Holding

The circumstantial evidence, including child witness, taxi driver, extra‑judicial confessions, fingerprint and material recoveries, establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the death penalty is not justified as the case is not "rarest of rare".

Summary

The appellants were convicted for kidnapping and murdering two children based largely on circumstantial evidence, including the testimony of a child witness, a taxi driver, extra‑judicial confessions, fingerprint matches, recovered clothing, and a ransom‑demand letter. The trial and High Courts upheld the convictions and death sentences, holding that the case did not qualify as "rarest of rare" for capital punishment. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the admissibility and reliability of the child’s testimony, the extra‑judicial confessions (noting that the father’s statement under Sec. 164 was inadmissible), and the relevance of recoveries made pursuant to information from the accused under Sec. 27 Evidence Act. The Court concluded that the totality of the circumstantial evidence formed a complete chain establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, that the extra‑judicial confessions were admissible with corroboration, and that the death penalty was not warranted. Consequently, both appeals were dismissed, leaving the convictions and sentences intact.

Issues considered

The sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to sustain conviction for kidnapping and murder
The admissibility and credibility of the child witness (PW‑4) testimony
The admissibility and evidentiary value of extra‑judicial confessions, including the need for corroboration
The admissibility of the father’s statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC
The relevance of material recoveries made on information supplied by the accused under Section 27 Evidence Act
The appropriateness of the death penalty under the "rarest of rare" doctrine
The admissibility of statements under Section 8 Evidence Act (e.g., tutor’s testimony)

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 164, s. 366
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 27, s. 6, s. 8
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302, s. 34, s. 364

Subjects

kidnappingmurdercircumstantial evidenceextra‑judicial confessionchild witnessdeath penaltyrarest of rare doctrinefingerprint evidenceransom letterSection 164 CrPCSection 27 Evidence ActSection 8 Evidence Act

Judgment

GAGAN KANOJIA AND ANR. A
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB

NOVEMBER 24, 2006

[S.B. SINHA AND MARKANDEY KA TJU, JJ.] B

Penal Code, 1860; Ss. 34, 201, 302 and 364/Evidence Act, 1872; Ss.
8 and 27/Evidence Act, 1872; Ss.' 8 and 27:

Kidnapping and murder-Children picked up by their relative who C
allegedly committed their murder-Circumstantial evidence-Appreciation
of-Charges-Proving of-Held: Charges could be proved on the basis of
circumstantial evidence provided direct evidence not available-Prosecution
case must be judged having regard to totality of the circumstances-In doing
so, the Court must adopt an integrated approach by using yardstick of D
probability, appreciate intrinsic value of evidence and analyze and assess
them objectively-There is no reason as to why part of the statement of child
witness that the deceased children were taken by accused on his scooter
should not be taken into consideration for the purpose of corroboration as
he merely made a little retraction in his cross-examination-Besides, his
evidence, if read, as a whole inspire confidence-Another independent eye- E
witness, a taxi driver corroborated the evidence of kidnapping of deceased
children, there is no reason to disbelieve his evidence-Merely because name
of accused though informed by PW4 to PWlO but not mentioned in FIR, is
not a ground to disbelieve his statement as to the recoveries of dead bodies
of the children-Recoveries of the articles made pursuant to the information F
given by accused-Information so given led to discove1y of some facts-Such
1
facts are relevant facts in terms of Section 27 of Evidence Act, therefore,
admissible in evidence-It could be used as a corroborative piece of evidence
to establish extra judicial confession made by the accused-Circumstantial
evidence as ~'brought on record established that all link in the chain are
complete-Evidence concludes guilt of the accused-Hence, he has rightly G
been convicted of the offences charged by fhe trial Court as affirmed by the
High Court-High Court also rightly held that the case is not one of the
rarest of rare cases meriting award of death punishment-Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973-Section 366.
413 H
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 164:-

Evidence-Extra judicial confession-Admissibility in evidence-
Discussed.

Children of the complainant went to take private tuition in the house of
B a lady tutor. They were supposed to come back by 6.30 p.m. As they did not
return, the complainant went to her house. She informed him that the children
had left her house at 6.15 p.m. Later, he came to know that one scooterist
wearing trouser of black colour and shirt of white colour had taken his
children on his scooter. A First Information Report was lodged. During
C investigation, the school bags and dead bodies of the children were recovered.
Accused-appellant No. I is a relative of the complainant P.W-4, a child witness,
is nephew of accused-appellant No.I. They live in the same house. Appellant
No. I was seen riding the scooter along with the children by PW-4 and PW-
15, a taxi driver. Both the appellants furthermore went to the house of PW-
11, an advocate and the leader of their community and made an extra-judicial
D confession about kidnapping and murder of the children. Extra judicial
confession was also purported to have been made by them before the father of
Appellant No.I, who also got his statement recorded before the Magistrate
under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He, however, was not
examined. Appellant No.1 was arrested. He made disclosure statements leading
to recoveries of clothes and tapes wherewith hands and legs of the deceased
E children were said to have been tied. The prosecution in proving the charges
against the appellants relied upon a purported letter received by the father of
the victims wherein ransom was demanded. It was found to be in the
handwriting of Appellant No.2. Accused were prosecuted for commission of
an offence under Sections 364/34, 302/34 and 201/34 of the Indian Penal
F Code for kidnapping and murdering of two children. They were sentenced to
death. A reference was made to the High Court under Section 366 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. Appeals were preferred by Appellants also before the
High Court. The High Court while upholding the judgment and conviction
opined that the case cannot be said to be a rarest of rare one meriting award
a
of death penalty. Hence the present appeals and cross appeal.
G
Accused-appellants contended that the evidence of PW-4, a child witness
identifying the accused, could not have been believed particularly when he
was examined after 20 days; that the extra-judicial confession is a weak peace
of evidence and the same having not been corroborated in material particulars,
H no reliance could be placed thereupon; that the High Court committed an
GAGAN KANOJIA v. ST ATE OF PUNJAB 415

illegality in relying upon the statement of the father of Appellant No.1 under A
Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was not admissible in
evidence; that PW-11, before whom the purported extra-judicial confession
was made, having been called to the police station as also being a witness to
the recovery should not have been relied upon; that the delay having occurred
in recording the statement of PW-15, a taxi driver, no reliance thereupon B
could have been placed; and that since the investigating officer having

.
fabricated a part of the records, no reliance could be placed upon the materials
found on the investigation.

State submitted that the evidence of PW-4 must be judged keeping in
view the fact that he and Appellant No.1 were residing in the same house and C
as such he must have obliged his family members in making some statements
in his favour; that the letter Ex.D-1 having been produced by the accused could
not have formed the basis of his statement before the police after two years,
as was suggested on behalfofthe appellants to PW-4; that PW-15 being an
independent witness, there is no reason as to why his statement, that he had
seen Appellant No.1 in the company of the deceased children, should be D
disbelieved; that the recoveries of tape and clothes and in particular the shirt
and trouser belonging to Appellant No.1 point out his guilt; that the finger
prints of the appellants were also found on the bottles and glasses which were
recovered near the place from where the dead bodies were recovered also
corroborates the prosecution case; that the letter demanding ransom was in E
the handwriting of Appellant No.2 which was proved by an handwriting expert,
is also a pointer to their involvement; that the evidence of the tutor, who
examined herself as PW-5, is also corroborative of the fact that she came to
know that the victims sat on a scooter of a person whom they called as
'Chachu', which is admissible in evidence under Section 8 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872; and that the Extra-judicial confession made before PW- F
11, who was a President of the Dhobi Maha Sabha, cannot be disbelieved, as
both the appellants belonging to Dhobi (washer man) community thought that
he being an advocate could save them from the criminal case.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court
G
HELD: I.I. The prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence.
Indisputably, charges can be proved on the basis of the circumstantial evidence,
when direct evidence is not available. In doing so, the prosecution case must
be judged in its entirety having regard to the totality of the circumstances.
The approach of the court should be an integrated one and not truncated or H
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A isolated. The court should use the yardstick of probability and appreciate the
intrinsic value of the evidence brought on records and analyze and assess the
same objectively. (422-G-H; 423-B-C)

1.2. Ordinarily, the statement of PW4, a child witness, would not have
been accepted, but his statement that he had deposed on the basis of Ex.D-1
B cannot be believed. If Ex.D-1 was a- document which was prepared by the
investigating officer, how it was produced by the accused in cross-examination
is beyond all comprehensions. The trial Judge made a comparison between
the statements contained in Ex.D-1 and those made under Section 164 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure so as to find a large number of discrepancies
C therein. It is not contended that the same was not correct. Thus, Ex. D-1 cannot
be a document which was prepared by the Investigating Officer at the instance
of PW-11, as suggested on behalf of the Appellants or otherwise. How the
said letter could be produced by the defence after two years is again beyond
all camprehensions. Even if that part of the statement made by PW-4 is
discarded, there is no reason as to why a part of his statement, namely, he
D was present when the children were taken by appellant no. 1 on his scooter,
should be disbelieved or at least should not be taken into consideration for
the purpose of corroboration. He merely made a little retraction in his cross-
examination. His evidence, if read as a whole, inspires confidence. It is well
known that for certain purpose, the statement of even a hostile witness can
E be believed. [425-A-B-C-D-E]

State of UP. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra and Anr., [1996] 10 SCC 360,
relied on.

1.3. PW-15, a taxi driver, is another witness who also last saw the
F victims sitting on the scooter of Appellant No.I. On 08.06.2000, he had gone
to the house of his partner, which is just near the place of occurrence, and
had seen three children coming on foot after getting tuition. It is not unlikely
that the police might have come to know that he was also present at the relevant
time. It is important to note that Appellant No.1 even had not been arrested at
that point of time. There was, thus, no reason for him to implicate Appellant
G No.I as he had no animosity with him. He gave a very vivid and detailed
description of the place from where the children came and boarded the scooter.
According to him the children were standing about 5-7·feet away from him
on the street from where they boarded the scooter. He did not notice PW-4.
He also accepted that he did not know the third child. There was no reason
H for him to know her. There is, thus, no reason as to why his evidence should
GAGAN KANOJIA v. STATE OF PUNJAB 417

be disbelieved. A
1.4. P.W. 10, Uncle of the deceased children deposed that he had also
searched for the missing children. He was also a witness to the recoveries of
the school bags and dead bodies. He proved that it was PW4 who had informed
him that appellant No.I was seen with the children. Contention of Counsel
for the appellants, if that was so, appellant No.I should have been named in B
the F.l.R., but it is not denied that on the basis of the said statement, father of
the deceased children and the witness had gone to his house, but he was not
found there. As they were merely searching for the children, they might not
have thought at that time that appellant No.I had kidnapped the children.
Ordinarily a near relation would not be suspected. He categorically stated C
till that time, it was not known who was the accused when the dead bodies
were recovered. There is, thus, no reason to disbelieve his evidence.
(426-G-H; 427-A)
1.5. PW-I I, President of the Dhobi Maha Sabha, is an Advocate and
appellant No.I was a member ther~of. He knew the family of Appellant No.I. D
According to the said witness, on 13.06.2000, appellant No.I together with
another person came to his residence and disclosed about a plan they had
hatched to kidnap the children for ransom. Each and every detail of the mode
and manner in which the plan was to be implemented was disclosed by them.
Extra-judicial confessions made by the appellants separately have been stated
by PW-11 in sufficient details. He was extensively cross-examined, but his E
statement made in examination in chief remained unshattered. This Court
does not see any reason as to why he would be disbelieved. The Trial Judge as
also the High Court rightly relied upon his statement. Extra-judicial
confession, as is well-known, can form the basis of a conviction. By way of
abundant caution, however, the court may look for some corroboration. Extra-
judicial confession cannot ipso facto be termed to be tainted. An extra-judicial F
confession, if made voluntarily and proved can be relied upon by the courts.
[427-B-C-D-E-F-G-H)
Sukhwant Singh@ Ba/winder Singh v. State through CBI, AIR (2003)
SC 3362, relied on.
G
State of UP. v. Arun Kumar Gupta, 12003] 2 SCC 202, held inapplicable.
1.6. In the present case, extra-judicial confession, however, purported
to have been made by Appellant No.I before his father, which was recorded in
his statement before the Magistrate under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, was not admissible in evidence. He was not examined by the H
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A prosecution. He might not have been examined for good reasons. At one point
of time, he might have been sure about the involvement of his son, but at a
later stage, he would have thought not to depose against him. (428-A-B)

State of Delhi v. Shri Ram Lohia, AIR (1960) SC 490 and George and
Ors. v. State of Kera/a and Anr., (1998] 4 SCC 605, relied on.
B 2.1. Recoveries o°f school bags of the deceased children and their dead
bodies have also been proved, which have neither been denied nor disputed
before this Court. (428-D-E)

2.2. The recovery had also been made of empty bottles and glasses. The
C said recovery has been proved by Sub Inspector, PW-17. PW-10 stated in his
evidence that the School from whose 'Ahata' the empty bottle and glasses had
been recovered was at a distance of 100 yards from the place wherefrom the
dead bodies of the children were recovered. PW-20, Police Inspector, recovered
empty bottle of liquor containing a few drops thereof as also two glasses. PW-
16, Sub Inspector of Police, found the traces of finger prints on those articles.
D He developed the finger prints on the glasses, which were comparable. They
were sent to the Finger Print Bureau, and the report revealed that the thumb
impression lifted from the glasses by PW-16 and thumb impression obtained
from the appellants tallied with each other. (428-E-F-G-H)

2.3. A letter was receive1 by PW-3 earlier wherein a sum of Rs.10 lakhs
E was demanded by way of ransom. It also bore a postal stamp. PW-3 was asked
to tie a cloth of red colour on the roof of his house, which would be an
indication to show that he was ready to pay the amount. Thereafter specimen
signature of the handwriting of both the accused were obtained under the
order of the Judicial Magistrate, who examined himself as PW~12; and the
same was sent to an handwriting expert, who examined himself as PW-21. He
F submitted a report stating that the said letter was in the handwriting of
Appellant No.2. (428-H; 429-A-B)

2.4. Another important circumstance which weighed with the trial Judge
as also the High Court was the recovery of a camera fr,om the bed-box of
G Appellant No. 1 as also remaining part of the dirty white cloth with which the
arms of both the children were tied had been kept concealed therein. He
furthermore disclosed that the deck with two speakers were also kept
concealed in the same room on the Angeethi and the said house was locked
by him and he had kept concealed the keys of the said house near the outer
gate underneath the same bricks. His disclosure statement was recorded and
H thereafter recoveries were made, which was proved by the investigating
GAGAN KANOJIA v. STATE OF PUNJAB 419

officer, PW-20. His statement was corroborated by ASI. A cello tape was A
also recovered-whieh was used by the accused for pasting on the mouth and
nose of both the victims and for tying the plastic envelopes which were put on
the faces of both the children. [429-C-D-E)

2.5. Recoveries of the articles were made pursuant to the information
given by Appellant No. 1. The information so given led to discovery of some B
facts. Discovery of some facts on the information so furnished is a relevant
fact within the meaning of Section 27 of the Indian Penal Code. It is, therefore,
admissible in evidence and the same could have been taken into consideration
as a corroborative piece of evidence to establish general trend of corroboration
to the extra-judicial confession made by the appellants. [429-E-F) C
2.6. It was urged that the investigation was tainted. However, no reason
is found to hold so. Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code might have been
mentioned in some of the documents by the investigating officer, although no
case thereunder was made out till the recovery of the dead bodies. But, nothing
was found to hold that the same was made designedly. One of the cautions D
which is required to be applied is to see that actual culprit does not end up
getting a~quitted. (429-G-H]

Kishore Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh, [1991) 1 SCC 286,
distinguished.
E
3. Circumstantial evidences, which have been brought on records,
established that all links in the chain are complete and the evidences led by
the prosecution point out only to one conclusion, that is, the guilt of the
appellants. They have rightly been convicted of the «:>ffences charged against
them by the trial Court The High Court has not committed any error in opining
that the case is not one of the rarest of rare cases. (430-B-C) F
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.561-62
of2005.

From the Judgment and Order dated 30-11-2004 of the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. A. Nos. 746-DB and 747-08/2004.3 G

WITH

• Crl. A. No. 563 of2005.

-
I
H
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A Mahabir Singh, Rakesh Dahiya, Gagandeep Sharma, Nikhil Jain, Ajay
Pal, Sunil Kumar Jain, Dinesh Kumar Garg, Mahaveer Singh and Dr. Bheem
Pratap Singh for the Appellants.

D.P. Singh, Arun K. Sinha and Avneet Toor for the Respondent.

B The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. Appellants herein were prosecuted for commission of
an offence under Sections 364/34, 302/34 and 201/34 of the Indian Penal Code
for kidnapping and murdering two children, Abhishek and Heena, aged six
and eight years respectively, of one Kamal Kishore. They were sentenced to
C death. A reference was made to the High Court under Section 366 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure.

Appeals were preferred by Appellants also before the High Court.

By reason of the impugned judgment, the High Court while upholding
D the judgment and conviction opined that the case cannot be said to be a
rarest of rare one meriting award of death penalty.

The children went to take private tuition in the house of one Pooja.
They were supposed to come back by 6.30 p.m. As they did not return, Kamal
Kishore went to her house. He was informed that the children had left her
E house at 6.15 p.m. The children were continued to be searched. He, however,
came to know that one scooterist wearing trouser of black colour and shirt
of white colour had taken his children on his scooter. A First Information
Report was lodged. During investigation, the school bags and dead bodies
of the children were recovered. Appellant No: 1 herein is related to the
F complainant. They belong to the same community. They were neighbours.
They, however, said to be belonging to different unions of their community
being that of washermen.

P.W-4 is a child witness. He is nephew of Appellant No. l. They live
in the same house. He is said to have seen the children sitting on the scooter
G of Appellant No. l herein. Appellant No. 1 was also seen riding the scooter
along with the children by PW-15, who was a taxi driver.

Both the appellants furthermore went to the house of PW-11, an advocate
and the leader of their community and made an extra-judicial confession. Extra
judicial confession was also purported to have been made by them before the
H
GAGAN KANOJIA v. STATE OF PUNJAB [S.B. SINHA, J.] 421
father of Appellant No. I herein, who also got his statement recorded before
the Magistrate under Section I 64 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He,
however, was not examined. Appellant No. I was arrested on the basis of
the said extra-judicial confession. He made .disclosure statements leading to
recoveries of clothes and tapes wherewith hands and legs of the deceased
children were said to have been tied.
B
The prosecution in proving the charges against the appellants herein,
inter alia, relied upon a purported letter received by the said Kamal Kishore
wherein ransom was demanded. It was found to be in the handwriting of
Appellant No.2.

Mr. Mahabir Singh, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of C
the appellants, in support of the appeals would submit :

(I) Evidence of PW-4, Sahil, who was a child witness, could not
have been believed particularly when: (a) he was examined
after 20 days; (b) he identified the accused at the instance of D
PW- I I; and (c) he purported to have made the statement on the
basis of a letter Ex. D-1.
(2) Extra-judicial confession is a weak peace of evidence and the
same having not been corroborated in material particulars, no
reliance could be placed thereupon.
E
(3) The High Court committed an illegality in relying upon the
statement of the father of Appellant No.I under Section I64 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was not admissible in
evidence.

(4) PW-I l, before whom the purported extra-judicial confession was F
made, having been called to the poHce station as also being a
witness to the recovery should not have been relied upon.

(5) Delay having occurred in recording the statement of PW-15, no
reliance thereupon could have been placed.

(6) Investigating officer having fabricated a part of the records, no G
reliance could be placed upon the materials found on investigation.

Mr. D.P. Singh, the learned counsel appearing on behalfofthe State, on
the other hand, would submit :

(I) Evidence of PW-4 must be judged keeping in view the fact that H
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
)
A he and Appellant No. I were residing in the same house and. as r
such he must have obliged his family members in making some
statements in his favour.

(2) The letter Ex.D- I having been produced by the accused could
not have formed the basis of his statement before the police after
B two years, as was suggested on behalf of the appellants to PW-
4.
(3) PW-I5, Rajindra Kumar, being an independent witness, there is
no reason as to why his statement, that he had seen Appellant
No. I in the company of the deceased children, should be
c disbelieved.

(4) Recoveries of tape and clothes and in particular the shirt and
trouser belonging to Appellant No. I point out to his guilt.
(5) Finger prints of the appellants were also found on the bottles and
glasses which were recovered near the place from where the dead
D bodies were recovered also corroborates the prosecution case.
(6) The letter demanding ransom was in the handwriting of Appellant
No.2 which was proved by an handwriting expert, being Deputy
Director, Documents, Forensic Science Laboratory, Chandigarh is
also a pointer to their involvement.
E
(7) Evidence of Pooja, who examined herself as PW-5, is also
corroborative of the fact that she came to know that the victims
sat on a scooter of a person whom they called as 'Chachu',
which is admissible in evidence under Section 8 of the Indian
Evidence Act, I872.
F (8) Extra-judicial confession made before PW-11, Rakesh Kumar
Kanojia, who was a President of the Dhobi Maha Sabha, cannot
be disbelieved, as both the appellants thought that he being an
advocate could save them from the criminal case.

G The prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence. Indisputably,
charges can be proved on the basis of the circumstantial evidence, when
direct evidence is not available. It is well-settled that in a case based on a
circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must prove that within all human
probabilities, the act must have been done by the accused. It is, however,
necessary for the courts to remember that there is a long gap between 'may
H be true' and 'must be true'. Prosecution case is required to be covered by
- GAGAN KANOJIA v. STATE OF PUNJAB [S.B. SINHA, J.]

leading· cogent, believable and credible evidence. Whereas the court must
423
A
raise a presumption that the accused is innocent and in the event two views
are possible, one indicating to his guilt of the accused and the other to his
innocence, the defence available to the accused should be accepted, but at
the same time, the court must not reject the evidence of the prosecution,
proceeding on the basis that they are false, not trustworthy, unreliable and B
made on flimsy grounds or only on the basis of surmises and conjectures.
The prosecution case, thus, must be judged in its entirety having regard to
the totality of the circumstances. The approach of the court should be an
integrated one and not truncated or isolated. The court should use the
yardstick of probability and appreciate the intrinsic value of the evidence
brought on records and analyze and assess the same objectively. C
We would proceed on the well-known principles in regard to appreciation
of the circumstantial evidence which were noticed by the High Court in the
following terms :

"(I) There must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to D
leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the
innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that
within all human probability the act must have been done by the
accused.
(2) Circumstantial evidence can be reasonably made the basis of an E
accused person's conviction if it is of such character that it is
wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and is
consistent only with his guilt.
(3) There should be no missing links but it is not that everyone of
the links must appear on the surface of the evidence, since some F
of these links may only be inferred from the proven facts.

(4) On the availability of two inferences, the one in favour of the
accused must be accepted.
(5) It cannot be said that prosecution must meet any and every
hypothesis put forwarded by the accused however far-fetched G
and fanciful it might be. Nor does it mean that prosecution
evidence must be rejected on the slightest doubt because the law
permits rejection if the doubt is reasonable and not otherwise."

PW-1 is Dr. Balbir Singh. He conducted the post-mortem examination.
H
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A It may not be necessary for us to deal with his deposition at length; the
homicidal nature of death of the victims being not in dispute. PW-2 is a
formal witness. PW-3 is Kamal Kishore. The statements made by him in the
First Information Report for kidnapping and murder of his children have not
been doubted. He proved the letter received by him demanding ransom. As
B noticed hereinbefore, the same was found to be in the handwriting of Appellant
No.2. Sahil Kumar (PW-4), is the child witness, aged about IO years. He
was examined by the learned Trial Judge at some length. He was found to
be capable of giving evidence. He deposed that Appellant No. I was his uncle
being his father's elder brother and they reside in the same house. He
categorically stated in his evidence that on 08.06.2000 he saw Heena and
C Abhishek sitting on the scooter which was driven by Appellant No. I. He
asserted that he had seen the scooter and could identify the same. Even he
gave the details of the place where the children sat on the scooter of Appellant
No. I. He categorically stated that Abhishek was reluctant to sit on the
scooter but he saw Heena asking him to do so saying that Gangan was their
uncle, whereupon Abhishek also sat thereon. He also stated that Gagan was
D wearing a helmet. Th~ brother of Kamal Kishore also visited the house of
Appellant No. I with him wherein they found a friend of Gagan to be present.
PW-4 left for Ambala on the next day. He came back on 26.06.2000. He
accepted that he got his statement recorded before the Magistrate. A document
Ex.D-1 was produced by the accused, which was shown to him, which
E according to him was a letter written by Rakesh Kanojia (PW-11) and was
given to him. He alleged that the contents of the said letter was dictated by
the investigating officer. In his cross-examination, he reiterated his statement
made in the examination in chief as also his statement made under Section
164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in no uncertain terms stated that
at about 6. I 5 p.m., he saw Gagan, Abhishek and Heena sitting on the scooter.
F He, however, stated :

" .... The face of the scooter driver was not visible due to the
helmet. I had given the name of Gagan as told by Rakesh Kanojia ....."

G He denied the suggestion that he was tutored by the police. He was
sought to be cross-examined by the public prosecutor in view of the statement
given by him, but for reasons best known to the court, the same was not
permitted.

H
GAGAN KANOJIA v. STATE OF PUNJAB [S.B. SINHA, J.] 425

Ordinarily, we would not have accepted the statement of PW-4, but his A
statement that he had deposed on the basis of Ex.D-1 cannot be believed. If
Ex.D-1 was a document which was prepared by the investigating officer, how
it was produced by the accused counsel in cross-examination is beyond all
comprehensions. The learned Trial Judge made a comparison between the
statements contained in Ex.D-1 and those made under Section 164 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure so as to find a large number of discrepancies therein, B
as would appear from paragraphs 105 and 106 of his judgment. It is not
contended that the same was not correct. Thus, Ex. D-1 cannot be a document
which was prepared by N irmal Singh at the instance of PW-11, as suggested
on behalf of the Appellants or otherwise. How the said letter could be
produced by the defence after two years is again beyond all comprehensions. C
Even if we discard that part of the statement made by PW-4, there is no
reason as to why a part of his statement, namely, he was present when the
children were taken by Gagan on his scooter, should be disbelieved or at least
shoukt not be taken into consideration for the purpose of corroboration.

He merely made a little retraction in his cross-examination. His evidence, D
if read as a whole, inspires confidence.

It is well known that for certain purpose, the statement of even a hostile
witness can be believed. [See State of UP. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra and Anr.
[1996] 10 sec 360].
E
We have, therefore, no hesitation in opining that Ex. D-1 was not and
could not have been written by Rajender Kumar Kanojia at the dictation of
the investigating officer or otherwise. To the aforementioned extent, we find
force in Mr. Singh's contention.

PW-15, Rajinder Kumar, is another witness who also last saw the F
victims sitting on the scooter of Appellant No. I. On 08.06.2000, he had gone
to the house of his partner Paramjit Singh, which is just near the place of
occurrence, and had seen three children coming on foot after getting tuition.
He saw two children, namely Heena and Abhishek boarding the scooter of
Appellant No. I, who drove the scooter towards Cine Paya! Cinema. He was G
undoubtedly examined on 12.06.2000. He, however, disclosed the reason
therefore. He categorically stated that he had left for Delhi on the same night
and on his return he came to know that the police had been visiting his house.
It is not unlikely that the police might have come to know that he was also
present at the relevant time. It is important to note that Appellant No. I even
H
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 9 S.C.R. -....
A had not been arrested at that point of time. There was, thus, no reason for
him to implicate Appellant No. l as he had no animosity with him. He gave
a very vivid and detailed description of the place from where the children
came boarded the scooter. According to hi~ the children were standing
about 5-7 feet away from him on the street from where they boarded che
B scooter. He did not notice Sahil (PW-4). He also accepted that he did not
know Sarita. There was no reason for him to know her. There is, thus, no
reason as to why we should disbelieve his evidence.

PW-5, Pooja, is a tutor. She merely stated that she had gone to the
reside_nce of other student, Sarita, having been informed that Abhishek and
C Heena did not return to their house. Sarita told her that Heena had called
some person wearing helmet, white shin, black pant, as 'Chacha' and then
Abhishek and Heena sat on the scooter.

Sarita having not been examined, we do not intend to place any reliance
on her statement. We also do not accept the contention of Mr. D.P. Singh
D that her statement is admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. Section
8, inter alia, speaks about the conduct of an accused. The statements made
by Sarita before Pooja vis-' -vis the conduct of the victims did not form part
of the same transaction. Unless any fact or statement forms part of the same
transaction, it will not be admissible in evidence. Sarita had not identified the
accused. Sarita had not been examined and, therefore, the hearsay evidence
E of Pooja could not have been relied upon being based qpon the puq..:>rted
statement of Sarita. As regards conduct of the victims vis-a-vis the person
about whom she was informed and whose identity was not known, cannot be
said to be admissible in terms of Section 8 of the Evidence Act.

F The learned Trial Judge relied upon Section 6 of the Evidence Act
which, in our opinion, has no application.

P. W. I 0 is Rakesh Kumar, brother of Kamal Kishore. He deposed that
he had also searched for the missing children. He was also a witness to the
recoveries of the school bags and dead bodies. He proved that it was Sahil
G who had informed him that Gagan was seen with the children. Contention
of Mr. Mahabir Singh, if that was so, Gagan should have been named in the
F.I.R., but it is not denied that on the basis of the said statement, Kamal
Kishore and the witness had gone to his house, but he was not found there.
As they were merely searching for the children, they might not have thought
at that time that Gagan had kidnapped the children. Ordinarily a near relation
H
....
GAGAN KANOJIA v. STATE OF PUNJAB [S.B. SINHA, J.] 427
would not be suspected. He categorically stated till that time, it was not A
known who was the accused when the dead bodies were recovered. We do
not see any reason to disbelieve his evidence.

PW-11 is Rakesh Kumar Kanojia. He was the President of the Dhobi
Maha Sabha, Punjab. Appellant No. I was also a member thereof. He knew
the family of Appellant No. l. He was also an advocate. According to the B
said witness, on 13.06.2000, Gagan together with another person, Rajinder
Kumar, came to his residence and disclosed about a plan they had hatched
to kidnap the children for ransom. Each and pvery detail of the mode and
manner in which the nlan was to be implemented was disclosed by them.

Extra-judicial confessions made by the appellants separately have been C
stated by the said witness in sufficient details. He was extensively cross-
examined, but his statement made in examination in chief remained unshattered.
He denied and disputed that Ex. D- l was in his handwriting. The only
comment made by Mr. Mahabir Singh in regard to his evidence was that he
was called to the police station on 16.06.2000 by the investigating officer. He D
accepted the same. We do not see any reason as to why he would not visit
the police station if called upon to do so by the investigating officer. He did
not deny or dispute that he was also a witness to the recoveries. He had
no other option but to go to the police station as was asked by the investigating
officer. Even no suggestion has been given that he was inimically disposed
t"wards Gagan or there was any animosity between the two families. E
Mr. Mahabir Singh relied upon a decision of this Court in State of UP.
v. Ar .. 11 Kumar Gupta [2003] 2 SCC 202, wherein the evidence of a witness
was not believecj., as he was taking extra-ordinary interest in the investigation
and was present at practically every important place and time ia the course F
of investigation. The said decision cannot be said to have any application
in the instant case. PW-11 was examined by the prosecution to prove extra-
judicial confession made before him by the appellants We do not see any
reason as to why he would be disbelieved. The learned Trial Judge as also
the High Court rightly relied upon his statement.
G
Extra-judicial confession, as is well-known, can form the basis of a
conviction. By way of abundant caution, however, the court may look for
some corroboration. Extra-judicial confession cannot ipso facto be termed to
be tainted. An extra-judicial confession, if made voluntarily and proved can
be relied upon by the courts. ~See Sukhwant Singh @ Ba/winder Singh v.
State through CBI - AIR (2003) SC 3362]. H
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A Extra-judicial confession, however, purported to have been made by
Appellant No. I before his father, which was recorded in his statement before
the Magistrate under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was not
admissible in evidence. [See State of Delhi v. Shri Ram Lohia - AIR (1960)
SC 490 para 13; and George and Ors v. State of Kera/a and Another [1998]
4 SCC 605 para 36]. He was not examined by the prosecution. He might not
B have been examined for good reasons. At one point of time, he might have
been sure about the involvement of his son, but at a later stage, he would
have thought not to depose against him.

In a case of this nature, it was also not expected that the family members
C of Appellant No. I would depose against him, as regards recovery of clothes
which were recovered from his own house. The prosecution furthennore has
brought on record the recovery of trouser and shirt of the accused. The
colour of the said gannents is not in dispute. The fact that the same were
not belonging to him has also not been canvassed before us. Place of
kidnapping has also not been disputed before us. Apart from PW-4, PW-11
D is also a witness to the said fact.

Recoveries of school bags of the deceased children and their dead
bodies have also been proved, which have neither been denied nor disputed
before us.

E We may notice now that the recovery had also been made of empty
bottles and glasses. The said recovery has been proved by Sub Inspector
Baldev Singh, PW-17. PW-10, Rakesh Kumar, stated in his evidence that
Deep Public School from whose 'Ahata' the empty bottle and glasses had
been recovered was at a distance of 100 yards from the place wherefrom the
F dead bodies of the children were recovered. PW-20, Inspector Ninnal Singh,
recovered empty bottle of liquor containing a few drops thereof as also two
glasses. PW-16, Sub Inspector Hardeep Singh, found the traces of finger
prints on those articles. He developed the finger prints on the glasses, which
were comparable. They were sent to the Finger Print Bureau, Phillaur and the
report, which was marked as Ex.PHHH, revealed that the thumb impression
G lifted from the glasses by PW-16 and thumb impression obtained from the
appellants herein tallied with each other.

A letter was received by PW-3, Kamal Kishore, on 09.06.2000 wherein
a sum of Rs.l 0 lakhs was demanded by way of ransom. It also bore a postal
stamp. PW-3 was asked to tfo a cloth of red colour on the roof of his house,
H
- GAGAN KANOJIA v. STA TE OF PUNJAB [S.B. SINHA, J.)

which would be an indication to show that he was ready to pay the amount.
429
A
The said letter was marked as Ex.PT. Thereafter specimen signature of the
handwriting of both the accused were obtained under the order of Shri H.S.
Grewal, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, who examined himself as PW-12; and
the same was sent to an handwriting expert Shri Balwinder Singh Bhandal,
who examined himself as PW-21. He. submitted a report which was marked
as Ex. PJJ, stating that the said letter was in the handwriting of Appellant B
No.2.

Another important circumstance which weighed with the learned Trial
Judge as also the High Court was the recovery of a camera from the bed-box
of Appellant No. 1 as also remaining part of the dirty white cloth with which C
the arms of both the children were tied had been kept concealed therein. He
furthermore disclosed that the deck with two speakers were also kept concealed
in the same room on the Angeethi and the said house was locked by him and
he had kept concealed the keys of the said house near the outer gate
underneath the same bricks. His disclosure statement was recorded and
thereafter recoveries were made, which was proved by the investigating D
officer, Inspector Nirmal Singh, PW-20. His statement were corroborated by
ASI Mohinder Singh. A cello tape was also recovered which was used by
the accused for pasting on the mouth and nose of both the victims and for
tying the plastic envelopes which were put on the faces of both the children.

Recoveries of the said articles were made pursuant to the information E
given by Appellant No. l. The information given by Appellant No. I led to
discovery of some facts. Discovery of some facts on the information furnished
by Appellant No. I is a relevant fact within the meaning of Section 27 of the
Indian Penal Code. It is, therefore, admissible in evidence and the same could
have been taken into consideration as a corroborative piece of evidence to F
establish general trend of corroboration to the extra-judicial confession made
by the appellants.

It was urged that the investigation was tainted. We do not find any
reason to hold so. Section 302 of the Indian r1enal Code might have been
mentioned in some of the documents by the investigating officer, although G
no case thereunder was made out till the recovery of the dead bodies. But
we do not find that the same was made designedly. One of the cautions
which is required to be applied is to see that actual culprit does not end up
getting acquitted. Reliance, in this behalf, has been placed by Mr. Mahabir
Singh on Kishore Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh [1991] 1SCC286., H
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 9 S.C.R. -
A ln that Cll!:e none of the circumstantial evidence could be proved. Therein
indulgence of the investigating officer in free fabrication of the record was
established which was deplored by this Court.

Keeping in view the circumstantial evidences, which have been brought
on records, we are satisfied that all links in the chain are complete and the
B evidences led by the prosecution point out only to one conclusion, that is,
the guilt of the appellants herein. They have rightly been convicted of the
offences charged against them by the learned Trial Judge.

An appeal had also been preferred by the complainant for enhancing
C the sentence.

Mr. D.K. Garg, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
complainant, would appeal to us for enhancement of the sentence. We, do
not think that the High Court has committed any error in opining that the case
is not one of the rarest of rare cases.
D It is also not a case where we should exercise our extra-ordinary
jurisdiction in converting the penalty of rigorous imprisonment for life to one
of imposition of death sentence. We decline to do so.

For the reasons aforementioned, both the appeals are dismissed.

S.K.S. Appeals dismissed.