Holding

The cancellation of the entire examination process was lawful, reasonable and not disproportionate, and therefore the appeals were dismissed.

Summary

The appellants, candidates who had appeared for the Gujarat Revenue Talati examination, challenged the State's decision to cancel the entire recruitment process on grounds of alleged large‑scale malpractices. The State, through a Government Resolution, cancelled the exam and ordered a fresh recruitment, arguing that the integrity of the examination was compromised. The appellants contended that the cancellation was illegal, disproportionate, and violated Article 14 because it treated innocent candidates the same as those who had cheated. The Supreme Court held that the State is empowered to cancel an examination when there is reasonable material indicating large‑scale tampering, and that such a decision does not meet the threshold of Wednesbury unreasonableness or disproportionate infringement of equality. The Court further explained that the proportionality test applies only to discriminatory actions, whereas the present cancellation was a legitimate response to alleged arbitrariness, and that identifying each wrongdoer would be impracticable. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, upholding the State's action.

Issues considered

The legality of the State's cancellation of the entire examination process under administrative law.
Whether the cancellation violates Article 14 of the Constitution as arbitrary or discriminatory.
Whether the Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness applies to the State's decision.
Whether the proportionality test should be applied to assess the fairness of the cancellation.
Whether the State must identify individual candidates guilty of malpractice before cancelling the exam.

Subjects

administrative lawjudicial reviewWednesbury unreasonablenessproportionalityArticle 14examination recruitmentmalpracticespublic interest

Judgment

[2017] 3 S.C.R. 401

GOHIL VISHVARAJ HANUBHAI & OTHERS A
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT & OTHERS
(Civil Appeal Nos. 5680-83of2017)
APRIL 28, 2017 B
[J. CHELAMESWAR AND ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.)
Administrative law - Administrative action - Judicial review
- Power of - On facts, complaint of large scale malpractices in the
entire examination process to the post of Revenue Talati - Issuance C
of Government resolution cancelling the recruitment process and
Government deciding to conduct fresh examination - Challenge to
- High Court held that the GR not illegal and arbitrary -
Interference with - Held: Not called for - Impugned action not
vitiated by lack of nexus with the object sought to be achieved by
the State, by herding all the candidates, those who had resorted to D
malpractice and others who did not, at the examination together -
Innocent candidates including the wrong doers still get an
opportunity of participating in the fresh examination process to be
conducted by the State - Identifying all the candidates who are
guilty of malpractice either by criminal prosecution or even by an
E
administrative enqui1y is a time consuming process - If identijication
of the wrong doers was a must and had to be eliminated from the
selection process, and until such identification is completed the
process cannot be carried on, it would result in a great
inconvenience to the administration as also loss oftime to the innocent
candidates - Judicial review. F
Doctrines/Principles - Principle of Wednesbury s
unreasonableness - Held: A decision which is so outrageous in its
defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible
person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided
could have arrived at it. G
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Normally while exercising the power of judicial
review, the Courts would only examine the decision making
process of the administrative authorities but not the decision
H
401
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A itself. [Para 201[410-GI
Chairman, All India Railway Recruitment Board v. K
Shyam Kumar [20101 6 SCR 291 : (2010) 6 SCC 614;
Sterling Computers Ltd. v. MN. Publications Ltd. [19931
1 SCR 81 : (1993) 1 SCC 445; State of A.P. v. P. V.
B Hanumantha Rao [20031 4 Suppl. SCR 736 : (2003)
10 sec 121 - referred to.
1.2 Purity of the examination process-whether such
examination process pertains to assessment of the academic
accomplishment or suitability of candidates for employment under
c the State-is an unquestionable requirement of the rationality of
any examination process. Rationality is an indispensable aspect
of public administration under the Constitution. The authority of
the State to take appropriate measures to maintain the purity of
any examination process is unquestionable. Where there are
allegations of the occurrence of large scale malpractices in the
D course of the conduct of any examination process, the State or its
instrumentalities are entitled to cancel the examination. This
Court has approved the action of the State or its instrumentalities
to cancel examinations whenever such action is believed to be
necessary on the basis, ~f some reasonable material to indicate
E that the examination process is vitiated. They are also not obliged
to seek proof of each and every fact which vitiated the examination
process. [Para 221 [411-C-E; 412-AI
Ramona Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport
Authority of India & Others [19791 3 SCR 1014 : (1979)
F 3 SCC 489; Union of India v. Anand Kumar Pandey
[19941 1 Suppl. SCR 750 : (1994) 5 sec 663;
Chairman, All India Railway Recruitment Board v.. K
Shyam Kumar [2010] 6 SCR 291 : (2010) 6 SCC 614;
Nidhi Kaim v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others [20161
7 SCR 822 : (2016) 7 SCC 615 - referred to.
G
1.3 There were allegations of large s«;ale tampering with
the examination process. Scrutiny of the answer sheets (OMR)
revealed that there were glaring aberrations which provide prima
facie proof of the occurrence of a large scale tampering of the
examination process. Denying power to the State from taking
H
GOHlL VlSHVARAJ HANUBHAl & OTHERS v. STATE OF 403
GUJARAT & OTHERS

appropriate remedial actions in such circumstances on the ground A
that the State did not establish the truth of those allegations in
accordance with the rules of evidence relevant for the proof of
facts in a Court of Jaw (either in a criminal or a civil proceeding),
would neither be consistent with the demands of larger public
interest nor would be conducive to the efficiency of administration. B
No binding precedent is brought to the notice which compels to
hold otherwise. It cannot be said that there is no proof of tampering
with the examination process on a large scale as asserted by the
respondent, but there are only allegations of such tampering, the
truth of which has never been tested by any established precess
of law, thus, the decision of the respondent to cancel the C
examination in its entirety is without any basis in law. [Paras 21,
23][411-B; 412-B-D]
1.4 The principle of Wednesbury's unreasonableness is that
"a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of
accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied D
his mind to the question to be dedded could have arrived at it".
Having regard to the nature of the allegations and the prima facie
proof indicating the possibility of occurrence of large scale
tampering with the examination process which led to the impugned
action, it cannot be said that the impugned action of the
E
respondent is "so outrageous in its defiance of logic" or "woral
standards". (Para 24J(412-E; 413-A-B)
1.5 There were large scale malpractices at the examination
process and the State was entitled to take appropriate remedial
action. In such malpractice obviously there can be two classes of
candidates: those who had resorted to malpractice and others F
who did not. By the impugned action, no doubt, all of them were
treated alike. (Para 29J(415-D-EJ
1.6 Identifying all the candidates who are guilty of
malpractice either by criminal prosecution or even by an
administrative enquiry is certainly a time consuming process. If G
it were to be the requirement of law that such identification of
the wrong doers is a must and only the identified wrongdoers be
eliminated from the selection process, and until such identification
is completed the process cannot be carried on, it would not only
result in a great inconvenience to the administration, but ;ilso H
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A result in a loss of time even to the innocent candidates. On the
other hand, by virtue of the impugned action, the innocent
candidates (all candidates including wrong doers) still get an
opportunity of participating in the fresh examination process to
be conducted by the State. The only legal disadvantage if at all is
B that some of them might have crossed the upper age limit for
appearing in the fresh recruitment process. That aspect of the
matter is taken care of by the State. Therefore, it cannot be said
that the impugned action is vitiated by lack of nexus with the
object sought to be achieved by the State, by herding all the
candidates at the examination together. There is no reason to
C interfere with the impugned judgment.[Paras 29, 301[415-F-H;
416-A-B)
Tata Cellular v. Union of India [1994) 2 Suppl. SCR
122: (1994) 6 SCC 651; Siemens Public Communication
v. Union of India AIR 2009 SC 1204 : [2008) 15 SCR
D 585; Om Kumar & Others v. Union of India [2000] 4
Suppl. SCR 693 : (2001) 2 SCC 386 - referred to.
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbwy
Corporation (1948) 1 KB 223; Council of Civil Service
Unions v. Minister for Civil Service (1984) 3 All ER
E 935 (HL) - referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 122 referred to Para 19
[2008] 15 SCR 585 referred to Para 19
F [2010) 6 SCR 291 referred to Para 20
[1993] 1 SCR 81 referred to Para 20
[2003) 4 Suppl. SCR 736 referred to Para 20
[1979] 3 SCR 1014 referred to Para 22
G [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 750 referred to. Para 22
[2000] 4 Suppl. SCR 693 referred to Para 26
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 5680-
5683 of2017.
H
GOHIL VISHVARAJ HANUBHAI & OTHERS v. STATE OF 405
GUJARAT & OTHERS

From the Judgment and Order dated 27.06.2016 of the High A
Court of Gujarat atAhmedabad in Letters Patent Appeal No. 73 of2016
in Special Civil Application No. 11i49of2015 with Letters Patent Appeal
No. 74 of2016 in CivilApplicationNo. Il685 of2015 with Civil Application
No. 1066 of2016 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 74 of 2016 with Special
Civil Application No. 11149 of2015. ·s
Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, Sr. Adv, Anshul Narayan, Nilesh A. Pandya,
Prem Prakash, Advs. for the Appellants.
Ms. Manisha Lav Kumar, Ms. Jesal Wahi, Ms. Marnia. Singh,
Mrs. Hemantika Wahi, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by C
CHELAMESWAR, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals are preferred against the final judgement dated
27 June 2016 of the High court of Gujarat in Letters Patent Appeal No.
73 of2016 in Special Civil Application No. 11149 of 2015 with Letters
Patent Appeal No. 74 of2016 in Civil Application No. 11685 of2015 D
with Civil Application No.1066 of2016 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 74
of2016 with Special Civil Application No 11149 of2015. The facts leading
to the instant litigation are as follows:
3.TheAppellants herein are candidates who successfully appeared
in the examination conducted by the ~espondents for recrnitment to the E
post of Revenue Talati but were not appointed.
4. The State of Gujarat decided to create a new post of Revenue
Talati, under the control of the Revenue Department. Revenue talatis
are to maintain revenue records, collect revenue etc. The creation of
these posts is meant to ease the burden on existing talati-cum-mantris p
who were under the control of the Panchayat Department, performing
duties relating to maintenance ofland records and various duties incidental
thereto.
5. A total of 1800 posts of Revenue Talati were created by a
Govemrilent Resolution dated 23.10.2008. Ordinarily recruitment to such G
post js carried out by Gujarat Subordinate Service Selection Eoard
(GSSSB). The board was requested to do so. The board expressed its
inability to undertake the task within the time frame decided by the state.
6. Given the urgency of the situation, the Revenue board of the
State of Gujarat decided to undertake the recruitment process by itself.
H
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A The proposal was approved by the State by a Resolution dated4.12.2013
(for convenience GR-I) of the General Administration Department. By
another GR dated 11.12.2013, the Revenue Talati Recrnitment Committee
(hereafter COMMITTEE) was constituted under the chairmanship of
Revenue Inspection Commissioner, who is an Ex-Officio Secretary to
the State of Gujarat with Collector, Ahmedabad and Collector,
B
Gandhinagar and Joint Secretary of Revenue department as Members
of the COMMITTEE, to "carry out the procedure of direct recruitment"
and matters incidental thereto and subject to the various limitations
imposed under the said GR. The COMMITTEE decided to avail the
assistance of Gujarat Technological University (hereinafter GTU) for
C conducting the examination. 1
7. On 15.1.2014 an advertisement for filling up of 1500 posts of
Revenue Talatis was published. Performance of the candidates at an
objective type written examination for 100 marks was stipulated to be
the basis for selection. The examination was conducted in 2691 centres
D spread over 33 districts. 7,53,703 candidates appeared in the examination.
8. A day prior to the examination, i.e., 15.02.2014, a crime was
registered in F.l.R. No.46 of 2014 in Sector-7 police station, Gandhinagar
under sections 406, 420 and 144 of the Indian Penal Code against two
persons, namely Kalyanish Mulsinh and Nileshbhai Umeshbhai Shah.
E The allegation is that they had collected money from some of the
candidates who were to appear in the said examination by assuring them
appointments.
9. However the examination process went ahead. In the process
of evaluating the OMR sheets, it was noticed that a large number of
F OMR sheets had specific markings. On 26.05.2014 the police authorities
informed the Chai1man of the COMMITTEE that during inte1Togation
of the two arrested persons, it emerged that they had advised the
candidates to put a 'b' mark on the right side of the OMR sheet.
I 0. Thereafter, the entire data was sent to a forensic science
G laboratory for further investigation. The investigation revealed 284 OMR
' The Recruitment Committee has resolved to hand over the procedure of setting
question paper; taking examination and declaring results, thereof, to the Gujarat
Technological University, and hence, for the aforesaid purpose, you are requested to
send the rates chargeable for each procedure to the Department, at the earliest. -
Letter of the Member Secretary, Recruitment Committee to Registrar, GTU
H dated 15.1.2014
GOHlL VISHVARAJ HANUBHAI & OTHERS v. STATE OF 407
GUJARAT & OTHERS [CHELAMESWAR, J.]

sheets with the specific mark. The COMMITTEE decided to eliminate A
those candidates from consideration. Therefore, a provisional merit list
was declared on 10.10.2014. 8465 candidates were placed in the list.
11. In the meanwhile, complaints were received by different
authorities of the State alleging the commission of a large number of
malpractices in connection with the examination: B
- a complaint from Bhubhai Damor on 17.10.2014.
- The Collector, Sabrakantha District forwarded a complaint
received by him from Mr R.D. Patel detailing various
irregularities.
c
- Similar complaint of irregularities was addressed to the Principal
Secretary, General Administration Department by one
Kameshbhai from Rupakheda, District Dahod.
- Another complaint was filed in the local crime branch of
Surendranagar against one Hiren Narottambhai Kaoisha alleging D
that he had collected an amount of Rs.1.55 crores from 62
candidates.
- Further complaint alleging that one Dhirubhai Bhil, who was
working as a peon in the office of the Secretary, Land Reforms
and one woman employee from the same office had accepted E
money from a number of candidates promising to ensure that
these candidates would clear the examination. The Secretary,
Land Reforms was also the Chairman of the Recruitment
Committee.
12. In view of receipt of a large number of complaints, the
F
COMMITTEE probed into the matter. Some i1regularities were noticed.
For example, 127 candidates belonging to one family were placed b the
provisional merit list. 178 candidates were found to have given same
residential addresses. Both these sets of candidates had 47 candidates
in common etc.
13. The COMMITTEE thought it fit to cancel the entire G
examination process. Accordingly, Government issued orders by a
Resolution dated 03.07.2015 (hereafter GR-II) cancelling the recruitment
process. It was further ordered inter alia thereunder:
"3. On cancelling the entire recruitment procedure for filling-up
H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A the 1500 posts of Revenue Tai ati class and by adding 900 vacancies
from the other years, it is, hereby, resolved to fill-up the total 2400
posts through Gujarat Subsidiary Service Selection Boad.
4. As stated at No.I, the candidates, whose name figured in the
list, whose upper age limit is about to attain, now, as they shall not
B be entitled to appear in the examination that shall be conducted
now, as a special case, a relaxation of five years is given in the
upper age limit."
14. Aggrieved by the abovementioned GR, the appellants herein
filed a Writ Petition (Special Civil Application No.11149/2015) seeking a
c declaration that the GR was illegal and arbitrary. Further the Petitioners
filed an application (Civil Application No. 11685 of2015) seeking to
restrain the Respondents from publishing any fresh advertisements for
recruitment. The Gujarat High Court vide an Interim Order dated
14.12.2015 disposed of Civil Application No.11685 of2015 allowing the
Respondents to proceed with fresh recruitment for 980 seats. The
D Petitioners filed LPAsNo.73 and 74 of2016 challenging the 14.12.2015
order. The Petitioners also filed an application seeking a stay on fresh
recruitment being LPA No.74/2016. The Gujarat High Court dismissed
all apolications and appeals vi de the impugned judgment holding that the
decision of the COMMITTEE was not unreasonable since there was
E some material on the basis of which the decision was made, viz. the
various allegations that· have cast a shadow over the sanctity of the
recruitment process. Hence this appeal.
15. The appellants argued (i) that cancellation of the exal'!lination
without any investigation or proof of the allegations of a vitiated
F examination process is illegal; (ii) the legality of the GR-II must be tested
on the touchstone of the principle of'Wednesbury Reasonableness' and
the principle ofproportionality; (iii) Tested in the light of the twin principles
mentioned above, the decision of the COMMITTEE is both unreasonable
and disproportionate to the alleged mischief, unreasonable since it is
based on the irrelevant consideration of the embarrassment caused to
G the governrnent and disproportionate since the allegations pertain to a
small number of candidates whose candidature could have been
segregated and,..rejected.
16. Two questions need to be examined:
(1) What are the principles which govern the jurisdiction of the
H
GOHIL VISHVARAJ HANUBHAI & OTHERS v. STATE OF 409
GUJARAT & OTHERS [CHELAMESWAR, J.]

Courts which exercise the power of judicial n;view of A
administrative action in the context of a situation like the one
presented by the facts of these appeals;
(2) Whether those legal principles are strictly followed by the
respondents while taking the impugned decision?
17. The basic principles governing the judicial review of 8
administrative action are too well settled. Two judgments which are
frequently quoted in this regard are - Associated Provincial Pirture
Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbu,ry Corporatio,,Z and Council ofCivil Service
Unions v. Minister for Civil Service1.,
. 18. Lord Dip lock in his celebrated _opinion in Council of Civil C
Service Unions summarised the principles as follows:
" ... Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when
without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the
development has come about, one can conveniently classify under
three heads the grounds upon which administrative action is subject D
to control. by judicial review. The first ground I would call
"illegality," the second "irrationality" and the third "procedural
impropriety." That is not to say that further development on a
case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds.
I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of E
the principle of "proportionality" which is recognised in the
administrative law of several of our fellow members of the
European Economic Commtmity; but to dispose of the instant case
the three already well-established heads that I have mentioned
will suffice. By "illegality" as a ground for judicial review I mean
that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that F
regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it.
Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to
be decided, in the event of dispute, by those persons, the judges,
by .whom the judicial power of the state is exercisable. By
"irrationality" I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to G
as "'Wednesbury unreasonableness" (Associated Provincial
Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB
223). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance
2 (1948) I KB223

' 1984 3 All ER 935 (HL)
H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 3 S.C.R.

A of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person
who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have
arrived at it. Whether a decision fi1lls within this category is a
question that judges by their training and experience should be
well equipped to answer, or else there would be something badly
wrong with our judicial system. To justify the court's exercise of
B
this role, resort I think is today no longer needed to Viscount
Radcliffe's ingenious explanation in Edwards v. Bairstow [1956]
AC 14 of irrationality as a ground for a court's reversal of a
decision by ascribing it to an inferred though unid~ntifiable mistake
of law by the decision-maker. "Irrationality" by now can stand
c upon its own feet as an accepted ground on which a decision may
be attacked by judicial review. I have described the third head as
"procedural impropriety" rather than failure to observe basic rules
of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards
the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because
susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure
D
by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are
expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its
jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve
any denial ofnatural justice. But the instant case is not concerned
with the proceedings ofan administrative tribtmalat all."
E
It can be seen from the above extract, Lord Diplock identified
three heads under which judicial review is undertaken, i.e., illegality,
irrationality and procedural impropriety. He also recognised the possibility
of new heads such as 'proportionality' being identified in future. He
explained the concepts of the three already identified heads. He declared
F that the head 'irrationality' is synonymous with 'Wednesbury
unreasonableness'.
19. The principle laid down in Council of Civil Service Unions
has been quoted with approval by this Court in Tata Cellular v. Union
of India' and Siemens Public Communication v. Union of India 5•
G 20. Normally while exercising the power of judicial review, Courts
would only examine the decision making process of the administrative
authorities but not the decision itself. The said principle has been
sec
• (1994) 6 651
' AIR 2009 SC 1204
H
GOHIL VISHVARAJ HANUBHAI & OTHERS v. STATE OF 411
GUJARAT & OTHERS [CHELAMESWAR, J.]

repeatedly stated by this Court on number of occasions. 6 A
21. We shall now examine the questions raised by the appellants
in the light of the abovementioned principles in which judicial review of
administrative action is undertaken.
The 1" submission of the appellant is that there is no proof of
tampering with the examination process on a large scale as asserted by B
the respondent, but there are only allegations of such tampering, the
truth of which has never been tested by any established process oflaw.
Therefore, the decision of the respondent' to cancel the, examination in
its entirety is without any basis in law.
22. Purity of the examination process -whether such examination c
process pertains to assessment of the academic accomplishment or
suitability of candidates for employment under the State - is an
unquestionable requirement of the rationality of any examination process.
Rationality is an indispensable aspect of public administration under our
Constitution7 • The authority of the State to take appropriate measures D
to maintain the purity of any examination process is unquestionable: It is
too well settled a principle oflaw in light of the various earlier decisions
of this Court that where there are allegations of the occurrence of large
scale malpractices in the course of the conduct of any examination
process, the State or its instrumentalities are entitled to cancel the
examination. 8 This Court has on numerous occasions approved the action E
6
Chairman, All India Railway Recruitment Board Vs. K Shyam Kumar, ( 20 I 0) 6
SCC 614 at para 21; Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M.N. Publications Ltd., (1993) I
SCC 445; State of A.P. v. P.V. Hanumantha Rao, (2003) JO SCC 121
7
Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India & Others, ( 1979)
3 sec 489
'Nidhi Kaim v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others, (2016) 7 SCC 615 at para 23: f
"Even otherwise, the argument of the appellants is required to be rejected fdr the
following reasons: Under the scheme of our Constitution, the executive power·ofthe
State is co-extensive with its legislative power. In the absence of any operative legislation,
the executive power could certainly be exercised to protect the public interest. The
right of each one of the appellants herein for admission to the medical colleges in the
State of Madhya Pradesh is itself an emanation of the State's executive action. No
doubt, even executive action of the State can create rights. Unless there is something G
either in the Constitution-or law which prohibits the abrogation or abridgment of rights,
it is permissible for the State to do so by executive action in accordance with some
specified procedure oflaw. No doubt,Jhat the overarching requirementofConstitution
is that every action of the State must be informed with reason and must be in public
interest. Nothing has been brought to our notice which prohibits the impugned executive
action. If it is established that the adoption of unfair means on large scale resulted in the
eontamination of the entrance examination (PMT) process of successive years, the State H
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 3 S.C.R.

A of the State or its instrumentalities to cancel examinations whenever
such action is believed to be necessary on the basis of some reasonable
material to indicate that the examination process is vitiated. They are
also not obliged to seek proof of each and every fact which vitiated the
examination process. 9
B 23. Coming to the case on hand, there were allegations of large
scale tampering with the examination process. Scrutiny of the answer
sheets (OMR) revealed that there were glaring aberrations which provide
prima facie proof of the occurrence of a large scale tampering of the
examination process. Denying power to the State from taking appropriate
remedial actions in such circumstances on the ground that the State did
C not establish the truth of those allegations in accordance with the rules
of evidence relevant for the proof of facts in a Court of law (either in a
criminal or a civil proceeding), would neither be consistent with the
demands oflarger public interest nor would be conducive to the efficiency
ofadministration. No binding precedent is brought to our notice which
D compels us to hold otherwise. Therefore, the 1" submission is rejected.
24. The next question is whether the impugned decision could be
sustained judged in the light of the principles of 'Wednesbury
unreasonableness'. In the language of Lord Diplock, the principle is that
"a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance oflogic or ofaccepted
E moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the
undoubtedly would have the power to take appropriate action t9 protect the public
interest. I, therefore, reject the submission of the appellants.";
In the case of Union ofIndia v. Anand K11mar Pandey, 1994 5 SCC 663 large scale
cheating occurred in the Railway Recruitment Board Examination, specifically in two
rooms of a center. The Board took a decision to subject the successful candidates
from that center to a re-examination. This was set aside by the Central Administrative
F Tribunal on the ground that such a decision was taken in violation of the principles
of natural justice. It was held that there cannot be any straight-jacket formula for the
application of the principles of natural justice. This Court did not find any fault
with the decision to conduct a fresh examination.;
In the case of Chairman All India Railway Recr11itment Board & Another v. K.
Shyam K11mar & Others, 2010 6 SCC 6 I 4, largMcale malpractices surfaced in the
G written test. The recruitment board ordered a retest, which was challenged in the
Central Administrative Tribunal. The tribunal held that a retest was valid. High Court
reversed invoking the wednesbmy's principles ofreasonableness. This Court held that
in the face of such large scale allegations suppo1ted by rep01ts ofthe vigilance department
and the CBI, the High Court was wrong in reversing the tribunal's decision.
' Nidhi Kaim v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others, (2016) 7 SCC 615 see para 42.1
H 'and 42.2 at 649
GOHIL VISHVARAJ HANUBHAI & OTHERS v. STATE OF 413
GUJARAT & OTHERS [CHELAMESWAR, J.]

question to be decided could have arrived at it''. Having regard to the A
nature of the allegations and the prima facie proofindicating the possibility
of occurrence of large scale tampering with the examination process
which led to the impugned action, it cannot be said that the impugned
action of the respondent is "so outrageous in its defiance of logic" or
"moral standards". Therefore, the 211d st1bmission of the appellant ·is B
also required to be rejected.
25. We are left with the 3rd question -whether the magnitude of
the impugned action is so disproportionate to the mischief sought to be
addressed by the respondents that the cancellation of the entire
examination process affecting lakhs of candidates cannot be justified on
the basis of doctrine of proportionality. C
26. The doctrine of proportionality, its origin and its application
both in the context oflegislative and administrative action was considered
in some detail by this Court in Om Kumar & Others v. U11ion ofIndia,
(2001) 2 sec 386.
D
This Court drew a distinction between administrative action which
affects fundamental freedoms 10 under Articles 19(1) and 21 and
administrative action which is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India. This Court held that in the context of the violation of
fundamental freedoms;
E
"54 ...... the proportionality of administrative action affecting the
freedoms under Article 19(1) or Article 21 has been tested by the
courts as a primary reviewing authority and not on the basis of
Wednesbury principles. It may be that the courts did not call this
proportionality but it really was.
F
This Court, thereafter took note of the fact that the Supreme Court
oflsrael recognised proportionality as a separate ground in administrative
law to be different from unreasonableness.
27. It is nobody's case before us that the impugned action is violative
of any of the fundamental freedoms of the appellants. We are called G
upon to examine the proportionality of the administrative action only on
the ground of violation ofArticle 14. It is therefore necessary to examine
the principles laid down by this Court in this regard.
This Court posed the question in Ornkar's Case;
" See paras 52 to 54
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414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A 61. When does the court apply, under Article 14, the proportionality
test as a primary reviewing authority and when does the court
apply the Wednesbury rule as a secondary reviewing authority?
From the earlier review of basic principles, the answer becomes
simple. In fact, we have further guidance in this behalf.
B and concluded;
"66. It is clear from the above discussion that in India where
administrative action is challenged under Article 14 as being
discriminatory, equals are treated unequally or unequals are treated
equally, the question is for the Constitutional Courts as primary
c reviewing courts to consider c~rrectness of the level of
discrimination applied and whether it is excessive and
whether it has a nexus with the objective intended to be
achieved by the administrator. Here the court deals with the
merits of the balancing action of the administrator and is, in essence,
applying "proportionality" and is a primary reviewing authority.
D
67. But where an administrative action is challenged as "arbitrary"
under Article 14 on the basis of E.P Royappa v. State of T.N.,
(1974) 4 sec 3, (as in cases where punishments in disciplinary
cases are challenged), the question will be whether the
administrative order is "rational" or "reasonable" and the test then
E is the Wednesbury test. The courts would then be confined
only to a secondary role and will only have to see whether
.the administrator has done well in his primary role, whether
he has acted illegally or has omitted relevant factors from
·consideration or has taken irrelevant factors into
F consideration or whether his view is one which no
reasonable person could have taken. If his action does not
satisfy these rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary. In G.B. Mahajan
v. Jalgaon Municipal Council, (1991) 3 SCC 91, Venkatachaliah,
J. (as he then was) pointed out that "reasonableness" of the
· administrator under Article 14 in the context of administrative law
G has to be judged from the stand point of Wednesbury rules. In
Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651, Indian
Express Newspapers Bombay (P) Ltd. v. Union ofIndia, (1985)
1 SCC 641, Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union
of India, (1989) 4 SCC 187, and U.P Financial Corpn. V. Gem
H Cap (India) (P) Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 299, while judging whether
GOHIL VISHVARAJ HANUBHAI & OTHERS v. STATE OF 415
GUJARAT & OTHERS [CHELAMESWAR, J.]

the administrative action is "arbitrary" under Article 14 (i.e. A
otherwise then being discriminatory), this Court has confined itself
to a Wednesbury review always.
68. Thus, when administrative action is attacked as discriminatory
under Article 14, the principle of primary review is for the courts
by applying proportionality. However, where administrative action B
is questioned as "arbitrary" under Article 14, the principle of
secondary review based on Wednesbury principles applies."
28. The submission by the appellants is that the mere fact that
some of the candidates resorted to some malpractice cannot lead to the
conclusion that the entire examination process is required to be cancelled c
as it would cause undue hardship to huge number of innocent candidates.
In other words, the appellants urge this Court to apply the primary review
test.
29. We have already held that there were large scale malpractices
at the examination process and the State was entitled to take appropriate D
remedial action. In the context of the occurrence of such malpractice
obviously there can be two classes of candidates: those who had resorted
to malpractice and others who did not. By the impugned action, no
doubt, all of them were treated alike. Whether such herding together
would amount to the denial of the equal protection guaranteed under
Article 14? is the question. E

Identifying all the candidates who are guilty of malpractice either
by criminal prosecution or even'by an administrative enquiry is certainly
a time consuming process. If it were to be the requirement of law that
such identification ofthe wrong doers is a must and only the identified
wrongdoers be eliminated from the selection process, and until such F
identification is completed the process cannot be carried on, it would not
only result in a great inconvenience to the administration, but also result
in a loss of time even to the innocent candidates. On the other hand, by
virtue of the impugned action, the innocent candidates (for that matter
all the candidates including the wrong doers) still get an opportunity of G
participating in the fresh examination process to be conducted by the
State. The only legal disadvantage if at all is that some of them might
have crossed the upper age limit for appearing in the fresh recruitment
process. That aspect of the matter is taken care of by the State.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned action is vitiated by lack
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416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A of nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the State, by herding
all the candidates at the examination together.
30. We see no reason to interfere with the judgment under appeal.
The appeals are, therefore, dismissed, with no order as to costs.

B
Nidbi Jain Appeals dismissed.