GORLE S. NAIDUversusSTTE OF A.P. AND ORS.

A                               GORLE S. NAIDU
                                         v.
                           ST A TE OF A.P. AND ORS.

                              DECEMBER 15, 2003

B            [DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.]

           Penal Code, 1860-Sections 109, J20B, 147, 148, 149, 201, 302, 307,
     323, 326, 341, 342 and 397-Assault by accused persons leading to death
     of both the victims-Trial court convicting some of the accused for
C    different offences and acquitting rest of the accused-In appeal, High
     Court acquitting all the accused-Tenability of-Held, it cannot be said
     that view taken by the High Court is not a possible view-There are
     inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses and other factors which make
     prosecution version vulnerable-Order ofacquittal ofHigh Court, upheld-
D    Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 164.

          Evidence:

         Witness claiming to have got injured by accused at the time of
   occurrence-Refusal to get medically examined being afraid ofthe accused
E .persons after giving statement to the Police-Such examination got done
   after 2 days-Held, there was no reason for the witness to be apprehen-
   sive-Such circumstance casting doubt on the evidence of witness-
   Besides, his statement regarding his presence at the time ofoccurrence also
   creates doubts.
F         FIR-Delay in lodging of-Father of deceased, lodging FIR after
     considerable length of time despite police post being just in front of his
     house-Such delay not having been explained-Held, in the absence ofany
     plausible explanation for the delay, it certainly was a suspicious circum-
     stance making the prosecution version vulnerable.
G.
         Witness stating that occurrence took place at I 0 AM-Such fact being
   at great variance with the prosecution version as unfolded during trial-
   Further, :hae was inconsistency as regards the assailants of one of thf!
   deceased-Witnesses accepting that they did not specifically name any
H . accused person during investigation-Dog squads being taken to the place
                                         816
                 GORLE S. NAIDU v. STATE OF A.P.                      817

of occurrence and various houses in the village-Witness's statement that A
dogs are taken when assailants are not known, being significant-Held,
such factors throwing considerable light on the vulnerability of the
prosecution version-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 164.

     Practice and Procedure-Order of' acquittal-Inte1ference by Appel- B
late Court-Principles governing, discussed.

     Criminal Law:

       Acquittal of co-accused persons-Held, it does not per se entitle
others to acquittal-If after sieving the unacceptable portion of the C
evidence residue is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused, there is no
legal bar in convicting a person on the evidence which has been primarily
disbelieved vis-a-vis others-However, where such evidence is insepara-
ble, the Court would be within its legal limits to discard the evidence in
to to.
                                                                            D
          Rivalry between two groups-one headed by PW4 and the other
    by A-29-in a village was alleged to have led to assault on two persons
   belonging to complainant group, which caused their death. According
   to the prosecution case, on the date of occurrence both .the deceased
  were coming back to their village, when they gave lift to PWl on their E
   motorcycle. On their way, they were accosted by A-1 who armed with
   a wooden plank beat deceased no. 1 on his head. Thereafter, the
    motorcycle proceeded further to a distance of 50 yards when A-4, A-
    12 and A-25 placed a cart across the road forcing the motorcycle to
    stop. A-5 and A-6 beat deceased no. 1 and A-2 beat deceased no. 2 with F
   stout sticks. As a result of such assaults, deceased no. 2 fell down.
   Thereafter, A-4, A-7, A-9, A-10, A-11, A-13 and A-26 beat deceased
    no. 1 indiscriminately. When he fell down, A-3 poked on his throat with
   a spear. Then both the deceased were tied with a rope and carried to
    a short distance. When PW 1 tried to run away, some of the accused
... beat him and tied him in cattle shed. Later on, PW-1 was released by G
    the accused who threatened to kill him if he revealed the incident to
    anyone. Thereafter PW-1 went to h~.:; house and informed about the
    incident to his elder brother. PW-1 's statement was noted by Sub-
    Inspector of Police and on that basis a report was scribed and a case
    registered. When the Inspector of Police tried to send PW-1 to hospital, H
    818               SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A he refused and went for sue~ examination only 2 days later. On search
    by the police, the two dead bodies were. found the next morning.

          The police investigation culminated in prosecution of 39 persons
    for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 148,
B   201, 307, 323, 326, 341, 342, 397, 302 r/w Sections 149 and Section 120B
    and 109 IPC.

         The Trial Court convicted some of the accused for different
    offences while others were acquitted. Three appeals were filed before
    High Court, two by the convicted accused persons and one by the State
C   against acquittal of the accused persons. High Court held that the
    prosecution version lacked credibility and was full of inconsistencies,
    and allowed the appeals of accused persons directing their acquittal
    and dismissed the appeal by State. Hence, the present appeals.

         It was contended for the appellants that the approach of the High
D
    Court was fallacious; that considering the large number of accused
    persons, minor discrepancies in evidence should not have found favour
    with the High Court to direct acquittal; and, that the High Court did
    not analyze the evidence in ,detail and in a cryptic manner accepted the
    submissions of the accused persons and directed acquittal.
E
         On the other hand, on behalf of the accused it was contended that
    there were contradictions in prosecution case; the trial court erred in
    convicting 16 of the accused when on the same evidence it acquitted
    21 accused and the benefit extended to 21 persons should have been
F   logically extended to the persons who were convicted; and that the
    High Court by acquitting the remaining accused corrected the legal
    infirmities, which the trial cou.-t did not notice.

          Dismissing the appeals, the Court

G         HELD : 1.1. The High Court rightly held that the prosecution
    version collapsed on account of incredibility in it and that the accused
    persons were entitled to acquittal. It cannot be said that view taken by
    the High Court is not a possible view. It would not be appropriate in
    the circumstances of the case to interfere with the elaborately discussed
H   and well-reasoned judgment of the High Court. (830-H; 831-GI
                GORLE S. NAIDU v. STATE OF A.P.                   819

     1.2. The High Court has doubted the truthfulness of the evidence A
of PW-1 who claimed that he did not get himself medically examined
being afraid of the accused persons. PW-1 claimed to have stated
before the police officers about the incident and on the basis of that
the first information report was recorded. Thereafter, there was no
reason for him to be apprehensive as claimed not to go for medical B
treatment. If really he was so terrified it is not understood as to how
after two days the fear vanished and he went for treatment. One more
thing which casts doubt on the evidence of PW-1 is that he claimed to
have received the money from PW-17 at about 2.00 p.m. and then to
have returned. Thereafter he had left for returning home. On the C
contrary PW-17 states that money was paid at 11.00 a.m. That itself
throws doubt regarding the possibility of his presence at the alleged
time of occurrence. (829-D-E; 830-B)

      1.3. The conduct of PW-4, the father of deceased no. 1 is equally
shrouded in mystery. Though the Police post was just in front of his D
house, he did not choose to inform the police and the FIR was lodged
after considerable length of time. Though in all cases delay in lodging
the FIR does not attract suspicion, yet on the facts of a particular case
the same is certainly a factor to be considered. In the case at hand, in
the absence of any plausible explanation for the delay, it certainly was E
a suspicious circumstance making the prosecution version vulnerable.
In this case the occurrence allegedly took place at about 4.00 p.m. FIR
was lodged at about 11.30 p.m. the next day. The delay, considering the
fact that there was police outpost just in front of PW4's house and Court
was at a very short distance, has not been explained. Further, according F
to the prosecution version, the dead bodies were found 15 to 20 yards
from the culvert near which the alleged occurrence took place. It is
highly improbable that when PW-4 went for searching the dead bodies
on allegedly getting information about the assaults, they could not trace
the bodies. The plea that he could not lodge the FIR and had to wait for
searching by police which purportedly got the dead bodies early in the G
morning is equally implausible. (829-E-G; 830-C, DJ

     1.4. There is clear contradiction between the version of PW-1 on
the one hand and PWs 2 and 3 on the other as regards the assailants
of deceased no. 2. PW-3 has accepted before the Magistrate in her H
    820               SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A   statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code that the occurrence
    took place at 10.00 a.m. This was at great variance with the prosecution
    version as unfolded during trial. Similarly, PWs 2 and 3 accepted that
    they did not specifically name any accused person during investigation,
    and only said that followers of A-7 were the assailants. That is not
B   suffici~nt when definite names were stated in Court. This is not an
    elaboration of a statement already made, and on the contrary is a vital
    omission. [829-H; 830-A, E, F; 828-H]

         1.5. Dog squad was taken to the place of occurrence and dogs were
    taken to various houses in the village to know about the assailants.
C   PW-24's statement that dogs are taken when a!:sailants are not known
    is very significant. This to a great extent shows that the police were
    not sure who the assailants were. [830-G, HI

         2.1. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the
    evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the
D   order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption
    of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The
    golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice
    in cl"iminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence
    adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the
E   other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused        ..
    should be adopted. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a
    duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence
    where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining
    as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence or not.
F                                                                 [831-A-D]

        Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2002) 2
    Supreme 567, referred to.

          2.2. Th~ principle to be followed by appellate Court considering
G the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when
    there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the
    impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convinc-
    ing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a
    compelling reason for interference. (831-D-EJ

H         Shivaji Sahabrao Babade and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR
             GORLE S. NAIDU v. STATE OF A.P. [PASAYAT, J.]              821

     (1973). SC 2622; Ramesh Babula! Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 4 A
     Supreme 167; Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana, (2000) 3 Supreme 320;
     Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar and 01'5., (2003) 7 Supreme 152; State
     of Punjab v. Karnail Singh, (2003) 5 Supreme 508; State of Punjab v.
     Pohla Singh and Anr., (2003) 7 Supreme 17 and Suchand Pal v. Phani
     Pal and Anr., JT (2003) 9 SC 17, referred to.                            B
          3. Though mere acquittal of large number of co-accused persons
     does not per se entitle others to acquittal, the Court has a duty in such
     cases to separate the grain from the chaff. If after sieving the untruth
     or unacceptable portion of the evidence residue is sufficient to prove
     the guilt of the accused, there is no legal bar in convicting a person C
     on the evidence which has been primarily disbelieved vis-a-vis others.
     But where they are so inseparable that any attempt to separate them
     would destroy the substratum on which the prosecution version is
     founded, then the Court would be within its legal limits to discard the
     evidence in toto. [829-B-D]                                               D
          CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.
     232-234 of 1997.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 5.8.96 of the Andhra Pradesh
..   High Court in Crl. A. P. Nos. 834, 835/95 and 385 of 1996.         E
                                     WITH

          Crl. A. Nos. 1495-97 of 2003.

         R. Venkataramani, Satya Mitra Garg, Ashok Panigrahi and Mrs.         F
     Manju Aggarwal for the Appellant.

          Ms. K. Amareswari and G. Prabhakar for State of A.P.

          Sushil Kumar, B. Vikash, Sanjay Jain, Adolf Mathew, Mrs. Anjani G
     Aiyagari, D. Ramakrishna Reddy and Mrs. D. Bharathi Reddy for the
     Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. : Leave granted in SLP (Crl.) Nos. 3088-90/97.   H
    822                SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A        These six appeals are interlinked and relate to a Division Bench
    judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court whereby the respondents were
    acquitted. Criminal Appeal Nos. 232-234/1977 is by Gorle Suryanarayana
    Naidu (PW-4), the father of the Kurmi Naidu who along with Meesala
    Jogulu (both of them hereinafter referred to as 'deceased No. l and
B   deceased No. 2' by their respective names) lost lives on 10.4.1991
    purportedly on the basis of assaults made by respondents-accused persons.

          In all 39 persons faced tried on the accusations of being responsible
    for the death of aforesaid two persons. It is to be noted that the trial Court
    acquitted Gorle Ramarao (A-5), Gorle Laxmanarao (A-6), Gorle Satyam
C   (A-12), Meesala Narayanarao (A-14 ), Gorle Asirinaidu Kasavayya (A-15),
    Relli Ramachandra (A-19), Gorle Ramaswamy, Gorle Chinnarao, Gorle
    Ramamurthy 0 Dihbaddu, Gorle Satyam, Gorle Surappalanaidu, Gorle
    Papinaidus, gorle Haribabu, Gorle Venunaidu (A-23 to A-30 respectively),
    Datti Appayya (A-32), Gorle Sreeramulu, Relli Sanyas11padu, Gorle
D   Sanasappadu, Pisini Satyam. Gorle Bodinaidu, Buri Papudu (A-34 to A-
    39 respectively). Gorle Raminaidu (A-16) and Potnuru Raminaidu (A-22)
    were convicted for offence punishable under Section 341 of the Indian
    Penal Code. 1860 (for short the 'IPC') and sentenced to undergo rigorous
    imprisonment for one year with a fine of Rs. 500. Meesala Chandramoli
E   (A-3), Gorle Ramaswamy (A-4), Gorle Harinarayana (A-7), Muntha
    Prasadarao (A-9), Pyla Venkatasuri (A-10), Gorle Sanyasappadu (A-11),
    Gorle Ramakrishna (A-13), Gorle Raminaidu (A-16), Muntha Banoji (A-
    17), Relli Paoinaidu (A-18), Muntha Pardhasaradh (A-20), Gorle Ramana
    (A-21) and Potnuru Raminaidu (A-22) were convicted for offence punish-
    able under Section 324 IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for two years and
F   also to pay a fine of Rs. 500 each. Gorle Asirinaidu (A-1 ), Gorle
    Vasudevarao (A-2) and Gorle Mohanarao (A-8) were convicted for the
    offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and each was sentenced to
    undergo imprisonment for life. The sentences of imprisonment imposed on
    A-16 and A-22 were directed to run concurrently.
G
          Three appeals were filed before the Andhra Pradesh High Court, two
    by the convicted accused persons, and one by the State against acquittal
    of the accused persons as noted above.

          Sans unnecessary details the prosecution version as unfolded during
H trial is as follows :
         GORLE S. NAIDU v. STATE OF A.P. [PASAYAT, J.]                 823

       The deceased persons Kurmi Naidu and Meesala Jogulu were resi- A
dents of Patharlapalle village. The deceased Kurmi Naidu was the seconcl
son of the first wife of Gorle Suryanarayana Naidu (PW-4). Kurmi Naidu
was a student of Bachelor of Engineering at the relevant time. There was
a fire accident in their village i.e. Patharlapalle wherein more than four
hundred houses were burnt. The Government and the insurance company B
sanctioned Rs. 500 and Rs. 1,000 respectively to owner of each of the
houses which was burnt. A group of persons headed by Hari .Babu (A-29)
started saying that they had got sanctioned the amount and asked the
 recipients to pay Rs. 100 each. The persons, who did not pay the amount·
 so demanded came and complained to PW-4. On that score a group rivalry C
 started. One group was headed by A-29 and the other group by PW-4. In
the year 1989, G. Ramarao (A-5) started 'Indira Priyadarsini Yuvajana
 Sangam'. The said Sangam started collecting Rs. 50 fr~m each of the
 members. Whenever any village refused to join the Sangam, the members
 of that Sangam used to damage their agricultural implemenJs like carts etc.,
 and also the crops. The said Sangam entertained a grouse against PW.-4· D
 thinking that he was causing obstruction to their activities. About one year
 prior to the death of the deceased (on 10.4.199 l) all the accused and some
 others attacked the house of PW-4 by hurling bombs. As there was no
 safety in the village, and threat to his life, PW-4 started living in the house
 which is situated in his land at Nakkalacheruvu. Three months prior to the E
 present incident the deceased Kurmi Naidu came down to Patharlapalle
 from Madras. All the household supply cards which were taken away by
 the group of A-29 in his village were kept in the house of A-15. So some
 residents of Patharlapalle sent a petition to the Manda! Revenue Officer
·who came to the house of A-15 (Gorle A. Kasavayya) and seized 375 cards. F
 This led to further grouse against PW-4 as he was considered responsible
  for such seizure of the household supply cards. Thereafter, all the accused
 decided to do away the life of PW-4. Gorle Ramarao (A-5) is the President
  of Yuvajana Sangam. Some of the accused and other villagers are members
  of the Sangam. On 23.12.1990 PW-5 accompanied the deceased to
  Visakkhapatnam. On return from Visakkhapatnam. At Ranasthalam one G
  Komati Satyam informed the deceased and PW-5 that Haribabu and has
 group were lying in wait for Kurmi Naidu on the road leading to
  Patharlapalle, and thereafter they changed their route and proceeded to
 Nakkalacheruvu via Theppalavalasa. Due to fear of the Sangam headed by
 A-5 some persons joined in that Sangam. A-5 asked the members to H
     824               SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A commit thefts of coconuts or carts. Some amounts were collected in the
     name of Yuvajana Sangam and spent away by A-5 for consumption of
     alcohol. The members of the Sangam used to beat the followers of PW-
     4 and also took away household supply cards from their houses and kept
     them with A-15.
B          Three weeks prior to the death of deceased when PW-4 was present
     in his house, he heard A-2, A-3, A-9, A-10, A-17 and A-3 7 and some others
     were talking in the Sangam, and it was decided to do away with the life
     of PW-4 and his son (deceased Kurmi Naidu). One day prior to death of
     deceased, when PW-9 went to the bank at 12 noon, he found A-1, A-2,
C    A-3, A-5, A-10, A-18, A-19, A-26 and A-37 and some others and at that
     time A-37 was telling others that Kurmi Naidu had gone to Srikakulam and
     while returning to the village he should be done to death near Haribabu's
     garden, which was suitable for the purpose. One day prior to the death of
     deceased, G. Ramana (PW-10) was proceeding to the village at about 11
'D   p.m. and when he peeped through beneath the eves of cattle shed of P.
     Ramamurthy (PW-2) he found all the accused persons. He heard telling
     A-29 to other accused that the deceased Kurmi Naidu and his father were
     coming in their way and therefore they have to be killed. He found liquor
     bottles with glasses. On the next day PW-10 informed PW-4 all that he
 E   had heard. But PW-4 did not heed to his words. On the date of occurrence
     at about 2 p.m. while he was returning from his land, he saw A-3 armed
     with crowbar like spear, A-1 armed with wooden plank and the remaining
     accused persons armed with stout sticks proceeding towards Kosta side
     from Peddagudibadi.

F        On the date of occurrence i.e. 10.4.1991 at about 9 p.m. PW-I left
   for Srikakulam, where he collected some amount from S.M. Pyraijan (PW-
    17) and after purchasing a dhoti he came to Kasta junction. At that time
   both the deceased (Kurmi Naidu and Jogulu) were coming on a motorcycle.
   When- PW-1 made a request to them for lift, they agreed and all three were
"G proceeding towards Patharlapalle village on the 1noto;cy~le. Similarly, V.
   Sreeramulu (PW-2) was returning to Surampeta village a.fter handing over
   the cycle which he had hired from P. Jagannadham (PW-18) at Kosta
   junction. D. Ankamma (PW-3) after collecting cashew nuts and mangoes
   was on way to her house at Patharlapalle in the afternoon. When deceased
 H 1 and 2 reached about one kilometer after Derasam near the mango grove
             GORLE S. NAIDU v. STATE OF A.P. [PASAYAT, J.]                825

     of A-29, A-1 armed with a wooden plank beat deceased (Kurmi Naidu) A
     on his head. Thereafter, the motorcycle proceeded fu1iher to a distance of
     50 yards and at that place there is a culve1i. At that time A-4, A-12 and
     A-25 placed a cart across the road. Therefore, the deceased persons and
     PW-1 stopped the motorcycle. A-5 and A-6 beat deceased (Kurmi Naidu)
     with stout sticks on the head. When the deceased (Jogulu) questioned the B
     accused about such highhandedness, A-2 beat him with a stout stick on his
     head and as a result of such assaults deceased Jogulu fell down. Thereafter
     A-4, A-7, A-9, A-10, A-11, A-13, A-26 beat deceased Kurmi Naidu
     indiscriminately. When deceased Kurmi Naidu fell down, A-3 poked on
     his throat with a spear. Then A-I, A-4, A-7 and A-9 tied the deceased C
     Kurmi Naidu with a rope and carried him towards eastern side. A-23, A-
     24, A-27 and A-28 tied deceased Jogulu with a rope and also carried him
     towards eastern side. When some of the accused were saying that PW-1
     should not be allowed to live and thought of throwing him into a well, he
     ran towards eastern side. But fell down at Lankalacheruvu tank bund. Then
     some of the accused beat him and tied him in the cattle shed. At about 7 D·
     p.m., some of the accused came there and untied him and threatened him
     that he should not reveal the incident to anybody and if he revealed the
     same, he would be killed. Thereafter PW- I went to his house and informed
     about the incident to his elder brother Silla Arjuna.
                                                                                E
           The Sub-Inspector of Police, Jagannadharajarpuram N. Rama Rao
     (PW-24) received a phone message about the kidnapping ofKurmi Naidu
     on 10.4.1991 at about 5.30 p.m. Then he immediately proceeded to
     Pathralapalle and he was told by the police personnel present in the picket
     that persons were talking about kidnap of deceased Kurmi Nai_du. At about F
     9 p.m., the Inspector of Police namely, Kamalanadha Rao came to
     Pathalapalle. Then they received a vague information that PW-I who is
     resident of Sillapeta had sustained injuries. Thereafter, the Sub-Inspector
     and the Inspector of Police proceeded to Silapeta and found PW-1 with
     injuries. On the basis of PW-1 's narration, PW-24 scribed a report. Then
     the Sub-Inspector went to the police station and registered a case. He sent G
     the original first information report to the Court. When the Inspector of
     Police tried to send PW-1 to the hospital, he refused. Then PW-25


..   examined PW-I and recorded his statement and seized M.Os. 6 to 8 in the
     presence of mediators under mediator's report. Then the Inspector of
     Police, the Sub-Inspector and other police personnel formed a special party H
     826                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A and combed the area in search of the dead
                                         ... bodies of the deceased in the
    nearby thrashing floors. On 11.4.1991, early morning at about 5.45 a.m.
    they noticed two dead bodies in the 'mango grove of A-25, and the
    motorcycle was also found nearby. Thereafter they noticed the place of
  . occurrence which is at a distance of about one furlong from the place where
B two bodies were found.
          On the basis of information lodged, investigation was done and on
    completion thereof charge sheet was filed for the alleged commission of
    offences punishable under sections 147, 148, 201, 307, 323, 326, 341, 497,
    302 read with Section 149 and Section 1208 and I 09 IPC. During trial,
 C Gode Lottayyagari Satyam (A-31) died and case against Muntha Pentadu
    @ Barrodu (A-33) was separated as he had absconded. PW-4 who is the
    father of deceased Kurmi Naidu was stated to be the intended target.
    Reliance was placed by the trial Court on the evidence ofPWs 1, 2 and
    3 to conclude that accusations against some have been established , though
 D against others it was not credible and · therefore benefit of ·doubt w~
    extended to them. The High Court by the impugned judgment found that
    the prosecution version was full of holes, did not appear credible and the
    so-called eyewitnesses' evidence does not inspire confidence. The evi-
    dence of PW-I was held to be unreliable, as the same appeared to be the
.E outcome of careful planning and deliberation. Though he claimed to have
    sustained several serious injuries, he did not go to ·the hospital for tre~tment
   ·for nearly three days. He did not indicate the narries of aH the assailants
    who allegedly had beaten him. According to him, after the incident, he
    went to his house and told his brother that persori of Peddagudibadi and
    Thatigudibedi had beaten him and the deceased. Though he knew the
 F names of the accused persons prior to giving the information, he did not
    name them specifically. There was delay in lodging the report and no
    explanation was offered for it. There was also considerable delay in
    sending the FIR to the Court. There was no reason as to why PW-4 did
    not lodge the report to the police though the police outpost was situated
 G just in front of his house, if he was really informed by PW-1 and PW-3
    as claimed by them. It was noticed that the prosecution version was also
    incredible in the sense that ifthe accused persons who were 39 in n11mber
    had the motive of killing PW-4, they could have done so in the village
    instead of going to the mango grove of A-29 and waiting for coming of
 H deceased Kurmi Naidu and then attack him without any motive' for doing·
         GORLE S. NAIDU v. STATE OF A.P. [PASAYAT, J.]               827

so. Neither of the deceased was their target, and they did not have any A
motive for killing them. In a faction-ridden village when two rival groups
were craving for the blood of each other, the prosecution version lacks
credibility and is full of inconsistencies. The trial Court was of the view
that entire evidence was not to be discarded, and even taking note of the
improvements, discrepancies, the evidence was sufficient for conviction of B
some of the accused persons. Accordingly as noted earlier, some of the
accused were convicted and others were acquitted. Juclgment of the trial
Court was assailed by the convicted accused questioning their conviction
and by State challenging the acquittals. By a common judgment, three
appeals (two by the accused and one by the State) were disposed of. The      ,
High Court noticed that there was considerable delay in lodging the C
complaint, recording statement of the witnesses and there was no cogent
material for statements. The correct yardstick to be applied for evaluation
of evidence was not done by the trial Court and vague conclusions were
arrived at. The trial Court failed to notice that the prosecution tried to
improve its case from stage to stage and from one witness to another. That D
 being so, the prosecution version collapsed on account of incredibility in
 it. Consequentially, the High court felt that the accused persons were
 entitled to acquittal and accordingly directed. The State's appeal was
 consequentially dismissed.
                                                                           E
      In the present ~ppeals, learned counsel for PW-4, father of deceased
No. 1 and the State contended that the approach of the High Court is
fallacious. Considering the large number of accused persons, minor
discrepancies in evidence should not have found favour with the High
Court to direct acquittal. It was submitted that PW-1 was afraid apprehend-
ing danger to his own life after seeing the manner in which the accused F
persons assaulted and killed two innocent persons. Merely because he did
not go for medical examination immediately, though asked by the police,
that cannot be a ground sufficient to discard his credible evidence. Merely
because PWs l, 2 and 3 were in some way related with the accused persons,
that cannot be a ground for discarding their evidence. PW- I was an injured G
person and, therefore, his evidence should have been acted upon, as he has
sufficient!y explained his presence at the spot and has also indicated why
he happened to be at the spot of occurrence. Similarly, the non-lodging of
information for long cannot be a suspicious circumstance when one
considers the mental condition of PW-4 the father. He immediately went H
    828                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A out to search for. the dead bodies, and was told on the next day morning
    about finding of the dead bodies. Thereafter, the information was lodged
    around 11.30 a.m.

          It was further submitted that the High Court did not analyse the
B evidence in detail and in a cryptic manner accepted the submissions of the
    accused persons and directed acquittal.

          Learned counsel for the accused on the other hand submitted that the
    High Court has analysed the evidence after considering the findings
    recorded by the trial Court. It has highlighted as to how the prosecution
C   version does not inspire conildence. It is to be noted that originally there
    were 39 persons. A-31 died during trial and so far as A-33 is concerned
    the trial was separated. The trial Court acquitted 21 persons on the same
    evidence and convicted 16. The evidence is so full of contradictions, that
    the benefit extended to 21 acquitted persons should have also been applied
D   logically to the persons who were convicted by the trial Court, and the High
    Court corrected the legal intirmities which court did not notice and came
    to the right conclusion about innocence of the accused persons. In any
    event, it was pointed out that PW-1 does not speak of. any attack on the
    deceased by A-2. According to him deceased Jogulu (D-2) has received
E   a single blow which caused his death and the same was inflicted by A-10
    who was acquitted by the trial Court. PW-1 categorically involved A-10
    as the assailant of D-2. Though PWs 2 and 3 named A-2 as the assailant,
    that itself improbabilises the prosecution veision. Only one blow was held
    to be a fatal biow and it could not have been inflicted by A-2 and A-10
    separately. As there is inconsistency as regards who is the assailant of D-
F   2, the benefit of doubt was clearly available and the High Court has held
    this to be a factor for acquitting A-2. The evidence of PW-2 and PW-3
    show that during investigation they did not name the accused persons
    categorically. In a vague way, it was stated that supporters of A-7 had hit
    the deceased. To a similar effect was the evidence of PWs 1 and 3. PWs
G   2 and 3 have also accepted about non-mentioning specifically names of the
    accused persons to be the assailants. So far as PW-3 is concerned, she stated
    before the Magistrate in her statement recorded under Section 164 of the
    Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the 'Code') that the occurrence
    took place at 10.00 a.m. This is at great variance with the prosecution
H   version as unfolded during trial. Additionally, she was not available for a
         GORLE S. NAIDU v. STATE OF A.P. [PASAYAT, J.]                 829

period of 3 days and her statement was not recorded. No explanation was A
offered for her absence. Accordingly, it was submitted that the High
Court's judgment does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference
at our hands.

        Though mere acquittal of large number of co-accused persons does
 not per se entitle others to acquittal, the Comt has a duty in such cases to B
 separate the grain from the chaff. If after sieving the untruth or unaccept-
 able portion of the evidence residue is sufficient to prove the guilt of the
 accused, there is no legal bar in convicting a person on the evidence which
 has been primarily disbelieved vis-a-vis others. But where they are so
 inseparable that any attempt to separate them would destroy the substratum C
 on which the prosecution version is founded, then the Court would be
 within its legal limits to discard the evidence in toto. In the aforesaid
 background, the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3 who are stated to be
 eyewitnesses is to be analysed. The High Court has doubted the truthful-
 ness of the PW-1 who claimed thathe did not get medically examined being D
 afraid of the accused persons. That is clearly unacceptable. He claimed to
  have stated before the police officers about the incident and on the basis
  of that the first information report was recorded. Thereafter, there was no
  reason for him to be apprehensive as claimed not to go for medical
 treatment. If really he was so terrified it is not understood as to how after
 two days the fear vanished and he went for treatment. The conduct of PW- E
 4, the father of deceased No. 1 is equally shrouded in mystery. Though
  the Police post was just in front of his house, he did not choose to inform
  the police and the FIR was lodged after considerable length of time.
  Though in all case delay in lodging the FIR does not attract suspicion, yet
  on the facts of a particular case the same is certainly a factor to be p
  considered. In the case at hand, in the absence of any plausible explanation
  for the delay, it certainly was a suspicious circumstance making the
  prosecution version vulnerable. In this case the occurrence allegedly took
  place at about 4.00 p.m. on I 0.4.1991. FIR was lodged at about 11.30 p.m.
  and reached Court at about I 0.00 a.m. on 11.4.1991. The delay, cons id- G
. ering the fact that there was police outpost just in front of PW4's house
  and Court was at a very short distance, has not been explained. Addition-
  ally, as rightly submitted by learned counsel for the accused-respondents,_
  A-2 was not indicated to be the author of the assaults so far as deceased
  Jogulu is concerned. There is clear contradictions between the version of
  PW-1 on the one hand and PWs 2 and 3 on the other as regards the H
    830                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A assailants of deceased No. 2 (Jogulu). The evidence of PW-3 who claimed
    to have informed PW-4 is equally baffling. She has accepted before the
    Magistrate in her statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code that
    the occurrence took place at 10.00 a.m. One more thing which needs to
    be noticed to cast doubt on the evidence of PW-I is that he claimed to have
B   received the money from PW-17, at about 2.00 p.m. and then to have
    returned. Thereafter he had left for returning home. On the contrary PW-
    17 states that money was paid at 11.00 a.m. That itself throws doubt
    regarding the possibility of his presence at the alleged time of occurrence.
    Several other factors which throw considerable light on vulnerability of the
C   prosecution version are the alleged search by PW-4 and others for the dead
    bodies. According to ti'e prosecution version, the dead bodies were found
    15 to 20 yards from the culvert near which the alleged occurrence took
    place. It is highly improbable that when PW-4 went for searching the dead
    bodies on allegedly getting information about the assaults, they could not
D   trace the bodies. The plea that he could not lodge the FIR and had to wait
    for searching by police which purportedly got the dead bodies early in the
    morning is equally implausible. Even if that is accepted for the sake of
    argument it is absolutely not explained in any manner why the FIR could
    not be registered immediately thereafter and several hours had to pass by.
E   Though the FIR is not supposed to an encyclopedia of the factors
    concerning the crime, yet there must be some definite information vis-a-
    vis the crime. That does not appear to be the case at hand. Similarly, PWs
    2, and 3 accepted that they did not specifically name any accused person
    during investigation, and only said that followers of A-7 were the
    assailants. That is not sufficient :when definite names were stated in Court.
F   This is not an elaboration of a statement already made, and on the contrary
    is a vital omission. Certain other factors, which otherwise would not have
    been of much relevance, have assumed importance in the present case. If
    PW-I had stated before the police, the details as contained in the FIR, there
    was really no necessity of calling a dog squad on 11.4.. 1991. This to a great
G   extent shows that the police were not sure who the assailants were.              l

    Admittedly, dog squad was taken to the place of occurrence at about 1.00
    p.m. on 11.4.1991, and dogs were taken to various house in the village to
    know about the assailants. PW-24's statement that dogs are taken when
    assailants are not known is very significant. It cannot be said that view
H   taken by the High Court is not a possible view.
         GORLE S. NAIDU v. STATE OF A.P. [PASAYAT, J.]                  831

       The respective stands need careful consideration. There is no em- A
 bargo on the appellant Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order
 of acquittal is based. Generally, the order ofacquittal shall not be interfered
 with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further
 strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web
 of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are B
 possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of
 the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable
 to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the
 Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage
 of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from C
 the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is
 ignored, as duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the
 evidence where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of
 ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence
 or not. [See Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2002)
 2 Supreme 567]. The principle to be followed by appellate Court considering D
 the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there
 are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned
 judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials
 have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason
 for interference. These aspects were highlighted by this C<;>urt in Shivaji E
 Sahabrao Bobade and Anr. v. State ofMaharashtra, AIR (1973) SC 2622;
 Ramesh Babula/ Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 4 Supreme I 67; Jaswant
 Singh v. State ofHaryana, (2000) 3 Supreme 320; Raj Kishore Jha v. S:ate
 ofBiharand Ors., (2003) 7 Supreme 152; State ofPunjab v. Karnail Singh,
.(2003) 5 Supreme 508. and State ofPunjab v. Pohla Singh and Anr., (2003) F
 7 Supreme 17 and Suchand Pal v. Phani Pal and Anr., JT (2003) 9 SC
  17.

      That being so, it would not be appropriate in the circumstances of the
case to interfere with the elaborately discussed and well-reasoned judgment
of the High Court. The appeals fails and are dismissed.                      G
M.P.                                                    Appeals dismissed.