Holding

Comparative hardship is a relevant factor, but because the landlord has no alternative accommodation or existing business, the factors of Rule 16(2)(c) do not apply and the appellate authority’s factual findings stand.

Summary

The appellant, a 76‑year‑old widow, sought to retain a shop that had been occupied by her deceased husband for over 50 years, claiming she needed it for her livelihood. The respondent, a retired army officer drawing a modest pension, applied to the Chief Judicial Magistrate for release of the same shop under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, asserting a bona‑fide requirement to start a business. The prescribed authority dismissed the application, but the appellate authority reversed the decision, finding the respondent’s need bona‑fide; the High Court upheld that reversal. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that comparative hardship is a relevant factual factor under Rule 16(2)(c) of the Rules, but the respondent had no alternative accommodation or existing business, so the factors in that clause did not apply. The Court declined to disturb the appellate authority’s factual findings and granted the appellant six months to vacate the premises, dismissing the appeal.

Issues considered

The landlord’s requirement under Section 21(1)(a) is bona‑fide or not.
Whether comparative hardship under Rule 16(2)(c) of the U.P. Urban Buildings Rules is a relevant factor in this case.
Whether the appellate authority’s finding of fact can be interfered with by the Supreme Court.
Whether alternative accommodation for the landlord exists.
The appropriate period to be granted to the tenant for vacating the premises.

Legislation cited

U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972s. 21(1)(a), s. 41
U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972s. 16(2)(c)

Subjects

release of premisesbona fide requirementcomparative hardshipU.P. Urban Buildings Actlandlord‑tenantevictionRule 16Section 21pensionalternative accommodation

Judgment

[2008] 8 S.C.R. 538

A GANGA DEVI -+-- "
v.
DISTT. JUDGE, NAINITAL AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3541 Of 2008)

MAY 13, 2008
B
[S.S. SINHA AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.]
)I;;.
UP Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1972- s.21(1)(a)- UP Urban Buildings (Regu-
c lation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 - r.16(2) -
Release Qf shop under occupation of tenant - On. ground of
personal requirement - Held: Comparative hardship is a rel-
evant factor for determining the question as to whether the re-
quirement of th.e landlord is bona fide or not - It is essentially a
question of fact- Such a question of fact, however, is to be de-
D
termined on the touchstone of the statutory provisions as con- )- .
fained in s.21 (.1 )(a) of the Act and r.16(2)(c) of the Rules - On
facts, Respondent-landlord did not have any business - Hence,
question of application of the factors as envisaged in the first
part of clause (c) of Sub-Rule. (2) of r.16 did not arise - On the
E findings of the Appellate Authority, no alternate accommoda-
lion was available with him - Hence the question of any such
premises being let out in favour of Appellant does not arise -
There is a/so nothing on record to show that for the .last so many
years, Appellant had made any effort to find out a tenanted pre- ).
F mises for herself so that she can continue with her business - •
Six months time granted to Appellant to vacate the premises.
The husband of Appellant was a tenant in the shop
in question. He died leaving behind Appellant and two
daughters. The daughters are married and have no con-
G
cern with the shop in question. Respondent-landlord had
retired from the Army and was living with his wife and -t.
children. He was drawing a sum of Rs.2,000/- by way of
pension and wanted to start his business in the said shop.

H 538
GANGA DEVI v. DISTT JUDGE, NAINITAL 539
AND ORS.
-~
He filed an application for release of the shop on ground A
of bona fide requirement before the prescribed authority
being Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nainital in terms of Sec-
tion 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Let-
ting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The application was
dismissed, inter a/ia, on the premise that Respondent paid B
a shop other than the shop in question. The Appellate
#Ji Authority, however, reversed the said order holding that
Respondent was in bona fide need of the said shop for
the purposes of carrying out an independent business.
As regards comparative hardship, it was held that Rule c
16 of the Rules framed in terms of s.41 of the Act of 1972
would not be a ground for refusing to allow a release ap-
plication. The writ petition filed by Appellant thereagainst
was dismissed by the High Court.

. ~. In appeal to this Court it was contended that the High D
Court failed to ta~e'into consideration the scope and pl!r-
port of the 4th proviso appended to s.21 (1 )(a) of the Act
vis-a-vis r.16 of the Rules; that while considering the ques-
tion of comparative hardship, the Appellate Court as also
the High Court should have made an attempt to balance E
the requirements of both the landlord and tenant by di-
recting division of the tenanted premises into two, and
that the fact that the husband of the Appellant was the
...._ tenant in the shop in question for a long time, viz., for more
• than 50 years, is itself a pointer to show that r.16 of the F
Rules would be applicable. The contention of the Appel-
lant is that she is a 76 years old lady and that she has to
run business from the shop in question as of necessity.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
G
HELD:1.1. Before the Prescribed Authority, no plea
*t was taken by the appellants that another shop was avail-
able to the Respondent. The Prescribed Authority, on the
basis of a purported statement made by the sister of the
Respondent, arrived at a purported finding that ground-
H
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 8 S.C.R.

A floor of one building, known as, "Durga Cottage" is avail-
able. The Appellate Authority, however, upon consider-
ation of the entire materials on record arrived at a differ-
ent conclusion opining that Respondent has been living
with his wife and children independently and having re-
B gard to the fact that admittedly he has been receiving a
petty sum of Rs.2,000/- by way of pension wherewith it
was not possible to maintain a family of 4-5 members, he
must augment his source of income. It was also found
that or:ie of his sons had been studying in Nainital. No
c evidence was brought on record to show that he has any
property other than the one where the shop in question
is situated. Respondent was found to have been resid-
ing in a portion of first floor of the property and. the dis-
puted shop was situated in the ground-floor and on the
said premise it was held that it was not possible to ask
0
him to open a shop at the first-floor by giving up his resi-
dential accommodation. [Para 10] [547-E,F,G, 548-A,B]
1.2. It is not the case of the Appellant that the 'Durga
Cottage" is situated at any other place or it is another prop-
E erty where Respondent has a share and whereat, he can
start running a shop. The aforementioned finding of the
Appellate Authority was not challenged before the High
Court. An error committed by the Prescribed Authority as
regards availability of an alternative accommodation to
F Respondent was corrected by the Appellate Authority and,
thus, in the event, the Appellant intended to question. the
correctness thereof, a specific ground in the writ petition
should have been taken. Even it does not appear from
the special leave petition that such a ground has been
G raised even before this Court. In the absence of any
ground, thus, having been taken either before the High
Court or before this Court the aforementioned finding of
the Appellant Authority must be held to be containing an
error of record, and thus the said finding of fact should
H not be interfered with. [Para 11] [548-8,C,D,E]
GANGA DEVI v. DISTT. JUDGE, NAiNiT/l,L 541
AND ORS.

2.1. Comparative hardship is a relevant factor for de- A
termining the question as to·whether the requirement of
the landlord is bona fide or not within the meaning of tha
provisions of the said Act and the Rules. It is essentially
a question of fact. Such a question of fact, however, is to
be determined on the touchstone of the statutory provi- B
sions as contained in s.21 (1 )(a) and Rules 16(2)(c) of the
Rules. [Para 13] [549-C,D]
2.2. Rule 1q provides for some factors which are re-
quired to be taken into consideration for the purpose of
determining the comparative hardship. Respondent No. C
3 in this case does not have any business. If he has no
business, the question of application of the factors as
envisaged in the first part of clause (c) of Sub-Rule (2) of
Rule 16 will not arise. On the findings of the Appellate
Authority, no accommodation is available with him. The D
question of thus any premises beirig let out in favour of
1st appellant also does riot arise. [Para 14] [549-D,E,F]
2.3. There is also nothing on record to show that for
the last so many years the appellant had made any effort
to find out a tenanted premises for herself so that she can E
continue with her business. No such material at least has
been brought on record. Any subsequent event as re-
gards thereto has neither been pleaded nor proved. [Para
15] [549-F,G]
F
2.4. The provisions of the statutory rules must be
interpreted so as to give effect to the object and purport
of the Act. It cannot be applied in a vacuum, as the stat-
ute requires comparison of the hardship of both the ten-
ant as also the landlord. It is, therefore, not a case where G
Rule 16 has any application. [Para 15] [549-G,H, 550-A]
2.5. The Court would not determine a question only
on the basis of sympathy or sentiment. Stricto sensu eq-
uity as such may not have any role to play. [Para 16] [550-
A,B] H
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S,C,R.

A Bhagwan Das v Jiley Kaur (1991) Supp. 2 SCC 300 -
relied on,
Bishan Chand v Vth Add/, District Judge, Bulandshahr
(1982) 1 SCC 626; Rishi Kumar Gavit v Maqsoodan & Ors,
(2007) 4 sec 465; sushi/a v find ADJ (2003) 2 sec 28 and
B Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs, v Union of India (UOI) and
Anr. (2008) 6 SCALE 325 - referred to.
3. Appellant No.1 is said to be 76 years old and her
daughters 'are married. Though she contended that she
c should be allowed at least five years' time to shift at a dif-
ferent place, having regard to the fact that the suit was
filed in 2003, she should not be given that much time. In
the facts and circumstances of this case, six months' time
should be granted to the 1st Appellant to vacate the pre-
D mises, which should serve the ends of justice. [Paras 18,
19] [552-A,B]
CIVIL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No,
3541 of 2008

From the final Judgment and order dated 20/1112006 of
E the High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital in W.P (Civil) No, 581/ 1

2005 (M/S)

R.P. Gupta, Sushendra Kumar Chauhan, HD. Pandey~
Ravi Mohan, Suman Gupta and Priyanka S, Mathur for the Ap-
F pellant.
Sanjay Parikh, Dr. l.B. Gaur, Piyush Sharma, Neeraj D.
Gaur, S.P. Kandpal and Shiv Kumar Suri for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
2, This appeal is directed against a judgment and order
dated 20.11.2006 passed by the High Court of Uttranchal at
Nainital in Writ Petition No. 581 of 2005 affirming the judgment
H and order dated 4.6.2005 passed by the District Judge, Nainital
GANGA DEVI v. DISTT JUDGE, NAINITAL 543
AND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J]

allowing an appeal from a judgment and order dated 22.11.2004 A
whereby and whereunder an application for release filed by the
respondent on the ground of his bona fide requirement was dis-
missed.
3. Respondents 1 and 2 are the joint owners of a shop
situated in H.. No. 110 Durga Cottage Annexy Safak Suffock B
._> Hall Compound, Tallital, Nainital.

Khyali Ram, the husband of the appellant, was a tenant
therein. He died leaving behind the appellant (his wife) and two
daughters Smt Hema Tiwari and Smt Deepa Joshi. They are c
married. They have no concern with the shop in question.
Respondent No. 3 was in military service. He retired from
army. He was living at Nainital with his wife and children. He
draws a sum of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees Two thousand only) by way
• j, of pension. He, therefore, wanted to start his business in the D
said shop.
An application for release of the shop was filed before the
prescribed authority being Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nainital
in terms of Section 21 (1 )(a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regula-
tion of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The said applica- E
tion was dismissed, inter alia, on the premise that applicants
own a shop other than the shop in question holding:
"However, as regards need of N.A. No. 1 for the said
shop, she has no other means of her livelihood except the F
shop in question and it is also clear that the N.A. No.1 is
an old lady of 50-50 years of age because of which she
was unable to carry business elsewhere. In such a case,
therefore, in relation to the applicants N.A. No.1 has intense
and bonafide need of the shop in question and in case the G
shop in question is released in favour of the applicants
undoubtedly the N.A No.1 having nci means of livelihood
would face too much hardship, when applicant No. 2 is a
retired man and is living on pension and he is still young
and he has a shop adjoining the shop in question and he H
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.
f~;;

,._
A can carry his business elsewhere. In such a case therefore, ..
in relation to applicants the N.A. No.1 has intense and
genuine need of the shop in question and the relative
hardship is very much in favour of the non applicants No.
1 and against the applicants."
B 4. The Appellate Authority, however, reversed the said or-
der holding that respondent No.3 was in bona fide need of the . ~~
. said shop for the purposes of carrying out an independent busi-
ness.

c As regards comparative hardship, it was opined that Rule
16 of the Rules framed in terms of Section 41 of the Act 13 of
1972 would not be a ground for refusing to allow a release ap-
plication. The writ petition filed by the appellant thereagainst
as indicated hereinbefore has been dismissed by the High
Court by reason of the impugned judgment.
D
5. The High Court, we may at the outset notice, has com-
~ "
mitted an error in holding that the findings of both the prescribed
authority as also the Appellate Authority were concurrent; in fact
the Appellate Authority reversed the findings of the prescribed
E authority.

6. Mr. R.P. Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant would submit:

i) The High Court and the courts below have failed to
~ ...
F take into consideration the scope and purport of the
4th proviso appended to Section 21 (1 )(a) of the Act
vis-a-vis Rule 16 of the Rules.
ii) While considering the question of comparative
hardship, the appellate court as also the High Court
G should have made an attempt to balance the
requirements of both the landlord and tenant by 4
·~
directing division of the tenanted premises into two,
which measures 30 ft. x 20 ft.

(iii) The fact that the husband of the petitioner was the
H
'

GANGA DEVI v. DISTT. JUDGE, NAINITAL 545
AND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
~ __... tenant in the shop in question for a long time, viz., for A
more than 50 years, is itself a pointer to show that
Rule 16 of the Rules would be applicable.
7. Mr. Sanjay Parikh, learned counsel appearing on be-
half of the respondents on the other hand supported the im-
pugned judgment. B

.,, 8. Section 21 (1 )(a) of the Act reads as under:-

"21. Proceedings for release of building under
occupation oftenant.-(1) The prescribed authority may,
on an application of the landlord in that behalf, order the c
eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any
specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the
following grounds exists namely-
(a) that the building is bona fide required either in its existing
D
• -;, form or after demolition and new construction by the
landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his
family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him,
either for residential purposes or for purposes of any
profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the
trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the E
trust;"

The fourth proviso appended thereto reads as under:
"Provided also that the prescribed authority shall, except
• -'- in cases provided for in the Explanation, take into account F
the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the
application as against the likely hardship to the landlord
from the refusal of the application and for that purpose
shall have regard to such factors as may be prescribed."
G
Section 41 of the Act 13 of 1972 provides for the rule mak-
r ing power. Pursuant thereto or in furtherance thereof Rules have
been framed by the State of U.P. known as U.P. Urban Build-
ings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (for
short, "the Rules").
H

r'
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S. C.R.

A Rule 16(2) of the Rules reads as under:
,._
...
~·,

"16. Application for release on the ground of personal '
requirement -
( 1) ...................'. ....... ~
B (2) While considering an application for release under
clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 in respect of a
building let out for purposes of any business, the -~ ..
Prescribed Authority shall also have regard to such facts
as the following:-
c
(a) the greater the period since when the tenant opposite
party, or the original tenant whose heir the opposite
party is, has been carrying on his business in that
building, the less the justification for allowing the
application;
0
~-
(b) Where the tenant has available with him suitable 4

accommodation to which he can shift his business
without substantial loss there shall be greater
justification for allowing the application.
E
(c) the greater the existing business of the landlord's
own, apart from the business proposed to be set up
in the leased premises, the less the justification for
allowing the application, and even if an application
is allowed in such a case, the prescribed authority
F ~-
may on the application of the tenant impose the ~

condition where the landlord has available with him
other accommodation (whether subject to the Act or
not) which is not suitable for his own proposed
business but may serve the purpose of the tenant,
G that the landlord shall let out that accommodation to
the tenant on a fair rent to be fixed by the prescribed
'i
authority; ;-

(d) where a son or unmarried or widowed or divorced or
judicially·separated daughter of a male lineal
H
0
GANGA DEVI v. DISTI. JUDGE, NAINITAL 547
AND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
-~
descendant of the landlord has, after the building A
was originally let out, completed his or her technical
education and is not employed in Government
service, and wants to engage in self employment,
his or her need shall be given due consideration."

9. Application of the aforementioned provisions to the fact B
•-1 of this case is in question.

Bona fide requirement of the shop premises has been
found in favour of respondent No.3 - Sunil Kumar. It now al-
most stands admitted that Shri Anil Kumar resides and runs a c
business at Almora. It is also beyond any doubt that Shri Sunil
Kumar resides at Nainital. The fact that he is a retired person
is not in dispute. He receives a sum of Rs. 2;000/- by way of

... .,..
pension has also not been disputed. The Appellate Authority
has found existence of bona fide requirement on the part of the
said Shri Sunil Kumar as indicated hereinbefore. The conten-
D·
tion of the appellant No.1 is that she is a 76 years old lady and
that she has to run the said business as of necessity. The core
question is whether the Appellate Authority was wholly wrong in
arriving at the said finding so as to warrant interference by the
Writ Court. E

10. Before the Prescribed Authority, no plea was taken by
the appellants that another shop was available to the respon-
~
dent No.3. The Prescribed Authority, on the basis of a purported
• statement made by the sister of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, F
arrived at a purported finding that ground~floor of one building,
commonly known as, "Durga Cottage" is available~ The Appel-
late Authority, however, upon consideration of the entire materi-
als on record arrived at a different conclusion opining that the
respondent No. 3 has been living with his wife and children in-
G
dependently and having regard to the fact that admittedly he
' has been receiving a petty sum of Rs.2,000/- by way of pension
wherewith it was not possible to maintain a family of 4-5 mem-
bers, he must augment his source of income. It was also found
that one·of his sons had been studying in Nainital. No evidence
H
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A was brought on record to show that he has any property other
than the one where the shop in question is situated. Respon-
dent No. 3 was found to have been residing in a portion of first
floor of the property and the disputed shop was situated in the
§round-floor and on the said premise it was held that it was not
B possible to ask him to open a shop at the first-floor by giving up
his residential accommodation.
11. It is not the case of the appellant that the 'Durga Cot-
tage" is situated at any other place or it is another property where
the respondent No. 3 has a share and whereat, he can start
C running a shop. The aforementioned finding of the Appellate
Authority was not challenged before the High Court. An error
committed by the Prescribed Authority as regards availability
of an alternative accommodation to the respondent No.3 was
corrected by the Appellate Authority and, thus, in the event, the
D appellant intended to question the correctness thereof, a spe-
cific ground in the writ petition should have been taken. Even it
does not appear from the special leave petition that such a
ground has been raised even before us. In the absence of any
ground, thus, having been taken either before the High Court or
E before us that the aforementioned finding of the Appellant Au-
thority must be held to be containing an error of record, and
thus, we are of the opinion that the said finding of fact should
not be interfered with.
We may now consider the submission of Mr. Gupta,
F learned counsel for the appellant, that the size of the shop be-
ing 13 ft. x 20 ft. can be divided into two shops so as to accom-
modate both the 1st appellant as also the 3rd respondent. It ap-
pears that there exists a dispute in regard thereto. Respon-
dents in their affidavit categorically stated :
G
"That it may also be pointed out that the present
Respondent filed an application for release of the disputed
accommodation situated at Nainital which is a small shop
measuring 8 feet x 10 feet and is not capable of being
partitioned."
H
GANGA DEVI v. DISTT. JUDGE, NAINITAL 549
AND ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
- - _..
12. The said averments have been traversed in paragraph A
8 of the rejoinder in the following terms:

"That the contents of para 3 of counter affidavit of
respondents are wrong and denied and the respective
contents of petition are reiterated."
B
13. We are, however, not oblivious of the fact that with the
.. 'f
said rejoinder a sketch map has been annexed to show that it
measured 13 ft. x 20 ft. We are, however, of the opinion that
such disputed questions of fact cannot be gone into by this Court
for the first time. c
Ii Comparative hardship, indisputably, is a relevant factor
for determining the question as to whether the requirement of
the landlord is bona fide or not within the meaning of the provi-
sions of the said Act and the Rules. It is essentially a question
... of fact. Such a question of fact, however, is to be determined D
on the touchstone of the statutory pmvisions as contained in
Section 21(1)(a) and Rules 16(2)(c) of the Rules.
14. Rule 16 provides for some factors which are required
to be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining
E
the comparative hardship. Respondent No. 3 in this case does
not have any business. If he has no business, the question of
application of the factors as envisaged in the first part of clause
(c) of Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 16 will not arise. On the findings of
.... the Appellate Authority, no accommodation is available with him .
•
The question of thus any premises being let out in favour of 1•1 F
appellant also does not arise.
15. There is also nothing on record to show that for the last
so many years the appellant had made any effort to find out a
tenanted premises for herself so that she can continue with her
G
business. No such material at least has been brought on record.
'
-' Any subsequent event as regards thereto has neither been
pleaded nor proved.
The provisions of the statutory rules must be interpreted
so as to give effect to the object and purport of the Act. It cannot H
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A be applied in a vacuum, as the statute requires comparison of
the hardship of both the tenant as also the landlord. It is, there-
fore, not a case where Rule 16 has any application.
16. The court would not determine a question only on-the
basis of sympathy or sentiment. Stricto sensu equity as such
B may not have any role to play.
17. In Bhagwan Das vs. Jiley Kaurreported in [1991 Supp.
(2) SCC 300], this Court distinguishing the earlier decision of
this Court in Bishan Chand vs. Vth Addi. District Judge,
c Bu/andshahr[(1982) 1SCC626] stated the law in the follow-
ing terms:
"It was also pointed out in this case that the provisions of
Rule 16(2) of the Act (sic for Rules) had not been
considered at all. In our opinion, the said decision is
clearly distinguishable. Firstly, the instant case was one ·
where there was an outweighing circumstance in favour of
the landlord namely that two of her sons after completing
their education were unemployed and wanted to carry on
business for self-employment. Secondly, as already seen
above, it was not a case where the provisions of Rule
16(2) can be said to have been ignored by the District
Judge. Thirdly, it was a case where there was even this
additional circumstance that the appellant had brought no
material on record to indicate that at any time during the
·•
pendency of this long drawn out litigation he made any
attempt to seek an alternative accommodation and was
unablE;! to get it."
The 'thirdly' referred to therein applies to the fact of this
case.
Yet again in Rishi Kumar _Govil vs. Maqsoodan & ors.
[(2007) 4 sec 465] (wherein one of us Panta,J. was a Mem-
ber), this Court quoted from the decision from Sushi/a vs. /Ind
ADJ [(2003) 2 SCC 28], wherein it was stated:
"11. In the/ case in hand we find that even though the
GANGA DEVI v. DISTI. JUDGE, NAINITAL 551
AND ORS. [S.8. SINHA, J.]
. ~-.

period of tenancy of the respondent is no doubt long but A
availability of another shop to him where he can very well
shift his business as found by the prescribed authority,
neutralizes the factor of length of tenancy in the
accommodation in dispute. We further find that the landlady
has no other shop where she can establish her son who B
is married and unemployed. There is nothing on the record
~ ~
to indicate that the business of the father of Prem Prakash
is so huge or that it is a very flourishing business so as to
attract application of clause (c) of Rule 16(2). As observed
c
earlier it is clear that the length of the period of tenancy as
provided under clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 of the
Rules, 1972 is only one of the actors to be taken into
account in context with other facts and circumstances of
the case. It cannot be a sole criterion or deciding factor
... ... to order or not the eviction of the tenant. Considering the
D
facts in the light of Rule 16 pressed into service on behalf
of the respondent, we find that according to the guidelines
provided therein balance tilts in favour of the unemployed
son of the landlady whose need is certainly bona fide and
has also been so accepted by the respondent before us."
E
We may notice that recently in Satyawati Sharma (Dead)
by LRs. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Anr. reported in 2008 (6)
SCALE 325. Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
,.., 1958 was declared ultra vires stating that with the passage of
• time a statute which was held to be valid may be held to be F
invalid in the following terms:
"It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite
reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may
with the lapse of time and/or due to change of
circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and G
_. t violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of
such legislation may have been upheld at a giyen point of
time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down
the same if it is found that the rationale of classification
has become non-existent." H
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A 18. Appellant No.1 is said to be 76 years old. Her da1.1gh-
ters are married. Learned counsel submits that she should be
allowed at least five years' time to shift at a different place. We
do not think that having regard to the fact that the suit was filed
in 2003, she should be given that much time.
8 19. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of
the opinion, that six months' time should be granted to the 1st
Appellant to vacate the premises, which should serve the ends
of justice. It is directed accordingly.

c Subject to the aforementioned directions, this appeal is
dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there ~'

i
shall be no order as to costs.
8.8.8. Appeal dismissed.

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