GAYATHRIversusM. GIRISH

                          •
                         ~016] 4 S.C.R. 15

                              GAYATHRI                                   A
                                  v.
                               M. GIRISH
           (Special Leave Petition (C) No. 22628of2016)
                              JULY27,2016                                8

    [DIPAK MISRA AND ROHINTON I<. NARIMAN, JJ.)
      Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or. XVII, rr. 1 & 2 - Multiple
Adjournments - Dilatory tactics adopted by parties - Abuse of
process of Court - Practice deprecated - In a suit filed in 2007 by
Respondent-Plaintiff, a. septuagenarian, for recovery of possession
                                                                         c
and damages, examination-in-chief continued for long and the
matter was adjourned seven times - Defendant sought adjournment
after adjournment for cross-examination, on some pretext or the
other - Permission granted by trial court, despite such indulgence
neither defendant nor her counsel turned up, matter adjourned yet        D
again - Eventually on 22.2.16, the defendant filed application under
Or. XVIII, rr.17 seeking further cross-examination of Plaintiff.
declined - Held: Non-concern shown by the defendant towards the
proceedings of the Court is absolutely manifest - Marathon of
interlocutory applications filed showing disregard to Plaintiff's old
                                                                         E
age - Defendant acted in a 1i10nner causing colossal insult to justice
and to the concept of speedy disposal of civil litigation - Virus of
seeking adjournment has to be controlled - Cost of Rs.50,0001-
imposed, failing which right of the defendant to examine its
witnesses shall stand foreclosed.
                                                                         F
       Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or. XVII, rr. l& 2 -
Adjournments - Institutional responsibility of counsels - A counsel
appearing for a litigant has to have institutional responsibility -
The Code of Civil Procedure so commands - Applications not to be
filed on flimsy grounds and in a brazen and obtrusive manner - It
is wholly reprehensible - Legal profession - Professional ethics.        G
   · Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or. XVIII, r.17 - Court's
power to recall and examine witnesses - Purpose of filing
applications under. reiterated.

                                                                         H
                                   15
16            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2016] 4 S.C.R.



A         Dismissing the Special Leave Petition, the Court
           HELD: 1.1. In the case at hand; the examination-in-chief
     continued for long and the matter was adjourned seven times.
     The defendant sought adjournment after adjournment for cross-
     examination on some pretext or the other which are. really not
B    entertainable in law. But the trial Court eventually granted
     permission subject to payment of costs. Regardless of the
     allowance extended, the defendant stood embedded on his
     adamantine platform and prayed for adjournment as if it was his
     right to seek adjournment on any ground whatsoever and in any
     circumstance. The non-concern of the defendant-petitioner shown
c    towards the proceedings of the Court was absolutely manifest.
     The disregard shown to the plaintiff's age was also visible from
     the marathon of interlocutory applications filed. A counsel
     appearing for a litigant has to have institutional responsibility.
     The Code of Civil Procedure so commands. Applications not to
D    be filed in such a brazen and obtrusive manner. It is wholly
     reprehensible. The law does not countenance it. [Para 10) [21-
     D-H)
           1.2. In the case at hand, the defendant-petitioner acted in a
     manner to cause colossal insult to justice and to the concept of
E    speedy disposal of civil litigation. The virus of seeking
     adjournment has to be controlled. The saying of Gita "Awake!
     Arise! Oh! Partha" is apt here to be stated for guidance of trial
     courts. Cost of Rs.50,000/- imposed, to be paid to the State Legal
     Services Authority, Karnataka, failing which the right of defence
     to examine its witnesses would stand foreclosed. [Paras 13 and
F    14) [23-A-D)
                           Case Law Reference·
          2011 (4) SCR 31                 referred to         Para 6
          2013 (2) SCR 116                referred to         Para 8
G         2011 (10) SCR 787               referred to         Para 11
          2013 (3) SCR 1146               referred to         Para 12
          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition
     No. 22628 of2016.
           From the Judgment and Order dated 14.07.2016 of the High Court
H    of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Writ Petition No. 36022 of2016.
                      GAYATHRI v. M. GIRISH                                     17



      Ashwin V. Kotemath, Mrs. S. Usha Reddy, Advs. for the                     A
Appellant.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
        DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. If a case ever exposed the maladroit
efforts ofa litigant to indulge in abuse of the process of Court, the present
one is a resplendent example. The factual narration, to which we shall          B
advert to immediately hereinafter, would limpidly show that the defendant-
petitioner has endeavoured very hard to master the art of adjournment
and on occasions having been successful become quite ambitious. And
the ambition had no bounds; it could reach the Everestine heights or to
put it differently, could engulf the entire Pacific Ocean.                      c
        2. The factual expose' as is evincible from the impugned orders,
the respondent filed OS No.1712 of 2007 for recovery of possession
and damages. The general power of attorney holder through which the
plaintiff prosecuted the litigation was examined on 13.1.2009 in chief
and it was completed on 12.9.2012. It is worthy to note here that for           D
examination-in-chief, the witness was constrained to come to court on
seven occasions. Thereafter, the defendant filed an interlocutory
application under Order XVII Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure seeking adjournment of the matter for one month on the
ground that the mother of the senior counsel was unwell. The matter
stood adjourned. As the facts would further unfold, the defendant filed         E
I.A. No.9 under the very same provision seeking adjournment on the
ground that the counsel engaged by him was not keeping well. I.A.
No. I 0 was filed seeking adjournment for one month on the ground that
the senior counsel was out of station. I.A. No. I I was filed on the plea
that the defendant was unable to get certified copies of 'P' series             F
documents. The fifth application, i.e., IA No.12 was filed on the similar
ground. The incurable habit continued and I.A. no.13 was filed seeking
adjournment on the ground that the counsel was busy in the marriage
ceremony of a relative. And, the matter stood adjourned. The proceedings
 in the suit got arrested as if"time" had been arrested. Despite filing of
 so many interlocutory applications, the defendant remained indefatigable       G
with obsessed consistency and again filed I.A. No.14 on the ground that
 certified copies were required by her. Thereafter, I.A. No.15 was
 preferred to recall PW-I for cross-examination on the foundation that
 on the previous occasion, the senior counsel who was engaged by the
 defendant was busy in some other court. The learned trial Judge, hoping        H
18                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      (20 I 6] 4 S.C.R.



A    that all his owe would be over and the disease of adjournment affecting
     the marrows oflitigation would be kept at bay, allowed the said application
     on 27.5.2013 subject to payment of costs of Rs.800/-.
            3. We must state here that the learned trial Judge was in total
     illusion, for the defendant-petitioner had some other design in mind. We
B    are prompted to say so, had the story ended there, possibly the trial
     court's assessment of phenomenon would have been correct and the
     matter would not have travelled to this Court. But it was not to be so. In
     spite of the court granting adjournment subject to payment of costs, the
     defendant chose not to cross-examine the witness and continued filing
     interlocutory applications forming the subject matters of I.A. Nos.16,
c    17, 19, 20 and 21 and the ordeal of the plaintiff, a septuagenarian,
     continued. The difficulties faced by an old man when he is compelled to
     come to Court so many times to give evidence can be well imagined. In
     spite of this, the trial court adjourned the matter to 3.10.2015.
     Notwithstanding the unwarranted indulgence shown, the defendant
D    remained adamant and thought it wise not to participate in the suit. On
     3.10.2015, though the witness was present, neither the defendant nor
     her counsel turned up. The trial Court posted the suit for defendant's
     evidence and adjourned the matter. After the aforesaid order came to
     be passed, on 22.2.20 I 6 IA No.22 of 2016 was filed seeking fu11her
     cross-examination of the plaintiff. The said prayer was declined by the
E    trial court with costs of Rs.1,000/-.
           4. Grieved by the aforesaid order passed by the learned trial
     Judge, the defendant preferred, W.P. No.36022 of 2016 (GM-CPC)
     before the High Court ofKarnataka at Bangalore and the learned Single
     Judge, vide order dated 14.07.2016 recorded the facts, placed reliance
F    on K. K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy1 and held as follows :-
              "6. The impugned order is a narration of ciassic case of abuse of
              process of law. Trial Court has rejected the said application by
              na1Tating in detail the conduct of petitioner - defendant. Hence,
              there is no error in the order passed by the Trial Cou11."
G
           Eventually, the High Cout1 dismissed the writ petition without
     imposition of any costs.
           5. We have heard, Mr. Ashwin K. Kotemath, learned counsel for
     the petitioner. We have narrated the facts in great detail so that what
H    1
         (2011 l 11 sec 21s
         GAYATHRI v. M. GIRISH [DIPAK MISRA, J.]                                19



we have said in the beginning with regard to the abuse of the process of        A
court gets fortified.
      6. In K.K. Velusamy (supra), while dealing with the power of the
Court under Order XVIII Rule I 7, this Court held that:-
      "9. Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code enables the court, at any stage
      of a suit, to recall any witness who has been examined (subject to        B
      the law of evidence for the time being in force) and put such
      questions to him as it thinks fit. The power to recall any witness
      under Order 18 Rule 17 can be exercised by the court either on
      its own motion or on an application filed by any of the parties to
      the suit requesting the court to exercise the said power. The power       c
      is discretionary and should be used sparingly in appropriate cases
      to enable the cou1t to clarify any doubts it may have in regard to
      the evidence led by the parties. The said power is not intended to
      be used to fill up omissions in the evidence ofa witness who has
      already been examined. (Vide Vadiraj Naggappa Yernekar v.
      Sharadchandra Prabhakar Gogate - 2009 (4) SCC 410].                       D

      10. Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code is not a provision intended to
      enable the parties to recall any witnesses for their further
      examination-in- chief or cross-examination or to place additional
      material or evidence which could not be produced when the
      evidence was being recorded. Order 18 Rule 17 is primarily a              E
      provision enabling the court to clarify any issue or doubt, by
      recalling any witness either suo moto, or at the request of any
      party, so that the court itself can put questions and elicit answers.
      Once a witness is recalled for purposes of such clarification, it
      may, of course, permit the parties to assist it by putting some           F
      questions."
      And again:-
      "19. We may add a word of caution. The power under Section
      151 or Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code is not intended to be used
      routinely, merely for the asking. If so used, it will defeat the very     G
      purpose of various amendments to the Code to expedite trials.
      But where the application is found to be bona fide and where the
      additional evidence, oral or documentary, w'ill assist the court to
      clarify the evidence on the issues and will assist in renderingjustice,
      and the court is satisfied that non-production earlier was for valid
                                                                                H
20                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2016] 4 S.C.R.


A          and sufficient reasons, the court may exercise its discretion to
           recall the witnesses or permit the fresh evidence. But if it does
           so, it should ensure that the process does not become a protracting
           tactic. The court should firstly award appropriate costs to the
           other party to compensate for the delay. Secondly, the com1 should
           take up and complete the ca'e ;, iLi1in a fixed time schedule so
B
           that the delay is avoided. Thirdly, ifthe application is found to be
           mischievous, or frivolous, or to cover up negligence or lacunae, it
           should be rejected with heavy costs.
           x           x                x                 x                 x
           21. Ideally, the recording of evidence should be continuous, followed
c          by arguments, without any gap. Courts should constantly
           endeavour to follow such a time schedule. The amended Code
           expects them to do so. If that is done, applications for
           adjournments, re-opening, recalling, or interim measures could be
           avoidedc The more the period of pendency, the more the number
D          of interlocutory applications which in turn add to the period of
           pendency."
             7. We have referred to the said paragraphs to show the purpose
     of filing an application under Order XVJJI Rule I 7 of the Code. We may
     add that though in the said decision th is Court allowed the appeals in
E    part, the fact situation, the co~1duct of the party and the grievance agitated
     were different. The Court also thought it apposite to add a word of
     caution and also laid down that ifthe application is mischievous or frivolous,
     it is desirable to reject the application with costs.
            8. In this context, we may fruitfully refer to Bagai Co11structio11
F    Tltrouglt its proprietor La/it Bagai v. Gupta Buildi11g Material Store~.
     In the said case the Court had expressed its concern about 'the order
     passed by the High Court whereby it had allowed the application preferred
     under Order XVIIJ Rule 17 that was rejected by the trial court on the
     ground that there was no acceptable reason to entertain the prayer. Be
     it stated, this Court set aside the order passed by the High Court.
G
           9. In the said case, it has also been held that it is desirable thatthe
     recording of evidence should be continuous and followed by arguments
     and decision thereon within a reasonable time. That apart, it has also
     been held that the Courts should constantly endeavour to follow such a

H    '(2013) 14SCC I
               :
         GAYATHRI
            .
                  v. M. GJRISH [DIPAK
                               -      MISRA, J.]                                21



time schedule so that the purpose of amendments brought in the Code of          A
Civil Procedure are not defeated. Painfully, the Court observed:-
      " .. .In fact, applications for adjournments, reopening and recalling
      are interim measures, could be as far as possible avoided and
      only in compelling and acceptable reasons, those applications are
      to be considered. We are satisfied that the plaintiff has filed those     B
      two applications before the trial Court in order to overcome the
      lacunae in the plaint, pleadings and evidence.his not the case of
      the plaintiff that it was not given adequate opportunity. In fact, the.
      materials placed show that the plaintiff has filed both the
      applications after more than sufficient opportunity had been granted
      to it to prove its case. During the entire trial, those documents
                                                                                c
      have remained in exclusive possession ofthe plaintiff, still plaintiff
      has not placed those bills on record. It further shows that final
      arguments were heard on number of times and judgment was
      reserved and only thereafter, in order to improve its case, the
      plaintiff came forward with such an application to avoid the final        D
      judgment against it. Such course is not permissible even with the
      aid of Section 151 CPC."
       10. In the case at hand, as we have stated herein before, the
examination-in-chief continued for long and the matter was adjourned
seven times. The defendant sought adjournment after adjournment for              E
cross-examination on some pretext or the other which are really not
entertainable in law. But the trial Court eventually granted permission
subject to payment of costs. Regardless of the allowance extended, the
defendant stood embedded on his adamantine platform and prayed for
adjournment as if it was his right to seek adjournment on any ground
whatsoever and on any circumstance. The non-concern of the defendant-            F
petitioner shown towards the proceedings of the Court is absolutely
manifest. The disregard shown to the plaintiff's age is also visible from
the marathon of interlocutory applications filed. A counsel appearing for
a litigant has to have institutional responsibility. The Code of Civil
Procedure so command. Applications are not to be filed on the grounds            G
which we have referred to hereinabove and that too in such a brazen
and obtrusive manner. It is wholly reprehensible. The law does not
countenance it and, if we permit ourselves to say so, the professional
ethics decries such practice. It is because such acts are against the
majesty of law.
                                                                                H
22              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        (2016) 4 S.C.R.


A            11. In this context, we may profitable reproduce a passage from
     Sil iv Cotex v. Tirgun Auto Plast (P) Ltd.·' wherein it has been stated
     that it is sad, but true, that the litigants seek - and the_ courts grant -
     adjournments at the drop of a hat. In the cases where the Judges are
     little proactive and refuse to accede to the requests of unnecessary
     adjournments, the litigants deploy oil ~v'lS of methods in protracting the
B
     litigation. The court has further laid down that it is not surprising that
     civil disputes drag on and on. The misplaced sympathy and indulgence
     by the appellate and revisional courts compound the malady further.
           12. In Noor Molwmmed v. Jetlu11u11ul' commenting on the delay
     caused due to dilatory tactics adopted by the parties, the Court was
c    compelled to say:-
           "ln a democratic set-up, intrinsic and embedded faith in the
           adjudicatory system is of seminal and pivotal concern. Delay
           gradually declines the citizenry faith in the system. It is the faith
           and faith alone that keeps the system alive. It provides oxygen
D          constantly. Fragmentation of faith has the effect-potentiality to
           bring in a state of cataclysm where justice may become a casualty.
           A litigant expects a reasoned verdict from a temperate Judge but
           does not intend to and, rightly so, to guillotine much of time at the
           altar of reasons. Timely delivery ofjustice keeps the faith ingrained
E          and establishes the sustained stability. Access to speedy justice is
           regarded as a human right which is deeply rooted in the foundational
           concept of democracy and such a right is not only the creation of
           law but also a natural right. Th is right can be fully ripened by the
           requisite commitment ofall concerned with the system. It cannot
           be regarded as a facet of Utopianism because such a thought is
F          likely to make the right a mirage losing the centrality of purpose.
           Therefore, whoever has a role to play in the justice-dispensation
           system cannot be allowed to remotely conceive of a casual
           approach."
            And, again:-
G          "Thus, from the aforesaid; it is clear as day that e~eryone involved
           in the system of dispensation ofjustice has to inspire the confidence
           of the common man in the effectiveness of the judicial system.
           Sustenance of faith has to be treated as spinal sans sympathy or
     '(2011) 9 sec 678
H    '(2013) s sec 202
          GAYATHRI v. M. GIRISH [DIPAK MISRA, J.]                              23


      indulgence. If someone considers the task to be Herculean, the           A
      same has to be performed with solemnity, for faith is the "elan
      vital" of our system."
       13. In the case at hand, it can indubitably be stated that the
defendant-petitioner has acted in a manner to cause colossal insult to
justice and to the concept of speedy disposal ofcivil litigation. We are       B
constrained to say the virus of seeking adjournment has to be controlled.
The saying of Gita ''Awake! Arise! Oh! Partha" is_ apt here to be stated
for guidance of trial courts.
        14. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we decline to entertain the
special leave petition and dismiss it with costs which is assessed at          c
Rs.50,000/-(Rupees fifty thousand only). The costs shall be paid to the
State Legal Services Authority, Karnataka. The said amount shall be
deposited before the trial Court within eight weeks hence, which shall
do the needful to transfer it to the State Legal Services Authori!;'. If the
amount is not deposited, the right of defence to examine its witnesses
shall stand foreclosed.                       '                                D
Divya Pandey                                                  SLP dismissed.