Holding

The MRTP Act is a self‑contained code and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 introduced by the 1984 amendment may be read into it only to the extent of acquisition, compensation and remedies, but Section 11A and its time‑limit provisions cannot be applied to acquisitions under the MRTP Act.

Summary

The case concerned a parcel of land in Jalgaon reserved for a development plan under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning (MRTP) Act, 1966. The appellant claimed that the State Government and Municipal Council failed to acquire the land within the time limits prescribed by the MRTP Act and sought relief under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, including the application of Section 11A which imposes a two‑year limit for making an award. The principal issue was whether the MRTP Act is a self‑contained code and, if so, whether the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act – particularly Section 11A – could be read into the MRTP Act by reference or incorporation. The Court held that the MRTP Act is indeed a complete, self‑contained code whose primary purpose is planned development, with land acquisition only incidental. Accordingly, only the limited provisions of the Land Acquisition Act relating to acquisition, compensation and remedies apply, while the procedural time‑limits and default provisions of Section 11A cannot be read into the MRTP Act as they would frustrate its scheme. The Court therefore allowed the appeal, subject to the limited exceptions articulated.

Issues considered

The MRTP Act, 1966, is a self‑contained code or a supplemental statute.
Whether the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (especially Section 11A) apply to acquisitions under Chapter VII of the MRTP Act by legislation‑by‑reference or legislation‑by‑incorporation.
The effect of reading Section 11A into the MRTP Act on the scheme of planned development and on the rights of the State and landowners.
The applicability of doctrines of pith and substance, incidental encroachment and the test of unworkability in interpreting the two statutes.

Legislation cited

General Clauses Act, 1897s. 8
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 11A, s. 16, s. 17, s. 23, s. 24, s. 28, s. 4, s. 48, s. 6
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Central Act 68 of 1984)s. 11A, s. 23(1A), s. 23(2), s. 28
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966s. 113A, s. 116, s. 125, s. 126, s. 127, s. 128, s. 129

Subjects

self‑contained codelegislation by referencelegislation by incorporationpith and substanceincidental encroachmentland acquisitionplanned developmentstatutory interpretationconstitutional federalismSection 11A

Judgment

[2011) 3 S.C.R. 1 ·. -

GIRNAR TRADERS A
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3703 of 2003)
JANUARY 11, 2011
B
[5.H. KAPADIA, CJI AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM
SHARMA, K.5. RADHAKRISHNAN, SWATANTER
K~MAR AND ANIL R. DAVE, JJ.]

Maharash(ra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 C
(MRTP Act):

Purpose of - Held: The principal object of the MRTP Act
is planned development of the State of Maharashtra by
preparing development plans for regions and town planning
0
schemes and constitution of various authorities to achieve the
said purpose - It includes the function of acquisition of land
but for a very limited purpose - Acquisition of land takes
place only where the land is reserved, designated or required
for eomplete qevelopment in the view of the Planning,
D~ve/Qpment pr Appropriate Authority as the case may be. E
Scheme 1.mcfer the Act . . , Wh~ther the Act is a self-
contained Code - Held, Yes - MRTP Act is ~n Act which
completely provides for various steps in relation to execution
of its object, constitution of various authorities to implement F
the underlying scheme of planned development, machinery
for interested persons to raise their claims for adjudication
under the provisions of the Act or at best to an authority
referred to in the Act - Thus, the MRTP Act is a complete code
in itself. G

Chapter VII - Whether all the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, as amended by Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984 [Act 68 of 1984], with particular
1 H .
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A reference on s. 11 A can be read into the provisions of the
MRTP Act on the principle of either legislation by reference
or legislation by incorporation - Held: All the provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act introduced by later amendments would
not, per se, become applicable and be deemed to be part and
B parcel of the MRTP Act - The intent of the legislature to make
the MRTP Act a self-contained Code with definite reference
to required provisions of the Land Acquisition Act is clear -
Unambiguous language of the provisions of the MRTP Act
and the legislative intent clearly mandates that it is a case of
c legislation by incorporation in contradistinction to legislation
by reference - Nonetheless, some of the amended
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act would be applicable to
the MRTP Act or read as a part thereof, with reference to the
doctrine of pith and substance and harmonious application
of the two statutes - The provisions introduced in the Land
0
Acquisition Act, 1894 by Act 68 of 1984, limited to the extent
of acquisition of land, payment of compensation and recourse
to legal remedies provided under the said Act, can be read
into an acquisition controlled by the provisions of Chapter VII
of the MRTP Act but with a specific exception that the
E provisions of the Land Acquisition Act in so far as they provide
different time frames and consequences of default thereof
including lapsing of acquisition proceedings cannot be read
into the MRTP Act - S. 11 A of the Land Acquisition Act being
one of such provisions cannot be applied to acquisitions
F under Chapter VII of the MRTP Act - Reading of s. 11 A of the
Land Acquisition Act into Chapter VII of the MRTP Act will
rendE1r the substantive provisions of the MRTP Act ineffective,
unworkable and may frustrate its object materially - Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 - s.11A.
G
Land Acquisition Act, 1984 - Enactment of- Purpose -
Scheme under the Act - Discussed - Held: The primary
object of the Act is acquisition of land for a public purpose
which may be 'planned development' or even otherwise - The
H Act itself is a self contained code within the framework of its
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 3
AND ORS.
limited purpose, i.e. acquisition of land - It provides for A
complete machinery for acquisition of land including the
process of execution, payment of compensation as well as
legal remedies in case of any grievances.

Doctrines:
B
Doctrine of legislation by reference - Meaning and
applicability of - Held: When there is general reference in the
Act in question to some earlier Act but there is no specific
mention of the provisions of the former Act, then it is clearly
considered as legislation by reference - In the case of C
legislation by reference, the amending laws of the former Act
would normally become applicable to the later Act.

Doctrine of legislation by incorporation - Meaning and
applicability of - Held: When the provisions of an Act are D
specifically referred and incorporated in the later statute, then
those provisions alone are applicable and the amending
provisions of the former Act would not become part of the later
Act - This principle is generally called legislation by
incorporation.
E
Doctrine of pith and substance and doctrine of incidental
encroachment - Applicability of - Discussed - Held: Once it
is found that in pith and substance, an Act is a law on a
permitted field then any incidental encroachment, even on a
forbidden field, does not affect the competence of the F
legislature to enact that law - An incidental cause cannot
override the primary cause.

Interpretation of Statutes:

Referential legislation as a tool of interpretative G
application - Held: The Court, while applying referential
legislation as a tool of interpretative application, should keep
in mind that such interpretation should not, in any way, defeat
the object and essence of prin::ipal legislation - The
H
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 3 S.C.R.

A likelihood of any interference with the scheme under the
principal Act would tilt against accepting such an
interpretation.

Self-contained code - Held: Should be distinguished
from supplemental law.
8
Legislation - Legislation by reference - Held: The rule
of legislation by reference is bound to have exceptions - It
cannot be stated as an absolute proposition of law that
wherever legislation by reference exists, subsequent
C amendments to the earlier law shall stand implanted into the
later law without analyzing the impact of such incorporation
on the object and effectuality of the later law - The later law
being the principal law, its object, legislative intent and
effective implementation shall always be of paramount
D consideration while determining the compatibility of the
amended prior law with the later law as on relevant date.

Maxims - maxim ut res magis va/eat quam pereat -
Held: A statute should be construed so as to make it effective
E and operative - Interpretation of Statutes.
The questions referred for consideration of this
Constitution Bench were: 1) whether the Maharashtra
Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (MRTP) is a self-
contained Code or not, if so, to what effect and 2)
F whether, in any event, all the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, as amended by Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984 [Act 68 of 1984) with particular
reference on Section 11A can be read into the provisions
of the MRTP Act on the principle of either legislation by
G reference or legislation by incorporation.

Answering the reference, the Court

HELD:1.1. The Maharashtra Regional & Town
Planning Act, 1966 (MRTP Act) is a code in itself. It is a
H
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 5
AND ORS.

legislation which has the paramount purpose only of A
planning; and acquisition of land is merely incidental, that
too for a very limited purpose. Acquisition of land takes
place only where the land is reserved, designated or
required for complete development in the view of the
Planning, Development or Appropriate Authority. A B
complete mechanism of planning, implementation,
adjudicatory process in that regard as well as the
methodology adopted for acquiring lands, in its limited
sense, inclusive of change in the use, for public purpose,
for which the land is required have been specifically C
provided under the MRTP Act. The State Act is hardly
dependent upon the Land Acquisition Act except to the
limited extent of completing the process of determining.
compensation, other than the compensation determinable
by the designated Arbitrator or Tribunal. This being the D
scheme of the MRTP Act, mere reference to some of the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act would not take
away the substantive scheme of the State Act which is a
complete code in itself. [Para 21) [69-C-E-G; 70-H; 71~A]

1.2. The Land Acquisition Act, 1984 was enacted as E
it was considered expedient to amend the law for
acquisition of land needed for public purposes and for
companies and, particularly, for payment and
determination of the amount of compensation to be paid
on account of such acquisition. From the objects and F
reasons of the Land Acquisition Act, it is clear that the
primary object of this Act is acquisition of land for a
public purpose which may be 'planned development' or
even otherwise. In fact the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act do not deal with the concept of G
development as is intended under the specific statutes
like MRTP Act, Delhi Development Act, 1957, Bangalore
Development Authority Act, 1976 etc. The primary
purpose of the Land Acquisition Act is to acquire land for
public purpose and for companies as well as to award H
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A compensation to the owners/interested persons in
accordance with the provisions of this Act. It is not an
Act dealing in extenso or otherwise with development
and planning. The scheme of this Act is very simple. The
Land Acquisition Act itself is a self contained code within
B the framework of its limited purpose, i.e. acquisition of
land. It provides for complete machinery for acquisition
of land including the process of execution, payment of
compensation as well as legal remedies in case of any
grievances. [Paras 22, 24 and 25] [71-B; 72-F-G; 74-E; 75-
C D]
1.3. The MRTP Act and the Land Acquisition Act are
two different statutes operating in different fields, the
provisions of which are required to be utilized by the
concerned authorities for the object sought to be
D achieved under the respective Acts. The schemes under
the two Acts are distinct and different. Scheme under the
State Act can be implemented with recourse to the
provisions of the Central Act which have been
specifically stated therein. At the same time where there
::: are specific provisions under the State Act the
corresponding provisions of the Central Act will not
apply. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act relating
to the acquisition of land alone, for which there are no
specific provisions under the State Act, would be
F applicable to the acquisition under the State Act. [Para
27] [79-B-D]
(

1.4. For an Act to be a 'self contained code', it is
required to be shown that it is a complete legislation for
G the purpose for which it is enacted. The provisions of the
MRTP Act relate to preparation, submission and sanction
of approval of different plans by the concerned
authorities which are aimed at achieving the object of
planned development in contradistinction to haphazard
development. An owner/person interested in the land and
H
GIRNAR TRADERS v, STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 7
AND ORS.
who wishes to object to the plans at the appropriate stage A
a self-contained adjudicatory machinery has been spelt
out in the MRTP Act. Even the remedy of appeal is
available under the MRTP Ac~ with a complete Chapter
being devoted to acquisition of land for the planned
development. Providing adjudicatory mechanism is one B
of the most important facets of deciding wt:ether a
particular statute is a 'complete code' in itself or not. [Para
28] (79-F-H]

1.5. If complete machinery or mechanism is not
provided under an Act to ensure effective execution of the C
functions assigned therein with due protection of the
rights of the interested persons within the framework of
law, it may not be possible for the Court to hold that such
a statute is a self-contained code. [Para 33] [84-E]
D
1.6. It may not be possible to state parameters of
universal application which could determine with
precision as to whether an Act is a self-contained code
or not. It is difficult and, in fact, may not even be
permissible to formulate any hard and fast rule which E
could uniformly be applied to all statutes for such
determination. 'Complete' adds a degree of certainty to
the code. It has to be a compilation of provisions which
would comprehensively deal with various aspects of the
purpose sought to be achieved by that law and its F
dependence on other legislations is either absent or at
best is minimal. The provisions of the enactment in
question should provide for a complete machinery to deal
with various problems that may arise during its execution.
Sufficient powers should be vested in the authority/forum G
created under the Act to ensure effectual and complete
implementation of the Act. There should be complete and
coherent scheme of the statutory provisions for
attainment of the object and· purpose of the Act. It
essenti~lly should also provide for adjudicatory scheme
H
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 3 S.C.R.

A to deal with grievances/claims of the persons affected by
enforcement of the provisions of the Act, preferably,
including an appellate forum within the framework of the
Act. In other words, the Act in itself should be a panacea
to all facets arising from the implementation of the Act
B itself. [Para 34, 35] [84-F; 85-C-F]

1.7. The principal object of MRTP Act is planned
development of the State of Maharashtra by preparing
development plans for regions and town planning
schemes and constitution of various authorities to
C achieve the said purpose. Incidentally, it includes the
function of acquisition of land but for a very limited
purpose. It is not expected of the authorities to apply to
the Government for a general acquisition but the
acquisition has to be of the land which is required,
D reserved or designated under any development plan.
Thus, it is an acquisition of a very limited connotation.
The MRTP Act specifies all the authorities, their respective
powers and functions for attaining the object of the Act.
[Para 36) [85-G; 86-A-B]
E
1.8. The complete scheme has been provided under
the MRTP Act for attaining the object of planned
development. Various provisions of the Act
comprehensively prescribe what and how the steps are
F required to be taken by the authorities under the Act, right
from the stage of preparation of draft development plan
to its finalization as well as preparation and finalization
of all regional and town planning schemes. The MRTP
Act clearly spells out as to how these schemes are to be
implemented and by whom. Right of the interested person
G to raise objections, pre-finalization of the respective
plans, is specifically provided. The authority before whom
such objections are to be raised and who is to be granted
hearing and by whom is clearly spelt out. There is no
aspect which is not dealt with or provided for under the
H
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 9
AND ORS.

provisions of the State Act right from the initia' stage to A
its final execution. Besides providing right of objection
to the owner of the land or property, which fall within the
development plan, the State Act also provides machinery
for finalization and determination of disputes between the
authorities and private parties. Furthermore, a person is B
entitled to raise all disputes including the dispute of
ownership. The Arbitrator nominated under the MRTP Act
has the jurisdiction to decide all such matters. The
jurisdiction of the Arbitrator is a limited one like estimation ·
and payment of compensation in relation to plots in c
distinction to lands as defined under the Act within the
four corners of the provisions of Sections 72 to 74 of the
MRTP Act with reference to Section 97 of the State Act.
Some of his decisions are final, while on most of other
decisions, an appeal lies to the Tribunal. [Para 37) [86-C- D
H]

1.9. The MRTP Act besides being a code in itself has
one pre-dominant purpose, i.e., planned development.
Other matters are incidental and, therefore, should be
construed to achieve that pre-dominant object. All the E
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be applied
to the MRTP Act. The provisions of the MRTP Act have
to be implemented in their own field. As far as the
provisions relating to preparation, approval and
execution of the development plans are concerned, there F
is hardly any dependency of the State Act on the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. It may be
necessary, sometimes, to acquire land which primarily
would be for the purpose of planned development as
contemplated under the MRTP Act. Some of the G
provisions of the State Act have specifically referred to
some of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act but
for the limited purpose of acquiring land. Thus, the
purpose of such reference is, obviously, to take aid of the
provisions of the Central Act only for the purpose of H
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A acquiring a land in accordance w.ith law stated therein
rather than letting any provision of the Central Act hamper
or obstruct the principal object of the State Act, i.e.
execution of the planned development. The MRTP Act is
a self-contained code and does not lose its colour or
a content of being a self-contained code merely because
it makes a reference to some of the provisions of Land
Acquisition Act for acquisition of land for the purpose of
MRTP Act and determination of compensation in that
behalf. The referred provisions of the Land Acquisition
c Act may only be taken recourse to that limited extent,
withiil the extensive framework and for the purpose of
MRTP Act. [Para 38] [87-A-F]

1.10. MRTP Act is an Act which completely provides
for various steps in relation to execution of its object,
D constitution of various authorities to implement the
underlying scheme of planned development, machinery
for interested persons to raise their claims for
adjudication under the provisions of this Act or at best·
to an authority referred to in the Act. Thus, the MRTP Act
E is a complete code in itself. [Para 39] [87-G-H; 88-A]

1.11. Once it is held that MRTP Act is a self-contained
code, application of either of the doctrines, i.e. 'legislation
by reference' or 'legislation by incorporation', would lose
F their significance particularly when the two Acts can co-
exist and operate without conflict. However, since this
aspect was argued by the parties at great length, the
merit or otherwise of this contention is being discussed
as an alternative plea. [Para 40, 41] [88-C-D]
G 1.12. When there is general reference in the Act in
question to some earlier Act but there is no specific .
mention of the provisions of the former Act, then it Is
clearly considered as legislation by reference. In the case
of legislation by reference, the amending laws of the
H former Act would normally become applicable to the later
,
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 11
AND ORS.
. .
Act; b'ut, when the provisions of an Act are specifically A
referred and incorporated in the later statute, then those
provisions atone are applicable and the amending
provisions of the former Act would not become part of
the tater Act. This principle is generally called legislation
by incorporation. General reference, ordinarily, will imply B
exclusion of specific reference and this is precisely the
fine line of distinction between these two doctrines. Both
are referential legislations, one merely by way of reference
and the other by incorporation. It, normally, will depend
on the language used in the later law and other relevant c
considerations. While the principle of legislation by
incorporation has well defined exceptions, the law
enunciated as of now provides for no exceptions to the
principle of legislation by reference. Furthermore, despite
strict application of doctrine of incorporation, it may still
0
not operate in certain legislations and such legislation
may fall within one of the stated exceptions. [Para 41] [88-
E-H; 89-A]

1.13. With the development of law, the legislature has
adopted the common practice of referring to the E
provisions of the existing statute while enacting new
laws. Reference to an earlier law in the later law could be
a simple reference of provisions of earlier statute or a
specific reference where the earlier law is made an integral
part of the new law, i.e., by incorporation. In the case of F
legislation by reference, it is fictionally made a part of the
later law. All amendments to the former law, though made
subsequent to the enactment of the later law, would ipso
facto apply and one finds mention of this particular
aspect in Section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. In
contrast to such simple reference, legal incidents of
legislation by incorporation is that it becomes part of the
existing law which implies bodily lifting provisions of one
enactment and making them part of another and in such
cases subsequent amendments in the incorporated Act
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A could not be treated as part of the incorporating Act. -
Ultimately, it is the expression and/or the language used
in the new law with reference to the existing law that
would determine as to under what class of referential
legislation it falls. In some of the statutes, expressions like
B "shall for that purpose be deemed to form part of this Act
· i,n the same manner as if they were enacted in the body
thereof' or "the provisions of Section of the said Act (set
out in the Schedule) shall apply as if they were herein re-
enacted" are typical examples of legislation by
c incorporation. Another glaring example of incorporation
one finds in the provision of Bombay Municipal
Corporation Act, 1949 where Section 284N uses the
expression "the LA Act ... shall for that purpose be
deemed to form part of this chapter as if enacted in the
0 body hereof". Another feature of legislation by
incorporation is that the language is explicit and positive.
Self-contained enactment should be clearly distinguished
from supplemental law. When the later_ law depends on
the former law for procedural/ substantive provisions or
E is to draw its strength from the provisions of the former
Act, the later Act is termed as the supplemental to the
former law. MRTP Act and the Land Acquisition Act are
Acts which operate in different fields. One is a Central Act
while the other is a State Act. They derive their source
from different entries in the constitutional lists. [Para 42]
F [89-E-H; 90-A-F]

1.14. The legislative intent appears to make the MRTP
Act a self-contained code and does not generally advert
to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for
G execution of planned development. The default, its
consequences and remedies have been specifically
provided for under Section 126 of the MRTP Act and in
that regard there is apparentfy no need to refer to the
default clause contained in Section 11A of the Land
H Acquisition Act. Time limitations and consequences of
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 13
AND ORS.
their default are specifically provided for in the MRTP Act A
by the Legislature and, therefore, it will not be appropriate
to read into these provisions something which has not
been stated by the Legislature on the inference that time
limitations or bars created under the Land Acquisition Act
would essentially have to be read as part of the MRTP Act. B
Wherever the State Legislature considered it appropriate,
it has made specific reference to a particular provision of
the Land Acquisition Act and for attainment of a particular
purpose. There is no general reference to the Land.
Acquisition Act in any of the provisions of the MRTP Act c .
to say that the provisions of the former Act, in their
entirety, will be applicable to all kind of proceedings and
purposes under the later Act. [Paras 46, 47) [94-A-C; 95-
H; 96-A]

1.15. Another aspect which would support the view D
that it is legislation by incorporation and there is every
legislative intent to exclude legislation by reference is that
wherever there was a general reference to the provisions
of the Land Acquisition Act like Section 127 of the MRTP
Act, the same stands excluded/deleted by amendment of E
2009. Furthermore, the entire Land Acquisition Act cannot
be made applicable to proceedings under the MRTP Act
where, unlike Land Acquisition Act, the proceedings·
commence and consequences take place the. moment
the land is designated or reserved under a plan, draft plan F
or even scheme. On the contrary, the proceedings under
th~ Land Acquisition Act start when the notification un·der
S~ction 4 of that Act is issued. This exclusion is of
paramount significance as the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act relating acquisition would not come into G
play till the issuance of the notification under Section 4
thereof while that is not true under the MRTP Act. If the ·
Legislature intended to apply the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act generally and wanted to make a general
reference and implementation of those provisions, it H
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A could have said that the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act would be applicable to the MRTP Act.
Such expression is conspicuous by its very absence.
[Para 48] [96-8-F]

1.16. Besides the MRTP Act being a self-contained
8
Code, these are enactments which, apparently, are ,
dissimilar in their content and application. The provisions
of Section 127 of the MRTP Act were amended long after
the amendment of the Land Acquisition Act by Central
Act 68 of 1984. The Legislature was fully aware of the
C entire matter including hardship of the land owners. The
statement of objects and reasons for amendment of
Section 127 of the MRTP Act conveys intent antipodal to
that sought to be put forward by the appellants, that
Section 11 A of the Land Acquisition Act would be
D attracted. Section 11 A was in existence at the time of
amendment in 2009 of the MRTP Act and if it was
intended to be applied to the MRTP Act there was hardly
any need to amend Section 127 of the MRTP Act in the
manner in which it was done. If the intention of the
E legislature was to permit lapsing of acquisition, in that
event provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition
Act, per se, would have achieved the purpose. The 2009
amendment to the State Act restricted even lapsing of the
reservation or designation only if there was default in
F compliance to the provisions of Section 126(2) and 126(4)
of the MRTP Act. General reference to acquisition under
the Land Acquisition Act was deleted as it was never
intended to be read as a part of the State Act. Thus, the
State Legislature in its wisdom restricted the
G consequences only to lapsing of reservation. [Para 49]
[96-G-H; 97-A-C]

1.17. Normally, when it is by reference or citation, the
amendment to the earlier law is accepted to be applicable
H to the later law while in the case of incorporation, the
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 15
. AND ORS.
subsequent amendments to the earlier law are irrelevant A
for application to the subsequent law unless it falls in the
exceptions stated by this Court in M. V. Narasimhan's
case. Even where there is legislation by reference, the
Court needs to apply its mind as to what effect the
subsequent amendments to the earlier law would have B
on the application of the later law. The objective of all
these principles of interpretation and their application is
to ensure that both the Acts operate in harmony and
object of the principal statute is not defeated by such
incorporation. [Para 58] [103-C-E] c
1.18. In the case in hand, it is clear that both these
Acts are self-contained codes within themselves. The
State Legislature while enacting the MRTP Act has
referred to the specific sections of the Land Acquisition
Act in the provisions of the State Act. None of the D
sections require application of the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act generally or mutatis mutandis. On the
contrary, there is a specific reference to certain sections
and/or contentllanguage of the section of the Land
Acquisition Act in the provisions of the MRTP Act. Section E
113A of the State Act refers to acquisition of land under
the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose under Section
113(3A) which in turn refers to the complexity and
magnitude of the work involved in developing any area
as a site for new town. Section 116 of the State Act refers F
to the power which shall vest in a Developing Authority,
constituted under Section 113(2) of the MRTP Act, for
acquisition by agreement or under the Land Acquisition
Act, as provided in Chapter VII of the MRTP Act. Section
125 of the State Act provides that any land which is G
required, reserved or designated in a regional plan or a
scheme for a public purpose, which shall be deemed to
be land needed for a public purpose within the meaning
of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 126(1 )(b) provides for
payment of an amount equivalent to the value of lessor's H
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A interest to be determined by the authorities on the basis
of the principles laid down in the Land Acquisition Act.
Thus, the reference to the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act is only for the purpose of adopting the
principles stated therein for a very limited purpose. In
8 terms of Section 126(1 )(c) of the MRTP Act, the application
to the State Government has to be made for acquiring
such land under the Land Acquisition Act. Such land
refers to the lands which are required only under the
provisions of the MRTP Act. Section 1:?6(2) refers to
C Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act only for the
purpose of format in which the declaration has to be
made. In terms of Section 126(3), on publication of the
declaration, the Collector shall proceed to take order for
acquisition of the land under the State Act, i.e. for the
purpose of acquisition of land; the procedure adopted
0
under the Land Acquisition Act shall be adopted by the
Collector and nothing more. The afore-referred
provisions of the State Act clearly frame a scheme for
planned development with limited incorporation of some
of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The
E provisions of the State Act were amended last in point of
time and, therefore, the State Legislature was aware of
the relevant existing laws including Section 11 A of the
Land Acquisition Act. The intent of the legislature to
exclude the application of Section 11A clearly emerges
F from the fact that while amending Section 127 of the
MRTP Act, it made no reference, generally or specifically,
to the said provision rather it deleted reference to the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act from the
unamended provisions of Section 127. Reference to
G Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act in the State Act,
under Section 128(3) of the State Act, is again relatable
to the acquisition proceedings under the Land
Acquisition Act, as under Section 83 of the State Act, the
land could vest in the Planning Authority even at the
H threshold and it is vesting of a different kind than j
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 17
AND ORS. I
contemplated under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition A
Act. The purpose and intent of Section 129 of the MRTP
Act is akin to the provisions of Section 17 of the Land
Acquisition Act.and from linguistic point of view, there is
similarity in the two Sections but still the State Act has
provided for· a complete scheme with regard to B
possession and compensation payable to the owner of
the land in cases of urgency. Thus, it is clear that there
is no general reference to the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act and they shall not apply as such or even
mutatis mutandis to the MRTP Act. On the contrary, c
reference to the Central Act, wherever is made in the State
Act, is specific and for a definite purpose.. [Para 59] (104-
E-H; 105-A-H; 106-A-C]

1.19. The acquisition proceedings under the Land
Acquisition Act commence only when a notification under D
Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act is issued. Section
5A of the Central Act makes it incumbent upon the
authorities to invite objections and decide the same
before issuing declaration under Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act. All these proceedings have specifically E
·been given a go-by under the MRTP Act,. where
notification is to be issued under Section 126(2) in the
manner provided under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition
Act.· Specific reference to various sections of the Land
Acquisition Act in the MRTP Act necessarily implies .F
exclusion of the provisions not specifically mentioned
therein. Acquisition proceedings under the MRTP Act are
commenced by issuance of a declaration under Section
126(2) and then the procedure prescribed under the Land
Acquisition Act is followed upto passing of award under G
Section 11 of that Act. Further, determination of
compensation will again depend upon the principles
stated in Sections 23 and 24 of .the Land Acquisition Act
but subject to Sections 128(2) and 129(1) of the MRTP Act.
Statutory benefits accrued under Sections 23(1A), 23(2) H
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act would be applicable
as held by this Court in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad.
Vesting, unlike Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act
which operates only after the award is made and
compensation is given, whereas under the MRTP Act it
B may operate even at the initial stages before making of
an award, for example, under Sections 126(1)(c) and e3.
While referring to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act,
the State Legislature has not adopted, specifically or
otherwise, the period mentioned in proviso to Section 6(1)
C of the Land Acquisition Act. On the cor.~rary, different time
frames have been postulated under different provisions
of the MRTP Act. If those limitations of time are not
adhered to by the concerned authorities, the
consequences have also been provided therefor. From
D the stage of initiation of steps for preparation of draft
plans to the finalization of the scheme, it takes
considerable time. Furthermore, its implementation at the
ground level, takes still much more time. If this entire
planned development which is a massive project is
E permitted to lapse on the application of Section 11 A of
the Central Act, it will have the effect of rendering every
project of planned development frustrated. It can hardly
be an argument that the Government can always issue
fresh declaration in terms of Section 6 of the Land
F Acquisition Act and take further proceedings.
Recommencement of acquisition proceedings at different
levels of the hierarchy of the State and Planning Authority
itself takes considerable time and, thus, it will be difficult
to achieve the target of planned development. This
G clearly demonstrates that all the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act introduced by later amendments would
not, per se, become applicable and be deemed to be part
and parcel of the MRTP Act. The intent of the legislature
to make the State Act a self-contained Code with definite
reference to required provisions of the Land Acquisition
H Act is clear. [Para 60) [106-G-H; 107-A-H; 108-A-B]
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 19
AND ORS.
1.20. Besides this, if the provisions of Section 11A of A
the Land Acquisition Act are appliad or deemed to be
incorporated by application of any doctrine of law into the
provisions of MRTP Act, it will have the effect of
destroying the statutory rights available to the State
Government and/or the Planning Authority. For instance, B
proviso to Section 126(2) of the State Act provides tliat
where a .declaration in the manner provided in Section 6
of the !:.and Acquisition Act in respect of the said land is
not made within one year from the date of publication of
draft regional plan, thereafter no such declaration stiall c
·be made. Section 126(4) makes an exception to the
consequences stated in proviso to Section 126(2) that the
State Government, notwithstanding those provisions, can
make a fresh declaration for acquiring the land under the
Land Acquisition Act. However, the market va!Ue of the D
land shall be the market value at the date of declaration
in the Official Gazette made for acquiring such land
afresh. In other words, the rest of the machinery provided
under the Act would not operate after the prescribed
period. However, in terms of Section 127 of the MRTP Act,
if any land reserved, allotted or designated for any E
purpose specified is not acquired by agreement within 10
years from the date on which final regional plan or final
development plan comes into force or if a declaration
under sub-sections (2) or (4) of Section 126 of the MRTP .
Act is not published in the Official Gazette within such F
period, the owner or any person interested in the land
may serve notice upon such authority to that effect and
if within 12 months from the date of service of such
notice, the land is not acquired or no steps, as aforesaid,
are commenced for its acquisition, the reservation, G
allotment or designation shall be deemed to have lapsed
and the land would become available to the owner for the
purposes of development. The defaults, their
consequences' and even exceptions thereto have been ·
specifically stated in the State Act. For a period of 11 H
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 3 S.C.R.

A years, the land would remain under reservation or
designation, as the case may be, in terms of Section 127
of the MRTP Act(1 Oyears + notice period). However, if the
provisions of Section 11 A of the Central Act were
permitted to punctuate a scheme of the State Act and the
B award is not made within two years from the date of
declaration under Section 6 of the Central Act, the
acquisition proceedings will lapse which will frustrate the
rights of the State as well as the scheme contemplated
under Section 126 as well as Section 127 of the State Act
c and that would not be permissible in law. This f>eing
legislation by incorporation, the general reference to the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act shall stand
excluded. [Para 61] [108-0-H; 109-A-E]

1.21. Section 126(2) of the State Act refers to the
D manner of declaration as contemplated under Section 6
of the Land Acquisition Act but the legislature
intentionally avoided making any reference to other
features contained in Section 6 of the Central Act as well
as the time frame prescribed under that Act. On the
E contrary, proviso to Section 126(2) of the MRTP Act spells
out its own time frame whereafter such declaration
cannot be made subject to the provisions of Section
126(4). The unamended provisions of Section 127 of the
State Act though refer to the acquisition under Land
F Acquisition Act but without making any reference to the
time frame prescribed under the said Act. In this Section
also, the specific time frame and the consequences of
default thereof have been stated. Sections 128 and 129
of the MRTP Act relate to acquiring land for the purpose
G other than for which it is designated in any plan or
scheme and taking of possession of land in cases of
urgency respectively. The Court cannot lose sight of one
very important fact that the MRTP Act is an Act relating
to planned development and acquisition is an incidental
H aspect thereof. Planned development is quite different
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 21
AND ORS.
from merely 'achieving a public purpose' for which the A
land is acquired under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act. Development plan, Regional Plan and
town planning scheme are major events in the
development of a State. They are controlled and guided
by different financial, architectural iiind public interest for B
the development including macro and micro planning of
the entire State. The provisions relating to planned
development of the State or any part thereof, read in
conjunction with the object of the Act, show that different
time frames are required for initiation, finalization and C
complete execution of such development plans. The
period of 10 years stated in Section 127 of the MRTP Act,
therefore, cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable
ex facie. If the provisions of Section 11 A of the Land
Acquisition Act, with its serious consequence of lapsing
of entire acquisition proceedings, are bodily lifted and D
read into the provisions of MRTP Act, it is bound to
frustrate the entire scheme and render it ineffective and
uncertain. Keeping in view the consequence of Section
11A of the Central Act, every development plan could
stand frustrated only for the reason that period of two E
years has lapsed and it will tantamount to putting an end
to the entire development process. Also, for the full and
complete implementation of the scheme de hors such
reservation, allotment and designation, lands have to be
acquired and once acquisition as argued, fails on the F
application of Section 11A of the Central Act, those lands
would have to be restored to the owners while lands of
other plot owners under the same scheme would
continue to be under reservation, allotment or
designation. Even this would render the scheme G
unworkable. If the legislature has opted not to introduce
any such limitation in the MRTP Act, then to read the same
with reference to the provisions of the Land. Acquisition
1-Act would be unjust and render the scheme under the

State Act completely unworkable. That certainly is no~ the H
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A legislative intent. Thus, reading of Section 11A of the Land
Acquisition Act into Chapter VII of the MRTP Act will
render the substantive provisions of the State Act
ineffective, unworkable and may frustrate the object of
the Act materially. [Para 62] [109-H; 110-A-H; 111-A-D]
B
1.22. The Court should keep in mind while applying
referential legislation as a tool of interpretative application
that such Interpretation should not, in any way, defeat the
object and essence of principal legislation. The likelihood
of any interference with the scheme under the principal
C Act would tilt against accepting such an interpretation.
[Para 63] [111-EJ

1.23. The Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the
. acquisition of land for planned development under the
D MRTP Act may be completed much prior to the time frame
stipulated under Sections 126 and 127 of that Act. Once
the acquisition is complete and land is vested in the State,
the person interested ceases to have any interest in the
land in question. The provisions of the MRTP Act provide
E for time limitation as well as the consequences in the
event of default. Wherever there is delay, despite such
framework provided under the MRTP Act, the applicants
are duly compensated by payment of compensation. If the
provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act are
F read and enforced stricto sensu in the MRTP Act,
inevitable consequences would be that various
development schemes under the MRTP Act would come
to a halt and the larger public interest would suffer. On
the other hand, some inconvenience may be caused to
G the owners/interested persons of the land by non-
induction of provisions of Section 11 A of the Central Act.
Thus, private interest would suffer which, in comparison
to larger public interest, can hardly be a consideration. If
acquisition and all proceedings thereafter are permitted
H to lapse in terms of Section 11 A of the Land Acquisition
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 23
AND ORS.

Act, the development plans which may have already A
commenced or even progressed mny come to a
standstill causing huge damage to the public interest as
well as to the State Revenue which, ultimately, is nothing
but public funds. This is more so for the reason that the
lands come under a reservation, designation as land B
required for plans including township even when the
draft plans are prepared and approved by the State. From
whatever point of view this is examined, it is not poss·ible
to read the provisions of Section 11 A of the Land
Acquisition Act into the MRTP Act without adversely C
affecting the very object of the MRTP Act and causing
impediments, legal or otherwise, in the implementation of
the development plans. These Acts operate in different
fields and such incorporation by reference would be
incompatible with the cause of the MRTP Act, particularly, D
when the reference to the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act are, primarily, for achieving the purpose
of the MRTP Act. [Para 65] [112-D-H; 113-A-E]

1.24. The rule of legislation by reference is bound to E
have exceptions and it cannot be stated as an absolute
proposition of law that wherever legislation by reference
exists, subsequent amendments to the earlier law shall
stand implanted into the later law without analyzing the
mpact of such incorporation on the object and effectuality
of the later law. The later law being the principal law, its F
object, legislative intent and effective implementation
shall always be of paramount consideration while
- determining the compatibility of the amended prior law
with the later law as on relevant date. It will be useful to
apply the 'test of intention' and 'test of unworkability' with G
their respective contextual reference while determining
the applicability of either of the doctrines. and for that
matter, even on the applicability of the amended law to
the later law. Impact analysis on the workability of the
respective legislation shall be a relevant consideration for H
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 3 S.C.R.

A resolving such an issue. There can be instances where
the amended law, if applied and treated as incorporated
in the principal legislation, may be apparently
unadjustable to the scheme of that legislation. in that
circumstance, it will be unfair to interpret the amended law
B as deemed to be incorporated, irrespective of its
consequences on the implementation of the provisions
of the principal Act. The object of the principal Act should
not be permitted to be defeated on the basis of either of
the doctrines above referred. Hence, there is need for
c carving out exceptions to the rule of legislation by
reference as well. Examples where such reference would
be impermissible are as follows : a) Legislation by
reference should not result in defeating the object and
purpose of the later Act; b) Where the amendments to the
D earlier law are read into the subsequent law as a result
of legislation by reference, if the result is irresolvable
conflict between their provisions or it results in
destroying the essence and purpose of the principal Act
(later law). The above exceptions to the doctrine are not
E exhaustive but are merely indicative. The possibility of
other exceptions to this doctrine cannot be ruled out as
it is difficult for this Court to state all such exceptions with
precision. Furthermore, defining such exceptions with
exactitude will not even aid the ends of justice. [Paras 66,
F 67] [114-8-H; 115-A-C]

1.25. Synoptic analysis of the stated doctrines leads
to the conclusion that it is a case of legislation by
incorporation. The reference to the provisions of the
Central Act is specific as opposed to general. The State
G Act uses similar but definite language and expressions
while referring to the provisions of the Central Act
indicating the intent of the legislature not to adopt or even
apply the provisions of the Central Act generally. This
premise clearly is more than suggestive of the animus
H imponentis to exclude the application of the provisions
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 25
AND ORS.

of Central legislation prescribing time frame and A
consequences of default thereof to the State Act. It will
give rise to an irresolvable conflict amongst the
provisions of the two legislations if provisions like
Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act are to be read
into the State law. Even otherwise, it will still fall within B
the exceptions stated to the principle of legislation by
reference. Reading such i:;rovisions into the State law
would result in destroying the essence and effective
implementation of the State law. Though it is a case of
legislation by incorporation, still some of the amended c
provisions of the Central Act would be applicable to the
State Act or read as a part thereof, with reference to the
doctrine of pith and substance and harmonious
application of the statutes. [Para 68] [114-D-H; 115-A]

Delhi Development Authority v. Mahender Singh (2009) D
5 SCC 339 ; Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development
Authority (2010) 7 SCC 129 and Mariyappa v. State of
Kamataka (1998) 3 SCC 276 - relied on.

Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India v. E
Union of India (1989) 3 SCC 634; Secretary of State for India
in Council v. Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd.
[AIR 1931 PC 149; Municipal Commissioner of Howrah v.
Shalimar Wood Products (1963) 1 SCR 47; Boiani Ores Ltd.
v. State of Orissa (1974) 2 SCC 777; Mahindra & Mahindra F
v. Union of India (1979) 2 SCC 529; Ujagar Prints v. Union
of India (1989) 3 SCC 488; U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad
v. Jainul Islam (1998) 2 SCC 467; Nagpur Improvement Trust
v. Vasant Rao [(2002) 7 SCC 657; Maharashtra State Road
Transport Corporation v. State of Maharashtra (2003) 4 SCC G
200; 8. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry (1967)
2 SCR 650; Gauri Shankar Gaur v. State of U.P. (1994) 1 SCC
92; State of Maharashtra v. Sant Joginder Singh Kishan Singh
1995 Supp.(2) SCC 475; Gimar Traders v. State of
Maharashtra (2004) 8 SCC 505; Nagpur Improvement Trust H
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A v. Vithal Rao (1973) 1SCC 500 Gimar Traders v. State of
Maharashtra (2007) 7 SCC 555; Munithimmaiah v. State of
Kamataka (2002) 4 SCC 326; Prakash Amichand Shah v.
State of Gujarat (1986) 1 SCC 581; Gopal Sardar v. Karuna
Sardar (2004) 4 SCC 252; Church of North India v. Lavajibhai
B Ratanjibhai (2005) 10 SCC 760; Bajaya v. Gopikabai (1978)
2 SCC 542 and Land Acquisition Officer v. H. Narayanaiah
(1976) 4 sec 9 - referred to.

P. Ramanatha Aiyar's 'The Law Lexicon' (2nd Edn.
C 1997) -referred to.

2.1. The reservation under the MRTP Act necessarily
may not mean and include acquisition. The acquisition
under the Land Acquisition Act may not necessarily mean
and include reservation. They are well explained concepts
D within the legislative scheme of the respective Acts. It
may not be necessary at all for an appropriate authority
to always acquire the entire or part of the land included
in the planned development, while there may be cases
where the land is acquired for the purpose of completing
E planned development. [Para 70) [117 -B-0)

2.2. The acquisition of land, urid.er the provisions of
the Central Act, has to be for the purpose of the State Act.
There is a complete and comprehensive scheme on
F harmonious application of both the Acts when specific
provisions of the Central Act, as contemplated under the
State Act, alone are read into the State Act. The Planning
Authority is expected to prepare the plan indicating what
land it needs to acquire for implementation of the
development plan. Like town planning scheme, once it is
G finalized, all concerned must adhere thereto as it is a part
of -enforceable law and consequences of default would
accordingly flow. No person can develop any property
contrary to Development/Regional Plan or town planning
scheme and permissions are required to be obtained
H
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 27
AND ORS.

under various provisions of the State Act. Acquisition of A
land may become necessary for completing the planned
development. Thus, the acquisition will only be for
planned development as required under Section 126 of
the State Act. Of course, the State Government has been
vested with the power to acquire land for a purpose other B
than the one for which it is designated in any plan or
scheme, in terms of Section 128 of the State Act. Still, the
acquisition by the State under those provisions has to be
for the authorities specified under the MRTP Act or for
Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation under c
the provisions of the Maharashtra Industrial Development
Act, 1961. [Para 73] [121-E-H; 122-A-B]
2.3. The vesting of land, again, has different
connotations when examined in light of different
provisions of the State Act. The State Act has multi- D
dimensional purposes leading to primary object of
planned development, while the Central Act has only one
dimension, i.e. acquisition of land for a specified public
purpose. The land, in terms of Section 16 of the Central
Act shall vest in the State free of encumbrances only E
when the compensation is paid and possession of the
land is taken under that Act. Section 48 of the Central Act
empowers the State to withdraw from acquisition of any
land of which possession has not been taken, despite
the fact that award may have been pronounced in terms F
of Section 11 of the Central Act. But once there is
complete vesting of land in the State it amounts to
transfer of title from owner to the State by fiction of law.
Neither the Central Act has any provision to deal with re-
vesting of the land in the owner, nor does it appear to be G
permissible within the scheme of both the Acts~ Corollary
to this would be that even where the reservation lapses
as a result of default specified in the provisions of
Se.ctions 49, 126 and 127 of the State Act the acquisition
of the vested land would not, per se, lapse. The H
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011} 3 S.C.R.

A provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act do
not have any application to such cases under the
provisions of MRTP Act. Furthermore, the provisions of
Sections 126(2) and 127{1) of the State Act proceed on
the basis that there has been no acquisition of land or
B there is a default in acquiring the land. The bare reading
of these provisions puts the matter beyond ambiguity
that where the land has been acquired these provisions
would not apply. This is so because if the land stands
acquired and owner is divested of its title he is left with
c no interest in the acquired land or even against the
reservation of such land. Where lands have not been
acquired and the default persists for periods specified
under the relevant provisions, that land would become
available, free of reservation or designation, to the owner
for developing it in accordance with law. The legislature
0
in its wisdom, and rightly so, has not referred to lapsing
of acquisition as a consequence of the default contained
in Section 127 of the State Act. Section 127 opens with
the words "If any land reserved, allotted or designated for
E any purpose specified in any plan under this Act is not
acquired by agreement within ten years
........................ " or if a declaration under sub-section
(2) or sub-section {4) of Sect;on 126 of the MRTP Act is
not published in the Official Gazette within such period
then the interested person is entitled to invoke the
F provisions of Section 127 of the MRTP Act by serving a
notice and still if steps for acquisition are not taken within
twelve months of the date of such notice for acquiring the
land or the land is not acquired then the consequences
of lapsing of reservation, allotment or designation shall
G follow. This also demonstrates the intention of the
legislature, not to apply mandate of Section 11A of the
Central Act to the State Act. Lapsing of acquisition is not
contemplated under the scheme of either of the two Acts
in question, once the land is vested in the State. Such a
H view will find support from the fact that under the
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 29
AND ORS.
provisions of the State Act the Government has been A
given power to acquire land for the purpose other than
the one for which it was specified in the plan, i.e. the
purpose of acquisition can be changed. Whenever such
a situation arises, in that event, the relevant plan or
scheme shall also be deemed to be suitably varied by 8
such acquisition in terms of Sub-sections (1), (1A) and (2)
of Section 128 of the State Act. [Para 74] [122-C-H; 123-
A-H; 124-A-C]

Patna Improvement Trust v. Smt. Lakshmi Devi, AIR C
1963 sc 1077 and Satya Pal v. State of U.P. (1997) 9 sec
117 - referred to.

3.1. The implication of the doctrine of pith and
substance and the doctrine of incidental encroachment
is, primarily, to protect the legislation and to construe D
both the laws harmoniously and to achieve the o.bject or .
the legislative intent of each Act. The doctrine of pith and
substance can be applied to examine the validity or
otherwise of a legislation for want of legislative
competence as well as where two legislations are E
embodied together for achieving the purpose of the
principal Act. The doctrine of pith and substance find its
origin from the principle that it is necessary to examine
the true nature and character of the legislation to know
whether it falls in a forbidden sphere. The principle has F
been applied to the cases of alleged repugnancy and
there is no reason why its application cannot be extended
even to the cases of present kind which ultimately relates
to statutory interpretation founded on source of
legislation. The question of invasion into the territory of G
another legislation is to be determined not by degree but
by substance. The doctrine of pith and substance has to
be applied not only in cases of conflict between the
powers of two legislatures but also in any case where the
question arises whether a legislation is covered by a H
:30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 3 S.C.R.

A particular legislative field over which the power is
purported to be exercised. In other words, what is of
paramount consideration is that the substance of the
legislation should be examined to arrive at a correct
analysis or in examining the validity of law, where two
B legislations are in conflict or alleged to be repugnant. An
apparent repugnancy upon proper examination of
substance of the Act may not amount to a repugnancy
in law. Determination of true nature and substance of the
laws in question and even taking into consideration the
c extent to which such provisions can be harmonized,
could resolve such a controversy and permit the laws to
operate in their respective fields. [Paras 75, 76] [127-E;
124-E-F; 124-G; 125-A-B-F]

3.2. A statute should be construed so as to make it
D effective and operative on the principle expressed in the
maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Once it is found
that in pith and substance, an Act is a law on a permitted
field then any incidental encroachment, even on a
forbidden field, does not affect the competence of the
E legislature to enact that law. To examine the true
application of these principles, the scheme of the Act, its
object and purpose, the pith and substance of the
legislation are required to be focused at, to determine its
true nature and character. The State Act is intended only
F to ensure planned development as a statutory function
of the various authorities constituted under the Act and
within a very limited compass. An incidental cause cannot
override the primary cause. When both the Acts can be
implemented without conflict, then need for construing
G them harmoniously arises. The State Act being a code in
itself can take within its ambit provisions of the Central
Act related to acquisition, while excluding the provisions
which offend and frustrate the object of the State Act. It
will not be necessary to create, or read into the
H legislations, an imaginary conflict or repugnancy between
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 31
AND ORS.
the two legislations, particularly, when they can be A
enforced in their respective fields without conflict. Even
if they are examined from the point of view that
repugnancy is implied between Section 11A of the Land
Acquisition Act and Sections 126 and 127 of the MRTP
Act, then they would fall within the permissible limits of s
doctrine of "incidental encroachment" without rendering
any part of the State law invalid. Once the doctrine of pith
and substance is applied to the facts of the present case,
it is more than clear that in substance the State Act is
aimed at planned development unlike the Central Act c
where the object is to acquire land and disburse
compensation in accordance with law. Paramount
purpose and object of the State Act being planned
development and acquisition being incidental thereto, the
question of repugnancy does not arise. The State, in D
terms of Entry 5 of List II of Schedule VII, is competent to
enact such a law. It is a settled canon of law that Courts
normally would make every effort to save the legislation
and resolve the conflicUrepugnancy, if any, rather than
invalidating the statute. Therefore, it will be the purposive E
approach to permit both the enactments to operate in
their own fields by applying them harmoniously. [Para 77]
[128-E-H; 129-A-F]

State of Bombay v. Narottamdas Jethabhai 1951 SCR
51 - relied on. F

Prafufla Kumar Mukherjea v. Bank of Commerce Ltd.,
Khulna AIR 1947 PC 60; Union of India v. Shah Gobardhan
L. Kabra Teachers' College (2002) 8 SCC 228; Hoechst
Pharamaceutica/s Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 45; G
Muthuswami Goundan v. Subramanyam Chettiar [1940 FCR
188] and Jijubhai Nanbhai Kachar v. State of Gujarat 1995
Supp.(1) SCC 596 - referred to.

4. A self-contained code is an exception to the rule
of referential legislation. The schemes of the MRTP Act H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A and the Land Acquisition Act do not admit any conflict
or repugnancy in their implementation. The slight
overlapping would not take the colour of repugnancy. In
such cases, the doctrine of pith and substance would
squarely be applicable and rigours of Article 254(1) of the
B Constitution would not be attracted. Besides that, the
reference is limited to specific provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, in the State Act. Unambiguous language
qt the provisions of the MRTP Act and the legislative
i~tent clearly mandates that it is a case of legislation by
c incorporation in contradistinction to legislation by
reference. Only those provisions of the Central Act which
precisely apply to acquisition of land, determination and
disbursement of compensation in accordance with law,
can be read into the State Act. But with the specific
0 exceptions that the provisions of the Central Act relating
to default and consequences thereof, including lapsing
of acquisition proceedings, cannot be read into the State
Act. It is for the reason that neither they have been
specifically incorporated into the State law nor they can
E be absorbed objectively into that statute. If such
provisions (Section 11A being one of such sections) are
read as part of the State enactment, they are bound to
produce undesirable results as they would destroy the
very essence, object and purpose of the MRTP Act. Even
if fractional overlapping is accepted between the two
F statutes, then it will be saved by the doctrine of incidental
encroachment, and it shall also be inconsequential as
both the constituents have enacted the respective laws
within their legislative competence and, moreover, both
the statutes can eloquently co-exist and operate with
G compatibility. It will be in consonance with the
established canons of law to tilt the balance in favour of
the legislation rather than invalidating the same,
particularly, when the Central and State Law can be
enforced symbiotically to achieve the ultimate goal of
H planned development. [Para 78] [129-G-H; 130-A-F]
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 33
AND ORS.
5. In conclusion, it is held that the MRTP Act is a self- A
contained code. Further, the provisions introduced in the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by Central Act 68 of 1984,
limited to the extent of acquisition of land, payment of
compensation and recourse to legal remedies provided
under the said Act, can be read into an acquisition B
controlled by the provisions of Chapter VII of the MRTP
Act but with a specific exception that the provisions of
the Land Acquisition Act in so far as they provide
different time frames and consequences of default thereof
including lapsing of acquisition proceedings cannot be c
read into the MRTP Act. Section 11 A of the Land
Acquisi~ion Act being one of such provisions cannot be
applied to the acquisitions under Chapter VII of the MRTP
Act. [Para 80] [132-G-H; 133-A-B]
Case Law Reference: D

(1989) 3 sec 634 referred to Para 2
AIR 1931 PC 149 referred to Para 2
(1963) 1 SCR 47 referred to Para 2 E
(1974) 2 sec 111 referred to Para 2
(1979) 2 sec 529 referred to Para 2
(1989) 3 sec 488 referred to Para 2
F
(1998) 2 sec 467 referred to Para 2
(2002) 1 sec 657 referred to Para 2
(2003) 4 sec 200 referred to Para 2
G-
(1967) 2 SCR 650 referred to Para 2
(1994) 1 sec 92 referred to Para 2
1995 Supp.(2) sec 475 referred to Para 2
(2004) 8 sec 505 referred to Para 2 H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A (1973) 1SCC 500 referred to Para 9

(2001) 1 sec 555 referred to Para 20

(2009) 5 sec 339 relied on Para 24

B (2010) 1 sec 129 relied on Para 27

(2002) 4 sec 326 referred to Para 29

(1986) 1 sec 581 referred to Para 30

(2004) 4 sec 252 referred tc Para 31
c
(2005) 1o sec 760 referred to Para 32

(1998) 3 sec 276 relied on Para 33

(1978) 2 sec 542 referred to Para 53
D (1976) 4 sec 9 referred to Para 54
AIR 1963 SC 1077 referred to Para 69

(1997) 9 sec 111 referred to Para 72

E AIR 1947 PC 60 referred to Para 75

(2002) 8 sec 228 referred to Para 75

(1983) 4 sec 45 referred to Para 75

1995 Supp.(1) sec 596 referred to Para 76
F
1940 FCR 188 referred to Para 76

1951 SCR 51 relied on Para 77

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
G 3703 of 2003.

From the Judgment & Order dated 29.3.2000 of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay, bench At Aurangabad in Writ
Petition No. 822 of 2000.
H
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 35
AND ORS.

WITH A

C.A. No. 292 of 2011.

Arvind Savant, Pallav Shishodia, Altaf Ahmad, A.P.
Mayee, P.V. Yogeswaran, Charudatta Mahindrakar, Ejaz
Maqbool, Sanjay V. Kharde, Chinmoy A. Khaladkar, Sachin J. B
Patil, Asha G. Nair Shivaji M. Jadhav, Bhargava V. Desai,
Rahul Gupta, Nikhil Sharma, S. K. Bhattacharya, A.S. Bhasme,
Brajesh Pande, Shailendra Kumar Mishra, V.N. Raghupathy,
S.K. Kulkarni, Ankur S. Kulkarni, Jitedra Mohan Sharma, Vinay
Navare, Keshav Ranjan, Abha R. Sharma, S. U.k. Sagar (for C
Lawyer's Lnit & Co.) Prakash Ahuja, Jitendra Kumar, Shiv
Kumar Suri, Rahman, Rajesh Kumar, S.C. Birla, Subhash
Chandra Birla, R.K. Adsure, Satyajit A. Desai, Anagha S.
Desai for the appearing parties.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. Leave granted in SLP (C)
No. 9734 of 2005.

2. IA Nos.4 and 5 of 2009 in Civil Appeal No.3703 of 2003 E
are allowed subject to just exceptions and limited to this
reference.

3. Legalistic federalism was introduced as a technique of
governance with the people of India adopting, enacting and
giving unto themselves the Constitution of India on 26th F
November, 1949. The legislative competence of the Central
and State Legislatures has been demarcated by the
Constitution under Article 246, with the fields for exercise of
legislative power enumerated in List I (Central List), List II (State
List) and List Ill (Concurrent List) of Schedule VII to the G
Constitution of India. Power to enact laws, thus, is vested in the
Parliament as well as in the State Legislative Assemblies within
their respective spheres. This is the paramount source for
enactment of law, i.e., direct exercise of legislative power by
H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 3 S.C.R.

A the respective constituents. On the issue of distribution of
powers between the Centre and the State, a Constitution Bench
of this Court in Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association
of India v. Union of India [(1989) 3 SCC 634], noticed that the
constitutionality of a law becomes essentially a question of
B power which, in a federal constitution, turns upon the
construction of the entries in the legislative lists. Interpretative
process, as a tool of interpretation, introduced new dimensions
to the expansion of law enacted by Legislature, through Judge
made law. Amongst others, doctrines of 'legislation by
C reference' and 'legislation by incorporation' are the creation of
judicial pronouncements. One of the earliest instances, where
the Privy Council, then responsible for Indian Judicial system,
accepted the plea of 'legislation by incorporation' and
interpreted the statute accordingly in the case of Secretary of
State for India in Council v. Hindusthan Co-operative
0
Insurance Society Ltd. [AIR 1931 PC 149]. This judicial
pronouncement was followed in different subsequent judgments
and these doctrines were analyzed in greater depth for bringing
out the distinction between them. The judgment of the Privy
Council was referred with approval by this Court in different
E judgments including Municipal Commissioner of Howrah v.
Shalimar Wood Products [(1963) 1 SCR 47]; Boiani Ores Ltd.
v. State of Orissa [(1974) 2 SCC 777]; Mahindra & Mahindra
v. Union of India [(1979) 2 SCC 529]; Ujagar Prints v. Union
of India [(1989} 3 SCC 488]; U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad
F v. Jainul Islam [(1998) 2 SCC 467]; Nagpur Improvement
Trust v. Vasant Rao ((2002) 7 SCC 657] and Maharashtra
State Road Transport Corporation v. State of Maharashtra
((2003) 4 sec 200]. The principle that was enunciated by the
Privy Council in the case of Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance
G Society Ltd. (supra) stated, "where certain provisions from an
existing Act have been incorporated into a subsequent Act, no
addition to the former Act, which is not expressly made
applicable to the subsequent Act, can be deemed to be
incorporated in it, at all events, if it is possible for the
H
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 37
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
subsequent to function effectually without the addition". Though A
this principle has been reiterated from time to time; with the
development of law, still certain doubts were reflected in the
judicial pronouncements of the courts as to the application of
this principle as an absolute proposition of law. On the contrary,
this principle received criticism from various quarters. The critics B
said that it was causing impediments in smooth operatior. of
the later law as well as abdication of legislative power by the
concerned legislative constituent. Another criticism and
argument which, in fact, was even advanced before us is that
while approving the principle stated by the Privy Council, the c
subsequent Benches have not taken into consideration the
impact of the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court
in 8. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry [(1967) 2
SCR 650]. A pertinent constitutional aspect that ought to have
been brought to the notice of different Benches was that the
federal structure of the Constitution had come into force which D
controlled governance of the country and therefore the
principles, inter alia, stated by the Privy Council could not be
adopted as law of universal application without appropriately
modifying the stated position of law to bring it in complete E
harmony with the constitutional mandate. In the case of Gauri
Shankar Gaurv. State of UP. [(1994) 1 sec 92], one member
of the Bench of this Court, relied upon the principle stated in
Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. (supra) and
held that in a case of legislation by incorporation, subsequent
amendment or repeal of the provisions of an earlier Act F
adopted cannot be deemed to have been incorporated in the
adopting Act which may be true in the case of legislation by
reference. This judgment was relied upon by another Bench of
this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Sant Joginder
Singh Kishan Singh [1995 Supp.(2) SCC 475]. The G
amendments in various relevant laws and introduction and
application of newly enunciated principles of law resulted in
varied opinions. A Bench of this Court in the case of Gimar
Traders v. State of Maharashtra [(2004) 8 SCC 505]
(hereinafter referred to as 'Gimar Traders-I) expressed certain H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A doubts on the correctness of the law stated in the case of Sant
Joginder Singh (supra) and referred the matter to a larger
Bench.

4. The Bench in Gimar Traders-I (supra) felt that there
B were good reasons for reading the provisions introduced by the
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred
to as the 'Central Act 68 of 1984') into Chapter VII of the
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (for short,
'the M RTP Act' or 'the State Act') and Section 11 A of the Land
C Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Land Acquisition Act' or
'the Central Act') is one of such- provisions. Thus, the
Constitution Bench is called upon to examine whether the
MRTP Act is a self-contained Code or not, if so, to what effect?
Further, whether, in any event, all the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, as amended by Central Act 68 of 1984 with
D emphasis on Section 11A can be read into the provisions of
the MRTP Act?

5. The above questions require examination in light of the
facts which, to some extent, have been referred to in the Order
E of Reference dated 14th October, 2004 which reads as under:

"This appeal is directed against the judgment of the
Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay,
Aurangabad Bench, dismissing the writ petition of the
appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution. The
F
question for consideration is: whether all the provisions of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Central Act
68of1984 can be read into the provisions under Chapter
VII of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act,
1966 for an acquisition thereunder.
G
The appellant is a registered partnership firm owning
certain lands situated within the jurisdiction of the second
respondent Jalgaon Municipal Council. The land owned by
the appellant was subject to .a reservation in the draft
H
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 39
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
development plan of Jalgaon town, which was published A
on 19-3-1987. Since the appellant was unable to develop
the land under reservation, and no steps were being taken
by the Jalgaon Municipal Council to acquire the said land
under the provisions of the Maharashtra Regional and
Town Planning Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as "the B
MRTP Act"), the appellant issued a notice dated 19-1-
1989 under Section 49(1) of the MRTP Act, calling upon
the State Government to either confirm or refuse the
purchase notice within the period fixed under Section 49
~fueMITTP~. C

On 25-7-1989 the State Government, acting under Section
49(4) of the MRTP Act, confirmed the purchase notice
issued by the appellant. Despite confirmation of the
purchase notice, the second respondent Jalgaon Municipal
Council did not take any steps under Section 126 of the D
MRTP Act, nor did it apply to the State Government for
acquisition of the land under reservation.

Ultimately, on 3-10-1991, the first respondent State
Government issued a notification under Section 126(4) of E
the MRTP Act read with Section 6 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, declaring thM the land concerned was required
for a public purpose as indicated in the notification. This
notification expressly mentions that the period of three
years prescribed under Section 126(2) of the MRTP Act F
was over and, therefore, the State Government was acting
under sub-section (4) of Section 126 of the MRTP Act.

It is the case of the appellant that it had no knowledge of
this declaration dated 3-10-1991 as no individual notice
has been served on it, though this declaration was G
published in the Official Gazette on 15-10-1991. Despite
the declaration under Section 126(4) of the MRTP Act, as
aforesaid, nothing happened till March 1994. On 23-3-
1994 the appellant issued second purchase notice under
H
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A Section 49(1) of the MRTP Act. By a reply dated 10-4-
1995, the State Government informed the appellant that
inasmuch as the earlier purchase notice dated 19-1-1989
had already been confirmed by the State Government on
25-7-1989, and further since the Jalgaon Municipal
B Council has already initiated proceedings for acquisition
of the land, the second purchase notice was rejected.

The appellant challenged the said rejection by his Writ
Petition No. 2829 of 1996 before the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay. This writ petition was disposed of
c by the High Court by its judgment and order dated 31-3-
1997 by which the State Government and the Municipal
Council were directed to initiate the proceedings for
acquisition of the lands in question within one year and
complete the same within the time prescribed under the
D
MRTP Act. The High Court further directed, "in case the
authorities fail to initiate the acquisition proceedings within
the prescribed period, the lands of the petitioners shall be
deemed to have been released from the reservation".

E According to the appellant, despite the order of the High
Court, it was not informed about any steps taken by the
·authorities concerned for acquisition of its land. On 13-4-
1998, the appellant issued a letter to the Special Land
Acquisition Officer, Respondent 3, calling upon him to
F disclose whether any proceedings had been initiated for
acquisition. The appellant, however, received no reply.

On 18-2-1999, Respondent 3 issued a notice to the
appellant under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 calling upon him to accept the compensation for the
G
land acquired as per the award. The appellant moved Writ
Petition No. 822 of 2000 in the High Court of Judicature
at Bombay and sought quashing of the notice under
Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and a
direction enabling it to develop its land for residential
H
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 41
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

purpose. By the impugned judgment, the High Court A
dismissed the writ petition by holding that the prayer for
declar~tion of dereservation of the subject land as well as
granting of permission to develop the property for
residential purpose had already been declined by its
earlier order dated 31-3-1997, which had become final as B
far as the appellant was concerned. The High CourtJhus
took the view, "the only issue we are required to examine
i.e. whether the Land Acquisition Officer has complied with
our directions and if the directions were not complied
within the period of one year, as set out by us, whether c
the petitioner is entitled for the reliefs prayed for in this
petition". The High Court held: "on perusal of the
documents submitted before us we are satisfied that the .
requisite steps have been taken by the Special Land
Acquisition Officer for acquisition of the subject land and D
after Writ Petition No. 2829 of 1996 was disposed of, there
was no necessity to initiate fresh action by the Planning
Authority as contemplated under Section 126(1 )(c) of the
MRTP Act". In this view of the matter, the writ petition came
to be dismissed. Hence, this appeal by special leave.
E
Mr V.A. Mohta, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant
urged that the scheme of the MRTP Act shows that, on
receipt of an application under sub-section (1) of Section
126, if the State Government is satisfied that the land
. specified in the application is required for a public F
purpose, it may make a declaration to that effect in the
Official Gazette in the manner specified in the Land
Acquisition Act; 1894, and such dt!claration is deemed to
be a declaration duly made under Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. The proviso to sub-section (2) of G
this section prescribes the period within which such
declaration has to be made: Sub-section (3) of this section
provides that on publication of the declaration under
Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Collector
shall proceed to take order for the acquisition of the land H
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 3 S.C.R.

A under the said Act, and thereafter, the provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall apply to the acquisition
of the said land, subject to the modification introduced by .
sub-section (3), which pertains only to the market value
of the land. The only change made in the scheme of this
B Act is that, if the State Government fails to make the
declaration under sub-section (2) within the time provided
in the proviso thereto, the declaration does not become
bad as it is saved by sub-section (4). Under sub-section
(4), notwithstanding the fact that the requisite declaration
c under sub-section (2) had not been made within the time
provided therein, the State Government is empowered to
issue a fresh declaration for acquiring the land in the
manner provided by sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section
126 of the MRTP Act, but, if that be done, the market value
of the land for the purpose of compensation shall be the
D
market value at the date of such declaration made afresh,

Mr. Mehta submitted that barring the above special
modifica!ion introduced in the scheme of acquisition of
land, in all other respects, the provisions of the Land
E Acquisition Act, 1894 would mutatis mutandis apply to
an acquisition under Chapter VII of the MRTP Act. He
pointed out that the MRTP Act contains neither any
provision for payment of compensation, nor does it
prescribe the time within which the award has to be made
F after a declaration is made under sub-sections (2), (3) or
(4) of Section 126. It is urged that the legislature could not
have left it vague and indefinite. In the submission of the
learned counsel, this is a situation of invocation of the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, not by
G incorporation, but by reference. In other words, as and
when the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are
amended, all the amended provisions would be attracted
to an acquisition under Chapter VII of the MRTP Act,
unless barred expressly or by direct implication. The
H amendments introduced in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 43
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

by Central Act 68 of 1984 would all automatically apply. A
Consequently, the period of limitation prescribed under
Section 11-A for making the award would squarely apply.

Appellant urges that while sub-section (4) of Section 126
may save a declaration under Section 6 of the Land
8
Acquisition Act, 1894 from becoming bad because of
lapse of time (though, subject to the modification with
regard to the market value of the land prescribed therein),
there is nothing in the MRTP Act which precludes, expressly
or by direct implication, the provisions of Section 11-A from C
applying to govern the period within which the award has
to be made: In the facts of the present case, there is no
dispute that the declaration under Section 126(4) was
made on 3-10-1991 and published in the Official Gazette
on 15-10-1991, while the award is said to have been made
on 18-2-1999. In these circumstances, the award not D
having been made within the period of two years from the
date of the declaration under Section 6, the entire
proceedings for the acquisition of the land would lapse by
reason of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
E
Appellant relies heavily on the Statement of Objects and
Reasons attached to the Bill preceding Act 68 of 1984. The
attention of the legislature was drawn to the fact -of
pendency of acquisition proceedings for long time and, "the
pendency of acquisition proceedings for long periods often F
causes hardship to the affected parties and renders
unrealistic the scale of compensation offered to them".

Finally, it is contended that the amendments introduced by
. Central Act 68 of 1984 in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
were by way of a composite package and it is not open to G
anyone to pick and choose them in their application, unless
so provided in any competent legislative enactment. In the
present case, there is nothing in the provisions of the
MRTP Act which could oust the application of the entire
H
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A gamut of amendments introduced by Central Act 68 of
1984 and, therefore, all acquisitions, even under the MRTP
Act, must be read subject to them.

Learned counsel for the respondents, refuting the
8 contentions urged on behalf of the appellant, placed heavy
reliance upon the judgment of a Bench of two learned
Judges in State of Maharashtra v. Sant Joginder Singh
Kishan Singh 1 • Learned counsel for the respondents
strongly urged that this judgment clinches the arguments
against the appellant. The same contention as urged by
c the appellant before us has been considered and
negatived in Sant Joginder Singh (supra) wherein it is
observed (vide para 13) as under:

"It is next contended that since no separate
D procedure was prescribed by the Act for
determining the compensation, by necessary
inference, the Central Act was intended to be
applied mutatis mutandis to the acquisition under
the Act. He seeks support from the award made by
E the Collector in that behalf. It is true that th~re is no
express provision under the Act to determine
compensation for the land acquired under the Act.
Therefore, by necessary implication, compensatio!l
needs to be determined by applying the principles
F in Section 23 of the Central Act. But, there is a
distinction between procedural and substantive
provisions of a statute. Determination of
compensation by applying appropriate principles is
relatable to substantive provision, whereas making
G of award within a prescribed period is basically
procedural. So, merely because Section 23 of the
Central Act would apply to acquisition under the Act,
it is not enough to hold that what is contained in
Section 11-A would also apply. Further, what has
been provided in sub-section (4) of Section 126 of
H
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 45
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
the Act is a clear indication that failure to make the A
award within two years from the date of the
declaration under sub-section (2) of Section 126 of
the Act, would not render the notification published
under Section 125 of the Act non est."
B
The appellant urges that Sant Joginder Singh (supra)
needs reconsideration by a larger Bench.

Upon careful consideration of the contentions urged before
us, we are inclined to accept the submissions of Mr. Mohta
for more than one reason. First, although the MRTP Act C
and similar Regional Town Planning Acts did not contain ...
specific provisions for payment of compensation, when they
were challenged as infringing Article 14 of the Constitution,
their validity was upheld by reading the provisions as to
payment of compensation contained in the Land D
Acquisition Act, 1894 into the Regional Town Planning
Acts. (See in this connection Gauri Shanker Gaurv. State
of U.P. 2 and Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao3)

Secondly, Sant Joginder Singh (supra) appears to have E
been doubted by a judgment of another Bench of two
learned Judges in Maharashtra SRTC v. State of
Maharashtra4 • This was a case under the provisions of the
same Act viz. MRTP Act, 1966. After considering the
judgment~ in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Jainul F
lslam5 and Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra) it was held
that the provisions with regard to compensation made by
Central Act 68 of 1984, by addition of sub-section (1-A)
to Section 23 and the increased amount of solatium under
Section 23(2) and the interest payable under Section 28 r:
would all apply to an acquisition under Chapter VII of the G
MRTP Act. Dealing with Sant Joginder Singh (supra) the
Division Bench of this Court explained away Sant Joginder
Singh by observing :_

"The ultimate conclusion in Sant Joginder Singh i H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A case 1 seems to rest on the ratio that there is
sufficient indicia in the MRTP Act itself to exclude
the applicability of Section 11-A of the LA Act in
view of sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 126. As
we are approaching the question of correct
B interpretation of Section 126(3) from a different
perspective, there is no need to enter into a further
discussion as to whether and to what extent support
can be drawn from this decision."

Reading the judgment in Maharashtra SRTC (supra) it
c appears to us that, the Division Bench in that case did not
seem to agree with the proposition that was laid down in
Sant Joginder Singh (supra).

There appears to be no good reason to shut out or
D preclude the amendments introduced by Central Act 68 of
1984 in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 from applying to
an acquisition under Chapter VII of the MRTP Act. Or else,
the consequence would be that, in respect of two
landholders there would be arbitrary discrimination in the
E matter of acquisition of their lands, merely because in one
case the acquisition is by the direct route of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 and, in another case, through the
indirect route of the MRTP Act. The vice of discrimination
pointed out by a Bench of seven learned Judges in
F Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra) (vide para 31) would
affect such a situation. In order to avoid such a situation,
and to save the constitutionality of the provisions of the
MRTP Act, the provisions of enhanced benefits introduced
by Central Act 68 of 1984 were read into the provisions
of the MRTP Act, and an acquisition under the MRTP Act
G
was held to be governed by the same provisions. The
same principle should apply in the matter of attracting the·
provisions of Section 11-A of Act 68 of 1984 also to the
acquisition under the MRTP Act.
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 47
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

Thirdly, if the provisions of the MRTP Act are read as A
contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, in
the light of Sant Joginder Singh (supra) then it would be
open to the authorities, after issuing a declaration under
sub-section (3), to go into hibernation and leave the matter
hanging in perpetuity. That certainly would seriously affect B
the rights of the landholder preventing him from developing
the land or alienating it, merely because the authority
chooses to act under one Act instead of the other. This
again, would attract the wrath of Article 14 of the
Constitution, not only on account of discrimination, but also c
on account of arbitrariness.

We, therefore, see no good reason as to why the provisions
introduced in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by Central
Act 68 of 1984 should not be read into an acquisition under D
Chapter VII of the MRTP Act, to the extent not precluded
by the MRTP Act, 1966. Section 11-A being one such
section, it may t:iave to be applied to the acquisition under
Chapter VII of the MRTP Act.

For these reasons, in our considered view, the decision E
in Sant Joginder Singh (supra) requires reconsideration
by a larger Bench.

The Registry is directed to place the papers before the
Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for appropriate directions in F
the matter."

6. At the cost of repetition and also keeping in mind that
certain important facts do not emerge in entirety from the Order
of Reference, we will prefer to refer some of the essential
additional facts as they appear from the record and, particularly, G, ·
from the impugned judgment. Draft Development Plan was
published on 19th March, 1987 and the lands of the appellant
were reserved for a school and playground. On 19th January,
1989, the appellant served purchase notice under Section 49
of the MRTP Act which was confirmed on 25th July, 1989. The H
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A Planning Authority requested the Collector to initiate steps for,
acquisition of the land in question on 18th November, 1989 in
furtherance to which the Collector, Jalgaon appointed Special
Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) to initiate proceedings for
acquiring reserved lands in the Development Plan. However,
s thE~ Planning Authority passed a resolution (No.736)
recommending de-reservation of appellant's land but no further
steps in accordance with law were taken and, on the contrary,
on 3rd October, 1991, declaration under Section 126(2) of the
MRTP Act in the manner specified under Section 6 of the Land
c Acquisition Act was issued along with notices under Section 9
of that Act, which had been denied by the appellant. It is
alleged that this resolution was passed in collusion with the
appellants. The State Government sanctioned the Draft
Development Plan on 6th January, 1993 and draft award was
D prepared by the LAO on 20th July, 1993. The application dated
19th March, 1994 for developing the land, filed by the appellant
under Section 44 of the MRTP Act, was turned down by the .
Municipality. The appellant served the second purchase notice
under Section 49 of the MRTP Act which was also turned down
vide order dated 10th April, 1995. It may be noticed that the
E communication dated 10th April, 1995 was challenged by the
appellant before the High Court by filing a writ petition being
CWP No.2829of1996. In this petition, the appellant had prayed
for quashing of the communication dated 10th April, 1995 and
declaring that the appellant's land would be deemed to have
F been released from the reservation. The Court, vide its order
dated 31st March, 1997, rejected all the prayers and directed
as under:

"The respondents No.1 and 3 are directed to initiate the
G proceedings for acquisition of the lands in question within
one year from today and complete the same within the time
prescribed under the Act. In case the authorities fail to
initiate the acquisition proceedings within the prescribed
period, the lands of the petitioner shall be deemed to have
H
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 49 · .
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
been released from the reservation. Petition is disposed A
of accordingly."

7. Final award was passed by the LAO on 10th February,
1999 and he issued notices to the parties under Section 12(2)
of the Land Acquisition Act on 18th February, 1999. The B
appellant approached the High Court of Bombay, again, by
filing Writ Petition No.822 of 2000 in which the basic challenge
to the action of the respondent was on the ground that the
concerned authorities including the Planning Authority had
failed to take steps for acquisition in terms of the order of the
c
Court dated 31st March, 1997 within one year and, thus, the
reservation had lapsed. The land of the appellant, thus, should
be deemed to have reverted to the appellant and he should
be at liberty to develop the said land free from any
encumbrance. The writ petition came to be dismissed
summarily by the High Court vide order dated 29th March, 0
2000 which was challenged by filing a Special Leave Petition
which subsequently had been registered upon grant of leave
as Civil Appeal No.3703 of 2003. It has been noticed by the
High Court in the Impugned judgment, "Admittedly, a notice
under Section 127 of the MRTP Act has not been issued by E
the appellant to. the Planning Authority at any time and,
therefore, the reliance on the provisions of Section 127 of the
MRTP Act is totally misplaced. The appellant had issued the
first purchase notice under Section 49 of the MRTP Act to the
State Government on 19th January, 1989 and it was confirmed F
by the State Government under Section 49(4) of the MRTP Act
on 25th July, 1989." This is not even disputed by the appellant
before us.
8. Another important fact which needs to be noticed by G
us is that the order dated 31st March, 1997 passed by the High
Court in Writ Petition (C) No.2829 of 1996, was clarified in the
impugned judgment by stating that the LAO had taken steps
in furtherance to his appointment by the Collector vide order
dated 29th June, 1990 and had prepared the draft award on
H
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A 20th July, 1993. As these facts were not brought to the notice
of the Court, the directions issued by the High Court certainly
did not mean that fresh steps for acquisition should be taken.
In fact, the acquisition proceedings were expected to be
completed by the LAO in furtherance to his appointment by the
B Collector in accordance with law. Thus, the High Court, while
referring to the second notice served by the appellant under
Section 49 of the MRTP Act, rejected all relief claimed by the
appellant, as necessary steps had already been taken by the
LAO.
c 9. The appellant herein had argued in Gimar Traders-I
(supra) that the decision of this Court in Sant Joginder Singh's
case (supra) needs reconsideration by a larger Bench as it did
not state correct law whereas the respondent-State of
Maharashtra had taken up the plea that Sant Joginder Singh's
D case (supra) clinched the entire issue. The Bench, while
accepting the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant,
stated three reasons for referring the matter to a larger Bench.
As is evident from para 17 of the Order of Reference, the Bench
noticed that Sant Joginder Singh's case (supra) appears to
E have been doubted by judgments of other Benches of this Court
in the cases of Maharashtra SRTC, Nagpur Improvement
Trust and U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (supra) in which it
was held that the provisions with regard to compensation in -
terms of Central Act 68 of 1984, including Sections 23(1A),
F 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act would be applicable
to an acquisition under Chapter VII of the MRTP Act. On the
contrary, in Sant Joginder Singh's case (supra), the Court had
held that there are sufficient indicia in MRTP Act itself to
exclude applicability of Section 11 A of the Land Acquisition Act
G in view of sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 126 of the MRTP
Act. The Bench also felt that voice of discrimination pointed by
the Seven Judge Bench in Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal
Rao [(1973) 1SCC 500) would affect a situation like the present
case and such provisions may have to be read into the Land
H Acquisition Act. After expressing this view, the Bench chose
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 51
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

to refer a restricted question for determination by the larger A
Bench that whether provisions of Section 11A of the Land
Acquisition Act, amongst other provisions, introduced by
Central Act 68 of 1984 would, apply to Chapter VII of the MRTP
Act.
B
10. Before we answer this legal controversy arising in the
present case, we consider it appropriate to refer to the
contentions r.aised by the learned counsel appearing before us.

11. The appellant has challenged the findings recorded by
the High Court in the impugned judgment on various grounds. C
They have to be examined on merits by the appropriate Bench.
We are primarily concerned with answering the question
referred to this Bench in the above Order of Reference. In that
regard, the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants are:
D
1. There is generic reference to the provisions of Land
Acquisition Act in different Chapters of the MRTP
Act. Hence, the provisions of the Land Acquisition
Act will have to be read into the provisions of MRTP
Act as it is legislation by reference. As a result E
thereto, all the provisions introduced by the
amending Central Act 68 of 1984, including Section
11A of the Land Acquisition Act will be read into
and become integral part of the MRTP Act.

2. The scheme under both the Acts is complementary F
to each other. Therefore, both the Acts have to
operate in a common field and, then alone, it will
form a unified workable scheme with due regard to
dichotomy between reservation and acquisition.
G
3. In terms of Section 125 of the MRTP Act, the
purpose of acquisition shall be deemed to be a
public purpose within the meaning of the Land
Acquisition Act. The provisions of Section 126 of
the MRTP Act require application of the provisions H
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A of the Land Acquisition Act. Once notification under
Section 126(2) is issued, automatically the
provisions of Section 6 and complete mechanism
for acquisition of land under the provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act comes into operation and,
B thus, the provisions of Section 11A of the Land
Acquisition Act would become part of such
acquisition necessarily.

4. The provisions of the Central Act 68 of 1984 are
procedural in their nature and application and are
c not substantive. These provisions, therefore, would
form part of the MRTP Act. Hence, the judgment of
this Court in Sant Joginder Singh's case (supra)
requires reconsideration.

D 5. The view taken by this Court in the case of Sant
Joginder Singh (supra), following Hindusthan Co-
op'erative Insurance Society's case (supra),
applying the principle of legislation by incorporation
is not applicable to the present case and these
E judgments require reconsideration by this Court.

6. Lastly and in alternative, it is contended that any
other approach would vest the concerned
authorities with the choice of initiating proceedings
under either of these Acts which have substantially
F different consequences, in fact and in law. It is also
argued that if Section 11A of the Land Acquisition
Act is not read into or treated as part of the MRTP
Act, then it will amount to discrimination between
the similarly situated persons whose lands are
G subject matter of acquisition.

12. Reacting to the above submissions, the learned
counsel appearing for different respondents contended that:

1. The MRTP Act is a self-contained Code in itself.
H
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 53
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

Consequently, it is not necessary for the Court to A
go into the larger question, whether it is a case of
legislation by reference or legislation by
incorporation.

2. In the alternative, even if the Court decides to B
examine this aspect, it is a clear case of legislation
by incorporation. Various provisions of the MRTP
Act have referred to specific provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act and no general application of the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act is
ccntemplated under the provisions of the MRTP
c
Act. Since it is legislation by incorporation, the
amended provisions inserted by Central Act 68 of
1984 cannot be read into the MRTP Act. Both the
laws are wholly dissimilar, operate in different fields
and have different objects. The Land Acquisition Act D
is a Central legislation relatable to Entry 42 of List
Ill while the MRTP Act is enacted by the State
Legislature with reference to Entries 5 and 18 of
List II of Schedule VII to the Constitution.
E
3. These being the legislations enacted by two
different bodies for different purposes cannot attract
any of the aforestated principles. Both the Acts
operate in different fields and cannot be read
together to create a coherent legislation as that F
would frustrate the very object of the legislation
falling exclusively in the domain of the State
Legislature.

4. The State enactment has provided for definite time
frame in regard to different subjects, except for G
making of the award after a declaration in terms of
Section 126(2) or 126(4) of the State Act as the
case may be, which by necessary implication,
would mean intended exclusion of the provisions of
Section 11A of the Central Act. H
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 3 S.C.R.

A 5. On following the principle stated by the Constitution
Bench in the case of B. Shama Rao (supra), the
other judgments of this Court cannot be stated as
a binding precedent. There shall be abdication of
its constitutional functions by the State Legislature
B as it would not be aware of and able to apply its
mind to the amendments made to the Central
Legislation, if the principle of legislation by
reference is applied to the present case. It would
lead to undesirable consequences.
c SCHEME UNDER THE RESPECTIVE ACTS :

THE MAHARASHTRA REGIONAL & TOWN PLANNING
ACT, 1966

D 13. The MRTP Act was enacted by the legislature of the
State of Maharashtra as it was expedient to make provisions
for the planning, development and use of the land in regions
established for the purpose of that Act, for the constitution of
Regional Planning Boards therefor and to. make better
provisions for the preparation of development plans with a view ' (
E
to ensure that the town planning scheme is made in a proper.
manner and its execution is made effective. According to the
statement of objects and reasons of this enactment, the
Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 had made planning of land
possible only within the areas of local authorities and there was
F no provision to control development of land in the important
peripheral areas outside the municipal limits. This resulted in
development of land in the peripheral areas in an irregular and
- haphazard manner which was clearly demonstrated in the vast
areas outside Greater Bombay, Poona and other important
G urban centres. The object of regional planning was to facilitate
proper planning of such extensive areas of land, called Regions
in the Bill, having common physical, social and economic
.
problems so that certain matters such as. distribution of
population and industries, roads and highways, preservation of
H good agricultural lands, reservation of green belts and
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 55
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

preservation of areas of natural scenery etc. could be dealt with A
and planned comprehensively on a regional level. The Bill had
sought to improve the provisions of the Bombay Town Planning
Act, 1954 in regard to preparation and execution of
development plans to ensure that such plans are made
properly and expeditiously. Every planning Authority is required B
to appoint a Town Planner for carrying· out surveys and to
prepare an existing land use map and formulating proposals
of the development plan within the framework of the Regional
Plan, where one exists, for the consideration of the Planning
c
Authority. The Planning Authority is entitled to refuse or grant, .
subject to certain conditions, permission to develop. in
accordance with such plan. This order of the Planning Authority
is appealable before the Prescribed Officer in the State
Government Unauthorized development was made penal and
could be removed and the use contrary to the plan could be D ·
discontinued. One of the main features of the Bill was the
provision for creation of new towns by means of Development
Authorities. The problems of overcrowding of population and
industries, traffic congestion, inadequacy of public services and
utilities like schools, hospitals, markets, water supply, drainage E
and road, rail transport etc. became so acute in the regions of
Greater Bombay and Poona that it became necessary to
consider proposals for the dispersal of population and industry
from such centres and their reallocation at suitable places
within the Region. The MRTP Act required every local authority F
to prepare a development plan for the area within its .
jurisdiction. Under such plan, the local authority was to allocate
land for different uses, e.g. for residential, industrial, commercial
and agricultural and to reserve sites required for public
purposes as-well. Town planning schemes could be made in
respect of any land, whether open or built up and incremental G
contribution, i.e. betterments in land value could be recovered
from owners of the plots benefitting from the proposals made
in the scheme. These were the features of the Bombay Town
Planning Act, 1954 which extended to whole of the State of
Maharashtra excluding the City of Nagpur and, thus, a more H
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 3 S.C.R.

A comprehensive and effective legislation was contemplated by.
the legislature.
14. The scheme of the MRTP Act is, primarily, focused on
planning and development of the land in the entire State of
Maharashtra. The MRTP Act provides for development plans
B from macro to.micro levelwhich includes specifying the land
to be, used for providing various public amenities and services.
That is the precise reason that the expression 'development'
under Section 2(7) of the MRTP Act has been defined in very
wide terms. It is difficult to comprehend any activity relating to
C land and planning which could fall outside the scope of this
definition. Section 2(9) of the State Act defines 'development
plan' to mean a plan for development or redevelopment of the
area within the jurisdiction of the Planning Authority and includes
revision of a development plan and proposals of a Special ·
D Planning Authority for developnient of land within its jurisdiction.
The 'regional plan' means a plan for development or
redevelopment of a region which is approved by the State
Government and has come into operation under the MRTP Act.
The expression 'town planning scheme' has not been defined
E as such but the term 'scheme' includes a plan relating to town
planning scheme in terms of Section 2(30) of the State Act.'
Corresponding to each plan there are authorities like
'Development Authority' which means a New Town
Development Authority constituted or declared under Section
__ F a
113 of the MRTP Act, 'Planning Authority' which means local
authority including a· Special Planning Authority and the Slum
Rehabilitation Authority appointed under Section 40 of this Act
and Section 3(c) of the Maharashtra Slum Areas Improvement
Clearance & Redevelopment Act, 1971 respectively. 'Region'
G means any area established to be .region under Section 3,
'Regional Board' or 'Board' means Regional Planning Board
constituted under Section 4, 'Regional Planning Committee'
means a committee constituted· under Section 10. ·
'Development Rights' in terms of Section 2(9A) means the right
H to carry out development or to develop the land or building or
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 57
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

both and shall include the transferable development right in the A
form of right to utilize the Floor Space Index of land utilizable
either on the remainder of the land partially reserved for a public
purpose or elsewhere, as the final Development Control
Regulations in this behalf provide. Once a region has been
created under the provisions of the MRTP Act then a regional B
plan is to be prepared and it should provide for matters
contemplated under Section 14. This plan is to be submitted
to the State Government for approval. The Regional Board,
before preparing common regional plan and submitting it to the
State Government for approval, is required to carry out C
necessary surveys and prepare an existing land use map of the
region or such other maps as are considered necessary and
then prepare a draft regional plan. It shall be published in the
Official Gazette in the manner prescribed and shall be open to
inspection at all reasonable hours mentioned therein inviting D
objections and suggestions from any person with regard to draft
plan before the specified date which is not to be earlier than
four months from the publication of the notice. Then this plan
has to be notified in accordance with the provisions of Section
17 of the MRTP Act. It is important to note that once the draft E
regional plan or regional plan has been notified and published
then Section 18 of the MRTP Act places a restriction on change
of use of land or development thereof which reads as under:

"18. Restriction on change of user of land or development
~~ F
\, (1) No person shall on or [after the publication of the notice
that the draft of Regional plan has been prepared or the
draft Regional plan has been arproved], institute or change
the use of any land for any purpose other than agriculture, G
or carry out any development, in respect of any land without
·the previous permission of the Municipal Corporation or
Municipal Council, within whose area the land is situate,
and elsewhere,. of the Collector.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the H
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A time being in force the permission referred to in sub-
section (1) shall not be granted otherwise than in conformity
with the provisions of the draft of final Regional plan.

(3) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-sections (1)
and (2) or any other provisions of this Act, any person
B
intending to execute a Special Township Project on any
land, may make an application to the State Government
and on receipt of such application the State Government
may, after making such inquiry as it may deem fit in that
behalf, grant such permission and declare such project to
c be a Special Township Project by notification in the Official
Gazette or, reject the application"

15. Section 20 of the State Act empowers the State
Government to revise or modify the regional plan in accordance
o with the prescribed procedure. Chapter Ill of the MRTP Act
deals with preparation, submission and sanction of
Development Plan and, primarily, provides for use of land for
purposes such as residential, industrial, commercial,
agricultural, recreational, schools, colleges and other
E educational institutions, open spaces, playgrounds, stadia,
zoological gardens, green belts, nature reserves, transport and
communication, water supply, drainage, sewerage amongst
other public utilities and amenities. The Draft Development
Plan is also to be submitted to the State Government in terms
F of Section 30 of the MRTP Act. Chapter IV of this Act contains
certain significant provisions and relates to control of
development and use of land included in the development
plans. Section 43 of the MRTP Act states that after the date
on which, the declaration of intention to prepare a development
· plan for any area is published in the Official Gazette or after
G the date on which a notification specifying any undeveloped
area as a notified area, or any area designated as a site for a
new town is published in the Official Gazette, no person shall
institute or change the use of any land or carry out any
development of land without the permission in writing of the
H Planning Authority. However, the proviso to this Section
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 59
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
provides that no such permission shall be necessary for carrying A
out works for the maintenance, improvement or other alterations
of any building which do not materially affect the external
appearance thereof as specified in that Section. Even in terms
· of Section 49 of the MRTP Act where a purchase notice is
served, the person has to call upon the authorities to purchase B
his interest in the land for reasons contained in clauses (a) to
(e) of sub-sectio6 (1) and in accordance with the provisions of
this Act.
16. The GovernmenVAppropriate Authority, other than the C
Planning Authority is vested with the powers under Section 50
of the MRTP Act to delete reserved or designated land from
interim or draft or final development plan and in terms of
Section 68 of the MRTP Act, the State Government is also
vested with the power to sanction even the draft scheme.
Section 69 of the MRTP contemplates similar restrictions on D
the use an·d development of the land upon declaration of town
planning scheme. Town planning schemes are required to be
prepared for the purposes of implementing the proposal in the
official development plan in terms of the provisions of Chapter
V of MRTP Act. Another aspect which requires consideration E
of this Court is reference to Section 72 of the MRTP Act which
refers that the matters in relation to such schemes to be
adjudicated upon by the Arbitrator who has been vested with
wide powers and duties. The Arbitrator shall follow the
procedure prescribed under Section 72(3), estimate the value F
and fix difference between the values of the original plots and
the values of the final plots included in the final scheme and
estimate the amount of compensation payable under Section
66 of the MRTP Act, estimate the reference of claims made
before him and decide the dispute of ownership amongst other G
specified matters. Appeal against the decision of the Arbitrator
under clauses (iv) to (xi) (both inclusive) and clauses (xiv) to
(xvi) of sub-section (3) of Section 72 of the State Act lies to a
tribunal constituted under Section 75 of the MRTP Act. In fact,
certain decisions of the Arbitrator are final and binding on the H
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A parties including the Planning Authority. However, some of such
decisions do not attain finality qua filing of civil suits, e.g.
disputes under Section 71 of the MRTP. Thus, an adjudicatory
mechanism covering larger aspects of planning and execution
is provided under the provisions of the MRTP Act. Preparation,
B submission and sanction of development plans are basic
functions of various authorities constituted under Chapter VI of
the MRTP Act with ultimate object of execution of such plan.
The MRTP Act contemplates preparation, approval and
finalization of an interim or draft plan and, as already noticed,
c with the publication of such plans, the restrictions operate.

17. We may also notice that Section 14(e) of the MRTP
Act contemplates reservation of sites for new towns, industrial
estates and any other large scale development or project which
is required to be undertaken for proper development of the
D reg ion or new town. Section 113 of the State Act provides for
designation of a site for a new town.

18. The most important facet of this legislation is the
provisions with regard to acquisition and lapsing of reservation
E and powers of the Government in that regard. These aspects
have been dealt with under Chapter VII of the MRTP Act.
Section 125 of the MRTP Act provides that any land required,
reserved or designated in a Regional Plan, Development Plan
or Town Planning Scheme for a public purpose or purposes,
F · . including plans for any area of comprehensive development or
for any new town shall be deemed to be land needed for a -
public purpose within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act.
Section 126 of the MRTP Act contemplates that after the
publication of a draft Regional Plan, a Development Plan or any
other plan or Town Planning Scheme, if any land is required or
G reserved for any of the public purposes specified in any plan
or scheme under this Act at any time the Planning Authority,
Development Authority, or as the case may be, any Appropriate
Authority may, except as otherwise provided in section 113A
of the MRTP Act, acquire the land, in the mode specified in that
H Section. Section 126(2) of the MRTP Act also contemplates
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 61
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

that where an application has been moved under Section A
126(1 )(c) of the MRTP Act to the State Government for
acquiring such land under the Land Acquisition Act, then the
Government is to act in accordance with and subject to the
provisions of Section 126(2) of the MRTP Act. If the State
Government is of the opinion that any land inCluded in such plan B
is needed for any public purpose, it may make a declaration
to that effect in the Official Gazette, in the manner provided in
Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (emphasis supplied).
Such declaration, notwithstanding anything contained in the
Land Acquisition Act, shall be deemed to be a declaration duly c
made under that Section. In other words, there is no
requirement to comply with the provisions of Sections 4 and
. S(A) of the Land Acquisition Act before such declaration is
published. It is further provided that subject to the provisions of
Section 126(4) of the MRTP Act no such declaration shall be D
made after the expiry of one year from the date of publication
of the draft regional plan, development plan or any other plan
or the scheme, as the case may be. After such declaration is
published, the Collector shall proceed to take order for the
acquisition of the land under the Land Acquisition Act and E
provisions of that Act shall apply to the acquisition of the said
land with the modification that date of market value of the land
to be acquired shall be determined with reference to sub-
section 3(i) to 3(iii) of Section 126 of the MRTP Act. Sub-
section (4) of Section 126 empowers the State Government to F
make a fresh declaration for acquiring the land where the
period of one year, as specified in the proviso to sub-section
(2) to Section 126 of the MRTP Act, has lapsed but then the
market value of the land would be the market value on the date
of publication of fresh declaration. Section 126 of the MRTP ..
Act reads as under: · .u
"126. Acquisition of land required for public purposes
specified in plans. ··

(1) When after the publication ofa draft regional Plan, a H
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R. .

A Development or of land any other plan or town planning
scheme, any land is required or reserved for any of the
public purposes specified in any plan or scheme under this
Act at any time of the Planning Authority, Development
Authority, or as the case may be, any Appropriate Authority
B may, except as otherwise provided in section 113A .
acquire the land, - ·

(a)' by agreement by paying an amount agreed to, or

(b) in lieu of any such amount, by granting the land-owner
c or the lessee, subject, however, to the lessee-paying the
lessor or depositing with the Planning Authority,
Development Authority or Appropriate Authority, as the
case may be, for payment to the lessor, an amount
. equivalent to the value of the lessor's interest to be
D determined by any of the said Authorities concerned on
the basis of the principles laid down in the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, Floor Space Index (FSI) or
Transferable Development Rights (TOR) against the area
of land surrendered free of cost and free fiom all
E encumbrances, and also further additional Floor Space
Index or Transferable Development Rights against the
development or construction of the amenity on the
· surrendered land at his cost, as the Final Development
. Control Regulations prepared in this behalf provide; or ·
F . (c) by making an application to the State Government for
acquiring such land under the Land Acquisition Act; 1894, ·
and the land (together' with the amenity, if any, so
developed or constructed) so acquired by agreement or
· by grant of Floor Space Index or additional Floor Space
G Index or Transferable· Development Rights under this
sections or under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as the
case may be, shall vest absolutely free from all
encumbrances in the Planning Authority; Development
Authority, or as the case may be, any Appropriate
H Authority.
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 63
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
(2) On receipt of such application, if the State Government A
is satisfied that the and specified in the application is
needed for the public purpose therein specified, or if the
State Government (except in cases falling under section
49 and except as provided in section 113A) itself is of
opinion that any land included in any such plan is needed B
for ~my public purpose, it may make a declaration to that
effegt in the Official Gazette, in the manner provided in
section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in respect of
the said land, The declaration so published shall,
notwithstanding anything contained in the said Act, be c
deemed to be a declaration duly made under the said
section :

Provided that, subject to the provisions of sub- section (4),
no such declaration shall be made after the expiry of one
year from the date of publication of the draft Regional Plan, D
Development Plan or any other Plan, or Scheme, as the
case may be. ·

(3) On publication of a declaration under the said section
6, the Collector shall proceed to take order for the E
acquisition of the land under the said Act; and the
provisions of that Act shall apply to the acquisition of the
said land with the modification that the market value of the
land shall be, -
F
(i) where the land is to be acquired for the purposes
of a new town, the market value prevailing on the
date of publication of the notification constituting or
declaring the Development Authority for such town;
(ii) where the land is acquired for the purposes of a G
Special Planning Authority, the market value
prevailing on the date of publication of the
notification of the area as an undeveloped area;
and
H
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A (iii) in any other case the market value on the date of
publication of the interim development plan, the draft
development plan or the plan for the area or areas
for comprehensive development, whichever is
earlier, or as the case may be the date or
B publication of the draft town planning scheme :

Provided that, nothing in this sub-section shall affect the
date for the purpose of determining the market value of
land in respect of which proceedings for acquisition
commenced before the commencement of the
c Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning (Second
Amendment) Act, 1972:

Provided further that, for the purpose of clause (ii) of this
sub-section, the market value in respect of land included
D in any undeveloped area notified under sub-section (1) of
section 40 prior to the commencement of the Maharashtra
Regional and Town Planning (Second Amendment) Act,
1972, shall be the market value prevailing on the date of
such commencement.
E
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the proviso to
sub-section (2) and sub-section (3), if a declaration,] is not
made, within the period referred to in sub-section (2) (or
having been made, the aforesaid period expired on the
commencement of the Maharashtra Regional and Town
F Planning [(Amendment) Act, 1993)], the State Government
may make a fresh declaration for acquiring the land under
the Land of Acquisition Act, 1894, in the manner provided
by sub-sections (2) and (3) of this section, subject to the
modification that the market value of the land shall be the
G market value at the date of declaration in the Official
Gazette, made for acquiring the land afresh."

19. Section 127 of the MRTP Act relates to lapsing of
reservations. The unamended provisions of Section 127 MRTP
H Act, subject to satisfaction of the ingredients therein, provide
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 65
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
that if any land reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose A
specified in any plan under this Act is not acquired by
agreement within ten years from the date on which a final
Regional plan, or final Development plan comes into force or
no steps for acquisition have been taken then the reservation,
allotment or designation shall be deemed to have lapsed, and B
thereupon the land shall be deemed to be released from such
reservation, allotment or designation and shall become
available to the owner for the purpose of development as
otherwise permissible in the case of adjacent land under the
relevant plan. The provisions of Section 127 of the MRTP Act c
came to be amended by The Maharashtra Regional & Town
Planning (Second Amendment) Act, 2009. By amendment, the
portion underlined in the unamended Section, reproduced
hereinafter, was deleted. The Legislature, in its wisdom, while
deleting the reference to the Land Acquisition Act made lapsing D
of reservation a consequence of the default arising only from
sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 126 of the MRTP Act.
Where such default appeared as well as no steps for
acquisition were taken within the specified time, under the
amended/unamended Section 127 of the MRTP Act, the owner
was required to give notice in relation to release of the property. E
If no steps for acquisition were taken within 12 months of such
notice, the land stood de-reserved. The amended and
unamended provisions of Section 127 of the MRTP Act read
as under:
F
Unamended "127. Lapsing of reservations. If any land
reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose specified
in any plan under this Act is not acquired by agreement
within ten years from the date on which a final Regional
plan, or final Development plan comes into force or if G
proceedings for the acquisition of such land under this
Act or under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, are not
commenced within such period, the owner or any person
interested in the land may serve notice on the Planning
Authority, Development Authority or as the case may be, H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A Appropriate Authority to that effect; and if within six
months from the date of the service of such notice, the land
is not acquired or no steps as aforesaid are commenced
for its acquisition, the reservation, allotment or designation
shall be deemed to have lapsed, and thereupon the land
B shall be deemed to be released from such reservation,
allotment or designation and shall become available to the
owner for the purpose of development as otherwise,
permissible in the case of adjacent land under the relevant
plan." (emphasis supplied)
c Amended "127. Lapsing of reservations. (1) If any land
reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose specified
in any plan under this Act is not acquired by agreement
within ten years from the date on which a final Regional
plan, or final Development plan comes into force or, if a
D declaration under sub-section (2) or (4) of section 126 is
not published in the Official Gazette within such period, the
owner or any person interested in the land may serve
notice, along with the documents showing his title or
interest in the said land, on the Planning Authority, the
E Development Authority or, as the case may be, the
Appropriate Authority to that effect ; and if within twelve
months from the date of the service of such notice, the land
is not acquired or no steps as aforesaid are commenced
for its acquisition, the reservation, allotment or designation
F shall be deemed to have lapsed, and thereupon the land
shall be deemed to be released from such reservation,
allotment or designation and shall become available to the
owner for the purpose of development as otherwise,
permissible in the case of adjacent land under the relevant
G plan;

(2) On Lapsing of reservation, allocation or designation of
any land under sub-section (1), the Government shall notify
the same, by an order published in the Official Gazette. n

H 20. The objects and reasons for amendment of Section
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 67
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
127 of the MRTP Act specifically referred to the hardship to the A
land owners, stated in the judgment of this Court in the case of
Gimar Traders v. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 7 SCC 555]
(hereinafter referred to as 'Gimar Traders-//), pertaining to
indefinite waiting for release of their respective lands because
of inaction on the part of the Planning Authority in acquisition B
of their lands. The Legislature was obviously aware of the
provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act which
permitted lapse of entire acquisition proceedings after the
prescribed period. Still, the Legislature opted to amend Section
127 of the MRTP Act in the manner as it had amended. The c
intention appears to be to remove the doubt, if any, created by
the unamended provisions of Section 127 of the MRTP Act with
regard to application of Section 11A of the Central Act to the
State Act. Once the State Legislature has, by amendment,
restricted the application of default clause only in the situations
0
covered under Section 126(2) and 126(4) of the State Act
respectively, it will then be impermissible to read Section 11A
of the Land Acquisition Act into the language of Section 126(2)
of the State Act. The amendment ex-facie appears to be to
avoid undue hardship to the owners of the land on the one hand
while on the other, exclusion of the underlined portion supra E
especially the words 'under the Land Acquisition Act', suggests
the legislative intent to complete all proceedings within the
framework of the MRTP Act. Section 128 of the State Act deals
with the powers of the State Government to acquire land for
purposes other than the one for which it is designated in any F
plan or scheme. This provision is quite distinct and different
from any of the provisions in the Land Acquisition Act. Section
128(2) of the MRTP Act makes, by operation of law, any
Planning, Development or Appropriate Authority under this Act
as a 'person interested' in the land acquired under the G
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act; and in determining the
amount of compensation to be awarded, the market value of
the land shall be assessed as if the land has been released
from reservation, allotment or designation made. Further the
Collector or the Court shall take into consideration the damage H
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 3 S.C.R.

A sustained along with the proportionate cost of the development
plan or town planning scheme or new town, if any, incurred by
such authority which is rendered abortive by reason of such
acquisition. The provisions of Section 129 of the MRTP Act are
relatable to and in substance are pari materia to the provisions
B of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act. On an application
made by the Planning, Development or Appropriate Authority,
the State Government if satisfied that the possession of any land
is reserved or designated for a public purpose under any of the
plans is urgently required in the public interest by that Authority,
c can take steps for taking possession of the land after giving a
notice of 15 days and thereupon, the right or interest in that
land shall extinguish from the date specified; and on the date
on which possession is taken, the land shall vest without any
further assurance and free from encumbrances in the State
D Government. Of course, this power has to be exercised in
consonance with other provisions of Section 129 of the MRTP
Act. Wherever the possession of the land is taken under sub-
section (1) the authority is required to pay at the request of the
person interested an advance not exceeding 2/3rd of the«
amount estimated to be payable to such person on account of
E the land after executing an agreement in that behalf un.der
Section 157 of the MRTP Act.

21. The various provisions, which we have indicated
above, clearly demonstrate a self-contained scheme under the
F MRTP Act. Section 116 of MRTP Act is one other provision
which refers to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and
states that a Development Authority constituted under Section
113(2) of the MRTP Act is vested with the powers of a Planning_
Authority under Chapter VII of this Act for the purposes of
G acquisition either by agreement or under the Land Acquisition
Act Reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act in
some of the provisions of the MRTP Act could only imply that
they have solely been made for the purpose of completing the
process of acquisition. Most of the provisions of the Land
H Acquisition Act, with alteration in the language, have been
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 69
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
· specifically stated under the provisions of MRTP Act itself. A
Sections 126 to 129 of the State Act clearly enunciate the
intention of the framers that substanfr1e provisions of Land
Acquisition Act are not applicable to MRTP Act, which is a self-
contained code providing procedure regarding all matters
contained therein, except to the extent that provisions of B
Sections 9 to 11 of the Land Acquisition Act be brought into it
for the limited purpose of acquiring land. Once the provisions
of MRTP Act are analyzed in their correct perspective, a holistic
view can be taken that it is a code in itself. It is a legislation
which has the paramount purpose only of planning; and c
acquisition of land is merely incidental, that too for a very limited
purpose. The object of the MRTP Act is to specify and provide
for development plans at the macro as well as micro level. While
providing for larger concepts of development as contemplated
under the regional plan as well as reservations under the D
development plan, provision for development at the most
minute level.Le. a small township as a part of region has also
been provided. The primary object of the State Act is planned ·
development. Acquisition of land takes place only where the
land is reserved, designated or required for complete E
development in. the view of the Planning, Development or
Appropriate Authority. Complete mechanism as to how the
development plans shall be prepared, notified and implemented
as well as how the land is to be acquired, and how the rights
and disputes inter se parties as well as between the Planning
• Authorities and the owners will be settled are provided under F
different provisions of this Act. In other words, it is explicitly clear
that a complete mechanism of planning, implementation,
adjudicatory process in that regard as well as the methodology
adopted for acquiring lands, in its limited sense, inclusive of
change in the use, for public purpose, for which the land is G
required have been specifically provided· under the MRTP Act.
The State Act is hardly dependent upon the Land Acquisition
Act except to the limited extent of completing the process of
determining compensation, other than the compensation
detenninable by the designated Arbitrator or Tribunat Recourse H
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 3 S.C.R.

A to legal remedies and providing a complete machinery to
remedy the grievances of claimants is another significant
feature to be considered while examining the legislative
scheme of a statute. Section 72 of the MRTP Act gives
jurisdiction to the Arbitrator to decide certain disputes arising
B between Planning Authority and claimants, as well as between
the private owners. The jurisdiction of the Arbitrator is strictly
controlled by the provisions of that Section. The power of the
Arbitrator in regard to estimation and determination of the
amounts, as contemplated under Section 72(iii) and 72(iv) of
c the MRTP Act are referable only to Section 97 of the State Act.
The Arbitrator is primarily to resolve disputes relating to the
'plots' as defined under the MRTP Act in contradistinction to
the expression 'land' used in other provisions of the Act. This
indicates the limited jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. Appeals lie
to the Tribunal only from such orders of the Arbitrator which are
0
specified under Sections 73 and 74 of the MRTP Act. The
matters for acquisition and payment of compensation are to be
finalized with the aid of the provisions of the Land Acquisition
Act. Under Section 83 of the MRTP Act, the lands can be vested
E in the concerned authority at different stages right from the
commencement of preparation/approval of draft plan to the final
plans and their execution under the provisions of the Act. Like
Section 83 of the MRTP Act, Sections 116 and 128(3) of the
State Act can be enforced by the planning authorities with an
object to achieve planned development and as part of planning
F under the Act. Section 117 of the State Act again states the
consequences of default. Where the land notified under Section
113 of the MRTP Act, as site of a new town, is not acquired by
the Government or a development authority within a period of
ten years from the date of notification, the owner is entitled to
· G serve a notice upon the authority, upon service of such notice,
the provisions of Section 127 of the MRTP Act would come into
play for lapsing of reservation. This being the scheme of the
MRTP Act, mere reference to some of the provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act would not take away the substantive
H
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 71
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
scheme of the State Act which is a complete code in itself. A

LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894

22. Land Acquisition Act was enacted as it was
considered expedient to amend the law for acquisition of land
8
needed for public purposes and for companies and, particularly,
for payment and determination of the amount of compensation
to be paid on account of such acquisition. The Land Acquisition
Act, 1870 made it obligatory for the Collector, to refer the
matter to Civil Courts for a decision in cases of difference of
opinion with interested person(s) as to value of the land as well C
as cases in which one of the claimants was absent, as the
Collector was not empowered to make an award ex-parte even
after notice. This requirement resulted in a lot of litigation, delay
and expenses. According to the statement of objects and
reasol'ls of the Land Acquisition Act; the Act of 1870 had not, D
in practice, been found entirely effective for the protection either
of the persons interested in lands taken up or of the public
purse. Thus the law was amended by making Collector's award
final unless altered by a decree. The persons interested in the
land thus still have the opportunity, if they desire, to prefer to E
an authority, quite independent of the Collector, their claims for
more substantial compensation than what the Collector has
awarded. Procedure for determining the valuation of land was
also proposed to be suitably changed. Major amendments were
proposed by the Central Act 68 of 1984 to the Land Acquisition F
Act. The statement of objects and reasons for this amending
Bill posited that due to enormous expansion of the State's role
in promoting public welfare and economic development since
independence, acquisition of land for public purposes,
industrialization, building of institutions etc. has become far G
more numerous than ever before. Acquisition of land for private
enterprises ought not to be placed on the same footing as
acquisition for the State or for an enterprise under it. The
individuals and institutions who are unavoidably to be deprived
oLtheir property rights in land need to be adequately
H
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A compensated for the loss keeping in view the sacrifice they
have to make for larger interest of the community. The
pendency of acquisition proceedings for long periods often
caused hardship to the affected parties and rendered
unrealistic, the scale of compensation offered to them. With this
B background the legislature felt that it was necessary to
restructure the legislative framework for acquisition of land so
that it is more adequately governed by the objective of serving
the interests of the community in harmony with the rights of the
individuals. Recommendations on similar lines were also made
c by the Law Commission and while considering these proposals
for amendment, the legislature carried out various amendments
of significance in the existing Land Acquisition Act. Besides
enlarging the definition of 'public purpose', provision was also
made for acquisition of land for non-governmental companies.
o Further, it provided the time limit for completion of all formalities
between issue of preliminary notification under Section 4(1) and
declaration under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.
Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act was introduced which
provided for time limit of two years, from the date of publication
E of declaration under Section 6 of the Central Act, within which
the Collector should make its award under that Act. Provision
was also made for taking of possession of land by the Collector
before the award is made in urgent cases. From the objects
and reasons of the Land Acquisition Act, it is clear that the
F primary object of this Act is acquisition of land for a public
purpose which may be 'planned development' or even
otherwl~e. In f11et thft provlfflflnR of th~ Land Aequl1ltlon Act do
not dfliil with th~ conc@pt af d@velPpm~nt as Is intemded und@r
the 1,1p@cifiP stgtut@a lik~ MRiP Act. Oc:!lhi Peiv@lflpm@nt Aet,
1@Irr' a11n(Jaltml fJ§V@ltJpm@Rt AuthPrity Aet, 1El7t) (fgf §h1ut,
G thlil ~i:m~rnlQff:! At>t') ~t(~, 'fhfl primary purpose t.if the 6and
1

AGi;iYi§itign A§t i~ tg acqYire lim~ for py!Jli& purpQ§e am~ •fgr
i;igmpeRie§ a§ well a§ tg i'!Wqfg (:;ompeni>~tion tg th~ Pwniar§/
inter§§te,i:l pf3r§gn~ in aR!3tm,1~Relil with the provi&iQJ1§ @f thi~
Act.
H
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 73
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
23. The acquisition proceedings commence with issuance A
of a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act
against ·wlilch the interested persons are entitled to file
objections which will be heard by the competent authority in
accordance with the provisions of Section SA leading to
issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition B
Act. After complying with the requirements of Section 9 of the
Land acquisition Act, the Collector is expected to make an
award under Section 11 of the Central Act and in terms of
Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, if the award is not
made within two years from the date of publication of the c
declaration the acquisition proceedings shall lapse. Section
11A of the Land Acquisition Act reads as under:

"11A. Period within which an award shall be made.-(1)
The Collector shall make an award under section 11 within
a period of two years from the aate of the publication of D
the declaration and if no award is made within that period,
the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall
lapse:
Provided that in a case where the said declaration has E
been. published before the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be
made within a period of two years from such
commencement.

J,gxpl~rrntlon,-=ln computlns th@ pculod ef two yearu F
ref~rr@d tg In this §@etlcm th@ ~@rlod during which ony
~@tir;in or proe@@f:linQ to b§ tl)k@n in pur§Y!iJneo of th@ §~id
dlil~leir~ti§fl i§ §teiy@d by ein erd@r gf El Court §h~!! b@
§lf§lb1'1@§,"
~4, If th@ eiwem i§ meif:I@ within th@ §tipti!!!lt@f;f ~@M~ci, §Y@h
~ward eHElifl§ fineility unf:l@f §@§ti~fl rn
gf th!.'! ~Elflf:I A@!,'f Yi§ition
A§t eind i§ @§n@IY§iV@ @vii;f@n@@ of th@ trn@ eir@~ §f th@ vE!!Y@ §f
·th§ leiflf:I El§ b@tw§@fl th@ eoll@§t@r Elflf:I ~§f§Pll iflt§f@§t@tt In
ru1iff'leil eu:iq1:1i§itim1 ~!'Q§§@difl~§1 eift§r pEl§§in~ the eiweiffi, tl'I@ 1=1
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A Collector may take possession of the land which shall thereupon
vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances
as per Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act. The possession
can also be taken earlier as the Appropriate Government is
vested with special powers in cases of urgency. In that case,
B the provisions of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act state
the scheme to be followed by the Collector for acquisition of
the land including taking of possession prior to making of an
award. Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act is another ·
important provision of this Act which empowers the
c Government to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of
which possession has not been taken and whenever it
withdraws from the acquisition, the Collector shall determine the
amount of compensation due for the damage suffered by the
owner/interested person in consequence of such proceedings.
0 The owner/interested person is entitled to invoke the remedy
of reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act
against the award made by the Collector and thereafter he may
appeal to the High Court under Section 54 of the Land
Acquisition Ar.t for enhancement of compensation including
E determination of the disputes covered under the provisions of
this Act. As is evident from the afore-narrated provisions, the
primary purpose and the only object of the Land Acquisition Act
. is acquisition.of land and payment of compensation for such
acquisition. It is not an Act dealing in extenso or otherwise with
development and planning. The scheme of this Act is very
F simple. Despite the fact that it is compulsory acquisition, which
is in exercise of the State's power of eminent domain, the
legislature has still attempted to create a balance between
compulsory acquisition on the one hand and rights of owner/
interested person in land on the other. The acquisition
G proceedings are commenced with issuance of a notification
under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act for a public
purpose and would end with the payment of compensation for
such acquired land. The mechanism provided under this Act
is entirely relatable to the process of acquisition of land. and ·
H payment of compensation. This Court in the case of Delhi
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 75
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
Development Authority v. Mahender Singh [(2009) 5 SCC A
339], while examining the scope of power of the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution to direct payment of
statutory interest in terms of Section 34 of the Land Acquisition
Act held as under:
.B
11. "In D-Block Ashok Nagar (Sahibabad) Plot Holders'
Assn. (Regd.) v. State of U.P.[(1997) 7 SCC 77Jthis Court
again observed that liability to pay interest to the claimant
arises only in accordance with Section 34 of the Act. As
the Act is a self-contained code. common law principles C
of justice, equity and good conscience cannot be extended
in awarding interest, contrary to or beyond the provisions
of the statute."

25. The Land Acquisition Act itself is a self contained code
within the framework of its limited purpose, i.e. acquisition of D
land. It provides for complete machinery for acquisition of land
including the proce13s of execution, payment of compensation
as well as legal remedies in case of any gri~vance~. \
Having stated the scheme of the two Acts, let us proceect . .e,.;··
to examine if there are marked distinctions between the
statutory provisions of the two Acts and, if so, what is the scope
of the same. ,.

SI.. Land Acquisition Act MRTPAct
Ne. F

1. The Land Acquisition Act The primary object of MRTP
is a legislation regulating Act is regional/town planning .
only the acquisition of land and development of the
for a public purpose and entire State of Maharashtra. G
payment of it!> The function of the authorities
compensation. In other constituted under the Act is
words, it is a legislation of planning. The purpose of the
acquisition alone and is in Act primarily is planned
no way concerned with development and acquisition H
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A planned development. is incidental thereto.

2. The lands are to be The Act deals with and
acquired only for a public provides only for land
purpose in terms of the required, reserved or
B notification under Section designated for planned
4. development.

3. Upon issuance of Even prior to issuance of
notification under Section declaration under Section
c 4 of the Act, the owner/ 126(2), i.e., on publication of
interested person can declaration of intention to
develop the land or utilize prepare a development plan
the same for his benefit but for any area under Section
without claiming any 43 or town planning scheme
compensation for such under Section 69, the rights
D
modification subsequent of the owner are completely
to the date of the restricted. No person is
notification (Matter entitled to institute or change
seventhly of Section 24) the use of any land or carry
out any development of land
E without permission of the
authority under Section 43 or
a commencement certificate
under Section 69.

F 4. Under normal proceedings Under this Act, the land
for acquisition under the required for development
Act, the land vests in the vests in the Government at
Government only after the the very threshold. Under
award is made and Section 129(1) when
G possession is taken in emergency provisions are
terms of Section 16 of the invoked, the land shall vest
Act, of course with the without any further assurance
exception stated in and free from all
Section 17 of the Act. encumbrances in the State
H only when notice of 15 days
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 77
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

is given by the Collector prior A
to taking possession.
Section 83 shows marked
distinction that possession
of the land can be taken and
it shall vest in the B
GovernmenVauthority where
it is necessary to undertake
forthwith any work included
even in a draft scheme for a
oublic ouroose. C
5. Unqeuhis Act, there is no In terms of Section 128(1),
provision empowering the the Government has been
State Government to vested with the power to
acquire the land for any acquire land for the
purpose other than the one purposes other than the one D
specified in the notification for which it is designated in
issued under Section 4 for any plan or scheme.
which the property was
acquired.
6. Very few provisions There are as many as 80 E
provide for limitation of different provisions of the Act
period within which the which provide limitation of
action by the authority is time for commencement,
required to be taken and execution and completiori'of
default thereto results in actions by the authorities F
_ substantial consequences. concerned and in default the
(Sections 6 and 11A) consequences flowing
therefrom.
7. The Collector is vested with Multiple authorities have
all the powers under the been constituted under G
Act right from acquisition different provisions of the Act
till payment of which are responsible for
compensation. The award performing the specified
passed by the Collector is functions. The Arbitrator
subiect to reference and nominated and the Tribunal H
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A appeal under the constituted under the
provisions of the Act. provisions of the Act has to
perform practically all the
adjudicatory proceedings
except where land is to be
B acquired for planned
development acquisition
thereof and awarding of its
compensation by the
Collector.
c 8. This Act is a Central This Act is a State
Legislation relatable to Legislation relatable to
Entry 42 of List 111 of Entries 5 and 18 of List II of
Schedule VII to the the Schedule VII to the
Constitution. Constitution. (without
D prejudice to the contention
of the parties)
9. The market value of the The market value has to be
land has to be determined determined with reference to
as of the date of issuance the date/dates specified in
E
of notification under Section 126(3) and upon
Section 4 of the Land issuance of a declaration
Acquisition Act. under Section 126(2) in the
manner for issuance of
declaration under Section 6
F
of the LA Act.
10. The Government can There is no provision
withdraw from acquisition empowering the planning
of any land before authority from de-notifying
possession is taken in land from acquisition.
G terms of Section 48 of the However, in terms of Section
Act 50, it has power to delete
from reservation,
designation for an interim
I draft plan.
't I
' ·-··---·---------'------------
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 79
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

27. These are some of the glaring points of distinction A
between the two Acts. Of course, there may be other
distinctions and the ones stated by us are only illustrative. The
purpose of referring to .these distinctions is primarily to
demonstrate that they are two different statutes operating in
different fields, the provisions of which are required to be B
utilized by the concerned authorities for the object sought to be
achieved under the respective Acts. The schemes under the
two Acts are distinct and different. Scheme under the State Act
can be implemented with recourse to the provisions of the
Central Act which have been specifically stated therein. At the c
same time where there are specific provisions under the State
. Act the corresponding provisions of the Central Act will not
apply. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act relating to the
acquisition of land alone, for which there are no specific
provisions under the State Act, would be applicable to the D
acquisition under the State Act. This view was also taken by a
three Judge Bench of this Court in a very recent judgment in
the case of Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development
Authority [(2010) 7 SCC 129).

SELF-CONTAINED CODE E

28. For an Act to be a 'self-contained code', it is required
to be shown that it is a complete legislation for the purpose for
which it is enacted. The provisions of the MRTP Act relate to
preparation, submission and sanction of approval of different F
plans by the concerned authorities which are aimed at
achieving the object of planned development in contradistinction
to haphazard development. An owner/person interested in the
land and who wishes to object to the plans at the appropriate
stage a self-contained adjudicatory machinery has been spelt G
out in the MRTP Act. Even the remedy of appeal is available
under the MRTP Act with a complete Chapter being devoted
to acquisition of land for the planned development. Providing
adjudicatory mechanism is one of the most important facets of
deciding whether a particular statute is a 'complete code' in H
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A itself or not.

29. This Court in Munithimmaiah v. State of Karnataka
[(2002) 4 sec 326] had the occasion to consider somewhat
similar question in relation to the Bangalore Act and the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The provisions of
8
Section 36 of the Bangalore Act refer to application of the
provi9ions of the Land Acquisition Act. The Court rejected the
plea that provisions of Sections 6 and 11A of the Land
Acquisition Act providing a shorter period of limitation for
publication of final notification and maki11g of an award, were
C applicable to acquisition made under the Bangalore Act.
Further, while holding that the Bangalore Act is a self-contained
code, the Court held as under :

"15. So far as the.BOA Act is concerned, it is not an Act
0 for mere acquisition of land but an Act'to provide for the
establishment of a development authority to facilitate and
ensure planned growth and development of J~e city of
Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto and acqufsition of
lands, if any, therefore is merely incidental thereto. In pith
E and substance the Act is one which will squarely fall under,
and be traceable to the powers of the State Legislature
under Entry 5 of List II of the Seventh Schedule and not a
law for acquisition of land like the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 traceable to Entry 42 of List Ill of the Seventh
F Schedule to the Constitution of India, the field in respect
of which is already occupied by the Central enactment of
1894, as amended from time to time. If at all, the BOA Act,
so far as acquisition of land for its developmental activities
is concerned, in substance and effect will constitute a
special law providing for acquisition for the special
G
purposes of BOA and the same was not also considered
to be part of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It could not
also be legitimately stated, on a reading of Section 36 of
the BOA Act that the .Karnataka Legislature intended
thereby to bind themselves to any future additions or
H
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 81
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
amendments, which might be made by altogether a A
different legislature, be it Parliament, to the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. The procedure for acquisition under
the BOA Act vis-a-vis the Central Act has been analysed
elaborately by the Division Bench, as noticed supra, in our
view, very rightly too, consider~ to constitute a special and B
self-contained code of its own and the BOA Act and
Central Act cannot be said to be either supplemental to
each other, or pari materia legislations. That apart, the
BOA Act could not be said to be either wholly unworkable
and ineffectual if the subsequent amendments to the c
Central Act are not also imported into consideration. On
an overall consideration of the entire situation also it could
not either possibly or reasonably be stated that the
subsequent amendments to the Central &yt get attracted
or applied either due to any express provision or by
0
necessary intendment or implication to acquisitions under
the BDA Act. When the BOA Act, expressly provides by
specifically enacting the circumstances under which and
the period of time on the expiry of which alone the
proceedings initiated· thereunder shall lapse due to any E
default, the different circumstances and period of limitation
envisaged under the Central Act, 1894, as amended by
the amending Act of 1984 for completing the proceedings
on pain of letting them lapse forever, cannot be imported
into consideration for purposes of the BOA Act without
doing violence to the language or destroying and defeating F
the very intendment of the State Legislature expressed by
the enactment of its own special provisions in a special
law falling under a topic of legislation exclusively
earmarked for the State Legislature."
G
30. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Prakash
Amichand Shah v. State of Gujarat [(1986) 1 SCC 581), while
dealing with the erstwhile Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 (for
short, 'the Bombay Act') discussed in some elaboration the
working under the Land Acquisition Act vis-a-vis the Bombay H
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A Act. The Court said that development and planning carried out
under the Bombay Act is, primarily, for the benefit of the public.
The local authority is under an obligation to function according
to the Bombay Act and has to bear part of the expenses of
development. It is in one sense a package deal. The
B proceedings relating to scheme are neither like ac.quisition
proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act nor its provisions
are made applicable to the Bombay Act either with or without
modifications as in the case of Nagpur Improvement Trust Act,
1936.
c 31. Another school of thought has taken the view that while
determining whether a statute is a self-contained code or not,
relevant consideration would be whether such Act contains a
bar for application of other statute by specific language or even
by necessary implication to the Act in question. In some cases,
D there may be general application of other laws to the law in
question or there may be a reference of certain provisions of
other statute in the provisions of the later statute and only those
specified provisions would apply to the later statute while in
other cases, the situation may be different where the later
E statute is not a self-contained code. It may be possible to
enforce the bar or limitations created under the earlier statute
even by subsequent amendments. We may refer to the
judgment of this Court in the case of Gopal Sardar v. Karuna
Sardc:rr[(2004) 4 sec 252], wherein the Court was concerned
F with the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. Some of the
provisions of that Act referred to certain provisions of the
Limitation Act, 1963. Section 8 of the West Bengal Land
Reforms Act required service of the notice in terms of Section
5(5) within three months of the date of the transfer but no
G reference was made to any of the provisions of the Limitation
Act in this Section. The contention raised was that the applicant
could invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the
delay in filing an application in terms of Section 8 of the West
Bengal Land Reforms Act. The Court while emphasizing, that
H the West Bengal Land Reforms Act was a self-contained code,
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 83
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
held as under: A

"13. Section 8 of the Act prescribes definite period of
limitation of three months or four months, as the case may
be, for initiating proceedings for enforcement of right of pre-
emption by different categories of people with no provision
8
made for extension or application of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. When in the same statute in respect of
various other provisions relating to filing of appeals and
revisions, specific provisions are made so as to give
benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and such
provision is not made to an application to be made under
c
Section 8 of the Act, it obviously and necessarily follows
that the legislature consciously excluded the application of
SectiOn 5 of the Limitation Act. Considering the scheme
of the Act being a self-contained code in dealing with the
matters arising under Section 8 of the Act and in the light D
of the aforementioned decisions of this Court in the case
of Hukumdev Narain Yadav, Anwari Basavaraj Patil and
Parson Tools it should be construed that there has been
exclusion of application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act
to an application under Section 8 of the Act. In view of what E
is stated above, the non-applicability of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act to the proceedings under Section 8 of the
Act is certain and sufficiently clear. Section 29(2) of the
·Limitation Act as to the express exclusion of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act and the specific period of limitation F
prescribed under Section ? of the Act without providing for
either extension of time or application of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act or its principles can be read together
harmoniously."
G
32. In the case of Church of North India v. Lavajibhai
Ratanjibhai [(2005) 10 SCC 760], Bombay Public Trusts Act,
1950 under which the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is expressly
barred was held to be a 'complete code' in itself providing
ade,q_1,1ate machinery to deal with disputes relating to H
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 3 S.C.R.

A management of trust property. The provisions of this Act and
the scheme thereof left no manner of doubt that the Act is a
complete code in itself. It provides for a complete machinery
for a person interested in a trust to put forward his claim before
the Charity Commissioner, who is the competent authority
B under this Act to go into the said question and can prefer an
appeal if he feels aggrieved by any decision.

33. Now, we may, while referring to an example, show
when a statute may not be treated as a self-contained Code.
In the case of Mariyappa v. State of Karnataka [(1998) 3 SCC
C 276), a Bench of this Court was concerned with the Karnataka
Acquisition of Land for Grant of House Sites Act, 1972 (in short
'the Karnataka Act') which was an Act of only seven Sections
and Section 5 of which provided that provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act shall mutatis mutandis apply. The Court, in
D paragraph 37 of the judgment. stated that there being no
detailed machinery whatsoever in the Karnataka Act, it cannot
be treated as a self-contained code. This clearly shows that if
compl«~te machinery or mechanism is not provided under an
Act to ensure effective execution of the functions assigned
E therein with due protection of the rights of the interested
persons within the framework of law, it may not be possible for
the Court to hold that such a statute is a self-contained code.

34. It may not be possible to state parameters of universal
F application which could determine with precision as to whether
an Act I• 111lf·contoincd codo or not. It 11 difficult and, In fact,
ml!lyi.aot even b~ r:iermli§ible to formulote rmy l'tard and fa1t rule
whi"h aculd 1.miff)rmly blil opplifld to 1tll $fatute§ fQr §Utlh
fl@t@flflinE:Jtian, We h~V§ m@rtily indie11tei:J §gme. of thl:l ff:!fttlJre§
whi@h §@bllci §@fV@ p§ 1m~'1e.pt§ ff)f th@ §@Urt§ tg l'lflAly&f:! Wh@th@f
@ Fltl Agt i§ P §@mple.t@ §tJde. in it§e.lf t:1r not The. ,l:!JJPfi§§ign
'1,1cm~h~te. Q@de. in ih~e.lf' ha§ m1t be.@fl de.fine.d pri:iGi3@ly,
HijWi:!V~f, it will be. gf §cm@ he.Ip tg Ynd@f§temt'I wheit tht! w@rd
1
et:1de.' m@ein§. It h@§ be.@n e.Kpleiin@d in fJ. ~eimeifleithei Aiyaf'§
H 'ih@ Leiw l,,@xiei:>n' (and igg,,, 1~Q7) @§ unijer;
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 85
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
"A general collection or compilation of laws by public A
authority; a system of law; a systematic and complete body
of law, on any subject such as Civil Procedure Code,
Code of Criminal Procedure, Penal Code. etc .

... The code is broader in its scope, and more
comprehensive in its purposes. Its general object is to 8
embody, as near as practicable, all the law of the state,
on any particular subject. It is more than evidentiary of the
law; it is the law itself."

35. 'Complete' further adds a degree of certainty to the C
code. It has to be a compilation of provisions which would
comprehensively deal with various aspects of the purpose
sought to be achieved by that law and its dependence on other
legislations is either absent or at best is minimal. The
provisions of the enactment in question should provide for a D
complete machinery to deal with various problems that may
arise during its execution. Sufficient powers should be vested
in the authority/forum created under the Act to ensure effectual
and complete implementation of the Act. There should be
complete and coherent scheme of the statutory provisions for E
attainment of the object and purpose of the Act. It essentially
should also provide for adjudicatory scheme to deal with
grievances/claims of the persons affected by enforcement of
the provisions of the Act, pr~ferably, including an appellate
forum within the framework of the Act. In other words, the Act F
In Itself t1houlcf be a pon~e@a to ~II f11cets ~rl1ln9 from the
lmpl@m@nt~t!on gf th~ Act it§@lf,

3~, Llpi;in enll!y§i§ gf th~ i!lb.@VtJ prif!QiP.1§§ i,Jf!t.l f,!~ftiCY!Orly
k@@pifl!'.:I if! mini;! th~ m~{Jetivi;i iR§ti!lfl§§ in th@ §F.!§@ @f MEJrly~p~
(!?Yprn), w@ m~y tl:lm be§k tg th@ pmvi§i9n§ gf th@ Mf'rl'f.J A@t @
The prin§ipei! gtJj@iJt gf thi§ l@~i§!eti@n i§ plenn@ti d@v§lgpm@flt
@f th§ ~tet§ gf Mehi!lr~§htrFJ ~v pr@~i!lrin~ d@V§li:ipmi;iflt plEln!?
fflf !tlgi~fl§ iimt.l t~wn f}!eflnifl~ §§h@ffi@§ eflf:'.I !?Qfl§titYti@n @f
YefiQY§ eYthgfiti§§ tg il@hi@V§ th@ §ei!.1 ~Yf~t}§@, lfl@id@flteilly, it
inglyd@§ th@ fYf!Qti@n Qf ~§!;!Yi§iti@rt §f 1£ifl!'J ~Yt fQf ~ V@ry limit@d l=I
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A purpose. It is not expected of the authorities to apply to the
Government for a general acquisition but the acquisition has
to be of the land which is required, reserved or designated
under any development plan. Thus, it is an acquisition of a very
limited connotation. The MRTP Act specifies all the authorities,
8 their respective powers and functions for attaining the object
of the Act.

37. The complete scheme has been provided under the
MRTP Act for attaining the object of planned development.
Various provisions of the Act comprehensively prescribe what
C and how the steps are required to be taken by the authorities
under the Act, right from the stage of preparation of draft
development plan to its finalization as well as preparation and
finalization of all regional and town planning schemes. The
MRTP Act clearly spells out as to how these schemes are to
IJ be implemented and by whom. Right of the interested person
to raise objections, pre-finalization of the respective plans, is
specifically provided. The authority before whom such
objections are to be raised and who is to be granted hearing
and by whom is clearly spelt out. There is no aspect which is
E not dealt with or provided for under the provisions of the State
Act right from the initial stage to its final execution. Besides
providing right of objection to the owner of the land or property,
which fall within the development plan, the State Act also
provides machinery for finalization and determination of
F disputes between th·e authorities and private parties.
Furthermore, a person is entitled to raise all disputes including
the dispute of ownership. The Arbitrator nominated under the
MRTP Act has the jurisdiction to decide all such matters. The
jurisdiction of the Arbitrator is a limited one like estimation and
G payment of compensation in relation to plots in distinction to
lands as defined under the Act within the four corners of the
provisions of Sections 72 to 74 of the MRTP Act with reference
to Section 97 of the State Act. Some of his decisions are final,
while on most of other decisions, an appeal lies to the Tribunal.
H

·-
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 87
AND ORS. (SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
38. The MRTP Act besides being a code in itself has one A
pre-dominant purpose, i.e., planned development. Other
matters are incidental and, therefore, should be construed to
achieve that pre-dominant object. All the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act cannot be applied to the MRTP Act. The
provisions of the MRTP Act have to be implemented in their B
own field. As far as the provisions relating to preparation,
approval and execution of the development plans are
concerned, there is hardly any dependency of the State Act on
the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. It may be necessary,
sometimes, to acquire .land which primarily would be for the c
purpose of planned development as contemplated under the
MRTP Act. Some of the provisions of the State Act have
specifically referred to some of the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act but for the limited purpose of acquiring land.
Thus, the purpose of such reference is, obviously, to take aid D
of the provisions of the Central Act only for the purpose of
acquiring a land in accordance with law stated therein rather
than letting any provision of the Central Act hamper or obstruct
i the principal object of the State Act, i.e. execution of the planned
! development. There can hardly be any hesitation in concluding
that the MRTP Act is a self-contained code and does not lose E
its colour or content of being a self-contained code merely
because it makes a reference to some of the provisions of
Land Acquisition Act for acquisition of land for the purpose of
MRTP Act and determination of compensation in that behalf.
The referred provisions of the Land Acquisition Act may only F
be taken recourse to that limited extent, within the extensive
framework and for the purpose of MRTP Act.

39. Therefore, MRTP Act is an Act which completely
provides for various steps in relation to execution of its object, G
constitution of various authorities to implement the undeftYfng
scheme of planned development, machinery for interested
persons to raise their. claims for adjudication under the
provisions of this Act or at best to an authority referred to in
· the Act. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that the MRTP H
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A Act is a complete code in itself.

Whether the provisions of the Central Act 68of1984, with
particular reference to Section 11A. can be read into and
treated as part of the MRTP Act on the principle of either
legislation by reference or legislation by incorporation?
8
40. At the very outset, we may notice that in the preceding
paragraphs of the judgment, we have specifically held that
MRTP Act· is a self-contained code. Once such finding is
recorded, application of either of the doctrines, i.e. 'legislation
C by reference' or 'legislation by incorporation', would lose their
significance particularly when the two Acts can co-exist and
operate without conflict.

41. However, since this aspect was argued by the learned
0 counsel appearing for the parties at great length, we will
proceed to discuss the merit or otherwise of this contention
without prejudice to the above findings and as an alternative
plea. These principles have been applied by the courts for a
considerable period now. When there is general reference in
E the Act in question to some earlier Act but there is no specific
mention of the provisions of the former Act, then it is clearly
considered as legislation by reference. In the case of legislation
by reference, the amending laws of the former Act would
normally become applicable to the later Act; but, when the
F provisions of an Act are specifically referred and incorporated
in the later statute, then those provisions alone are applicable
and the amending provisions of the former Act would not
become part of the later Act. This principle is generally called
legislation by incorporation. Qeneral reference, ordinarily, will
imply exclusion of specific reference and this is precisely the
G fine line of distinction between these two doctrines. Both are
referential legislations, one merely by way of reference and the
other by incorporation. It, normally, will depend on the language
used in the later law and other relevant considerations. While
the principle of legislation by incorporation has well defined
H exceptions, the law enunciated as of now provides for no
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 89
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

exceptions to the principle of legislation by reference. A
Furthermore, despite strict application of doctrine of
incorporation, it may still not operate in certain legislations and
such legislation may fall within one of the stated exceptions. In
this regard, the judgment of this Court in the case of M. V.
Narasimhan (supra) can be usefully noticed where the Court . B
after analyzing various judgments, summed up the exceptions
to this rule as follows :

"(a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are
supplemental to each other;
c
(b) where the two Acts are in· pari materia;

(c) where the amendment in the previous Act, if not
imported into the subsequent Act also, would render
the slfbsequent Act wholly unworkable and D
ineffectual; and

(d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either
expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the
said provisions to the subsequent Act."

42. With the development of law, the legislature has
adopted the common practice of referring to the provisions of
the existing statute while enacting new laws. Reference to an
earlier law in the later law could be a simple reference of
provisions of earlier statute or a specific reference where the F
earlier law is made an integral part of the new law, i.e., by
incorporation. In the case of legislation by reference, it is
fictionally made a part of the later law. We have already noticed
that all amendments to the former law, though made subsequent
to the enactment of the later law, would ipso facto apply and G
one finds raention of this particular aspect in Section 8 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897. In contrast to such simple
reference, legal incidents of legislation by incorporation is that
it becomes part of the existing law which implies bodily lifting
provisions of one enactment and making them part of another H
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A and in such cases subsequent amendments in the incorporated
Act could not be treated as part of the incorporating Act.
Ultimately, it is the expression and/or the language used in the
new law with reference to the existing law that would determine
as to under what class of referential legislation it falls. In some
B of the statutes, expressions like "shall for that purpose be
deell)ed to form part of this Act in the same manner as if they
were enacted in the body thereoF6 or "the provisions of Section
of the said Act (set out in the Schedule) shall apply as if they
were herein re-enacted 7" are typical examples of legislation by
c incorporation. Another glaring example of incorporation one
finds in the provision of Bombay Municipal Corporation Act,
1949 where Section 284N uses the expression "the LA Act ...
shall for that purpose be deemed to form part of this chapter
as if enacted in the body hereor. Another feature of legislation
0 by incorporation is that the language is explicit and positive. This
demonstrates the desire of the legislature for legislation by
incorporation. Self-contained enactment should be clearly
distinguished from supplemental law. When the later law
depends on the former law for procedural/substantive
E provisions or is to draw its strength from the provisions of the
former Act, the later Act is termed as the supplemental to the
former law. The statement of object and reasons of both the
Acts, i.e. the MRTP Act and the Land Acquisition Act as well
as the scheme of these Acts, we have already discussed at
length. They are Acts which operate in different fields. One is
F a Central Act while the other is a State Act. They derive their
source from different entries in the constitutional lists.

43. On behalf of the appellant, it was contended before us
that the MRTP Act would be rendered unworkable and
G ineffective without the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. It
was also contended on behalf of the appeilants that reservation
and acquisition has a clear legal dichotomy and if acquisition
lapses it will result in lapsing of reservation by operation of
provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act. Thus, it
H is implied that the provisions of Section 11A would form an
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 91
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

integral part of the MRTP Act and an acquisition will lapse in A
terms thereof in the event of default. While referring to the
provisions of Sections 113A, 116 and 126(2) of the MRTP Act,
it is stated that there is a generic reference to the provisions
of the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, all the amendments
made by the Central Act 68 of 1984, with particular reference B
to Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, would be read into
the provisions of the MRTP Act. Keeping in view the language
used by the Legislature, it will inevitably be legislation by
reference.
c
44. Per contra, the submission made on behalf of the
respondents is that both these Acts operate in different fields
and have a differentobject. The provisions specifically referred,
clearly demonstrate that the intent of the legislature, at best, was
to incorporate these limited provisions of the Land Acquisition D
Act and, but for the application of those provisions, nothing else
would form part of the later law, i.e. the MRTP Act. This being
legislation by incorporation, the general reference to the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act shall stand excluded.
Both the laws, according to the respondents, are wholly
dissimilar and the principal purpose of the MRTP Act can be E
achieved without the aid of the Land Acquisition Act which has
a very limited and restricted application. It is argued that there
being specific provisions providing for different time schedules
in the MRTP Act at a number of places, it will not be permissible
to read in a bar in that respect from another legislation. In other F
words, to bodily lift the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act
and imprint them in the MRTP Act. including Section11A, would
be impermissible as the State Legislature has already
exercised its legislative power by enacting/amending Sections
126 and 127 of the MRTP Act in face of the provisions of G
Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act.

45. Now, let us examine the specific reference made to
the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act in the provisions of
the MRTP Act. Section 113A of the MRTP Act provides that H
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A where any company or corporation has been declared to be
the new town development authority under sub-section (3A) of
Section 113, then the State Government shall acquire either by
agreement or under the Land Acquisition Act any land within
the area designated under this Act. Similarly, Section 116 of
B th& MRTP Act gives power to the development authority
constituted under sub-section (2) of Section 113 as having all
powers of a planning authority under this Act as provided in
Chapter VII for the purpose of acquisition either by agreement
or under the Land Acquisition Act. This clearly shows that these
c provisions make 'reference to a specific aspect of the
acquisition, i.e. for exercise of powers by the authority
concerned for the purposes of Chapter VII of the State Act.
Section 125 of the MRTP Act introduces a legal fiction as it
requires that reservation and designation of land under the plan
D shall be deemed to be a public purpose within the meaning of
the definition of Land Acquisition Act. Section 126 of the MRTP
Act is the effective provision which refers to the Land
Acquisition Act. In terms of Section 126(1), the land can be
acquired for public purpose specified in the plan. It gives right
to acquire eyen after publication of a draft regional plan.
E Whenever a land is required or reserved for any public purpose
spE~cified in any plan or scheme under the MRTP Act, the
concerned authority may, with the exception of the provisions
of Section 113A of the State Act, i.e. land designated under
the Act connected with the development of the new town,
F acquire the land by different modes i.e. (a) by paying an amount
agreed (by agreement); (b) in lieu of any such amount by
granting the right specified under Section 126(1)(b); and (c) by
making an application to the State Government for acquiring
such land under the Land Acquisition Act. Section 126(2) lays
G down the procedure, primarily, as to how the application made
under Section 126(1)(c) is to be dealt with by the State
Government and if it is satisfied, to make a declaration in the
Official Gazette to the effect that the land is needed for a public
purpose, in the manner provided in Section 6 of the Land
H Acquisition Act. Section 126(3) deals with the procedure to be
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 93
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

followed after declaration contemplated under Section 126(2) A
has been published. The Collector has to proceed for
acquisition of the land under the Land Acquisition Act and the
provisions of that Act shall apply for acquisition. Market value
of the land has to be determined with reference to the date
specified in clauses (i) to (iii) of sub-section (3) of Section.126. B
In terms of proviso to Section 126(2) if.the declaration is not
made within one year from the date of publication of the draft
reg:onal plan or any other plan or the scheme, as the case may
be, the authority loses the right to make such a declaration.
Exception to this is contemplated under Section 126(4) that c
despite the above consequences, the Government still has the
right to make a fresh declaration for acquisition of the land
subject to the modification that market value of the land shall ,
be the market value at the date of declaration in the Official
Gazette made for acquiring the land afresh.
0
46. Section 127 of the MRTP Act which deals with lapsing
of reservation under this Act stood amended vide Maharashtra
Amendment Act 16 of 2009. We have already reproduced
above the amended and unamended provisions of Section 127
of the MRTP Act. It is noteworthy that in the unamended E
provision of Section 127, it was contemplated that if the
proceedings for acquisition of such land under this Act or under
the Land Acquisition Act are not commenced within such
period, the owner/interested person of any land may serve a
notice on the planning authority and if within six months from F
the date of the service of such notice, the land was not acquired
or no steps were taken, the land shall be deemed to be
released from such reservation. By amendment, the expression
'if proceedings for acquisition of such land under this Act or
under the Land Acquisition Act' stood deleted. This further G
buttresses the view that general reference to the provisions of
the Land Acquisition Act was intentionally deleted by the
Legislature and in its place specific reference to the provisions
... of Section 126(2) or 126(4) of the State Act was made and the
period of six months was increased to 12 months. The H
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A legislative intent appears to make the MRTP Act a self-
contained code and does not generally advert to the provisions
of the Land Acquisition Act for execution of planned
development. The default, its consequences and remedies,
thus, have been specifically provided for under Section 126 of
B the MRTP Act and in that regard there is apparently no need
to refer to the default clause contained in Section 11 A of the
Land Acquisition Act. We have also referred that time limitations
and consequences of their default are specifically provided for
in the MRTP Act by the Legislature and, therefore, it will not be
c appropriate to read into these provisions something which has
not been stated by the Legislature on the inference that time
limitations or bars created under the Land Acquisition Act
would essentially have to be read as part of the MRTP Act.
Sections 128 and 129 of the State Act are other relevant
provisions which are required to be examined analytically. Both
0
these provisions refer to certain definite aspects of acquisition
under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The State
Government under Section 128(1) is vested with the power of
acquiring land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act
where any land which had been included as reserved/
E designated land for any purpose specified and that land is
needed for a public purpose different from any such public
purpose or purpose of the Planning Authority. The provisions
of Section 128(2) deal with three different aspects that further
reflect the mind of the Legislature to restrictivellf apply the
F provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and even give
precedence to the provisions of the MRTP Act vis-a-vis that
Land Acquisition Act. Firstly, the Planning Authority or any other
authority under the State Act shall be deemed to be a person
interested in the land acquired; secondly while determining the
G amount of compensation to be awarded, the market value of
the land shall be assessed as if land had been released from
the reservation, allotment or designation; thirdly, the Collector
or the Court shall take into consideration the damage, if any,
that the authority has suffered or may sustain by reason of
H acquisition of such land under the Land Act, lsition Act or
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 95
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
otherwise and proportionate cost of the development etc., if A
any, incurred by the authority for the reason that such acquisition
has been rendered abortive. Section 129 of the MRTP Act
relates to exercise of powers for taking possession of the land
in case of urgency akin to the provisions of Section 17 of the
Land Acquisition Act. Proviso. to Section 129(1) provides B
reference to payment of compensation to the interested person
by the Collector for any damage sustained by the person which
is caused by such sudden dispossession and compensation
not excepted in Section 24 of the Land Acquisition Act and if
such offer is not accepted, then it shall be allowed in awarding c
compensation for the said land under the provisions of the said
Act. The compensation under the Land Acquisition Act is to be
determined in· accordance with the provisions of Section 23
while neglecting the matters stated under Section 24 of the said
Act. However, the provisions of the State Act in terms of Section D
128(2) mandate that despite the property being reserved,
allotted or designated for a purpose, the same shall be deemed
to be released from such reservation, allotment or desi9nation
while awarding compensation. This requirement is completely
distinct from provisions of Section 23 of the Central Act. In other. E
words, the value of the land acquired shall not be diminished
because it has been reserved for a particular purpose.
Reference to Section 24 of the Central Act is again very
specific. It also needs to be mentioned that there are provisions
regarding vesting of land in the State/Authority but still reference
has been made to Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act under F
Section 128(3) of the State Act. The specific reference to
provisions of Land Ac(iuisition Act and purpose to be achieved
is clear from the language of the above-referred provisions of
the State Act.
G
47. In other words, wherever the State Legislature
considered it appropriate, it has made specific reference to a
particular provision of the Land Acquisition Act and for
attainment of a particular purpose. There is no general
reference to the Land Acquisition Act in any of the provisions H
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A of the MRTP Act to say that the provisions of the former Act, in
their entirety, will be applicable to all kind of proceedings and
purposes under the later Act.

48. Another aspect which would support the view that it is
legislation by incorporation and there is every legislative intent
8
to exc:lude legislation by reference is that wherever there was
a general reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition ..
Act like Section 127 of the MRTP Act, the same stands
excluded/deleted by amendment of 2009. Furthermore, the
entire Land Acquisition Act cannot be made applicable to
C proceedings under the MRTP Act where, unlike Land
Acquisition Act, the proceedings commence and
consequences take place the moment the land is designated
or reserved under a plan, draft plan or even scheme. On the
contrary, the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act start
D when the notification under Section 4 of that Act is issued. This
exclusion is of paramount significance as the provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act relating acquisition would not come into
play till the issuance of the notification under Section 4 thereof
while that is not true under the MRTP Act. If the Legislature
E intended to apply the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act
generally and wanted to make a general reference and
implementation of those provisions, it could have said that the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act would be applicable to
the MRTP Act. Such expression is conspicuous by its very
F absence.

49. Besides the MRTP Act being a self-contained Code,
these are enactments which, apparently, are dissimilar in their
content and application. The provisions of Section 127 of the
MRTP Act were amended long after the amendment of the Land
G Acquisition Act by Central Act 68 of 1984. The Legislature was
fully aware of the entire matter including hardship of the land
owners. The statement of objects and reasons for amendment
of Section 127 of the MRTP Act conveys intent antipodal to that
sought to be put forward by the appellants, that Section 11A of
H
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 97
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

the Land Acquisition Act would be attracted. Section 11A was A
in existence at the time of amendment in 2009 of the MRTP
Act and if it was intended to be applied to the MRTP Act there
was hardly any need to amend Section 127 of the MRTP Act
in the manner in which it was done. If the intention of the
legislature was to permit lapsing of acquisition, in that event B
provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, per se,
would have achieved the purpose. The 2009 amendment to the
State Act restricted even lapsing of the reservation or
designation only if there was default in compliance to the
provisions of Section 126(2) and 126(4) of the MRTP Act. c
General reference to acquisition under the Land Acquisition
Act was deleted as it was never intended to be read as a part
of the State Act. Thus, the State Legislature in its wisdom
restricted the consequences only to lapsing of reservation.

50. Now, let us examine these two settled doctrines with D
reference to judgments of this Court, particularly, the ones
which have been relied upon by the learned counsel appearing
for the parties. In the case of Mis. Ujagar Prints (supra), a
Constitution Bench of this Court was dealing with the question
whether the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 which defines E
the expression 'manufacture' as defined in Central Excuse and
Salt Act, 1984 which came to be enlarged by amendment of
the definition the year 1980, would apply to the provisions of
the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance)
Act, 1957 and whether such an amendment of the Central F
Excise Act was ultra vires to Entry 84 of List I of Schedule VII
to the Constitution and, therefore, beyond the competence of
the Parliament. The Court held as under :

"93. Referential legislation is of two types. One is where G
an earlier Act or some of its provisions are incorporated
by reference into a later Act. In this event, the provisions
of the earlier Act or those so incorporated, as they stand
in the earlier Act at the time of incorporation, will be read
into the later Act. Subsequent changes in the earlier Act H
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

or the incorporated provisions will have to be ignored
because, for all practical purposes, the existing provisions
of the earlier Act have been re-enacted by such reference
into the later one, rendering irrelevant what happens to the
earlier statute thereafter. Examples of this can be seen in
B Secretary of State v. Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance
Society, Boiani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa, Mahindra and
Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India. On the other hand, the
later statute may not incorporate the earlier provisions. It
may only make a reference of a broad nature as to the iaw
c on a subject generally, as in Bhajiya v. Gopikabai, or
contain a general reference to the terms of an earlier ·
statute which are to be made applicable. In this case any
modification, repeal or re-enactment of the earlier statute
will also be c~rried into in the later, for here, the idea is
that certain pr Jvisions of an earlier statute which become
D
applicable in certain circumstances are to be made use
of for the purpose of the later Act also. Examples of this
type of legislation are to be seen in Collector of Customs
v. Nathe/la Sampathu Chetty, New Central Jute Mills Co.
Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Special
E Land Acquisition Officer v. City Improvement Trust.
Whether a particular statute falls into the first or second
category is always a question of construction. In the present
case, in my view, the legislation falls into the second
category. Section 3(3) of the 1957 Act does not
F incorporate into the 1957 Act any specific provisions of the
1944 Act. It only declares generally that the provisions of
the 1944 Act shall apply "so far as may be", that is, to the
extent necessary and practical, for the purposes of the
1957 Act as well."
G
51. Besides deciding this aspect directly with reference
to doctrine afore-referred, the Bench also applied the doctrine
of pith and substance. It held that entries to the Legislative List
are not source of legislative power, but are merely topics or
H fields of legislation and must receive a liberal construction
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 99
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
inspired by a broad and generous spirit and not in a narrow A
pedantic sense. The expression 'with respect to' in Article 246
brings in the doctrine of 'Pith and Substance'. In the
understanding of the exertion of the legislative power and
wherever the question of legislative competence is raised the
test is whether the iegislation, looked at as a whole, is B.
substantially 'with respect to' the particular topic of legislation.
If the legislation has a substantial and not merely a remote
connection with the entry, the matter may well be taken to be
legislation on the topic.

52. In the case of M. V. Narasimhan (supra), the Court C
while applying the principle of legislation by incorporation had
read amendment to Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code
defining a 'public servant' into the provisions of Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947. The Court clarified that when provisions
of a later Act borrowed the provisions of the IPC; the same D
became an integral and independent part of the subsequent
Act and, therefore, usually remained unaffected by any repeal
or amendment in the previous Act. But the Court, while spelling
out the exceptions to the rule of legislation by incorporation, had
applied one of such exceptions where the reading of the E
amended provisions of the earlier statute into the later
enactment becomes necessary as non-incorporation thereof
would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and
ineffectual. The significant dictum of the court in this case after
noticing other judgments was, "It seems to be no less logical F
to hold that where certain provisions from an existing Act have
been incorporated into a subsequent Act, no addition to the
former Act, which is not expressly made applicable to the
subsequent Act, can be deemed to be incorporated in it, at all
events if it is possible for the subsequent Act to function G
effectually without the addition".

53. In an earlier judgment of this Court in the case of
Bajaya V. Gopikabai [(1978) 2 sec 542], the Court was
concerned with the provisions of Section 151 of the Madhya
H
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954 which provided that
subject to personal law, the interest of the tenure-holder shall
on his death, pass by inheritance, survivorship or bequest as
the case may be. The argument addressed was that despite
the fact that Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force
s subsequent to the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1954, the
expression 'personal law' in Section 151 includes the definition
in the generic law on the subject on the basis of the principle
of legislation by reference. The Court, while accepting this
argument, held that it was well-known that legislature can
c legislate on a subject by reference if the subject is
constitutionally within its legislative competence and also
noticed that there were no words in the Section of the Code or
elsewhere which limits the scope of the expression 'personal
law' to that prevailing on February 5, 1955. On the contrary, the
words 'on his death' used in Section 151 clearly show that the
0
legislative intention was that 'personal law' as amended up to
date on which devolution of the tenure-holder's interest is to be
determined, shall be the rule of decision.

54. The distinction between these doctrines received a
E new dimension founded upon a distinction between procedural
and substantive provisions of the statute. In the case of Sant
Joginder Singh (supra), the Court was concerned with the
provisions of the MRTP Act amended by the Maharashtra Act
14 of 1971, specially failure to publish declaration within three
F years, as was then prescribed under proviso to Section 126(2)
of the said Act, and the application of provisions of Section 11A
of the Land Acquisition Act which provided limitation of two
years for making award. Applying the principle of distinction
between procedural and substantive provisions of the statute,
G the Court came to the conclusion that Section 11A cannot be
read into the provisions of the MRTP Act and rejected the
argument as the provisions of Section 23 of the Central Act
have to be applied for determining compensation, Section 11A
would also automatically apply. The Court found that Section
H 11A was a procedural provision while Section 23 was a
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 101
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

substantive provision and held, "So, merely because Section A
23 of the Central Act would apply to acquisition under the State
Act, it is not enough to hold that what is contained in Section
11A would also apply". Even, the earlier judgments of this Court
have taken the view that as the statutes like the present one
do not contain specific procedure for determination of B
compensation payable for acquisition, the provisions of
Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act may be attracted. In the
case of Land Acquisition Officer v. H. Narayanaiah ((1976) 4
SCC 9), wherein Section 27 of the Bangalore City Improvement
Trust Act, 1945 referred to the provisions of the Land C
Acquisition Act insofar as they are applicable, in absence of
there being a specific provision for· computation of
compensation, provisions of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition
Act were held to be applicable by a Bench of three Judges of
this Court. D

55. In the case of Gauri Shankar Gaur (supra), a Bench
of two Judges of this Court took divergent view while dealing
with the challenge to the validity of Section 55 read with the
Schedule to the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam,
1965 which provided that the provisions of the Land Acquisition E
Act would apply in the matter of acquisition of land for the
purpose of the Adhiniyam. One view was that the provisions of
the Adhiniyam and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act
both co-existed independently in relation to the procedure
prescribed under the respective Acts without, in any way, one F
colliding with the other. Thus, Section 55 and the Schedule did
not become void. Justice K. Ramaswamy (as he then was) held
that the limitation of three years prescribed under the first
proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was not
attracted, in its application, to the State of U.P. vis-a-vis the G
procedure prescribed in paragraph 2 of the Schedule to the Act
read with Section 55 of the Act. In other words, the bar of
limitation contained in the Land Acquisition Act would not apply.
Justice R.M. Sahai's (as he then was) view was that in
absence of express exclusion, it is more in interest of justice H
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 3 S.C.R.

A to hold that the restrictions of three years added by the proviso
to Section 6 should be applied to the later Act. Any effort to
demonstrate impossibility of completing proceedings within
three years cannot be countenanced. Legislative intention
cannot be frustrated by executive inaction. The acquisition
B proceedings were, therefore, to come to an end after expiry of
three years from the date of issuance of notification under the
provisions of the UP Act analogous to Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act. Thus, there was difference of opinion on this
question of law between the Judges of the same Bench. Since
c the appeal was dismissed on different grounds by both the
learned Judges, the matter remained at that stage.

56. The above dissent led to reference of the legal issue
to a three Judge Bench in the case of U.P. Avas Evam Vikas
Parishad (supra) where the Court took the view that the
D acquisition effected under the provisions of U.P. Avas Evam
Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965, where Section 55 read with
the Schedule of that Act adopted the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, such adoption was held to be legislation by
reference and, therefore, the land owners would be entitled to
E the benefits of Sections 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 as introduced
by the Central Act 68of1984 as otherwise it would suffer from
the vice of arbitrariness and hostile discrimination. This Court
while dealing with the provision of Section 55 of the Adhiniyam
held that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as amended
F by the Central Act 68 of 1984, relating to determination and
payment of compensation, would be applicable to acquisition
of land for the purposes of Adhiniyam.

57. The principle of legislation by incorporation as stated
G in Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. (supra) had
been followed in subsequent cases as well. It was clearly stated
that in the case of legislation by incorporation, it is a statute
existing at that time which stands incorporated in the later law
to the extent it is adopted by the legislature and subsequent
amendments are inconsequential for implementation of the law
H
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 103
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
contained in the subsequent Act. Even in the case of Boiani A
Ores Ltd. (supra), the Court while dealing with the definition of
'motor vehicle' in Section 2(18) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
and Section 2(c) of the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Tax
Acts, 1930 held that the amendment to Section 2(18) of the
Motor Vehicles Act by Act 100 of 1956 could not be read into s
the Bihar Act, as the legislature had intended to incorporate the
provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act as it stood in 1939.

58. These are the few examples and principles stated by
this Court dealing with both the doctrines of legislation by C
incorporation as well as by reference. Normally, when it is by
reference or\citation, the amendment to the earlier law is
accepted to be applicable to the later law while'm the case of
incorporation, 'the subsequent amendments to the earlier law
are irrelevant for application to the subsequent law unless it falls
in the exceptions stated by this Court in M. V. Narasimhan's D ·
case (supra). It could well be said that even where there is
legislation by refierence, the Court needs to apply its mind as
to what effect the• subsequent amendments to the earlier law
would have on the application of the later law. The objective of
all these principle:s of interpretation and their application is to E
ensure that both tbe Acts operate in harmony and object of the
principal statute is not defeated by such incorporation. Courts
I, have made attempts to clarify this distinction by reference to
,variious established canons. But still there are certain gre'
/
areas which may re·quire the court to consider other angles 1 j( F
interpretation. In thH case of Maharashtra SRTC (supra), t ,be .
court was considering the provisions of the MRTP Act as · well
as the provisions of the Land Acquircition Act. The Court f 1rmlly
took the view by ad1opting the principle stated in U.P . Av.is
Evam Vikas Parishacf (supra) and held that there is no thing in G
the MRTP Act which ~ irecludes the adoption of the con ,struction
that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as arr 1ended by
the Central Act 68 of ·1984, relating to award of corr .lpensation
.would apply with full vigour to the acquisition of lar ,d uni:fer the
MRTP Act, as otherwise it would be hit b y invidious H
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A discrimination and palpable arbitrariness and consequently
invite the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution. While referring
· to the principle stated in the case of Hindusthan Cooperative
Insurance Society Ltd. (supra) and clarifying the distinction
between the two doctrines, the Court declined to apply any
B specific doctrine and primarily based its view on the plea of
discrimination but still observed. :

"8 .... The fact that no clear-cut guidelines or distinguishing
features have been spelt out to ascertain whether it belongs
to one or the other category makes the task of idf:ntification
c difficult. The semantics associated with interpriatation play
their role to a limited extent. Ultimately, it is a matter of
probe into legislative intention and/or taking an insight into
the working of the enactment if one or the other view is
adopted. The doctrinaire approach to ascertain whether
D the legislation is by incorporation or reff;rence is, on
ultimate analysis, directed towards that end. The distinction
often pales into insignificance with the exceptions
enveloping the main rule."

E 59. In the case in hand, it is clear that bQf:h these Acts are
self-contained codes within themselves. The State Legislature
while enacting the MRTP Act has referred to the specific
sections of the Land Acquisition Act in the provisions of the
State Act. None of the sections require a.pplication of the
F provisions of the Land Acquisition Act generally or mutatis
mutandis. On the contrary, there is a specific reference to
certain sections and/or content/language of the section of the
Land Acquisition Act in the provisions of the MRTP Act. Section
113A of the State Act refers to acquisition of land under the
G Land Acquisition Act for the purpose under Section 113(3A)
which in turn refers to the complexity and magnitude of the work
involved in developing any area as a site for new town. Section
116 of the State Act refers to the power which shall vest in a
Developing Authority, constituted under Section 113(2) of the
MRTP Act, for acquisition by agreement or under the Land
H
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 105
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
Acquisition Act, as provided in Chapter VII of the MRTP Act. A
Section 125 of the State Act provides that any land which is
required, reserved or designated in a regional plan or a
scheme for a public purpose, which shall be deemed to be land
needed for a public purpose within the meaning of the Land
Acquisition Act. Section 126(1)(b) provides for payment of an B
amount equivalent to the value of lessor's interest to be
determined by the authorities on the basis of the principles laid
down in the Land Acquisition Act. Thus, the reference to the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act is only for the purpose
of adopting the principles stated therein for a very limited c
purpose. In terms of Section 126(1)(c) of the MRTP Act, the
·application to the State Government has to be made for
. acquiring such land under the Land Acquisition Act. Such land
refers to the lands which are required only under the provisions
of the MRTP Act. Section 126(2) refers to Section 6 of the Land D
Acquisition Act. only for the purpose of format in which the
declaration has to be made. In terms of Section 126(3), on
publication of the declaration, the Collector shall proceed to
take order for acquisition of the land under the State Act, i.e.
for the purpose of acquisition of land; the procedure adopted E
under the Land Acquisition Act shall be adopted by the
Collector and nothing more. The afore-referred provisions of the
State Act clearly frame a scheme for planned development with
limited incorporation of some of the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act. The provisions of the State Act were amended
last in point of time and, therefore, the State Legislature was F
aware of the relevant existing laws including Section 11A of the
Land Acquisition Act. The intent of the legislature to exclude
the application of Section 11A clearly emerges from the fact
that while amending Section 127 of the M RTP Act, it made no
reference, generally or specifically, to the said provision rather G
it deleted reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition
Act from the unamended provisions of Section 127. Reference
to Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act in the State Act, under
Section 128(3) of the State Act, is again relatable to the
acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, as H
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 3 S.C.R.

A under Section 83 of the State Act, the land could vest in the
Planning Authority even at the threshold and it is vesting of a
different kind than contemplated under Section 16 of the Land
Acquisition Act. The purpose and intent of Section 129 of the
MRTP Act is akin to the provisions of Section 17 of the Land
B Acquisition Act and from linguistic point of view, there is
similarity in the two Sections but still the State Act has provided
for a complete scheme with regard to possession and
compensation payable to the owner of the land in cases of
urgency. Thus, it is clear that there is no general reference to
c the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and they shall not
apply as such or even mutatis mutandis to the MRTP Act. On
the contrary, reference to the Central Act, wherever is made in
the State Act, is specific and for a definite purpose.

60. Another argument which had been vehemently
D advanced on behalf of the appellant is that the reference to the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act in different provisions
of the MRTP Act would require that the proceedings commence
from Section 6 of the Central Act onwards and award is made
in terms of Section 11 of that Act and as those provisions apply
E to these proceedings, Section 11A would automatically come
into play so would the other provisions of the Land Acquisition
Act. The expression 'under the said Acf in Section 126(3) of
the MRTP Act is sufficient indication that it is a legislation by
reference and, thus, all subsequent amendments would apply.
F It was also contended that on a bare reading of Sections 126
and 127 of the MRTP Act, it is clear that it does not exclude
the application of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act. We
certainly are not impressed by this argument advanced on
behalf of the appellants. Firstly, if we examine the acquisition . \
G proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, they commence
only when a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act is issued. Section SA of the Central Act makes it incumbent
upon the authorities to invite objections and decide the same
before issuing declaration under Section 6 of the Land
H Acquisition Act. All these proceedings have specifically been
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 107
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.)
given a go-by under the MRTP Act, where notification is to be A
issued under Section 126(2) in the manner provided, under
Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Secondly, specific
reference to various sections of the land Acquisition Act in the
MRTP Act necessarily implies exclusion of the provisions not ·
specifically mentioned therein. Lastly, acquisition proceedings 8
under the MRTP Act are commenced by issuance of a
declaration under Section 126(2) and then the procedure
prescribed under the Land Acquisition Act is followed upto
passing of award under Section 11 of that Act. Further,
determination of compensation will again depend upon the C
principles stated in Sections 23 and 24 of the Land Acquisition
Act but subject to Sections 128(2) and 129(1) of the MRTP Act.
Statutory benefits accrued under Sections 23(1A), 23(2) and
28 of the Land Acquisition Act would be applicable as held by
this Court in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (supra). Vesting,
unlike Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act which operates D
only after the award is made and compensation is given,
whereas under the MRTP Act it may operate even at the initial
stages before making of an award, for example, under Sections
126(1 )(c) and 83. While referring to Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, the State Legislature has not adopted, E
specifically or otherwise, the period mentioned in proviso to
Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. On the contrary,
different time frames have been postulated under different
provisions of the MRTP Act. If those limitations of time are not
adhered to by the concerned authorities, the consequences F
have also been provided therefor. From the stage of initiation
of steps for preparation of draft plans to the finalization of the
scheme, it takes considerable time. Furthermore, its
implementation at the ground level, takes still much more time.
If this entire planned development which is a massive project G
is permitted to lapse on the application of Section 11A of the
Central Act, it will have the effect of rendering every project of
planned development frustrated. It can hardly be an argument
that the Government can always issue fresh declaration in terms
H
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and take further
proceedings. Recommencement of acquisition proceedings at
different levels of the hierarchy of the State and Planning
Authority itself takes considerable time and, thus, it will be
difficult to achieve the target of planned development. This
B clearly demonstrates that all the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act introduced by later amendments would not, per
se, become applicable and be deemed to be part and parcel
of the MRTP Act. The intent of the legislature to make the State
Act a self-contained Code with definite reference to required
C provisions of the Land Acquisition Act is clear.

61. Besides this, another very important aspect of the
present case is that if the provisions of Section 11A of the Land
Acquisition Act are applied or deemed to be incorporated by
application of any doctrine of law into the provisions of MRTP
D Act, it will have the effect of destroying the statutory rights
available to the State Government and/or the Planning Authority.
For instance, proviso to Section 126(2) of the State Act
provides that where a declaration in the manner provided in
Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the said land
E is not made within one year from the date of publication of draft
regional plan, thereafter no such declaration shall be made.
Section 126(4) makes an exception to the consequences stated
in proviso to Section 126(2) that the State Government,
notwithstanding those provisions, can make a fresh declaration
F for acquiring the land under the Land Acquisition Act. However,
the market value of the land shall be the market value at the
date of declaration in the Official Gazette made for acquiring
such land afresh. In other words, the rest of the machinery
provided under the Act would not operate after the prescribed
G period. However, in terms of Section 127 of the MRTP Act, if
any land reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose
specified is not acquired by agreement within 10 years from
the date on which final regional plan or final development plan
comes into force or if a declaration under sub-sections (2) or
H (4) of Section 126 of the MRTP Act is not published in the
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 109
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
Official Gazette within such period, the owner or any person A
interested in the land may serve notice upon such authority to
that effect and if within 12 months from the date of service of
such notice, the land is not acquired or np steps, as aforesaid,
are commenced for its acquisition, the reservation, allotment
or designation shall be deemed to have lapsed and the land B
would become available to the owner for the purposes of
development. The defaults, their consequences and even
exceptions thereto have been specifically stated in the State
Act. For a pariod of 11 years, the land would remain under
reservation or designation, as the case may be, in terms of c
Section 127 of the MRTP Act(10 years + notice period).
However, if the provisions of Section 11A of the Central Act
were permitted to punctuate a scheme of the State Act and the
award is not made within two years from the date of declaration
under Section 6 of the Central Act, the acquisition proceedings D
will lapse which will frustrate the rights of the State as well as
the scheme contemplated under Section 126 as well as-Section
127 of the State Act and that would not be permissible in law.
This being legislatiori by incorporation, the general reference
to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act shall stand
E
excluded.

62. While applying any of the doctrines, the Court will have
to take care that there is no distortion or destruction of the
provisions of the principal statute. For examining this aspect,
it really would not matter whether we apply the doctrine of F
incorporation or reference to the facts of the present case. It
will have to be examined on the touch stone of effective and
complete workability while protecting legislative intent.
Primarily, we have to examine whether incorporating provisions
of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act into the provisions G
of MRTP Act by reference would disturb the scheme of the
MRTP Act and cause legal and practical impediments in
execution of this Act. Section 126(2) of the State Act refers to
the manner of declaration as contemplated under Section 6 of
--the Land Acquisition Act but the legislature intentionally avoided H
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A making any reference to other features contained in Section 6
of the Central Act as well as the time frame prescribed under
that Act. On the contrary, proviso to Section 126(2) of the
MRTP Act spells out its own time frame whereafter such
declaration cannot be made subject to the provisions of Section
s 126(4). The unamended provisions of Section 127 of the State
Act though refer to the acquisition under Land Acquisition Act
but without making any reference to the time frame prescribed
under the said Act. In this Section also, the specific time frame
and the consequences of default thereof have been stated.
c Sections 128 and 129 of the MRTP Act relate to acquiring land
for the purpose other than for which it is designated in any plan
or scheme and taking of possession of land in cases of urgency
respectively. The Court cannot lose sight of one very important
fact that the MRTP Act is an Act relating to planned
D development and acquisition is an incidental aspect thereof.
Planned development is quite different from merely 'achieving
a public purpose' for which the land is acquired under the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Development plan,
Regional Plan and town planning scheme are major events in
the development of a State. They are controlled and guided by
E different financial, architectural and public interest for the
development including macro and micro planning of the entire
State. The provisions relating to planned development of the
State or any part thereof, read in conjunction with the object of
the Act, show that different time frames are required for initiation,
F finalization and complete execution of such development plans.
The period of 10 years stated in Section 127 of the MRTP Act,
therefore, cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable ex
facie. If the provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition
Act, with its serious consequence of lapsing of entire acquisition
G proceedings, are bodily lifted and read into the provisions of
MRTP Act, it is bound to frustrate the entire scheme and render
it ineffective and uncertain. Keeping in view the consequence
of Section 11A of the Central Act, every development plan
could stand frustrated only for the reason that period of two
H
G!RNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 111
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

years has lapsed and it will tantamount to putting an end to the A
entire development process. Another reason for rejecting the
contention of the appellants is that for the full and complete ·
implementation of the scheme de hors such reservation,
allotment and designation, lands have to be acquired and once
acquisition as argued, fails on the application of Section 11A B
of the Central Act, those lands would have to be restored to
the owners while lands of other plot owners under the same
scheme would continue to be under reservation, allotment or
designation. Even this would render the scheme unworkable.
If the legislature has opted not to introduce any such limitation C
in the MRTP Act, then to read the same with reference to the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act would be unjust and
render the scheme under the State Act completely unworkable.
That certainly is not the legislative intent. Thus, in our view,
reading of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act into Chapter D
VII of the MRTP Act will render the substantive provisions of
the State Act ineffective, unworkable and may frustrate the
object of the Act materially.

63. One of the pertinent principles that the Court should
keep in mind while applying referential legislation as a tool of E
interpretative application is that such interpretation should not,
in any way, defeat the object and essence of principal
legislation. The likelihood of any interference with the scheme
under the principal Act would tilt against accepting such an
interpretation. F

64. Counsel appearing for the appellant strenuously argued
with the aid of equitable principles that the judicial discretion
while referring to such statutes should tilt in favour of the owners
of the land rather than in favour of the State which in any case G
is exercising its power of eminent domain. The contention is
that Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act should be read
into the MRTP Act on equitable grounds, as that alone will
balance the rights of the citizens vis-a-vis right of the State. In
other words, if a declaration is made under Section 126(2) of H
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A the State Act in the manner specified under Section 6 of the
Central Act but consequently an award is not made within two
years of such declaration, then the acquisition and all
proceedings thereafter would lapse in terms of Section 11A of
the Central Act. It was pressed that if this contention is not
B accepted, great injustice will be caused to the appellants
inasmuch as they will have to wait for years together for
finalization of the proceedings and 1O years, in any case, is an
unduly long period. Per contra, the respondents argue that
induction of Section 11A into the MRTP Act would hamper the
c scheme and would frustrate its object.

65. We find no merit in the contention raised on behalf of
the appellants. The Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the
acquisition of land for planned development under the MRTP
Act may be completed much prior to the time frame stipulated
D under Sections 126 and 127 of that Act. Once the acquisition
is complete and land is vested in the State, the person
interested ceases to have any interest in the land in question.
Even for variety of other reasons, this contention cannot be
accepted. Firstly, the provisions of the MRTP Act do provide
E for time limitation as well as the consequences in the event of
default. Secondly, wherever there is delay, despite such
framework provided under the MRTP Act, the applicants are
duly compensated by payment of compensation. If the
provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act are read
F and enforced stricto sensu in the MRTP Act, inevitable
consequences would be that various development schemes ·
under the MRTP Act would come to a halt and the larger public
interest would suffer. On the other hand, some inconvenience
may be caused to the owners/interested persons of the land
G by non-induction of provisions of Section 11A of the Central Act.
Thus, private interest would suffer which, in comparison to larger
public interest, can hardly be a consideration for accepting the
contention raised on behalf of the appellant. It has been held
by various judgments of this Court and rightly so that the
H provisions of Sections 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 113
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

Acquisition Act which relate to payment of interest and solatium A
with regard to the amount of compensation determined under
the award made by the Collector under Section 11 of that Act,
is an adequate compensation to the appellants for the delay
which may be caused by the Government due to avoidable
and/or unavoidable circumstances. On the contrary, if B
acquisition and all proceedings thereafter are permitted to
lapse in terms of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, the
development plans which may have already commenced or
even progressed may come to a standstill causing huge
damage to the public interest as well as to the State Revenue c
which, ultimately, is nothing but public funds. This is more so
for the reason that the lands come under a reservation,
designation as land required for plans including township even
when the draft plans are__prepared and approved by the State.
From whatever point of view this is examined, it is not possible D
to read the provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition
Act into the MRTP Act without adversely affecting the very object
of the MRTP Act and causing impediments, legal or otherwise,
in the implementation of the development plans. These Acts
operate in different fields and such incorporation by reference E
would be incompatible with the cause of the MRTP Act,
particularly, when the reference to the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act are, primarily, for achieving the purpose of the
MRTP Act.

66. Various judgments of this Court, which have been F
relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the respective ·
parties; appear to have taken the view that doctrine of legislation
by reference would ipso facto include all the prospective
amendments to the earlier statute into the later statute. Further,
it was contended that this rule of legislation by reference is a G
rule to which, so far, no exceptions have been carved out like
those to the principle of legislation by incorporation as provided
in the case of M. V. Narasimhan (supra). However, during the
course of hearing, all the learned counsel appearing for the
respective parties contended and fairly stated that the rule of H
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A legislation by reference too can have exceptions though to a
limited extent. Having perused and analyzed the various
judgments cited at the Bar we are of the considered view that
this rule is bound to have exceptions and it cannot be stated
as an absolute proposition of law that wherever legislation by
B reference exists, subsequent amendments to the earlier law
shall stand implanted into the later law without analyzing the
impact of such incorporation on the object and effectuality of
the later law. The later law being the principal law, its object,
legislative intent and effective impiementation shall always be
C of paramount consideration while determining the compatibility
of the amended prior law with the later law as on relevant date.
It will be useful to apply the 'test of intention' and 'test of
unworkability' with their respective contextual reference while
determining the applicability of either of the doctrines and for
that matter, even on the applicability of the amended law to the
0
later law. Impact analysis on the workability of the respective
legislation shall be a relevant consideration for resolving such
an issue. There can be instances where the amended law, if
applied and treated as incorporated in the principal legislation,
may be apparently unadjustable to the scheme of that
E legislation. In that circumstance, it will be unfair to interpret the
amended law as deemed to be incorporated, irrespective of
its consequences on the implementation of the provisions of
the principal Act. It is emphasized that the object of the principal
Act should not be permitted to be defeated on the basis of
F either of the doctrines above referred. Hence, there is need for
carving out exceptions to the rule of legislation by reference as
well. Examples where such reference would be impermissible
are as follows :

G (a) Legislation by reference should not result in
defeating the object and purpose of the later Act;

(b) Where the amendments to the earlier law are read
into the subsequent law as a result of legislation by
reference, if the result is irresolvable conflict
H
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 115
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
between their provisions or it results in destroying A
the essence and purpose of the principal Act (later
law).

67. The above exceptions to the doctrine are not
exhaustive but are merely indicative. The possibility of other B
exceptions to this doctrine cannot be ruled out as it is difficult
for this Court to state all such exceptions with precision.
Furthermore, defining such exceptions with exactitude will not
even aid the ends of justice. We have already r\oticed that all
the learned counsel appearing for the parties are ad idem that C
it would be necessary to carve out such exceptions to apply the
doctrine appropriately, advantageously and objectively.

68. Synoptic analysis of the stated doctrines leads us to
conclude that it is a case of legislation by incorporation. The
reference to the provisions of the Central Act is specific as D
opposed to general. The State Act uses similar but definite
language and expressions while referring to the provisions of
the Central Act indicating the intent of the legislature not to
.adopt or even apply the provisions of the Central Act generally.
This premise clearly is more than suggestive of the animus E-
imponentis to exclude the application of the provisions of
·• Central legislation prescribing time frame and consequences
~ of default thereof to the State Act. It will give rise to an
• irresolvable conflict amongst the provisions of the two
legislations if provisions like Section 11A of the Land F
Acquisition Act are to be read into the State law. Even if the
contention advanced by the appellant is accepted, for the sake
of argument, it will still fall within the exceptions stated (supra)
to the principle of legislation by reference. Reading such
provisions into the State law would result in destroying the G
essence and effective implementation of the State law. We
have discussed the above plea in regard to referential
legislation as an alternative argument addressed by the learned
counsel for the respective parties. While holding that it is a
case of legislation by incorporation, we still are of the
considered view that some of the amended provisions of the H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A Central Act would be applicable to the State Act or read as a
part thereof, with reference to the doctrine of pith and substance
and harmonious application of the statutes. These principles
we shall shortly proceed to discuss.

Harmonious Application
8
69. Having analyzed the niceties of the doctrines and
principles of law at some length, let us now proceed to examine
whether both these statutes, being self-contained codes in
themselves, can be applied harmoniously to achieve the object
C of the State Act without any conflict, with particular reference
to acquisition proceedings. As it is not always necessary for
the Courts to examine conflict or inconsistency between the two
statutes, one enacted by the State and other by the Centre, in
such situation one Act itself may afford the key to the solution
D of the problem, which may relate to construction of the
provisions of the statute. The Central law can be applied to the
State law for a purpose and with such adjustments as may be
contemplated under the relevant law. In the case of Patna
Improvement Trust v. Smt. Lakshmi Devi [AIR 1963 SC 1077},
E the majority of the four Judge Bench took such a view and held
as under:

"5. It is not necessary to go into the argument of
inconsistency between the Bihar Act and the Land
Acquisition Act or the special Act excluding the general
F because it appears to us that the various provisions of the
Bihar Act themselves afford the key to the solution of the
problem before us which is one of construction. Section
71 of the Bihar Act which modifies the Land Acquisition
Act, itself states that for the purpose of acquisition of land
G for the Trust under the Land Acquisition Act, that Act (Land
Acquisition Act) shall be subject to the modification
specified in the Schedule. Therefore even for the purpose
of acquiring land for the Trust the machinery of the Land
Acquisition Act as modified is contemplated. It does not
H
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ·117
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
exclude the Land Acquisition Act, on the contrary it makes A
it applicable but subject to its modifications and
exceptions ... "

70. The Court has to keep in mind the clearly stated legal
distinction between reservation and designation on one hand 8
and acquisition on the other. These are well defined terms used
by the Legislature in both the enactments and they do not admit
any synonymity or interchangeability. The reservation under the
MRTP Act necessarily may not mean and include acquisition.
The acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act may not C
necessarily mean and include reservation. They are well
explained concepts within the legislative scheme of the
respective Acts. It may not be necessary at all for an
appropriate authority to always acquire the entire or part of the
land included in the planned development, while there may be
cases where the land is acquired for the purpose of completing D
planned development. With this distinction in mind, let us,
again, refer to some of the relevant provisions of both the
enactments. Once the notification under Section 126(2) of the
MRTP Act has been issued in the manner prescribed under
Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the mechanism stated E
under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, for the limited
purpose of acquisition and determination of compensation,
would be read into the State Act. It is provided under the
provisions of the State Act that the Collector shall take order
in terms of Section 126(3) for acquisition of the land after F
declaration under Section 126(2) has been issued. The
provisions of Section 126(3) of the M RTP Act are similar to the
provisions of Section 7 of the Land Acquisition Act. Thereafter,
the authority responsible for initiating the acquisition
proceedings is expected to comply with the provisions of G
Sections 9 and 10 and finally make an award under Section
11 of the Central Act. With passing of the award, the first phase
of proceedings for acquisition is complete. Undue delay in
completion of proceedings was a matter of concern both before
the Parliament and the State Legislature when the respective H
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A Acts were amended. This had led to introduction of certain
beneficial provisions in the Land Acquisition Act which were
intended to give additional benefits by way of interest and
solatium to the owner/interested person in the land on account
of delay in completion of such proceedings. These are Sections
B 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act which are in
consonance with the scheme of the State Act and in no way
obstruct the planned development, rather they ensure proper
balance between private and State interest by granting just and
fair compensation to the claimants. A three Judge Bench of this
c Court in the case of U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (supra),
has already taken the view that these provisions are to be
applied while determining compensation payable for acquisition
of land and we see no reason to differ with the view taken. The
State Act does not provide for any specific machinery for
D determination of compensation and rights of the claimants when
an award is made. Again, to this extent, recourse to provisions
of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for making a
reference to the Court of competent jurisdiction at the behest
of owner/interested person as well as provisions of appeal to
E the High Court would be attracted as the remedy available to
the claimant. Of course, compensation would have to be
determined with reference to the principles stated under
Sections 23 and 24 of the Land Acquisition Act which have
been made applicable by judicial pronouncements but, again,
subject to the restrictions stated under Sections 128(2) and 129
F of the State Act. The provisions of Section 72 of the MRTP Act
require determination of disputes referred to in that section by
the Arbitrator. The jurisdiction and powers of the Arbitrator as
well as of the Tribunal under Section 74 of the State Act have
a very limited scope. The Arbitrator can only adjudicate the
G disputes which strictly fall within the ambit of his jurisdiction ·
under Section 72(3) clauses (i) to {xviii) of the State Act.
Clauses (iii) and (iv) of Section 72(3) of the MRTP Act provide
for fixation of value and difference between the values of the
'original plots' and the 'final plots' as well as estimating the
H
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 119
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
compensation payable for the loss of the area of the 'original A
plot' in accordance with the provisions contained in clause (f)
of sub-section (1) of Section 97 of the MRTP Act which deals
with cost of a town planning scheme. This adjudicatory power
is in relation to the 'plots' as defined under Section 2(21 ), in
distinction to compensation payable for acquired 'land' as B
defined under Section 2(14) of the State Act. The provisicns
of Sections 72 and 74 of the MRTP Act grant specific power
and jurisdiction to the Arbitrator and the Tribunal respectively.
None of these provisions deal with the concept of land
acquisition and payment of compensation in terms of the c
Central Act which the State legislature has specifically provided
by devoting a complete chapter to acquisition (Chapter VII) in
the State Act. It is also pertinent to note that predominantly the
provisions of the State Act relate to planned development. The
provisions of Chapter V(b)with particular reference to Sections D
72, 73 and 82 to 86 of the State Act are another pointer towards
the limited jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. The principal role of the
Arbitrator is relatable to the events occurring between
finalization of draft plan to approval of the final scheme, under
the provisions of the Act, and the disputes connected thereto.
E
71. Another very specific power vested in the Arbitrator is
performance of the functions attributed to it under Section 83
of the State Act. According to that Section, possession of the
land can be taken in advance of town planning scheme with
reference to the draft scheme. The Planning Authority is entitled F
to make an application, through the Arbitrator, to the State
Government to vest in it the land, without building, shown in the
draft scheme. If the Government is satisfied that such land is
urgently necessary in the public interest, it could empower the
Planning Authority to enter upon the land and may direct the G
Arbitrator to take possession of the land by notification in the
Official Gazette. The Arbitrator under Section 83(2) and 83(3)
of the State Act is required to serve a notice to the person
interested in the land to give possession of the land to the
Arbitrator or any person authorized by him within the specified , H
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.t.;.R.

A period. If there is default of compliance to his directions issued
under Section 83(3), the Arbitrator can request the
Commissioner of Police or District Magistrate to enforce
delivery of possession of land under Section 84 of the MRTP
Act. Section 85 of the State Act directs that the person
s interested in such land shall be entitled to interest at the rate
of 4 per cent per annum on amount of compensation payable
to him under the final scheme in respect of the said land from
the date on which possession is taken till the date on which the
. amount of compensation is paid to him by the Planning
c Authority. These provisions (Sections 83 to 85 of the MRTP Act)
do not empower the Arbitrator to determine the compensation
and no such power is vested in the Arbitrator under Section 72
of the State Act too. The right of the person interested in the
plot to receive compensation and interest as contemplated
under Section 85 of the MRTP Act arises only when it is part
0
of the land possession of which is taken as part of the final
scheme. The final scheme is to be sanctioned by the
Government as per the provisions of Section 86 of the MRTP
Act.

E 72. Section 102, which falls in Chapter V(h) of the State
Act, relates to payment of compensation in respect of property
or right injuriously affected by the making of town planPling
scheme. Even this Chapter does not talk of compensation
payable for acquisition of land which is governed by Chapter
F VII and the relevant provisions of the Central Act. The provisions
of the Central Act, which are read into the State Act by specific
reference, do not cause any impediment in proper execution
and attainment of the object of planned development, in fact, it
is a pragmatic view which would further the cause of the State
G Act. The provisions which provide for a time frame,
consequences of default and lapsing of the proceedings under
the amended Central Act cannot be deemed to be incorporated
into the State Act by fiction of law. We have already dealt with
this aspect in some detail. Suffice it to note that their deemed
H incorporation will disturb the working under the State Act and,
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 121
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.)
simultaneously, defeat its purpose. Different Benches of this A
Court, and for valid reasons, have taken the view that provisions
of Section 6 as well as Section 11 A of the Central Act are not
applicable and cannot be read into the State Act. The law
enunciated in the case of Gauri Shankar Gaur (supra) in so
far as it is in line with the principles stated in this judgment is B
the correct enunciation of law. The view of this Court in the case
of Sant Joginder Singh (su;xa) is again the correct statement
of law but for reasons stated in this judgment and reasons
recorded in that judgment other than the distinction carved out
between procedural and substantive provisions of a statute. We c
may notice that Gauri Shankar Gaur (supra) was followed in
Satya Pal v. State of UP. [(1997) 9 SCC 117), wherein the
Court took the view that Section 11A of the Land Acquisition
Act would not be applicable to the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas
Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965. D

73. We have already noticed that reservation, designation
and acquisition are different concepts of distinct scope,
application and consequences. The acquisition of land, under
the provisions of the Central Act, has to be for the purpose of
the State Act. There is a complete and comprehensive scheme E
on harmonious application of both the Acts when specific
provisions of the Central Act, as contemplated under the State
Act, alone are read into the State Act. The Planning Authority
is expected to prepare the plan indicating what land it needs
to acquire for implementation of the development plan. Like F
town planning scheme, once it is finalized, all concerned must
adhere thereto as it is a part of enforceable law and
consequences of default would accordingly flow, No person can
develop any property contrary to Development/Regional Plan
or town planning scheme and permissions are required to be G
obtained under various provisions of the State Act. Acquisition
of land may bE)come necessary for completing the planned
development. Thus, the acquisition will only be for planned
development cis required under Section 126 of the State Act.
Of course, the State Government hcis been vested with the H
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A power to acquire land for a purpose other than the one for which
it is designated in any plan or scheme, in terms of Section 128
of the State Act. Still, the acquisition by the State under those
provisions has to be for the authorities specified under the
MRTP Act or for Maharashtra Industrial Development
B Corporation under the provisions of the Maharashtra Industrial
Development Act, 1961.

74. The vesting of land, again, has different connotations
when examined in light of different provisions of the State Act.
Section 83(3) of the MRTP Act provides for vesting of land in
C the Planning Authority, free from encumbrances, in advance of
town planning scheme. Section 88 of the MRTP .A.ct mentions
vesting in the Pianning Authority, free from encumbrances, as
one of the effects of final scheme, for the purpose of handing
over possession of the final plots to the owners to whom they
D are allotted in that scheme. Section 128(3) of the MRTP Act
provides for vesting of land in the State Government under
Section 16 or 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, as the case may
be, wher. the land is acquired for the purpose other than the
one for which it is designated and the plan or the scheme shall
E be deemed to be suitably varied by reason of acquisition of
the said land. Section 129(1) of the MRTP Act relates to a
situation where urgency provisions are invoked by the State
upon an application made by the Planning Authority and
possession of land is taken thereof, then it shall vest without
F any further assurance and free from encumbrances in the State
. Government. There are different kinds of vesting of lands as
· mentioned in the two Acts. The State Act has multi-dimensional
purposes leading to primary object of planned development,
while the Central Act has only one dimension, i.e. acquisition
G of land for a specified public purpose. The land, in terms of
Section 16 of the Central Act shall vest in the State free of
encumbrances only when the compensation is paid and
possession of the land is taken under that Act. Section 48 of
the Central Act empowers the State to withdraw from
H acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken,
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 123
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
despite the fact that award may have been pronounced in A
terms of Section 11 of the Central Act. But once there is
complete vesting of land in the State it amounts to transfer of
title from owner to the State by fiction of law. Neither the Central
Act has any provision to deal with re-vesting of the land in the
owner, nor does it appear to be permissible within the scheme B
of both the Acts. Corollary to this would be that even where the
reservation lapses as a result of default specified· in the
provisions of Sections 49, 126 and 127 of the State Act the
acquisition of the vested land would not, per se, lapse. The
provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act do not c
have any application to such cases under the provisions of
MRTP Act. Furthermore, the provisions of Sections 126(2) and
127(1) of the State Act proceed on the basis that there has been
no acquisition of land or there is a default in acquiring the land.
The bare reading of these provisions puts the matter beyond 0
ambiguity that where the land has been acquired these
provisions would not apply. This is so because if the land stands
acquired and owner is divested of its title he is left with no
interest in the acquired land or even against the reservation of
such land. Where lands have not been acquired and the default
persists for periods specified under the relevant provisions, that E
land would become available, free of reservation or designation,
to the owner for developing it in accordance with law. The
legislature in its wisdom, and appears to us rightly so, has not
referred to lapsing of acquisition as a consequence of the
default contained in Section 127 of the State Act. Section 127 F
opens with the words "If any land reserved, allotted or
designated for any purpose specified in any plan ynder this Act
is not acquired by agreement within ten years
....................... ."or if a declaration under sub-section (2) or
sub-section (4) of Section 126 of the MRTP Act is not published G
in the Official Gazette within such period then the interested
person is entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 127 of the
MRTP Act by serving a notice and still if steps for acquisition
are not taken within twelve months of the date of such notice
H
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A for acquiring the land or the land is not acquired then the
consequences of lapsing of reservation, allotment or
designation shall follow. This also demonstrates the intention
of the legislature, not to apply mandate of Section 11A of the
Central Act to the State Act. Lapsing of acquisition is not
B contemplated under the scheme of either of the two Acts in
question, once the land is vested in the State. Such a view will
find support from the fact that under the provisions of the State
Act the Government has been given power to acquire land for
the purpose other than the one for which it was specified in the
c plan, i.e. the purpose of acquisition can be changed. Whenever
such a situation arises, in that event, the relevant plan or
scheme shall also be deemed to be suitably varied by such
acquisition in terms of Sub-sections (1 ), (1A) and (2) of Section
128 of the State Act.

D Application of doctrine of pith and substance and
incidental encroachment to the issue raised in the present
~

75. The doctrine of pith and substance can be applied to
E examine the validity or otherwise of a legislation for want of
legislative competence as well as where two legislations are
embodied together for achieving the purpose of the principal
Act. Keeping in view that we are construing a federal
Constitution, distribution of legislative powers between the
F Centre and the State is of great significance. Serious attempt
was made to convince the Court that the doctrine of pith and
substance has a very restricted application and it applies only
to the cases where the Court is called upon to examine the
enactment to be ultra vires on account of legislative
G incompetence. We are unable to persuade ourselves to accept
this proposition. The doctrine of pith and substance find its
origin from the principle that it is necessary to examine the true
nature and character of the legislation to know whether it falls
in a forbidden sphere. This doctrine was first applied in India
H in the case of Prafulla Kumar Mukherjea v. Bank of
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 125
·AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

Commerce Ltd., Khulna [AIR 1947 PC 60]. The principle has A
been applied to the cases of alleged repugnancy and we see
no reason why its application cannot be extended even to the
cases of present kind which ultimately relates to statutory
interpretation founded on source of legislation. In the case of
Union of India v. Shah Gobardhan L. Kabra Teachers' B
College [(2002) 8 SCC 228], this Court held that in order to
examine the true character of the enactment, the entire Act, its
object and scope is required to be gone into. The question of
invasion into the territory of another legislation is to be
determined not by degree but by substance. The doctrine of c
pith and substance has to be applied not only in cases of conflict
between the powers of two legislatures but also in any case
where the question arises whether a legislation is covered by
a particular legislative field over which the power is purported
to be exercised. In other words, what is of paramount 0
consideration is that the substance of the legislation should be
examined to arrive at a correct analysis or in examining the
validity of law, where two legislations are in conflict or alleged
to be repugnant. An apparent repugnancy upon proper
examination of substance of the Act may not amount to a E
repugnancy in law. Determination of true nature and substance
of the laws in question and even taking into consideration the
extent to which such provisions can be harmonized, could
resolve such a controversy and permit the laws to operate in
their respective fields. The question of repugnancy arises only
when both the legislatures are competent to legislate in the F
same field, i.e. when both, the Union and the State laws, relate
to a subject in List Ill [(Hoechst Pharamaceuticals Ltd. v. State
of Bihar [(1983) 4 SCC 45)]. We have already noticed that
according to the appellant, the source of legislation being
Article 246 read with Entry No. 42 of the Concurrent List the G
provisions of the State Act in so far as they are in conflict with
the Central Act, will be still born and ineffective. Thus, provisions
of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act would take
precedence. On the contrary, it is contended on behalf of the
H
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A respondent that the planned development and matters rP.lating
to management of land are relatable to Entry 5/18 of State List
and acquisition being an incidental act, the question of conflict
does not arise and the provisions of the State Act can be
enforced without any impediment. This controversy need not
B detain us any further because the contention is squarely
answered by the Bench of this Court in Bondu Ramaswami's
case (supra) where the Court not only considered the
applicability of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act vis-
a-vis the Bangalore Act but even traced the source of legislative
c competence for the State law to Entry 5 of List II of Schedule
VII and held as under:

"92. Where the law covered by an entry in the State List
made by the State Legislature contains a provision which
directly and substantially relates to a matter enumerated
D in the Concurrent List and is repugnant to the provisions
of any existing law with respect to that matter in the
Concurrent List, then the repugnant provision in the State
List may be void unless it can coexist and operate without
repugnancy to the provisions of the existing law. This Court
E in Munithimmaiah v. State of Karnc.taka {(2002) 4 SCC
326] has held that the BOA Act is an Act to provide for
the establishment of a Development Authority to facilitate
and ensure planned growth and development of the city of
Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto, and that acquisition
F of any lands, for such development, is merely incidental to
the main object of the Act, that is, development of
Bangalore Metropolitan Area. This Court held that in pith
and substance, the BOA Act is one which squarely falls
under Entry 5 of List II of the Seventh Schedule and is not
G a law for acquisition of land like the LA Act, traceable to
Entry 42 of List Ill of the Seventh Schedule, the field in
respect of which is already occupied by the Central Act,
as amended from time to time. This Court held that if at
all, the BOA Act, so far as acquisition of land for its
H developmental activities is concerned, in substance and
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 127
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
effect will constitute a special law providing for acquisition A
for the special purposes of BOA and the same ~II not be
considered to be a part of the LA Act. The fallacy in the
contention of the appellants is that it assumes, erroneously,
that the BOA Act is a law referable to Entry 42 of List 111,
while it is a law referable to Entry 5 of List IL Hence the B
question of repugnancy and Section 6 of the LA Act
prevailing over Section 19 of the BOA Act would not at all
arise."

76. While holding as above, the Bench found that the C
question of repugnancy did not arise. The Court has to keep
in mind that function of these constitutional lists is not to confer
power, but to merely demarcate the legislative heads or fields
of legislation and the area over which the appropriate
legislatures can operate. These Entries have always been
construed liberally as they define fields of power which spring D
from the constitutional mandate contained in various clauses
of Article 246. The possibility of overlapping cannot be ruled
out and by advancement of !aw this has resulted in formulation
of, amongst others, two principal doctrines, i.e. doctrine of pith
and substance and doctrine of incidental encroachment. The E
implication of these doctrines is, primarily, to protect the
legislation and to construe both the laws harmoniously and to
achieve the object or the legislative intent of each Act. In the
ancient case of Muthuswami Goundan v. Subramanyam
Chettiar[1940 FCR 188], Sir Maurice Gwyer, CJ supported the F
principle laid down by the Judicial Committee as a guideline,
i.e. pith and substance to be the true nature and character of
the legislation, for the purpose of determining as to which list
the legislation belongs to. This Court in the case of Jijubhai
Nanbhai Kachar v. State of Gujarat [1995 Supp.(1) SCC 596], G
referring to the principle of interpretation of Entries in the
legislative lists, held as under:

"7. It is settled law of interpretation that entries in the
Seventh Schedule are not powers but fields of legislation.
H
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A The legislature derives its power from Article 246 and other
related articles of the Constitution. Therefore, the power
to make the Amendment Act is derived not from the
respective entries but under Article 246 of the Constitution.
The language of the respective eniries should be given the
B widest scope of their meaning, fairly capable to meet the
machinery of the Government settled by the Constitution.
Each general word should extend to all ancillary or
subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be
comprehended in it. When the vires of an enactment is
c impugned, there is an initial presumption of its
constitutionality and if there is any difficulty in ascertaining
the limits of the legislative power, the difficulty must be
resolved, as far as possible in favour of the legislature
putting the most liberal construction upon the legislative
entry so that it may have the widest amplitude ... ."
D
77. The primary object of applying these principles is not
limited to determining the reference of legislation to an Entry
in either of the lists, but there is a greater legal requirement to
be satisfied in this interpretative process. A statute should be
E construed so as to make it effective and operative on the
principle expressed in the maxim ut res magis va/eat quam
pereat. Once it is found that in pith and substance, an Act is a
law on a permitted field then any incidental encroachment, even
on a forbidden field, does not affect the competence of the
F legislature to enact that law [State of Bombay v. Narottamdas
Jethabhai [1951 SCR 51]. To examine the true application of
these principles, the scheme of the Act, its object and purpose,
the pith and substance of the legislation are required to be
focused at, to determine its true nature and character. The State
G Act is intended only to ensure planned deve~opment as a
statutory function of the various authorities constituted under the
Act and within a very limited compass. An incidental cause
cannot override the primary cause. When both the Acts can be
implemented without conflict, then need for construing them
H harmoniously arises. We have already discussed in great detail
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 129
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
that the State Act being a code in itself can take within its ambit A
provisions of the Central Act related to acquisition, while
excluding the provisions which offend and frustrate the object
of the State Act. It will not be necessary to create, or read into
the legislations, an imaginary conflict or repugnancy between
the two legislations, particularly, when they can be enforced in B
their respective fields without conflict. Even if they are examined
from the point of view that repugnancy is implied between
Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act and Sections 126 and
127 of the MRTP Act, then in our considered view, they would
fall within the permissible limits of doctrine of "incidental c
encroachment" without rendering any part of the State law
invalid. Once the doctrine of pith and substance is applied to
the facts of the present case, it is more than clear that in
substance the State Act is aimed at planned development
unlike the Central Act where the object is to acquire land and D
disburse compensation in accordance with law. Paramount
purpose and object of the State Act being planned development
and acquisition being incidental thereto, the question of
repugnancy does not arise. The State, in terms of Entry 5 of
List II of Schedule VII, is competent to enact such a law. It is a E
settled canon of law that Courts normally would make every
effort to save the legislation and resolve the conflict/repugnancy,
if any, rather than invalidating the statute. Therefore, it will be
the purposive approach to permit both the enactments to
operate in their own fields by applying them harmoniously. Thus,
in our view, the ground of repugnancy raised by the appellants, F
in the present appeals, merits rejection.

78. A self-contained code is an exception to the rule of
referential legislation. The various legal concepts covering the
relevant issues have been discussed by us in detail above. The G
schemes of the MRTP Act and the land Acquisition Act do not
admit any conflict or repugnancy in their implementation. The
slight overlapping would not take the colour of repugnancy. In
· such cases, the doctrine of pith and substance would squarely
be applicable and rigours of Article 254(1) would not be H
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 3 S.C.R.

A attracted. Besides that, the· reference is limited to specific
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, in the State Act.
Unambiguous language of the provisions of the MRTP Act and
the legislative intent clearly mandates that it is a case of
legislation by incorporation in contradistinction to legislation by
s reference. Only those provisions of the Central Act which
precisely apply to acquisition of land, determination and
disbursement of compensation in accordance with law, can be
read into the State Act. But with the specific exceptions that
the provisions of the Central Act relating to default and
c consequences thereof, including lapsing of acquisition
proceedings, cannot be read into the State Act. It is for the
reason that neither they have been specifically incorporated into
the State law nor they can be absorbed objectively into that
statute. If such provisions (Section 11A being one of such
sections) are read as part of the State enactment, they are
0
bound to produce undesirable results as they would destroy the
very essence, object and purpose of the MRTP Act. Even if
fractional overlapping is accepte'd between the two statutes,
then it will be saved by the doctrine of incidental encroachment,
E and it shall also be inconsequential as both the constituents
have enacted the respective laws within their legislative
competence and, moreover, both the statutes can eloquently
co-exist and operate with compatibility. It will be in consonance
with the established canons of law to tilt the balance in favour
of the legislation rather than invalidating the same, particularly,
F when the Central and State Law can be enforced symbiotically
to achieve the ultimate goal of planned development. Thus, the
contentions raised by the appellants are unsustainable in law
as considered by us under different heads and are liable to be
rejected.
G
79. Before we conclude, we must notice that learned
counsel appearing for respective parties had raised certain
other contentions during the course of arguments, which have
not been, specifically and intentionally, dealt with by us in the
H judgment. Firstly, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 131
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
is not necessary for us to dwell upon those contentions in any A
detail as we are of the considered view that the question
referred could be answered by the Court without going into the
merit or otherwise of these arguments. Secondly, because on
application of different doctrines and principles, de hors the
contentions raised and judgments relied upon in that regard B
including the plea of legislative abdication, we have precisely
answered the question referred to the larger bench. Thus, we
leave these questions open to be dealt with in an appropriate
case. These contentions are:

1. The Constitution Bench in B. Shama Rao's case C
(supra) has clearly stated the principle that even in
the case of legislation by reference, if subsequent
amendments are deemed to be part of the later law
adopting the earlier law, in that event, it would
amount to abdication of legislative functions by the D
concerned constituent. It was also contended that
B. Shama Rao's case (supra) has not been noticed
by subsequent Benches including the Constitution
Bench of this Court and, thus, the law in the later
judgments cannot be said to be correct exposition E
of law. On the contrary, reference was made to the
Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in
Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. The
Asstt. Commissioner of Sales Tax ((1974) 4 SCC
98] to contend that the ruling in B. Shama Rao's F
case (supra) must be confined to the facts of that
case. It is doubtful whether there is any general
principle which precludes the Parliament or a State
Legislature from adopting a law and future
amendments to the law passed respectively by a G
State Legislature or the Parliament and
incorporating them in its legislation. Further, it was
contended that the law in B. Shama Rao (supra)
was contrary to the ratio of the judgment of this
Court in Rajnarain Singh v. Chairman, Patna H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A Administration Committee [(1955 (1) SCR 290]
and the still-born theory expanded in B. Shama
Rao's case (supra) was even contrary to Devi Das
v. State of Punjab [AIR 1967 SC 1896].

2. The other challenge was on the ground that if the
B
provisions of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition
Act are not read into the provisions of the MRTP
Act, it will result in patent discrimination in regard
to determination of compensation and, thus, is
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Per
c Contra, it was argued that such contention, in
somewhat similar cases, has already been rejected
by different Benches of this Court and has no merit.
Reliance in this regard was placed upon the
judgments of this Court in the case of U.P. Avas
D Evam Vikas Parishad (supra) and a Constitution
Bench judgment in the case of Nagpur
Improvement Trust-II (2002) (supra).

3. The various judgments of this Court have not
E examined the effect of federal structure of the
Constitution while applying the principle enunciated
by the Privy Council in the case of Hindusthan Co-
operative Insurance Society Ltd. (supra).

80. Having said so, now we proceed to record our answer
F to the proposition referred to the larger Bench as follows :

"For the reasons stated in this judgment, we hold that the
MRTP Act is a self-contained code. Further, we hold that
provisions introduced in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by
G Central Act 68 of 1984, limited to the extent of acquisition of
land, payment of compensation and recourse to legal remedies
provided under the said Act, can be read into an acquisition
controlled by the provisions of Chapter VII of the MRTP Act but
with a specific exception that the provisions of the Land
H Acquisition Act in so far as they provide different time frames
GIRNAR TRADERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 133
AND ORS. [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

and consequences of default thereof including lapsing of A
acquisition proceedings cannot be read into the MRTP Act.
Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act being one of such
provisions cannot be applied to the acquisitions under Chapter
VII of the MRTP Act."
B
81. The Reference is answered accordingly. Mattem now
, be placed before the appropriate Bench for disposal in
accordance with law.

B.B.B. Reference Answered.