Holding

The killing falls within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, so the accused are liable for culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I.

Summary

The case arose from a land dispute in which the deceased and his relatives clashed with Gapoo Yadav and his sons over a tree. During a sudden quarrel the accused assaulted the deceased, causing several injuries, one of which was grievous and led to his death. The trial court convicted the accused under Sections 148 and 302 read with Section 149 IPC, a conviction upheld by the High Court. On appeal, the accused argued that the killing occurred in the heat of passion during a sudden fight and thus fell under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, negating murder. The Supreme Court held that the injury was not inflicted in a cruel or unusual manner, there was no undue advantage, and the facts satisfied all ingredients of Exception 4, converting the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304 Part I). Consequently, the appeal was allowed in part and the conviction and sentence were modified accordingly.

Issues considered

Whether the facts constitute murder under Section 302 IPC or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.
Whether the accused acted with undue advantage or in a cruel or unusual manner.
Whether the injury was inflicted when the deceased was in a helpless condition.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 148, s. 149, s. 300, s. 302, s. 304

Subjects

murderculpable homicideException 4sudden quarrelheat of passionundue advantagecruel or unusual mannerland disputeIPC

Judgment

\
~ GHAPOO YADAV AND ORS. A
v.
STATE OF M.P.

FEBRUARY 17, 2003

[SHIVARAJ V. PATIL AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.] B

Penal Code, 1860; Ss. 148"149, Exception 4 to Section 300:

Deceased succumbed to injuries inflicted by accused in a sudden
quarrel-Trial Court convicted accused under Section 300 rlw Section 149- c
Upheld by High Court-On appeal, Held: Though one of the injuries was held
to be of grievous nature, there is no material to show that injury was inflicted
when the deceased was in helpless condition-Besides assaults were made at
random and it was not the case of the prosecution that accused came prepared
for attacking the deceased-Under the facts and circumstances of the case, D
causing of such injury could not be termed to be either in a cruel or unusual
manner but in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel-Hence, Exception
JV to Section 300 /PC attracted--Conviction and sentence modified accordingly.

Exception I & IV to Section 300 /PC-Distinction between-Discussed
E
According to the prosecution, there was an altercation regarding
cutting of trees on the disputed land between the deceased, his brother
..... (PW2) and father (PWl) on the one side and accused, his three sons and
nephew on the other. The accused persons assaulted the deceased and also
threatened his brother and father. A complaint was lodged by the father
of the deceased and the deceased was admitted in a hospital in injured F
condition where his dying declaration was recorded. He succumbed to his
injuries on the next day.

Trial Court found the accused persons guilty and convicted and
sentenced them under Section 148 and 302 r/w Section 149 IPC. In appeal,
High Court upheld the conviction and sentence. Hence the present appeal• G
.. It was contended for the appellant that since the injuries caused by
the appellant on the deceased were in the course of sudden quarrel without

..
,)
premeditation and without cruel intent, Exception IV to Section 300 IPC
was attracted.
69
H
I

I~
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] 2 S.C.R.

A Partly allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I.I. To bring a case within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC
all the ingredients mentioned therein must be found. The 'fight' occurring
in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not d~fined in the IPC. It takes two
to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for
B the passion to cool down. A fight is a combat between two and more
persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate
any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is
a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily
depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of
C Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel
and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender
has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The
expression 'undue advantage' as used in the provision means 'unfair
advantage'. [73-F, G, H; 74-A, BJ

D 1.2. In the instant case, out of the seven injuries, only injury No.2
was held to be of grievous nature, which was sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death of the deceased. The infliction of the
injuries, and their nature proves the intention of the accused appellants,
but causing of such injuries cannot be termed to be either in a cruel or
unusual manner. After the injuries were inflicted the injured has fallen
E down, but there is no material to show that thereafter any injury was
inflicted when he was in helpless condition. The assaults were made at
random. Even the previous altercations were verbal and not physical. It ...
is not the case of the prosecution that the accused appellants had come
prepared and armed for attacking the deceased. This goes to show that
F in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel followed by a fight the
accused persons had caused injuries on the deceased, but not acted in cruel
or unusual manner. That being so, Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is
clearly applicable. [74-B, C, DJ

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
G 229 of 2003.

From the Judgment and Order dated 18.4.200 I of the Madhya Pradesh •
High Court in Crl. A. No. 718 of 1989.

L.N. Gupta for the Appellants.
H
GHAPOO YADAV v. STATE OF M.P. [ARIJIT PASA YAT, J.] 71
. A
R.P. Gupta, Ms. Kamakshi S. Mehlwal, Sanjeev Kumar and Ms. Vaneeta
Mehra for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. Leave granted. B
Appellants (hereinafter referred to as 'the accused' by their respective
names) question legality of the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
dated 18.4.200 I, upholding their conviction for offences punishable under
Sections 148 and 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(in short '.the !PC') and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for three years C
and fine of Rs. 2,000 with default stipulation, and imprisonment for life and
fine of Rs. 5,000 with default stipulation respectively.

Factual scenario as described by the prosecution is essentially as follows:

Lekhram (PW-2) and Gopal (hereinafter referred to as 'the deceased') D
were sons of Ramlal (PW-I). Accused Gapoo Yadav is the father of accused
Janku, Kewal and Mangal Singh. Accused Sunder is the nephew of accused
Gapoo. Deceased, the witnesses and the accused belonged to the same village
and there was land dispute between them. On the request made by Ramlal
(PW-I), measurement of the land was done by the revenue authority. On the
basis of the said measurement, it was found that land belonging to accused E

-
Mangat Singh was in the possession ofRamlal (PW-I) and over the said land
a berry tree existed. Though, initially the tree was in possession of Ramlal,
after measurement he parted with possession thereof. Said tree was cut by the
family members of Ramlal (PW-I) a day prior to the incident for which
deceased had altercation with the accused persons. On the date of incident p
i.e. 9.6.1986 there were altercations between the accused persons and the
deceased, his brother Lekhram and father Ramlal. Accused Janku enquired
from the deceased as to why they were cutting the tree. Lekhram responded
that it was cut lhree days prior to the incident as the tree belonged to t)lem
and was planted by their family members. Deceased claimed that he had not
cut the tree. This led to altercations and scuffles amongst them and the G
accused persons assaulted deceased, which resulted a fracture of his leg.
When Ramlal and Lekhram went to save him, the accused persons ran towards
them threateningly. Ramlal and Lekhram fled away from the place of incident,
and returned later on with the other villagers. They took the deceased who
was then grasping for breath on a cot to Maharajpur Police Station. Information H
I
:i
; '-

72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) 2 S.C.R.

A was given by the deceased to the police at 8.45 p.m. He was sent for treatment
and was examined by Dr. R.K. Chaturvedi (PW-3). On examination he found
7 injuries on his body. His dying declaration was recorded. Later on, deceased
took his last breath on 10.6.1986 at 2.00 a.m. Dr. Chaturvedi sent the intimation
of death to the Police Station. Though initially case was registered under
Section 307 IPC, same was converted to one under Section 302 !PC. Port
B mortem was conducted by Dr. D.N. Adhikari (PW-6). Investigation was
undertaken and on completion thereof charge sheet was filed indicating alleged
commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 148 and 302 read
with Section l49 IPC. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions, and
finally charges 'were framed under Sections 148 and 302 read with Section
C 149 !PC.

Accused persons pleaded innocence and claimed false implication.

On consideration of the evidence on record, the Trial Court found that
the accused persons were guilty and accordingly convicted and sentenced
D them as aforenoted. It is to be noted that apart from the evidence of the two
eye-witnesses, reliance was also placed on the dying declaration (Ex.P-1)
recorded by Dr. Chaturvedi (PW-3). In appeal, the conviction and
consequential sentences imposed were upheld.

Though, in support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellants
E attacked the findings recorded, ultimately he confined his arguments to the
question relating to nature of the offence. He further conceded that if the
factual findings as recorded are affirmed then Sections 148 and 149 would
have application. In our view, the approach is well founded because the Trial
Court and the High Court having analysed the evidence in detail, concluded
that accused persons were culprits.
F
It was the stand of the learned counsel for the appellants that the injuries
sustained by the deceased were in course of sudden quarrel, without pre-
meditation and without cruel intents and, therefore, Section 302 IPC was not
applicable. According to him, Section 302 IPC cannot be applied even if the
prosecution case is accepted in toto, and Exception 4 to Section 300 is clearly
G applicable.

In response, learned counsel appearing for the State of Madhya Pradesh
submitted that it is a case to which Section 302 has clear application, and the
courts below have rightly applied it along with Sections 148 and 149 IPC.

H The question is about applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300, !PC.
GHAPOO YADAV v. STATE OF M.P. [ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.) 73

For bringing in its operation it has to be established that the act was committed A
without premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden
quarrel without the offender having taken undue- advantage and not having
acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

The Fourth Exception of Section 300, !PC covers acts done in a sudden
fight. The said exception deals with a case of prosecution not covered by the B
first exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The
exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of
premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation
of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion
'
which clouds men's ·sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would C
--.) not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception I; but
the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact
Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have
been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in
whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of
both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A 'sudden fight' D
implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed
is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could
the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more
appropriately applicable would be Exception I. There is no previous
deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which E
both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts
it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have
taken the serious tum it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation,
and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each
fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without
premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken F
undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must
have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the
ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the 'fight'
occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300, !PC is not defined in the !PC. It
takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time G
for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked
themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning.
A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without
weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be

-- deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel
is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. H
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] 2 S.C.R.

A For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was
a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown
that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual
manner. The expression 'undue advantage' as used in the provision means
'unfair advantage'.

B In the case at hand, out of the seven injuries, only injury No.2 was held
to be of grievous nature, which was sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death of the deceased. The infliction of the injuries, and their
nature proves the intention of the accused appellants, but causing of such
injuries cannot be termed to be either in a cruel or unusual manuer for ·not
C availing the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. After the injuries
were inflicted the injured has fallen down, but there is no material to show
that thereafter any injury was inflicted when he was in helpless condition.
-'
The assaults were made at random. Even the previous altercations were verbal
and not physicals. It is not the case of the prosecution that the accused
appellants had come prepared and armed for attacking the deceased. The
D previous disputes over land do not appear to have assumed characteristics of
physical combat. This goes to show that in the heat of passion upon a sudden
quarrel followed by a fight the accused persons had caused injuries on the
deceased, but had not acted in cruel or unusual manner. That being so,
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is clearly applicable. The fact situation bears
E great similarity to those in Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002] 3 sec
327). Appellants are to be convicted under Section 304 Part I, IPC and
custodial sentence of 10 years and fine as was imposed by the Trial Court
would meet the ends of justice. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated
above.

S.K.S. Appeal allowed.