GEETA MEHROTRA & ANR.versusSTATE OF U.P. & ANR.

.•




                        [2012] 9 S.C.R. 641


                     GEETA MEHROTRA & ANR.                           A
                                   v.
                       STATE OF U.P. & ANR.
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 1674 of 2012)

                         OCTOBER 17, 2012
                                                                     B
          [T.S. THAKUR AND GYAN SUDHA MISRA, JJ.]

          Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 498A/323!504!506 - Dowry
     Prohibition Act, 1961 - ss.314 - Matrimonial dispute - Quashing
     of criminal proceedings - Duty of the Court - Complaint by wife C
     against husband and in-laws - Prayer for quashing of criminal
     proceedings against unmarried sister-in-law and elder brother-
     in-law i.e. the appellants - Held: The courts are expected to
     adopt a cautious approach in matters of quashing specially
     in cases of matrimonial dispute - Mere casual reference of D
     the names of the family members in a matrimonial dispute
     without allegation of active involvement in the matter would
     not justify taking cognizance against them - On facts, the FIR
     did not disclose specific allegation against the appellants
     except casual reference of their names - In view thereof, E
     criminal proceedings quashed insofar as they were concerned.

           Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - Petition
     under - Manner of disposal - Propriety - Matrimonial dispute
      ~Complaint by wife - Prayer for quashing of criminal
     proceedings against unmarried sister-in-law and elder brother- F
     in-law i.e. the appellants inter alia on grounds of malafide
     intention on the part of complainant-wife and also lack of
     territorial jurisdiction - High Court disposed of petition uls. 482
      CrPC observing that the question of territorial jurisdiction
     could not be properly decided by it for want of adequate facts, G
     and permitting the appellants to move the trial court for
     dropping the proceedings on ground of lack of territorial
     jurisdiction - Held: The plea of territorial jurisdiction was just

                                  641                                 H
     642      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 9 S.C.R.

A     one of the grounds raised to quash the proceedings initiated
     against the appellants u/s. 482 CrPC - The High Court,
     therefore, ought to have considered that even if the trial court
     had the jurisdiction to hold the trial, the question still remained
     as to whether the trial against the appellants was fit to be
s    continued and whether that would amount to abuse of the
    process of the court - It is apparent that the High Court had
    not applied its mind on that question - It further overlooked
     the fact that during the pendency of this case, the complainant-
    wife had obtained an ex-parte decree of divorce against her
c   husband - The same could have weighed with the High Court
    to consider whether proceeding initiated prior to the divorce
    decree was fit to be pursued in spite of absence of specific
    allegations at least against the appellants - High Court did
    not examine these aspects carefully and side-tracked all
    these considerations merely on the ground that the plea of
0
    lack of territorial jurisdiction could be raised only before the
    magistrate conducting the trial.

        Remand - Practice & Procedure - Matrimonial dispute -
  Criminal proceedings initiated by wife against husband and
E in-laws - Petition by sister-in-law and brother-in-law i.e. the
  appellants for quashing of proceedings - Disposed of, by High
  Court - Appeal before Supreme Court - Question as to
  whether the matter merited fresh consideration by the High
  Court- Held: Respondent no.2-wife had lodged the complaint
F after seven years of delay, and yet the complaint lacked
  ingredients constituting the alleged offences against the
  appellants and their involvement in the whole incident
  appears only by way of a casual inclusion of their names -
  Hence, on facts, it would be total abuse of the process of law
G if the matter is remanded to the High Court to consider
  whether there were still any material to hold that the trial should
  proceed against them in spite of absence of prima facie
  material constituting the offence alleged against them - Matter
  adjudicated by Supreme Court itself - Criminal proceedings
H quashed insofar as the appellants were concerned - Penal
  GEETA MEHROTRA & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. &              643
                  ANR.
Code, 1860 - ss. 498Al323!504!506 - Dowry Prohibition Act,     A
1961 - ss.314.

     Respondent no.2 lodged FIR at Allahabad under
Sections 498A/323/504/506 IPC read with Section 3/4 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 alleging that there was
                                                               B
bickering at her matrimonial home at Faridabad, Haryana
which made her life miserable and compelled her to leave
it to live with her father at Allahabad. On the basis of the
complaint, police submitted charge-sheet against the
tiusband and in-laws of respondent no.2.
                                                               c
     Appellant no.1 and appellant no.2, the unmarried
sister-in-law and elder brother-in-law of respondent no.2
respectively, filed petition under Section 482 CrPC for
quashing of the charge-sheet and the entire proceedings
pending in the court of Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad         D
{which took cognizance against the appellants), inter-
alia, on grounds that FIR was lodged with malafide
intentions and that the incident having been alleged to
have taken place at Faridabad, investigation should have
been done there only and the arrest warrant could not          E
have been issued from Allahabad.

     The High Court disposed of the application under
Section 482 CrPC observing that the question of
territorial jurisdiction could not be properly decided by
it for want of adequate facts, and accordingly permitting      F
the appellants to move the trial court for dropping the
proceedings on the ground of lack of territorial
jurisdiction. The appellants inspite of the liberty granted
to them to move the trial court, filed the instant appeal
for quashing the proceedings.                                  G

     Allowing the appeal, the Court

    HELD: 1.1. It is apparent that the High Court has not
applied its mind on the question as to whether the case
                                                               H
    644     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012J ~ S.C.R.

A was fit to be quashed against the appellants and has
  merely disposed of the petition granting liberty to the
  appellants to move the trial court and raise contentions
  on the ground as to whether it has territorial jurisdiction
  to continue with the trial in the light of the averment that
s no part of the cause of action had arisen at Allahabad and
  the entire incident even as per the FIR had taken place
  at Faridabad. [Para 13] [653-H; 654-A-B]

         1.2. The High Court further overlooked the fact that
C during the pendency of this case, the complainant-
    respondent No.2 has obtained an ex-parte decree of
   divorce against her husband. When respondent no.2 and
   her husband are divorced, the same could have weighed
   with the High Court to consider whether proceeding
   initiated prior to the divorce decree was fit to be pursued
D in spite of absence of specific allegations at least against
   the brother and sister of the complainant's husband i.e.
   the appellants and whether continuing with this
   proceeding could not have amounted to abuse of the
   process of the court. The High Court, however, seems
E not to have examined these aspects carefully and have
   thus side-tracked all these considerations merely on the
   ground that the territorial jurisdiction could be raised only
   before the magistrate conducting the trial. [Paras 14, 22]
   [654-C; 658-E-G]
F
        1.3. The plea of territorial jurisdiction was just one of
  the grounds raised to quash the proceedings initiated
  against the appellants under Section 482 CrPC. It was
  also alleged that no prima facie case was made out
G against the appellants for initiating the proceedings
  under the Dowry Prohibition Act and other provisions of
  the IPC. The High Court, therefore, ought to have
  considered that even if the trial court at Allahabad had the
  jurisdiction to hold the trial, the question still remained as
H to whether the trial against the appellants was fit to be
  GEETA MEHROTRA & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. &              645
                  ANR.
continued and whether that would amount to abuse of            A
the process of the court. [Para 18] [656-D-E, F-G]

     1.4. It is apparent from the contents of the FIR that
there are no allegations against the appellants except
casual reference of their names who have been included         8
in the FIR but mere casual reference of the names of the
family members in a matrimonial dispute without
allegation of active involvement in the matter would not
justify taking cognizance against them overlooking the
fact borne out of experience that there is a tendency to
involve the entire family members of the household in the      C
domestic quarrel taking place in a matrimonial dispute
specially if it happens soon after the wedding. [Para 19]
[656-H; 657-A-B]

     1:5. If the FIR as it stands does not disclose specific   D
allegation against accused more so against the co-
accused specially in a matter arising out of matrimonial
bickering, it would be clear abuse of the legal and judicial
process to mechanically send the named accused in the
FIR to undergo the trial unless of course the FIR discloses    E
specific allegation~ which would persuade the court to
take cognizance of the offence alleged against the
r~latives of the main accused who are prima facie not
found to hav.e indulged in physical and mental torture of
the complainant-wife. If the FIR does not disclose the         F
commission of an offence, the court would be justified in
quashing the proceedings preventing the abuse of the
process of law. Simultaneously, the courts are expected
to adopt a cautious approach in matters of quashing
specially in cases of matrimonial dispute whether the FIR      G
in fact discloses commission of an offence by the
relatives of the principal accused or the FIR prima facie
discloses a case of over-implication by involving the
entire family of the accused at the instance of the
complainant, who is out to settle her scores arising out
                                                               H
   646     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A of the teething problem or skirmish of domestic bickering
  while settling down in her new matrimonial surrounding.
  [Para 24] [659-G-H; 660-A-D]

       1.6. Responqent no.2 had lodged the complaint after
  seven years of delay, and yet the complaint as it stands
8
  lacks ingredients constituting the offence under Section
  498A and Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act against the
  appellants and their involvement in the whole incident
  appears only by way of a casual inclusion of their names.
  Hence, it would be total abuse of the process of law if the
C matter is remanded to the High Court to consider whether
  there were still any material to hold that the trial should
  proceed against them in spite of absence of prima facie
  material constituting the offence alleged against them.
  [Para 23] [659-C-E]
D
       1.7. As the contents of the FIR does not disclose
  specific allegation against the appellants except casual
  reference of their names, it would not be just to direct
  them to go through protracted procedure by remanding
E for consideration of the matter all over again by the High
  Court and make the appellants to suffer the ordeal of a
  criminal case pending against them specially when the
  FIR does not disclose ingredients of offence under
  Sections 498A/323/504/506, IPC and Sections 3/4 of the
F Dowry Prohibition Act. [Para 26] [661-B-D]

       1.8. It is, therefore, deemed just and legally
  appropriate to quash the proceedings initiated against
  the appellants as the FIR does not disclose any material
  which could be held to be constituting any offence
G against these two appellants. In view of the mere general
  allegation that they were also involved in physical and
  mental torture of the complainant-respondent No.2
  without mentioning even a single incident against them
  as also the fact as to how they could be motivated to
H demand dowry when they are only related as brother and
  GEETA MEHROTRA & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. &                 647
                  ANR.

sister of the complainant's husband, the criminal                 A
proceedings insofar as these appellants are concerned
are quashed and set aside and consequently the order
passed by the High Court shall stand overruled. [Para 27]
[661-E-G]
                                                                  B
     Ramesh v. State of Tamil Nadu (2005) SCC (Crl.) 735;
G. V. Rao v. L.H. V. Prasad & Ors. (2000) 3 SCC 693: 2000
(2) SCR 123 and 8. S. Joshi& Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr.
AIR (2003) SC 1386: 2003 (2) SCR 1104 - referred to.

                     Case Law Reference:                          c
    (2005) SCC (Crl.) 735     referred to           Para 15

    2000 (2) SCR 123          referred to           Para 20
    2003 (2) SCR 1104         referred to           Para 21       D
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1674 of 2012.

     From the Judgment & Order dated 06.09.2010 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Misc. Application No. 22714   E
of 2007.

    Anoop G. Chowdhary, KB Rohatgi, Aparna Rohatgi Jain,
Sanjay Kumar Singhal for the Appellants.

    Ajay Kumar Misra, Sabha Dixit, Anuradha D. Misra, Tulika      F
Mukherjee, Bharat Dubey, Anuradha & Associates, Pradeep
Misra, Malvika Trivedi, Manoj Kr. Sharma for the Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J. 1. This appeal by special leave          G
in which we granted leave has been filed by the appellants
against the order dated 6.9.2010 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad in Crl. Miscellaneous Application
No.22714/2007 whereby the High Court had been pleased to
                                                                  H
    648      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A dispose of the application moved by the appellants under
  Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the order of the Magistrate
  taking cognizance against the appellants under Sections 498A/
  323/504/506 IPC read with Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition
  Act with an observation that the question of territorial jurisdiction
B cannot be properly decided by the High Court under Section
  482 Cr.P.C. for want of adequate facts. It was, therefore, left
  open to the appellants to move the trial court for dropping the
  proceedings on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The
  High Court however granted interim protection to the appellants
c by directing the authorities not to issue coercive process
  against the appellants until disposal of the application filed by
  the appellants with a further direction to the trial court to dispose
  of the application if moved by the appellants, within a period
  of two months from the date of moving the application. The
D application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was thus disposed of
  by the High Court.

       2. The appellants in spite of the liberty granted to them to
  move the trial court, have filed this appeal for quashing the
  proceedings which had been initiated on the basis of a case
E lodged by the respondent No.2 Smt. Shipra Mehrotra (earlier
  known as Shipra Seth) against her husband, father-in-law,
  mother-in-law, brother-in-law and sister-in-law. This appeal has
  been preferred by the sister-in-law, who is appellant No.1 and
  brother-in•ffiw of the complainant, who is appellant No.2.
F
       3. The case emerges out of the first information report
  lodged by respondent No.2 Smt. Shipra Mehrotra under
  Sections 498A/323/504/506 IPC read with Section 3/4 of the
  Dowry Prohibition Act bearing F.l.R.No. 52/2004. The F.l.R. was
G registered at Mahila Thana Daraganj, Allahabad wherein the
  complainant alleged that she was married to Shyamji Mehrotra
  s/o Balbir Saran who was living at Eros Garden, Charmswood
  Village, Faridabad, Suraj Kund Road at Faridabad Haryana as
  per the Hindu marriage rites and customs. Prior to marriage
H the complainant and her family members were told by Shyamji
  GEETA MEHROTRA & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. &                   649
        ANR. [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
Mehrotra and his elder brother Ramji Mehrotra who is appellant      A
No.2 herein and their mother Smt. Kamla Mehrotra and her
sister Geeta Mehrotra who is appellant No.1 herein that Shyamji
is employed as a Team Leader in a top l.T. Company in
Chennai and is getting salary of Rs.45,000/- per month. After
negotiation between the parents of the complainant and the          B
accused parties, the marriage of the complainant Shipra Seth
(later Shipra Mehrotra) and Shyamji Mehrotra was performed
after which the respondent-complainant left for the house of her
in-laws.

      4. It was stated that the atmosphere in the house was         C
peaceful for sometime but soon after the wedding, when all the
relatives left, the maid who cooked meals was first of all paid-
off by the aforesaid four persons who then told the complainant
that from now onwards, the complainant will have to prepare
food for the family. In addition, the above mentioned people        D
started taunting and scolding her on trivial issues. The
complainant also came to know that Shyamji was not employed
anywhere and always stayed in the house. Shyamji gradually
took away all the money which the complainant had with her
and then told her that her father had not given dowry properly,     E
therefore, she should get Rupees five lakhs from her father in
order to enable him to start business, because he was not
getting any job. When the complainant clearly declined and
stated that she will not ask her parents for money, Shyamji, on
instigation of other accused-family members, started beating        F
her occasionally. To escape every day torture and financial
status of the family, the complainant took up a job in a Call
Centre at Convergys on 17.2.2003 where the complainant had
to do night shifts due to which she used to come back home
at around 3 a.m. in the morning. Just on her return from work,      G
the household people started playing bhajan cassettes after
which she had to getup at 7'o clock in the morning to prepare
and serve food to all the members in the family. Often on falling
asleep in the morning, Shyamji, Kamla Devi and Geeta
Mehrotra tortured the complainant every day mentally and            H
    650      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A   physically. Ramji Mehrotra often provoked the other three family
    members to torture and often used to make the complainant
    feel sad by making inappropriate statements about the
    complainant and her parents. Her husband Shyamji also took
    away the salary from the complainant.
B
           5. After persistent efforts, Shyamji finally got a job in
    Chennai and he went to Chennai for the job in May, 2003. But,
    it is alleged that there was no change in his behaviour even after
   going to Chennai. The complainant often called him on phone
   to talk to him but he always did irrelevant conversation. He
C never spoke properly with the complainant whenever he visited
    home and often used to hurl filthy abuses. The complainant
   states that she often wept and tolerated the tortures of the
   accused persons for a long time but did not complain to her
   family members, as that would have made them feel sad. At
D last, when the complainant realized that even her life was in
   danger, she was compelled to tell everything to her father on
   phone who was very upset on hearing her woes. On 15. 7 .2003
   complainant heard some conversation of her mother-in-law and
   sister-in-law from which it appeared to her that they want to kill
E the complainant in the night only. Thereupon the complainant
   apprised her father of the situation on phone to which her father
   replied that he will call back her father-in-law ar,j she should
   go with him immediately and he will come in the morning. The
  ·father-in-law Satish Dhawan and his wife who were living in
F NOIDA thereafter came in the night and somehow took the
   complainant to their home who also came to know of
   everything. The complainant's father and brother later went to
   her matrimonial home on 16.7.2003. On seeing her father and
   brother, Kamla Mehrotra and Geeta Mehrotra started speaking
G loudly and started saying that Shyamji would be coming by the
   evening and so he should come in the evening for talking to
   them. Her father and brother then went away from there. That
   very day, her husband Shyamji and brother-in-law Ramji also
   reached home. On reaching there, Shyamji abused her on
H phone and told her to send her father.
   GEETA MEHROTRA & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. &                  651
         ANR. [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
      6. When father and brother of the complainant went home        A
in the evening, they were also insulted by all the four and video
camera and tape were played and in the end they were told
that they should leave from here. Insulted, they came back from
there and then came back to Allahabad with the complainant.
For many days the complainant and her family members hoped           B
that the situation would improve if the matter was resolved.
Many times other people tried to persuade the in - laws but to
no avail. Her brother went to their house to talk to her in - laws
but it came to his knowledge that the in - laws had changed
their house. After much effort, they came to know that the father-   c
in-law and mother-in-law started living at B-39, Brahma
cooperative group housing society, block 7, sector-7, Dwarka,
Delhi. On 19.09.04 evening, her father talked to Kamla Mehrotra
and Geeta Mehrotra regarding the complainant using bad
words and it was said that if her daughter came there she will       0
be kicked out. After some time Shyamji rang up at
complainant's home but on hearing the complainant's voice, he
told her abusively that now she should not come his way and
she should tell her father not to phone him in future. At
approximately 10:30 pm in the night Ramji's phone came to the        E
complainant's home. He used bad words while talking to her
father and in the end said that he had got papers prepared in
his defence and he may do whatever he could but if he could
afford to give Rs.10 lakhs then it should be conveyed after which
he will reconsider the matter. lf the girl was sent to his place
without money, then even her dead body will not be found.            F

     7. On hearing these talks of the accused, the complainant
believed that her in-laws will not let the complainant enter their
home without taking ten lakhs and if the complainant went there
on her own, she will not be safe. Hence, she lodged the report       G
wherein she prayed that the SHO Daraganj should be ordered
to do the needful after registering the case against the accused
Shyam Mehrotra, Ramji Mehrotra, Kamla Mehrotra and Geeta
Mehrotra. Thus, in substance, the complainant related the
bickering at her matrimonial home which made her life                H
    652      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A   miserable in several ways and compelled her to leave her in-
    law's place in order to live with her father where she lodged a
    police case as stated hereinbefore.

        8. On the basis of the complaint, the investigating
    authorities at P.S. Daraganj, Allahabad started investigation of
8
    the case and thereafter the police submitted chargesheet
    against the appellants and other family members of the
    complainant's husband.

         9. Hence, the appellants who are sister and brother of the
C   complainant's husband filed petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
    for quashing of the chargesheet and the entire proceedings
    pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Court No.IV,
    Allahabad, inter-alia, on the ground that FIR has been lodged
    with mala fide intentions to harass the appellants and that no
D   case was made out against the appellants as well as other
    family members. But the principal ground of challenge to the
    FIR was that the incident although was alleged to have taken
    place at Faridabad and the investigation should have been
    done there only, the complainant with mala fide intention in
E   connivance with the father of the complainant, got the
    investigating officer to record the statements by visiting
    Ghaziabad which was beyond his territorial jurisdiction and
    cannot be construed as legal and proper investigation. It was
    also alleged that the father of the complainant got the arrest
F   warrant issued through George Town Police Station, Allahabad,
    in spite of the cause of action having arisen at Allahabad.

       10. This appeal has been preferred by Kumari Geeta
  Mehrotra i.e. the sister of the complainant's husband and Ramji
  Mehrotra i.e. the elder brother of the complainant's husband
G assailing the order of the High Court and it was submitted that
  the Hon'ble High Court ought to have appreciated that the
  complainant who had already obtained an ex-parte decree of
  divorce, is pursuing the present case through her father with the
  sole purpose to unnecessarily harass the appellants to extract
H money from them as all efforts of mediation had failed.
  GEETA MEHROTRA & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. &                     653
        ANR. [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
     11. However, the grounds of challenge before this Court          A
to the order of the High Court, inter alia is that the High Cou!"t
had failed to appreciate that the investigation had been done
by the authority without following due process of law which also
lacked territorial jurisdiction. The relevant documents/parcha
diary for deciding the territorial jurisdiction had been overlooked   B
as the FIR has been lodged at Allahabad although the cause
of action of the entire incident is alleged to have taken place
at Faridabad (Haryana). It was, therefore, $Ubmitted that the
investigating authorities of the Allahabad have traversed
beyond the territorial limits which is clearly an abuse of the        c
process of law and the High Court has failed ·to exercise its
inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the facts and
circumstances of this case and allowed the proceedings to go
on before the trial court although it had no jurisdiction to
adjudicate the same.
                                                                      D
      12. It was further averred that the High Court had failed to
examine the facts of the FIR to see whether the facts stated in
the FIR constitute any prima facie case making out an offence
against the sister-in-law and brother-in-law of the complainant
and whether there was at all any material to constitute an            E
offence against the appellants and their family members.
Attention of this Court was further invited to the contradictions
in the statement of the complainant and her father which indicate
mciterial contradictions indicating that the complainant and her      -
father have concocted the story to implicate the appellants as        F
well as all their family members in a criminal case merely with
a mala fide intention to settle her scores and extract money
from the family of her ex-husband Shyamji Mehrotra and his
family members.
                                                                      G
     13. On a perusal of the complaint and other materials on
record as also analysis of the arguments advanced by the
contesting parties in the light of the settled principles of law
reflected in a catena of decisions, it is apparent that the High
Court has not applied its mind on the question as to whether
                                                                      H
    654      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A the case was fit to be quashed against the appellants and has
  merely disposed of the petition granting liberty to the appellants
  to move the trial court and raise contentions on the ground as
  to whether it has territorial jurisdiction to continue with the trial
  in the light of the averment that no part of the cause of action
B had arisen at Allahabad and the entire incident even as per the
  FIR had taken place at Faridabad.

        14. The High Court further overlooked the fact that during
  the pendency of this case, the complainant-respondent No.2
C has obtained an ex-parte decree of divorce against her
   husband Shyamji Mehrotra and the High Court failed to apply
   its mind whether any case could be held to have been made
  out against Kumari Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra, who
  are the unmarried sister and elder brother of the complainant's
  ex-husband. Facts of the FIR even as it stands indicate that
D
  although a prima facie case against the husband Shyamji
  Mehrotra and some other accused persons may or may not be
  constituted, it surely appears to be a case where no ingredients
  making out a case against the unmarried sister of the accused
  Shyamji Mehrotra and his brother Ramji Mehrotra appear to be
E existing for even when the complainant came to her in-law's
  house after her wedding, she has alleged physical and mental
  torture by stating in general that she had been ordered to do
  household activities of cooking meals for the whole family. But
  there appears to be no specific allegation against the sister and
F brother of the complainant's husband as to how they could be
  implicated into the mutual bickering between the complainant
  and her husband Shyamji Mehrotra including his parents.
        15. Under the facts and circumstance of similar nature in
G the case of Ramesh vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2005)
  sec (Crl.) 735 at 738 allegations were made in a complaint
  against the husband, the in-laws, husband's brother and sister
  who were all the petitioners before the High Court wherein after
  registration of the F.l.R. and investigation, the charge sheet was
H filed by the Inspector of Police in the court of Judicial Magistrate
   GEETA MEHROTRA & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. &                655
         ANR. [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
Ill, Trichy. Thereupon, the learned magistrate took cognizance A
of the offence and issued warrants against the appellants on
13.2.2002. Four of the accused-appellants were arrested and
released on bail by the magistrate at Mumbai. The appellants
had filed petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. before the Madras
High Court for quashing the proceedings in complaint case on B
the file of the Judicial Magistrate Ill, Trichy. The High Court by
the impugned order dismissed the petition observing that the
grounds raised by the petitioners were all subject matters to be
heard by the trial court for better appreciation after conducting
full trial as the High Court was of the view that it was only     c
desirable to dismiss the criminal original petition and the same
was also dismissed. However, the High Court had directed the
Magistrate to dispense with the personal attendance of the
appellants.

      16. Aggrieved by the order of the Madras High Court D
dismissing the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the special
leave petition was filed in this Court giving rise to the appeals
therein where threefold contentions were raised viz., (i) that the
allegations are frivolous and without any basis; (ii) even
according to the FIR, no incriminating acts were done within the E
jurisdiction of Trichy Police Station and the court at Trichy and,
therefore, the learned magistrate lacked territorial jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the offence and (iii) taking cognizance
of the alleged offence at that stage was barred under Section
468(1) Cr.P.C. as it was beyond the period of limitation F
prescribed under Section 468(2) Cr.P.C. Apart from the
subsequent two contentions, it was urged that the allegations
under the FIR do not make out any offence of which cognizance
could be taken.
                                                                   G
      17. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in this matter
had been pleased to hold that the bald allegations made against
the sister in law by the complainant appeared to suggest the
anxiety of the informant to rope in as many of the husband's
relatives as possible. It was held that neither the FIR nor the H
    656      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A   charge sheet furnished the legal basis for the magistrate to
    take cognizance of the offences alleged against the appellants.
    The learned Judges were pleased to hold that looking to the
    allegations in the FIR and the contents of the charge sheet, none
    of the alleged offences under Section 498 A, 406 and Section
B   4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act were made against the married
    sister of the complainant's husband who was undisputedly not
    living with the family of the complainant's husband. Their
    Lordships of the Supreme Court were pleased to hold that the
    High Court ought not to have relegated the sister in law to the
c   ordeal of trial. Accordingly, the proceedings against the
    appellants were quashed and the appeal was allowed.

        18. In so far as the plea of territorial jurisdiction is
  concerned, it is no doubt true that the High Court was correct
  to the extent that the question of territorial jurisdiction could be
D decided by the trial court itself. But this ground wa·s just one of
  the grounds to quash the proceedings initiated against the
  appellants under Section 482° Cr.P.C. wherein it was also
  alleged that no prima facie case was made out against the
  appellants for initiating the proceedings under the Dowry
E Prohibition Act and other provisions of the IPC. The High Court
  has failed to exercise its jurisdiction in so far as the
  consideration of the case of the appellants are concerned, who
  are only brother and sister of the complainant's husband and
  are not alleged even by the complainant to have demanded
F dowry from her. The High Court, therefore, ought to have
  considered that even if the trial court at Allahabad had the
  jurisdiction to hold the trial, the question still remained as to
  whether the trial against the brother and sister of the husband
  was fit to be continued and whether that would amount to abuse
G of the process of the court.

         19. Coming to the facts of this case, when the contents of
    the FIR is perused, it is apparent that there are no allegations
    against Kumari Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra except
    casual reference of their names who have been included in the
H
  GEETA MEHROTRA & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. &                 657
        ANR. [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
FIR but mere casual reference of the names of the family A
members in a matrimonial dispute without allegation of active
involvement in the matter would not justify taking cognizance
against them overlooking the fact borne out of experience that
there is a tendency to involve the entire family members of the
household in the domestic quarrel taking place in a matrimonial B
dispute specially if it happens soon after the wedding.

     20. It would be relevant at this stage to take note of an apt
observation of this Court recorded in the matter of G. V. Rao
vs. L.H. V. Prasad & Ors. reported in (2000) 3 SCC 693
wherein also in a matrimonial dispute, this Court had held that C
the High Court should have quashed the complaint arising out
of a matrimonial dispute wherein all family members had been
roped into the matrimonial litigation which was quashed and
set aside. Their Lordships observed therein with which we
entirely agree that:                                               D

    "there has been an outburst of matrimonial dispute in
    recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, main
    purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle
    down in life and, live peacefully. But little matrimonial E
    skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious
    proportions resulting in heinous crimes in which elders of
    the family are also involved with the result that those who
    could have counselled and brought about rapprochement
    are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused F
    in the criminal case. There are many reasons which need
    not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial
    litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults
    and terminate the disputes amicably by mutual agreement
    instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes G
    years and years to conclude and in that process the
    parties lose their "young" days in chasing their cases in
    different courts."

The view taken by the judges in this matter was that the courts
would not encourage such disputes.                                H
    658       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A         21. In yet another case reported in AIR 2003 SC 1386 in
    the matter of B. S. Joshi & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Anr. it
    was observed that there is no doubt that the object of
    introducing Chapter XXA containing Section 498A in the Indian
     Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman by her
B   husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498A was
    added with a view to punish the husband and his relatives who
    harass or torture the wife to coerce her relatives to satisfy
    unlawful demands of dowry. But if the proceedings are initiated
    by the wife under Section 498A against the husband and his
c   relatives and subsequently she has settled her disputes with her
    husband and his relatives and the wife and husband agreed
    for mutual divorce, refusal to exercise inherent powers by the
    High Court would not be proper as it would prevent woman from
    settling earlier. Thus for the purpose of securing the ends of
    justice quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320
0
    Cr.P.C. would not be a bar to the exercise of power of
    quashing. It would however be a different matter depending
    upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to
    exercise or not to exercise such a power.

E         22. In the instant matter, when the complainant and her
    husband are divorced as the complainant-wife secured an ex-
    parte decree of divorce, the same could have weighed with the
    High Court to consider whether proceeding initiated prior to the
    divorce decree was fit to be pursued in spite of absence of
F   specific allegations at least against the brother and sister of
    the complainant's husband and whether continuing with this
    proceeding could not have amounted to abuse of the process
    of the court. The High Court, however, seems not to have
    examined these aspects carefully and have thus side-tracked
G   all these considerations merely on the ground that the territorial
    jurisdiction could be raised only before the magistrate
    conducting the trial.

        23. In the instant case, the question of territorial jurisdiction
    was just one of the grounds for quashing the proceedings along
H
   GEETA MEHROTRA & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. &                   659
         ANR. [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
 with the other grounds and, therefore, the High Court should A
 have examined whether the prosecution case was fit to be
 quashed on other grounds or not. At this stage, the question
 also crops up whether the matter is fit to be remanded to the
 High Court to consider all these aspects. But in matters arising
 out bf a criminal case, fresh consideration by remanding the B
 same would further result into a protracted and vexatious
 proceeding which is unwarranted as was held by this Court in
 the case of Ramesh vs. State of Tamil Nadu (supra) that such
 a course of remand would be unnecessary and inexpedient as
 there was no need to prolong the controversy. The facts in this      c
 matter on this aspect was although somewhat different since
 the complainant had lodged the complaint after seven years of
 delay, yet in the ins~ant matter the factual position remains that
.the complaint as it stands lacks ingredients constituting the
 offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition
                                                                    0
 Act against the appellants who are sister and brother of the.
 complainant's husband and their involvement in the whole
 incident appears only by way of a casual inclusion of their
 names. Hence, it cannot be overlooked that it would be total
 abuse of the process of law if we were to remand the matter
 to the High Court to consider whether there were still any E
 material to hold that the trial should proceed against them in
 spite of absence of prima facie material constituting the offence
 alleged against them.

     24. However, we deem it appropriate to add by way of             F
caution that we may not be misunderstood so as to infer that
even if there are allegation of overt act indicating the complicity
of the members of the famil_y named in the FIR in a given case,
cognizance would be unjustified but what we wish to emphasize
by highlighting is that, if the FIR as it stands does not disclose    G
specific allegation against accused more so against the co-
accused specially in a matter arising out of matrimonial
bickering, it would be clear abuse of the legal and judicial
process to mechanically send the named accused in the FIR
to undergo the trial unless of course the FIR discloses specific      H
    660      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 9 S.C.R.

A allegations which would persuade the court to take· cognisance
  of the offence alleged against the relatives of the main accused
  who are prima facie not found to have indulged in physical and
  mental torture of the complainant-wife. It is the well settled
  principle laid down in cases too numerous to mention, that if
B the FIR did not disclose the commission of an offence, the court
  would be justified in quashing the proceedings preventing the
  abuse of the process of law. Simultaneously, the courts are
  expected to adopt a cautious approach in matters of quashing
  specially in cases of matrimonial dispute whether the FIR in fact
c discloses commission of an offence by the relatives of the
  principal accused or the FIR prima facie discloses a case of
  over-implication by involving the entire family of the accused at
  the instance of the complainant, who is out to settle her scores
  arising out of the teething problem or skirmish of domestic
  bickering while settling down in her new matrimonial
0
  surrounding.

        25. In the case at hand, when the brother and unmarried
  sister of the principal accused Shyamji Mehrotra approached
  the High Court for quashing the proceedings against them, inter-
E alia, on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction as also on
  the ground that no case was made out against them under
  Sections 498A,/323/504/506 including Sections 3/4 of the
   Dowry Prohibffion Act, it was the legal duty of the High Court
  to examine whether there were prima facie material against the
F appellants so that they could be directed to undergo the trial,
  besides the question of territorial jurisdiction. The High Court
  seems to have overlooked all the pleas that were raised and
  rejected the petition on the solitary ground of territorial
  jurisdiction giving liberty to the appellants to approach the trial
G court.

          26. The High Court in our considered opinion appear to
    have missed that assuming the trial court had territorial
    jurisdiction, it was still left to be decided whether it was a fit
    case to send the appellants for trial when the FIR failed to
H
  GEETA MEHROTRA & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. &                  661
        ANR. [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
make out a prima facie case against them regarding the              A
allegation of inflicting physical and mental torture to the
complainant demanding dowry from the complainant. Since the
High Court has failed to consider all these aspects, this Court
as already stated hereinbefore, could have remitted the matter
to the High Court to- consider whether a case was made out          B
against the appellants to proceed against them. But as the
contents of the FIR does not disclose specific allegation against
the brother and sister of the complainant's husband except
casual reference of their names, it would not be just to direct
them to go through protracted procedure by remanding for            c
consideration of the matter all over again by the High Court and
make the unmarried sister of the main accused and his elder
brother to suffer the ordeal of a criminal case pending against
them specially when the FIR does not disclose ingredients of
offence under Sections 498A/323/504/506, IPC and Sections
                                                                    0
3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

     27. We, therefore, deem it just and legally appropriate to
quash the proceedings initiated against the appellants Geeta
Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra as the FIR does not disclose any
material which could be held to be constituting any offence         E
against these two appellants. Merely by making a general
allegation that they were also involved in physical and mental
torture of the complainant-respondent No.2 without mentioning
even a single incident against them as also the fact as to how
they could be motivated to demand dowry when they are only          F
related as brother and sister of the complainant's husband, we
are pleased to quash and set aside the criminal proceedings
in so far as these appellants are concerned and consequently
the order passed by the High Court shall stand overruled. The
appeal accordingly is allowed.                                      G

B.B.B.                                         Appeal allowed.