Supreme Court of India
GIAN SINGHversusSTATE OF PUNJAB & ANOTHER
- Citation
- 2012 INSC 419
- Decided
- 24 September 2012
- Disposal
- Reference answered
- Bench
- RAJENDRA MAL LODHA
Holding
Section 482 confers an overriding inherent power on the High Court to quash criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice, distinct from the statutory compounding power under Section 320, and may be exercised even for non‑compoundable offences where the facts justify it.
Summary
The petitioner, convicted under Sections 420 and 120‑B IPC, sought quashing of the FIR under Section 482 of the CrPC on the ground that the dispute with the victim had been settled, although the offences were non‑compoundable under Section 320. The larger Bench examined the scope of the High Court's inherent power under Section 482, distinguishing it from the statutory power of compounding under Section 320. It held that Section 482 is an overriding provision that may be exercised to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice, but must be used sparingly and with regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous offences such as murder, rape, dacoity, or offences under special statutes cannot be quashed merely because of a settlement, whereas offences of a predominantly civil flavour may be quashed if continuation would be futile and unjust. The Bench affirmed that earlier decisions in B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant and Manoj Sharma correctly applied this principle and declined to overrule them. Consequently, the reference was answered and the matter was listed before the appropriate benches for further orders.
Issues considered
- The extent of the High Court's inherent power under Section 482 CrPC to quash criminal proceedings where the offender and victim have settled, despite the offence being non‑compoundable under Section 320.
- Whether the power of compounding under Section 320 is interchangeable with the power to quash under Section 482.
- The applicability of Section 482 to heinous offences and offences under special statutes.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 320, s. 362, s. 397, s. 401, s. 482
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 1208, s. 120B, s. 147, s. 148, s. 279, s. 302, s. 307, s. 326, s. 354, s. 394, s. 420, s. 465, s. 467, s. 468, s. 471, s. 498A, s. 506
Subjects
inherent jurisdictionSection 482 CrPCSection 320 CrPCcompounding of offencesquashing of FIRnon‑compoundable offencessettlement between partiesends of justiceabuse of process
Judgment
[2012] 8 S.C.R. 753
GIAN SINGH A
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANOTHER
(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 8989 of 2010 etc.)
SEPTEMBER 24, 2012
B
[R.M. LODHA, ANIL R. DAVE AND
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
c
ss. 482 and 320 - Quashing of criminal proceedings in
a case where offender has settled his dispute with the victim
of crime, but the said crime is not compoundable - Ambit and
scope of ss. 482 and 302 - Explained - Held: Power of
compounding of offences given to a court u/s 320 is materially 0
different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the
High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction - In
compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is
circumscribed by the provisions contained in s. 320 and the
court is guided solely and squarely thereby; whreas the E
formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal
offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is
guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of
justice would justify such exercise of power although the
ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of
indictment - The words "nothing in this Code" occurring in F
s.482 means that it is an overriding provision and none of the
provisions orthe Code limits or restricts the inherent power -
Decisions in the cases of B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj
Sharma and Shiji alias Pappu do illustrate the principle that
the High Court may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or G
complaint in exercise of its inherent power uls 482 of the
Code, and s. 320 does not limit or affect the powers of the
High Court u/s 482 - It cannot be said that by quashing
criminal proceedings in the said cases, the Court has
753
H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A compounded the non-compoundable offences indirectly -
Principles emerging from various decisions culled out.
s. 482 - Inherent power of High Court - Quashing of
criminal proceedings - Held: Before exercise of the power,
8 High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity
of the crime - Heinous and serious offences of mental
depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot
be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family
and the offender have settled the dispute - Similarly, any
compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the
C offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption
Act or the offences committed by public servants while working
in that capacity etc. cannot provide any basis for quashing
criminal proceedings involving such offences - But, as has
been explained in the instant judgment, the criminal cases
D having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour
stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing.
Maxim:
E Quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine
qua res ipsa esse non potest - Explained.
The petitioner was convicted ulss 420 and 120-B IPC.
During the pendency of the appeal before the Sessions
Judge, the petitioner filed a petition uls 482 CrPC before
· F the High Court seeking to quash the FIR on the ground
of compounding the offence. The petition was dismissed.
When the instant petition was listed before a two-
Judge Bench, it felt that the decisions in B. S. Joshi', Nikhil
G Merchant2 and Manoj Sharma 3 required reconsideration
and, therefore, referred the matter to a larger Bench4 •
1. 2003 (2) SCR 1104.
2. 2008 (12) SCR 236.
3. 2008 (14) SCR 539
H 4. 201 O SCR 1034.
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 755
The issue for consideration before the Court was with A
regard to inherent powers of the High Court in quashing
the criminal proceedings against an offender who had
settled his dispute with the victim of the crime but the
crime in which he was involved was not compoundable
u/s 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. B
Answering the reference, the Court
HELD: 1.1. Quashing of offence or criminal
proceedings on the ground of settlement between an
offender and victim is not the same thing as C
compounding of offence. They are different and not
interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of
compounding of offences given to a court u/s 320 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is materially different
from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High o
Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In
compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is
circumscribed by the provisions contained in s. 320 and
the court is guided solely and squarely thereby. The
consequence of the composition of an offence is acquittal E
of the accused. Sub-s. (9) of s. 320 mandates that no
offence shall be compounded except as provided by this
Section. Obviously, in view thereof the composition of an
offence has to be in accord with s. 320 and in no other
manner. On the other hand, the formation of opinion by
F
the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal
proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the
material on record as to whether the ends of justice
would justify such exercise of power although the
ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of G
indictment. Where High Court quashes a criminal
proceeding having regard to the fact that dispute
between the offender and victim has been settled
although offences are not compoundable, it does so as
in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will
be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 8 S.C.R.
A that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and
peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the
ultimate guiding factor. [para 47 and 53-54] [806-E-F; 808-
C-H]
1.2. Section 482 of the Code, as its very language
8
suggests, saves the inherent power of the High Court
which it has by virtue of it being a superior court to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice. It begins with the words,
'nothing in this Code' which means that it is an overriding
C provision. These words leave no manner of doubt that
none of the provisions of the Code limits or restricts the
inherent power. The guideline for exercise of such power
is provided in s. 482 itself i.e., to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
D justice. As has been repeatedly stated, s. 482 confers no
new powers on High Court; it merely safeguards existing
inherent powers possessed by High Court necessary to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure
the ends of justice. It is equally well settled that the power
E is not to be resorted to if there is specific provision in the
Code for the redress of the grievance of an aggrieved
party. It should be exercised very sparingly and it should
not be exercised as against the express bar of law
engrafted in any other provision of the Code. In different
F situations, the inherent power may be exercised in
different ways to achieve its ultimate objective. Formation
of opinion by the High Court before it exercises inherent
power u/s 482 on either of the twin objectives, (i) to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or (ii) to secure
G the ends of justice, is a sine qua non. [para 49-50] [806-
G-H; 807-A-E]
1.3. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the
judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in
course of administration of justice or to prevent
H continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 757
founded on the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui A
concedit, conceditur et id sine qua res ipsa esse non potest,
the full import of which is whenever anything is
authorised, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required
to be done by law, it is found impossible to do that thing
unless something else not authorised in express terms B
be also done, may also be done, then that something
else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Ex debito
justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to
do real, complete and substantial justice for which it
exists. The power possessed by the High Court u/s 482 c
of the Code is of wide amplitude but requires exercise
with great caution and circumspection. [para 51] [807-E-
H; 808-A]
1.4. B. S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji
alias Pappu do illustrate the principle that High Court may D
quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent power u/s 482 of the Code and s.
320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court
u/s 482. It cannot be said that by quashing criminal
proceedings in the said cases, this Court has E
compounded the non-compoundable offences indirectly.
There is no incongruity in this principle of law and the
decisions of this Court in Simrikhia, Dharampal, Arun
Shankar Shukla, lshwar Singh, Rumi Dhar (Smt.) and Ashok
Sadarangani.Therefore, it cannot be said that 8.S. Joshi, F
Nikhil Merchant and Manoj Sharma were not correctly
decided. [para 55,56 and 58] [809-F-H; 810-A-B-C; 812-F-
G]
B.S. Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and another G
2003 (2) SCR 1104 = (2003) 4 SCC 675, Nikhil Merchant v.
Central Bureau of Investigation and another 2008 (12)
SCR 236 = (2008) 9 SCC 677; Manoj Sharma v. State and
others 2008 (14) SCR 539 = (2008) 16 sec 1; and Shiji
alias Pappu and others vs. Radhika and another 2011 (13) H
scR 135 =(2011) 10 sec 705 - upheld.
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee
and another 1990 (1) SCR 788 = (1990) 2 sec 437;
Dharampal & Ors. v. Ramshri (Smt.) and others 1993 Crl. L.J.
1049; Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh and ors.
=
1999 (3) SCR 1060 AIR 1999 SC 2554; /shwar Singh v.
=
B State of Madhya Pradesh 2008 (14) SCR 574 (2008) 15
SCC 667; Rumi Dhar (Smt.) v. State of West Bengal and
another -2009 (5) SCR 553 = (2009) 6 SCC 364; Ashok
Sadarangani and Anr. vs. Union of India and others JT 2012
(3) SC 469; CBI v. Duncans Agro Industries Limited 1996 (3)
=
c Suppl. SCR 360 (1996) 5 SCC 591, State of Haryana v.
=
Bhajan Lal 1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 259 (1992) 4 SCC 305,
=
State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma 1991 (2) SCR 1 1992 Supp
(1) SCC 335, Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary 1992 (1) Suppl.
=
SCR 226 (1992) 4 SCC 305; Rajiv Saxena and others v.
0 State (NCT of Delhi) and another (2012) 5 sec 627;
Jayrajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana v. State of Gujarat and another
JT 2012 (6) SC 504; Y. Suresh Babu v. State of A. P. (2005)
1 SCC 347; Ram Lal and Anr. v. State of J & K 1999 (1)
=
. SCR 230 (1999) 2 SCC 213 ; Ku/winder Singh and others
v. State of Punjab and another (2007) 4 CTC 769; Abasaheb
.E Yadav Honmane v. State of Maharashtra 2008 (2)
Mh.L.J.856- referred to.
1.5. The position that emerges from the decisions of
this Court can be summarised thus: the power of the
F High Court in quashing a.criminal proceeding or FIR or·
complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct
and different from the power given to a criminal court for . ·
compounding the offences u/s 320 of the Code. Inherent ..
power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but .·
G it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline·_
engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of.
justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any:.
Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal
proceeding or complaint or F.l.R may be exercised where
H the offender and victim have settled their dispute would ,
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 759
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and A
no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise
of such power, the High Court must have due regard to
the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the B
victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the
dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have
serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise
between the victim and offender in relation to the
offences under special statutes like Prevention of c
Corruption Act or the offences committed by public
servants while working in that capacity etc. cannot
provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings
involving such offences. But the criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand
0
on different footing for the purposes of quashing,
particularly, the offences arising from commercial,
financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like
transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony
relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the E
wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the
parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category
of cases, High Court may, within the frame work of its
inherent power, quash criminal proceedings if in its view,
because of the compromise between the offender and
victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak F
and continuation of criminal case would put accused to
great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice
would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal
case despite full and complete settlement and
compromise with the victim. The High Court must G
consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the
interest of justice to continue with the criminal
proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding
would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite
settlement and compromise between the victim and H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it
is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if
the answer to the questions is in affirmative, the High
Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the
criminal proceeding. [para 57] [811-D-H; 812-A-F]
B
Central Bureau of Investigation and others v. Keshub
=
Mahindra and others 2011 (6) SCR 384 (2011) 6 SCC 216
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rameshwar and others 2009 (5)
=
SCR 510 (2009) 11 SCC 424; Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir
C Ahmed (1945) 47 Born. L.R. 245; Khushi Ram v. Hashim
and others AIR 1959 SC 542; State of Uttar Pradesh. v.
=
Mohammad Nairn 1964 SCR 363 AIR 1964 SC 703;
Pampathy v. State of Mysore 1966 (Suppl) SCR 477; State
of Kamataka v. L. Muniswamy and others 1977 (3) SCR
=
113 (1977) 2 SCC 699; Madhu Limaye v. The State of
D Maharashtra 1978 (1) SCR 749 = (1977) 4 SCC 551; Raj
Kapoor and others v. State and others 1980 (1) SCR 1081 =
(1980) 1 SCC 43; G. Sagar Suri and another v. State of U.P.
and others 2000 (1) SCR 417 = (2000) 2 SCC 636; State of
Kamataka v. M. Devendrappa and another 2002 (1)
=
E SCR 275 (2002) 3 SCC 89; Central Bureau of Investigation
v. A. Ravishankar Prasad and others (2009) 6 SCC 351;
Devendra and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another
2009 (7) SCR 872 = (2009) 7 sec 495 Sushi/ Suri v. Central
=
Bureau of Investigation and another 2011 (8) SCR 1 (2011)
F 5 SCC 708; Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab 2008
(5) SCR 526 =
(2008) 4 SCC 582; Jetha Ram v. State of
Rajasthan (2006) 9 sec 255; Murugesan v. Ganapathy
Velar (2001) 10 SCC 504; lshwarlal v. State of M.P. (2008)
15 SCC 671 and Mahesh Chand & another v. State of
G Rajasthan 1990 (supp) SCC 681 - referred to
Lala Jairam Das & Ors. v. Emperor AIR 1945 PC 94-
referred to
H
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 761
Case Law Reference: A
2003 (2) SCR 1104 upheld para 1
2008 (12) SCR 236 upheld para 1
2008 (14) SCR 539 upheld para 1 B
2011 (6) SCR 384 referred to para 16
2009 (5) SCR 510 referred to para 16
(1945) 47 Born. LR. 245 referred to para 18
c
AIR 1959 SC 542 referred to para 19
AIR 1945 PC 94 referred to para 20
1964 SCR 363 referred to para 20
referred to para 21 D
1966 (Suppl) SCR 477
1977 (3) SCR 113 referred to para 22
1978 (1) SCR 749 referred to para 24
1980 (1) SCR 1081 referred to para 25 E
1990 (1) SCR 788 referred to para 26
1993 Crl. L.J. 1049 referred to para 27
1999 (3) SCR 1060 referred to para 28
F
2000 (1) SCR 417 referred to para 29
2002 (1) SCR 275 referred to para 30
2009 (6) sec 351 referred to para 31
G
2009 (7) SCR 872 referred to para 32
2011 (8) SCR 1 referred to para 33
2008 (5) SCR 526 referred to para 35
2008 (14) SCR 574 referred to para 36 H
•
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 8 S.C.R.
A 2006 (9) sec 255 referred to para 37
2001 (10) sec 504 referred to para 37
(2006) 9 sec 255 referred to para 37
2001 (10) sec 504 referred to para 37
B
(2008) 15 sec 671 referred to para 37
1990 (supp) sec 681 referred to para 38
2009 (5) SCR 553 referred to para 38
c
1996 (3) Suppl. SCR 360 referred to para 38
1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 259 referred to para 38
1991 (2) SCR 1 referred to para 38
D 1992 (1) Suppl. SCR 226 referred to para 38
2011 (13) SCR 135 upheld para 39
2012 (3) JT 469 referred to para 40
E 2012 (5) sec 627 referred to para 41
JT 2012 (6) SC 504 referred to para 42
(2005) 1 sec 347 referred to para 43
1999 (1) SCR 230 referred to para 43
F
(2007) 4 CTC 769 referred to para 45
2008 (2) Mh.L.J.856 referred to para 46
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave
G Petition (Crl) No. 8989 of 2010.
From the Judgment & Order dated 17.9.2010 of the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM No. M-
27367 of 2010.
H
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB 763
WITH A
SLP (Crl) Nos. 6138 of 2006, 5203 and 259 of 2011, 5921,
7148 and 6324 of 2009 and Criminal Appeal No. 2107-2125
of 2011.
P.P. Malhotra, ASG, P.P. Rao, Dr. Abhishek Manu B
Singhvi, V. Giri, Rajiv Kataria, (for Delhi Law Chambers), P:
Parmeswaran, Rajiv Nanda, T.A. Khan, Ranjana Narayan,
Priyanka Mathur, Arvind Kumar Sharma, B.K. Satija, Sameer
Sodhi, Amit Bhandari, Ashok Jain, Pankaj Jain, Bijoy Kumar
Jain, Pragati Neekhra, Suryanarayana Singh, Yashoda Sharma, c
Sushil Karanjkar, Nikhilesh Kumar, Mohammed Sadique T.A.,
K.N. Rai, A.V. Rangam, Buddy Ranganadhan, Richa
Bharadwaj, V. Prabhakar, R. Chandrachud, Jyoti Prashar, Yasir
Rauf, Vishwaaman Kandwal, Dr. Kailash Chand, Sunil Kumar
Verma, Asha Gopalan Nair, Praveen Swarup, Nikhil Jain, Atishi D
Dipankar, Manu Beri, Ashish Agarwal, Yash Pal Dhingra,
Deepak Dhingra, Partha Sil, Rajesh Tyagi, Anil Kumar Bakshi,
Pawan Kumar, Sheel Kumar, Ravi Bassi for the Appearing
Parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by E
R.M. LODHA, J. 1. When the special leave petition in
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and a_nother came up for hearing,
a two-Judge Bench (Markandey Katju and Gyan Sudha Misra,
JJ.) doubted the correctness of the decisions of this Court in F
B. S. Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and another', Nikhil
Merchant v. Central Bureau of Investigation and anotheF and
Manoj Sharma v. State and others3 and referred the matter to
a larger Bench. The reference order reads as follows :
"Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. G
The petitioner ha'S been convicted under Section 420
- -----
1. (2003) 4 sec 675.
2. (2008) g sec 677.
3. (2008) 16 sec 1. H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A and Section 1208, IPC by the learned Magistrate. He filed
an appeal challenging his conviction before the learned
Sessions Judge. While his appeal was pending, he filed
an application before the learned Sessions Judge for
compounding the offence, which, according to the learned
B counsel, was directed to be taken up along with the main
appeal. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition under
Section 482, Cr.P.C. for quashing of the FIR on the ground
of compounding the offence. That petition under Section
482 Cr.P.C. has been dismissed by the High Court by its
c impugned order. Hence, this petition has been filed in this
Court.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on three
decisions of this Court, all by two Judge Benches. They
are 8. S. Joshi VS. State of Haryana (2003) 4 sec 675;
D Nikhil Merchant vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and
Another (2008) 9 SCC 677; and Mano~ Sharma vs. State
and Others (2008) 16 SCC 1. In these decisions, this
Court has indirectly permitted compounding of non-
compoundable offences. One of us, Hon'ble Mr. Justice
E Markandey Katju, was a member to the last two decisions.
Section 320, Cr.P.C. mentions certain offences as
compoundable, certain other offences as compoundable
with the permission of the Court, and the other offences
as non-compoundable vide Section 320(7).
F
Section 420, IPC, one of the counts on which the
petitioner has been convicted, no doubt, is a
compoundable offence with permission of the Court in
view of Section 320, Cr.P.C. but Section 1208 IPC, the
G other count on which the petitioner has been convicted. is
a non-compoundable offence. Section 1208 (Criminal
conspiracy) is a separate offence and since it is a non-
com poundable offence, we cannot permit it to be
compounded.
H
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 765
The Court cannot amend the statute and must A
maintain judicial restraint in this connection. The Courts
should not try to take over the function of the Parliament
or executive. It is the legislature alone which can amend
Section 320 Cr.P.C.
B
We are of the opinion that the above three decisions
require to be re-considered as, in our opinion, something
which cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
In our, prima facie, opinion, non-compoundable offences
cannot be permitted to be compounded by the Court, C
whether directly or indirectly. Hence, the above three
decisions do not appear to us to be correctly decided.
It is true that in the last two decisions, one of us,
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Markandey Katju, was a member but
a Judge should always be open to correct his mistakes. D
We feel that these decisions require re-consideration and
hence we direct that this matter be placed before a larger
Bench to reconsider the correctness of the aforesaid three
decisions.
E
Let the papers of this case be placed before
Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger
Bench."
2. This is how these matters have come up for
consideration before us. F
3. Two provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (for short, 'Code') which are vital for consideration of the
issue referred to the larger Bench are Sections 320 and 482.
Section 320 of the Code provides for compounding of certain G
offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for
short, 'IPC'). It reads as follows :
H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A "S. 320. Compounding of offences.-(1) The offences
punishable under the sections of the Indian Penal Code,
(45 of 1860) specified in the first two columns of the Table
next following may be compounded by the persons
mentioned in the third column of that Table :
B
TABLE
Offence Section of Person by whom offence
the Indian may be compounded
Penal Code
c applicable
1 2 3
(2) The offences punishable under the sections of the
D Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) specified in the first two
columns of the table next following may, with the
permission of the Court before which any prosecution for
such offence is pending, be compounded by the persons
mentioned in the third column of that Table:-
E
TABLE
Offence Section of Person by whom
the Indian offence may be
Penal Code compounded
F applicable
1 2 3
(3) When an offence is compoundable under this section,
G the abatement of such offence or an attempt to commit
such offence (when such attempt is itself an offence) or
where the accused is liable under section 34 or 149 of the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) may be compounded in
like manner.
H
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 767
(4) (a) When the person who would otherwise be A
competent to compound an offence under this
section is under the age of eighteen years or is an
idiot or a lunatic, any person competent to contract
on his behalf, may, with the permission of the Court,
compound such offence. B
(b) When the person who would otherwise be
competent to compound an offence under this
section is dead, the legal representative, as
defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 of C
such person may, with the· consent of the Court,
compound such offence.
(5) When the accused has been committed for trial or when
he has been convicted and an appeal is pending, no
composition for the offence shall be allowed without the D
leave of the Court to which he is committed, or, as the case
may be, before which the appeal is to be heard.
(6) A High Court or Court of Session acting in the exercise
of its powers of revision under section 401 may allow any E
person to compound any offence which such person is
competent to compound under this section.
(7) No offence shall be compounded if the accused is, by
reason of a previous conviction, liable either to enhanced
punishment or to a punishment of a different kind for such F
offence.
(8) The composition of an offence under this section shall
have the effect of an acquittal of the accused with whom
the offence has been compounded. G
(9) No offence shall be compounded except as provided
by this section." •
4. Section 482 saves the inherent power of the High Court
and it reads as follows : H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A "S. 482. Saving of inherent power of High Court. -Nothing
in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent
powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be
necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or
to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise
B to secure the ends of justice."
5. In B. S. Joshi\ the undisputed facts were these : the
husband was one of the appellants while the wife was
respondent no. 2 in the appeal before this Court. They were
married on 21.7.1999 and were living separately since
C 15.7.2000. An FIR was registered under Sections 498-A/323
and 406, IPC at the instance of the wife on 2.1.2002. When the
criminal case registered at the instance of the wife was
pending, the dispute between the husband and wife and their
family members was settled. It appears that the wife filed an
D affidavit that her disputes with the husband and the other
members of his family had been finally settled and she and her
husband had agreed for mutual divorce. Based on the said
affidavit, the matter was taken to the High Court by both the
parties and they jointly prayed for quashing the criminal
E proceedings launched against the husband and his family
members on the basis of the FIR registered at the wife's
instance under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC. The High Court
dismissed the petition for quashing the FIR as in its view the
offences under Sections 498-A and 406, IPC were non-
F compoundable and the inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code could not be invoked to by-pass Section 320 of the
Code. It is from this order that the matter reached this Court.
This Court held that the High Court in exercise of its inherent
powers could quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint
G and Section 320 of the Code did not limit or affect the powers
under Section 482 of the Code. The Court in paragraphs 14
and 15 (Pg. 682) of the Report held as under:
"14. There is no doubt that the object of introducing
Chapter XX-A containing Section 498-A in the Indian
H
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J] 769
Penal Code was to prevent torture to a woman by her A
husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498-A was
added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives
who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives
to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hypertechnical
view would be counterproductive and would act against B
interests of women and against the object for which this
provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-
exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to
meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling
earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XX-A of the Indian c
Penal Code.
15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High
Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal
proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the
Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 D
of the Code."
6. In Nikhil Merchant 2 , a company, Mis. Neemuch
Emballage Ltd., Mumbai was granted financial assistance by
Andhra Bank under various facilities. On account of default in E
repayment of loans, the bank filed a suit for recovery of the
amount payable by the borrower company. The bank also filed
a complaint against the company, its Managing Director and
the officials of Andhra Bank for diverse offences, namely,
Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of the F
IPC read with Sections 5(2) and 5(1 )(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947 and Section 13(2) read with Section
13(1 )(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The suit for
recovery filed by the bank against the company and the
Managing Director of the Company was compromised. The suit G
was compromised upon the defendants agreeing to pay the
amounts due as per the schedule mentioned in the consent
terms. Clause 11 of the consent terms read, "agreed that save
as aforesaid neither party has any claim against the other and
parties do hereby withdraw all the allegations and counter- H
allegations made against each other". Based on clause 11 of
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A the consent terms, the Managing Director of the Company, the
appellant who was accused no. 3 in charge sheet filed by CBI,
made application for discharge from the criminal complaint. The
said application was rejected by the Special Judge (CBI),
Greater Bombay, which came to be challenged before the
B Bombay High Court. The contention before the High Court was
that since the subject matter of the dispute had been settled
between the appellant and the bank, it would be unreasonable
to continue with the criminal proceedings. The High Court
rejected the application for discharge from the criminal cases.
c It is from this order that the matter reached this Court by way
of special leave. The Court having regard to the facts of the
case and the earlier decision of this Court in 8. S. Joshi', set
aside the order of the High Court and quashed the criminal
proceedings by consideration of the matter thus:
D "28. The basic intention of the accused in this case
appears to have been to misrepresent the financial status
of the Company, M/s Neemuch Emballage Ltd., Mumbai,
in order to avail of the credit facilities to an extent to which
the Company was not entitled. In other words, the main
E intention of the Company and its officers was to cheat the
Bank and induce it to part with additional amounts of credit
to which the Company was not otherwise entitled.
29. Despite the ingredients and the factual content of an
F offence of cheating punishable under Section 420 IPC, the
same has been made compoundable under sub-section
(2) of Section 320 CrPC with the leave of the court. Of
course, forgery has not been included as one of the
compoundable offences, but it is in such cases that the
prineiple enunciated in B.S. Joshi case becomes relevant.
G
30. In the instant case, the disputes between the Company
and the Bank have been set at rest on the basis of the
compromise arrived at by them whereunder the dues of
the Bank have been cleared and the Bank does not appear
H to have any further claim against the Company. What,
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [RM. LODHA, J.] 771
however, remains is the fact that certain documents were A
alleged to have been created by the appellant herein in
order to avail of credit facilities beyond the limit to which
the Company was entitled. The dispute involved herein has
overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facets. The
question which is required to be answered in this case is B
whether the power which independently lies with this Court
to quash the criminal proceedings pursuant to the
compromise arrived at, should at all be exercised?
31. On an overall view of the facts as indicated
hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this Court
c
in B. S. Joshi case and the compromise arrived at between
the Company and the Bank as also Clause 11 of the
consent terms filed in the suit filed by the Bank, we are
satisfied that this is a fit case where technicality should not
be allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of the D
criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the continuance
of the same after the compromise arrived at between the
parties would be a futile exercise."
7. In Mano} Sharma 3 , the Court was concerned with the E
question whether an F.l.R. under Sections 420/468/471/34/120-
B IPC can be quashed either under Section 482 of the Code
or under Article 226 of the Constitution when the accused and
the complainant have compromised and settled the matter
between themselves. Altamas Kabir, J., who delivered the lead F
judgment referred to B.S. Joshi1 and the submission made on
behalf of the State that B. S. Joshi' required a second look and
held that the Court was not inclined to accept the contention
made on behalf of the State that the decision in B.S. Joshi'
required reconsideration, at least not in the facts of the case. It
G
was held that what was decided in B.S. Joshi' was the power
and authority of the High Court to exercise jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code or under Article 226 of the Constitution
to quash offences which were not compoundable. The law
stated in B.S. Joshi' simply indicated the powers of the High n
H
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A Court to quash any criminal proceeding or first information
report or complaint whether the offences were compoundable
or not. Altamas Kabir, J. further observed, "The ultimate
exercise of discretion under Section 482 CrPC or under Article
226 of the Constitution is with the court which has to exercise
B such jurisdiction in the facts of each case. It has been explained
that the said power is in no way limited by the provisions of
Section 320 CrPC. We are unable to disagree with such
statement of law. In any event, in this case, we are only required
to consider whether the High Court had exercised its jurisdiction
c under Section 482 CrPC legally and correctly." Then in
paragraphs 8 and 9 (pg. 5) of the Report, Altamas Kabir, J.,
inter alia, held as under :
"8 ...... Once the complainant decided not to pursue the
matter further, the High Court could have taken a more
D pragmatic view of the matter. We do not suggest that while
exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution
the High Court could not have refused to quash the first
information report, but what we do say is that the matter
could have been considered by the High Court with greater
E pragmatism in the facts of the case.
9 ....... In the facts of this case we are of the view that
continuing with the criminal proceedings would be an
exercise in futility ......... "
F 8. Markandey Katju, J. although concurred with the view
of Altamas Kabir, J. that criminal proceedings in that case
deserved to be quashed but observed that question may have
to be decided in some subsequent decision or decisions
(preferably by a larger Bench) as to which non-compoundable
G cases can be quashed under Section 482 of the Code or Article
226 of the Constitution on the basis that the parties have entered
into compromise. In paragraphs 27 and 28 (pg. 10) of the
report he held as under:
H "27. There can be no doubt that a case under Section 302
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 773
IPC or other serious offences like those under Sections A
395, 307 or 304-B cannot be compounded and hen_ce
proceedings in those provisions cannot be quashed by the
High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482
CrPC or in writ jurisdiction on the basis of compromise.
However, in some other cases (like those akin to a civil B
nature), the proceedings can be quashed by the High
Court if the parties have come to an amicable settlement
even though the provisions are not compoundable. Where
a line is to be drawn will have to be decided in some later
decisions of this Court, preferably by a larger Bench (so c
as to make it more authoritative). Some guidelines will
have to be evolved in this. connection and the matter
cannot be left at the sole unguided discretion of Judges,
otherwise there may be conflicting decisions and judicial
anarchy. A judicial discretion has to be exercised on some
0
objective guiding principles and criteria, and not on the
whims and fancies of individual Judges. Discretion, after
all, cannot be the Chancellor's foot.
28. I am expressing this opinion because Shri B.B. Singh,
learned counsel for the respondent has rightly expressed E
his concern that the decision in B.S. Joshi case should not
be understood to have meant that Judges can quash any
kind of criminal case merely because there has been a
compromise between the parties. After all, a crime is an
offence against society, and not merely against a private F
individual.·
9. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior counsel for
the petitioner in SLP(Crl.) No. 6324 of 2009 submitted that the
inherent power of the High Court to quash a non-compoundable G
offence was not circumscribed by any of the provisions of the
Code, including Section 320. Section 482 is a declaration of
the inherent power pre-existing in the High Court and so long
as the exercise of the inherent power falls within the parameters
of Section 482, it sh all have an overriding effect over any of the H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A provisions of the Code. He, thus, submitted that in exercise of
its inherent powers under Section 482, the High Court may
permit compounding of a non-compoundable offence provided
that in doing so it satisfies the conditions mentioned therein.
Learned senior counsel would submit that the power to quash
s the criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Code exists
even in non-compoundable offence but its actual exercise will
depend on facts of a particular case. He submitted that some
or all of the following tests may be relevant to decide whether
to quash or not to quash the criminal proceedings in a given
c case; (a) the nature and gravity of case; (b) does the dispute
reflect overwhelming and pre-dominantly civil flavour; (c) would
the quashing involve settlement of entire or almost the entire
dispute; (d) the compromise/settlement between parties and/
or other facts and the circumstances render possibility of
conviction remote and bleak; (e) not to quash would cause
0
extreme injustice and would not serve ends of justice and (f)
not to quash would result in abuse of process of court.
10. Shri P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for the petitioner
in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 5921 of 2009 submitted that
E Section 482 of the Code is complete answer to the reference
made to the larger Bench. He analysed Section 482 and
Section 320 of the Code and submitted that Section 320 did
not limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court.
Notwithstanding Section 320, High Court can exercise its
F inherent power, inter alia, to prevent abuse of the process of
any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. To secure
the ends of justice is a wholesome and definite guideline. It
requires formation of opinion by High Court on the basis of
material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify
G quashing of a particular criminal complaint, FIR or a proceeding.
When the Court exercises its inherent power under Section 482
in respect of offences which are not compoundable taking into
account the fact that the accused and the complainant have
settled their differences amicably, it cannot be viewed as
H permitting compounding of offence which is not compoundable.
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 775
11. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel submitted that A
in cases of civil wrongs which also constitute criminal offences,
the High Court may pass order under Section 482 once both
parties jointly pray for dropping the criminal proceeding initiated
by one of them to put an end to the dispute and restore peace
between the parties. B
12. Mr. V. Giri, learned senior counsel for the respondent
(accused) in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 6138 of 2006
submitted that the real question that needs to be considered
by this Court in the reference is whether Section 320(9) of the C
Code creates a bar or limits or affects the inherent powers of
the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. It was submitted
that Section 320(9) does not create a bar or limit or affect the
inherent powers of the High Court in the matter of quashing any
criminal proceedings. Relying upon various decisions of this
Court, it was submitted that it has been consistently held that D
the High Court has unfettered powers under Section 482 of the
Code to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of the
process of the Court. He also submitted that on compromise
between the parties, the High Court in exercise of powers under
Section 482 can quash the criminal proceedings, more so the E
matters arising from matrimonial dispute, property dispute,
dispute between close relations, partners or business concerns
which are predominantly of civil, financial or commercial nature.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioner in Special Leave F
Petition (Crl.) No. 8989 of 2010 submitted that the court should
have positive view to quash the proceedings once the
aggrieved party has compromised the matter with the wrong
doer. It was submitted that if the court did not allow the quashing
of FIR or complaint or criminal case where the parties settled G
their dispute amicably, it would encourage the parties to speak
lie in the court and witnesses would become hostile and the
criminal proceeding would not end in conviction. Learned
counsel submitted that the court could also consider the two
questions (1) can there be partial quashing of the FIR qua
H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A accused with whom the complainant/aggrieved party enters into
compromise. (2) can the court quash the proceedings in the
cases which have not arisen from the matrimonial or civil
disputes but the offences are personal in nature like grievous
hurt (S.326), attempt to murder (S.307), rape (S.376),
B trespassing (S.452) and kidnapping (S.364, 365) etc.
14. Mr. P. P. Malhotra, learned Additional Solicitor General
referred to the scheme of the Code. He submitted that in any
criminal case investigated by police on filing the report under
C Section 173 of the Code, the Magistrate, after applying his mind
to the chargesheet and the documents accompanying the
same, if takes cognizance of the offences and summons the
accused and/or frames charges and in certain grave and
serious offences, commits the accused to be tried by a court
of Sessions and the Sessions Court after satisfying itself and
D after hearing the accused frames charges for the offences
alleged to·have been committed by him, the Code provides a
remedy to accused to challenge the order taking cognizance
or of framing charges. Similar situation may follow in a
complaint case. Learned Additional Solicitor General submitted
E that power under Section 482 of the Code cannot be invoked
in the non-compoundable offences since Section 320(9)
expressly prohibits the compounding of such offences. Quashing
of criminal proceedings of the offences which are non-
compoundable would negative the effect of the order of framing
F charges or taking cognizance and therefore quashing would
amount to taking away the order of cognizance passed by the
Magistrate.
15. Learned Additional Solicitor General would submit that
G when the Court takes cognizance or frames charges, it is in
accordance with the procedure established by law. Once the
court takes cognizance or frames charges, the method to
challenge such order is by way of appropriate application to
the superior court under the provisions of the Code.
H 16. If power under Section 482 is exercised, in relation to
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.) 777
non-compoundable offences, it will amount to what is prohibited A
by law and such cases cannot be brought within the parameters
'to secure ends of justice'. Any order in violation and breach of
statutory provisions, learned Additional Solicitor General would
submit, would be a case against the ends of justice. He heavily
relied upon a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in B
Central Bureau of Investigation and others v. Keshub
Mahindra and others" wherein this Court held, 'no decision by
any court, this Court not excluded, can be read in a manner as
to nullify the express provisions of an Act or the Code.' With
reference to B. S. Joshi', learned Additional Solicitor General c
submitted that that was a case where the dispute was between
the husband and wife and the court felt that if the proceedings
were not quashed, it would prevent the woman from settling in
life and the wife had already filed an affidavit that there were
temperamental differences and she was not supporting
D
continuation of criminal proceedings. As regards, Nikhil
Merchant2 , learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that
this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rameshwar and
others held that the said decision was a decision under Article
142 of the Constitution. With regard to Manoj Sharma3 , learned
Additional Solicitor General referred to the observations made E
by Markandey Katju, J. in paragraphs 24 and 28 of the Report.
17. Learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that the
High Court has no power to quash criminal proceedings in
regard to offences in which a cognizance has been taken by F
the Magistrate merely because there has been settlement
between the victim and the offender because the criminal
offence is against the society.
18. More than 65 years back, in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir G
Ahmed6, it was observed by the Privy Council that Section
561A (corresponding to Section 482 of the Code) had not
4. c2011) 6 sec 216.
5. (2009) 11 sec 424.
6. (1945) 47 Born. L.R. 245. H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A given increased powers to the Court which it did not possess
before that section was enacted. It was observed, 'The section
gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the court
already inherently possess shall be preserved and is inserted
lest, as their Lordships think, it should be considered that the
B only powers possessed by the court are those expressly
conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code and that no inherent
power had survived the passing of the Code'.
19. In Khushi Ram v. Hashim and others7, this Court held
as under:
c
"It is unnecessary to emphasise that the inherent power of
the High Court under Section 561A cannot be invoked in
regard to matters which· are directly covered by the
specific provisions of the Code ... "
D
20. The above view of Privy Council in Khwaja Nazir
Ahmec/l and another decision in Lala Jairam Das & Ors. v.
Emperor" was expressly accepted by this Court in State of Uttar
Pradesh. v. Mohammad Naim 9 • The Court said :
E "7. It is now well settled that the section confers no new
powers on the High Court. It merely safeguards all existing
inherent powers possessed by a High Court necessary
(among other purposes) to secure the ends of justice. The
section provides that those powers which the court
F inherently possesses shall be preserved lest it be
considered that the only powers possessed by the court
are those expressly conferred by the Code and that no
inherent powers had survived the passing of the
Code ........... "
G
21. In Pampathy v. State of Mysore 10, a three-Judge
7. AIR 1959 SC 542.
8. AIR 1945 PC 94.
9. AIR 1964 SC 703.
H 10. 1966 (Suppl) SCR 477.
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.) 779
Bench of this Court stated as follows : A
" The inherent power of the High Court mentioned in
Section 561 A, Criminal Procedure Code can be
exercised only for either of the three purposes specifically
mentioned in the section. The inherent power cannot be
8
invoked in respect of any matter covered by the specific
provisions of the Code. It cannot also be invoked if its
exercise would be inconsistent with any of the specific
provisions of the Code. It is only if the matter in question
is not covered by any specific provisions of the Code that C
s. 561A can come into operation ....... "
22. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others'',
a three-Judge Bench of this Court referred to Section 482 of
the Code and in paragraph 7 (pg. 703) of the Report held as
under: D
"7 ......... In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High
Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the
conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would
be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends E
of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.
The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in
civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary
public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not
to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of
harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled F
object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the
material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and
the like would justify the High Court in quashing the
proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice
are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has G
got to be administered according to laws made by the
legislature. The compelling necessity for making these
observations is that without a proper realisation of the
11. (1977) 2 sec 699. H
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save
the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice
between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible
to appreciate the width and contours of that salient
jurisdiction."
B
23. The Court then observed that the considerations
justifying the exercise of inherent powers for securing the ends
of justice naturally vary from case to case and a jurisdiction as
wholesome as the one conferred by Section 482 ought not to
C be encased within the straitjacket of a rigid formula.
24. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Madhu Limaye
v. The State of Maharashtra' 2, dealt with the invocation of
inherent power under Section 482 for quashing interlocutory
order even though revision under Section 397(2) of the Code
D was prohibited. The Court noticed the principles in relation to
the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court as under:
"(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a
specific provision in the Code for the redress of the
grievance of the aggrieved party;
E
(2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent
abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice;
F (3) That it should not be exercised as against the express
bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code."
25. In Raj Kapoor and others v. State and others' 3, the
Court explained the width and amplitude of the inherent power
of the High Court under Section 482 vis-a-vis revisional power
G under Section 397 as follows:
"10 ........The opening words of Section 482 contradict this
12. (1977) 4 sec 551.
H 13. (1980) 1 sec 43.
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.) 781
contention because nothing of the Code, not even Section A
397, can affect the amplitude of the inherent power
preserved in so many terms by the language of Section
482. Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of
law when a specific provision is made: easy resort to
inherent power is not right except under compelling B
circumstances. Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but
that inherent power should not invade areas set apart for
specific power under the same Code. In Madhu Limaye's
case this Court has exhaustively and, if I may say so with
great respect, correctly discussed and delineated the law c
beyond mistake. While it is true that Section 482 is
pervasive it should not subvert legal interdicts written into
the same Code, such, for instance, in Section 397(2).
Apparent conflict may arise in some situations between the
two provisions and a happy solution
0
"would be to say that the bar provided in sub-
section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise
of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning
thereby that the High Court will have no power of
revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then E
in accordance with one or the other principles
enunciated above, the inherent power will come into
play, there being no other provision in the Code for
the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party.
But then, if the order assailed is purely of an F
interlocutory character which could be corrected in
exercise of the revisional power of the High Court
under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to
exercise its inherent power. But in case the
impugned order clearly brings about a situation G
which is an abuse of the process of the Court or
for the purpose of securing the ends of justice
interference by the High Court is absolutely
necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2)
can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power H
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A by the High Court. But such cases would be few
and far between. The High Court must exercise the
inherent power very sparingly. One such case would
be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal
proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being
B without jurisdiction".
In short, there is no total ban on the exercise of inherent
power where abuse of the process of the court or other
extraordinary situation excites the court's jurisdiction. The
limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. The policy of the
c law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and simple,
should not be taken up to the High Court resulting in
unnecessary litigation and delay. At the other extreme, final
orders are clearly capable of being considered in exercise
of inherent power, if glaring injustice stares the court in the
D face. In between is a tertium quid, as Untwalia, J. has
pointed out as for example, where it is more than a purely
interlocutory order and less than a final disposal. The
present case falls under that category where the accused
complain of harassment through the court's process. Can
E we state that in this third category the inherent power can
be exercised? In the words of Untwalia, J.: (SCC p. 556,
para 10)
"The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate
F to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court
and/or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the
petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial.
The High Court can examine the matter in an
appropriate case under its inherent powers. The
present case undoubtedly falls for exercise of the
G
power of the High Court in. accordance with Section
482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, although not
accepting, that invoking the revisional power of the
High Court is impermissible."
H I am, therefore clear in my mind that the inherent power is
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 783
not rebuffed in the case situation before us. Counsel on A
both sides, sensitively responding to our allergy for
legalistics, rightly agreed that the fanatical insistence on
the formal filing of a copy of the order under cessation
need not take up this court's time. Our conclusion concurs
with the concession of counsel on both sides that merely B
because a copy of the order has not been produced,
despite its presence in the records in the court, it is not
possible for me to hold that the entire revisory power stands
frustrated and the inherent power stultified."
26. In Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi C
Mukherjee and another14 , the Court considered the scope of
Section 482 of the Code in a case where on dismissal of
petition under Section 482, a second petition under Section
482 of the Code was made. The contention before this Court
was that the second petition under Section 482 of the Code D
was not entertainable; the exercise of power under Section 482
on a second petition by the same party on the same ground
virt"ually amounts to review of the earlier order and is contrary
to the spirit of Section 362 of the Code and the High Court was
in error in having quashed the proceedings by adopting that E
course. While accepting this argument, this Court held as
follows:
"3 ....... The inherent power under Section 482 is intended
to prevent the abuse of the process of the court and to F
secure ends of justice. Such power cannot be exercised
to do something which is expressly barred under the
Code. If any consideration of the facts by way of review is
not permissible under the Code and is expressly barred,
it is not for the court to exercise its inherent power to G
reconsider the matter and record a conflicting decision. If
there had been change in the circumstances of the case,
it would be in order for the High Court to exercise its
14. (1990) 2 sec 437. H
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 8 S.C.R.
A inherent powers in the prevailing circumstances and pass
appropriate orders to secure the ends of justice or to
prevent the abuse of the process of the court. Where there
is no such changed circumstances and the decision has
to be arrived at on the facts that existed as on the date of
B the earlier order, the exercise of the power to reconsider
the same materials to arrive at different conclusion is in
effect a review, which is expressly barred under Section
362.
5. Section 362 of the Code expressly provides that no
c court when it has signed its judgment or final order
disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except
to correct a clerical or arithmetical error save as otherwise
provided by the Code. Section 482 enables the High Court
to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to
D any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice. The inherent powers, however, as much are
controlled by principle and precedent as are its express
powers by statute. If a matter is covered by an express
E letter of law, the court cannot give a go-by to the statutory
provisions and instead evolve a new provision in the garb
of inherent jurisdiction.
7. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be
invoked to override bar of review under Section 362. It is
F
clearly stated in Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal, that the inherent
power of the court cannot be exercised for doing that which
is specifically prohibited by the Code. The law is therefore
clear that the inherent power cannot be exercised for doing
that which cannot be done on account of the bar under
G
other provisions of the Code. The court is not empowered
to review its own decision under the purported exercise
of inherent power. We find that the impugned order in this
case is in effect one reviewing the earlier order on a
reconsideration of the same materials. The High Court has
H
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 785
grievously erred in doing so. Even on merits, we do not A
find any compelling reasons to quash the proceedings at
that stage."
27. In Dharampa/ & Ors. v. Ramshri (Smt.) and others 15,
this Court observed as follows : B
" ...... It is now well settled that the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilized for exercising
powers which are expressly barred by the Code ....... "
28. In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh and C
16
Ors. , a two-Judge Bench of this Court held as under :
" .... It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the High
Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may
be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code
0
or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions
"abuse of the process of law'' or "to secure the ends of
justice" do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High
Court and the alleged abuse of the process of law or the
ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with E
law including procedural law and not otherwise. Further,
inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers
to be used sparingly for achieving the object mentioned
in Section 482 of the Code in cases where there is no
express provision empowering the High Court to achieve F
the said object. It is well-neigh settled that inherent power
is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by
specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would
infringe any specific provi.sion of the Code. In the present
case, the High Court overlooked the procedural law which G
empowered the convicted accused to prefer statutory
appeal against conviction of the offence. The High Court
has intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-pedalled
15. 1993 Crl. L.J. 1049.
16. AIR 1999 SC 2554. H
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A the course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial."
29. In G. Sagar Suri and another v. State of U.P. and
others 17, the Court was concerned with the order of the High
Court whereby the application under Section 482 of the Code
for quashing the criminal proceedings under Sections 406 and
B 420 of the IPC pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Ghaziabad was dismissed. In paragraph 8 (pg. 643) of the
Report, the Court held as under:
"8. Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code has to be
c exercised with great care. In exercise of its jurisdiction the
High Court is not to examine the matter superficially. It is
to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of a civil nature,
has been given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal
proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies
D available in law. Before issuing process a criminal court
has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused
it is a serious matter. This Court has laid certain principles
on the basis of which the High Court is to exercise its
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction
under this section has to be exercised to prevent abuse
E
of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice."
30. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of
Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another' 6 restated what has
F been stated in earlier decisions that Section 482 does not
confer any new powers on the High Court, it only saves the
inherent power which the court possessed before the
commencement of the Code. The Court went on to explain the
exercise of inherent power by the High Court in paragraph 6
G (Pg.94) of the Report as under :
"6 .......... It envisages three circumstances under which the
inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (1) to give
11. (2000) 2 sec 636.
H 18. (2002) 3 sec 89.
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 787
effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of A
the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends
of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down
any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of
inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with
procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly B
arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from
express provisions of law which are necessary for proper
discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by
law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the
section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent c
powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or
criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision,
as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are
necessary to do the rigbt and to undo a wrong in course
of administration of justice on the principle quando lex
0
aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo
res ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a person
anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist).
While exercising powers under the section, the court does
not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent
jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be E
exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only
when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid
down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the F
court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt
is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice,
the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse
of process of the court to allow any action which would
result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In G
exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash
any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it
amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of
these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of
. t•ice ....... ."
JUS H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A The Court in paragraph 9 (Pg. 96) further stated :
"9 .......... the powers possessed by the High Court under
Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very
plenitude of the power requires great caution in its
exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in
B
exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The
inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate
prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a
State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie
decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete
c and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been
collected and produced before the Court and the issues
involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and
cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient
material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rulEt can be laid down
D in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise
its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at
any saget ...... "
31. In Central Bureau of Investigation v. A. Ravishankar
E Prasad and others 19 , the Court observed in paragraphs
17, 19,20 and 39 (Pgs. 356, 357 and 363) of the Report as
follows:
"17. Undoubtedly, the High Court possesses inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
F Procedure. These inherent powers of the High Court are
meant to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial
justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to
prevent abuse of the process of the court.
G 19. This Court time and again has observed that the
extraordinary power under Section 482 CrPC should be
exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. The
Court would be justified in exercising the power when it is
H 19. (2009) 6 sec
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 789
imperative to exercise the power in order to prevent A
injustice. In order to understand the nature and scope of
power under Section 482 CrPC it has become necessary
to recapitulate the ratio of the decided cases.
20. Reference to the following cases would reveal that the B
Courts have consistently taken the view that they must use
the court's extraordinary power only to prevent injustice and
secure the ends of justice. We have largely inherited the
provisions of inherent powers from the English
jurisprudence, therefore the principles decided by the C
English courts would be of relevance for us. It is generally
agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect
its process from abuse. The English courts have also used
inherent power to achieve the same objective.
39. Careful analysis of all these judgments clearly reveals D
that the exercise of inherent powers would entirely depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case. The object
of incorporating inherent powers in the Code is to prevent
abuse of the process of the court or to secure ends of
justice." E
32. In Devendra and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
another< 0 , while dealing with the question whether a pure civil
dispute can be subject matter of a criminal proceeding under
Sections 420, 467, 468 and 469 IPC, a two-Judge Bench of
this Court observed that the High Court ordinarily would exercise F
its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code if the allegations
made in the First Information Report, even if given face value
and taken to be correct in their entirety, do not make out any
offence.
G
33. In Sushi/ Suri v. Central Bureau of Investigation and
another"1 , the Court considered the scope and ambit of the
20. (2009) 1 sec 495.
21. (2011) 5 sec 10s. H
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A inherent jurisdiction of the High Court and made the following
observations in para 16 (pg. 715) of the Report:
"16. Section 482 CrPC itself envisages three
circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be
exercised by the High Court, namely, (1) to give effect to
B
an order under CrPC; (i1) to prevent an abuse of the
process of court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of
justice. It is trite that although the power possessed by the
High Court under the said provision is very wide but it is
not unbridled. It has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and
c cautiously, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial
justice for which alone the Court exists. Nevertheless, it is
neither feasible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule
which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of
the Court. Yet, in numerous cases, this Court has laid down
D certain broad principles which may be borne in mind while
exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. Though
it is emphasised that exercise of inherent powers would
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, but
the common thread which runs through all the decisions
E on the subject is that the Court would be justified in
invoking its inherent jurisdiction where the allegations
made in the complaint or charge-sheet, as the case may
be, taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety
do not constitute the offence alleged."
F
34. Besides B. S. Joshi 1, Nikhil Merchant2 and Manoj
Sharma', there are other decisions of this Court where the
scope of Section 320 vis-a-vis the inherent power of the High
Court under Section 482 of the Code has come up for
G consideration.
35. In Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab 22, in the
appeal before this Court which arose from an order of the High
Court refusing to quash the FIR against the appellant lodged
H 22. (2000) 4 sec s02.
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 791
under Sections 379, 406, 409, 418, 506/34, IPC on account A
of compromise entered into between the complainant and the
accused, in paragraphs 5 and 6 (pg. 584) of the Report, the
Court held as under :
"5. It is on the basis of this compromise that the application
8
was filed in the High Court for quashing of proceedings
which has been dismisse.d by the impugned order. We
notice from a reading of the FIR and the other documents
on record that the dispute was purely a personal one
between two contesting parties and that it arose out of
extensive business dealings between them and that there C
was absolutely no public policy involved in the nature of the
allegations made against the accused. We are, therefore,
of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served in
continuing with the proceedings in the light of the
compromise and also in the light of the fact that the D
complainant has on 11-1-2004 passed away and the
possibility of a conviction being recorded has thus to be
ruled out.
6. We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that E
in disputes where the question involved is of a purely
personal nature, the court should ordinarily accept the
terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as
keeping the matter alive with no possibility .of a result in
favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the courts, F
grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that
the time so saved can be utilised in deciding more effective
and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense
approach to the matter based on ground of realities and
bereft of the technicalities of the law."
G
23
36. In lshwar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh , the
Court was concerned with a case where the accused -
appellant was convicted and sentenced by the Additional
23. c2ooai 15 sec 667. H
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 8 S.C.R.
A Sessions Judge for an offence punishable under Section 307,
IPC. The High Court dismissed the appeal from the judgment
and conviction. In the appeal, by special leave, the injured -
complainant was ordered to be joined as party as it was stated
by the counsel for the appellant that mutual compromise has
B been arrived at between the parties, i.e. accused on the one
hand and the complainant - victim on the other hand during the
pendency of the proceedings before this Court. It was prayed
on behalf of the appellant that the appeal be disposed of on
the basis of compromise between the parties. In para 12 (pg.
C 670) of the Report, the Court observed as follows :
"12. Now, it cannot be gainsaid that an offence punishable
under Section 307 IPC is not a compoundab'le offence.
Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
expressly states that no offence shall be compounded if it
D is not compoundable under the Code. At the same time,
however, while dealing with such matters, this Court may
take into account a relevant and important consideration
about compromise between the parties for the purpose of
reduction of sentence."
E
37. The Court also referred to the earlier decisions of this
Court in Jetha Ram v. State ofRa}asthan 24, Murugesan v.
Ganapathy Ve/a~ 5 , /shwarlal v. State of M.P26 • and Mahesh
Chand & another v. State of Rajasthan 27 and noted in
F paragraph 13 (pg. 670) of the Report as follows:
"13. In Jetha Ram v. State of Rajasthan, Murugesan v.
Ganapathy Velar and lshwarlal v. State of M.P. this Court,
while taking into account the fact of compromise between
the parties, reduced sentence imposed on the appellant-
G accused to already undergone, though the offences were
24. (2006) 9 sec 255.
25. (2001 > 1o sec 504.
26. (2008) 1 sec 671.
H 27. 1990 (supp) sec 681.
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 793
not compoundable. But it was also stated that in Mahesh A
Chand v. State of Rajasthan such offence was ordered
to be compounded."
Then, in paragraphs 14 and 15 (pg. 670) the Court held
as under: B
"14. In our considered opinion, it would not be appropriate
to order compounding of an offence not compoundable
under the Code ignoring and keeping aside statutory
provisions. In our judgment, however, limited submission
of the learned counsel for the appellant deserves C
consideration that while imposing substantive sentence, the
factum of compromise between the parties is indeed a
relevant circumstance which the Court may keep in mind.
15. In the instant case, the incident took place before more o
than fifteen years; the parties are residing in one and the
same village and they are also relatives. The appellant was
about 20 years of age at the time of commission of crime.
It was his first offence. After conviction, the petitioner was
taken into custody. During the pendency of appeal before E
the High Court, he was enlarged on bail but, after the
decision of the High Court, he again surrendered and is
in jail at present. Though he had applied for bail, the prayer
was not granted and he was not released on bail.
Considering the totality of facts and circumstances, in our
opinion, the ends of justice would be met if the sentence
F
of imprisonment awarded to the appellant (Accused 1) is
reduced to the period already undergone."
38. In Rumi Dhar (Smt.) v. State of West Bengal and
another28 , the Court was concerned with applicability of Section G
320 of the Code where the accused was being prosecuted for
commission of offences under Sections 120-B/420/467/468/
471 of the IPC along with the bank officers who were being
2s. (2009) 6 sec 364. H
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S. C.R.
A prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The accused had paid the
entire due amount as per the settlement with the bank in the
matter of recovery before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The
accused prayed for her discharge on the grounds (i) having
B regard to the settlement arrived at between her and the bank,
no case for proceeding against her has been made out; (ii) the
amount having already been paid and the title deeds having
been returned, the criminal proceedings should be dropped on
the basis of the settlement and (iii) the dispute between the
c parties were purely civil in nature and that she had not
fabricated any document or cheated the bank in any way
whatsoever and charges could not have been framed against
her. The CBI contested the application for discharge on the
ground that mere repayment to the bank could not exonerate
0 the accused from the criminal proceeding. The two-Judge
Bench of this Court referred to Section 320 of the Code and
the earlier decisions of this Court in CBI v. Duncans Agro
Industries Limited2 9, State of Haryana v. Bhajan LaP0, State
of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma31 , Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary32 and
E Nikhil Merchant2 which followed the decision in B.S. Josh11 and
then with reference to Article 142 of the Constitution and
Section 482 of the Code refused to quash the charge against
the accused by holding as under:
"24. The jurisdiction of the Court under Article 142 of the
F Constitution of India is not in dispute. Exercise of such
power would, however, depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. The High Court, in exercise
of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, and this Court, in terms of Article 142
G of the Constitution of India, would not direct quashing of a
29. (1996) 5 sec 591.
30. 1992 Supp (1) sec 335.
31. 1992 supp (1) sec 222.
H 32. (1992) 4 sec 305.
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB .[R.M. LODHA, J.] 795
case involving crime against the society particularly when A
both the learned Special Judge as also the High Court
have found that a prima facie case has been made out
against the appellant herein for framing the charge."
39. In Shiji alias Pappu and others vs. Radhika and
8
another'3 3 this Court considered the exercise of inherent power
by the High Court under Section 482 in a matter where the
offence was not compoundable as the accused was already
involved in commission of the offences punishable under
Sections 354 and 394 IPC. The High Court rejected the prayer
by holding that the offences with which appellants were charged C
are not 'personal in nature' to justify quashing the criminal
proceedings on the basis of a compromise arrived at between
the complainant and the appellants. This Court considered
earlier decisions of this Court, the provisions contained in
Sections 320 and 394 of the Code and in paragraphs 17, 18 D
and 19 (pgs. 712 and 713) of the Report held as under:
"17. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not
compoundable under Section 320 CrPC is by itself no
reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power E
under Section 482 CrPC. That power can in our opinion
be exercised in cases where there is no chance of
recording a conviction against the accused and the entire
exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility.
There is a subtle distinction between compounding of F
offences by the parties before the trial court or in appeal
on the one hand and the exercise of power by the High
Court to quash the prosecution under Section 482 CrPC
on the other. While a court trying an accused or hearing
an appeal against conviction, may not be competent to G
permit compounding of an offence based on a settlement
arrived at between the parties in cases where the offences
are not compoundable under Section 320, the High Court
may quash the prosecution even· in cases where the
33. (2011) 1o sec 10s. H
796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A offences with which the accused stand charged are non-
compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC are not for that purpose
controlled by Section 320 CrPC.
18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the
B plenitude of the power under Section 482 CrPC by itself,
makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same
with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of
the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and
only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be
c recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the
prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process
of law. It is neithe~ necessary nor proper for us to
enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power
under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say
D is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends
of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that
power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The
High Court may be justified in declining interference if it is
called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume
E the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition
under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider
the facts and circumstances of each case to determine
whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may
F be invoked.
19. Coming to the case at hand, we are of the view that
the incident in question had its genesis in a dispute relating
to the access to the two plots which are adjacent to each
other. It was not a case of broad daylight robbery for gain.
G It was a case which has its origin in the civil dispute
between the parties, which dispute has, it appears, been
resolved by them. That being so, continuance of the
prosecution where the complainant is not ready to support
the allegations which are now described by her as arising
H
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 797
out of some "misunderstanding and misconception" will be A
a futile exercise that will serve no purpose. It is noteworthy
that the two alleged eyewitnesses, who are closely related
to the complainant, are also no longer supportive of the
prosecution version. The continuance of the proceedings
is thus nothing but an empty formality. Section 482 CrPC B
could, in such circumstances, be justifiably invoked by the
High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and
thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the courts
below".
40. In Ashok Sadarangani and Anr. vs. Union of India and
c
others34, the issue under consideration was whether an offence
which was not compoundable under the provisions of the Code
could be quashed. That was a case where a criminal case was
registered against the accused persons under Sections 120-
B, 465, 467, 468 and 471 of IPC. The allegation was that D
accused secured the credit facilities by submitting forged
property documents as collaterals and utilized such facilities in
a dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening Letters of Credit
in respect of foreign supplies of goods, without actually bringing
any goods but inducing the Bank to negotiate the Letters of E
Credit in favour of foreign suppliers and also by misusing the
cash credit facility. The Court considered the earlier decisions
of this Court including B.S. Joshi', Nikhil Merchant2 , Manoj
Sharma 3 , Shiji alias Pappu 33 , Duncans Agro Industries
Limited29, Rumi Dhar (Smt.)28 and Sushi/ SurP' and also F
referred to the order of reference in one of the cases before
us. In paragraphs 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the Report it was held
as under:-
"17. Having carefully considered the facts and G
circumstances of the case, as also the law relating to the
continuance of criminal cases where the complainant and
the accused had settled their differences and had arrived
at an amicable arrangement, we see no reason to differ
34. JT 2012 (3) SC 469. H
798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A with the views that had been taken in Nikhil Merchant's
case or Manoj Sharma's case (supra) or the several
decisions that have come thereafter. It is, however, no
coincidence that the golden thread which runs through all
the decisions cited, indicates that continuance of a criminal
B proceeding after a compromise has been arrived at
between the complainant and the accused, would amount
to abuse of the process of court and an exercise in futility,
since the trial could be prolonged and ultimately, may
conclude in a decision which may be of any consequence
c to any of the other parties. Even in Sushi! Suri's case on
which the learned Additional Solicitor General had relied,
the learned Judges who decided the said case, took note
of the decisions in various other cases, where it had been
reiterated that the exercise of inherent powers would
depend entirely on the facts and circumstances of each
D
case. In other words, not that there is any restriction on the
power or authority vested in the Supreme Court in
exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, but
that in exercising such powers the Court has to be
circumspect, and has to exercise such power sparingly in
E the facts of each case. Furthermore, the issue, which has
been referred to a larger Bench iri Gian Singh's case
(supra) in relation to the decisions of this Court in S.S.
Joshi's case, Nikhil Merchant's case, as also Manoj
Sharma's case, deal with a situation which is different from
F that of the present case. While in the cases referred to
hereinabove, the main question was whether offences
which were not compoundable, under Section 320 Cr.P.C.
could be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., in Gian
Singh's case the Court was of the view that a non-
G compoundable offence could not be compounded and that
the Courts should not try to take over the function of the
Parliament or executive. In fact, in none of the cases
referred to in Gian Singh's case, did this Court permit
compounding of non-compoundable offences. On the other
H hand, upon taking various factors into consideration,
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 799
including the futility of continuing with the criminal A
proceedings, this Court ultimately quashed the same.
18. In addition to the above, even with regard to the
decision of this Court in Central Bureau of Investigation
v. Ravi Shankar Prasad and Ors. : [(2009) 6 SCC 351], B
this Court observed that the High Court can exercise power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to do real and substantial
justice and to prevent abuse of the process of Court when
exceptional circumstances warranted the exercise of such
power. Once the circumstances in a given case were held C
to be such as to attract the provisions of Article 142 or
Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, it would be open
to the Supreme Court to exercise its extraordinary powers
under Article 142 of the Constitution to quash the
proceedings, the continuance whereof would only amount
to abuse of the process of Court. In the instant case the D
dispute between the petitioners and the Banks having
been compromised, we have to examine whether the
continuance of the criminal proceeding could turn out to be
an exercise in futility without anything positive being
ultimately achieved. E
19. As was indicated in Harbhajan Singh's case (supra),
the pendency of a reference to a larger Bench, does not
mean that all other proceedings involving the same issue
would remain stayed till a decision was rendered in the F
reference. The reference made in Gian Singh's case
(supra) need not, therefore, detain us. Till such time as the
decisions cited at the Bar are not modified or altered in
any way, they continue to hold the field.
20. In the present case, the fact situation is different from G
that in Nikhil Merchant's case (supra). While in Nikhil
Merchant's case the accused had misrepresented the
financial status of the company in question in order to avail
of credit facilities to an extent to which the company was
not entitled, in the instant case, the allegation is that as part H
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A of a larger conspiracy, property acquired on lease from a
person who had no title to the leased properties, was
offered as collateral security for loans obtained. Apart from
the above, the actual owner of the property has filed a
criminal complaint against Shri Kersi V. Mehta who had
B held himself out as the Attorney of the owner and his family
members. The ratio of the decisions in B.S. Joshi's case
and in Nikhi/ Merchant's case or for that matter, even in
Mano} Sharma's case, does not help the case of the writ
petitioners. In Nikhil Merchant's case, this Court had in the
c facts of the case observed that the dispute involved had
overtures of a civil dispute with criminal facets. This is not
so in the instant case, where the emphasis is more on the
criminal intent of the Petitioners than on the civil aspect
involving the dues of the Bank in respect of which a
compromise was worked out."
D
The Court distinguished B.S. Joshi' and Nikhil Merchant2
by observing that those cases dealt with different fact situation.
'
41. In Rajiv Saxena and others v. State (NCT of Delhi)
E and anothef3 5 , this Court allowed the quashment of criminal
case under Sections 498-A and 496 read with Section 34 IPC
by a brief order. It was observed that since the parties had
settled their disputes and the complainant agreed that the
criminal proceedings need not be continued, the criminal
F proceedings could be quashed.
42. In a very recent judgment decided by this Court in the
month of July, 2012 in Jayrajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana v. State
of Gujarat and another"6 , this Court was again concerned with
the question of quashment of an FIR alleging offences
G punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120-B IPC.
The High Court refused to quash the criminal case under
Section 482 of the Code. The question for consideration was
35. (2012) 5 sec 627.
H 36. JT 2012 (6) SC 504.
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.) 801
that inasmuch as all those offences, except Section 420 IPC, A
were non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the
Code, whether ii would be possible to quash the FIR by the High
Court under Section 482 of the Code or by this Court under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The Bench elaborately
considered the decision of this Court in Shiji alias Pappu3 3 and B
by invoking Article 142 of the Constitution quashed the criminal
proceedings. It was held as under:-
"10. In the light of the principles mentioned above,
inasmuch as Respondent No. 2 - the Complainant has filed
an affidavit highlighting the stand taken by the Appellant C
(Accused No. 3) during the pendency of the appeal before
this Court and the terms of settlement as stated in the said
affidavit, by applying the same analogy and in order to do
complete justice under Article 142 of the Constitution, we
accept the terms of settlement insofar as the Appellant D
herein (Accused No. 3) is concerned.
11. In view of the same, we quash and set aside the
impugned FIR No. 45/2011 registered with Sanand Police
Station, Ahmedabad for offences punishable Under E
Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120-B of IPC insofar as
the Appellant (Accused No. 3) is concerned. The appeal
is allowed to the extent mentioned above".
43. In Y. Suresh Babu v. State of A. P.37 decided on April
F
29, 1987, this Court allowed the compounding of an offence
under Section 326 IPC even though such compounding was not
permitted by Section 320 of the Code. However, in Ram Lal
and Anr. v. State of J &K38, this Court observed that Y Suresh
Babu37 was per incuriam. It was held that an offence which law
declares to be non-compoundable cannot be compounded at G
all even with the permission of the Court.
37. (2005) 1 sec 347.
38. (1999) 2 sec 213. H
802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A 44. Having surveyed the decisions of this Court which throw
light on the question raised before us, two decisions, one given
by the Punjab and Haryana High Court and the other by
Bombay High Court deserve to be noticed.
B 45. A five-Judge Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High
Court in Ku/winder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and
another39 was called upon to determine, inter alia, the question
whether the High Court has the power under Section 482 of the
Code to quash the criminal proceedings or allow the
compounding of the offences in the cases which have been
C specified as non-compoundable offences under the provisions
of Section 320 of the Code. The five-Judge Bench referred to
quite a few decisions of this Court including the decisions in
Madhu Limaye12 , Bhajan LaP 0 , L. Muniswamy11 , Simrikhia 14,
B. S. Joshi' and Ram LaP8 and framed the following guidelines:
D
"a. Cases arising from matrimonial discord, even if other
offences are introduced for aggravation of the case.
b. Cases pertaining to property disputes between close
relations, which are predominantly civil in nature and they
E
have a genuine or belaboured dimension of criminal
liability. Notwithstanding a touch of criminal liability, the
settlement would bring lasting peace and harmony to larger
number of people.
F c. Cases of dispute between old partners or business
concerns with dealings over a long period which are
predominantly civil and are given or acquire a criminal
dimension but the parties are essentially seeking a
redressal of their financial or commercial claim.
G
d. Minor offences as under Section 279, IPC may be
permitted to be compounded on the basis of legitimate
settlement between the parties. Yet another offence which
H 39. (2007) 4 CTC 769.
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 803
remains non- compoundable is Section 506 (II), IPC, which A
is punishable with 7 years imprisonment. It is the judicial
experience that an offence under Section 506 IPC in most
cases is based on the oral declaration with different shades
of intention. Another set of offences, which ought to be
liberally compounded, are Sections 147 and 148, IPC, B
more particularly where other offences are compoundable.
It may be added here that the State of Madhya Pradesh
vide M.P. Act No. 17 of 1999 (Section 3) has made
Sections 506(11) IPC, 147 IPC and 148, IPC compoundable
offences by amending the schedule under Section 320, c
Cr.P.C.
e. The offences against human body other than murder and
culpable homicide where the victim dies in the course of
transaction would fall in the category where compounding
may not be permitted. Heinous offences like highway D
robbery, dacoity or a case involving clear-cut allegations
of rape should also fall in the prohibited category.
Offences committed by Public Servants purporting to act
in that capacity as also offences against public servant
while the victims are acting in the discharge of their duty E
must remain non-compoundable. Offences against the
State enshrined in Chapter-VII (relating to army, navy and
air force) must remain non-compoundable.
f. That as a broad guideline the offences against human F
body other than murder and culpable homicide may be
permitted to be compounded when the court is in the
position to record a finding that the settlement between the
parties is voluntary and fair.
While parting with this part, it appears necessary to add G
that the settlement or compromise must satisfy the
conscience of the court. The settlement must be just and
fair besides being free from the undue pressure, the court
must examine the cases of weaker and vulnerable victims
with necessary caution." H
804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 8 S.C.R.
A To conclude, it can safely be said that there can never be
any hard and fast category which can be prescribed to
enable the Court to exercise its power under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C. The only principle that can be laid down is
the one which has been incorporated in the Section itself,
B i.e., "to prevent abuse of the process of any Court" or "to
secure the ends of justice".
It was further held as _under :
"23. No embargo, be in the shape of Section 320(9) of the
c Cr.P.C., or any other such curtailment, can whittle down the
power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
25. The only inevitable conclusion from the above
discussion is that there is no statutory bar under the
Cr.P.C. which can affect the inherent power of this Court
D
under Section 482. Further, the same cannot be limited to
matrimonial cases alone and the Court has the wide
power to quash the proceedings even in non-
compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar under
Section 320 of the Cr.P.C., in order to prevent the abuse
E
of law and to secure the ends of justice. The power under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is to be exercised ex-debito
Justitiae to prevent an abuse of process of Court. There
can neither be an exhaustive list nor the defined para-
meters to enable a High Court to invoke or exercise its
F inherent powers. It will always depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. The power under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C. has no limits. However, the High Court will
exercise it sparingly and with utmost care and caution. The
exercise of power has to be with circumspection and
G restraint. The Court is a vital and an extra-ordinary effective
instrument to maintain and control social order. The Courts
play role of paramount importance in achieving peace,
harmony and ever-lasting congeniality in society.
Resolution of a dispute by way of a compromise between
H two warring groups, therefore, should attract the immediate
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 805
and prompt attention of a Court which should endeavour A
to give full effect to the same unless such compromise is
abhorrent to lawful composition of the society or would
promote savagery."
46. A three-Judge Bench of the Bombay High Court in 8
Abasaheb Yadav Honmane v. State of Maharashtra 40 dealt
with the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of
the Code vis-a-vis the express bar for compounding of the non-
compoundable offences in Section 320(9) of the Code. The
High Court referred to various decisions of this Court and also C
the decisions of the various High Courts and then stated as
follows:
"The power of compounding on one hand and quashing
of criminal proceedings in exercise of inherent powers on
the other, are incapable of being treated as synonymous D
or even inter-changeable in law. The conditions precedent
and satisfaction of criteria in each of these cases are
distinct and different. May be, the only aspect where they
have any commonality is the result of exercise of such
power in favour of the accused, as acquittal is the end E
result in both these cases. Both these powers are to be
exercised for valid grounds and with some element of
objectivity. Particularly, the power of quashing the FIR or
criminal proceedings by the Court by taking recourse to
inherent powers is expected to be used sparingly and that F
too without losing sight of impact of such order -on the
criminal justice delivery system. It may be obligatory upon
the Court to strike a balance between the nature of the
offence and the need to pass an order in exercise of
inherent powers, as the object of criminal law is protection G
of public by maintenance of law and order."
47. Section 320 of the Code articulates public policy with
40. 2008 (2) Mh. l.J. 856. H
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 8 S.C.R.
A regard to the compounding of offences. It catalogues the
offences punishable under IPC which may be compounded by
the parties without permission of the Court and the composition
of certain offences with the permission of the court. The
offences punishable under the special statutes are not covered
B by Section 320. When an offence is compoundable under
Section 320, abatement of such offence or an attempt to
commit such offence or where the accused is liable under
Section 34 or 149 of the IPC can also be compounded in the
same manner. A person who is under 18 years of age or is an
C idiot or a lunatic is not competent to contract compounding of
offence but the same can be done on his behalf with the
permission of the court. If a person is otherwise competent to
compound an offence is dead, his legal representatives may
also compound the offence with the permission of the court.
Where the accused has been committed for trial or he has
0
been convicted and the appeal is pending, composition can
only be done with the leave of the court to which he has been
committed or with the leave of the appeal court, as the case
may be. The revisional court is also competent to allow any
person to compound any offence who is competent to
E compound. The consequence of the composition of an offence
is acquittal of the accused. Sub-section (9) of Section 320
mandates that no offence shall be compounded except as
provided by this Section. Obviously, in view thereof the
composition of an offence has to be in accord with Section 320
F and in no other manner.
48. The question is with regard to the inherent power of
the High Court in quashing the criminal proceedings against
an offender who has settled his dispute with the victim of the
G crime but the crime in which he is allegedly involved is not
compoundable under Section 320 of the Code.
49. Section 482 of the Code, as its very language
suggests, saves the inherent power of.the High Court which it
has by virtue of it being a superior court to prevent abuse of
H
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 807
the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of A
' justice. II begins with the words, 'nothing in this Code' which
means that the provision is an overriding provision. These
words leave no manner of doubt that none of the provisions of
the Code limits or restricts the inherent power. The guideline
for exercise of such power is provided in Section 482 itself i.e., B
to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice. As has been repeatedly stated that
Section 482 confers no new powers on High Court; it merely
safeguards existing inherent powers possessed by High Court
necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to c
secure the ends of justice. It is equally well settled that the power
is not to be resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code
for the redress of the grievance of an aggrieved party. It should
be exercised very sparingly and it should not be exercised as
against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision .
0
of the Code.
50. In different situations, the inherent power may be
exercised in different ways to achieve its ultimate objective.
Formation of opinion by the High Court before it exercises
inherent power under Section 482 on either of the twin E
objectives, (i) to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
(ii) to secure the ends of justice, is a sine qua non.
51. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial
obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of F
administration of justice or to prevent continuation of
unnecessary judicial process. This is founded on the legal
maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedituret id s{ne
qua res ipsa esse non potest. The full import of which is
wheneveranything is authorised, and especially if, as a matter G
of duty, required to be done by law, it is found impossible to
do that thing unless something else not authorised in express
terms be also done, may also be done, then that something
else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Ex debito
justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real,
H
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012) 8 S.C.R.
A complete and substantial justice for which it exists. The power
possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code
is of wide amplitude but requires exercise with great caution
and circumspection.
52. It needs no emphasis that exercise of inherent power
8
by the High Court would entirely depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. It is neither permissible nor proper
for the court to provide a straitjacket formula regulating the
exercise of inherent powers under Section 482. No precise and
inflexible guidelines can also be provided.
c
53. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the
ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the
same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and
not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of
D compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320
is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings
by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In
compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is
circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and
E the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the
other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for
quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal
complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the
ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although
F the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of
indictment.
54. Where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding
having regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and
victim has been settled although offences are not
G compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of
criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice
in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is
put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice
being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts
H
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 809
which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrong A
doing that seriously endangers and threatens well-being of
society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because
he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the
. victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have
' been made compoundable in law, with or without permission B
of the Court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc; or other offences of mental depravity under IPC
or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like
.Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by
1
public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement c
between offender and victim can have no legal sanction at all.
However, certain offences which ov·erwhelmingly and
predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil,
mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like
transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony,
0
particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where
the wrong is basically to victim and the offender and victim have
settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the
fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the
High Court may within the framework of its inherent power,
quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or F.l.R if E
it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly
any likelihood of offender being convicted and by not quashing
the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of
justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not
exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard F
and fast category can be prescribed.
55. B.S. Joshi', Nikhil Merchant', Manoj Sharma 3 and
Shiji alias Pappu 33 do illustrate the principle that High Court
may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise G
of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and
Section 320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High
Court under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing
criminal proceedings in B.S. Josh11. Nikhil Merchant2 , Manoj
Sharma 3 and Shiji alias Pappu 33 , this Court has compounded H
810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 8 S.C.R.
A the non-compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so.
There does exist the distinction between compounding of an
offence under Section 320 and quashing of a criminal case by
the High Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482.
The two powers are distinct and different although ultimate
B consequence may be same viz., acquittal of the accused or
dismissal of indictment.
56. We find no incongruity in the above principle of law and
the decisions of this Court in Simrikhia 14 , Dharampa/1 5 , Arun
Shankar Shukla 16 , /shwar Singh 23 , Rumi Dhar (Smt.). 28 and
C Ashok SadaranganP4 • The principle propounded in Simrikhia 14
that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked
to override express bar provided in law is by now well settled.
In Dharampa/1 5 , the Court observed the same thing that the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be
D utilized for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the
Code. Similar statement of law is made in Arun Shankar
Shuk/a 16• In /shwar Singh23 , the accused was alleged to have
committed an offence punishable under Section 307, IPC and
with reference to Section 320 of the Code, it was held that the
E offence punishable under Section 307 IPC was not
compoundable offence and there was express bar in Section
320 that no offence shall be compounded if it is not
compoundable under the Code. In Rumi Dhar (Smt.) 28 although
the accused had paid the entire due amount as per the
F settlement with the bank in the matter of recovery before the
Debts Recovery Tribunal, the accused was being proceeded
with for commission of offences under Section 120-8/420/467/
468/471 of the IPC along with the bank officers who were being
prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with 13(1 )(d) of
G Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court refused to quash the
charge against the accused by holding that the Court would not
quash a case involving a crime against the society when a
prima facie case has been made out against the accused for
framing the charge. Ashok Sadarangani34 was again a case
H where the accused persons were charged of having committed
GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB [R.M. LODHA, J.] 811
offences under Sections 120-B, 465, 467, 468 and 471, IPC 'A
and the allegations were that the accused secured the cre_dit
facilities by submitting forged property documents as collaterals
and utilized such facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner
by opening letters of credit in respect of foreign supplies of
goods, without actually bringing any goods but inducing the B
bank to negotiate the letters of credit in favour of foreign
suppliers and also by misusing the cash-credit facility. The Court
was alive to the reference made in one of the present matters
and also the decisions in B. S. Joshi1 , Nikhi/ Merchant2 and
Mano} Sharma3 and it was held that B.S. Josht\ and Nikhil c
Merchant2 dealt with different factual situation as the dispute
involved had overtures of a civil dispute but the case under
consideration in Ashok Sadarangani34 was more on the
criminal intent than on a civil aspect. The decision in Ashok
Sadarangani34 supports the view that the criminal matters
0
involving overtures of a civil dispute stand on a different footing.
57. The position that emerges from the above discussion
can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in
quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise
of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power E
given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under
Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude
with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord
with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the
ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any F
Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding
or complaint or F.l.R may be exercised where the offender and
victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no category can be
prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High G
Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the
crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly
quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the
offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private H
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 8 S.C.R.
A in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any
compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the
offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption
Act or the offences committed by public servants while working
in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing
B criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal
cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour
stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing,
particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial,
mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the
C offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the
family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal
in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In
this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal
proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between
the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote
0
and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused
to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would
be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite
full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim.
In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would
E be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with
the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal
proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law
despite settlement and compromise between the victim and
wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is
F appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer
to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall
be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.
58. In view of the above, it cannot be said that B. S. Joshi',
G Nikhil Merchant2 and Manoj Sharma 3 were not correctly
decided. We answer the reference accordingly. Let these
matters be now listed before the concerned Bench(es).
R.P. Reference Answered.
H
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