Holding

Acquisition of possession of property by a female Hindu after the Hindu Succession Act does not automatically attract Section 14(1); its applicability depends on the nature of the right, and where the possession is not as an heir, Section 14(2) applies, rendering the appellant not an absolute owner.

Summary

The suit property was a house jointly purchased in 1963 by T.G. Seshagiri Rao and his uncle T.K. Vasudeva Murthy. The uncle later relinquished his interest to Rao by a release deed in 1989, making Rao the absolute owner. After the death of her husband (Vasudeva Murthy's son), the appellant, G. Rama, occupied the house as a licensee and claimed ownership under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, alleging the property was given to her in lieu of maintenance. The trial court held Rao entitled to an undivided half share and ordered partition; the High Court examined the applicability of Section 14(1). The Supreme Court held that mere acquisition of possession after the Act does not automatically invoke Section 14(1); the nature of the right must be that of an heir, which was not established, so Section 14(2) applies and the appellant is not an absolute owner. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act applies to a female Hindu who acquires possession of property after the Act in lieu of maintenance.
Whether the appellant has an absolute ownership interest in the suit property.
Whether the respondent is entitled to vacant possession of the property.
Whether the appellant's possession is as a licensee or as an heir under the Act.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 96
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956s. 19
Hindu Succession Act, 1956s. 14(1), s. 14(2), s. 30

Subjects

Hindu Succession ActSection 14property rights of womenmaintenanceabsolute ownershiplicenseepartitionjoint family propertyrelease deedvacant possession

Judgment

[2008] 10 S.C.R. 152

A G.. RAMA
v.
T.G. SESHAGIRI RAO (D) BY LRS. ·
(Civil Appeal No. 4215 of 2008)
JULY 7, 2008
B
. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND LOKESHWAR SINGH
P~NTA, JJ.]

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - s. 14(1) and 14(2) - Appli-
C cability of s. 14(1) d?pend on the nature of the right acquired
by Hindu female - If she takes it as an heir under the Act, she
takes it absolutely - If while getting possession of property
after the Act under a devise, gift or other transaction, any re-
striction is placed on her right, the restriction will have play in
D view of s. 14(2) of the Act - On facts, no evidence Jed to show
that widow of son was in possession of property in lieu of main-
tenance, hence she cannot claim to be absolute owner of the
property
T.fle suit property was jointly purchase.d by respon-
E dent who was father and by the uncle of the husband of
appellant. The uncle relinquished his right, title and inter-
est i'n favour of respondent by virtue of release deed. The
-
husband of appellant died and she was permitted to re-'.
side in the house as licensee. The respondent filed suit
F praying to declare him as absolute owner of suit prop-
erty and to direct appellant to deliver vacant possession
,~of suit property. The trial court held that respondent was
· '" ' only entitled for undivided half share in the suit property
and entitled f~r partition and separate possession of his
G . half ·Share .. The respondent filed .appeal, which was al-_
lowed. Hence the present appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Cou~
HELD : 1. Appellant took the stand .that it was a joint
---H· . 152
G. RAMA v. T.G. SESHAGIRI RAO (D) BY 153
LRS.

family property and, therefore, she had half share. No A
specific issue regarding the nature of the property was
framed. There was no issue reiating to Section 14(1) of
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and there was also no
. evidence led in that regard. Even no evidence was led
. specifically to show that in lieu of maintenance she was B
permitted to possess the property. Strangely the trial court
treated the suit as one for partition though the suit was
for declaration. There was no counter-claim filed by ap- .
pellant. It is pointed out that uncle of appellant's husband
was alive when the trial of the suit proceeded. Before the c
High Court an undertaking was given to vacate the pre-
mises which was accepted subject to filing of an under-
taking which was in fact filed. Two years after a review
petition was filed and the same was withdrawn. [Paras
14, 15] [157-G,H; 158-A,B & C]
.o
3. Any acquisition of possession of property (not
/ right) by a female Hindu after the coming into force of the
Act, cannot normally attract Section 14 (1) of the Act. It
would depend- on the nature of the right acquired by her.
If she takes it as an heir under the Act, she takes it abso- E
lutely. If while getting possession of the property after the
Act, under a devise, gift or other transaction, any restric-
tion is placed on her right, the restriction will have play in
view of Section 14 (2) of the Act. [Para 19] [161-F,G & H]
V. Tulasamma and Ors. v. Sesha Reddy (d) by Lrs. F
1977(3) SCC, 99; Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara·Sahib Narike a·nd
Ors. 2006(8) SCC 75; Sharad Subramanyan v. Soumi
Mazumdar & Ors. 2006(8) SCC 91 ; Eramma v. Verrupanna
and Ors. 1966 (2) SCR 626 - relied on. ·
G
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : .Civil Appeal Nos.
4215 of 2008
From the Judgment and final order dated 7/1 /2004 of the
.High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in R.F.A. No. 19112000
H
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 10 $ . C.R.

A Kiran Suri, S.J, Amith and Apama Bhat for the Appellant.
Raghvendra S. Srivastsa for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dr. ARIJITPASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
B
2. Challenge in this appeal is:to:thejudgment of a·le.arned
SH1gle Judge of the Karnataka High Court aJloWing the appeal. ·
fJJed··itl. terms of· Section 96.re:adwith OrderXU ofthe·Code: of
Civii.Procedure, 1908 (in short the 'G.P;G').
c -3. Background facts in a nutshe.11 are as follows: ·,
The respondent T.G. Seshagiri Rao who after his death
has been substituted by his legal heirs, had filed asuitwith inter
alia prayer to declare him as an absolute owner of the plaint
schedute.property and to dJrect the defendant (appellant herein)
0
to deliver vacant posse~sion of the suit schedule property. The
suit property is a residential house bearing No.257/1, s~h Cross,
·Ke.mpegowda Na gar; Bangatore measuring East West 15' x 5'
and north
south 35 •
1

E 4. The case set out by the parties is as follows: ·
The schedule premises was purchased by .Kate· T.G.
SeshagiriRao along with his uncle one T.~: Vasudeva Murthy
under a registered sale deed dated 5.6.1963 for a valuable .
sale consideration of Rs.20,000/- and that his uncle T.K.
F Vasudeva Murthy-relinquished his right, title and interest which
,he had over the suit schedule property .in favour of the plaintiff
under a registered release deed dated 17.4.1989 and by vir-
tue of the release deed, the plaintiff became the absolute owner
of the suit schedule property. The defendant is the daughter in·
G law dfT.K. Vasudeva Murthy who lost her husband. in an acCi"'
dent and that she was permitted to reside in the house -as a
ljcensee. ·

5. The suit was filed seeking possessron, as the defen,. --'--··-
H dant refused to vacate the premises in spite of repe~ted re-

~-~ .-
G. RAMA v. T.G. SESHAGIRI RAO (D) BY 155
LRS. [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]

quests and a legal notice. A
6. The defendant contested the case. According to h'er
written statement, Sri T.K. Vasudeva Murthy has no right to ex-
ecute the sale deed and that Vasudeva Murthy purchased the
suit schedule property along with the plaintiff out of the joint family
nucleus and that joint family had consisted of Vasudeva Murthy H
and his son Venkata Krishna, the deceased husband of the de-
fendant. According to her, after the death of her husband, she
and her daughter Soumya were also having equal rights along .
with Vasudeva Murthy. It is her further case that she has been
residing in the schedule premises not as a licensee but in her C
own right as a daughter-in-law and that the property was given
to her by her in-laws till the marriage of her daughter Soumya
and to enjoy the same for life with an independent title. She
also contended that she was put in possession of the suit sched-
ule property by Vasudeva Murthy with an understanding that she D
would remain in possession in lieu of maintenance and that she
has acquired ownership as per the provisions of Section 14 of
the.Hindu Suc.cessjonAci, .1955 (in short the 'Act').
7~ Based on the above pleadrngs; the following issues were
h~ . . E
1. Whether the plaintiff proves· that he is the absolute
owner of the suit schedule.property as on the date of
fifing of the suit?
2.. · Whether the plaintiff further proves that he is entitled F
.fo the delivery of vacant possession of the schedule
property from. the. defendant?
Whether the plaintiff. is entitled .to past and future
mesne profits.as claimed?
G
4. Whether the defendant proves that she has perfected
her title to the suit schedule property by way of
adverse possession?
5. . Whether the court fee paid ts insufficient?
H
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {2008] 10 S.C.R.
h-
A 6. Whether the defendant proves that she has got a
legal right to the extent of her share in the suit schedule
property?
7. To what order and decree?
~
B 8. The plaintiff exami!Jed himself as PW-1. He relied upon
Exs.P1 to P9. The defendant examined himself as OW 1. She
did not produce any documents before the trial court. The trial_
Court on appreciation of the evidence adduced by the parties,
held issues 1 and 2 in the negative and further held that the .~

c plaintiff is entitled for undivided half share in the suit schedule
property and entitled for partition and separate possession of
his. half share. In respect-of issue No. 3, it was held that "entitled
for future mesne profits from the date of the suit till the date of
~
possession in respect of his _half share". Issue No. 4 was an".' ~-
swered in the negative. Issue No. 5 was held in the affirmative. ·-
D .
Issue No. 6 in affirmative holding that the defendant is entitled
to claim half share. Ultimately, the suit of the plaintiff was de-
I
creed in part declaring that he has become the absolute owner
of the undivided half share and entitled for partition and sepa-
rate possession of his half share. The said judgment and de-
E cree was called in question before the High Court.

9. The High Court found that the basic question related to
Section 14(1) of the Act. It was noted that a suit OS No. 4949 of
1991 for partition was filed by the defendant, appellant herein. >,-
F It was held that without any material, the trial court held that de-
fendant had become absolute owner pursuant to Section 14(1)
of the Act.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
true scope and ambit of Section 14 of Act wer_e lost sight of by
G the High Court.
,.._
11. It is pointed out that the property in question was given ..
to her in' lieu of maintenance and therefore she had to shift fromj
the main portion of the building to the out house. It is pointed out -
that the claim is against the husband ~nd not qua recovering
H
G. RAMA v. T.G. SESHAGIRI RAO (D) BY 157
LRS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]
')'~
lost property. -Strong reliance is p.laced on a decision of this A
Court in V Tulasamma and Ors. v. Sesha Reddy (d) by
Lrs.(1977 (3) sec 99).
4
I 12. It is pointed out that after the death of her husband,
~
attempt of her father-in-law and the original plaintiff was to de-
prive her of the property over which she had legitimate owner- B
"""'
ship.
13. It is pointed out that she was married to T.V.
Venkatakrishna on 4. 7 .1979 and her husband died on
11.7.1980 and the child was born·to her on 9.2.1981. The re- c
lease deed was purportedly executed by her father-in-law in
1989. The admitted position is that her father-in-law wanted to
deprive her of the legitimate rights and for that purpose release
,deed was executed.
~

i 14. In response, learned counsel for the respondent sub- D
mitted that the factual scenario needs to be noted. On 5.6.1963
the original plaintiff Seshagiri and Vasudeva Murthy who was
his uncle and the father-in-law of the defendant/ appellant pur-
chased the property jointly. They were partners in a partnership
firm which was dissolved on 16.8.1971. On 8.3.1981, portion E
of the land purchased jointly by Sheshagiri and Vasudeva Murthy
was sold to one Puttann, There was no challenge to it. On
17.4.1989 Vasudeva executed the release deed for consider-
ation of 20,000/- in favour of Sheshagiri. On 4.r:1990 the suit
-&.
relating to the present dispute i.e. OS No.188of1990 was filed. F
lnit.ially in the written statement filed, defendant took the stand
that the property in question was joint family property and
claimed half share. Subsequently, the written statement was
amended. Plea was taken that she was permitted to stay in lieu
of maintenance and so the property was of absolute property
G
and in terms of Section 14(1) of the Act. On 19.8.1991 O.S. No.
~f 4949 of 1991 i.e. suit for partition was filed claiming the parti-
tion. There is no challenge to the release deed dated 17.4.1989
in the suit for partition. Appellant took the stand that it was a
joint family property and, therefore, he had half share. No spe-
H
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.

-h \
A cific· issue regarding the nature of the property was framed.
There was no issue relating to Section 14(1) of the Act and
there was also no evidence led in that regard. Strangely the
trial court treated the suit as one for partition though the suit
was for declaration. There was no counter-claim filed by de-
y
r
B fendant- Rama. It is pointed out that Vasudeva Murthy was alive
when the trial of the suit proceeded. Before the High Court an
undertaking was given to vacant the premises which was ac-
cepted subject to filing of an undertaking which was in fact filed
on 21.5.2004 after delivery of the judgment on 7.1.2004. Two
c years after a review petition was filed on 10.8.2006 and the
same was withdrawn on 30.8.2006.
15. As rightly contended by learned counsel for the respon-
dent there was no issue framed regarding Section 14 of the
Act. Even no evidenc~ was led specific~lly to show that in lieu ....
D of maintenance she was permitted to possess the property, ,,-
16. It is relevant to note that the trial COl;Jrt:made a refer-
ence to Section 19 of Hindu Adoption and Maintenan,ce Act,
1956 (in short the 'Mainteriance Act'). ·unfortunately the High
Court did not take note of sub section (2) of Section 19 of the
E
Maintenance Act.
17. Section 14(1) of the Act reads as follows:
"14. (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu,
whether acquired before or after the commencement of ~
F this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not
as a limited owner.
Explanation. - In this sub-section, "property" includes both
movable and immovable property acquired by a female
G Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu
of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from
any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after _._
her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion; or by purchase
or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and
also any such property held by her as stridhana
H
G. RAMA v. T.G. SESHAGIRI RAO (D) BY 159
LRS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]

immediately before the commencement of this Act. A

-
-1
(
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any
property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other
instrument or under a decree or order of a Civil Court or
under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other
instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a B
restricted estate in such property."
18. Section 19 of the Maintenance Act reads as follows:
Maintenance of widowed daughter-in-law.- (1) A Hindu
r
wife, whether married before or after the commencement c
of this Act, shall be entitled to be maintained after the
death of her husband by her father-in-law.
Provided and to the extent that she is unable to maintain
·~
herself out of her own earnings or other property or, where
-i D
she has no property of her own, is unable to obtain
maintenance-
from the estate of her husband or her father or mother, or
from her son or daughter, if any, or his or her estate.
E
(2) .Any obligation under sub-section (1) shall not be
enforceable if the fattier-in-law has opt the means to do so
from any coparcenary property in his possession· out of
which the daughter-in-law has not obtained any share,
-· and any such obligation shall case on the re-marriage of
.·the daughter-in-law.
F

19. In Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike and Ors.
[2006(8) sec 75] it was inter alia observed as follows:
"5. In the case on hand, since the properties admittedly G
were the separate properties of Ralla Singh, all that lsher
Kaur could claim de hors the will, is a right to maintenance
and could possibly proceed against the property even in
the hands of a transferee from her husband who had notice
of her right to maintenance under the Hindu Adoptions
H
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.

A and Maintenance Act. No doubt, but for the devise, she
would have obtained the property absolutely as an heir,
being a Class I heir. But, since the devise has intervened,
the ques_tion that arises has to be considered in the light
of this position. ,,....,
B xxx xxx xxx
11. On the wording of the section and in the context of
these decisions, it is clear that the ratio in V Tulasamma
v. V Shesha Reddi (supra) has application only when a
.. '
...
c female Hindu is possessed of th~ property oh the date of
the Act under semblance of a right, whether it be a limi_ted •'
·1
or a pre-existing right to maintenance in lieu of which she
was put in possession of the property. The tu/asamma
_ratio cannot be applied ignoring the requirement of the
female Hindu h.aving to be in possession of the property ....._:
r •
D t- ;
either directly or constructively as .on the date of the Act,
though she may acquire a right to it even after the.Act. The
same is. the position in Raghubar Singh v. Guiab· Singh
[1998 (6) sec 314Jwherein the testamentary succession
._was before the Act.. The widow had obt~ined possession )'
E under a Will. A suit was filed challenging the Will. The suit
was compromised. The compromise sought to restrict
the right otthe widow. This Court held that since the widow r
was in possession ot'the property on the date of the Act }
'
under the will as of right and since the compromise decree
F created no new or independent right in her, Section14(2) .
of the Act had no application and Section 14(1) governed
the case, her right to maintenance being a pre-existing
right.Jn Mst. Karmi v. Amru and Ors. (1972 {4) SC.C 86) ,._
the owner of the property executed a Will in respect of a ...
G self-acquired property. The testamentary succession
opened in favour of the wife in the year 1938. But it restricted
her right. Thus, though she was in possession· of the ......
I •

property on the date of the Act, this Court held that the life
estate given to her under the Will cannot become. an
H absolute estate under the provisions of the Act. This can
.... G. RAMA v. T.G. SESHAGIRI RAO (0) BY 161
'
..J LRS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]
·•.

only be on the premise that the widow had no pre- existing A
right in the self-acquired property of her husband. In a
case where a Hindu female was in possession of the
property as on the date of the coming into force of the Act,
the same being bequeathed to her by her father under a
will, this Court in Bhura and Ors. v. Kashi Ram [(1994) 2 B
sec 111 ]after finding on a construction of the will that it
only conferred a restricted right in the property in her, held
that Section 14(2) of the Act was attrac.ted and it was not
a case in which by virtue of the operation of Section 14 ( 1)
of the Act, her right would get enlarged into an absolute c
estate. This again could only be on the basis that she had
no pre-existing right in the property: In Sharad
Subramanyan v. Soumi Mazumdar and Ors. (JT 2006
> (11) SC 535) this Court held that since the legatee under
....
the will in that case, did not have a pre-existing right in the
D
property, she would not be entitled to rely on Section 14
( 1) of the Act to claim an absolute estate in the property
bequeathed to her and her rights were controlled by the
terms of the will and Section14 (2) of the Act. This Court
in the said decision has made a survey of the earlier
decisions including the one in Tulasa'inma. Thus, it is E
seen that the antecedents of the property, the possession
of the property as on the date of the Act and the existence
of a right in the female over it, however limited it may be,
-.i.
are the essential ingredients in determining whether Sub-
section (1) of Section 14 of the Act would come into play. F
What emerges according to us is that any acquisition of
possession of property (not right) by a female Hindu after
the coming into force of the Act, cannot normally attract
Section 14 (1) of the Act. It would depend on the nature of
the right acquired by her. If she takes it as an heir under G
;,..-j.-
the Act, she takes it absolutely. If while getting possession·
of the property after the Act, under a devise, gift or other.
transaction, any restriction is placed on her right, the
restriction will have play in view of Section 14 (2) of the
Act. H
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R.

A 12. When a male Hindu dies possessed of property after
the con1ing Into force of the Hindu Succession Act, his
heirs as per the schedule, take it in terms of Section 8 of
the Act. The heir or heirs take it absolutely. There is no
question of any limited estate. descending to the heir or
B ·heirs. Therefore, when a male Hindu dies after 17.6.1956
/

leaving his widow as his sole heir, she gets the property
as class I heir and there is no limit to her estate or limitation
·on her title. In such circumstances, Section 14 (1) of the
Act would not apply on succession after the Act, or it has
c no scope for operation. Or, in other words, even without
. calling in aid Section 14 (1) of the Act, she gets an absolute
estate."
20. In Sharad Subramanyan v. Soumi Mazumdar & Ors.
[2006(8) sec 91] this court observed as follows:
D
"Mr. Bhaskar P. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the
respondents, rightly distinguished all these cases, as it
was Clearly proved therein, that the properties had been
given to a female Hindu, either in recognition of or in lieu
of her right to maintenance under the Shastric Hindu Law
or under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956.
Consequently, these were instances where the dispositions
of property, albeit as a limited estate, would blossom into
a full interest by reason of Sub-section (1) of Section 14
of the Act.
F
Learned Counsel further contended that there is no
absolute rule that all properties demised to a female Hindu
were necessarily in recognition of or in lieu of her right to l
maintenance. It was possible, even after the Act came
into force, to create a limited estate by reason of a gift or
G
will. Such a situation would fall within the ambit of Sub-
section (2) of Section 14 of the Act as long as it was not
I-
in recognition of or in lieu of a right to maintenance under ,--

the Shastric Hindu Law or under a statute. Learned Senior
9ounsel-relied on Section 30 of the Act, which recognises
H
I
G. RAMA v. T.G. SESHAGIRI RAO (D) BY 163
LRS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]
)

the right of a Hindu to dispose of self-acquired property by A
Will. Mr. Gupta relied on the judgment of this Court in
Bhura and Ors. v. Kashi Ram (1994 (2) SCC 111) which
was also a case of limited estate conferred on a female
Hindu by a Will. This Court held that, upon a proper
construction of the Will, the bequeathal in favour of the · 8
female Hindu was clearly indicative of:

... the testator's intention of only creating a life interest
in her and nothing more and the various expressions
used therein are indicative of and are reconcilable
only with the hypothesis that the testator was creating c
an estate in favour of ... (the female Hindu) ... only for
her lifetime and not an absolute estate. [(1994)2 sec
111]
f
-f Thus, in view of the fact that there were no indications,
D
either in the Will or externally, to indicate that the propert~
had been given to the female Hindu in recognition of or in
lieu of her right to maintenance, it was held that the situation
fall within the ambit of Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of th~
Act and that the restricted life estate granted to the female
Hindu could not be enlarged into an absolute estate. E
Learned Counsel for the respondents relied strongly on
this judgment and contended that there was no proposition
of law that all dispositions of property made to a female
-.L
Hindu were necessarily in recognition of _her right to
maintenance whether under the Shastric Hindu Law ot F
under the statutory law. Unless the said fact was
independently established to the satisfaction of the court,
the grant of the property would be subject to the restrictions,
contained therein, either by way of a transfer, gift or
testamentary disposition. Learned Counsel also G
-)., distinguished the three cases cited by the learned Counsel
for·the appellant that in each, the circumstances clearly
indicated that the testamentary disposition was in lieu of
the right of maintenance of the female Hindu. We think
that this contention is well merited and needs to be upheld." ,H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 10 S.C.R. r \

A 21. in Eramma v. Verrupanna and Ors. [1966 (2) SCR r
!
626] it was observed by this Court that mere possession does
not automatically attract Section 14 of the Act.
22. As noted above, no issue was framed and also no
evidence was led to substantiate the plea that the appellant was
8 occupying the premises in lieu of maintenance. In view of this
factual position and the proposition of law referred to above,
inevitable conclusion is that the appeal is without merit, deserves
dismissal, whic;;h we direct. No costs.
D.G. Appeal dismissed.