GOPALAKRISHNA (D) BY LRS. & ORS.versusNARAYANAGOWDA (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS.

382                      [2019]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    6 S.C.R. 382               [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A                 GOPALAKRISHNA (D) BY LRS. & ORS.
                                        v.
              NARAYANAGOWDA (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS.
                         (Civil Appeal No.1332 of 2008)
B                               APRIL 03, 2019
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN AND K.M. JOSEPH, JJ.]
             Mysore Hindu Law Women’s Rights Act, 1933 – ss. 4,10 and
      11 – Limitation Act, 1908 – Arts. 140, 141 and s.28 – Appellants
      case that one ‘R’ was the owner of the scheduled properties – He
C
      passed away in 1907 – He had two wives ‘J’ & ‘S’ – From his first
      wife ‘J’, he had one daughter ‘V’ and ‘V’ in turn had a daughter
      ‘JK’ – His first wife predeceased him and daughter ‘V’ died in 1910
      – His second wife ‘S’ died in 1938 – Appellants claimed right to
      properties by virtue of sale deeds executed by ‘JK’ in the year 1955
D     – On the other hand, respondents contended that they had
      purchased the said property from one ‘SR’, who had in turn
      purchased from second wife of ‘R’ i.e. ‘S’ – Respondents were in
      possession of the property – Trial court decreed the suit in favour
      of appellants and declared them as owner of the properties entitled
      them to recover possession from the respondents – However, in first
E
      appeal, the Appellate Court inter alia found that the respondents
      were in possession and as the properties were not recovered within
      12 years, thus suit was barred by limitation – High Court affirmed
      the judgment of the First Appellate Court – On appeal, held: In
      1938, ‘S’ passed away – Even proceeding on the basis that ‘JK’,
F     the grand-daughter of ‘R’ was a reversioner, her estate in expectancy
      became vested in her, upon the death of the ‘R’s widow, ‘S’ in 1938
      – While it is true that it was open to the reversioner to ignore the
      sale deed executed by the widow, as not binding on her, as far as
      suit for recovery of possession, the law clearly provided for a period
      of 12 years and the period of limitation started with the death of the
G
      limited owner, namely, the widow in 1938 – The time started ticking
      with the passing away of the widow in 1938 – The period of limitation
      being 12 years, it ran out in 1950 – With the running out of the
      period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1908 (by
      Arts.140 and 141), the very right of the alleged reversioner ‘JK’
H
                                       382
GOPALAKRISHNA (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. ARAYANAGOWDA                      383
             (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS.

also came to an end – Thus, when she executed the sale in the year    A
1955 in favour of the appellants, she could not have conveyed any
right – In such circumstances, no reason to interfere with the
judgment of the High Court – Hindu Law – Madras School of
Mitakshara Law – Limitation Act, 1963 – s. 31.
      Dismissing the appeals, the Court                               B
      HELD: 1. Under the Hindu Law, a widow took a limited
estate. She was not a trustee for the reversioners. She was owner
of the properties. But she could alienate the property only for
necessity or benefit of the estate. By the Mysore Hindu Law
Women’s Rights Act, 1933 the widow’s estate became stridhana,         C
which by virtue of Section 11 conferred upon her absolute right
to dispose the property either by way of inter vivos transfer or
will. The State Act came into force on 01.01.1934. When the
succession opened on ‘R’ dying in 1907, he was survived by both
his widow ‘S’ and also his daughter ‘V’. Therefore, it is quite
clear that ‘S’ would not get an absolute right under Section 11 of    D
the State Act. When succession opened in this case to the estate
of ‘R’, in fact, the State Act was not in force at that time. The
estate which was inherited by ‘S’ was that of a widow. Therefore,
be it from stand point of Hindu Law as applicable prior to the
State Act or the provisions of the State Act, ‘S’ did not acquire     E
absolute rights. As such, the right which she had, was the right of
the Hindu widow under Hindu Law. [Para 23][397-F-H;
398-A-B]
       2. Further, as long as ‘S’-widow of ‘R’ was alive, no
reversioners had any vested interest. The daughter of ‘R’ (‘V’)       F
through his first wife passed away in the year 1910. At that time,
‘S’ the widow of ‘R’ was alive. Therefore, she (‘V’) would not get
any right in the property. ‘S’ died only in the year 1938. When
‘S’ died in 1938, no doubt ‘JK’ (daughter of ‘V’) was alive. It is
here that the Court must consider the argument of the
respondents that the daughter of a daughter was not recognized        G
as a heir. When succession opened upon the death of the widow,
in this case, namely ‘S’ in the year 1938, if ‘JK’ could be treated
as the reversioner being grand daughter of the last full owner,
then the property would vest in ‘JK’. [Para 23][398-B-D]
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384            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A            3. There would be two obstacles for the appellants:- firstly,
      it would have to be held that ‘JK’ being the grand daughter of ‘R’
      was a reversioner upon the death of ‘S’, the widow of ‘R’.
      Secondly, even assuming for a moment that ‘JK’ was the
      reversioner whether it was incumbent upon her to institute
      proceedings for recovery of possession within 12 years of death
B
      of ‘S’. [Para 24][398-E]
            4. While it was open to the reversioners to ignore an
      alienation made by a Hindu widow and the period of limitation
      would not start to run upon a transfer effected by the Hindu widow,
      undoubtedly, the period of limitation for filing a suit for recovery
C     of possession would commence upon the death of the widow.
      [Para 26][401-E-F]
            5. The property was alienated by ‘S’, the widow of ‘R’ in
      favour of her brother ‘SR’ in the year 1913. Undoubtedly, it was
      open to the reversioner to proceed on the basis that such
D     alienation does not bind her. [Para 27][401-F-G]
            6. Thereafter, in 1938, ‘S’ passed away. Even proceeding
      on the basis that ‘JK’, the grand-daughter of ‘R’ was a
      reversioner, her estate in expectancy became vested in her, upon
      the death of the ‘R’ widow, ‘S’ in 1938. While it is true that it was
E     open to the reversioner to ignore the sale deed executed by the
      widow, as not binding on her, as far as suit for recovery of
      possession, the law clearly provided for a period of 12 years and
      the period of limitation started with the death of the limited owner,
      namely, the widow in 1938. The time started ticking with the
F     passing away of the widow in 1938. The period of limitation being
      12 years, it ran out in 1950. With the running out of the period of
      limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1908 (by Articles
      140 and 141), the very right of the alleged reversioner ‘JK’ also
      came to an end. Thus, when she executed the sale in the year
      1955 in favour of the appellants, she could not have conveyed
G     any right. That apart, even for a moment, proceeding on the basis
      that period of limitation would start from 12 years from 1955 when
      the sale deed was executed in favour of the appellants by ‘JK’
      even that period ran out in 1967. In such circumstances, no
      reason to interfere with the Judgment of the High Court.
H     [Para 28][401-G-H; 402-A-C; F]
GOPALAKRISHNA (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. ARAYANAGOWDA                                385
             (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS.

      Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey & Ors. AIR 1962 SC                          A
      83 : [1962] SCR 553 ; Gogula Gurumurthy & Ors. v.
      Kurimeti Ayyappa (1975) 4 SCC 458 : [1974] 3 SCR
      595 – relied on.
      Kalipada Chakraborti & Anr. v. Palani Bala Devi &
      Ors. AIR 1953 SC 125 : [1953] SCR 503 –                                   B
      referred to.
                          Case Law Reference
      [1962] SCR 553               relied on                  Para 20
      [1974] 3 SCR 595             relied on                  Para 21           C
      [1953] SCR 503               referred to                Para 26
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1332
of 2008
      From the Judgment and Order dated 28.11.2005 of the High Court
                                                                                D
of Karnataka at Bangalore in R.S.A. No. 870/1996 C/w R.S.A.
No. 871/1996.
     Trideep Pais, N. K. Verma, Pranav Jain, Ms. Sanya Kumar,
Ms. Anjana Chandrashekar Advs. for the Appellants.
      M. Gireesh Kumar, Anand Srivastava, Vijay Kumar, Advs. for                E
the Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      K. M. JOSEPH, J.
       1. This appeal filed by special leave is directed against the judgment   F
dated 28.11.2005 passed by the High Court of Karnataka in Regular
Second Appeal Nos. 870/1996 and 871/1996. The High Court, by its
impugned judgment, dismissed the appeals and affirmed the judgment of
the First Appellate Court which had reversed the decree passed by the
Trial Court. The Trial Court decreed the suits [O.S. No. 68/1985 and
21/1986 (O.S. No. 393/75)] filed by the appellants.                             G
      2. The case of the appellants is as follows:-
      One Ramanna was the owner of the properties which are
scheduled to the plaint. He passed away in 1907. He was married to
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386             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A     Jankamma (first wife) who predeceased him. The second wife
      Seethamma passed away in the year 1938. Through his first wife
      (Jankamma), he had a daughter named Venkamma. Venkamma passed
      away in 1910. Venkamma, in turn, had a daughter named Jankamma.
      The appellants before us claimed right to the properties by virtue of sale
B     deeds executed by Jankamma in the year 1955.
              After the sale executed by Jankamma, the father of the first
      plaintiff and the second plaintiff claimed that they were in possession of
      the suit properties. The respondents filed the suits (bearing O.S. Nos.
      211 and 213 of 1955) for declaration of their title and injunction. The
      said suit was decreed by the Trial Court. The High Court in second
C
      appeal set aside the decree of the lower court and confirmed the sale of
      Jankamma in favour of the first plaintiff’s father and the second plaintiff
      and held that title to the properties could not be decided. It is their case
      that since Venkamma survived Ramanna, Jankamma became a full owner
      of the properties and through her under the sale deed, the plaintiffs claimed
D     absolute ownership, and sued for declaration of title, recovery of
      possession and mesne profits.
            3. The respondents, on the other hand, denied the allegations that
      Ramanna had a daughter by name Venkamma and Venkamma had a
      daughter by name Jankamma. The ownership by Jankamma was denied.
E     Seethamma had sold the properties to her brother - Srinivasa Rao.
            It is the further case of the respondents (defendants) that they
      purchased property from Srinivasa Rao under registered sale deed dated
      13.09.1954 and they are in possession since then. They also claimed
      adverse possession. They have been found to be in possession right upto
F     the High Court in the earlier proceedings.
              4. The Trial Court decreed the suit and found inter alia that
      Venkamma was the daughter of Ramanna and Venkamma had two
      daughters by name Patamma and Jankamma. Patamma died and
      Jankamma alone survived. The Trial Court further proceeded to enquire
G     whether Jankamma had acquired any right in the properties of her
      grandfather which was alienated to the plaintiffs. The Court referred to
      the following findings of the High Court in the earlier litigation commenced
      by the respondents:
            “17. Now, whether Seethamma independently got any right to
H           acquire the suit property from her husband is a matter to be looked
            into.
GOPALAKRISHNA (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. ARAYANAGOWDA                             387
       (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. [K.M. JOSEPH, J.]

      Further, this aspect has also been considered by the Hon’ble High      A
Court in S.A. No. 801/60 at page-16. It is observed in the said judgment:-
      “Now it should be point out that although there is no dispute that
      Ramanna left behind him his wife Seethamma, who died in the
      year 1938, there was a serious controversy in this litigation in
      regard to the question whether Ramanna had a daughter                  B
      Jankamma. A question which was even more serious than that
      was whether Venkamma was alive when Ramanna died in the
      year 1907 or there about. This question assumes great importance
      in the context of the finding recorded by the courts below, that
      Seethamma under the provisions of Mysore Hindu Law Women’s
      Right to property Act became an absolute owner of the properties       C
      of her husband. It is clear from Sec. 10(2)(g) of the Act that she
      could become absolute owner of these properties, only if Ramanna
      when he died did not left behind his a daughter or daughter’s son.
      If Venkamma was the daughter of Ramanna and she was alive
      when Ramanna died, then it becomes clear that Sec. 10(2)(g) of         D
      the Act is no application and Seethamma had only a widow’s
      estate and the properties could not become her Sreedhana
      properties. It was for this purpose to demonstrate that they did
      not that way become Sreedhana properties of Seethamma that
      defendants contended that Ramanna left behind him his daughter
      Venkamma and that Venkamma had a child Jankamma, who could             E
      convey to the contesting defendants the properties purchased by
      them. Both the courts have found that Venkamma was the
      daughter of Ramanna and that finding being a finding on the
      question of fact has remained undisturbed. They have further
      found that defendant No.8 is Jankamma, daughter of Venkamma            F
      and that finding is equally unassailable for the same reason.
      18. While answering issue Nos. 1 and 2, not only I have come to
      the conclusion that Venkamma survived her further and she was
      the daughter of Ramanna and she had a daughter by name
      Jankamma but earlier proceedings between the same parties have         G
      also established this fact beyond any shadow of doubt. When
      Venkamma survived her father, who died in the year 1907, then
      Seethamma, the 2nd wife of late Ramanna enquiring the properties
      of her husband could not have been there at all. Because as it is
      already stated above under Section 10(2)(g) of Hindu Law
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388             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A           Women’s Right to Properties Act she could not become an absolute
            owner of the properties of her husband, Ramanna. Because
            Ramanna had left behind his daughter Venkamma. The said
            Venkamma died in the year 1910. Leaving behind her daughter
            by name Jankamma. So under Section 10(2)(g) of the said Act,
            Seethamma had only a widow’s estate but the properties of her
B
            husband could not form her Sreedhana properties so in that way
            any alienations made by her in favour of her brother Srinivasa
            Rao were all illegal.”
             5. When Venkamma survived her father then Seethamma (the
      second wife of Ramanna) could not acquire properties of her husband.
C     Reference was made to Section 10(2)(g) of the Mysore Hindu Law
      Women’s Rights Act, 1933 (for short ‘the State Act’). On finding that
      Ramanna had left behind her daughter - Venkamma who died in the
      year 1910, therefore under Section 10(2)(g) of the Act, the widow
      Seethamma had only widow’s estate which could not form her Stridhan
D     properties and therefore any alienation made by her in favour of her
      brother - Srinivasa Rao was illegal. Seethamma was found to have no
      vested interest in the properties of her husband except having widow’s
      estate. Seethamma herself had not acquired any saleable interest in the
      properties of her husband - Ramanna. It was observed that in the earlier
      second appeal that the sale by Srinivas Rao in favour of the respondents
E     could not be sustained and accordingly the sale had been set aside only
      confirming the decree for permanent injunction against the appellants.
      The sale of the properties by Jankamma was upheld in the earlier
      proceedings. On this basis, the sale of properties by Seethamma in
      favour of her brother was found to be illegal entitling the plaintiffs to be
F     declared as owner.
             6. The contention of the respondents was that they were in
      possession and there were also entries in the revenue record to that
      effect. It was found that the entries in the revenue record would not
      advance the case of the respondents.
G            The Trial Court proceeded to consider the question whether the
      possession of the defendants could be found to be adverse and the Court
      came to the conclusion that the defendants had miserably failed to
      establish adverse possession. The contention based on limitation was
      accordingly rejected. Accordingly, on these findings, the suit came to be
H     decreed declaring the appellants as owners of the scheduled properties
GOPALAKRISHNA (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. ARAYANAGOWDA                              389
       (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. [K.M. JOSEPH, J.]

and entitled to recover possession of the suit properties and also mesne      A
profits from the respondents.
      7. In the first appeal, the Appellate Court inter alia found that the
respondents were in possession and if the properties were not recovered
within 12 years, then the right to recovery is extinguished as per the
decision in [AIR 1972 Mysore 22].                                             B
       Though the High Court in the earlier round of litigation observed
that the question relating to whether Venkamma survived Ramanna or
predeceased him has to be decided, the appellants should have
approached the Court immediately but they had approached the Court
with the delay of beyond 12 years and that too without giving any proper      C
explanation for the delay.
       It was found that the right of the appellants for recovery of
possession on the foot of their acquisition of title by sale from Jankamma
on 16.04.1955 accrued on 16.04.1955. The judgment of the High Court
in the earlier second appeal delivered on 16.09.1963 did not give rise to     D
any cause of action. Accordingly, the appeals were allowed and the
suits were dismissed.
      Proceedings in the High Court
      8. The High Court framed the following substantial questions of
law in R.S.A. No. 870/96 and R.S.A. No. 871/96:                               E
      R.S.A. No. 870/96
      i) Whether the finding of the first appellate Court that the suit is
      barred by time is without considering the provisions of Section 65
      of the Limitation Act of 1963?
                                                                              F
      ii) Whether the finding that the respondents have perfected their
      title by adverse possession is justified when they have contended
      that they are the owners of the property by virtue of a registered
      sale deed?
      R.S.A. No. 871/96                                                       G
      i) Whether the lower appellate Court was justified in holding that
      the suit was barred by limitation?
      ii) Whether the lower appellant court was justified in holding that
      the respondents acquired title by adverse possession?
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390              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A             9. The High Court came to the following findings after referring
      to the relationship of the parties. It was found inter alia that during the
      life time of Jankamma although the properties were sold by Seethamma
      in favour of his brother Srinivasa Rao but she had not challenged the
      same, so possession of the properties by the defendants by virtue of sale
      deed in favour of Srinivasa Rao and by Srinivasa Rao in favour of the
B
      respondents remained unchallenged and that would be the starting point
      of limitation.
             10. The transferees from Jankamma namely the appellants moved
      the Court only in 1975, 1985 and 1986. As per Madras School of
      Mitakshara Law in a catena of decisions, it is held that at a place other
C     than Bombay State the right of survivorship necessarily is in favour of
      the widow than the daughter and the grand-daughter. So the alienation
      made by Seethamma in favour of Srinivas Rao and by Srinivas Rao to
      the respondents could not be said to be invalid.
            11. Thereafter, the Court referred to the ‘the State Act’ and
D     observed that even under Section 4 as per Section 4(1)(ii) of the State
      Act, the widow stands in preference to the daughters i.e. the right of
      widow (Seethamma) is preferable to the right of daughter and
      Jankamma’s position comes only afterwards. Jankamma - the grand
      daughter is in category (ix) of the aforesaid provision.
E           12. Such being the position of law, the sale made by Jankamma,
      grand-daughter of Ramanna, in favour of the appellants, if any, is non
      est, more so, as noted, since Jankamma had not challenged the earlier
      sale made by Seethamma in favour of Srinivas Rao. Seethamma although
      had a limited interest, the alienation had not been challenged by the
F     reversioners of Ramanna for 50 years. The right of Seethamma stood
      unchallenged and the alienation made also remained unchallenged.
             As regards the point relating to limitation, it was found that first of
      all Jankamma had to challenge the alienation by Seethamma, which
      was of the year 1913. No special privilege was given in excluding
G     limitation created by the Limitation Act by the observation of the High
      Court in the earlier second appeals (801/1960 and 819/1960). Since the
      right of Seethamma had not been challenged by Jankamma, the suits are
      necessarily barred by time.
              Thereafter, regarding the adverse possession, this is what the Court
      held:
H
GOPALAKRISHNA (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. ARAYANAGOWDA                                 391
       (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. [K.M. JOSEPH, J.]

       “As to the point of adverse possession is concerned, it is made           A
       clear by the lower appellate court that even after order of
       declaration has been negatived by this Court in the second appeals
       801/60 and 819/60, the suits are belatedly filed by the plaintiffs in
       the year 1985 and 86 respectively and as such Sreenivas Rao and
       thereafter, the defendants have acquired right and title to the suit
                                                                                 B
       properties by adverse possession. It is needless to say that when
       necessarily these defendants have set up their right not only for
       possession, but also by virtue of the sale deed, that finding would
       not be appropriate.”
       13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned
counsel for the appellant drew our attention to Section 4 of the State Act       C
and then he further sought support from Section 10 of the Act. Section
10 (2) (g) of the Act reads as follows:-
       “10. (2) Stridhana includes:-
       (g) property taken by inheritance by a female from another female         D
       and property taken by inheritance by a female from her husband
       or son, or from a male relative connected by blood except when
       there is a daughter or daughter’s son of the propositus alive at the
       time the property is so inherited.”
       14. The appellant’s contention is that the High Court has committed       E
a clear error in taking the view that Seethamma - the widow would get
an absolute right. It is his contention that as per the definition of Stridhan
which undoubtedly is her absolute right, there is an exception carved out
in Section 10(2)(g) of the Act. In so far as the properties in question
were properties inherited by Seethamma on the death of her husband -
Ramanna and at that time the daughter Venkamma was very much alive,              F
therefore, Seethamma would not get an absolute right. In this case, the
daughter of Ramanna (Venkamma) died only in 1910 which was after
the death of Ramanna – 1907. When succession to the estate of Ramanna
in 1907 opened, then Seethamma his widow would inherit the property
where the right is only limited to the estate of a widow. On her death,          G
the property would revert back to the reversioners of her late husband -
Ramanna.
      15. It is his complaint that the High Court has overlooked this vital
aspect by not referring to Section 10 of the Act and confining its focus
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392            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A     on Section 4 of the State Act. Under Section 4 of the State Act, the
      widow has priority over daughter and granddaughter.
             When it was pointed out to the learned counsel for the appellant
      that since Ramanna died in 1907 and the State Act was not in existence
      as the Act was passed in 1933, learned counsel for the appellant took up
B     another contention. He contended that under the Mitakshara law which
      was applicable, the widow was entitled only to a limited estate. He
      would contend that the position even prior to the passing of the State Act
      was that the widow did not get absolute estate.
              16. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would contend
C     that Seethamma had transferred the property in the year 1913.
      Seethamma died in 1938. If that is so, the suit should have been filed if
      at all within a period of 12 years from the date on which the alleged right
      in the reversioners came to be vested namely upon the death of
      Seethamma in the year 1938. The period of 12 years would run out in
      1950. The appellants - plaintiffs purchased the property in the year
D     1955 from Jankamma - grand daughter of Ramanna. Even then the suit
      was filed by them only after more than 20 years. It is further contended
      by learned counsel for the respondent that under Mitakshara law
      applicable in the region in question, the grand daughter was not a heir.
      Only the daughter of a male upon his death intestate could inherit the
E     property. Therefore, even the limited right attributed to the widow
      Seethamma would by default become an absolute right.
            Findings in the earlier Second Appeal
             17. The findings in the earlier Second Appeals which emanated
      from the suits filed by the respondents are as follows: The High Court
F     did not interfere with a finding that the sale deeds executed by
      Seethamma in favour of Srinivas Rao were genuine. Equally, the High
      Court affirmed the finding that the respondents in this appeal were in
      possession of the properties purchased by them. Jankamma was found
      to be the grand-daughter of Ramanna. Further, the Court proceeded to
G     pose the question whether Venkamma was a daughter of Ramanna and
      whether she was alive when Ramanna died having regard to Section
      10(2)(g) of the State Act. It was noticed that both the Courts below had
      found that Venkamma was the daughter of Ramanna and Jankamma
      was the daughter of Venkamma. It was, however, observed that there

H
GOPALAKRISHNA (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. ARAYANAGOWDA                                393
       (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. [K.M. JOSEPH, J.]

were no pleadings as to whether Venkamma survived or predeceased                A
Ramanna.
       18. The Court was of the view that the first issue in all the cases
was whether Seethamma became absolute owner of the properties of
her husband and it was equally true that the processes by which she
could become such owner would be by her being alive and there being             B
no surviving child of Ramanna when he died.          It was found that the
parties did not have the opportunity to produce all evidences in this regard
and an investigation was required. The finding that Seethamma became
absolute owner of Ramanna’s properties was set aside. The Court,
however, proceeded to find that the fact that the aforesaid finding was
set aside did not mean that the Court held that Seethamma had not               C
become the absolute owner. No opinion was expressed as it was
dependent upon the question whether Venkamma was alive when
Ramanna died and materials in this regard were insufficient.
        19. On this basis, the decree declaring the respondents to be the
owners of the property was set aside. The decree restraining the                D
appellants from disturbing the respondents’ possession was also affirmed.
It may be seen from the judgment of the High Court in the earlier round
of litigation that the respondents were found to be in possession. The
question relating to title was essentially not decided as is clear from
what was found by the High Court. The Court left it open to be decided          E
on the basis that Seethamma would become absolute owner if Venkamma
- the daughter of Ramanna had not survived Ramanna.
      20. Now we shall proceed to render our findings.
      Position of a Hindu Widow prior to Hindu Succession Act and the
State Act                                                                       F
       There is no dispute that the parties are governed by the Madras
School of Hindu Law. Thereunder, every female who succeeded as a
heir whether to a male or a female, took a limited estate in the property
inherited by her. As regards widow’s estate, this statement is found in
Mulla Hindu Law, 23rd Edition.                                                  G
      “176. Widow’s estate – A widow or other limited heirs is not a
      tenant for life, but is owner of the property inherited by her, subject
      to certain restrictions on alienation and subject to its devolving
      upon the next heir of the last full owner upon her death. The
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394            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A           whole estate is for the time vested in her, and she represents it
            completely. As stated in a Privy Council case, her right is of the
            nature of a right of property; her position is that of owner; her
            powers in that character are, however limited; but so long as she
            is alive no one has any vested interest in the succession.”
B            In Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey & Ors. [AIR 1962 SC 83],
      this Court proceeded to hold that it could not be an inflexible proposition
      of law that whenever there is a usufructory mortgage, the widow could
      not sell the property on the ground that it would deprive the reversioners
      of the right to redeem it. This is what the Court held:
C           “……...Such a proposition could be supported only if the widow
            is in the position of a trustee, holding the estate for the benefit of
            the reversioners, with a duty cast on her to preserve the properties
            and pass them on intact to them. That, however, is not the law.
            When a widow succeeds as heir to her husband, the ownership in
            the properties both legal and beneficial vests in her. She fully
D           represents the estate, the interest of the reversioners therein being
            only spec successiones. The widow is entitled to the full beneficial
            enjoyment of the estate and is not accountable to any one. It is
            true that she cannot alienate the properties unless it be for necessity
            or for benefit to the estate, but this restriction on her powers is not
E           one imposed for the benefit of reversioners but is an incident of
            the estate as known to Hindu law. It is for this reason that it has
            been held that when Crown takes the property by escheat it takes
            it free from any alienation made by the widow of the last male
            holder which is not valid under the Hindu law vide : Collector of
            Masulipatam v. Cavaly Venkata 8 Moo Ind App 529(PC). Where,
F           however, there is necessity for a transfer, the restriction imposed
            by Hindu law on her power to alienate ceases to operate, and the
            widow as owner has got the fullest discretion to decide what form
            the alienation should assume. Her powers in this regard are, as
            held in a series of decisions beginning with Hunooman Persaud v.
G           Mussamat Babooee Mundraj Koonweree, 6 Moo Ind App 393
            (PC) those of the manager of an infant’s estate or the manager of
            joint Hindu family.”
                                                            (Emphasis Supplied)

H
GOPALAKRISHNA (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. ARAYANAGOWDA                             395
       (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. [K.M. JOSEPH, J.]

      21. In Gogula Gurumurthy & Ors. v. Kurimeti Ayyappa (1975)             A
4 SCC 458, this Court reiterated the position of a Hindu widow and of
greater relevance to us held no one has any vested interest in succession
as long as the widow is alive.
      “A hindu widow is entitled to the full beneficial enjoyment of the
      estate. So long as she is not guilty of wilful waste, she is           B
      answerable to no one. Her estate is not a life-estate, because in
      certain circumstances she can give an absolute and complete title.
      Nor is it in any sense an estate held in trust for reversioners.
      Within the limits imposed upon her, the female holder has the most
      absolute power of enjoyment and is accountable to no one. She
      fully represents the estate, and so long as she is alive, no one has   C
      any vested interests in the succession. It cannot be predicted
      who would be the nearest reversioner at the time of her death. It
      is, therefore, impossible for a reversioner to contend that for any
      loss which the estate might have sustained due to the negligence
      on the part of the widow he should be compensated from out of          D
      the widow’s separate properties. He is entitled to get only the
      property left on the date of the death of the widow. The widow
      could have, during her lifetime, for necessity, including her
      maintenance alienated the whole estate.”
                                                    (Emphasis Supplied)      E
      The impact of the State Act of 1933
      The State Act that is the Mysore Act of 1933 (as it was when it
was passed) came into force on first day of January, 1934.
      Section 2 reads as follows: -                                          F
      “2. (1) This Act applies to persons who but for the passing of this
      Act, would have been subject to the law of Mitakshara in respect
      of the provisions herein enacted.
      (2) Save as aforesaid, nothing herein contained shall be deemed
      to affect any rules or incidents of the Hindu Law which are not        G
      inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.”
       Thus, the rules or incidents of Hindu law to the extent they were
not inconsistent with the Act was to continue to operate. Section (4) of
the Act provided as follows:-
                                                                             H
396            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A           “4(1) The succession to a Hindu male dying intestate shall, in the
            first place, vest in the members of the family of the propositus
            mentioned below, and in the following order:-
             (ii) the widow;
            (iii) daughters;
B
            (ix) daughters’ daughters;
            As far as Section 10 is concerned, the relevant portion reads as
      follows: -
            “10(1) “Stridhana” means property of every description belonging
C           to a Hindu female, other than property in which she has, by law or
            under the terms of an instrument, only a limited estate.
            10(2) Stridhana includes:-
            (g) property taken by inheritance by a female from another female
            and property taken by inheritance by a female from her husband
D
            or son, or from a male relative connected by blood except when
            there is a daughter or daughter’s son of the propositus alive at the
            time the property is so inherited.”
               It is necessary to notice Section 11 also. Section 11 reads as
      follows:-
E
            “11.(1) A female owning stridhana property shall have over it
            absolute and unrestricted powers both of enjoyment and of
            disposition inter vivos and by will, subject only to the general law
            relating to guardianship during minority.

F           (2) Except when acting as the lawful guardian of his wife, a
            husband shall have no right to or interest in any portion of his
            wife’s stridhana during her life nor shall he be entitled to control
            the exercise of any of her powers in relation thereto.”
             Thus, the female owning stridhana property was conferred absolute
G     powers to dispose of the same as also in the matter of enjoyment. The
      disposal could be by will or transfer inter vivos. The only limitation was
      the law relating to guardianship would continue to operate during minority.
      Reverting back to Section 10 (2) (g), the property inherited by a woman
      inter alia from her husband was brought under the definition of stridhana.
      This was a clear expansion of a widow’s rights by conferring upon a
H
GOPALAKRISHNA (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. ARAYANAGOWDA                               397
       (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. [K.M. JOSEPH, J.]

widow absolute right over property inherited from her husband being a          A
radical departure from the widow’s estate under Hindu Law which was
a limited estate and under which there was no such absolute right of
disposal. There was however a catch and it was this. If the husband
was survived by the widow and a daughter or a daughter son, then the
widow’s estate as understood in Hindu Law was to continue undisturbed.
                                                                               B
If a daughter or grandson as mentioned did not survive the husband, the
widow would get the absolute right notwithstanding Section 10(1) defining
stridhana as meaning property of any description belonging to a Hindu
female other than which she has by law ‘only a limited estate’. Thus
though under Section 4, the widow would inherit in preference to the
daughter and daughters’ daughter the nature of the right is as contained       C
in Section 10 and Section 11, the effect of which we have called out.
      22. The next thing which we must ascertain is who are the
reversioners. The reversioners are the heirs of the last full owner, who
would be entitled to succeed to the estate of such owner on the death of
a widow or other limited heir, if they be then living (as per para 175 of      D
the Mulla on Hindu Law).
      The nature of the interest of reversioners is also discussed under
the same para, which is as follows:
      (2) Interest of reversioners – The interest of a reversioner is an
      interest expectant on the death of a limited heir and is not a vested    E
      interest. It is a spes successionis or a mere chance of succession
      within the meaning of Section 6, Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
      It cannot, therefore, be sold, mortgaged or assigned, nor can it be
      relinquished. A transfer of a spes successionis is a nullity, and it
      has no effect in law.                                                    F
       23. Under the Hindu Law, a widow took a limited estate. She was
not a trustee for the reversioners. She was owner of the properties. But
she could alienate the property only for necessity or benefit of the estate.
By the State Act, the widow’s estate became stridhana, which by virtue
of Section 11 conferred upon her absolute right to dispose the property        G
either by way of inter vivos transfer or will. The State Act came into
force on 01.01.1934. When the succession opened on Ramanna dying
in 1907, he was survived by both his widow Seethama and also his
daughter Venkamma. Therefore, it is quite clear that Seethama would
not get an absolute right under Section 11 of the State Act. When
                                                                               H
398            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A     succession opened in this case to the estate of Ramanna, in fact, the
      State Act was not in force at that time. The estate which was inherited
      by Seethama was that of a widow. Therefore, be it from stand point of
      Hindu Law as applicable prior to the State Act or the provisions of the
      State Act, Seethama did not acquire absolute rights. As such, the right
      which she had, was the right of the Hindu widow under Hindu Law.
B
             Further, as long as Seethamma - widow of Ramanna was alive,
      no reversioners had any vested interest. The daughter of Ramanna
      (Venkamma) through his first wife passed away in the year 1910. At
      that time, Seethamma the widow of Ramanna was alive. Therefore,
      she (Venkamma) would not get any right in the property. Seethamma
C     died only in the year 1938. When Seethamma died in 1938, no doubt
      Jankamma was alive. It is here that we must consider the argument of
      learned counsel for the respondents that the daughter of a daughter was
      not recognized as a heir. When succession opened upon the death of
      the widow, in this case, namely Seethamma in the year 1938, if Jankamma
D     could be treated as the reversioner being grand daughter of the last full
      owner, then the property would vest in Jankamma.
            24. There would be two obstacles for the appellants:- firstly, it
      would have to be held that Jankamma being the grand daughter of
      Ramanna was a reversioner upon the death of Seethamma, the widow
E     of Ramanna. Secondly, even assuming for a moment that Jankamma
      was the reversioner whether it was incumbent upon her to institute
      proceedings for recovery of possession within 12 years of death of
      Seethamma.
          25. Taking up the second question, we notice the following
F     commentary of Mulla on Hindu Law:
            “207. Reversioner’s suit for possession and limitation._ A suit by
            reversioners, entitled to succeed to the estate on the death of a
            widow or other limited heir, for possession of immovable property
            from an alienee from her must be brought within 12 years from
G           her death (the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Schedule I, Article
            141), and of movable property, within six years from that date.
            Now see Articles 65, 109 and 113 of the new Limitation Act,
            1963.

H
GOPALAKRISHNA (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. ARAYANAGOWDA                                399
       (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. [K.M. JOSEPH, J.]

      The reversioner may sue for possession without suing to have              A
      alienation set aside. The reason is that he is entitled to treat the
      unauthorized alienation as a nullity without the intervention of any
      court.
       26. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed considerable
reliance on the judgment of this Court in Kalipada Chakraborti & Anr.           B
v. Palani Bala Devi & Ors. [AIR 1953 SC 125]. Therein, this Court
dealt with transfer of Shebeiti right by Hindu Widow and the suit by
reversioners challenging the same. This Court held as follows:
      “But all doubts on this point were set at rest by the decision of the
      Privy Council itself in Faggo v. Utsava [(1929) 56 I.A. 267] and          C
      the law can now be taken to be perfectly well settled that except
      where a decree has been obtained fairly and properly and without
      fraud and collusion against the Hindu female heir in respect to a
      property held by her as a limited owner, the cause of action for a
      suit to be instituted by a reversioner to recover such property
      either against an alienee from the female heir or a trespasser who        D
      held adversely to her accrues only on the death of the female
      heir. This principle, which has been recognized in the law of
      limitation in this country ever since 1871 seems to us to be quite in
      accordance with the acknowledged principles of Hindu law. The
      right of reversionary heirs is in the nature of spes succession is,       E
      and as the reversioners do not trace their title through or from the
      widow, it would be manifestly unjust if they are to lose their rights
      simply because the widow has suffered the property to be
      destroyed by the adverse possession of a stranger. The contention
      raised by Mr. Ghose as regards the general principle to be applied
      in such cases cannot, therefore, be regarded as sound.                    F

        Ordinarily, there are two limitations upon a widow’s estate. In
      the first place, her rights of alienation are restricted and the in the
      second place, after her death the property goes not to her heirs
      but to the heirs of the last male owner.”
                                                                                G
      This view has been followed in the judgment reported in AIR
1969 SC 204. The law of limitation relevant at that point of time was the
Indian Limitation Act, 1908. It is crucial to notice Articles 140 and 141:-


                                                                                H
400            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A
       Description of Suit           Period         of   Time from which
                                     Limitation          period begins to run
       140. By a remainderman, a     Twelve years        When his estate falls
       reversioner (other than a                         into possession.
       landlord) or a devisee, for
B      possession of immovable
       property.
       141. Like suit by a Hindu     Twelve years        When     the   female
       or Muhammadan entitled                            dies.
       to the possession of
       immovable property on the
C      death of a Hindu or
       Muhammadan female.


             It is this statutory framework which formed the basis of the law
      laid down by this Court which we have noticed.
D           It is next relevant to notice Section 28 of the Act:-
            “28. Extinguishment of right to property. - At the determination of
            the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for
            possession of any property, his right to such property shall be
            extinguished.”
E
              In other words, while it was open to the reversioners to ignore an
      alienation made by a Hindu widow and the period of limitation would not
      start to run upon a transfer effected by the Hindu widow, undoubtedly,
      the period of limitation for filing a suit for recovery of possession would
      commence upon the death of the widow.
F
            27. The property was alienated by Seethamma, the widow of
      Ramanna in favour of her brother Srinivas Rao in the year 1913.
      Undoubtedly, it was open to the reversioner to proceed on the basis that
      such alienation does not bind her.
             28. Thereafter, in 1938, Seethamma passed away. Even proceeding
G     on the basis that Jankamma, the grand-daughter of Ramanna was a
      reversioner, her estate in expectancy became vested in her, upon the
      death of the Ramanna’s widow, Seethamma in 1938. While it is true that
      it was open to the reversioner to ignore the sale deed executed by the
      widow, as not binding on her, as far as suit for recovery of possession,
H
GOPALAKRISHNA (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. ARAYANAGOWDA                                   401
       (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. [K.M. JOSEPH, J.]

the law clearly provided for a period of 12 years and the period of limitation     A
started with the death of the limited owner, namely, the widow in 1938.
The time started ticking with the passing away of the widow in 1938.
The period of limitation being 12 years, it ran out in 1950. With the running
out of the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1908
(by Articles 140 and 141), the very right of the alleged reversioner
                                                                                   B
Jankamma also came to an end. Thus, when she executed the sale in
the year 1955 in favour of the appellants, she could not have conveyed
any right. That apart, even for a moment, proceeding on the basis that
period of limitation would start from 12 years from 1955 when the sale
deed was executed in favour of the appellants by Jankamma even that
period ran out in 1967. Admittedly, the suits were filed several years             C
even after 1967. Section 31 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as follows:-
       “31 Provisions as to barred or pending suits, etc:- Nothing in this
       Act shall,—
       (a) enable any suit, appeal or application to be instituted, preferred
       or made, for which the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian        D
       Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908), expired before the commencement
       of this Act; or
       (b) affect any suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or
       made before, and pending at, such commencement.”
                                                                                   E
       Quite clearly much before the Limitation Act, 1963 came into
force, the period of limitation for instituting the suits had expired. This is
apart from the effect of not filing such a suit on the very right itself.
      29. In such circumstances, we see no reason to interfere with the
judgment of the High Court. The appeals will stand dismissed with no               F
order as to costs.


Ankit Gyan                                                    Appeals dismissed.


                                                                                   G




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