Holding

The execution court must determine any question of representation under Section 47(3) CPC, and a transferee by operation of law is a ‘representative’; the sale is void for non‑payment of the balance within 15 days, so the first respondent is not a valid transferee and his substitution application fails.

Summary

Gangabai Gopaldas Mohata (appellant) owned Nazul land that was leased to several lessees. After a compromise decree required the lessees to vacate, the Municipal Council attached the property for alleged tax arrears and auctioned it. The court ordered that the sale would be cancelled if the appellant paid the arrears; she deposited Rs 50,000 on 12‑Mar‑84, but the sale proceeded and Fulchand (first respondent) became the highest bidder, later paying the balance only in 1990. Fulchand applied under Order 21 Rule 16 CPC to be substituted as the decree‑holder’s representative, which the execution court rejected; the High Court allowed the substitution, holding the dispute was not within Section 47 CPC. The Supreme Court held that Section 47(3) gives the execution court jurisdiction to decide any question of representation, that “representative” includes transferees by operation of law, and that the sale was void because the balance was not paid within the statutory 15‑day period. Consequently, Fulchand was not a valid transferee and his substitution application was dismissed.

Issues considered

The scope of Section 47(3) CPC: can the execution court resolve disputes about whether a person is a representative of the decree‑holder?
Whether a transferee by operation of law qualifies as a ‘representative’ under Section 47(3) CPC.
Whether the sale under the Maharashtra Municipalities (Sale of Distrained or Attached Movable and Immovable Property) Rules, 1967 is void for failure to pay the balance within the prescribed 15‑day period.
Whether the High Court erred in holding that the execution court cannot examine the legality of title documents in such disputes.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 47(3), s. 50, s. Order 21 Rule 16, s. Order 21 Rules 84, s. Order 21 Rules 85

Subjects

execution of decreeSection 47 CPCrepresentativetransfereemunicipal auctionsale voidOrder 21 Rule 16Maharashtra Municipalities Rulessubstitution of decree‑holder

Judgment

GANGABAI GOPALDAS MOHATA A
v.
FULCHAND AND OTHERS

DECEMBER 19, 1996
B
[MADAN MOHAN PUNCID AND K.T. THOMAS, JJ.]

Civil Procedure Code, 190&-Sections 47(3) and 50, order 21, Rules 16,
84 and 85-Person approaching the executing Court claiming to be the repre-
sentative of the decree-holder's interest in the decree, decree-holder disputes C
it-The executing Court has to resolve the dispute for proceeding with the
execution of the decre-Traneferee pendentelite is representative of his trans-
feror within the meaning of sub-section (3) of Section 47-'Representative'
under Section 47has wider meaning than 'legal Representative' used in Section
50.
D
Maharashtra Munidpalities (Sale of Distrained or Attached Movable
and Immovable Property) Rules, 1967-Rules 8(2), (3) and 13--Requirement
of making payment within the fixed period is mandatory-Failure to comply
with, renders the sale void-These mies follow the same prindple as provided
by Order 21, Rules 84, 85 CPC.
E
The Appellant filed a civil suit for recovery of possession of the Nazul
Land of Murtiza Municipality from respondents No. 2-5, the lessees. The
suit was compromised pursuant to which a compromise decree was passed.
As per the terms of comprolllise decree respondents were to vacate the
premises but they did not and the appellant took out execution proceedings F
against them. In the meantime the Municipality attached the suit property
for arrears of Municipal Tax claimed against the appellant and the
property was put to public auction. The appellant filed a suit for injunction
against the Municipal Committee from proceeding with the sale as no
Municipal tax was due from her. The application for interim injunction of G
the appellant under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC was dismissed on 24.2.1984 with
the observation that the l\funicipal Committee may conduct the sale but
. it should not be confirmed before fifteen days after the sale and before the
' expiry of this period if the appellant furnishes the outstanding amount,
the sale be not confirmed for one month more. If within that period of one
month, the appellant deposits the entire amount, the sale will be cancelled H
457
458 SUPREME COURTREPORTS[l996J SUPP.10 S.C.R.

A and if the said amount is not deposited the sale will be confirmed.
The auction sale took place on 27.2.1984. Respondent No. 1 was the
highest bidder and he deposited one fourth of the sale amount on the same
day. However, on 12.3.84, the appellant deposited Rs. 50,000 in the Court,
which was more than the claim of tax arrears demanded by the Municipal
B Committee. The appellant filed application for cancellation of the sale but
the same was dismissed with the observation that she should file a fresh
suit for this purpose. Fresh suit filed by the appellant was dismissed for
default on 7.11.1990. The first respondent deposited the balance bid
amount with the Municipal Committee on 9.11.1990 and got a sale certifi-
C cate issued in his favour from the Municipal Committee. On the basis of
the sale certificate respondent No. 1 filed an application Under Order 21
Rule 16 before the Execution Court praying that he be substituted as
transferee of the decree- holder. The Execution Court rejected the applica-
tion of the respondent No. 1 but the High Court took a contrary view that
the dispute between respondent No. 1 and the decree-holder is not of the
D kin which the Court could resolve under Section 47 of the CPC. Hence this
appeal.
/
Allowing the appeal, this Court

E HELD : 1. The High Court erred in holding that the dispute between
the first respondent and the decree-holder is not the kind of dispute which
the execution court should resolve under Section 47 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. On the contrary, if a person approaches the executing court
claiming that he is the representative or the decree-holder's interest in the
decree and the decree-holder disputes it, the executing court has to resolve
F the dispute for proceeding with the execution or the decree. [463-C-D]

The view taken by the High Court that the executing court exercising
power under Order 21, Rule 16 of the Code has only a limited jurisdiction
as the Court can not examine the legality of documents on title, is er-
roneous and not in consonance with the wide language of Section 47 of the
G Code. Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure is couched in a very wide
· language. The very object is to avert another suit concerning the decree
under execution. Even a transferee pendentalite is representative of his
transferor within the meaning of sub-section (3) of Section 47. One who
claims to be transferee by operation of law wonld as well be a repre-
H sentative and if his claim is disputed either by the opposite party or the
G.G. MOHATA v. FULCHAND [THOMAS, J.] 459
party under whom the claims (decree holder) such dispute must also be A
resolved, by the executing Court. The word 'representative' used in Section
47 is obviously much wider, than the word 'Legal representative' as used
in Section 50 CPC. [462-C-D; 462-F; 463-B-C]

2. Order 21 Rule 16 encompasses two types of transferees one, trans-
feree by virtue of an instrument of assignment and the other a transferee "by B
operation of law•. Respondent No. 1 claims to be transferee of the decree
holder/appellant by virtue of the sale conducted by the Municipal Council.
But the legal consequence of the order of the Civil Court dated24.2.1984 was
that, on depositing the tax arrears within the time stipulated in the order, the
sale would go off. Merely because the suit was subsequently dismissed, the C
legal effect of the Court's order dated 24.2.1984 would not become a nullity.
Whatever happened during the pendency of the suit, and what all actions
taken pursuant to any orders passed by the Court during interregnum
would remain a reality unless the Court itself had disturbed or modified
them. The sale should have gone off the very day the appellant deposited the
amount as per the direction of the Court. Neither the Chief Officer nor even D
the Municipal Counsel had any authority to bypass the order of the Civil
Court by confirming the sale on a later date without even obtaining permis·
sion from the Court. [463-E; 464-A]

3.1. Besides, the sale was conducted as per the Maharashtra
Municipalities (Sale of Distrained or Attached Movable and Immovable E
Property) Rules, 1967. A combined reading of Rule (8)(2)(3) and Rule 13
of the Rules would un-mistakably show that requirement to pay the
balance of 75% within fifteen days is mandatory. The consequence of
non-payment of the balance amount within the f1Xed period must
peremptorily visit the purchaser. Neither the Chief Officer, nor the F
Municipal Council has power to release or even condone the delay and
accept delayed payment. If an) officer had accepted the money after the
period fixed under sub Rule 2 the officer has no support of law and no
legal effect would flow therefrom and the sale consequently becomes void.
l
Rules relating to Court sale provided in Order 21 Rules 84 and 85 CPC G
are analogous and non-compliance with Rules 84 and 85 of Order 21 would
render the sale void in the eye of law. Th~ principle would apply to
the sale regnlation contained in. the Maharashtra Rules. [464-G; 465-C]

3.2. Respondent No. 1 did not legally ·ifcquire the interests of the
decree holder in the property. The sale was conducted on 27.2.1984 and the H
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS(1996] SUPP.10 S.C.R.

A bidder, who made his initial deposit of Rs. 25,000 did not pay the balance
within the period of fifteen days i.e. 13.3.1984. Whatever be the excuse, the
Respondent No. 1 did not pay the balance amount within fifteen days of
sale and the sale would, therefore, stand annulled ipso-jure without any-
thing more. He is, therefore, not a transferee by "Operation of Law" as
B envisaged under order 21 Rule 16 of the CPC.(466-A; 465-D-F; 466-B]

Manila/ Mohan Lal Shah v. Sardar Syed Ahmed Sayed Mohammad,
(1955] 1 SCR 108, relied on.

Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh, [1967] 2 SCR 77 and Sardar Govindrao
C Mahadik v. Devi Sahai, [1982] 2 SCR 186, distinguished.

CML APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 16835 of
1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.2.95 of the Bombay High
D Court in RA. No. 402 of 1981.
Soli J. Sorabjee and Uday Umesh Lalit for the Appellant.

G.L. Sanghi, M.N. Krishnamani, Ms. lndu Verma, (P.H. Parekh)
(NP), Jitender Mahapatra, G.B. Lohiya and AK Sanghi for the Respon-
E dents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

THOMAS, J. : Leave granted.

F This appeal is by a decree-holder whose effects to execute the decree
have now been stalled at the instance of a third party who claims to be
the transferee of the interest of the decree-holder in the decree "by
operation of law". The application filed by the said third party who is first
respondent herein purportedly under Order 21 Rule 16 of the Code of Civil l
G Procedure (for short "the Code") though repelled by the execution court
was allowed by the High Court as per the order challenged in this appeal.

More facts : Appellant Gangabai leased out a portion of her land in
Nazul plot No. 2. sheet No. 15/B of Murtizapur Municipality to one Ram ·
Pratap Agrawal (predecessor or respondent Nos. 2 to 5). A civil suit was
H filed by the appellant in 1970 for recovery of possession of the land from
G.G. MO HATAv. FULCHAND (THOMAS, J.] 461
...' the lessee. That suit was decreed by the trial court and in appeal filed by A
respondent Nos. 2 to 5 the suit was compromised pursuant to which a
compromise decree was passed. As per the terms of the compromise
decree the judgment-debtors (respondent Nos. 2 to 5) were to vacate the
premises by 31.12.1990. As they failed to vacate within the said time limit
the appellant took out execution proceedings.
B
What happened in the meanwhile is the cause for this appeal.
Murtizapur Municipal Council (hereinafter referred to as 'the Municipal
Council') attached the right of the appellant in the very same property for
arrears of municipal tax claimed from the appellant. The Municipal Coun-
cil put the property to public auction. Appellant then filed a civil suit for C
injunction against the Municipal Council from proceeding with the sale on
a contention that the tax arrears against the Municipal Council were not
really due from her. On an application filed by the appellant in the suit
under Order 39 Rule 1 of the Code, an order was passed on 24.2.1984
dismissing the application with the following observations :
D
"I may observe that the sale of the buildings on the plaintiff might
be held by the defendant but it should not be confirmed before 16
days after the sale if before expiry of period the plaintiff furnishes
a security before this court to the extent of the amount due against
her, then the sale be not confirmed of one month more. If within E
the period of such one month the plaintiff deposits the entire
amount in the court, the sale will be cancelled. If the said amount
is not deposited, then the sale may be confinned. With these obser-
vations dismissed the application.
F
(emphasis supplied)

Municipal Council thereupon conducted the public sale on 27.1.1984
in which the present first respondent - Fulchand was the highest bidder.
He deposited 1/4th of the bid amount on the same day. However, Appel-
lant deposited an amount of Rs. 50,000 in court on 12.3.1984 which is more G
·· than the arrears of tax amount claimed by the Municipal Council. Normal-
ly, by operation of the order dated 24.2.1984 of the· civil court the sale
should have remained cancelled by the aforesaid deposit. But the scope for
dispute arose between the appellant and the first respondent on account
of what happened subsequent thereto. Appellant filed an application for H
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS(1996) SUPP.10 S.C.R.

A cancellation of sale which was dismissed by the court with the observation ...'
that it is open to him to file a fresh suit for that purpose. Though the
appellant filed a fresh suit the same was dismissed for default on 7.11.1990.

First respondent deposited balance of the bid amount ·i.e. 3/4th of
the bid amount, with the Municipal Council on 9.11.1990. The Chief Officer
B of the Municipal Council thereupon issued a Sale Certificate in favour of
first respondent, it was on the strength of the said Sale Certificate that
first respondent moved the present application under Order 21Rule16 of
the Code.
.,
C Execution court took the view that the Sale Certificate issued by the
Municipal Council was not in accordance with law and hence first respon-
dent cannot be substituted as transferee of the deeree-holder. But a Single
Judge of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) took a contrary view
that the dispute between first respondent and the decree-holder is not the
D kind of dispute which execution court could resolve under Section 47 of
the Code. Learned Single Judge observed that the court exercising power
under order 21 Rule 16 of the Code has only a limited jurisdiction as the
· court cannot ex~mine the legality of the documents of title. Learned Judge
expressed that .the executing court has committed a patent illegality in
assuming jurisdiction under Section 47 of the Code and recording the
E finding that the sale certificate was illegal and the reasoning adopted by
the executing court is totally erroneous.

Section 47 of the Code is couched in a very wide language. The vary
object is to avert another suit concerning the decree under execution.
F Sub-section (1) of Section 47 of the Code states that -

"(i) All questions arising between the· parties to the suit in which
the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the
execution discharge or satisfac;,tion of the decree, shall be deter-
mined on the Court executing the decree and not by a separate
G suit."

Perhaps sub-section (i) would not have made it clear that dispute between
a party to the suit and another claiming to be his representative could have
been resolved in execution proceedings. But that doubt to longer subsists
H in view of sub-section (3) which reads :
G.G. MOHATA v. FULCHAND [THOMAS, J.] 463

"(3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not A
the representative of a party, such questit'n shall, for the purposes
of this section, be determined by the Court."

Even a transferee pendente lite is representative of his transferor within
the meaning of sub-section (3) of Section 47. One who claims to be
transferee by operation of law would as well be a representative and if his B
claim to be a representative is disputed either by the opposite party or by
the party under whom he claims, such dispute must also be resolved by the
executing court itself. The word "representative" used in Section 47 is
obviously much wider than the words "illegal representative" as used in
Section 50 of the Code. C

If a person approaches the execution courts claiming that he is the
representative of decree-holder's interest in the decree and the decree-
holder disputes it, the execution court has to resolve the dispute for
proceeding with the execution of the decree. The view of the learned Single
Judge of the High Court of Bombay that the court has only a limited D
jurisdiction is therefore not in consonance with the wide language
employed in Section 47 of the Code.

Order 21 Rule 16 encompasses two types of transferees - one, a
transferee by virtue of an instrument of assignments and the other a E
transferee "by operation of law". In this case, first respondent claims to be
transferee of the decree-holder's interest by virtue of the sale conducted
by the Municipal Council. But the legal, consequence of the order of the
Civil Court dated 24.2.1984 was that, on depositing th~ tax appears within
the time stipulated in the order, the sale would go off. Merely because the
suit was subsequently dismissed the legal effect of the court's direction F
contained in the interlocutory order dated 24.2.1984 would not become a
nullity, whatever happened during the pendency of the suit land what all
actions taken pursuant to any orders passed by the court during the
interregnum would remain a reality unless the court itself had disturbed or
modified them.
G
Would first respondent have got l:he rights or the appellant by
bidding in a sale which was conditioned by the court through the order
·dated 24.2.1984. The sale should have gone off the very day if the plaintiff
in that suit had deposited the amount as per directions of the court.
Neither the Chief Officer nor even the Municipal Council had the authority H
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS(1996] SUPP. 10 S.C.R.

A to bypass the order of the civil part by confirming the sale on a later day
without even obtaining permission from the court.

That apart, here the sale was conducted by the Municipal Council
on 27.2,1984 as per "the Maharashtra Municipalities (Sale of Distrained or
Attached Movable and Immovable Property) Rules 1967" framed under the
B Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965. Rules 8(2) of the said Rules says
that if the sale pertains to immovable property the person who is declared
to be the purchaser shall deposit 25 per cent of sale price, immediately
after his bid is accepted, to the officer conducting the sale. Regarding
payment of the balance sale amount the Rule stipulates that the purchaser
C shall pay the balance, within 15 days from the date of sale of the property,
to the office of the Council. If the last day be a Sunday or a public holiday,
then payment shall be made on the first working day immediately after such
day.

Sub-rule (3) provides the consequence of failure to pay the balance
D amount within the aforesaid period of 15 days, his deposit shall be forfeited
to the Council and the property shall be re-sold at his risk. The purchaser
shall forfeit claims to the said prices realised on resale and if such results
in any loss to the Council, he shall be liable for such loss." The only power
which the statute has conferred on the Chief Officer regarding confirma-
E tion of the sale has been stated in Rule 12((i) quoted below :

13. The Chief Offic:er to confirm the same.- It no objection is raised
within twenty-one days from the date on which the sale of immov-
able property is held, or even when any objections are so raised
and the Chief Officer is satisfied that there is no valid ground to
F set aside the sale and if full payment is made as required by these
rnles, the Chief Officer shall confirm the sale by granting a certifi-
cate as required by sub-section (2) of Section 156 in Form "C".

(Emphasis Supplied)

G A reading of Rule 8(2) in association with sub-rule (3) and Rule 13
would unmistakably show that the requirement to pay the balance 75 per _}.
cent within 15 days is mandatory. The consequence of non-payment of the
balance amount within the fixed period must peremptorily visit the pur- ·
chaser. Neither the Chief Officer nor even the Municipal Council has
H power to relax or even concerns the delay and accept a delayed payment,
G.G. MOHATA v. FULCHAND [THOMAS, J.] 465

if any officer accepted the money after the period fixed under sub-rule (2) A
.,
the action of the Officer has no support of law and no legal effect would
flow therefrom. The sale consequently becomes void.

Rules relating to court a sale provided in Order 21 Rules 84 & 85
are analogous. They require the purchaser to make deposit of 1/4th of the B
purchase money immediately after sale and the balance shall be deposited
within 15 days. This court held in Manila! Mohanlal Shah & Ors. v. Sardar
Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mohammed & Anot/1e1; (1966] 1 SCR 108, that non
compliance with Rules 84 & 85 of Order 21 would render the sale void in
the eye of law. The contention in the said case, that non compliance with
the aforesaid rule only render the sale irregular, was repelled by this Court. C
The same principle would apply to the sale regulations contained in the
above quoted Maharashtra Rules.

Here the sale was conducted on 27.2.1984. The bidder who made his
initial deposit of Rs. 25,000 did not pay the balance within the period of D
15 days i.e. 13.3.1984. Instead the payment was made only on 9.11.1990
• which was 6 years 6 months and 12 days after the sale. The excess
advanced by the first respondent was that the amount could not be paid
on account of pendency of the civil suit filed by the appellant. On the other
hand appellant contends that first respondent did not make the payment
as he too was pretty sure that the sale of 27.2.1984 stood canceiled by the E
''
operation of the conditions imposed by the courts, whatever is the excess
the fact remains that first respondent did not pay the balance sale amount
within 15 days of sale. The sale of 27.2.1984 would; therefore, stand
annulled ipso jure without anything more.
F
Learned counsel for the first respondent relied on two decision of
this Court to support his contention that stranger auction purchaser must
be protected against the attempts of judgment-debtor or decree-holder to
epp him out even if there were latches on the part of those persons in
conducting the sale. See : Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh and Another, (1967] G
2 SCR 77 and Sardar Govindrao Mahadid & Another v. Devi Sahai & Others,
(1982] 2 SCR 186. Neither of these two decisions has any usefulness in this
case, it has been observed in Janak Raj's case (supra) that if the sale had
• been validly held and if no application to set aside the sale was made or if
the application was made and the same was dismissed, the court has no
choice but to confirm the sale. The difference here is that the sale was not H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1996] SUPP. 10 S.C.R ..

A validly made at all as the failure on the part of the purchaser in depositing
the balance sale price within the time limits has rendered the sale a
non-est.

The conclusion is that first respondent did not legally acquire the
interest of the decree-holder in the property. He is, therefore, not a
B transferee by operation of law as envisaged under Order 21 Rule 16 of the
Code. His application for substitution is hence liable to be dismissed.

In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order
of the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench)
C and also dismiss the· application filed by the first respondent for substitu-
tion under Order 21 Rule 16. of the Code.

- H.K. Appeal allowed.