Holding

The amended Section 6 applies to incumbents as of 1 September 2016, permitting them to continue in office until the age of 65 or until they have completed a five‑year term, whichever is earlier.

Summary

The petitioners, appointed as Presiding Officers of Debt Recovery Tribunals before the 2016 amendment, challenged their retirement age and term of office, arguing that the amended Section 6 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (which raised the age limit to 65) should apply to them. The original provision limited tenure to five years or until the officer turned 62, whichever came first. The amendment, effected by Act 44 of 2016, substituted the old Section 6 and introduced a new age ceiling of 65 years. The Court examined whether the word "substituted" conferred a retrospective effect and applied purposive interpretation to ascertain legislative intent. It held that the amendment was intended to benefit incumbents as of 1 September 2016, allowing them to serve until 65 or complete five years, whichever is earlier. Consequently, the petitioners were reinstated with continuity of service and salary.

Issues considered

Whether the amendment to Section 6 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 applies retrospectively to Presiding Officers appointed before its commencement.
Whether the term "substituted" in the amending statute implies a deletion of the old provision and full operation of the new provision.
Whether purposive interpretation mandates that the legislative intent was to extend the enhanced retirement age to incumbents.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Term of officePresiding OfficerDebt Recovery TribunalStatutory amendmentRetrospective effectSubstitutionPurposive interpretationRetirement ageSection 6

Judgment

[2018] 11 S.C.R. 39 39

GOTTUMUKKALA VENKATA KRISHAMRAJU A
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of 2018)
SEPTEMBER 07, 2018. B
[A. K. SIKRI AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.]
Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993:
s. 6 (as substituted/amended by Act 44 of 2016 w.e.f. September
1, 2016) – Term of office of Presiding Officer – Applicability of the C
substituted/amended provision – To the Presiding Officers who were
appointed prior to the substitution of the provision – Petitioners
were appointed as Presiding Officers – Term of the office applicable
at the relevant time as per s. 6 (unamended) was for 5 years until
attaining 62 years of age, whichever was earlier – s. 6 was
D
substituted w.e.f. September 01, 2016 – As per the substituted
provision term of office was for five years till attaining the age of
65 – On September 01, 2016 the petitioners had not completed 35
years but were attaining 62 years of age – Writ petition claiming to
be governed by substituted s. 6 – Held: The amended /substituted s.
6 shall apply in the case of petitioners. E
s.6 (as substituted/amended by Act 44 of 2016) – Interpretation
of – Held: Purpose of the amendment was to reduce the burden of
pendency by enhancing of age of Judges – In order to fulfill the
objective purposive interpretation is to be given to the statute –
Interpretation of Statute – Purposive interpretation. F
Legislation:
Substitution of a provision – Effect of – Held: Whenever the
legislature uses the word ‘substitution’, it has the effect of deleting
the old provision and make the new provision operative – The words
‘substitution’ can be construed as an ‘amendment’, if it is found G
that legislature intended otherwise.
Words and Phrases:
‘Substitute’, ‘Substitution’ – Meaning of.
H
39
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 11 S.C.R.

A Allowing the matters, the Court
HELD: 1. The amended provisions of Section 6 shall apply
in the case of petitioners as well and, therefore, if they have not
completed five years of tenure as Presiding Officers of the Debt
Recovery Tribunal they are entitled to continue to work as
B Presiding Officers till they attain the age of 65 years or complete
five years’ term before attaining the age of 65 years. [Para
11][48-C]
2. Section 6 stands ‘substituted’ with the old Section.
Ordinarily wherever the word ‘substitute’ or ‘substitution’ is used
C by the legislature, it has the effect of deleting the old provision
and make the new provision operative. The process of
substitution consists of two steps: first, the old rule is made to
cease to exist and, next, the new rule is brought into existence
in its place. The rule is that when a subsequent Act amends an
earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part of
D itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be
read and construed as if the altered words had been written into
the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so
that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at
all. No doubt, in certain situations, the Court having regard to
E the purport and object sought to be achieved by the Legislature
may construe the word “substitution” as an “amendment” having
a prospective effect. Therefore, it is not a universal rule that the
word ‘substitution’ necessarily or always connotes two severable
steps, that is to say, one of repeal and another of a fresh enactment
even if it implies two steps. However, the aforesaid general
F meaning is to be given effect to, unless it is found that legislature
intended otherwise. [Paras 12, 14][49-G; 50-E-H; 51-A]
3. Insofar as present case is concerned, the legislative intent
was also to give effect to the amended provision even in respect
of those incumbents who were in service as on September 01,
G 2016. The effect, thus, would be to replace Section 6 as amended
with the intention as if this is the only provision which exist from
the date of introduction and the earlier provision was not there
at all. The effect of this would be that all those incumbents who
are holding the post of Presiding Officer on September 01, 2016
H would be governed by this provision. [Paras 14, 15][51-A-C]
GOTTUMUKKALA VENKATA KRISHAMRAJU v. UNION OF 41
INDIA

4. The purpose of amending Section 6 was to reduce the A
burden of pendency by enhancement of age of the Judges
concerned. This is apparent from the Report of the Lok Sabha
Joint Committee qua the Amendment and from the Statement of
Objects and Reasons to the amendment. In order to fulfill the
aforesaid objective of reducing the arrears and tackle the issue
B
of pendency of cases in various Debt Recovery Tribunals,
‘purposive interpretation’ is to be given. [Paras 18, 19 and 20][54-
D, G; 55-C-D]
5. Thus, while carrying out the aforesaid amendment with
the intention to substitute the amended provision with that of
unamended, the Parliament desired that the benefit of this C
provision extended even to those who are serving as Presiding
Officers on the date when the amendment became enforceable.
[Para 21][55-H; 56-A]
Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and
Investment Co. Ltd. & Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 424 : [1987] D
2 SCR 1; Government of India & Ors. v. Indian
Tobacco Association (2005) 7 SCC 396 : [2005] 2
Suppl. SCR 859; Zile Singh v. State of Haryana and
Others (2004) 8 SCC 1 : [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 272 –
relied on. E
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan
& Anr. (2011) 7 SCC 639 : [2011] 6 SCR 443; Boucher
Pierre Andre v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Tihar, New
Delhi & Anr. (1975) 1 SCC 192; Gupta v. Glaxo-
Smithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2007) 7 SCC 171 : F
[2007] 7 SCR 800 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1987] 2 SCR 1 relied on Para 8
[2011] 6 SCR 443 referred to Para 9
G
(1975) 1 SCC 192 referred to Para 9
[2007] 7 SCR 800 referred to Para 11
[2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 859 relied on Para 12
[2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 272 relied on Para 13 H
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 11 S.C.R.

A CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No.
732 of 2018.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
WITH
B T.C (C) Nos. 301, 304, 303, 305, 306 of 2017.
Vikramjeet Banerjee, ASG, Ashok Kumar Panda, R. Basant,
Sr. Advs., Ravindra Kumar, M. A. Chinnasamy, K. Ethiraj,
Ms. C. Rubavathi, V. Senthil Kumar, Santosh Krishnan, Chandra
Bhushan Prasad, Tejaswi Kumar Pradhan, M. Paikaray, Aniruddha
C Purushotham, Ms. Shobha Gupta, Nachiketa Joshi, Ms. Swarupama
Chaturvedi, Ms. Disha Rai, Mrs. Anil Katiyar, B.V. Balram Das, Advs.
for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A. K. SIKRI, J. 1. Petitioners in these petitions were appointed
D as Presiding Officers of Debt Recovery Tribunal created under the
Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993
which is rechristened as Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). The appointment was made under
the provisions of the said Act. Chapter II of the Act deals with the
establishment of Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal. The provisions relevant
E
for our purposes are Sections 3 to 6. Section 3 deals with establishment
of the Tribunal by the Central Government to be known as the Debts
Recovery Tribunal. Section 4 talks of composition of the Tribunal. Section
5 deals with the qualifications for appointment as Presiding Officers.
Once appointed, the term of office of a Presiding Officer is stipulated in
F Section 6. There have been amendments to the various provisions of
this Act in the year 2016. Also, the Act which was earlier known as the
Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 is
given a new nomenclature and is now known as the Recovery of Debts
and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 by the Finance Act, 2017. Unamended
Sections 3 to 6 were as under:
G
“3. Establishment of Tribunal.—(1) The Central Government
shall, by notification, establish one or more Tribunals, to be known
as the Debts Recovery Tribunal, to exercise the jurisdiction, powers
and authority conferred on such Tribunal by or under this Act.
H
GOTTUMUKKALA VENKATA KRISHAMRAJU v. UNION OF 43
INDIA [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

(2) The Central Government shall also specify, in the notification A
referred to in sub-section (1), the areas within which the Tribunal
may exercise jurisdiction for entertaining and deciding the
applications filed before it.
4. Composition of Tribunal.—(1) A Tribunal shall consist of
one person only (hereinafter referred to as the Presiding Officer) B
to be appointed by notification, by the Central Government.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the
Central Government may authorise the Presiding Officer of one
Tribunal to discharge also the functions of the Presiding Officer
of another Tribunal. C
5. Qualifications for appointment as Presiding Officer.—A
person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Presiding
Officer of a Tribunal unless he is, or has been, or is qualified to be,
a District Judge.
6. Term of Office. – The Presiding Officer of a Tribunal shall D
hold office for a term of five years from the date on which he
enters upon his office or until he attains the age of sixty-two years,
whichever is earlier.”
2. As is clear from Section 6, after the appointment of a person as
Presiding Officer to a Tribunal, he could hold office for a term of five E
years from the date on which he enters upon his office or until the
attainment of 62 years of age, whichever is earlier. This Section is
substituted by Act 44 of 2016 w.e.f. September 1, 2016 and the amended
provision read as under:
“6. Term of office of Presiding Officer – The Presiding Officer F
of a Tribunal shall hold office for a term of five years from the
date on which he enters upon his office and shall be eligible for
reappointment.
Provided that no person shall hold office as the Presiding Officer
of a Tribunal after he has attained the age of sixty-five years.” G
Along with that, another provision in the form of Section 6A is
also inserted which is to the following effect:
“6A. Qualifications, terms and conditions of service of
Presiding Officer – Notwithstanding anything contained in this
H
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 11 S.C.R.

A Act, the qualifications, appointment, term of office, salaries and
allowances, resignation, removal and the other terms and
conditions of service of the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal
appointed after the commencement of Part XIV of Chapter VI
of the Finance Act, 2017, shall be governed by the provisions of
section 184 of that Act:
B
Provided that the Presiding Officer appointed before the
commencement of Part XIV of Chapter VI of the Finance Act,
2017, shall continue to be governed by the provisions of this Act,
and the rules made thereunder as if the provisions of section 184
of the Finance Act, 2017 had not come into force.”
C
Some other provisions are also amended, but those are not relevant
for the purposes of these cases.
4. All the petitioners were appointed before the amendment to
Section 6. Thus, at the time of their appointment, the term of their office
D was “five years or till attaining the age of 62 years, whichever is earlier”.
These officers have not completed five years of service. However,
they are completing/or have attained 62 years of age after coming into
force amended Section 6. In the aforesaid backdrop, the question that
arises for consideration in these petitions is as to whether the petitioners
are entitled to complete the term of five years taking advantage of the
E amended provision which gives such Presiding Officers to continue until
attaining the age of 65 years or to continue till they reach the age of 65
years, whichever is earlier.
5. For the sake of convenience, we may give particulars in respect
of Transfer Case (Civil) No. 301 of 2017 and, at the same time, take
F note of the progress in other cases as well.
Date Event
27.12.1954 Date of birth of the petitioner. The petitioner turned
62 years on 26.12.2016 and will turn 65 years, on
26.12.2019.
G
27.08.1993 Enactment of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and
Financial Institutions Act, 1993. Section 6 of the Act
prescribed that a Presiding Officer of the Debt
Recovery Tribunal shall hold office for five years
form the date he enters office or 62 years, whichever
H is earlier.
GOTTUMUKKALA VENKATA KRISHAMRAJU v. UNION OF 45
INDIA [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

15.12.2014 Appointment notification of petitioner as Presiding A
Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow.
06.01.2015 Petitioner took office as the Presiding Officer, Debt
Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow.
12.08.2016 Amendment to the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and
Financial Institutions Act, 1993. Section 6 of the 1993 Act
was substituted. The amended Section 6 contemplates that B
the Presiding Officer shall hold office for five years from
the date he enters office. The proviso clarifies that the
Presiding Officer shall not continue beyond the age of 65
years.
01.09.2016 The 2016 amendment takes effect upon being so notified,
by the Central Government. C
29.09.2016 The Union of India advertises anticipated vacancies for
Presiding Officer for Debt Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow
and other Debt Recovery Tribunals.
06.10.2016 By way of an interim order, the Central Administrative
Tribunal, New Delhi, stays the release of Presiding
Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Guwahati (V.K. Garg), D
having regard to the enhanced age of retirement, in the
O.A. filed by him.
07.12.2016 By way of an interim order, the Allahabad High Court,
Lucknow Bench stays the release of petitioner, having
regard to the enhanced age of retirement in the writ
petition filed by him. E
09.12.2016 The Bombay High Court dismissed WP(L) No. 3299/2016
filed by Vasant Narayan Lothey Patel, Presiding Officer,
DRT III, Mumbai, whereby the said officer sought
application of the amended Section 6, to extend his tenure
to 65 years or completion of five years.
26.12.2016 The petitioner attained the age of 62 years. F
02.02.2017 By way of an interim order, the Madras High Court stays
the release of J.V. Raj, Debt Recovery Tribunal,
urned Coimbatore having regard to the enhanced age of
rs, on retirement in the writ petition filed by him.
09.02.2017 By way of an interim order, the Jharkhand High Court
G
ks and says the release of B.N. Dash, Debt Recovery Tribunal
he Act having regrd to the enhanced age of retirement, in his writ
Debt petition.
years 28.02.2017 By way of an interim order, the Madras High Court stays
hever the release of R. Ravindra Bose, Presiding Officer, Debt
Recovery Tribunal-II, Chennai having regrd to the
enhanced age of retirement.
H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 11 S.C.R.

A 04.10.2017 The Union of India filed five transfer petitions qua the
aforementioned petitions pending before the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Delhi and High Courts of
Allahabad, Madras, Jharkhand. A sixth transfer
petition was filed in respect of WP(L) No. 2358/2016
filed by Mohd. Zafar Imam before the Bombay High
B
Court. This officer had already demitted office on
17.09.2016. On 04.10.2017, this Court issued notice
in the aforementioned transfer petitions being TP(C)
Nos. 1315-1320/2017 and stayed further proceedings
before the courts concerned.
C 14.11.2017 This Court allowed all six transfer petitions (TP(C)
Nos. 1315-1320/2017) and also passed an interim
order reinstating Mohd. Zafar Imam as Presiding
Officer, DRT II, Mumbai.
26.12.2019 The petitioner will be completing the age of 65 years.
06.01.2020 The petitioner will be completing the term of five
D years on this date.

6. As per the provisions of unamended Section 6, the petitioner
could continue only upto December 26, 2016 as he had completed 62
years of age on that date though he had not completed five years of
term as the Presiding Officer. If amended Section 6 is applicable, then
E
he would be entitled to continue upto December 26, 2019 on which date
he shall attain the age of 65 years. Same is the fact situation in all these
cases, though the dates on which they would be completing five years
term or attaining 65 years of age, are different.
7. In this backdrop, the issue that has arisen in these petitions is as
F
to whether the petitioners would be governed by Section 6 as amended
or this provision is to be applied prospectively i.e., w.e.f. September 1,
2016 i.e. in respect of appointments which are made on or after
September 1, 2016.
8. The endeavour of the petitioners is to demonstrate that they
G would be governed by Section 6 as amended and, therefore, they have
right to continue upto the age of 65 years or till the time they complete
five years tenure before they have attained the age of 65 years. The
submission which are paraphrased by the petitioners in support of their
aforesaid plea are the following:
H
GOTTUMUKKALA VENKATA KRISHAMRAJU v. UNION OF 47
INDIA [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

a the (a) By the Amendment Act, new Section 6 stands ‘substituted’ A
ntral with the old Section 6. The legislature has used the expression
s of ‘substituted’ with a definite purpose, namely, making this provision
nsfer applicable also to those Presiding Officers who were holding the
2016 post as on September 1, 2016 when the amendment was brought
High into force. It was argued that the very expression ‘substituted’
B
e on would mean that the old Section 6 stands obliterated.
otice
(b) Purpose behind the amendment was to reduce the burden of
P(C)
ings pendency by enhancing the age of the Presiding Officers. This is
categorically mentioned in the report of the Lok Sabha, Joint
P(C) Committee and also in the Statement of Objects and Reasons to
the amendment. C
erim
ding (c) The provision needs to be given purposive interpretation and
keeping in view the purpose and object behind the amendment,
ars. the said purpose would be sub-served only if it is applied to the
five incumbents in the service as well as on the date of the application.
Reference is made to the judgment of this Court in Reserve Bank D
of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd.
& Ors.1
9. In that very hue, it is argued that to interpret the provision as
inapplicable to the incumbent would lead to assigning a perverse object
to the amendment which would be totally illogical. For this proposition, E
judgment in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan
& Anr.2 is relied upon. Reliance is also placed on Boucher Pierre Andre
v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Tihar, New Delhi & Anr.3
10. Contrasting the provisions of Section 6 with Section 6A of the
Act, it is argued that proviso to Section 6A categorically makes a provision F
to the effect that the Presiding Officer appointed before the
commencement of Finance Act, 2017 shall continue to be governed by
the provisions of Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017 as if the said
provisions had not coming to force. It was submitted that there is no
such proviso added to Section 6 which makes the intention of the G
legislature very clear, namely, the Presiding Officers who were in office
as on the date of amendment would be governed by the newly inserted
Section 6.
1
(1987) 1 SCC 424
2
(2011) 7 SCC 639
3
(1975) 1 SCC 192 H
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 11 S.C.R.

A 11. Mr. Banerjee, learned ASG appearing for the respondent Union
of India contradicted the aforesaid arguments raised by the petitioners
with the following submissions:
No right has accrued by virtue of amendment in Section 6 to
hold the office upto the age of 65 years. It was argued that unamended
B Section 6 provided that the Presiding Officer shall hold office for a term
of five years or ‘until he attains the age of 62 years, whichever is earlier’.
Amended provision, on the other hand, does not state that the term of
office would be five years or until the Presiding Officer attains the age
of 65 years. On the other hand, this provision of 65 years was made in
the proviso to Section 6 which was couched in negative terms as it is
C stipulated that no person shall hold the office after he has attained the
age of 65 years. Thus, no right accrues in favour of any person with
such a proviso. It was also submitted that unless a provision is specifically
given retrospective effect by the legislature, it only has prospective
operation. Therefore, intentment behind Section 6 was to make it
D applicable in respect of appointments which would be made on or after
September 1, 2016 when this provision was inserted and the date from
which it was specifically made effective. It was also argued that the
purpose was to infuse young blood by deputing fresh Presiding Officers
and not to give benefit to the existing Presiding Officers. The learned
ASG relied upon judgment of this Court in C. Gupta v. Glaxo-Smithkline
E Pharmaceuticals Ltd.4 and, in particular, following portion in that
judgment:
“21. In the present case, we find that for determining the nature
of amendment, the question is whether it affects the legal rights
of individual workers in the context that if they fall within the
F definition then they would be entitled to claim several benefits
conferred by the Act. The amendment should be also one which
would touch upon their substantive rights. Unless there is a clear
provision to the effect that it is retrospective or such retrospectivity
can be implied by necessary implication or intendment, it must be
G held to be prospective. We find no such clear provision or anything
to suggest by necessary implication or intendment either in the
amending Act or in the amendment itself. The amendment cannot
be said to be one which affects procedure. Insofar as the
amendment substantially changes the scope of the definition of
4
H (2007) 7 SCC 171
GOTTUMUKKALA VENKATA KRISHAMRAJU v. UNION OF 49
INDIA [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

the term “workman” it cannot be said to be merely declaratory or A
clarificatory. In this regard we find that entirely new category of
persons who are doing “operational” work was introduced first
time in the definition and the words “skilled” and “unskilled” were
made independent categories unlinked to the word “manual”. It
can be seen that the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1984
B
was enacted by Parliament on 31-8-1982. However, the
amendment itself was not brought into force immediately and in
sub-section (1) of Section 1 of the amending Act, it was provided
that it would come into force on such day as the Central
Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint.
Ultimately, by a notification the said amendment was brought into C
force on 21-8-1984. Although this Court has held that the
amendment would be prospective if it is deemed to have come
with effect on a particular day, a provision in the Amendment Act
to the effect that amendment would become operative in the future,
would have similar effect.
D
22. Therefore, by the application of the tests mentioned above, it
is clear that the definition of workman as amended must, therefore,
be presumed to be prospective.
12. We have given our due consideration to the arguments
advanced by the counsel for the parties on both sides and have also E
perused the relevant material. We find force in the arguments of the
petitioners that the amended provisions of Section 6 shall apply in their
cases as well and, therefore, if they have not completed five years of
tenure as Presiding Officers of the Debt Recovery Tribunal they are
entitled to continue to work as Presiding Officers till they attain the age
of 65 years or complete five years’ term before attaining the age of 65 F
years. In the first instance, we have to bear in mind the language/
terminology which the Legislature used while inserting new Section 6
with effect from September 01, 2016. This section stands ‘substituted’
with the old section. The word ‘substituted’ has its own significance.
In Government of India & Ors. v. Indian Tobacco Association5, this G
Court noted dictionary meaning of the word ‘substitute’ as can be seen
from para 15 of the said judgment:
“15. The word “substitute” ordinarily would mean “to put (one)
in place of another”; or “to replace”. In Black’s Law Dictionary,
5
(2005) 7 SCC 396 H
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 11 S.C.R.

A 5th Edn., at p. 1281, the word “substitute” has been defined to
mean “to put in the place of another person or thing”, or “to
exchange”. In Collins English Dictionary, the word “substitute”
has been defined to mean “to serve or cause to serve in place of
another person or thing”; “to replace (an atom or group in a
molecule) with (another atom or group)”; or “a person or thing
B
that serves in place of another, such as a player in a game who
takes the place of an injured colleague”.
13. This expression has also come up for interpretation by the
Courts in Zile Singh v. State of Haryana and Others6, the import and
impact of substituted provision were discussed in the following manner:
C
“23. The text of Section 2 of the Second Amendment Act provides
for the word “upto” being substituted for the word “after”. What
is the meaning and effect of the expression employed therein —
“shall be substituted”?
D 24. The substitution of one text for the other pre-existing text is
one of the known and well-recognised practices employed in
legislative drafting. “Substitution” has to be distinguished from
“supersession” or a mere repeal of an existing provision.”
14. Ordinarily wherever the word ‘substitute’ or ‘substitution’ is
E used by the legislature, it has the effect of deleting the old provision and
make the new provision operative. The process of substitution consists
of two steps: first, the old rule is made to cease to exist and, next, the
new rule is brought into existence in its place. The rule is that when a
subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate
itself, or a part of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter
F be read and construed as if the altered words had been written into the
earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter
there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all. No doubt, in certain
situations, the Court having regard to the purport and object sought to be
achieved by the Legislature may construe the word “substitution” as an
G “amendment” having a prospective effect. Therefore, we do not think
that it is a universal rule that the word ‘substitution’ necessarily or always
connotes two severable steps, that is to say, one of repeal and another of
a fresh enactment even if it implies two steps. However, the aforesaid
general meaning is to be given effect to, unless it is found that legislature
6
(2004) 8 SCC 1
H
GOTTUMUKKALA VENKATA KRISHAMRAJU v. UNION OF 51
INDIA [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

intended otherwise. Insofar as present case is concerned, as discussed A
hereinafter, the legislative intent was also to give effect to the amended
provision even in respect of those incumbents who were in service as on
September 01, 2016.
15. The effect, thus, would be to replace Section 6 as amended
with the intention as if this is the only provision which exist from the date B
of introduction and the earlier provision was not there at all. The effect
of this would be that all those incumbents who are holding the post of
Presiding Officer on September 01, 2016 would be governed by this
provision.
16. When we examine the matter in the aforesaid perspective, C
the question as to whether Section 6, as amended, is to be given
retrospective effect or not, does not arise for consideration. The
petitioners are right in submitting that persons who demitted the office
prior to the amendment are not sought to be covered by the amendment.
Had the provision been retrospective then it would have benefited those
persons as well. No such case is set up by any of the petitioners or any D
other person, it is only the incumbents who are serving as on the date of
the amendment are sought to be covered.
17. Though in a different context, the judgment in Boucher Pierre
Andre throws some light on the issue at hand, as can be discerned from
the following discussion in that case: E

“1. …..The petitioner was arrested on November 10, 1971 in
connection with an offence of theft which took place in the night
between October 31, 1971 and November 1, 1971 in Rajasthan
Emporium at Ashoka Hotel, New Delhi. He was tried by the
Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi and by an order dated July 16, F
1973 he was convicted of the offence under Section 380 of the
Indian Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for
four years and a fine of Rs 10,000 and in default of payment of
fine, further rigorous imprisonment of one year. An appeal preferred
by him to the High Court of Delhi failed and his conviction was G
confirmed but the substantive sentence of imprisonment was
reduced to two years though the fine was enhanced to Rs 15,000
with one year’s rigorous imprisonment in default. The order of
the High Court in appeal was passed on April 4, 1974. The petitioner
did not pay the amount of fine and he was, therefore, liable under
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52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 11 S.C.R.

A the order of the High Court to serve a maximum sentence of
imprisonment for three years. Since the petitioner was continuing
under detention from November 10, 1971 during the investigation,
enquiry and trial of the case against him, the petitioner contended
that by reason of Section 428 of the new Code of Criminal
Procedure, which came into force from April 1, 1974, the period
B
of detention from November 10, 1971 upto July 16, 1973 was
liable to be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed upon
him and he could be required to undergo imprisonment only for
the remainder of the term which, after taking into account the
remission granted on account of good behaviour, expired on August
C 12, 1974. The petitioner claimed that he was, therefore, entitled to
be freed on August 12, 1974 and his detention in jail since that
date was illegal. The petitioner filed an application for a writ of
habeas corpus in the High Court of Delhi challenging the validity
of his detention since August 12, 1974 but the High Court took the
view that since the conviction of the petitioner by the Sessions
D
Court had taken place prior to the coming into force of the new
Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 428 had no application and
the petitioner was bound to suffer imprisonment for the full term
of three years calculated from the date of conviction, namely,
July 16, 1973. The habeas corpus application in the High Court
E having failed, the petitioner preferred the present writ petition
directly in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. This
writ petition also claimed the same relief and the ground was also
the same, namely, that by reason of Section 428, the term of
imprisonment imposed on the petitioner came to an end on August
12, 1974 and his detention since that date was contrary to law.
F
2. The question which arises for determination in this petition is a
narrow one and it rests on the true interpretation of Section 428.
Is this section confined in its application only to cases where a
person is convicted after the coming into force of the new Code
of Criminal Procedure, or does it also embrace cases where a
G person has been convicted before but his sentence is still running
at the date when the new Code of Criminal Procedure came into
force? It is only if the latter interpretation is accepted that the
petitioner would be entitled to claim the benefit of the section and
hence it becomes necessary to arrive at its proper construction.
H Section 428 reads as follows:
GOTTUMUKKALA VENKATA KRISHAMRAJU v. UNION OF 53
INDIA [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

“Where an accused person has, on conviction, been sentenced A
to imprisonment for a term, the period of detention, if any,
undergone by him during the investigation, inquiry or trial of
the same case and before the date of such conviction, shall be
set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on
such conviction, and the liability of such person to undergo
B
imprisonment on such conviction shall be restricted to the
remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed on him.”
This section, on a plain natural construction of its language, posits
for its applicability a fact situation which is described by the clause
“where an accused person has, on conviction, been sentenced to
imprisonment for a term”. There is nothing in this clause which C
suggests, either expressly or by necessary implication, that the
conviction and sentence must be after the coming into force of
the new Code of Criminal Procedure. The language of the clause
is neutral. It does not refer to any particular point of time when
the accused person should have been convicted and sentenced. It D
merely indicates a fact situation which must exist in order to attract
the applicability of the section and this fact situation would be
satisfied equally whether an accused person has been convicted
and sentenced before or after the coming into force of the new
Code of Criminal Procedure. Even where an accused person has
been convicted prior to the coming into force of the new Code of E
Criminal Procedure but his sentence is still running, it would not
be inappropriate to say that the “accused person has, on conviction,
been sentenced to imprisonment for a term”. Therefore, where
an accused person has been convicted and he is still serving his
sentence at the date when the new Code of Criminal Procedure F
came into force. Section 428 would apply and he would be entitled
to claim that the period of detention undergone by him during the
investigation, inquiry or trial of the case should be set off against
the term of imprisonment imposed on him and he should be required
to undergo only the remainder of the term. Of course, if the term
of the sentence has already run out, no question of set off can G
arise. It is only where the sentence is still running that the section
can operate to restrict the term. This construction of the section
does not offend against the principle which requires that unless
the legislative intent is clear and compulsive, no retrospective
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54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 11 S.C.R.

A operation should be given to a statute. On this interpretation, the
section is not given any retrospective effect. It does not seek to
set at naught the conviction already recorded against the accused
person. The conviction remains intact and unaffected and so does
the sentence already undergone. It is only the sentence, insofar
as it yet remains to be undergone, that is, reduced. The section
B
operates prospectively on the sentence which yet remains to be
served and curtails it be setting off the period of detention
undergone by the accused person during the investigation, inquiry
or trial of the case. Any argument based on the objection against
giving retrospective operation is, therefore, irrelevant.”
C (emphasis supplied)
18. Our view is also in accord with the purport and objective
behind the amendment which were reflected while carrying out the
amendment itself. The purpose of amending Section 6 was to reduce
the burden of pendency by enhancement of age of the Judges concerned.
D The Report of the Lok Sabha Joint Committee qua the Amendment sets
out the background to the amendment as follows:
“On the issue of pendency of cases in various DRTs, the Committee
has been apprised by the Department of Financial Services that
approximately 70,000 court cases pending in DRTs involving
E more than Rs. 5 Lakh Crore. One of the reasons mentioned in
the memoranda submitted by various stakeholders for the
pendency of cases is vacancies in various stakeholders for
the pendency of cases is vacancies in various DRTs/DRATs.
A number of suggestions in this regard have been made by the
F stakeholders. After detailed deliberations on the issue, the
Committee decide(d) to insert the following new provision/
substitute some of the provisions under the RDDB & FI Act….”
(emphasis supplied)
19. Similarly, the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the
G amendment inter alia notes:
“The Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions
Act, 1993 and the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial
Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, were
enacted for expeditious recovery of loans of banks and financial
H
GOTTUMUKKALA VENKATA KRISHAMRAJU v. UNION OF 55
INDIA [A. K. SIKRI, J.]

institutions. Presently, there are approximately seventy A
thousand cases pending in Debts Recovery Tribunals. Though
the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions
Act provides for a period of 180 days for disposal of recovery
applications, the cases are pending for many years due to
various adjournments and prolonged hearings. In order to
B
facilitate expeditious disposal of recovery applications, it has
been decided to amend the said Acts and also to make
consequential amendments in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and the
Depositories Act, 1996.”
(emphasis supplied)
C
20. In order to fulfill the aforesaid objective of reducing the arrears
and tackle the issue of pendency of cases in various Debt Recovery
Tribunals, ‘purposive interpretation’ is to be given. In Reserve Bank of
India, the Court explained this principle in the following manner:
“33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They D
are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the
texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored.
Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the
textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best
interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this
knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then E
section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word
by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment,
with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context,
its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take
colour and appear different than when the statute is looked F
at without the glasses provided by the context. With these
glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what
each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant
and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No
part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in
isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a G
place and everything is in its place……..”
(emphasis supplied)
21. We are, thus, of the opinion that while carrying out the aforesaid
amendment with the intention to substitute the amended provision with
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56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 11 S.C.R.

A that of unamended, the Parliament desired that the benefit of this provision
extended even to those who are serving as Presiding Officers on the
date when the amendment became enforceable. This seems to be just,
reasonable and sensible outcome.
22. This interpretation is contextual as well which can be discerned
B by contrasting amended Section 6 with newly inserted Section 6A of the
Act.
“…..There is a clear distinction between incumbent officers and
the officers appointed in future. In contrast, there is no distinction,
legislatively drawn, between incumbent or officers appointed in
C future for application of amended Section 6.”
23. This view of ours would negate the contention of the learned
ASG that Section 6 as amended does not create any right. If such an
interpretation is accepted, then even those persons appointed as Presiding
Officers after September 01, 2016, can be denied the right to continue in
D service till 65 years. Judgment in Glaxo-Smithkline Pharmaceuticals
Ltd., which was relied upon by the learned ASG would have no application.
That was a case where there was an amendment to Section 2(s) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which was brought into force on August
21, 1994 and the Court held the same to be prospective in nature. It was
further held that the provision which was applicable as on the date of
E termination of the appellant in that case would apply. Obviously, such a
case has no application to the instant case.
24. The writ petition and the transferred cases filed by these
petitioners, accordingly, stand allowed with no order as to costs. As a
result, those petitioners in whose favour there is an interim stay would
F be allowed to continue. The petitioner in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 732 of
2018 shall be taken back in service forthwith, with continuity of service
and salary of intervening period.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Matters allowed.
G

H