GIRIMALLAPPAversusTHE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER M & MIP & ANR

                    (2012] 6 S.C.R. 975


                       GIRIMALLAPPA                               A
                              V.
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER M & MIP &
                          ANR.
    (Special Leave Petition (C) No. 21397 of 2012)
                                                                  B
                       JULY 16, 2012
 [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]

    LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1892:
                                                                  c
      s.28-A - Re-determination of compensation on the basis
of award of court ~ Held: The area of land acquired makes it
clear that the petitioner was a man of means - He did not file
a reference u/s 18 of the Act, but his application uls 28-A of
the Act was entertained - However, as the said order has not      0
been challenged by the respondent(s), Supreme Court cannot
examine the issue further, even if the order is totally
unwarranted - B'esides, petitioner's claim in the first appeal
before the District Judge had been to the tune of Rs.24,0001
- per acre which had been allowed - In appeal before the High     E
Court, no specified amount was demanded by the petitioner
- The memo of appeal reveals that Rs.25 was paid as court
fee - High Court dealt with the issue elaborately taking note
of the earlier proceedings so far including the order passed
uls 28-A of the Act and condonation of delay of 1717 by the
first appellate court - SLP is also delayed by 154 days, though   F
the said delay has been condoned - Mere making a reference
in the memo of appeal that the High Court had awarded a
higher amount in respect of a land covered by the same
Notification u/s 4 of the Act, is not enough - Claimant has to
satisfy the court that his land was similar in quality and had    G
same geographical location or was situated in close vicinity
of the land covered by the exemplar relied upon by him - In
the instant case, no such attempt has ever been made by the
petitioner - Thus, it is not that a meritorious case has been
                                975                               H
    976       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A   thrown out and the cause of justice stood defeated - It cannot
    be. said that the High Court preferred technicalities over
    substantial justice - Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 136 -
    Delayllaches.

        State of Orissa & Ors. v. Chitrasen Bhoi 2009 (14) SCR
8
    558 =JT 2009 (13) SC 388 - relied on

         Chandrashekhar & Ors. v. Addi. Special Land Acquisition
    Officer 2009 (10) SCR 505 =AIR 2009 SC 3012 - held
    inapplicable
c
        Godrej Sara Lee Limited v. Assistant Commissioner (AA)
    & Anr. 2009 (4) SCR 1183 = (2009) 14 SCC 338; and
    Harcharan v. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 43; Delhi
    Administration vs. Gurudeep Singh Uban 2000 (2) Suppl.
0   SCR 496 = 2000 AIR 3737 - referred to.
                          Case Law Reference:
          2009 (14) SCR 558         relied on            para 5
          2009 (10) SCR 505         held inapplicable para 12
E
          2009 (4) SCR 1183         referred to          para 13
          AIR 1983 SC 43            referred to          para 14
          2000 (2) Suppl. SCR 496 referred to            para 17
F
         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave
    Petition (Civil) No. 21397 of 2012.

      From the Judgment & Order dated 12.9.2011 of the High
  Court of Karnataka Circuit Bench at Gulbarga in Misc. Second
G Appeal No. 510 of 2010 (LAC).

        Kiran Suri, Aparna Mattoo, Nakibur Rahman for the
    Appellant.

          The Order of the Court was delivered
H
   GIRIMALLAPPA v. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION                   977
               OFFICER M & MIP

                             ORDER                                    A
        1. Delay condoned.

        2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this petition are
that:
                                                                      8
     A. A huge area of land was notified under Section 4(1) of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the 'Act') on
30.5.1984 including the petitioner's land measuring 11 Acres
32 ~untas at Gobbur (K) Village in District Gulbarga for the
purpose of construction of a tank. The possession of the said         c
land has been taken by the respondent authorities on
23.6.1985. The Land Acquisition Collector made an Award
under Section 11 of the Act fixing the market value of the land
at the rate of Rs. 3800/- per Acre.

      B. One LAC Case No. 500 of 1993 filed by another person D
was decided by the Reference Court under Section 18 of the
Act on 28.9.1994. While placing reliance on the same, the
petitioner filed application under Section 28-A of the Act. The
said application was allowed fixing the market value of the dry
land at the rate of Rs.10000/- per Acre. Petitioner preferred a E
further reference against that order claiming Rs.45000/- per
Acre for dry land and Rs.75000/- per Acre for irrigated lands.
The said reference was decided vide order dated 27.9.2003
assessing the market value at the rate of Rs. 15000/- perAcre
for dry land and Rs.21500/- per Acre for irrigated land.        F

     C. Aggrieved from the said reference award, petitioner
preferred LAC Appeal No. 64 of 2008 before the District Judge,
Gulbarga, seeking enhancement of compensation assessing
the market value of the land at the rate of Rs.24000/- per Acre G
which stood allowed vide judgment and. decree dated
27.10.2009.

    D. Petitioner filed MSA No. 510 of 2010 against the said
judgment and decree dated 27 .10.2009 before High Court
                                                                      H
    978       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A   which has been dismissed by the impugned judgment and
    order dated 12.9.2011.

          Hence, this petition.

          3. Ms. Kiran Suri, learned counsel appearing for the
B   petitioner, vehemently submitted that courts cannot defeat the
    claim based on substantial justice on mere technicalities.
    Learned counsel would submit that when technicalities are
    pitted against substantial justice, the latter must prevail; in case
    petitioner was entitled for a higher compensation, awarding a
C   lesser amount of compensation, tantamounts to expropriation
    of the property in violation of mandate of Article 300-A of the
    Constitution of India. Petitioner has been deprived the higher
    compensation as he could not afford to pay the court fees
    though he was entitled for higher compensation claimed by him.
D
         4. Record of the case reveals that petitioner's land
    measuring 11 Acres 32 Guntas had been acquired though there
    is nothing on record to show as to whether petitioner had some
    more land. But the area of land acquired makes it clear that
    petitioner was a man of means. We fail to understand, in case,
E
    he did not file a reference under Section 18 of the Act, under
    what circumstances his application under Section 28-A of the
    Act could be entertained.           ·

        5. This Court in State of Orissa & Ors. v. Chitrasen Bhoi,
F   JT 2009 (13) SC 388, considered this aspect and held :

          "The scope of provisions of Section 28-A of the Act was
          considered by this Court in Mewa Ram v. State of Haryana
          AIR 1987 SC 45, and the Court placed emphasis
          particularly on para 2 °(ix) of the object and reasons of the
G
          Amendment Act, 1987 which provided for a special
          provision for inarticulate and poor people to apply for re-
          determination of the compensation amount on the basis
          of the court award in a land acquisition reference filed by
          comparatively affluent land owner. The Court observed as
H
GIRIMALLAPPA v. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION                      979
            OFFICER M & MIP

 under:                                                               A

          Section 28-A in terms does not apply to the case
          of the petitioners ..... They do not belong to that class
          of society for whose benefit the provision is
          intended and meant, i.e. inarticulate and poor
                                                                      8
          people who by reason of their poverty and
          ignorance have failed to take advantage of the right
          of reference to the civil court under Section 18 of
          the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

 This Court approved and reiterated the law laid down in              C
 Mewa Ram (Supra) in Scheduled Caste Cooperative
 Land Owning Society Ltd. Bhatinda v. Union of India &
 Ors, AIR 1991 SC 730. In Babua Ram & Ors. v. State of
 U.P. & Anr. (1995) 2 SCC 689, this Court again reiterated
 the law laid down in Mewa Ram (Supra) observing as                   D
 under:-

          Legislature made a discriminatory policy between
          the poor and inarticulate as one class of persons
          to whom the benefit of Section 28-A was to be               E
          extended and comparatively affluent who had taken
          advantage of the reference under Section 18 and
          the latter as a class to which the benefit of Section
          28-A was not extended. Otherwise, the phraseology
          of the language of the non-obstante clause would
          have been differently worded ..... It is true that the
                                                                      F
          legislature intended to relieve hardship to the poor,
          indigent and inarticulate interested persons who
          generally failed to avail the reference under Section
          18 which is an existing bar and to remedy it,
          Section 28-A was enacted giving a right and                 G
          remedy for re- determination ...... The legislature
          appears to have presumed that the same state of
          affairs continue to subsist among the poor and
          inarticulate persons and they generally fail to avail
          the right under sub-section (1) of Section 18 due           H
    980       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A                to poverty or ignorance or avoidance of
                 expropriation.

          Thus, it is apparent that the legislature has carved out an
          exception in the form of Section 28-A and made a special
          provision to grant some relief to a particular class of
B
          society, namely poor, illiterate, ignorant and inarticulate
          people. It is made only for "little Indians". (Emphasis
          added)

       6. Petitioner cannot claim, by any means to fall under the
C said category of "little Indians". However, as the said order has
  not been challenged by the respondent(s), we cannot examine
  the issue further, even if the order is totally unwarranted.

       7. Petitioner's claim in the first appeal before the learned
D District Judge had been only to the tune of Rs.24000/- per Acre.
  The prayer before the learned District Judge in LAC No. 64 of
  2008 reads as under:

          "Hence, it is prayed that the Hon'ble Court may kindly be
          pleased to set aside the order passed by the court below
E         in LAC No. 193/01 and enhance it to Rs.24,000/- per Acre
          with all statutory benefits and excluding the interest for the
          delayed period in the interest of justice for which the
          appellants shall ever pray."

F        8. It may be pertinent to mention here that while hearing
    the appeal, the learned District Judge at Gulbarga condoned
    the delay of 1717 days in filing the appeal.

      9. In the appeal before the High Court, no specific amount
  was demanded by the petitioner. The prayer made before the
G High Court reads as under:

          ''Therefore, it is most humbly prayed that the Hon'ble Court
          may be pleased to allow this appeal and modify the
          judgment and Award dated 27.10.2009 passed in L.A.C.
H         Appeal No. 64/2008 by the learned Ill Addi. District Judge
                                                   ,,
  GIRIMALLAPPA v. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION                       981
              OFFICER M & MIP

     at Gulbarga, modifying the judgment and aware dated                 A
     27.9.2003 passed in LAC No. 193/2001 by the Prl. Civil
     Judge (Sr.On.) Gulbarga and pass any other appropriate
     orders, in the interest of justice."

       10. Thus, it is apparent that no specific demaod was              8
 raised by the petitioner before the High Court. The Memo of
Appeal reveals that Rs.25/- was paid as the court fees. The
 High Court dealt with the issue elaborately taking note of earlier
 proceedings/orders including the order passed under Section
28-A of the Act, and condonation of delay of 1717 days by the            C
first appellate court. Finally the Hi~h Court held that the claim
 itself was restricted to Rs. 24000/- per Acre. There was no
justification to interfere as the claim of. the petitioner stood fully
satisfied by the order passed in the first appeal.

    11. This special leave petition is filed with a delay of 154         D
days, with an explanation that petitioner suffered from the
ailment and could not approach the court within limitation.

     12. The question does arise as to whether such a vague
prayer can be entertained by the court. The memo of appeal               E
before the High Court does not even reveal as to what was his
demand. Reliance is being placed on the judgment of this Court
in Chandrashekhar & Ors. v. Addi. Special Land Acquisition
Officer, AIR 2009 SC 3012, wherein after considering the
earlier judgments, this Court held that court should not be too
technical in awarding the compensation in case there is a
                                                                         F
shortfall of court fees. The said judgment is not an authority on
the proposition advanced before us in this petition that court is
bound to enhance the amount of compensation though no
specific amount is demanded by the petitioner.
                                                                         G
     13. It was not a case where an order could be challenged
on the ground that the same is a nullity for want of competence
of the issuing authority and proper pleadings including
appropriate grounds challenging the same have been taken,
but no prayer has been made for quashing the said order. In              H
    982      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A   such an eventuality the order can be examined only after
    considering the statutory provisions involved therein. The court
    may reach a conclusion that the order suffers from lack of
    jurisdiction. (See: Godrej Sara Lee Limited v. Assistant
    Commissioner (AA) & Anr., (2009) 14 SCC 338).
B
       14. In case, the petitioner was serious about the matter,
  he could have amended the Memo of Appeal and that
  application could have been considered sympathetically by the
  High Court as held by this Court in Harcharan v. State of
C Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 43.

        15. The facts mentioned in this petition depict entirely
  different picture and it gives an impression as if the High Court
  had not enhanced the compensation though demanded by the
  petitioner for want of p(jlyment of court fees which he could not
D afford to pay due to paucity of funds.

        16. The case relied upon by Ms. Kiran Suri is the case
  where the prayer, was for a particular enhancement and it was
  further made clear that the applicants therein could not afford
E to pay the court fees for financial constraints. In the instant case,
  the first appeal filed by the petitioner was barred by 1717 days
  and the delay was condoned. This petition is also barred by
  154 days. Petitioner for the reasons best known to him did not
  make the demand for a specific enhancement. Mere making
  a reference in the Memo of Appeal that the High Court had
F awarded a higher amount in respect of a land covered by the
  same Notification under Section 4 of the Act, is not enough.
  The claimant has to satisfy the court that his land was similar
  in quality and had same geographical location or was situated
  in close vicinity of the land covered by the exemplar relied upon
G by him. In the instant case, no such attempt has ever been made
  by the petitioner. Thus, it is not that a meritorious case has been
  thrown out and the cause of justice stood defeated.

       More so, the exemplar cited first time before the High Court
H in Second Appeal has not been referred to in the First Appeal.
   GIRIMALLAPPA v. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION                   983
               OFFICER M & MIP

In absence thereof, it is beyond imagination as how findings          A
recorded by the first Appellate Court could be termed as
perverse and be a subject matter of appeal.

      17. Justice is an illusion as the meaning and definition of
'justice' varies from person to person and party to party. Party      8
feels having got justice only and only if it succeeds before the
court, though it may not have a justifiable claim.

      Justice is the virtue, by which the Society/Court/Tribunal
gives to a man what is his due, opposed to injury or wrong.
Justice is an act of rendering what is right and equitable towards    C
one who has suffered a wrong. Therefore, while tempering the
justice with mercy, the Court has to be very conscious that it
has to do justice in exact conformity to some obligatory law for
the reason that human actions are found to be just or unjust as
they are in conformity with or in opposition to the law. (Vide:       D
Delhi Administration v. Gurudeep Singh Uban, AIR 2000 SC
3737).

       18. Thus, in view of the above, we do not see any
"justification to accept the submission on behalf of the petitioner   E
 that the High Court preferred technicalities over substantial
justice.

       Petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.

R.P.                                                                  F
                                                 SLP dismissed.