deceased Channappa was in the habit of
  chewing paan and, therefore, he had gone out of the house to
  spit. At that time accused no. 1 Basappa abused him alleging
  that he is not able to lead married life with his daughter.
F Immediately thereafter, all the accused entered into the house.
  At that time, accused no. 2, Vipakshappa was armed with an
  axe whereas accused no. 5, Mahadevappa was carrying a
  jambia. According to this witness, accused no. 3, Goudappa
  and accused no. 4 Channappa @ Ajjappa caught hold of the
G deceased Channappa whereupon accused no. 5,
  Mahadevappa assaulted the deceased with jambia on his
  chest. It has further been stated that accused no. 1, Basappa
  pelted stone over the door whereas accused no. 2,
  Vipakshappa damaged the front door with an axe. lri the cross-
H examination, this witness has admitted that all of them including
   GOUDAPPA & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                      555
       [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
the deceased Channappa, were inside the house and watching            A
TV when the accused have come in front of their house and
the occurrence had taken place inside the house. He has further
admitted that in the first information report he had not mentioned
about the availability of electric light in the house and in the
street, at the time of the incident.                                  B

     7. Siddawwa (PW-2), who happens to be the mother of
the deceased, stated in her evidence that all the accused came
to their house, abused and threatened them of dire
consequences as the deceased was not accepting Kalavathi
to lead a married life. She has further stated that accused no.       C
3, Goudappa and accused no. 4, Channappa @ Ajjappa
caught hold of deceased's hands and accused no. 5,
Mahadevappa gave jambia blow on his chest. Evidence of
Manjunath (PW-3), the grandson of Siddawwa (PW-2), is the             D
same as those of other two eye witnesses. In the cross-
examination he had stated that the deceased Channappa was
inside the house when the accused came to the spot.

    8. Dr. Rajashekara (PW-6), who conducted the post-
mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased                   E
Channappa, had found the following external injuries on his
person:

     "1. Punctured wound over the left side of the chest over 2,
     3 and 4th intercostal space 3" below the junction of medial
                                                                      F
     1/3rd and later 2/3rd of clavicle bone 3" lateral to midline."

    9. He also found the following internal injuries on his
person:

     "On· opening of the skull brain was pale in colour. On           G
     examination of the chest. crack fracture of 2nd rib on the
     left side 3" from sterno costal junction. Plura opened at the
     site of the wound, which was described above. Containing
     blood with some clots and blood was about 1000 ml:

     Laryanx and treachea was intact and pale.                        H
    556       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 4 S.C.R.


A         Lungs were intact and pale. Plura was opened over tile
          left atrium of the heart.

          Punctured wound over left atrium 1%" x 1" clot blood at the
          margins and reddish in colour."
B       10. Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, Senior Advocate appears
    on behalf of the appellants, whereas the respondent-State of
    Karnataka is represented by Ms. Anitha Shenoy.

         11. Mr. Patil submits that the claim of Manjunatha (PW-1 ),
C Siddawwa (PW-2) and Manjunath (PW-3) to be the eye-
  witnesses to the occurrence and having witnessed the incident
  is fit to be rejected as, according to their own evidence, they
  were watching the television inside the house (PADASALE) at
  the time of occurrence, whereas the occurrence has taken place
D near the front door inside the house. In this connection, he has
  drawn our attention to the sketch map and points out that from
  the place where these witnesses were watching the television,
  the place where the deceased was assaulted is not visible. Ms.
  Shenoy, however, submits that the house where the incident had
E taken place is a small house and the distance between the
  place of occurrence and the PADASALE where they were
  watching TV is hardly 20 ft. She further submits that after the
  accused persons entered into the house and saw the deceased
  Channappa, the latter had raised an alarm which attracted the
F attention of the witnesses and they came to the spot and,
  hence, witnessed the occurrence.

       12. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival
  submissions and we find substance in the submission of Ms.
  Shenoy. The house in question is a small house and the
G distance between the place where they were watching TV and
  the place of occurrence is about 20 ft. Further, there was an
  alarm raised by the deceased Channappa which attracted the
  witnesses and, thus their claim of being eye-witnesses of the
  occurrence cannot be rejected on this ground.
H
    GOUDAPPA & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                     557
        [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
         13. Mr. Patil then submits that, according to the evidence   A
  of the prosecution witnesses, when the deceased came out of
  the house to spit, the occurrence has taken place, but the dead
  body was found inside the house and, therefore, prosecution
  has not been able to prove the place of occurrence beyond all
  reasonable doubt. According to him, the consistent case of the      B
  prosecution is that the deceased along with other eye-witnesses
  were watching TV in the PADASALE and the deceased was
  assaulted when he came out of the house to spit. In this
  connection, he has drawn our attention to the sketch map which
· gives the details of the house and the place of occurrence. This,   C
  according to Mr. Patil, clearly shows that the occurrence has
  taken place inside the house. We do not find any substance in
  the submission of Mr. Patil and the same is fit to be rejected.
  For appreciation of this submission one has to bear in mind
  that the house where the occurrence has taken place is a small
  house and the dead body was found 7 ft. inside the front door.      D
  It is the consistent evidence of the prosecution witnesses that
  the deceased Channappa was chewing paan and came out of
  the house to spit when accused no. 1 Basappa abused him
  alleging that he failed to keep his daughter whereupon all the
  accused persons entered the house and the crime was                 E
  committed. As stated earlier, the dead body was found 7 ft.
  inside the front door, we do not find any inconsistency in regard
  to the place of occurrence.
      14. Mr. Patil lastly submits that, according to the
 prosecution itself, role attributed to accused no. 3 Goudappa        F
 and accused no. 4 Channappa @ Ajjappa is that they had
 caught hold of the deceased Channappa and from that it cannot
 be inferred that the crime was committed in furtherance of
 common intention. According to him, these appellants had not
 intended to cause the death of the deceased and, hence,              G
 cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 302 with the
 aid of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. In support of the
 submission reliance has been placed on the judgment of this
 Court in the case of Ramashish Yadav v. State of Bihar,
 (1999) a sec 555:                                                    H
    558      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 4 S.C.R.


A         "This being the requirement of law for applicability of
          Section 34 IPC, from the mere fact that accused Ram
          Pravesh Yadav and Ramanand Yadav came and caught
          hold of Tapeshwar, whereafter Samundar Yadav and Sheo
          Layak Yadav came with gandasa in their hands and gave
B         blows by means of gandasa, it cannot be said that the
          accused Ram Pravesh Yadav and Ramanand Yadav
          shared the common intention with accused Samundar
          Yadav and Sheo Layak Yadav. Consequently, accused
          Ram Pravesh Yadav and Ramanand Yadav cannot be held
          guilty of the charge under Sections 302/34 IPC but
c         accused Samundar Yadav and Sheo Layak Yadav did
          commit the offence under Sections 302/34, having
          assaulted deceased Tapeshwar on his head by means of
          gandasa on account of which Tapeshwar died. The
          accused Ram P•avesh Yadav and Ramanand Yadav are,
D         therefore, acquitted of the charges levelled against them
          and they be set at liberty forthwith."

        15. Ms. Shenoy, however, submits that from the manner
  in which the crime has been committed and the role played by
E the aforesaid two appellants clearly show that the criminal act
  was done by several persons in furtherance of the common
  intention of all and, hence, each of such person shall be liable
  for the criminal act in the same manner as if it was done by
  him alone. Reference, in this connection, has been made to a
F decision of this Court in the case of Ramesh Singh v. State
  of A.P., (2004) 11 sec 305.

       16. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival
  submissions and the submission made by Ms. Shenoy
G commend us. Ordinarily, every man is responsible criminally for
  a criminal act done by him. No man can be held responsible
  for an independent act and wrong committed by another. The
  principle of criminal liability is that the person who commits an
  offence is responsible for that and he can only be held guilty.
  However, Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code makes an
H
    GOUDAPPA & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                          559
        [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.)

exception to this principle. It lays down a principle of joint liability   A
in the doing of a criminal act. The essence of that liability is to
be found in the existence of common intention, animating the
accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of
such intention. It deals with the doing of separate acts, similar
or adverse by several persons, if all are done in furtherance of           B
common intention. In such situation, each person is liable for
the result of that as if he had done that act himself. Section 34
of the Indian Penal Code thus lays down a principle of joint
criminal liability which is only a rule of evidence but does not
create a substantive offence. Therefore, if the act is the result          c
of a common intention that every person who did the criminal
act share, that common intention would make him liable for the
offence committed irrespective of the role which he had in its
perpetration. Then how to gather common intention? The
common intention is gathered from the manner in which the                  0
crime has been committed, the conduct of the accused soon
before and after the occurrence, the determination and concern
with which the crime was committed, the weapon carried by the
accused and from the nature and injury caused by one or some
of them. Therefore, for arriving -at a conclusion whether the              E
accused had the common intention to commit an offence of
which they could be convicted, the totality of circumstances must
be taken into consideration.

      17. Bearing in mind the principle aforesaid, when we
proceed to consider the case of these two appellants namely,               F
accused no. 3 Goudappa and accused no. 4 Channappa @
Aliappa, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that
the deceased Channappa was done to death in furtherance of
their common intention. All the accused had assembled at one
place and the moment deceased came out of the house to spit,               G
one of the accused started abusing him. They were armed with
axe and jambia and by catching and immobilizing the deceased
these two accused facilitated the assault by accused no. 5.
Accused no. 5 stabbed the deceased with jambia over the left
side of the chest and the blow was so severe that it penetrated            H
    560       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 4 S.C.R.


A into the heart and liver. The fact that these appellants held the
  deceased and facilitated the other accused to give the fatal
  blow and made no effort to prevent him from assaulting the
  deceased leads to irresistible and inescapable conclusion that
  these two appellants shared the common intention with accused
B no. 5. The intention of accused no. 5 is clear from the nature of
  weapon used and the severity of attack which was in the area
  of chest penetrating deep inside up to heart and liver which
  caused the death of the deceased.

      18. The view which we have taken finds support from the
C judgment of this Court in the case of Ramesh Singh (supra) in
  which it has been observed as follows:

                "Once the prosecution evidence tendered through
          PWs 1 to 3 is accepted, then it is clear that when A-2 and
D         A-3 held the hands of the deceased, they had some
          intention in disabling the deceased. This inference is
          possible to be drawn because the appellants in their
          statement recordad under Section 313 CrPC did not give
          any explanation why they held the hands of the deceased
E         which indicates that the appellants had the knowledge that
          A-1 was to assault the deceased. The fact that the
          appellants continued to hold the deceased all along without
          making any effort to prevent A-1 from further attacking, in
          our opinion, leads to an irresistible and an inescapable
F         conclusion that these accused persons also shared the
          common intention with A-1."

        19. However, we hasten to add that each case rests on
  its own facts and mere similarity of the facts in one case cannot
  be used to determine a conclusion of fact in another. Whether
G the crime was committed in furtherance of common intention
  is determined on appreciation of evidence laid in that case and
  the similarity of facts in one case may not be decisive to come
  to a definite conclusion of fact in another. Hence, answer of
  such question has to be found in the facts of a given case. In
H this connection, it is apt to reproduce the following passage
   GOUDAPPA & ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                         561
       [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]

from the case of Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955             A
SC 216:

             "But to say this is no more than to reproduce the
     ordinary rule about circumstantial evidence, for there is no
     special rule of evidence for this class of case. At bottom,       B
     it is a question of fact in every case and however similar
     the circumstances, facts in one case cannot be used as a
     precedent to determine the conclusion on the facts in
     another. All that is necessary is either to have direct proof
     of prior concert, or proof of circumstances which
     necessarily lead to that inference, or, as we prefer to put       C
     it in the time- honoured way, 'the incriminating facts must
     be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and
     incapable of explanation on any other reasonable
     hypothesis'. (Sarkar's Evidence, 8th Edn., p. 30)"
                                                             ,         D
     20. From the discussion aforesaid, it is evident that the
High Court has not committed any error in setting aside the
judgment of acquittal and holding all the accused guilty under
Section 143 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code and convicting
the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code           E
and sentencing them to undergo imprisonment for life with
default clause.

      21. In the result, we do not find any merit in the appeal and
it is dismissed accordingly.
                                                                       F
B.B.B.                                        Appeal dismissed.