Holding

The Government Order was not final and, due to violations of natural justice, the appellant was entitled to a further hearing, leading to the setting aside of the lower courts' judgments.

Summary

G. Srinivas claimed title to a plot of land based on an unregistered sale deed. The Andhra Pradesh Government, via a Government Order (GOM), directed the Collector to issue a no‑objection certificate and supplementary shethwar in his favour, but the Collector later rejected the claim, citing the land as evacuee property. The High Court initially ruled in favour of the appellant, but a Division Bench set aside that judgment. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the GOM had attained finality and whether the principles of natural justice were observed, noting that the appellant’s counsel was not properly served notice and no further hearing was afforded. The Court held that the GOM was not final, the State could rectify its mistake, and a further opportunity of hearing must be given. Consequently, both the Single Judge’s and Division Bench’s decisions were set aside and the appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

The GOM directing issuance of a no‑objection certificate and supplementary shethwar attained finality or could be revisited.
Whether the principles of natural justice were complied with, given the alleged failure to serve notice to counsel and denial of a further hearing.
Whether an administrative order passed by mistake or ignorance of material facts is reviewable.
Whether the subject land is an evacuee property under the Hyderabad Administration of Evacuee Property Regulation and the impact on title.
Whether the validity of the evacuation notification can be challenged in a collateral writ proceeding.

Subjects

property lawimmovable propertyunregistered sale deedevacuee propertynatural justiceno‑objection certificatesupplementary shethwaradministrative order reviewdue processhearing

Judgment

A G. SRINIVAS
v.
GOVT. OF A.P. AND ORS.

SEPTEMBER 20, 2005

B 'l~i; SINHA AND C.K. THAKKER, JJ.]

Property Laws : ·

Immoveable property-Title claim based on unregistered sale deed-
C State Government directing Collector to issue no-objection-certificate and a
supplementary shethwar in favour ofclaimant after satisfying itself ofdocuments
produced before him-Collector found it to be evacuee property and rejected
the claim-State Government upholding order of Collector, but before that, a
further opportunity for hearing asked by claimant was not considered-High
D Court upholding State Government order-Justification of-Held: Order of
State Government to Collector to issue no-objection-certificate in favour of
claimant did not attain finality-Fact that impugned property was evacuee
property was not brought to notice of State Government before it issued that
order and it was entitled to rectify its mistake-However, in facts of the case,
State Government directed to give one more opportunity ofhearing to claimant.
E
Government Order-Passed by mistake and with ignorance of relevant
facts-It can be reviewed if it is found that a fraud was practiced or there was
willful suppression.

Appellant cla.imed right, title and interest over the impugned plot
F of land relying on an unregistered sale deed in favour of his father. On
his representation, respondent-State Government by a GOM directed the
Collector to issue no objection certificate and supplementary shethwar in
his favour, after satisfying itself about documents produced by him. The
Collector gave opportunities of hearing to appellant wherein he denied
G that impugned plot was an evacuee property. However, the Collector
rejected his claim. By another notice, appellant was asked to appear before
Minister of Revenue, and he filed written submissions through his advocate
and hearing was given. But another notice to his advocate remained
unserved. Appellant asked for another opportunity of hearing, but instead,

H 404
1
G. SRJNlVAS v. GOVT. OF A.P. 405
respondent passed an order rejecting his claim. His writ petition against A
that order was allowed by Single Judge of High Court, declaring him to
be owner of the impugned plot. But a Division Bench of High Court set
aside that judgment. Hence the present appeal.

Appellant contended that by the GOM he had acquired a right which
he could not be deprived of without compliance with principles of natural B
justice. Further, keeping in view that notice could not be served on his
advocate, another opportunity of hearing should be given to him.

--· Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD I. Some findings were arrived at by the Government of A.P C
in favour of the Appellant in terms of GOM. The said order, however,
may not be said to have attained finality in the sense that the Collector
had been specifically directed to issue a supplementary sethwar in the
name of the Appellant and he was supposed to do so upon satisfying
himself in that behalf. Such a satisfaction on the part of the Collector could D .
be arrived at only upon application of mind on the claim of the Appellant.
If during inquiry, the Collector came to know that the property in question
was in fact evacuee property, nothing prevented him from bringing the
same to the notice of the State. The State also cannot be said to have acted
illegally or without jurisdiction in issuing the show cause notice to the
Appellant inter alia rectifying the mistakes as evidently the said fact had E
not been brought to its notice before issuing GOM. (411-B-E] .

2.1. Advocate appeared for the Appellant before the Minister for
Revenue and filed written submissions and parties were heard. However,
one notice does not appear to have been served asking the counsel for the
Appellant to appear on particular date. Furthermore, while passing his F
order, the Minister for Revenue does not appear to have taken into
consideration the representation for further hearing filed earlier.
(411-F-G; 412-A-B]

2.2. In the aforementioned situation, a further opportunity of hearing G
may be given to the Appellant. For the aforementioned purpose, it is not
necessary for the State to issue another notice inasmuch as in view of the
allegations and counter allegations made in the writ petition, special leave
petition as also the counter affidavits filed on behalf of respondents, each
party is aware of the contentions raised on behalf of the other side. The
appropriate authority of the State may, therefore, give an opportunity to H
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A the Appellant to be heard and an appropriate order may be passed
thereafter. (412-B-Dl

3. An order passed by mistake and ignorance of the relevant facts
indisputably can be reviewed, if inter alia, it is found that a fraud was
practiced or there was willful suppression on the part of the Appellant.
B (412-A-B)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2447 of2005.

From the Judgment and Order dated 15.9.2003 of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in W.A. No. 1929 of 2001.
C K.K. Venugopal, Jaideep Gupta, K.Maruthi Rao, Mrs. K. Radha and
Mrs. Anjani Aiyagari for the Appellant.
K. Sundara Vardan, Vikash Singh, Manoj Saxena, Amit Heharia,
Mohanprasad Meharia, Ms. Arpita Duarah, M.D. Adkar, Braj Kishore Mishra,
Vijay Kumar, Ms. Aparna Jha and Abhishek Singh for the Respondents.
D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. The scope and extent of application of the principles
of natural justice is in question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment
and order dated 15.09.2003 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court
of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Appeal No. 1929 of 2001 reversing the judgment
E and order dated 12.10.2002 passed by a learned Single Judge of the said
Court in Writ Petition No. 34 79 of 1997.
Plot No.7-A measuring 2 acres 38 guntas situated in Shaikpet village
is the subject matter of dispute between the parties. The Appellant herein
claims right, title and interest over the said plot relying on or on the basis of
F an unregistered deed of sale dated 11.11.1949 AD purported to have been
executed by one Khaja Moinuddin Ansari in favour of his father. The said
Shaikpet village was formerly a Sarfekhas village and after the merger thereof
in 1949, the administration thereof vested in the State.
One Khaja Moin Nawaz Jung Bahadur was said to be the Foreign
G Minister in the Nizam regime. With a view to commemorate the Silver Jubilee
Celebrations, the Jubilee Hills Municipality was constituted by including the
lands situated in Sarfekhas village. The then Government in order to develop
the Jubilee Hills Municipality into a planned city divided the land situated in
Survey Nos. 403 into 169 plots and allotted the same in favour of various
Nawabs and Nobles on certain terms and conditions which included the
H payment of specified amounts to the Government.
G. SRINIVAS v. GOVT. OF A.P.[SINHA, J.] 407
The Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad is the successor of the Jubilee A
Hills Municipality. The contention of the Appellant is that the said Plot No.7-
A was allotted in favour of Khaja Moinuddin Ansari by the Government,
who, as noticed hereinbefore, sold the same in favour of his father.

An application was filed for issuance of supplementary.sethwar and no
objection certificate. By an order dated 09 .0 l.1985, the said plot was B
derecognized. On the other hand, the contention of the State appears to be
that Khaja Moinuddin Ansari is in fact Moin Nawaz Jung Bahadur, who
during the police action was sent to the United Nations of Organization by
the then Nizam to raise the issue of police action by the Union of fadia and
he having failed therein left for Pakistan and never returned to India; C
whereupon by reason ofNotification No. 5 dated 15.09.1949, all his properties
were declared as evacuee properties in terms of Hyderabad Administration of
Evacuee Property Regulation which was published in the Hyderabad Gazette
on 19.12.1949. The relevant portion of said notification reads as under:

"By virtue of power vested in one as custodian under section 6 of the D
Hyderabad Administration of Evacuee Property Regulation, I hereby
declare that the following properties are Evacuee properties within
the terms of the said regulation and therefore, vest in me.

NAGENDRA BAHADUR

Custodian E
I. All immovable property of Moin Nawaz Jung Bahadur e.g.
bungalows, Muligies and lands etc., at Begumpet gunfoundry etc.,
including all shares; securities etc., as also property in Aurangabad
and elsewhere in the state.
F
2. All immovable property of Begum Moin Nawaz Jung as also the
shares and securities."

Taking advantage of the absence of the said Khaja Moinuddin Ansari,
several persons advanced false and frivolous claim thereupon. One K.
Satyamma filed a writ petition wherein some order was passed. Similarly, G
one Khaja Moinuddin Ansari through a purported holder of General Power
of Attorney K. Sudarshan also filed a writ petition. A claim over the said plot
was also made by one M. Shanker Rao.

The Appellant herein in view of the entertainment of the said writ H
'
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A petition by the High Court also made a representation before the Government.
By GOMs No. 955 dated 17.09.1992, it was directed:

"In view of the above said findings and observations and in view
of the fact that this is also a similar case, the Government consider
it just and proper to set aside the orders of de-recognition of plot No.
B 7-A measuring an extent of Ac. 2.38 guntas issued in the Government
Memo Second read above and to direct the Collector, Hyderabad to
issue no objection certificate and supplementary shethwar in favour
of Sri G. Srinivas, the Successor in title after satisfying himself about
the documents as was done in the case of Smt. A. Pentamma in Govt.

c Memo No. 2436/Assn. Ill(2)/85-21 dated 29.8.1990 to meet the ends
of natural justice."

As no action was taken, a writ petition came to be filed by the Appellant
herein, being Writ Petition No. 2024 of 1996. The writ petition was disposed
of directing the Government of Andhra Pradesh to complete the inquiry
D contemplated in Memo dated 16.07.1994. It was further observed:

"8. It is submitted by the learned Government pleader that the
land in question is an evacuee property and hence, the Government
is contemplating to take necessary consequential action as warranted
under law. This aspect is not the subject matter for enquiry in this
E writ petition. It is so open to the Government if so advised to proceed
in accordance with law in this regard.

9. As and when the enquiry is contemplated in Memo. Dated
16. 7.1994 is completed, the second respondent, District Collector,
shall take appropriate action to implement G.OMs. No. 955 without
F any further delay, preferably within six months from the date of
receipt of a copy of the enquiry report."

The Collector of Hyderabad District, however, drew the attention of the .
Government that issuance of a supplementary sethwar was not possible for
the reason stated therein. He before sending his report had given a notice to
G the Appellant on or about 15.11.1993 asking him to be present in his office
on 22.11.1993 along with the relevant documents and also the address
particulars of Moin Nawaz Jung for taking necessary action in the matter.
Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said notice, a written submission was
filed by the Appellant wherein he appeared to have denied and disputed the
H fact that Plot No. 7-A was a part of evacuee property contending that Khaja
G. SRINIVAS v. GOVT. OF A.P.[SINHA, J.] 409
Moinuddin Ansari was not an evacuee. The Collector of Hyderabad District A
by Memo. dated 23.12.1993 issued another notice asking the Appellants to
reply satisfactorily with supporting evidence on the points specified therein.
The Appellant in reply thereto, inter alia, stated that the Government had
already made inquiries, heard his counsel and arrived at certain findings but
without prejudice thereto, however he sought to clarify the points raised B
therein. The Collector thereafter allegedly made an inquiry upon verification
of the documents filed by the Respondents herein and submitted a detailed
report to the Government, opining that the Appellant's case does not deserve
any consideration on the grounds mentioned therein.

By a notice dated 16.07.1994, the parties were asked to appear before ·c
the Minister for Revenue on 23.07.1994. It is not in dispute that a detailed
written submission was filed by the Appellant and his counsel was heard
fully on the said date. However, it appears from the records that another
notice was issued to the Advocate of the Appellant which was not served.
Before us the original records have been produced from a perusal whereof,
it appears that the envelope containing the notice was returned to the D
Government with an endorsement of the postal authority thereupon. It is not
possible to cull out any meaning from the said endorsement.

On 29.11.1996, the Appellant made a representation for giving another
opportunity to him of hearing but the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued E
GOMs dated 26.12.1996 holding inter alia:

"The petitioner has never agitated against the Notification No. 5
dated 15th September, 1949 declaring the properties of Khaja
Moinuddin Ansari alias Moin Nawas Jung Bahadur as Evacuee
Properties till 10th April, 1997." F
Questioning the said order, the Appellant filed a writ petition wherein
a learned Single Judge, inter alia, held that the notification issued under
Regulation 6 of the Hyderabad Administration of Evacuee Properties
Regulation was bad in law, as the same did not contain material particulars
of the properties of the evacuee as was mandatorily required. It was further G
observed that in the said notification, the name of Moin Nawaz Jung Bahadur
was mentioned, but the allotment was made to Khaja Moinuddin Ansari and,
thus, two persons are not the same. It was further held :

"Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and consequently
it is declared that the property belonged to one Khaja Moinuddin H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Ansari; and the father of the petitioner having purchased the same
under sale document and the petitioner having succeeded the property ·
after the death of his father, he shall be deemed to have acquired the
ownership of the property in question. The respondents are directed
to implement the orders passed by the Government in G.O.Ms. No
955, dated 17.9.1992 within a period of two months from the date of
B receipt of a copy of this order."

The Division Bench on an appeal made by the Government of Andhra
Pradesh set aside the said judgment.

C Assailing the judgmert of the Division Bench, Mr. K.K. Venugopal,
the learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the Appellant, would
-
contend that the State of Andhra Pradesh could not have reopened the matter
in view ofGOMs. No. 955 dated 17.09.1992 without initiating a proceeding
under the Evacuee Property Regulation as by reason of the· said Government
Order the Appellant derived a right wherefrom he could be deprived only
D upon compliance of the principles of natural justice. In the aforementioned
situation, the State was required to issue a notice to the Appellant so as to
enable him to deal with the question not only as regard vesting of Plot No. 7-
A in the Government under the Hyderabad Administration of Evacuee Property
Reg:ilation but also that Khaja Moinuddin Ansari and Moin Nawaz Jung
E Bahadur were one and the same person. In absence of such a notice it was
urged that the findings arrived at by the State in the impugned order were
without jurisdiction.

Mr. Venugopal would contend that the only ground upon which the
notice dated 16.07.1994 was issued is that as to why the words 'supplementary
F sethwar' in para 8 of the GOMs. No. 955 dated 17.09.1992 should not be
deleted. the learned counsel would further submit that keeping in view the
fact that no notice could be served upon the Advocate of the Appellant, as
he had shifted his premises in view of the representation made by the Appellant
on 29.11.1996 prior to the passing of the impugned order, a fresh opportunity
G of hearing should be directed to be given.

Mr. K. Sundara Vardan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
the Respondents, on the other hand, would submit that the principles of
natural justice had fully been complied with, as would appear front the fact
that the Collector had put the Appellant on notice that Plot No. 7-A was an
H evacuee property and furthennore Khaja Moinuddin Ansari and Khaja Moin
Jung Bahadur were one and the same person.
G. SRINIVAS v. G. SRINIVAS [SINHA, J.) 411
It was further urged that the question as to whether Plot No. 7-A has A
validly been declared to be an evacuee property or not, can be raised only by
an evacuee or a person claiming through or under him in an appropriate
proceeding and not in a collateral proceeding.

In view of the order proposed to be passed, it is not necessary for us
to consider the rival contentions raised at the bar in details. It is beyond any B
cavil that some findings were arrived at by the Government of A.P. in favour
of the Appellant in terms of GOMs No. 955 dated 17.09.1992. The said
order, however, may not be said to have attained finality in the sense that the
'Collector had been specifically directed to issue a supplementary sethwar in
the name of the Appellant and he was supposed to do so upon satisfying C
himself in that behalf. Such a satisfaction on the part of the Collector could
be arrived at only upon application of mind on the claim of the Appellant.
If during inquiry, the Collector came to know that the property in question
was in fact an evacuee property and both Khaja Moinuddin Ansari and Khaja
Moin Nawab were one and the same person, nothing prevented him from
bringing the same to the notice of the State. The State also cannot be said to D
have acted illegally or without jurisdiction in issuing the show cause notice
to the Appellant inter alia for rectifying the mistakes as evidently the said
fact had not been brought to its notice before issuing GOMs. No. 995 dated
17.09.1992. However, despite the fact that the Appellant had availed the
opportunities to respond to the questions raised by the Collector in the notice E
dated 16.07.1994 he was merely asked to explain as to why the words
'supplemental"'/ sethwar' should not be deleted from the GOMs. No. 955
dated 17.09.1992. If the intention of the State was to recall the entire order
being GOMs. No. 955 dated 17.09.1992, it should have said so explicitly.
Mr. Sundara Vardan may be right in his submission that when the Appellant
had been given ample opportunities of hearing and he had filed a detailed F
written submission, it was not necessary for the State to issue a second show
cause notice but the fact remains that such a notice was issued.

We are not oblivious of the fact that in response to the notice dated
16.07 .1994, the learned Advocate appeared for the Appellant before the
Minister for Revenue and filed written submissions on 23.07.1994. Yet again G
in response to the notice dated 14.06.1996, the learned Advocate for the
Appellant appeared and filed a detailed representation on 21.06.1996 and
also argued the matter. Yet again pursuant to the notice dated 08. I 1.1996, the
parties were heard on 16.11.1996. However, the notice issued on 08.11.1996
does not appear to have been served asking the counsel for the Appellant to H
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
.,
A appear on 16.11.1996. Furthennore, while passing the order dated 30.11.1996,
the Minister for Revenue does not appear to have taken into consideration the
representation of the Appellant for further hearing filed on 29.11.1996.

An order passed by m.istake and ignorance of the relevant facts
indisputably can be reviewed, if inter alia, it is found that a fraud was
B practised or there was wilful suppression on the part of the Appellant.
It is in the aforementioned situation, we are of the opinion that a further
opportunity of hearing may be given to the Appellant. For the aforementioned
purpose, it is not necessary for the State to issue another notice inasmuch as
in view of the allegations and counter allegations made in the writ petition,
c special leave petition as also the counter affidavits filed on behalf of the
Respondents, each party before us is aware of the contentions raised on
behalfofthe other side. The appropriate authority of the State may, therefore,
give an opportunity to the Appellant to be heard and an appropriate order
may be passed thereafter.
D However, it is clarified that all the parties would be at liberty to raise
all contentions in the said proceeding.
We, however, do not appreciate the approach of the learned Single
Judge while passing his judgment dated 12.10.2002. He did not consider the
question as to whether validity or otherwise of the notification dated
E 15.09.1949 issued under Regulation 6 of the Hyderabad Administration of
Evacuee Property Regulation could have been questioned in a collateral
proceeding. He further did not consider the fact that the question of title
could not be detennined in a writ proceeding; nor the identity of a person
could conclusively be found out therein. The learned Single Judge furthennore
F did n.ot advert to the limited scope of judicial review, namely, that an
administrative order passed by the State can be questioned only on limited
grounds and while entertaining a writ petition, the writ court does not act as
an appellate authority.
"'
For the reasons aforementioned, both the judgments of the learned
G Single Judge and the Division Bench are set aside. The appeal is allowed
with the aforementioned observations. However, in the facts and circumstances \
_,
of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

v.s. Appeal allowed.