Holding

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, held the death to be homicidal, and set aside the conviction under Section 201 IPC.

Summary

The appellant Ganeshlal was charged, along with his parents, sister, maternal uncle and the uncle's daughter, for the murder of his wife Kanchana, whose body was found severely burnt on the third floor of their house. The trial court acquitted all accused, but the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) convicted Ganeshlal alone under Sections 302 and 201 IPC, sentencing him to life imprisonment and three years respectively. On appeal before the Supreme Court, the key issues were whether the death was a suicide or homicide, whether the circumstantial evidence established a common intention to murder, and whether conviction under Section 201 could stand. The Court held that the evidence showed Kanchana was rendered unconscious, kerosene was poured on her, and the accused deliberately prevented rescue, indicating homicide. The lack of a proven motive was deemed immaterial. Consequently, the conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC was upheld, the conviction under Section 201 was set aside, and the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The death of Kanchana was a suicide or homicide.
Whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish common intention under Section 34 IPC.
Whether conviction under Section 201 IPC was justified.
Whether the other accused could be acquitted while the appellant was convicted.
The relevance of motive in a murder conviction.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161, s. 313
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 8
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 203, s. 302, s. 306, s. 34

Subjects

murderhomicidesuicidecircumstantial evidencecommon intentionIPC 302IPC 34convictionmotiveevidence

Judgment

A GANESHLAL
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
. !I-

·-
APRIL 10, 1992

B [N.M. KASLIWAL AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ.]
A..
Indian Penal Code, 1860:

Sections 34, 201, 203 and 302-lJeath of wife due to sev,ere bums-Hus-
c band pleading innocence-Claiming it to be suicide--Circumstantial evidence
complete and consistent that husband and his family members committed the
-"'1 ---
offence-Conduct of accused-Unnatural, indifferent and hard-hearted-All
accused acquitted by trial court-High Court reversing and convicting the
husband alone-Conviction and sentenc~Validity ·of.
•
D Criminal Procedure Code, 1973:

Section 313-Death caused while in custody of accused-Plausible
explanation for cause of death-Need to be given in the statement.
6

E Section 161:

Criminal trial-Delay in recording statement of witness-Whether and
in what circumstances renders the evidence doubtful-Need for scanning the
...
evidence carefully.
...._
F At the residence of the appellant, his wife was found dead with severe
burns. The appellant, his parents, sister, maternal uncle and the uncle's
daughter were charged with the offence of murder and tried under section
302 read with section 34 and sections 201 and 203 read with section 34 IPC, )
though initially the case was registered under section 306 read with section
34 IPC.
G
The Trial Court acquitted all the accused. On appeal the High Court
convicted the appellant alone under sections 302 and 201 IPC and sen-
tenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and three years
imprisonment respectively, against which the appellant has preferred the
H present appeal.
,-·
502
GANESHLAL v. STATE 503

On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that it was a case of A
suicide as no kerosene was found in the house except in the room where
the death occurred; that the door to the room from stairs was not closed
from outside and in case of murder, the deceased could have run away
from tbe room opening the latch; that the deceased was determined to
commit suicide for humiliation caused to her on account of her not being B
allowed to go to the house of her sister; and that there were no signs of
.external injuries. It was also contended that since the prosecution all
through proceeded on the assumption that the appellant abetted suicide,
suddenly it could not be said to be a case or murder.

~ It was also contended that since all the other accused have been c
acquitted, the appellant could not be convicted under section 302 IPC•

• Dismissing the appeal, this Court,

HELD : 1. There is no evidence or even suggestion that the deceased D
had any tendency to commit suicide or affected with any psychosis for
committing suicide. It is also dear from the evidence that the door was
not bolud from inside. Unless the doors from outside were closed and
made the victim alone remain in the room, the smoke would not have
confined to the room. There is no evidence of any struggle by her as there
was no injuries to her ha.ck or feet or rubbing the ground. Kerosene tin E
IM> was found and there were no signs of kerosence sprinkled in the room. The
instinct of self preservation at the height of agony must lead in an attempt
to put out the flames at least with hands. Wbile the deceased was drying
the clothes, her palms were wet, somebody must ha't·e come from behind,
caught bold of her palms and another her legs, and she was made uncon- F
sciQus. The means used to make her unconscious is not available either
from medical evidence or circumstances. She was made to lie down in a
supine position on the ground. Thereafter, kerosene appears to have ~n
poured from the tin brought by someone and set her on fire. It is indis-
potable that kerosene smell was found .in the room and she died due to
burns. The walls and ceiling became blackish which would clearly show G
that a large quantity or kerosene was poured on her after she became
unconscious due to which her clothes were soaked of kerosene. The wit-

~. nesses have also seen from outside for about 10 to 20 minutes that smoke
was coming form the room. These circumstances clearly establish that the
death was not due to suicide, but one of homicidal. [S08G, H; S09A-EJ "H
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (19921 2 S.C.R.

A 2. The normal ordinary human conduct would· be that when one of
their inmates was in names, they would have made every endeavour to save
her life, if it were a case of suicide, and call the people to come to their
rescue to save her life or at least would have sought first aid from PW-6,
a compounder, who is next door neighbour, to save the life of the deceased.
No such attempt was made; nor even attempted. On the other hand the
B appellant's earliest attempt was to misguide the people that the deceased
died due to short circuit, which claim was falsified from the evidence of
PW-10, Electrical Engineer. [513G, H; 514A]

3.1. The evidence on record is not sufficient to arrive at an immediate
C motive to commit the crime and the case depends on circumstantial
evidence. But in circumstantial evidence also when the facts are clear it is
immaterial that no motive has been proved. Men do not act wholly without
motive. Failure to discover the motive of the offence does not signify the
non-existence of the crime. The failure to discover motive by appropriate
D clinching evidence may be a weakness in the proof of the prosecution case,
but it is not necessarily fatal as a matter of law. Proof of motive is never
an indispensable factor for conviction. [SlOD-F]

3.2. The evidence of witness recorded at late stage must be received
with a pinch of salt. Delay defeats justice. But each case has to be
E considered on its own facts. In the instant case, the High Court is well
justified in placing reliance on the evidence of PW-6. In fact material part
· of his .evidence was not subjected to cross examination, except suggesting
that he was deposing falsely. Under these circumstances he is a truthful
and reliable witness. His evidence clearly show,~hat neither the appellant,
F nor any member of the family though were present in the house, attempted
to save the deceased but were simply sitting in the first floor unmoved by
even the ghastly murder and the appellant was guarding at the grill gate
preventing the people from entering into the house falsely stating that
there was short circuit. This evidence receives corroboration from the
evidence of PW-7 and PW-8. [512C-E]
G
3.3 In his examination under section 313 Cr. P.C., the appellant
admitted that A-6 went to the police station and gave FIR stating that the
deceased caught fire while she was handling the wet clothes for drying, due
to short circuit, and that this information was conveyed by the appellant
H himself. This admission is not only a relevant fact under section 8 of
-,,'

GA"lESHLAL v. STATE 505

Evidence Act as res gestae but a most important circumstance against the A
appellant. The indifferent and hard hearted conduct are also important
circumstances. It is settled law that the conduct of an accused in an offence
previous and subsequent to the crime are relevant facts. Absence of any
attempt to save the life of the deceased while she was burning and was
charred to death, the conduct of the accused in not attempting to give any B
medical aid, the conduct of the appellant immediately after the death and
falsely proclaiming that there was short circuit implying to scare away the
people from attempting to save the deceased - these are most telling and
relevant crucial facts apart from repulsive inhuman conduct. The false
plea of suicide is yet another relevant fact. When the death had occurred
in the custody of the accused the appellant is under an obligation in section C
313 Cr. P.C. statement at least to give a plausible explanation for the cause
for her death. No sach attempt was even made except denying the prosecu-
tion case. These facts completely are inconsistent with the innocence, but
consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is a prime accused in the
commission of gruesome murder of bis wife. The circumstantial evidence D
is complete and consistent with the only conclusion that the inmates alone
committed the crime and the appellant was one among them. The absence
of an appeal against acquittal of A-1 and A-3 to A-6, al! of them or who
among them shared common intention with the appellant is obviated. The
appellant is the principal perpetrator of the crime or one among the
accused who sha~d common intention to murder the deceased. the con- E
> viction of the a11pellant is therefore altered to one under section 302 read
with section 34 IPC. Accordingly, appellant is convicted for the mul'.der of
bis wife and is sentenced to undergo rigorous imJ>risonment for life. The
conviction under section 201 IPC is set aside. [514C-H; 515A, BJ
F
Alley v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807; Balakrushna Swain v. State
of Orissa, AIR 1971 SC 804, relied on.

4. The Sessions Court framed the charges under section 302 read
with section 34 IPC. Thus, the fact of registering the case initially by the G
local police under section 306 IPC loses all significance. It cannot be
disputed that the Sessions Court was fully competent to frame charges
under section 302 read with section 34 IPC. At the trial, if the evidence
adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to bring home the offence under
section 302 IPC, the conviction thereon does not become illegal. [5108, CJ H
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 2 S.C.R.

A CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeai No.
732of1991.

From the Judgment and Order dated 30.10.91 of the Bombay High
Court of Judicature in Criminal Appeal No. 215 of 1987.

B U.R. Lalit, R.K. Jain, Makrand D Adkar, Jamshed Bey and Mrs.
V.D. Khanna Advocates for the Appellants.

V.V. Vaze and S.M. Jadhav for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
, K. RAMASWAMY, J. This appeal is under s.2 of Supreme Court
Enlargement of Criminal Jurisdiction Act, 1970. The appellant along with
his parents, sister, maternal uncle and uncle's daughter were charged for
the offence under :;.302 read with s.34 and ss.201 & W3 read with s.34
I.P.C. of the murder of his wife Kanchana. In S.T. No.125/84, the Addi.
D Sessions Judge, Akola by judgment dated February 10, 1987 acquitted all
of them. On appeal, the appellant alone was convicted under s.302 and
s.201 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and
three years respectively by judgment dated October 30, 1991 of the High
Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur.
E
The material facts that lie in short compass are thus :
~·
Kanchana was married to the appellant in the year 1975. In course
of time the appellant's father became rich, while her parents' family
remained poor leading to constant humilation. The sister of Kanchana,
F Vanmala, PW-5, was also married in the same village, Mangrulpir. On
September 3, 1983, PW-5 went to the deceased family at about 10.00 to
10.15 a.m. and i.-ivited the mother-in-law of the deceased and Kanchana to '
attend "Teej" function in her house for which the mother-in-law refused to
accept the invitation and also did not permit Kanchana to attend the
G function which resulted in exchange of words etc. 'When she was coming
out, she heard abuses against the deceased and somebody being beaten.
After extending invitations to two or three people when she came back
home and was entering into her house, PW-9, her maid servant, came
running and told her that Kanchana was dead. Thereafter she gave infor-
mation to her father, PW-4, and others at Amravati. A-6, maternal uncle
H of the appellant, went to the Police Station and lodged First Information
GANESHLAL v. STATE {RAMASWAMY, J.J 507

Reprot, Ex-73, that while Kanchana was drying wet clothers on the top A
floor, there was short circuit in the house resulting in her death. Mohanlal
PW-4, on receipt of the news reached the appellant's house at Mangrulpir
at about 4.00 p.m. On seeing the condition of the dead body he too laid
complaint of murder. In the meanwhile the police registered the crime. The
police reached the spot at about 12.50 p.m. A.SJ. Jadha'o, PW.14 along B
with Head Constable Sharma, PW-11, conducted investigation. He drew
the Panchanama, Ex-66, the scene of offence, attested by PW-7 and
another. He recovered the burnt articles, ornaments etc. and sent the body
for autopsy. It was further investigated by SJ., PW-15. Subsequnt!y, it was
entrusted to the C.I.D. and PW-16, Kshir Sagar conducted the investigation
and laid the chargesheet. It may be relevant to state at this stage that C
initially the crime was registered under s. 306 read with s.34 I.P.C. Later it
was converted and the charges were framed by the Sessions Court under
s.302 read with s.34 I.P.C.

The prosecution placed reliance on the evidence of PW-4 and PW-5 D
to prove motive for the crimes. PW-6, the Compounder and PW-8, Tea
Stall owner, PW-9, maid servant of PW-5 to prove the conduct of the
accused together with the medical evidence and also chemical examiner's
report. It also relied on the report Ex. 73 lodged by A-6. The case rests on
circumstantial evidence. The circumstances relied on by the prosecution
are as follows : E

The motive, namely the affluent circumstance of the accused party,
the relative poor financial position leading to ill treatment of Kanchana.
The treatment meted out to Kanchana in the presence of Vanmala, fol-
lowed by beating. PW-9, maid servant informing of the death. PW-6 spoke . F
of the appellant's conduct, corroborated by PW-8, of standing at the grill
gate, which is the only entry into the house and preventing the people to
go into the house stating that there was a short circuit and to save them;
indifferent attitude of the in-laws and other inmates and keeping mum,
their leaving the deceased alone in the third floor in flames; emitting of
kerosene smell; and their non-disclosure on inquiry for the cause of the G
death. PW-10, the Engineer, Electricity Department spoke that there was
no short circuit; the conduct of the appellant and also the first information
report given by A-6, the medical evidence that the death was due to shock
~d suffocation. The chemical analyst report and e\'idence of scene of
offence by PW-7. H
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) 2 S.C.R.

A Strenuous attempt was made in the grounds of appeal and also
vehemently contended by Shri U .R. Lalit, the learned Senior counsel for
the appellant, that one of the Judges (Justice A.A. Desai) who decided the
appeal, argued against the appellant as an Asstt. Govt. Pleader and despite
having been brought to his notice, the learned Judge disposed of the appeal
suggesting, thereby, that the appellant was not meted out fair treatment.
B We find no force in the contention. It is true that the record now placed
before us wouid show that way back in 1984 as Asstt. Govt. Pleader, Shri
Desai appeared against the appellant in a bail application and other
proceedings. Might be that the learned Judge had forgotten about his
appearing against the appellant. It might also be possible that it was not
c brought to his notice when the Bench heard the appeal. Finding that the
matter went against the appellant, he turned round and desperately raised
the contention. However, to remove the feeling of injustice due to above
factor and to satisfy ourselves of the merits, we have heard the appeal as
if it is a first appeal against the judgment of the Sessions court. The
D appellant engaged Shri U .R. Lalit and Shri R.K. Jain, Senior Advocates,
apart from a band of Junior Advocates assisting them. We ourselves
minutely considered the entire evidence afresh and reached our own
independent conclusions.

The crucial question in this case is whether Kanchana died due to
E suicide or homicide. The situs is the third floor of the house of the
appellant. The occurrence took place at 10.30 a.m .. No outsider had access
into the house that too except through the grill gate in the ground floor.
In the first floor, parents and sister of the appellant live. The second floor
was in the occupation of the appellant and the deceased and the third floor
F consists of one room and open varandah. The occurrence has taken place
in the room on the third floor. Thus it would be apparent that it is a
custodial death. The Doctor specifically stated that she died due to suf-
focation and shock by inhaling Carbonmonoxide. It would thl1~ be clear
that the door was closed at the time when this occurrence had taken place.
There is no evidence or even suggestion that the deceased had any tenden-
G cy to commit suicide or affected with any psychosis for committing suicide.
It is also clear from the evidence that the door was not bolted from inside.
Unless the doors from outside were closed and made the victim alone
remain in the room, it would be difficult to the smoke confining to the ~
room. From evidence it is clear that the deceased went to the top floor to
H dry up wet clothes. The deceased was of a weak constitution. Her arms
GANESHLAL v. STATE [RAMASWAMY, J.] 509·

)- and feet were not burnt. She was found lying on back in a supine position. A
Her back and clothes on back were not burnt. There is evidence on record
that there was a bucket with water and wet clothes in the room. There is
no evidence of any struggle by her as there are no injuries to her back or
feet or rubbing the ground. Kerosene tin was found and there are no signs
of kerosene sprinkled in the room. The instinct of self preservation at the
B
height of agony must lead in an attempt to put out the flames at least with
hands. Thus it would appear that, while the deceased was drying the
clothes, her palms were wet, somebody must have come from behind,
caught hold of her palms and another her legs, and she was made uncon-
scious. The means used to make her uncounscious is not available either
from medical evidence or circumstances. She was made to lie down in a C
supine position on the gound. Thereafter, kerosene appears to have been
poured from the tin brought by someone and set her on fire. It is indis-
putable that kerosene smell was found in the room and she died due to
burns. Kerosene tin was also found in the house. The walls and ceiling
became blackish which would clearly show that a large quantity of kerosene D
was poured on her after she became unconscious due to which her clothes
were soaked of kerosene. After fire was lit there was heavy smoke screen.
That will be visible when we find that the roof and walls became blackish.
The witnesses have also seen from outside for about 10 to 20 minutes that
smoke was coming from the room. These circumstances clearly establish
that the death was not due to suicide, but one of homicide. The contention E
that no kerosene was found in any other parts; the doors to the room from
stairs was not closed from out side in case of murder she should have run
away from the room opening the latch; she was determined to commit
suicide for humiliation caused to her and PW. 5 Vanmala her sister in not
allowing her to go to PW. S's house and that there were no signs of external F
injuries and, therefore, the death was due to suicide is fallacious and the
High Court has rightly negatived the same.

The next contention that the prosecution all through proceeded with
the assumption that the accused abeted suicide, punishable under s. 306
IPC and that, therefore, it is not a case of murder has no substance. G

·That apart, it appears that the investigatiorr made by the local police
initially did not proceed on the correct lines and no sincere effort appears
to have been made to collect the evidence of the material facts. The
investigation was later on entrusted to the C.l.D. on 10.11.1983 in pur- H
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] 2 S.C.R.

A suance. of an order datep 3.11.1983 passed by superior officers. PW. 16 Sri
Kshirsagar, Inspector C.I.D. conducted the investigation and recorded the
statements of some more witnesses. Ultimately he handed over the charge
of investigation to Mr. Deshpande (fW.18), Dy. S.P.-C.I.D., Crimes on
16.12.1983. Mr. Deshpande also recorded the statements of some more
witnesses and collected the other material evidence and after verifying and
B careful consideration of all the evidence, he added the charge under s. 302
I.P.C. Thereafter charge sheet was submitted in the Court of Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, Mangrulpir on 18.9.1984 who committed the case
to the court of Sessions Judge, Akola for trial. The Sessions Court framed
the charges under s. 302 read withs. 34 I.P.C. Thus, the fact of registering
c the case initially by the local police under s. 306 I.P.C. loses all significance.
It cannot be disputed that the Sessions Court was fully competent to frame
charges under s. 302 read with s.34 I.P.C. At the trial, if the evidence
adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to bring home the offence under
s.302 I.P .C., the conviction thereon does not become illegal.
D
It is next contended that the parents, ·sister, maternal uncle and
uncle's daughter, A-1, A-3 to A-6 having been acquitted the appellant
cannot be convicted under s. 302 I.P .C. The question therefore, is whether
it is the appellant alone who has committed the offence or parents, sister
and two others also are participis criminis. It is true as contended for the
E appellant that the evidence on record is not sufficient to arrive at an
immediate motive to commit the crime and the case depends on cir-
cumstantial evidence. But in circumstantial evidence also when the facts
are clear it is immaterial that no motive has. been proved. Men do not act
wholly without motive. Failure to discover the motive of the offence does
F not signify the non-existence of the crime. The failure to discover motive
by appropriate clinching evidence may be a weakness in the proof of the
prosecution case, but it is not necessarily fatal as a matter of law. Proof of
motive is never an indispensable factor for conviction. In Atley v. State of
U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807 at 810 this court held that where there is clear
G evidence that the person has committed the offence, it is immaterial where
no motive for commission of the crime has been shown. Therefore, even
in the case of circumstantial evidence, absence of motive which may be one
of the strongest links to connect the chain would not necessarily become
fatal provided the other circumstances would complete the chain and
connect the accused with the commission of the offence, leaving no room
H for reasonable doubt, even from the proved circumstances. Therefore, the
GANESHLAL v. STATE [RAMASWAMY, J.] 511

evidence of PW-4 and PW-5 partly with regard to the motive may not be A
sufficient to bring home the strong immediate motive. But the evidence of
PW-5, Vanmala, that on the fateful day, she went to her sister's house
situated at a distance of 40 to 50 ft. from her house and that she extended
invitation to Kanchana and Kanchana's mother-in-law to attend the "Teej"
ceremony in her house was not disputed in the cross examination. It was B
around 10.00 to 10.15 a.m. It is not necessary to dilate the conversation for
refusal to attend the ceremony but suffice to state that the appellant was
present at that time. When Vanmala came down from the first floor, she
heard exchange of words and somebody being beaten. After extending
invitation to some people when she returned home, her maid servant,
PW-9, after some time came and told her that her sister died. From her C
evidence in this behalf, there is no contradiction, but there is an omission
of hearing exchange of words and some body being beaten, in her state-
ment recorded under s.161 Cr. P.C. Giving allowance to omit this part of
the evidence i.e. exchange of words and hearing the beating of somebody,
the fact remains that at 10.30 a.m. Kanchana died. It is established from D
evidence of Vanmala, PW.5 that she saw her sister Kanchana. alive at about
10 to 10.15 a.m. in the company of her husband, in-laws, sister-in.-law in
the house and within few minutes thereafter she was reported dead while
in the house solely occupied by the accused appellant and his family
members.
E
Thereafter we have the evidence of PW-6, Moti Ram, who admittedly
is a Compounder in Dr. Chitlange Nursing Home, which is situated ad-
jacent to the house of the appellant. Therefore, he is a natural witness. It

- is his evidence that at about 10.30 a.m. he heard the voice of the appellant
stating "kakaji close down" "kakaji close down". The appellant was at the
grill holding it. It ~ already stated that the grill is the gateway into the
p

house and to the stair case. He went to the appellant's house; the appellant
prevented entry into the house; PW-6 pushed him aside and went inside
the house. The appellant's parents, sister and A- 5 were in the first floor.
When he enquired, they did not disclose anything when asked for, specifi-
cally the mother of the appellant also did not speak anything. Only his G
father said that Kanchana was burning. When PW.6 went to the third floor,
he saw Kanchana burning, having no clothes on her person and she was in
flames and her thighs were burning. He smelt kerosene and thereafter he
went, away. It is true that there was a delay of nearly 2112 months in
recording his statment but it goes explained as the investigation did not H
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 2 S.C.R.

A proceed in the desired lines initially and only after PW.16 took over the
investigation, he recorded the statement of PW.6. The dispensary used to
open by 10.00 a.m. and his presence is natural. He has no axe to grind
against the appellant or any of the members of his family. He is also an
independent witness. It is true that he was a Compounder working with
Doctor Chitlange, brother-in-law of PW-5. There is nothing on record nor
B even suggested that the family members of PW.5 were inimically disposed
towards the accused. It was suggested to PW.5 which was admitted that
appellant's mother visited PW.5 when she sustained an injury which would
show that both families were on cordial terms. So PW.6 being a natural
witness his evidence cannot be doubted due to delay. It is true that this
c court in Balakruslma Swain v. State of Orissa, AIR 1971 SC 804 held that --(.
the evidence of witness recorded at late stage must be received with a pinch
of salt. Delay defeats justice. But each case has to be considered on its own
facts. In view of the above facts we have scanned his evidence carefully.
We are satisfied that he is a truthful witness. The High Court is well
D justified in placing reliance on his evidence. In fact material part of his
evidence was not subjected to cross examination, except suggesting that he
was deposing falsely. Under these circumstances he is a truthful and
reliable witness. His evidence clearly shows that neither the appellant, nor
any member of the family though were present in the house, attempted to
save Kanchana but were simply sitting in the first floor unmoved by even
E the ghastly murder and the appellant was guarding at the grill gate prevent-
ing the people from entering into the house falsely stating that there was
short circuit. This evidence receives corroboration from the evidence of
PW-7 and PW-8. PW-7, Brij Lal, Panch witness stated that the grill door
was closed and the door was guarded by one. person. He went into the
F house and then to the top floor. He saw the deceased. The ceiling of the
room above the dead body became black, the walls became blakish and the
burnt clothes were smelling with kerosene.' One basket with wet clothes was
lying in the room. He also saw kerosene tin. PW-8, Liakat Ali, is another
independent witness. He owns a tea hotel opposite just about 30 to 40 ft.
from the house of the appellant. His statement was recorded on the next
G day. In his evidence he stated that in the beginning he saw smoke coming
from the 3rd floor and later he saw a crowd collected in front of the
appellant's house. He also went there. He saw the appellant shouting that
there was an electric short circuit in the building and was requesting the
people to save them. He was standing at the grill gate and when the witness
H
GANESHLAL v. STATE [RAMASWAMY, J.] 513

tried to enter in the house, the appellant prevented him. He pushed the A
appellant aside and went inside the house. In the first floor, he saw the
appellant's mother, sister and father sitting. On enquiry they did not speak
anything but directed to go upstairs. When he went, he saw the body of the
deceased in the room burning. The only omission in his statement under
s.161 Cr. P.C. was regarding his asking the mother and sister of the B
appellant and their directions to go to the upstairs. He admitted that his
shop belongs to PW.5's family. Admittedly he too had no enimity with the
appellant or his family, nor even suggested. As stated earlier, the family of
PW-5 had also no enimity. Under these circumstances PW-8 being also an
independent witness, his evidence inspires confidence to believe him as a
truthful witness. The High Court was right in believing his evidence. From C
the evidence of PW-6 and PW-8 it is clear that the appellant was falsely
exclaiming that there was a short circuit and requesting the people to save
them. At the same time he was preventing the people from getting into the
house. They saw the appellant and other accused in the house without
attempting to save the life of Kanchana. It may be relevant to state that the .D
earliest version of A.6 in Ex. 73 report given to the police was that the
deceased was drying the clothes at that time. Due to short circuit she
received shock and died. This theory is now found to be false from the
evidence of P.W.10, the Electrical Engineer. It is also now not set up as
defence even before us. Evidence of PW.7, the panch witness, and Asstt.
Sub-Inspector, PW-14, PW-6 and PW-8 clearly establishes that in the room E
on the third floor, the deceased was seen burning and that the door was
open from outside. The contention that the deceased had access to open
another door from inside into the staircase from the room and that it is
not a case of homocide, is false in view of the facts narrated hereinbefore.
F
From this evidence it is clear that the accused appellant and his
family members were present in the house at the titrte when the deceased
was buring due to fire lit after pouring kerosene on her and they made no
attempt to save her. The contention that the Doctor had stated that the
death was instantaneous and nothing was left for the appellant and the
other family members to save her, is unacceptable. The normal ordinary G
human conduct would be that when one of their inmates, namely Kanchana
was in flames, they would have made every endeavour to save her life, if it
were a case of suicide, and call the people to come to their rescue to save
her life or at least would have sought first aid from PW-6, who is next door
neighbour, to save the life of the deceased. No such attempt was made nor H
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] 2 S.C.R.

A even attempted. On the other hand the appellant's earliest attempt was to
misguide that Kanchana died due to short circuit. This attempt was hurried
fathom deep from the evidence of PW.10, Elect. Engr. Then they set up
the plea of suicide. We have Ex. 73, the first information report, immedi-
ately lodged by A-6 with the police. We need not go into the question as
to what extent the admission by a co-accused would be used against the
B appellant. Suffice it to state that in his examination under s.313 Cr. P.C.,
the appellant admitted that A-6 went to the poiice station and gave FIR
Ex-73, to the Head Constable, PW-11 and that A-6 stated that the deceased

c
caught fire while she was handling the wet clothes for drying, due to short
circuit. In Ex-73, it was also stated that this information was conveyed by
the appellant himself. This admission is not only a relevant fact under s.8
of Evidence Act as res gestae but a most important circumstance against
-
the appeilant. The indifferent and hard hearted conduct are also important
circumstances. It was also admitted that the walls in the room became
blackish due to smoke. It is settled law that the conduct of an accused in
D an offence previous and subsequent to the crime are relevant facts. Ab-
sence of any attempt to save the life of the deceased Kanchana while she
was burning and was charred to death, their conduct in not attempting to
give any medical aid, the conduct of the appellant immediately after the
deceased was soaked with kerosene and litting fire after closing the door
A.6 obviously opened it after ensuring that she had died, the appellant's
E coming down and standing at the grill gate on ground floor; the appellant
shouted that uncle A.6 should close down falsely proclaimed that there was
short circuit; implying to scare away the people from attempting to save
Kanchana. These are most telling and relevant crucial facts apart from
repulsive inhuman conduct. The false plea of suicide is yet another relevant
F fact. When the death had occurred in their custody the appellant is under
an obligation in s. 313 Cr. P.C. statement at least to give a plausible
explanation for the cause of her death. No such attempt was even made
excepting denying the prosecution case. These facts completely are incon-
sistent with the innocence, but consistent with the hypothesis that the
appellant is a prime accused in the commission of gruesome murder of his
G wife. The circumstantial evidence thus discussed is complete and consistent
with the only conclusion that the inmates alone committed the crime ~d
the appellant was one among them.

The evidence on record does establish that more than one would be
H participants to murder Kanchana. The absence of an appeal against acquit-
GANESHLAL v. STATE [RAMASWAMY, J.] 515

tal of A-1 and A-3 to A-6, namely, Hiralal, Ayodhyabai, Premlata, Aruna A
and Rameshwar, all of them or who among them shared comm.on intention
with the appellant is obviated. The appellant is the principal perpetrator
of the crime or one among the accused that shared common intention to
murder Kanchana. The conviction of the appellant is accordingly altered
to one under s. 302 read with s.34 I.P.C. The appellant is convicted for the B
murder of his wife, Kanchana under s.302 read with s.34; I.P.C. and is
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. The conviction under
s.201 is set aside. The judgment and order of the High Court is confirmed
with the above modification. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

G.N. Appeal dismissed.
~-