GM. (OPERATIONS) S.B.I. &ANR.versusR. PERIYASAMY

                     .[2014] 14 S.C.R. 929


            GM. (OPERATIONS) s. s.1 &ANR.                    A
                               v.
                        R. PERIYASAMY
                 (Civil Appeal No.10942 of 2014)
                     DECEMBER 10, 2014                       B
      [J. CHELAMESWAR AND S. A. BOBDE, JJ.]
     Service Law:
      Dismissal - Bank employee - Charged with being
accountable for shortage detected in the currency chest and  c
with excessive outside borrowings in violation of service rules
- Found guilty by disciplinary authority and was terminated
from service - Order upheld in departmental appeal - Writ
petition by the delinquent-Allowed by Single Judge of High
Courl and further upheld by Division Bench of High Court -   o
On appeal, held: The High Court, in exercise of jurisdiction
u/Arl. 226 of Constitution was not justified in going into the
question of adequacy of evidence - High Court, therefore,
was not correct in setting aside the dismissal order- However,
in the facts of the case employee-Bank directed to pay a sum E
of Rs. 3 lakhs to the delinquent-employee - State Bank of
India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules, 1975 - r.49(h) -
Constitution of India -Art. 226.
     Disciplinary proceeding- Standard ofproof- Held: The
standard of proof in disciplinary pro_ceeding is that of. F.
preponderance of probabilities arid not proof beyond
reasonable doubt- Evidence.
             '
     Maxims - 'Omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta' -
Applicability of.
     Allowing the appeal, the Court                          G

    HELD : 1. The Single Judge committed an error in
approaching the issue by asking whether the findings
have been arrived on acceptable evidence or not and
                                                             H
                              929
930       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2014] 14 S.C.R.

A coming to the conclusion that there was no acceptable
  evidence, and that in any case the evidence was not
  sufficient. In doing so, the Single Judge lost sight of the
  fact that the permissible enquiry was whether there is
  no evidence on which the eriquiry officer could have
B arrived at the findings or whether there was any
  perversity in the findings. Whether the evidence was
  acceptable or not, was a wrong question, unless it raised
  a question of admissibility. Also, the Single Judge was
  not entitled to go into the question of the adequacy of
c evidence and come to the conclusion that the evidence
  was not sufficient to hold the respondent guilty.
  [Para 9][939-D-G]
                                                    •
       2. The Single Judge wrongly observed that the
  concept of preponderance of, probabilities is alien to
D domestic enquiries. A disciplinary proc~eding is not a
  criminal 'trial and thus, the standard of proof required is
  that of preponderance of probabilities and not proof
  beyond reasonable doubt. A disciplinary authority is
  expected to prove the charges leveled against a bank-
E officer on the preponderance of probabilities and not on
  proof beyond reasonable doubt. [Para 10][939-G-H;
  940-A-B]
          Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur (1972) 4 SCC
          618 ; State Bank of India & ors. v. Ramesh Dinkar
 F        Punde (2006) 7 SCC 212 : 2006 (4) Suppl.
          SCR 511 ; State Bank of India v. Narendra Kumar
          Pandey(2013) 2 SCC 740: 2013 (3) SCR 1109;
          Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan (1998) 4
          SCC 310 ; Commissioner of Police New Delhi &
G         Anr. v. Mehar Singh (2013) 7 SCC 685 ; R.P.
          Kapur v. Union of/ndia AIR 1964 SC 787 : 1964
          SCR 431 - relied on.                      •
        3. In administrative law,' it is a settled principle that
 H the onus. of proof rests upon the party alleging the
   GM. (OPERATIONS) S.B.I &ANR. v. R. PERIYASAMY           931


 invalidity of an order. There is a presumption that the. A
 decision or executive order is properly and validly made,
 a p.resumption expressed in the maxim omnia
 praesumuntur rite esse acta which means 'all things are
 presumed to be done in due form. [Para 10][941-C-D]
      Minister of National Revenue v. Wright's Canadian    B
      Ropes Ltd. (1947) AC 109 at 122 ; Associated
     .Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury
      Cpn. (1948) 1 KB 223 at 228 ; Fawcett Properties
      Ltd. v. Buckingham County Council (1959) Ch.
      543 at 575, affirmed (1961) AC 636 ; Point ofAyr     C
      Collieries Ltd. v. Lloyd - George (1943) 2 All ER
      546 - referred to.
      4. It was not permissible for the High Court to
 proceed to draw an inference that there was a failure of
 natural justice in the bank having denied certain 0
 documents, in absence of proof that any such letter
 demanding certain documents was received by the
 appellant-Bank. An administrative authority such as the
 appellant, cannot be put to proof of the facts or
 conditions on which the validity of its order must depend, E
 unless the respondent-employee can produce evidence
 which will shift the burden of proof on the shoulders of
 the appellant. How much evidence is required for this
 purpose will always depend on the nature of that
 particular case. [Para 11][942-A-C]                        F
       5. The Division Bench approved the findings of the
  Single Judge that the inquiry report that the shortage of
  cash occurred only between 16.11.1985 and 05.04.1986,
  when the respondent was a joint custodian, was based G
  on surmise and conjecture, without adverting to the
  evidence. That evidence was rightly relied on by the
  enquiry officer which established that the shortage did
. occur between 16.11.1.985 and 05.04.1986. [Para 12]
  [942-D-F]
                                                           H
932        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2014] 14 S.C.R.


A      6. Sufficiency or adequacy of evidence is not the
  ground on which the findings of facts may be set-aside
  by the High Court under Article 226. The justification
  offered by the Division Bench that the Single Judge had
  to undertake the exercise of analysing the findings of
B the enquiry officer because the appellants had deprived
  the respondent of his livelihood is wholly untenable. A
  transgression of jurisdiction cannot be justified on the
  ground of consequences, as has been done. [Para
  12)[942-H; 943-A-B]
C      Mathura Prasad v. Union of/ndia & Ors. (2007) 1
       sec 437 : 2006 (8) suppl. scR 264 -
       distinguished
           .7. The Division Bench was also not correct in
      offering the justification that there was no failure on the
0     part of the respondent to observe utmost devotion to
      duty because the. case was not one of misappropriation
      but only of a shortage of money. [Para 12][943-C-D]
         8. Therefore, the impugned order is s.et aside and
 E the writ petition of the respondent is dismissed. However,
   having regard to the circumstances of the case, the
   appellant to pay an adhoc· sum of Rs.3,00,000/- to the
   respondent employee who retired long ago and has
   drawn pension of which he will be deprived hereafter.
 F [Paras 13 and 14)[943-D-F]       '
          State ofAndhra Pradesh and others v. Shri Rama
          Rao AIR 1963 SC 1723 : 1964 SCR 25 ; State
        · Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand
          Nalwaya (2011) 4 SCC 584: 2011 (3) SCR 589 -
                                     1
 G        referred to.                  ·

           Potato Marketing Board v. Merricks (1958) 2 QB
           316 at 331 ; Cannock Chase DC,v. Kelly (1978)
           1 WLR 1 - referred to.                      ·

 H
  GM. (OPERATIONS) S.B.I &ANR. v. R. PERIYASAMY                 933


                CASE LAW REFERENCE                              A
1964 SCR 25                referred to           Para 7
2011 (3) SCR 589            referred to          Para 8
(1972) 4 sec 618            relied on            Para 10
                                                                B
2006 (4) Suppl. SCR 511 relied on                P~ra 10

2013 (3) SCR 1109           relied on            Para 10
(1998) 4 sec 310            relied on            Para 10
(2013) 1 sec 685            relied on            Para 10        c
1964 SCR 431                relied on            Para 10
(1947) AC 109at122          referred to          Para 10
(1948) 1 KB 223 at 228      referred to          Para 10
(1959) Ch. 543 at 575       referred to          Para 10        D
(1961)AC 636                referred to          Para 10
(1943) 2 All ER 546         referred to          Para 10
(1.958) 2 QB 316 at 331     referred to          Para 11
                                                                E
(1978) 1WLR1                referred to          Para 11
2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 264 distinguished            Para 12
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
10942 of2014.
                                                                F
     From the Judgment and Order dated 30.08.2007 of the
High Court of Judicature at Madras in Writ Appeal No. 2375
of 1999.
     Vikas Singh, Sr. Adv., Sanjay Kapur, Anmol Chandan,
Ms. Priyanka Das, Ms. Daisy Hannah, Advs. for the Appellants.   G
    Guru Krishna Kumar, Sr. Adv., S. R. Setia, Adv. for the
Respondent.


                                                                H
934        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2014] 14 S.C.R.


A         The Judgment of the C_ourt was delivered by
          S. A. BOBDE, J. 1. Leave granted.
        2. The appellant, General Manager of the State Bank of
  India has preferred this appeal against the Judgment and Final
B Order dated 30.08.2007 passed by the High Court of
  Judicature at Madras in Writ Appeal No. of 2375 of 1999. By
  the impugned Judgment the High Court. dismissed the
  appellant's Writ Appeal and confirmed the finding and
  Judgment of the learned Single Judge by which the
C resp·ondent's Writ Petition was allowed and the orders
  dismissing him from servi.ce were set aside.
          3. The respondent.- Periyasamy, was serving as a
   Permanent Cash Officer at the Dharmapuri Bra rich 'of the State
   Bank of India in 1986. In a departmental enquiry, he was
 0 charged    with being accountable for a shortage detected in
   the currency chest in his joint custody along with one Ganesan.
   By the second charge, he was charged with not adhering to
   the laid down instructions regarding currency chest transactions
   and for committing lapses in the maintenance of the currency
 E chest register. By the third charge, he was charged with
   excessive outside borrowings in violation of Rule 41 (i) of the
   State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules ...
                ·      •   •. f   1   •   r
         4. An enquiry was duly conducted. The charged officer,
   the respondent, was given an opportunity to defend himself
 F and an Inquiry Report dated 03. 11. 1986 was submitted to the
   disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority considered the
   entire report ·and after discussing the same came to the
   conclusion that there was a preponderance of the probability
   thatthe respondent had been surreptitiously removing currency
 G notes from the chest over a period oftime, the shortage being
   Rs. 1,25,000/-. The disciplinary authority also took note of the
   fact that he was lending money to others, even without a
   pronote indicating that he had large amounts of cash. The
   disciplinary authority, therefore, recommended the dismissal
 H of the respondent from the service of the Bank in terms of Rule
  GM. (OPERATIONS) S.B.I &ANR. v. R. PERIYASAMY                  935
               [S. A. BOBDE, J.]

49(h) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Rules by    A
an order dated 27'h July, 1989. Thereafter, the Chief General
Manager considered the Inquiry Report· and the
recommendation of the disciplinary authority and concurred
with the views of the disciplinary authority. Against the
dismissal, the respondent preferred an appeal under the          B
Service Rules of the Bank. However, the appeal was also
turned down by the order dated 14.05.1990. Against the said
orders, the respondent preferred a Writ Petition before the
Madras High Court.As observed earlier, the learned Single
Judge allowed the petition and the Division Bench dismissed      c
the appeal against the petition. Hence, the Bank has preferred
this appeal.
      5. While the respondent was working as a Cash Officer,
at the Dharmapuri Branch with Ganesan, the branch-
accountant, as a joint custodian, the Branch inspection took D
place between 20.02.1986 to 05.04.1986. The respondent
had been working as the Cash Officer from 16.11.1985. Certain
irregularities were found in the inspection. As a result of the
irregularities, instructions were given to follow the dual locking
system for the storage bins where cash was stored and for the E
dividing doors with effect from 05.04.1986. On that very night,
the respondent met with an accident. The strong room keys
which were supposed to be in the physical possession of the
respondent were found in his Cupboard in the Branch. From
07 .04.1986 to 09.04.1986, one Swaminathan Officiated as the F
Cash Officer. From 10.04.1986to 11.04.1986, one N Krishnan
officiated as the Cash Officer. From 12.04.1986 to
17.04.1986, again, Shri Swaminathan officiated as the Cash
Officer. According to the appellant, there was no transfer of
not~.s from the operative bins of the bank to the storage bins G
and there was no cash withdrawal from the storage bins
between 05.04.1986 to 14.04.1986. On 15.4.1986, a cash
shortage of Rs.40,000/- was noticed by the officiating Cash
Officer. Therefore, the verification of the entire currency chest
was conducted, which showed a total cash shortage of H
936       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               . [2014] 14 S.C.R.


A Rs. 1,25,000/-.An internal investigation was conducted wherein
  it was found that the shortage in cash had taken place between
  16. 11. 1985 and 05.04. 1986 when the respondent ·and
  Ganesan were joint custodians. Show cause notices were
  issued to the respondent and Ganesan. Apparently, the other
B joint custodian, Ganesan has also been punished but he has
  not challenged his punishment: In the reply to the show cause
  notice, the respondent admitted various lapses on his part
  regarding the maintenance of the currency chest books .. In
  particular, the respondent stated in his reply that perhaps the
c shortage of Rs. 1,25,000/~ escaped his attention due to various
  reasons and was thus unfortunate. The respondent sought
  permission to peruse the relevant books and registers at the
  Dharmapuri branch and was allowed to do so. The Inquiring
   Officer eventually submitted a report and held the respondent
o guilty of. charges as stated earlier. The following are the
  important features of the Inquiry Report:
         a) When the branch inspection was concluded on
         05.04.1986, it was noticed that during the tenure of the
         respondent as the permanent Cash Officer of the Branch,
 E      .several currency storage bins inside the branch strong-
         room were not locked with dual pad locks and some were
         kept open when they were not being operated upon.
         b) Shortages were detected in the note bundles by the
         respondent. Upon further inspection, shortages in three
 F       more sections from the bundles last handled by the
         respondent, were also discovered.
         c) The two employees, who acted as Cash Officers after
         the charged officials, i.e. the respondent and Ganesan
         exited on 05.04.1985, had performed their duties, during
 G
         the period 05.04.1986 to 1:4.04.1986 when the storage
         strong room was locked with dual pad locks and they
         had functioned in the presence of the permanent
         Accountant of the Branch ..

 H
  G M.-(OPERATIONS) S.B.I &ANR. v. R. PERIYASAMY                   937
                [S. A. BOBDE, J.]

     d) Unlike in the case of acting Cash Officers, when the       A
     respondent used to function as Cash Officer, the
     Accountant Shri Ganesan was in the habit of leaving him
     alone inside the StrongRoom while he attended to his
     desk work outside. The significance of this last finding
     is that the shortages were found to have occurred             B
     between 16.11.1985 to 5.4.1986 when the respondent
     worked as the Cash Officer of the Branch and not from
     05.04.1986 to 15.04.1986, when others had acted as
     Cash Officers for the reasons stated hereinbefore. The
     respondent was also convicted of the other two relatively     c
     minor charges.
       6. The learned Single Judge, at the instance of the
respondent, went into the entire matter in tedious detail. The
Single Judge considered the entire evidence, even reproduced
it in parts, and upon re-appreciation of the evidence, virtually   D
disagreed with the findings of facts recorded by the Inquiry
Officer and set aside the respondent's dismissal.
      7. Shri Vikas Singl), the learned senior counsel for the
appellant submitted that both, the learned Single Judge as well
as the Division Bench, in confirming the order, have violated      E
the well settled parameters of the scope of the Jurisdiction of
the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in
such matters. Shri Singh submitted that the High Court
embarked on the unusual and unwarranted exercise of re-
appreciating the evidence and reversed the well considered         F
findings of fact recorded by the Inquiry Officer. The learned
counsel for the appellant brought to our notice the very first
decision, which authoritatively settled the law on this point in
the State of Andhra Pradesh and others vs. Shri Rama
Rao 1, where this Court observed as follows:                       G
     "This report was considered by the authority competent
     to impose punishment and a provisional conclusion that
     the respondent merited punishment of dismissal for the
'AIR 1963 SC 1723
                                                                   H
938             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 14 S.C.R.


A              charges held established by the report was recorded. A
               copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer was sent to the
               respondent and he was called upon to submit his
               representation against the action proposed to be taken
               in regard to him. The respondent submitted his
8              representation which was considered by the Deputy
               Inspector General of Police, 'Northern Range,. Waltair.
               That Officer referred to the evidence of witnesses for
               the State about the arrest of Durgalu on March 5, 1954,
               and the handing over of Durgalu to the respondent on
c              the same day. He observed that the evidence of Durgalu
               that after he was arrested on March 5: 1954, he had
               made good his escape and was again arrested on
               March 8, 1954, could not be accepted. Holding that the
               charge against the respondent was serious and had on
D              the evidence been adequately proved, in his view the
               only punishment which the respondent deserved was
               of dismissal from the police force."
          8. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Vs. Nemi
      Chand Nalwaya 2 , this Court observed as follows:-
 E             "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an
               appellate court and· reassess the evidence led in the
               domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that
               another view is possible on the material on record. If
               the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the
 F             findings are based on evidence, the question of
               adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the
               evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the
               findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts
               will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in
 G             departmental enquiries, except where such findings are
               based on no evidence or where they are clearly
               pervef'Se. The test to find out perversity is to see whether
               a tribunal acting reasonably could have anived at such
 H    2
          (2011) 4   sec 584
  GM. (OPERATIONS) S.B.I &ANR. v. R. PERIYASAMY                     939
               [S. A. BOBDE, J.]

     conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The A
     courts will however interfere with the findings in
     discjplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or
     statutory regulations have been violated or if the order
     is found to be arbitrary, capricious, ma/a fide or based
     on extraneous considerations. (Vide B. C. ChatuNedi B
     v. Union of India: (1995) 6 SCC 749, Union of India v.
     G. Ganayutham: (1997) 7 SCC 463, Bank of India v.
     Degala Suryanarayana: (1999) 5 SCC 76 and High
     Court of Judicature at Bombay v. ShashiKant S Patil
     (2000) 1 SCC416)."                                        C
      It is not necessary to multiply authoritie"s on this point.
Suffice it to say that the law is well settled in this regard.
       9. It is not really necessary to deal with the judgment of
the learned Single Judge since that has merged with the
judgment of the Division Bench. However, some observations D
are necessary. The learned Single Judge committed an error
in approaching the issue by asking whether the findings have
been arrived on acceptable evidence or not and coming to
the conclusion that there was no acceptable evidence, and
that in any case the evidence was not sufficient. In doing so, E
the learned Single Judge lost sight of the fact that the
permissible enquiry was whether there is no evidence on which
the enquiry officer could have arrived at the findings or whether
there was any perversity in the findings. Whether the evidence
was acceptable or not, was a wrong question; unless it raised F
a question of admissibility. Also, the learned Single Judge
was not entitled to go into the question of the adequacy of
evidence and come to the'conclusion that the evidence was
not sufficient to hold the respondent guilty.
                                                                    G
     10. It is interesting to note thatthe learned Single Judge
went to the extent of observing that the concept of
preponderance of probabilities is alien to domestic enquiries.
On the contrary, it is well known that the standard of proof that
must be employed in domestic enquiries is in fact that of the H
940         ,SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 14 S.C.R.


A preponderance of probabilities. In Union of/ndia Vs. Sardar
  Bahadur, this Court held that a disciplinary proceeding is not
  a criminal trial and thus, the standard of proof required is that
  of preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond
  reasonable doubt. This view was upheld by this Court in State
B Bank of India & ors. Vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde 4 • More
  recently, in State Bank of India Vs. Narendra Kumar
  Pandey5, this Court observed that a disciplinary authority is
  expected to prove the charges leveled against a bank-officer
  on the preponderance of probabilities and not on proof beyond
C reasonable doubt. Further, in Union Bank of India Vs.
  Vishwa Mohan6, this Court was confronted. with a case which
  was similar to the present one. The respondent therein was
  also a bank employee, who was unable to demonstrate to the
  Court as to how prejudice had been caused to him due to non-
D supply of the inquiry authorities report/findings in his case. This
  Court held that in the banking b~siness absolute devotion,
  diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be preserved by every
  bank employee and in particular the bank officer. If this were .
  not to be observed, the Court held that the confidence of the
E public/depositors would be impaired.· Thus in that case the
  Court set-aside the order of the High Court and upheld the
  dismissal of the bank employee, n~jecting the ground that any
  prejudice had been caused to him on account ofnon-fumishing
  of the inquiry report/findings to him.
 F      ·While dealing with the question as to whether .a person
   with doubtful integrity ought to be allowed to work in a
   Government Department, this Court in Commissioner of
   Police New Delhi& Anr. Vs. Mehar Singh', held that while
   the standard of proof in a criminal case is proof beyond all
 G reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is          I
   merely the preponderance of probabilities. The Court
      '(1972) 4 sec 618
      •(2006) 1 sec 212
      '(2013) 2 sec 140
      '(1998) 4 sec 310
 H    '(2013) 7 sec 685
   GM. (OPERATIONS) S.B.I &ANR. v. R. PERIYASAMY                             .941
                [S. A. BOBDE, J.]

observed that quite often criminal cases end in acquittal A
because witnesses turn hostile and therefore, such acquittals
are- not acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of
doubt would not stand on par with a clean acquittal on merit
after a full-fledged trial, where there is no indication of the
witnesses being won over. The long standing view on this B
subject was settled by this Court in R.P. Kapur Vs. Union of
lndia 8, whereby it was held that a departmental proceeding
can proceed even though a person is acquitted w.hen the
acquittal is other than honourable. We are in agreement with
this view.                                                      C
      In administrative law, it is a settled principle that the onus
of proof rests upon the party alleging the invalidity of an order'.
In other words, there is a presumption that the decision or
executive order is properly and validly made, a presumption
expressed in the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta D
which means 'a!I things are presumed to be done in dueform 10.'
      11. The Division Bench, in appeal, apparently found it fit
to rely on an additional affidavit filed for the first time by the
respondent in his Writ Petition, referring to the letter dated
30.12.1987 by which the respondent is purported to have E
sought the production of certain documents. It is not disputed
that the respondent had not at any stage earlier made any
grievance that he had written a letter dated 30.12.1987 calling
upon the bank to produce certain documents for his perusal
and which was denied. It is further not in dispute that there is F
no record of the bank having received the letter and there is
no proof for it. The bank has denied receiving the letter and
according to the bank they had received a letter dated
28.12.1987 and they had replied by their letter dated
14.01.1988. In their reply, there was no reference to the letter G
'AIR 1964 SC 787
'Minister of National Revenue v. Wright's Canadian Ropes Ltd. (1947) AC
109 at 122; Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Cpn.
(1948) 1KB223 at 228; Fawcett Properties Ltd. v. Buckingham County Council
(1959) Ch. 543 at 575, affirmed (1961) AC 636.                 .
 "Point of Ayr Collieries Ltd. v. Lloyd - George (1943) 2 All ER 546.'       H
942         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2014) 14 S.C.R.


A dated 30.12.1987 because they had not received it. We find
  that in the absence of proof that any such letter demanding
  certain documents was received by the bank, it was not
  permissible for the High Court to proceed to draw an inference
  that there was a failure of natural justice in the bank having
B denied    certain documents. Thus it may be said; that an
  administrative authority such as the Appellant, cannot be put
  to proof of the facts or conditions on which the validity of its
  order 171ust depend, unless the Respondent can produce
  evidence which will shift the burden of proof on the shoulders
c of the Appellant. How much evidence is required for this
  purpose will always depend on the nature of that particular case.
  In Potato Marketing Board v. Merricks 11 , it was held that if
  an order has an apparent fault on.the face of it, the burden is
  easily transferred. However, if the grounds of attack are bad-
D faith or unreasonableness, the Plaintiff's task is heavier.
         12. On the question of shortage of money, the Division
  Bench merely upheld the findings of the learned Single Judge
  that there was no clinching evidence in support of the charges.
  The Division Bench approved the findings of the Single Judge
E that the inquiry report that the shortage of cash occurred only
  between 16.11.1985 and 05.04.1986, when the respondent
  was a joint custodian, was based on surmise and conjecture.
  The Division Bench did not care to advert to the evidence.
  That evidence rightly relied on by the enquiry officer which
F established that the shortage did occur between 16.11.1985
  and 05.04.1986. In fact the inquiring officer has given cogent
   reasons for rendering the findings that the shortage could not
   have occurred after 05.04.1986 upto the discovery of
   15.04.1986, when two acting cashiers had functioned.                    I
G Moreover, the observation that there is no clinching evidence
   in support of the charges is another way of saying that the             I-
  evidence is insufficient or inadequate, which is not permissible.
   It bears repetition that sufficiency or adequacy of evidence is
                                                                           •
   not the ground on which the findings of facts may be set-aside
 H    11 (1958) 2"QB 316 at 331; Cannock Chase DC v. Kelly (1978) 1WLR1.   f-
   GM. (OPERATIONS) S.B.I &ANR. v. R. PERIYASAMY                   943
                [S. A. BOBDE, J.]

by the High Court under Article 226. The justification offered A
by the Division Bench that the learned Single Judge had to
 undertake the exercise of analysing the findings of the enquiry
officer because the appellants had deprived the respondent
of his livelihood is l!'lholly untenable. A transgression of
jurisdiction cannot be justified on the ground of consequences, B
as has been done. Moreover, the reliance by the Division
 Bench on Mathura Prasad Vs. Union of India & Ors. 12 is
entirely misplaced, since that case arose in an entirely different
set of circumstances. We also find it difficult to understand
the justification offered by the Division Bench that there was c
no failure on the part of the respondent to observe utmost
devotion to duty because the case was not one of
misappropriation but only of a shortage of money. The Division
 Bench has itself stated the main reason why its order cannot
 be upheld in the following words, "on reappreciation of the D
entire material placed on record, we do not find any reason to
 interfere with the well considered and merited order passed
by the lec:rned Single Judge."
     13. We accordingly set-aside the impugned order and
dismiss the writ petition of the respondent.                       E
         14. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, we
 find it appropriate to direct the appellant to pay an ad hoc sum
.of Rs.3,00,000/-to the respondent who has retired long ago·
 and has drawn pension of which he will be deprived hereafter.
 Appeal disposed off as allow.ed.                                 F

Kalpana K. Tripathy                              Appeal allowed.




"(2007) 1 sec 437