GAJANANversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA
- Citation
- 1996 INSC 1358
- Decided
- 20 November 1996
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- A S ANANDK T THOMAS
Holding
The High Court erred in reversing the trial court’s acquittal; the appellant’s acquittal is upheld.
Summary
Gajanan and his co-accused were tried for murder under IPC sections 302 and 34 for the death of Suryabhan on 10 September 1984. The trial court acquitted them, finding that the alleged eye‑witnesses had not actually seen the assault, their testimony conflicted with the medical report, and the purported extra‑judicial confession letter was not proved to be written by the appellant. The State appealed under Section 378 of the CrPC, and the High Court reversed the acquittal of Gajanan, convicting him of murder and sentencing him to life imprisonment while leaving the co‑accused acquitted. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had erred in overturning the trial court’s decision, as the reasons for acquittal were neither perverse nor unreasonable and the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and restored the trial court’s acquittal, ordering the appellant’s release if he was in custody.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court was justified in overturning the trial court’s acquittal on appeal under Section 378 CrPC.
- Whether the testimony of the alleged eye‑witnesses and the letter alleged to contain an extra‑judicial confession were sufficient to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313, s. 378
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34
Subjects
Judgment
GAJANAN A
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
NOVEMBER 20, 1996
[DR. A.S. ANAND AND K.T. THOMAS, JJ.] B
Indian Penal Code, 1860 :
S. 302134-Appellant along with another prosecuted for murder-
Trial Court acquitted them holding that witnesses claiming to be eye
witnesses did not see the actual incident; their testimony does not inspire C
confidence and is in conflict with medical evidence; the alleged extra
judicial confession was introduced by prosecution to buttress its case; the
occurrence did not take place in the manner suggested by the prosecution-
On appeal High Court convicted appellant u!s 302 and maintained acquittal
of the co-accused-Held, High Court should not have interfered with the D
order of acquittal more so when the reasons given by the trial court were
neither perverse nor even unreasonable-Trial Court gave cogent and
sufficient reasons to acquit the appellant-High Court did not dispel the
reasons given by trial court while upsetting the order ofacquittal-Judgment
of High Court set aside.
E
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 :
S. 3 78-Appeal against acquittal-Judicial approach in dealing with
a case of appeal against acquittal has to be cautious, circumspect and
careful-High Court overlooked these salutary principles and wrongly
interfered with a well merited order of acquittal by adopting an erroneous F
approach.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
708 of 1991.
, From the Judgment and Order dated 11.8.89 of the Bombay High G
Court in Crl. A. No. 285 of 1985.
Lokesh Kumar and R.S. Sodhi for the Appellant.
D.M. Nargolkar and S.M. Jadhav for the Respondent. H
935
936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.
A The following Order of the Court was delivered :
....
The appellant alongwith Dnyandeo were tried for an offence under
sections 302/34 !PC by the learned Sessions Judge, Buldhana in respect of
an occurrence which took place on 10th September, 1984 in which
Suryabhan died after receipt of a blow on his head resulting in multiple
B fracture of the scalp bone. The trial court found that Gangubai, PW2 and
Ukanda, PW. 3, who claimed to have seen the deceased being "dragged"
(pulled) by the appellant after hitting him on the head with a heavy stone,
had actually not seen the occurrence or any part thereof and their evidence
did not inspire confidence. The trial court also referred to the medical
evidence provided by Dr. Kashinath Motiram, PW. l, and found that the
C account given by PW. 2 and PW. 3 was in conflict with the medical opinion.
The trial court further opined that the prosecution had introduced letter
Ext. p. 22, the alleged extra Judicial confession of the appellant with a
view to buttress the prosecution case. It was held that the motive as alleged
by the prosecution had not been established and that the occurrence did
not take place in the manner and at the place suggested by the prosecution.
D The trial court, on the basis of these findings acquitted the appellant and
his co-accused. The High Court on an appeal by the State against acquittal
reversed the findings in so far as the appellant is concerned and convicted
him of an offence under sedion 302 !PC and sentenced hi.m to undergo
life imprisonment, but maintained the acquittal of the co-accused since
E learned counsel for the State did not press the appeal against his acquittal.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and critically analysed
the evidence on the record.
F The manner in which the High Court has dealt with the appeal against
acquittal has left much to be desired. The High Court treated PW. 2 and
PW. 3 as if they were the eye witnesses of the occurrence and opined that
the observations of the trial court "that there is no direct evidence in this
case is obviously wrong". In the words of the High Court "merely because
these witnesses did not see the actual assault by stone, their clinching
G evidence cannot be discarded". We fail to understand the justification for
criticism of the trial court as noticed above. If the High Court itself found •
that PW. 2 and PW. 3 had not seen the actual assault on the deceased how
they could be treated as providing direct evidence of assault is not at all
intelligible. Similarly, while dealing with letter Ext. p. 22, the High Court,
without at all dealing with the reasons given by the trial court to disbelieve
H the evidence of PW. 7 and the recovery of the letter Ext. P. 22, opined that
GAJANAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 937
one sentence in that letter amounts to confession and went on to rely upon A
the same as a piece of extra judicial confession. The High Court apparently
ignored that there was no proof worth the name on the record to show that
letter Ex. p. 22 had been written by the appellant. The appellant in his
statement under section 313 Cr. P.C. denied the authorship of the letter.
PW. 7 who claimed to have received the letter from the appellant, was
working as a labourer with the appellant and on his own admission he had B
never received any letter from the appellant nor had he any other occasion
to see his handwriting. How then could PW. 7's evidence be considered as
sufficient to prove that it was the appellant and the appellant alone who
had written letter Ext. P. 22? The prosecution led no other evidence to
prove the handwriting of the appellant. No expert was examined either.
Even otherwise, reading the letter Ext. P. 22 as a whole we do not find any C
extra judicial confession to have been made by the appellant, assuming for
the sake of arguments that the letter was written by the appellant. The
High Court was obviously in error in holding that Ext. P. 22 was written
by the appellant or that the letter amounted to an extra judicial confession.
The High Court also appears to have overlooked some glaring D
infirmities in the prosecution evidence. The occurrence, according to the
prosecution, took place in the field of Govind Shinde. The appellant after
causing the injury is alleged to have dragged (pulled) the body of the
seriously injured deceased for a distance of about 50 feet and left it in the
field of Rabbani. The reason for leading this evidence is not far to seek. E
Unless this exercise was done by the appellant, PW. 2 and PW. 3 who
claim to be on the track road could not have witnessed the dragging or
• identified the appellant. There was no need for the body to be dragged
from the field of Govind shinde to Rabbani's field by the appellant except
to enable himself to be identified. It appears that the story of dragging of
the deceased was introduced so as to enable PW. 2, wife of the deceased, F
to claim to have seen the appellant running away after dumping the body
in Rabbani's fields. Coupled with this is yet another tell tale circumstance.
The investigating officer in the inquest report, in his zeal to support the
story of dragging, showed that there were dragging marks/abbrasions etc.
On the legs and other parts of the body of the deceased. PW!, who,
performed the post mortem examination, however, clearly deposed that G
no such marks were found on the body of the deceased and that besides the
injury on the head, no other injury had been found on the body of the
deceased. PW .1 categorically asserted that had the body been dragged and
brought in contact with rough surface it was bound to sustain abrasions
but none was found on the body of the deceased. The manner in which the
investigating officer tried to introduce the story of dragging and the extra H
938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.
A judicial confession through Ext. P.22, shows that the investigation was not
fair and the High Court failed to take this aspect into consideration. -~
The Trial Court gave cogent and sufficient reasons to acquit the
appellant. The High Court should not have interfered with the order of
acquittal more so when the reasons given by the trial court were neither
B perverse nor even unreasonable. The High Court did not dispel the reasons
given by the Trial court while upsetting the order of acquittal. Though, no
distinction is made regarding powers of the High court in dealing with
appeals against acquittal as well as against conviction and it has full power
to review all the evidence and arrive at independent findings, nonetheless
the High Court should be rather slow to interfere with the findings of the
C trial court, unless the same are perverse or otherwise unreasonable. Judicial
approach in dealing with a case ofappeal against acquittal has to be cautious,
circumspect and careful. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked these
salutory principles and interfered with a well merited order of acquittal by
adopting an erroneous approach. The Order of the High Court under the
circumstances convicting and sentencing the appellant for an offence under
D section 302 !PC to life imprisonment cannot be sustained.
We, accordingly, accept this appeal and set aside the judgment of the
High Court dated I Ith August, I 989 and maintain the acquittal of the
appellant as recorded by the trial court. The appellant, if in jail, shall be
E released from custody forthwith if not required in any other case.
R.P. Appeal allowed.
;
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.