Holding

The High Court was correctly empowered to set aside the acquittal, apply the statutory presumption of gratification, and uphold the conviction, and the appeal may be continued by the appellant’s widow under s.394 CrPC.

Summary

Girja Prasad, a lower‑division clerk, was alleged to have accepted Rs 200 as a bribe on behalf of his superior, the Divisional Ayurved Chikitsa Adhikari, after a trap was laid by the complainant and police officials. The trial court acquitted him, deeming the key witnesses (the complainant and a police inspector) as interested and finding no proof that he could obligate the complainant. On appeal, the High Court set aside the acquittal, invoking Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which creates a presumption of gratification, and upheld the conviction under s.161 IPC and s.5(1)(d) & s.5(2) of the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed that the High Court was justified in re‑appreciating the evidence, that the presumption applied irrespective of whether the money was for the accused or a third party, and that the testimony of police officials could be relied upon. It also allowed the widow to continue the appeal under s.394 CrPC despite the appellant’s death, and dismissed the appeal, confirming the conviction.

Issues considered

The applicability of the presumption of gratification under Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 when the accused accepted money on behalf of a superior.
Whether the trial court erred in discarding the testimony of the complainant and the police inspector as interested witnesses.
Whether an appellate court can re‑appreciate evidence and set aside an acquittal under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Whether the appeal can be continued by the deceased appellant’s legal heir under Section 394 CrPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 394
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 161
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947s. 4, s. 5(1)(d), s. 5(2)

Subjects

briberycorruptionpresumption of gratificationappeal against acquittalinterested witnessSection 161 IPCPrevention of Corruption ActSection 394 CrPCdeath of appellant

Judgment

GIRIJA PRASAD (DEAD) BY LRS. A
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

AUGUST 27, 2007

(C.I(. THAKKERANDTARUNCHATTERJEE,JJ.) B

Penal Code, 1860:

s. 161-Prosecution of accused u!s 161 /PC and s.5(/)(d) rlw s.5(2)
of Prevention of Corruption Act-Accused caught by trap party accepting C
money from complainant-Plea of "false involvement" and "total denial" by
accused-Money said to have been accepted on behalf of his senior officer-
Acquittal by trial court-Conviction by High Court-Held, High Court wholly
justified in setting aside acquittal and recording conviction-There being
positive finding by both Courts below ofaccused accepting money, presumption D
u!s 4 of Prevention of Corruption Act would get attracted-It was also
inmaterial whether acceptance of money by accused was for himself or for
someone else-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947-ss. 5(/)(d) and 5(2)-
Presumption.

Evidence: E
Evidence of Police official-Trial court termed complainant and police
official as interested witnesses and discarded their evidence-Held, credibility
of witness has to be tested on touchstone oftruthfulness and trustworthiness-
No infirmity attaches to testimony of police officials merely beca.use they
belong to police force. F
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

Appeal against acquittal-High Court in appeal setting aside acquittal
and recording conviction-Held: Appellate court had every power to
reappreciate, review and reconsider the evidence as a whole-On facts, High G
Court justified in setting aside acquittal.

The appellant was prosecuted under s. 161 IPC ands. S(l)(d) read with
s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The prosecution case was

483 H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 9 S.C.R.

A that PW-4; the Divisional Ayurved Chikitsa Adhikari, accompanied by .the
appellant-accused, on a surprise visit to one Ayurvedic Chikisalaya, found that
several members of the staff of the said chikitsalaya including the Ayurvedic
Chikitsak himself(PW-1) were absent from duty. When Pw-1 approached PW-·
4 in order to explain his absence, the latter was said to have informed the
former either to pay him Rs. 500/- through the accused or to suffer
B suspension. PW-1 was said to have paid Rs. 300/- to the accused the same
day and assured him to pay the remaining amount of Rs. 200/-on a particular
day. PW-1 thereafter lodged a complaint in the office of the Lokayukt On the
specified day, the trap was laid and the accused was caught with the currency
notes which had already been treated with chemical powder. The accused denied
C the prosecution case before the trial Court. Two panch witnesses were also
treated 'hostile'. As regards the evidence of PW-1, the complainant and PW-
10, the Inspector of Special Police Establishment, the trial court observed
that the same could not be relied upon as both were interested witnesses.
However, on appeal by the State, the High Court_set aside the order of acqittal
and convicted the accused of the charges and sentenced him to simple
D imprisonment for four months and to pay a fine of Rs. 200/- for offence u/s
161 lPC. Aggrieved, the accused filed the instant appeal. During the pendency
of the appeal the accused died and his wife was allowed to prosecute the appeal
under s. 394 Cr. P.C.

It was contended for the appellant that since he was not in a position to
.E
oblige the complainant and the demand and acceptance was for and on behalf
of PW-4, the trial Court rightly ot:iserved that the accused was merely made
a 'scapegoat', and the High Court erred in disturbing the order of acquittal:
and that the trial Court rightly discarded the evidence of PWs 1 and 10 holding
them as interested witnesses. It was also submitted that the accused having
F died, if conviction and sentence were set aside, the family members of deceased
accused would be able to get the retrial benefits,

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1. The High Court was wholly justified in setting aside acquittal
G of the accused and in recording an order of conviction against him. Bo~h the
Courts below recorded a positive finding that the accused accepted an amount
of Rs. 200/- from PW-1, the complainant. Therefore, Section 4 of the Act got
attracted and presumption came into play against accused. There was no
rebuttal by the accused by leading any evidence whatsoever. The defence was
H of 'total denial' and 'false involvement'. Hence, the doctrine of 'preponderance
-- GIRIJA PRASAD (DEAD) BY LRS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 485

of probability' also had no application. It was also wholly immaterial whether A
the said acceptance of amount by the accused was for himself or for someone
else. Even if an accused accepts the amount for 'someone else', in view of$.
161 IPC ands. 5(l)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, he commits
the offence. It was also immaterial whether the accused was or was not in a
position to oblige the complainant by preventing or delaying his suspension. B
[Para 16, 19, 22 and 30) [490-G-H; 491-D; 493-A; 496-GI

2.1. The trial court erred in discarding the evidence of PWs 1 and 10.
on the ground that they were interest witnesses. It is well-settled that
credibility of a witness has to be tested on· the touchstone of truthfulness and
trustworthiness. No infirmity attaches to the testimony of police officials C
merely because they belong to police force. The rule of prudence may require
more careful scrutiny of their evidence. But, if the Court is convinced that
what was stated by a witness has a ring of truth, conviction can be based on
such evidence. [Para 23 andd 24] (493-E-G)

Aher Raja Khima v. State ofSaurashtra, AIR (1956) SC 217 and Tahir D
v. State (Delhi), [1996) 3 SCC 338, relied on.

2.2. An appeal against acquittal is also an appeal under the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, and an appellate court has every power to
reappreciate, review and reconsider the evidence as a whole before it It is, no
doubt, true there is presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and E
that presumption is reinforced by an order of acquittal recorded by the trial
court, yet it is for the appellate court to keep in view the relevant principles
of law, to reappreciate and reweigh the evidence as a whole and to come to its
own conclusion on such evidence in consonance with the principles of criminal
jurisprudence. (Para 27] (494-E, F]
F
Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793
and Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: JT (2007) 3 SC
316, relied on.

Kunju Muhammedv. State of Kera/a, (2004) 9 sec 193: JT (2003) 7 G
SC 114; Kashi Ram v. State of MP:, (2002) 1 SCC 71: JT (2001) 8 SC 650
and Meena v. State of Maharashtra, [2000) 5 SCC 21: JT (2000) 4 SC 521,
Cited.

3. Once it is found that the acquittal recorded by the trial court was not
in consonance with law and the High Court was right in setting aside it and H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 9 S.C.R.

A in convicting the accused, it is mere ' consequence' that the deceased-accused
may not be held entitled to pensionary and other benefits. (Para 311 (497-BI

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 885 of
2002.

B From the final Judgment and Order dated 17 .04.2002 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal No. 1070 of 1989

Shiv Sagar Tiwari for the Appellant.

C.D.Singh Merusagar Samantaray, Sunny Chowdhary and Ms. Vairagya
C Vardhar for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

C.K. THAKKER, J. 1. The present appeal was filed by appellant Girja
Prasad (since deceased) against the judgment and final order passed by the
D High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur on April 17, 2002 in Criminal Appeal
No. 1070of1989. By the said judgment, the High Court set aside an order
of acquittal recorded by the II Addi. District & Sessions Judge, Jabalpur on
March 15, 1989 in Special Criminal Case No. 40 of 1985 and convicted the
appellant for an offence punishable under ,Section 161 of the Indian Penal
Code fIPC' for short) and Section 5(1Xd) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention
E of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and ordered him
to undergo simple imprisonment for four months and to pay fine of
Rs.200/- for the offence under Section 161, IPC. No separate sentence, however,
was awarded to him for offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

F 2. Shortly stated, the facts are that the appellant (Girja Prasad) was -"'f

working as Lower Division Clerk (LDC) in the Office of Divisional Ayurved
Chikitsa Adhikari, Jabalpur Division, Jabalpur. It was the case oftbe prosecution
that on September 20, 1983, Ramanarain Rajoria, Divisional Ayurved Chikitsa
Adhikari, Jabalpur Division, Jabalpur (PW 4) paid surprise visit to Ayurvedic
Chikitsalaya, Dindori, District Mandia and found that several members of the
G staff were absent including the Ayurvedic Chikitsak himself. Consequently, he
locked the Ayurvedic Chikitsalaya and retum(;!d to Jabalpur. Ramnarain Rajoria
was accompanied by the accused Girja Prasad Gupta. On September 27, 1983,
the complainant Anup Kumar (PW I) came to Jabalpur and infonned to the
Divisional Ayurvedic Chikitsa Adhikari that he was on casual leave from
H September 7, 1983 to September 11, 1983. He also stated that he had submitted
GIRIJAPRASAD(DEAD)BYLRS. •·.STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [C.K. THAKKER,J.] 487

an application for extension of leave upto September 23, 1983 but the same A
was not available in the Office of Divisional Ayurvedic Chikitsa Adhikari,
Jabalpur. On the same day, the Divisional Ayurvedic Chikitsa Adhikari went
to Dindori and opened the lock of the Ayurvedic Chikitsalaya. It is alleged
that PW 4-Ramnarain Rajoria asked the complainant that either he should pay
an amount of Rs.500/- through accused Girja Prasad or should suffer B
suspension. The case of the prosecution was that Anup Kumar paid
Rs.300/- on the same day to accused Girja Prasad at Dindori and assured hitn
to pay the remaining amount of Rs.200/- on October 5, 1983 at Jabalpur.

3. According to the prosecution, PWl-complainant Anup Kumar was
not willing to pay the remaining amount ofRs.200/- to the Divisional Ayurvedic C
Chikitsa Adhikari. He, therefore, lodged a complaint in writing in the office of
Lokayukt at Jabalpur. In the said complaint, it was stated that the complainant
wanted the corrupt officer to be caught red-handed. One· J.M. Wadhwa (PW
8), an Assistant Engineer from P.H.E.D., a Gazetted Officer agreed to act as
trap witness. The complainant and Wadhwa were asked to come on the next
day i.e. on October 5, 1983 for arranging a trap. Accordingly, on October 5, D
1983, the complainant Anup Kumar reached the Office of Lokayukt at 11.00
a.m. He was asked to bring the accused in a hotel so that he may be caught
red-handed accepting the bribe. Two currency notes of Rs. I 00/- denomination
each were kept in the pocket of the complainant duly treated with chemical
powder and he was informed about the special signal after giving bribe to the E
accused, so that the accused can be caught. The complainant got back to the
Lokayukt Office and informed the 'trap-party' that the accused had. promised
to come to Narmada Restaurant at 5.00 p.m. At 5.00 p.m., the complainant
came with the accused in the restaurant and sat near the table of Wadhwa,
panch witness, who was intimated about the currency notes treated with
chemical powder. The accused then asked the complainant as to whether he F
had brought the amount. The complainant replied in the affirmative, took out
two currency notes with his right hand and gave them to the accused. The
complainant immediately gave signal to the 'trap party'. Inspector of Special
Police Establishment, S.K. Tiwari (PW 10) and Wadhwa (PW 8), Gazetted
Officer who was associated with the 'trap party' reached near the accused and G
asked him where the money was. The accused told them that die money was
in the pocket of his shirt. The hands of the accused were washed in the
solution of the sodium carbonate and liquid became 'matmaila'. The pocket
of the shirt of the accused was separately washed in the solution of the
sodium carbonate and the liquid again became 'matmai/a'. A panchnama of
the proceedings was drawn. Another panch was Jawahar Soni (PW 6). Liquid H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 9 S.C.R.

A of the 'hand-wash' and 'pocket-wash' of the accused was separately sealed in
two bottles and was sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory. On analysis, it
was found by the Chemical Examiner that the 'pocket-wash' of the shirt of the
accused was having traces of phenolphthalein powder. Sanction for prosecution
of the accused was granted. by the State Government. Charge sheet was
B submitted before the Special Judge. Investigation was conducted and the
accused was charged for offences punishable under Section 161, IPC and
Sections 5( l )(d) and 5(2) of the Act.

4. The prosecution, in order to prove the case against the accused, inter
alia examined PWl-Anup Kumar- Complainant, PW 4-Ramnarain Rajoria, PW
C 6-Jawahar Soni-Panch II, PW 8-J. M. Wadhwa-Panch I, PW 10-S.K. Tiwari-
Inspector of Special Police Establishment. The case of the appellant-accused
was of total denial. In his defence, he stated that he had been falsely implicated.

5. It may be stated that at the trial, both the Panch witnesses-Jawahar
Soni-PW 6 and Wadhwa-PW 8 did not support the prosecution and were
D treated 'hostile'. The fate of the case, therefore, hanged on two witnesses, PW
1-Anup Kumar-Complainant and PW 10-S.K. Tiwari-lnspector of Special Police
Establishment. The Trial Court negatived the contention of the accused that
sanction was not in accordance with law and the trial was vitiated. The Court,
however, acquitted the accused holding that both the Panchas did not support
the case of the prosecution. According to the prosecution, it was PW 4-
E Ramnarain Rajoria, the Divisional Aylirvedic Chikitsa Adhikari who had asked
the complainant to pay Rs.500/- to the accused that the complainant paid the
said amount to him. The Trial Court, therefore, concluded that the money was
to be paid to PW 4-Ramnarain Rajoria who was not arrayed as accused and
against whom no proceedings had been initiated.
F
6. Regarding evidence of PW 1-Anup Kumar- Complainant and PW 10-
S.K. Tiwari-Inspector of Special Police Establishment, the Court stated that
their evidence could not be relied upon since they were 'interested' witnesses.

7. The Court also observed that the accused was merely a Clerk and he
G was not in a position to oblige the complainant by not placfog him under
suspension. The .power to suspend was only with Ramnarain Rajoria-PW 4,
and the 'main work' was to be done by Ramnarain Rajoria, but it was not clear
under what compelling circumstances, no prosecution was launched against
Ramnarain Rajoria. The Court also observed that presumption under Section
4(1) of the Act was not available to the prosecution as the amount paid by
H the complainant was to be given to PW4-Ramnarain Rajoria. Accordingly, the
GIRIJA PRASAD (DEAD) BY LRS. v. STA TE OF MAD HYA PRADESH [C.K. THAKKER, J.] 489

Trial Court acquitted the accused. A
8. The State preferred an appeal against the acquittal and the High
Court, as observed earlier, set aside the order of acquittal and convicted the
accused for the offences with which he was charged. The said conviction has
been challenged by the accused in this Court.
B
9. On August 2, 2002, notice was issued by this Court. On September
2, 2002, leave was granted and the accused was ordered to be released on
bail. The matter was thereafter placed for final hearing.

10. On August I, 2007, when the matter was placed before us for final
hearing, it was stated that during the pendency of the appeal, Girja Prasad C
(original appellant-accused) died. It was stated that Smt. Munni Bai, widow
of deceased Girja Prasad had filed an application under proviso to sub-section
(2) of Section 394 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred
to as 'the Code') to allow her to continue the appeal by seeking leave of this
Court. The said provision confers right on near relatives of the accused who D
is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment and who dies during the pendency
of the appeal to continue the appeal in certain cases by applying to the Court
~ithin thirty days of the death of the appellant. Such application was filed

1 by Munni Bai. The Registry of this Court, however, raised an objection that
there was delay of 149 days in filing the application. After hearing learned
counsel for the parties, we condoned delay, granted the prayer of applicant- E
Munni Bai and allowed her to continue the. appeal. We, thereafter, heard
learned counsel for the parties.

11. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the High Court
was wholly wrong in allowing the appeal against an order of acquittal and in
convicting the deceased-accused for offences punishable under Section 161, F
IPC and Section 5(1 )(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Act. It was submitted
that the Trial Court was right in acquitting the accused, particularly when no
prosecution was lodged against PW 4-Ramnarain Rajoria who was the main
culprit and for whom the amount of Rs.200/- was alleged to have been
accepted by the accused. It was also submitted that the Trial Court was right G
in observing that no independent witness supported the prosecution and
only 'interested' version was placed before the Court in the form of deposition
of PW 1-Anup Kumar-Complainant and PW 10-S.K. Tiwari, Inspector. Both
independent panchas (PW 8-Wadhwa and PW 6-Jawahar Soni) did not oblige
the prosecution.
H
I '
-t-

490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 9 S.C.R.

A 12. The counsel submitted that from the evidence, it could not be said
that demand and acceptance ofRs.200/- by the accused was proved. But even
if it was held proved, since the accused was not in a position to oblige the
complainant and the demand and acceptance was for and on behalf of PW
4-Ramnarain Rajoria, the Trial Court was right in holding that the accused was
B merely made a 'scapegoat'.

13. It was also urged that even if the High Court felt that the other view
was possible, as per settled law, it ought not to have disturbed the order of
acquittal.

14. Finally, it was submitted that during the pendency of the appeal in
C this Court, the accused had died and hence there is no question of ~ending
the accused to jail. On the other hand, ifthe conviction is set aside, the family
members of the deceased-accused would be able to get retiral benefits of the
deceased.

D 15. The learned counsel for the respondent-State, on the other hand,
supported the order of conviction passed by the High Court. According to
him, the entire approach of the Trial Court was illegal and faulty. Once it is
proved that the accused accepted the amount, it was immaterial whether he
was in a position to oblige the complainant or not or whether the acceptance
of amount was for him or for someone else. The Trial Court was, therefore,
E not right in acquitting the accused on the ground that the accused accepted
the amount for Ramnarain Rajoria-PW 4. Grievance was also made by the
learned advocate that the Trial Court was legally wrong in discarding the
evidence of PW 1-Anup Kumar-Complainant and PW 10-S.K. Tiwari-Inspector,
characterizing them as 'interested' witnesses. It was, therefore, submitted that
F the appeal deserves· to be dismissed.

16. Having anxiously considered the rival contentions of the parties and
having gone through the record of the case meticulously, we are of the view
that the High Court was wholly justified in setting aside acquittal of the
accused and in recording an order of conviction against him. From what is
G stated above, it is clear that the Trial Court also believed the case of the
prosecution that the amount of Rs.200/- was paid by PWI-Anup Kumar-
Complainant to accu~ed Girja Prasad which is clear form the following finding
recorded in para 46 of the judgment;
I
"Thus from the above evidence from Anup Kumar, it becomes
H clear that Anup Kumar entrusted Rs.200/- to the accused so that
i
GIRIJAPRASAD(DEAD)BYLRS. v. STATEOFMADHYAPRADESH[C.K. THAKKER,J.] 491

accused Girja Prasad may give it to Shri Rajoria". A
17. The Court then proceeded to state;

"Clearly the acceptance of Rs.200/- currency notes by accused
Girja Prasad, he was only innocent scarifying goat in the hands of Mr.'
Rajoria..." B
18. The Trial Court also observed:

"It goes without saying that accused Girja Prasad worked as
innocent carrier to Rajoria misusing his post while performing his
official duty or he adopted illegal means for that". C
19. To us, the learned advocate for the respondent-State is right in
submitting that once it is proved that the amount has been received by the
accused, presumption under Section 4 of the Act would get attracted. Section ·
4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (since repealed) provided for
presumption where public servant accepted gratification other than legal D 1

remuneration. Sub-section (I) of the said section was relevant and read as
under;

"Presumption where public servant accepts gratification other
than legal remuneration.-{1) Where in any trial of an offence
punishable under Section 161 or Section 165 of the Indian Penal Code E
(45of1860) or of an offence referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of
sub-section (I) of Section 5 of this Act punishable under sub-section
(2) thereof, it is provided that an accused person has accepted or
obtained, or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain, for himself
or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) F
or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed unless
the contrary is proved that he accepted or obtained, or agreed to
accept or attempted to obtain, that gratification or that valuable thing,
as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in
the said Section 161, or, as the case may be, without consideration or
for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate." G
20. The Trial Court observed that the presumption is not 'absolute', but
is rebuttable and the accused can prove otherwise for getting rid of such
presumption. This is true .. But, in our view, the Trial Court lost sight of the
fact that the case of the accused was of'total denial' and of'false involvement'.
The presumption, in the circumstances, could not be said to have been H
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 9 S.C.R

A rebutted by the accused.

21. In out opinion, once the finding was recorded by the Trial Court that
the accused had accepted the amount, it was wholly immaterial whether the
said acceptance of amount was for him or for Someone else. Even if an
accused accepts the amount for 'someone else', he commits an offence. In this
B connection, we may refer to both the provisions i.e. Section 161, IPC (before
it was repealed by Section 31 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988) and
Section 5(l)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (before the said Act
was repealed by the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988).

l 6 l. Public servant taking gratification other than legal remunerat~on
c in respect of an official act-Whoever, being or expecting to be a
public servant, accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept, or attempts to
obtain fron:i any person, for himself or for any other person, any
gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or
reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing
or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour
or disfavour to any person, or for rendering or attempting to render
any service or disservice to any person, with the Central or any State
Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State, or with any
local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in
section 21, or with any public servant, as such, shall be punished with
E imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
three years, or with fine, or with both.

(emphasis supplied)

F
5 (l).Criminal misconduct.-{!) A public servant is said to commit the
offence of criminal misconduct---

(a) to (c) ....
(d) if he, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his
G position as public servant, obtains for himself or for any other
person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage.
(emphasis supplied)

22. It was, therefore, of no consequence whether the accused had
H accepted the amount for and on behalf of Ramnarain Rajoria-PW 4. Once it
GIRIJAPRASAD(DEAD)BYLRS. v. STATEOFMADHYAPRADESH[C.K. THAKKER,J.) 493

is proved that he accepted the amount of Rs.200/-, he cannot escape from A
criminal liability on a specious ground that he was made 'scapegoat' or was
merely 'innocent carrier'. It was also immaterial whether the accused was or
was not in a position to oblige the complainant by preventing or delaying his
suspension. The case of the prosecution was that the complainant was asked
to pay an amount of Rs.500/- by the accused and the said amount had been
accepted by him in two installments, Rs.300/- at Dindori and Rs.200/- at B
Jabalpur where trap was successful.

23. We are equally unable to uphold the contention of the learned
counsel for the appellant that the trial Court was right in not relying upon PW
1-Anup Kumar-Complainant and PW 10-S.K. Tiwari-Inspector of Special Police C
Establishment. The trial Court, it may be stated, discarded the evidence of
these two witnesses by laying down the following proposition of law;

"It goes without saying that Anup Kumar and Shri S.K. Tiwari
were concerned only with the success of the trap and thus both these
persons are interested witnesses. PW I 0, Shri Tiwari is Inspector in D
Lokayukt Office therefore he is highly interested witness".

24. In our judgment, the above proposition does not lay down correct
Jaw on the point. It is well-settled that credibility of witness has to be tested
on the touchstone of truthfulness and trustworthiness. It is quite possible
that in a given case, a Court of Law may not base conviction solely on the E
evidence of Complainant or a Police Official but it is not the law that police
witnesses should not be relied upon and their evidence cannot be accepted
unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other independent evidence.
The presumption that every person acts honestly applies as much in favour
of a Police Official as any other person. No infirmi~ attaches to the testimony F
of Police Officials merely because they belong to Police Force. There is no
rule of law which lays down that no conviction can be recorded on the
testimony of Police Officials even if such evidence is otherwise reliable and
trustworthy. The rule of prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their
evidence. But, if the Court is convinced that what was stated by a witness
- h~s a ring of truth, conviction can be based on such evidence. G
25. It is not necessary to refer to various decisions on the point. We
may, however, state that before more than half-a-century, in the leading case
of Aher Raja Khima v. State ofSaurashtra, AIR (1956) SC 217, Venkatarama
Ayyar, J. stated:
H
-t- -
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 9 S.C.R

A "The presumption that a person acts honestly applies as much
infavour of a police officer as of other persons, and it is not judicial
approach to distrust and suspect him without good grounds therefor.
Such an attitude could do neither credit to the magistracy nor good
to the public. It can only run down the prestige of the police
administration".
B
(emphasis supplied)

26. In Tahir v. State (Delhi), [ 1996] 3 SCC 338, dealing with a similar
question, Dr. A.S. Anand, J. (as His Lordship then was) stated: '-

C "Where the evidence of the police officials, after careful scrutiny,
inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can
fonn basis of conviction and the absence of some independent witness
of the locality to lend corroboration to their evidence, does not in any
way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case".

D 27. Regarding setting aside acquittal by the High Court, the learned
counsel for the appellant relied upon Kunju Muhammed v. State of Kera/a,
(2004] 9 SCC 193 : JT (2003) 7 SC 114, Kashi Ram v. State of MP., (2002] I
SCC 71 : JT (200 I) 8 SC 650 and Meena v. State of Maharashtra, [2000] 5 SCC
21 : JT 2000 (4) SC 521. In our opinion, the law is well settled. An appeal
E against acquittal is also an appeal under the Code and an Appellate Court has
every power to reappreciate, review and reconsider the evidence as a whole
before it. It is, no doubt, true that there is presumption of innocence in favour
of the accused and that .presumption is reinforced by an order of acquittal
recorded by the Trial Court. But that is not the end of the matter. It is for the
Appellate Court to keep in view the relevant principles of law, to reappreciat~
F and reweigh the evidence as a whole and to come to its own conclusion on
such evidence in consonance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence.

28. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, {1973] 2 SCC
793, dealing with a similar situation, a three Judge Bench speaking through
V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. stated:
G
"Even at this stage we may remind ourselves ofa necessary social
perspective in criminal cases which suffers from insufficient forensic
appreciation. The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of
benefit of doubt at the expense of social defence and to the soothing
sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to
H
GIRIJA PRASAD (DEAD) BY LRS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [C.K. THAKKER, J.) 495

- the victim and the community, demand especial emphasis in the A
contemporary context of escalating crime and escape. The judicial
instrument has a public accountability. The cherished principles or
golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs thro' the
web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every
hunch, hesitancy and degree. of doubt. The excessive solicitude B
reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one
innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable
doubts belong to the accused Otherwise any practical system of
justice will then break down and lose credibility with the community.
The evil of acquitting a guilty person light-heartedly as a learned
author has sapiently observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that C
just one guilty person has gone unpunished. If unmerited acquittals
become general, they tend to lead to a cynical disregard of the law,
and this in tum leads to a public demand for harsher legal presumptions
against indicated 'persons' and more severe punishment of those who
are found- guilty. Thus too frequent acquittals of the guilty may lead
to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial protection of D
the guiltless. For all these reasons it is true to say, with Viscount
Simon, that "a miscarriage ofjustice may arise from the acquittal of
the guilty no less than from the conviction of the innocent.... " In
short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm far presumed innocence must be
moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and E
realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing enhance
possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping
the logic of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents."

(emphasis supplied)
F
29. Recently, in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, [2007] 4 SCC 415
: JT (2007) 3 SC 316, after considering the relevant provisions of the old Code
(Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898) and the present Code (Code of Criminal
Procedure, I 973) and referring to decisions of the Privy Council and of this
Court, one ofus (C.K. Thakker, J.) laid down certain general principles regarding
powers of Appellate Court in dealing with appeal against an order of acquittal. G
In para 42 it was observed:

"42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following
general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing
with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge;
H
496 SUPREME COURTREPORTS [2007] 9 S.C.R.

A (I) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and
reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded;

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate
Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both
B on questions of fact and of law;

(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling
reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', ;very strong circumstances',
'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to
curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against
C acquittal. Such phraseologies.are more.in the nature of 'flourishes of
language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere
with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the
evidence and to .come .to its own.conclusion.

(4) An appellate Court, however, .must bear in mind that in case
D of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.
Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the
fundamental principle ofcriminai jurisprudence .that every_person shall
be presumed to be innocent.unless he is·proved guilty by a competent
court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and
E
strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are-possible on.the·basis of the
evidence on record, the appellate court should·notdisturb the finding
of acquittal recorded by the trial court".
F 30. In the case on hand, .as observed earlier, both the Courts below
recorded a positive finding that .the accused .accepted .an amount of
Rs.200/-. In our opinion, therefore, :Section 4 of the .Act got attracted and
presumption came into play .against the .accused. There was no rebuttal by
the accused by leading any_ evidence whatsoever. The .defence was of total
G denial and of false implication. Hence, the. doctrine of 'preponderance of
probability' also had no application. The Trial Court was,.the~efore, wrong in
not invoking Section 4 and raising presumption. The Trial. Court was also
wrong in discarding the evidence of PW 1-Anup Kumar-Complainant and PW
I 0-S.K. Tiwari-Inspector observing that they were 'interested' witnesses and
their testimony could not be·relied upon. If it is so, in our judgment, the High
H
GIRIJA PRASAD (DEAD) BY LRS. v. STATEOF MADHYA PRADESH [C.K. THAKKER, J.] 497

Court was justified in setting aside the order of acquittal and in convicting A
the accused for the offences with which he was charged.

31. We appredate the anxiety of the learned counsel for the appellant
that if the conviction of the deceased is upheld by this Court, the deceased
may not be held entitled to pensionary and other benefits. We are, howevet,
helpless. Once we are satisfied that the acquittal recorded by the Trial Court B
was not in consonance with law and the High Court was right in setting aside
it and in convicting the accused, it is a mere 'consequence' which cannot be
helped. The argument of 'sympathy', therefore, does not impress us and
cannot carry the case of the appellant-applicant herein further.

32. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal deserves to be dismissed and C
is accordingly dismissed.

RP. Appeal dismissed.