Holding

Fraud that suppresses material facts vitiates the order, and condonation of delay cannot be granted where such fraud is established.

Summary

The appellants, original owners of land declared surplus under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976, challenged the allotment of that land to weaker sections. An earlier appeal against the surplus declaration was dismissed in 1988, but the appellants later filed another appeal in 1995, suppressing the fact of the 1988 order. The High Court condoned a delay of 2,205 days in filing a review petition and allowed the litigation to proceed. The Supreme Court held that fraud and suppression of material facts vitiate any court order, and such fraud precludes condonation of delay; consequently, the High Court's order could not stand. However, exercising its Article 136 jurisdiction, the Court declined to interfere with the impugned judgment and dismissed the appeal with costs.

Issues considered

Whether suppression of a material fact/fraud on the court bars condonation of delay in filing a review petition.
Whether the High Court could validly condone a delay of 2,205 days in the present case.
Effect of fraud on the validity of judicial orders and subsequent proceedings.
Whether the Supreme Court may interfere with the High Court order under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Constitution of Indias. 136
Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976s. 10(3), s. 10(5), s. 23, s. 33

Subjects

fraudsuppression of material factcondonation of delayreview petitionUrban Land Ceiling Actsurplus landArticle 136natural justiceadministration of justice

Judgment

[2008] 3 S.C.R. 938

A GANPATBHAI MAHIJIBHAI SOLANKI t
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1727 of 2008)
MARCH 4, 2008
B
(S.B. SINHA AND V.S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.)
,
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
Condonation of delay - Surplus land - Appeal against,
c dismissed by appellate authority in 1988 - Allotment of
surplus land to weaker section of society - Another appeal
filed by original landowners in 1995 was partly allowed by
appellate authority - Filing of suits by original owner of land
seeking interim injunction against State from taking
D possession of suit land - Dismissed by trial Court on ground .
f
of suppressing material fact and for misleading the Court -
Affirmed by High Court - Correctness of - On appeal, Held:
Fraud vitiate all solemn acts - When an order is obtained by
committing fraud on court, even the principles of natural justice
E need not be complied with for setting aside the order- In case
of conflicting interest, the Court may adjust equities, but under
no circumstances it should refuse to consider merit of the case
when its attention was drawn about suppression of material
facts/commission of fraud on Court - While considering
~
F condonation of delay, the principle of the administration of
justice need to be followed - In terms thereof, legal process
r'
should be finite - Re-opening a case after a delay of
considerable period of time runs counter to the principle -
However, in exercise of power under Article 136 of the
Constitution, it would not be appropriate for the Supreme Court
G
to interfere with the impugned order - Principles of
administration of justice - requirements of - Constitution of
India, 1950 - Article 136 - Scope of - Urban Land Ceiling ~
Act, 1976 with repealing Act of 1999.
H 938
GANPATBHAI MAHIJIBHAI SOLANKI v. STATE OF 939
GUJARAT & ORS.

The question which arose for consideration in this A
appeal was as to whether suppression of a material fact
would entail allowing of an application for condonation
of delay in filing a review petition.
Appellant contended that the High Court committed
a serious error in passing the impugned judgments, by B
reason whereof not only 2205 days delay has been
condoned, but a litigation is sought to be revived which
would end in futility having regard to the conduct of the
State and the subsequent events.
c
Respondent submitted that the appellant had
committed a fraud on the Court as it had suppressed the
material fact about passing of appellate order dated
4.1.1988 while preferring another appeal after 11 years of
the passing of the original order dated 12.7.1984.
D
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD:. 1.1 Th.is Court is not oblivious of the fact that
the authorities of the State have made a complete goof
up with the situation. By its action, it allowed subsequent
events to happen. (Para - 13) [945-B] E

1.2 It is a well settled principle that fraud vitiates all
solemn acts. If an order is obtained by reason of
commission of fraud, even the principles of natural justice
' are not required to be complied with for setting aside the F
y same. (Para - 13) [945-C, DJ
T Vijendradas and Another Vs. M. Subramanian &
Others 2007 (12) SCALE 1 - relied on.

~ 1.3 If there is a conflicting interest, the Court may G
adjust equities but under no circumstance it should refuse
to consider the merit of the matter, when its attention is
drawn that suppression of material facts has taken place
or commission of fraud on Court has been committed.
The courts, for the aforementioned purpose may have to
H
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 3 S.C.R.

A consider the respective rights of the parties. The State t

has a constitutional duty/obligation to comply with the
principle of social justice as adumbrated under Section
23 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act and take the decision to
their logical conclusion. (Para - 14) (945-G; 946-A, BJ
B 2.1 In the instant case, the allottees have acquired a
statutory right. Only because the State was not aware of + ..
the factual position and/or the legal implication of the
provisions under the Repealed Act which led to withdrawal
of the writ petition from the High Court, the same by itself
c may not be sufficient to deprive the allottees from their
legal right to hold the said land. (Para - 15) (946-B, C]
2.2 The Court of Appeal in the case of Smith Vs.
Kvaerner Cementation Foundations Ltd condoned the delay
D
on the ground that the appellant therein had a human right
to get his lis adjudicated before an independent and (
..
impartial tribunal and as. the Judge was biased, delay in
preferring the appeal was condoned stating that the first
criterion to be considered is the interest of the
administration of justice. This would normally militate
E strongly against an extension of time as long as that
sought in this case. It is an important principle of the
administration of justice that legal process should be
finite. To reopen the case after a delay of four years plainly
runs counter to that principle. But this is a case where ...
F the appellant had been denied the right to which Art 6 of
r
the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 entitled him - to
a fair hearin!J before an independent and impartial tribunal.
This is the paramount consideration so far as the
G administration of justlce is concerned. For the reasons,
aforementioned, this Court is of the opinion that the merit
of the matter as also the question in regard to adjustment
of equities may be considered by the High Court.
However, this Court in exercise of jurisdiction in Article
H 136 of the Constitution of India refuse to interfere with the
GANPATBHAI MAHIJIBHAI SOLANKI v. STATE OF 941
GUJARAT & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
t
impugned judgment. (Paras - 17 & 18) [946-D, E, F, .~ A
947-A, 8]
Smith Vs. Kvaerner Cementation Foundations Ltd 2006
3 All ER 593 - referred to.
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1727 B
~
-+ of 2008

From the Judgment and Order dated 12/7/2006 of the High
Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in LP.A. No. 313 of 2006

Aniruddha P. Mayee for the Appellant. c
Hemantika Wahi, Madhvi Divan and Shivangi for the
Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
... D
5.8. SINHA, J. Leave granted.
1. Whether suppression of a material fact would entail
allowing of an application for condonation of 2205 days delay
in filing a review application is the core question involved herein.
2. Appellants were owners of various tracts of lands situated E
in the town of Vadodara. 10,807 sq. meters of land in survey
Nos. 345,r347/1and267 in Mazalapurwere declared as surplus
land under the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976
· (for short "the Act") by the competent authority. An appeal
"' preferred thereagainst was dismissed by an Order dated F
'(
4.1.1988 by the appellate authority, stating;
"As discussed above, no contention of the appellant is
acceptable and there is no reason to interfere with the
impugned order passed by the Competent Authority and
therefore the following order is passed. G

.. The appeal of the appellant is dismissed. The impugned
order dated 12/07/1984 passed by the competent
authority is confirmed.
The injunction orders passed by this office is vacated. H
942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.

A The order be informed to the parties." f

3. All contentions raised by the appellants were considered
therein. It was allowed to attain finality.
4. Notification under Section 10(3) of the Act was published
B in the Official Gazette on 4.5.1989. A notification was also issued
under Section 10(5) thereof on 23.8.1989. ....
+
Allegedly, the directions contained therein were not
complied by the appellant. Possession of the properties were
said to have been taken over on 20.4.1992. Surplus lands are
c said to have been allotted to members of the weaker sections
as envisaged under Section 23 of the Act. Another round of
litigation was initiated by the appellant. Another appeal was said
to have been filed before the appellate authority in terms of
Section 33 of the Act in the year 1995. The said appeal was
D entertained. By a judgment and order dated 30.3.1995, 6224 ...
f
sq. meters in Survey No. 267 only was declared as surplus land.
5. Respondent-State alleged that the Tribunal was not
informed about the result of the earlier appeal and the said order
dated 30.3.1995 was passed ex-parte. Even the allottees were
E not given any notice. A Writ Petition was preferred by one of the
allottees before the High Court wherein a direction was issued
to allot him an alternate land. The State also filed a writ petition
thereagainst which was marked as SCA No. 100 of 1996.
Appellant is said to have filed two civil suits in the years 1999
F and 2001 in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Vadodara
.
'(
being Civil Suit No. 935 of 1999 and 190 of 2001 seeking
injunction against the State from taking possession of the lands.
The application for interim injunction was, however, dismissed.
In the said interim order, allegedly a finding was recorded that
G the appellant had suppressed material facts and misled the
Court.
6. However, in the year 1999, the Act was repealed. On t
,
the basis thereof purported statement was made by the
Assistant Goveirnment Pleader in Special Civil Application No.
H
GANPATBHAI MAHIJIBHAI SOLANKI v. STATE OF 943
GUJARAT & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

.. 100 of 1996 withdrawing the said SCA No. 100 of 1996. The A
High Court in its Order dated 15.6.1999 recorded;

"Mr. Dave, Ld. Counsel for the petitioner states that in
view of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Repeal
Act, 1999, the present petition does not survive.
Consequently the same is disposed off accordingly. Rule B
., + discharged with no order as to costs. Ad-interim relief
vacated."

Thereafter notices were issued to the allottees for their
eviction. Several correspondences passed between the c
appellant and the Authorities of the State. Allegedly the Order of
the High Court dated 23.3.2000 was accepted by the State. A
stand was taken that the said order of the High Court dated
15.6.1999 would not be challenged.
... 7. Appellant sold the land to one Dineshbai Chhotabhai D
Patel by a registered deed of sale dated 20.5.2000. The said
vendee again sold half of the said land in favour of one Sanjay
Kumar Manila! Patel on 25.1.2001. Permission was granted
for construction of the buildings.
8. The allottees, filed a writ petition before the High Court. E
The State therein filed a counter affidavit accepting the order of
the Tribunal dated 31.3.1995. However, after a few days, an
application for recalling of the said order dated 15.6.1999 was
~ filed, whereupon a notice was issued.
F
y 9. By reason of a judgment dated 11.10.2005, a learned
Single Judge of the High Court allowed the said application
assigning cogent reason. A Letters Patent Appeal preferred
thereagainst by the appellant has been dismissed by a Division
Bench of the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment
G
expressing its agreement with the order passed by the learned
Single Judge.
" 10. Mr. Aniruddha P. Mayee, the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant urged that the High Court
committed a serious error in passing the impugned judgments, H
944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R.

A by reason whereof not only 2205 days delay has been
condoned, but a litigation is sought to be revived which would
end in futility having regard to tQe conduct of the State and the
subsequent events which took after 15.6.1999.
11. Ms. Madhvi Divan, learned counsel appearing on
B behalf of the respondent on the other hand, urged that the
appellant had committed a fraud on the Court as it had
suppressed the appellate order dated 4.1.1988 while preferring
.. -
another appeal after 11 years of the passing of the original order
dated 12.7.1984.
c
At no stage, the learned counsel would submit, the
appellant had brought to the notice of the authorities of the State
as also the High Court that the Order dated 12.7.1984 had
attained finality. It was, furthermore, contended that the stand
taken by the Assistant Government Pleader was not binding ....
D
upon the State as those cases where possession had also been (

taken over from the owner of the land have explicitly been saved
under the provisions of the 1999 Act.
12. Steps indisputably had been taken under the provisions
E of the Act, pursuant to the final order passed in the said
proceeding as not only some lands were declared to be surplus,
an appeal preferred thereagainst was dismissed, possession
had been taken over and even allotments have been made in
favour of the members of the weaker sections of the Society. ~

F We may notice that even possession ,of portions of lands
r
were handed over to 15 persons.
If the State is correct in its submission that in that view of
the matter, the 1999 Act will have no application, indisputably,
clny wrong concession made by a counsel would not be binding
G
upon the State.
In State of Haryana and Others Vs. M.P Moh/a [(2007) 1 t
,.
sec 457], it was held;
"25. The law as regards the effect of an admission is also
H
GANPATBHAI MAHIJIBHAI SOLANKI v. STATE OF 945
GUJARAT & ORS. [S.8. SINHA, J.]

• no longer res integra. Whereas a party may not be A
permitted to resile from his admission at a subsequent
stage of the same proceedings, it is a/so trite that an
admission made contrary to law shall not be binding on
the State."
13. We are not oblivious of the fact that the authorities of 8
" ~ the State have made a complete goof up with the situation. By
its action, it allowed subsequent events to happen, viz. sales of
the lands have taken up, constructions have .come up, but the
question which arises for our consideration is as to whether
even in such a situation, this Court would allow a suppression c
of fact to prevail.
It is now a well settled principle that fraud vitiates all solemn
acts. If an order is obtained by reason of commission of fraud,
... even the principles of natural justice are not required to be
D
complied with for setting aside the same.
In T Vijendradas and Another Vs. M. Subramanian &
Others [2007 (12) SCALE 1], this Court held;
"21 ....... When a fraud is practiced on a court, the same
is rendered a nullity. In a case of nullity, even the principles E
of natural justice are not required to be complied with.
[Kendriya Vidya/aya Sangathan and Others v. Ajay Kumar
Das and Others (2002) 4 SCC 503 & A. Umarani v.
~
Registrar, Cooperative societies and Others (2004) 7
sec 112-para 65] F
'1'
22. Once it is held/that by reason of commission of a
fraud, a decree is rendered to be void rendering all
subsequent proceedings taken pursuant thereto also nullity,
in our opinion, it would be wholly inequitable to confer a
G
benefit on a party, who is a beneficiary thereunder ..... "

~
14. The object and purport of a statute must be given effect
' to. If there is a conflicting interest, the Court may adjust equities
but under no circumstance it should refuse to consider the merit
of the matter, when its attention is drawn that suppression of H
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 3 S.C.R.

A material facts has taken place or commission of fraud on Court f
has been committed.
The courts, for the aforementioned purpose may have to
consider the respective rights of the parties. The State has a
constitutional duty/obligation to comply with the principle of social
B justice as adumberated under Section 23 of the Act and take
the decision to their logical conclusion. • •
15. The allottees have acquired a statutory right. Only
because the State was not aware of the factual position and/or
c the legal implication of the 1999 Act which led to withdrawal of
the writ petition from the High Court, the same by itself may not
be sufficient to deprive the allottees from their legal right to hold
the said land.
16. An extra-ordinary situation of this nature would require
D an extra-ordinary order. ...
f

17. In the matter of passing an order of condonation of
delay, we may notice that the Court of Appeal in Smith Vs.
Kvaerner Cementation Foundations Ltd (Bar Council
intervening) [2006 3 All ER 593] condoned the delay on the
E ground that the appellant therein had a human right to get his lis
adjudicated before an independent and impartial tribunal and
as the Judge was biased, delay in preferring the appeal was
condoned stating;
....
F "41. The first criterion to be considered, (a), is the interests
of the administration of justice. These would normally 'f
militate strongly against an extension of time as long as
that sought in this case. It is an important principle of the
administration of justice that legal process should be finite.
To reopen this case after a delay of four years plainly runs
G
counter to that principle. But this is a case where Mr. Smith
has been denied the right to which art 6 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and ~ "
Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (as set out in Sch 1 to the
Human Rights Act 1998) entitled him - to a fair hearing
H
GANPATBHAI MAHIJIBHAI SOLANKI v. STATE OF 947
GUJARAT & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

before an independent and impartial tribunal. This, in our A
view, is the paramount consideration so far as the
administration of justice is concerned."
18. For the reasons, aforementioned, we are of the opinion
that the merit of the matter as also the question in regard to
adjustment of equities may be considered by the High Court. 8
We, for the foregoing in exercise of our jurisdiction in Article
136 of the Constitution of India refuse to interfere with the
impugned judgment.
The appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee c
assessed at Rs. 10,000/- .
S.K.S. Appeal dismissed.

t