GANDHE VIJAY KUMARversusMULJI @ MULCHAND

                        [2017] 6 S.C.R. 551


                    GANDHE VIJAY KUMAR                                A
                                 v.
                     MULJI @ MULCHAND
                  (Civil Appeal No. 1384 of 2011)
                           JULY27,2017                                B

        [KURIAN JOSEPH AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.]
         Jurisdiction : Revisional jurisdiction - Scope of - On facts,
 concurrent findings of facts with regard to the bonafide requirement
of the landlord by Rent Controller as well as by Appellate Authority C
- Set aside by the High Court holding that the court can
 re-appreciate the evidence to test whether the findings of the Rent
 Controller are correct - On appeal, held: High Court misdirected
itself and exceeded its jurisdiction - In revisional jurisdiction, the
 Court is expected to see only whether the findings are illegal or
perverse - High Court should not have gone into the evidence as a D
first appeal and enter a different finding, though another finding
might also be possible - Merely because another view was possible
in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction, High Court could not upset
the factual findings - Judgment of the High Court set aside and
 that of Rent Controller and Appellate Authority, restored - Rent
                                                                       E
 Control and eviction.
      Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh
      (2014) 9 sec 78 - referred to.
                       Case Law Reference
        (20t4) 9 sec 78        referred to            Para I          F

       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1384
of 2011.
       From the Judgment and Order dated 25.04.2007 of the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Civil Revision Petition       G
No. 4820 of 2006.
       H. S. Gumraja Rao, Sr. Adv. Y. Raja Gopala Rao, Adv. for the
Appellant.
       K. Maruti Rao, Adv.(for Ms. Anjani Aiyagari) for the
Respondent.                                                           H
                            551
552            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2017] 6 S.C.R.


A             The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
               KURIAN, J. 1. The appellant before this Court is aggrieved by
      order passed by the High Court wherein concurrent findings on facts
      with regard to the bonafide requirements of the appellant have been
      upset holding that "the court can re-appreciate the evidence to test whether
 B    the findings of the Rent Controller are correct". We are afraid, the High
      Court has misdirected itself and exceeded its jurisdiction. In revisional
      jurisdiction, the Court is expected to see only whether the findings are
      illegal or perverse in the sense that a reasonably informed person will
      not enter such a finding. For proper guidance, it would be appropriate to
      refer to a recent Constitution Bench judgment in Hindustan Petroleum
 C    Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh', at paragraphs-30, 31 and 43:
             "30. We have already noted in the earlier part of the judgment
             that although there is some difference in the language employed
             by the three Rent Control Acts under consideration which provide
             for revisional jurisdiction but, in our view, the revisional power of
 D           the High Court under these Acts is substantially similar and broadly
             such power has the same scope save and except the power to
             invoke revisional jurisdiction suo motu unless so provided expressly.
             None of these statutes confer on revisional authority the power
             as wide as that of the appellate court or appellate authority despite
             such power being wider than that provided in Section 115 of the
 E           Code of Civil Procedure. The provision under consideration does
             not permit the High Court to invoke the revisional jurisdiction as
             the cloak of an appeal in disguise. Revision does not lie under
             these provisions to bring the orders ofthe trial court/Rent Controller
             and the appellate court/appellate authority for rehearing of the
 F           issues raised in the original proceedings.
             31. We are in full agreement with the view expressed in Sri Raja
             Lakshmi Dyeing Works that where both expressions "appeal"
             and "revision" are employed in a statute, obviously, the expression
             "revision" is meant to convey the idea of a much narrower
             jurisdiction than that conveyed by the expression "appeal". The
 G
             use of two expressions "appeal" and "revision" when used in one
             statute conferring appellate power and revisional power, we think,
             is not without purpose and significance. Ordinarily, appellate
             jurisdiction involves a rehearing while it is not so in the case of
             revisional jurisdiction when the same statute provides the remedy
 H    1
       (2014) 9sec1s
GANDHE VIJAY KUMAR v. MULJI@ MULCHAND                                  553
              [KURIAN, J.]


by way of an "appeal" and so also of a "revision". If that were so,    A
the revisional power would become coextensive with that of the
trial court or the subordinate tribunal which is never the case. The
classic statement in Dattonpan that revisional power under the
Rent Control Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power
under Section 115 of the Code but, at the same time, it is not wide    B
enough to make the High Court a second court of first appeal,
commends to us and we approve the same. We are of the view
that in the garb of revisional jurisdiction under the above three
rent control statutes, the High Court is not conferred a status of
second court of first appeal and the High Court should not enlarge
the scope ofrevisionaljurisdiction to that extent."                    c
  xxx              xxx               xxx                       xxx
43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control
Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact
recorded by the first appellate court/first appellate authority because
on reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the D
court/authority below. The consideration or examination of the
evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these
Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the
court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from
any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court/authority E
below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of
the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or
misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed
to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to
correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law.
In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisionaljurisdiction F
under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside
the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court
is entitled to satisfy itself as to the correctness or legality or
propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated
above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, G
legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the
High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to
reappreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a different
finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated
with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a
                                                                        H
554                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2017] 6 S.C.R.


A            court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be
             satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine
             whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural
             illegality or irregularity."
           These principles hold good generally for exercise of revisional
.B    power.
               2. There is no dispute with respect to the landlord-tenant
      relationship. The bonafide requirement also has been concurrently found
      by the Rent Controller as well as by the Appellate Authority. The High
      Court should not have ventured to look into the evidence as if in a first
 c    appeal and entered a different finding, though another finding might also
      be possible. Merely because another view is possible in exercise of the
      revisional jurisdiction, the High Court cannot upset the factual findings.
              3. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is
      allowed. The order passed by the Rent Controller, as upheld by the
 D    Appellate Authority, is restored.
               4. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent seeks some
      time to surrender the vacanfpossession to the appellant. Learned Senior
      Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that since the last 70 years,
      the respondent has been enjoying the property and the appellant is in
.E    pressing and bonafide need. Be that as it may, having regard to the fact
      that the respondent is- carrying on a hotel business, we permit him to
      continue upto 31" March, 2018. On or before I'' April, 2018, the
      respondent shaU surrender vacant and peaceful possession of the premises
      to the appellant. During the interregnum, the respondent shall not create
      any third party rights and shall not cause any damage to the property.
 F    He shall also file a usual undertaking in the Registry within four weeks
      from today.
                   5. There shall be no order as to costs.


      Nidhi Jain                                                  Appeal allowed.