G. PARSHWANATHversusSTATE OF KARNATAKA

                [2010] 10 S.C.R. 377


                   G. PARSHWANATH                            A
                            V.
                 STATE OF KARNATAKA
            (Criminal Appeal No. 628 of 2005)
                   AUGUST 18, 2010
                                                             B
    [HARJIT SINGH BEDI AND J.M. PANCHAL, JJ.]

     Penal Code, 1860 - ss.302 and 201 - Punishment for
murder and for causing disappearance of evidence -
Prosecution case rested on circumstantial evidence - C
Charred bodies of accused's wife and minor son recovered
from the house of accused - Accused suspected the
character of his wife and that he had not fathered the child -
Accused's mother-in-law testified that the accused subjected
his wife to cruelty - Door of the accused's house was found o
locked from outside - Kerosene was found present on the
dead bodies- Trial courl convicted the accused u/ss.302 and
201 and sentenced him to life imprisonment - Conviction
affirmed by High Coult - On appeal, held: The prosecution
sufficiently proved that the deaths were homicidal -More than E
one and totally inconsistent defences were taken by the
accused - The suicide theory put forlh by the defence is not
only improbable but also impossible - The accused had
sufficient motive to kill his wife and the child - The chain of
circumstances against the accused when viewed with the false
explanation given by him, with reference to the incident in F
question, makes it clear that the accused was the only person
responsible for murders of the two deceased - Conviction
upheld.                                         ·

    Evidence - Circumstantial evidence - Appreciation of -   G
Law discussed.

    The wife and the minor son of the appellant died of
extensive burn injuries. Placing reliance upon the
                         377                                 H
    378      SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2010] 10 S.C.R.

A circumstantial evidence in the facts and circumstances
  of the case, the Sessions Judge convicted the appellant
  under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and sentenced him to
  life imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed by the
  High Court.
B     In the instant appeal, the appellant challenged his
  conviction stating that the circumstances on which the
  prosecution proposed to rely were not firmly established
  nor did they form a chain to indicate that it was the
  appellant and appellant alone who had committed
C murders of the two deceased.

          Dismissing the appeal, the Court

       HELD:1. The evidence tendered in a court of law is
D either direct or circumstantial. Evidence is said to be
  direct if it consists of an eye-witness account of the facts
  in issue in a criminal case. On the other hand,
  circumstantial evidence is evidence of relevant facts from
  which, one can, by process of intuitive reasoning, infer
  about the existence of facts in issue or factum
E probandum. In cases where evidence is of a
  circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the
  conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should, in the first
  instance, be fully established. Each fact sought to be
  relied upon must be proved individually. However, in
F applying this principle a distinction must be made
  between facts called primary or basic on the one hand
  and inference of facts to be drawn from them on the other. ·
  In regard to proof of primary facts, the court has to judge
  the evidence and decide whether that evidence proves
G a particular fact and if that fact is 1>roved, the question
  whether that fact leads to an inference of guilt of the
  accused person should be considered. In deciding the
  sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence for the purpose

H
   G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA               379


of conviction, the court has to consider the total            A
cumulative effect of all the proved facts, each one of
which reinforces the conclusion of guilt and if the
combined effect of all these facts taken together is
conclusive in establishing the guilt of the accused, the
conviction would be justified even though it may be that      B
one or more of these facts by itself or themselves is/are
not decisive. The facts established should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and
should exclude every hypothesis except the one sought
to be proved. But this does not mean that before the          c
prosecution can succeed in a case resting upon
circumstantial evidence alone, it must exclude each and
every hypothesis suggested by the accused, howsoever,
extravagant and fanciful it might be. There must be a chain
of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable        0
ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence
of the accused and m.ust show that in all human
probability the act must ti.ave been done by the accused;
where various links in chcliin are in themselves complete,
then the false plea or false defence may be called into aid
only to lend assurance to the court. [Para 11] [394-H; 395-   E
A-H; 396-A-C]

     2.1. The first circumstance relied upon by the
prosecution is that both the deceased were residing with
the appellant and that the incident in question took place F
in the house of the appellant. The fact that the incident in
question has taken place in the house of the appellant is
not disputed by the appellant and this fact, also stands
firmly proved by the evidence of PW-12 (the mother of the
deceased) as well as by other evidence on the record. G
[Para 13] (396-E-G]

    2.2.The second circumstance relied upon by the
prosecution is that the wife of the appellant had
telephoned her parents on the date of the incident and H
    380     SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [20.10] 10 S.C.R


A   complained about harassment meted out to her by the
    appellant. The record of the case shows that PW-12, the
    mother of the deceased, was searchingly cross-examined
    at length by the defence on different dates; however, the
    assertion made by her that on the day of incident at about
B   11.00 A.M. the deceased had reported cruelty meted out
    to her over the telephone to her father, could not be
    demolished at all. PW12 further stated that again at about
    1.00 P.M., she herself had telephoned her daughter and
    as soon as the receiver was picked up by her daughter
c   the door bell of the house of the deceased rang and,
    therefore, the deceased had put down the receiver saying
    that her husband had come and that she would telephone
    her, i.e., PW-12 at 2.00 P.M. The evidence of PW-12
    establishes beyond shadow of doubt that at about 1.00
    P.M. the appellant had visited his house and left the same
0
    and subsequently at about 2.00 P.M. a person had
    telephoned the parents of the deceased informing them
    about the death of the appellant's wife and her child at
    the residence of the appellant. Her evidence also makes
E   clear that the incident in question had taken place
    between 1.00 P.M and 2.00 P.M. [Para 14) [396-H; 397-A-
    E; 398-8-D]
        2.3. The third circumstance relied upon by the
  prosecution is that the appellant who had visited his
F house at about 1.00 P.M. had left the same and come back
  when the fire fighters were extinguishing the fire.
  According to the appellant himself, he had left his house
  in order to give instructions to the shopkeeper, at whose
  shop he had given a refrigerator for repair. It is neither
G the case of the appellant nor there is evidence to show
  that any other person had visited his house between 1.00
  P.M. to 2.00 P.M. Therefore, the only reasonable inference
  that can be drawn would be that after the appellant had
  left the house, no other person had entered the house of
H the appellant. PW-4, fireman in the fire brigade, was asked
   G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA             381


a crucial question as to wherefrom the door of the house A
was closed. In reply, it was stated by him that he was not.
able to say whether the door was bolted from inside or
locked from outside. However, in his statement recorded
under Section 161 CrPC, he had stated that the door was
locked from outside and, therefore, it was broken. As he B
tried to plead ignorance about the fact whether door was
bolted from inside or locked from outside, he was treated
as hostile to the prosecution. However, it is settled law
that just because a witness turns hostile his entire
evidence need not be rejected by court. The trial court, c
which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of
PW4, relied upon his testimony for the purpose of coming.
to the conclusion that the main door of the house of the
appellant was locked from outside. This finding has been
approved by the High Court on re-appreciation of the D
entire evidence. The appellant could have been the only
person who could have locked his house from outside.
This circumstance was put to the appellant when his
statement under Section 313 CrPC was recorded. But no
explanation worth the name could be offered by him as
to how the door of the house was found locked from
                                                            E
outside. In addition, in the proceedings initiated under
Section 174 CrPC at the instance of the appellant, he had
mentioned that he had locked the door from outside
while going out to bring the repaired refrigerator. On the
facts and in the circumstance of the case, this finding F
recorded by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court
 deserves to be accepted by this Court. Once the
conclusion is reached that the door was locked from
 outside, unpleasant inference would have to be drawn
that the door was locked only with the intention to see G
that the deceased, who were set on fire, were not able to
come out from the house nor any outsider was in a
position to enter the house and make attempt to rescue
the deceased. [Para 15] [398-D-H; 399-A-H]
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    382    SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2010] 10 S.C.R.

A      2.4. The fourth circumstance relied upon by the
  prosecution is that kerosene was found by the Doctor
  who had conducted autopsy on the two dead bodies. The
  evidence of the Doctor (PW-21) makes it clear that he had
  found presence of kerosene on both the dead bodies.
B Though the Doctor could not give a clear opinion as to
  whether the death was homicidal or suicidal, but the fact
  that presence of Kerosene was found on the dead bodies
  stands amply proved by the evidence of PW-21. [Para 16)
  (399-H; 400-A-B]
c      2.5. Another circumstance sought to be relied upon
  by the prosecution is that the deceased wife was alive and
  conscious when she was set on fire and it was not
  probablized by the appellant that when the house caught
  fire the deceased inhaled carbon monoxide due to which
D the deceased had died and subsequently they were burnt
  in the fire which had engulfed the house. The post-
  mortem reports of the deceased revealed important
  features regarding the position of the dead bodies and the
  extent of burns and make it clear that both the deceased
E were alive when they had received the burn injuries and,
  therefore, the trial court as well as the High Court were
  justified in rejecting the contention of the appellant that
  both the deceased had received burn injuries after they
  were already dead. [Paras 17, 19) (400-C-D; 405-E-F]
F
        Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology by H.W.V. Cox
  and Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology by Modi - referred
  to.
      2.6. The sixth circumstance on which the prosecution
G has relied upon is that the deaths were homicidal and not
  suicidal. The fact that the wife and son of the appellant
  had died of extensive burn injuries stands amply proved
  even otherwise by the contents of the post-mortem
  reports produced coupled with the evidence of the
H Doctor who had conducted autopsy on the dead bodies.
   G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                383


The evidence of fire brigade personnel i.e. PW-4 and PW-      A
5 who were the first to enter the house and the
photographer PW-14 clearly establishes that both the
deceased had died unnatural death due to excessive
burn injuries. On perusal of the photographs produced
on the record of the case, it is clear that the dead bodies   B
were found lying inside a rpom next to eactl other. The
scene of offence sketched clearly indicates that the
house of the appellant is a big one, having a large
courtyard behind the living rooms etc. If the deceased
had tried to commit suicide after setting herself on fire     c
she could not have slept peacefully on the floor as is
indicated in the photograph because of the intensive
heat. Further, the burning process would make her run
around and not only in the room but in the entire house.
However, the photograph Exhibit P-24 clearly indicates
                                                              0
otherwise. The trial court and the High Court have rightly
held that the suicide theory put forth by the defence is
not only improbable but also impossible. [Paras 20, 21]
[405-G-H; 406-A-G]

     3. In a case when the motive alleged against             E
accused is fully established, it provides foundational
material to connect the chain of circumstances. However,
in a case based on circumstantial evidence where proved
circumstances complete the chain of evidence, it cannot
be said that in absence of motive, the other proved           F
circumstances are of no consequence. The absence of
motive, however, puts tile court on its guard to scrutinize
the circumstances more carefully to ensure. that
suspicion and conjecture do not take place of legal proof.
In the instant case, on the question of motive which          G
prompted the appellant to commit the crime in question,
the prosecution has alleged that the appellant had a
dislike for his deceased wife as he was su~pecting that
he had not fathered the child and he was contemplating
to marry another girl. The finding recorded by the High       H
    384     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              (2010] 10 S.C.R.


A   Court that from a letter relied upon by the defence i.e.
    Exhibit D-2 it transpires that the appellant was harassing
    the deceased and treating her with cruelty because he
    was desirous of marrying some other girl cannot be
    ignored. The contents of other letters produced by the
B   defence indicate that there was definitely something
    wrong between the appellant and his wife. They also
    indicate that the appellant was suspecting the character
    of the deceased and definitely causing mental cruelty to
    her. This constitutes sufficient motive on the part of the
c   appellant to kill his wife and child. The appellant had··
    initiated divorce proceedings against deceased. Those
    proceedings were dismissed for default. PW-17 claimed
    that the appellant's wife used to write letters to her stating
    that the appellant was subjecting her to ill-treatment
    saying that the child was not born through him. Her
0
    testimony would indicate that she had given reply to the
    letter of appellant's wife and one such reply was
    produced as Exh. P-25. Though this witness was also
    cross-examined searchingly, nothing could be brought
    on record to impeach her credibility. The evidence of PW-
E   17 also establishes the motive on the part of the appellant
    for commission of crime in question. [Para 22] [407-B-H;
    408-A-G]

       4.1. If all the circumstances of the instant case are
F taken together coupled with the absence of any material
  to indicate that the appellant's wife had committed
  suicide with the child, they lead to only one inference that
  in all human probability the murders of the deceased
  were committed by the appellant alone and none else.
G From the evidence of PW-3 ASI, it is clear that the
  appellant, knowing fully well that he had committed
  murders of his wife and child. gave false opinion to the
  police on the basis of which UDR proceedings were
  initiated. By examining the refrigerator repairer, it was
H sought to be suggested by the appellant that he was not
   G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                 385

present in his house when the incident had taken place.         A
Thus, the defence of the appellant was that a fire had
taken place in his house and both the deceased had died
because of inhaling of carbon monoxide after which their
bodies were burnt lJecause the house was engulfed in
fire. However, at another stage the defence of the              B
appellant was that his deceased wife with his child had
committed suicide because· her parents . were
pressurizing her to leave matrimonial home for their
selfish purpose of having income of the deceased.
Whereas, the deceased was not inclined to leave her             c
matrimonial home. Thus, more than one and totally
inconsistent defences have been taken by the appellant.
All the defences were false to the knowledge of the
appellant. Not a single defence was found to be probable
or plausible either by the trial court or by the High Court.·   0
The appellant could not explain satisfactorily the
circumstances in which his wife and child met violent
deaths. Therefore, offering of false explanation by the
appellant regarding death of his wife and child will have
to be regarded as an additional circumstance against him
strengthening the chain of circumstances already firmly         E
found. [Para 23] [408-G-H; 409-A-F]

     4.2. The evidence on record has been rightly
appreciated by the trial court and the High Court. On
appreciation of the evidence, the appellant is found guilty.    F
Neither the reasons given by the trial court nor given by
the High Court can be termed as perverse so as to call
for interference of this Court. [Para 24] [409-G-H]

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal           G
No. 628 of 2005.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 17.12.2004 of the High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No. 14247
of 2003.
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    386      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A      J.S. Attri, Dr. N.N. Ghatate, Rajesh Mahale, A. Rohan
  Singh, Aditya, Sanjay R. Hegde, Avijit Roy, Keshav Roy
  Choudhary (for Corporate Law Group), Gopal Singh, Chandan
  Kumar, Niraj Jha, D.K. Thakur, Subhash Kaushik, Anil Katiyar,
  Anis Suhrawardy, S. Mehdi Imam, Mohd. P. Dabas, T. Ahmed,
B G. Prakash, B. Anand, P.V. Dinesh, M.P. Singh, C.D. Singh,
  K.H. Nobin Singh, Kuldip Singh, K.K. Pandey, Aruna Mathur,
  Amarjeet Singh, S. Thanajayan, Promila, Harish Kr., R.
  Nedumaran, V.G. Pragasam, S.J. Aristotle, P.
  Ramasubramanin, Rituraj Biswas, T.C. Sharma, Neelam
c Sharma, A.P. Mayee, Asha G. Nair, Kamini Jaiswal, Atul Jha,
  D.K. Sinha, Milind Kr., R. Gopalakrishnan, Aruneshwar Gupta,
  Ranjan Mukherjee, Gopal Prasad, Ratan K. Chaudhary, Abhay
  Prakash Sahay, J. K. Bhatia, D. Bharathi Reddy, A.
  Subhashini, H. Wahi, K. N. Gupta, Naresh K. Sharma, Himinder
D Lal, Prashant, J.R. Das, G.V. Rao, Kamlendra Mishra, Praveen
  Swarup, D.S. Mehra, P.V. Dinesh, Ramesh Babu M.R.,
  Subramonium Prasad, C.D. Singh, Vibha Datta Makhija, Atul
  Jha, Dharmendra Kumar Sinha, Manish Kumar Saran for the
  appearing parties.

E         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          J.M. PANCHAL, J. 1. The instant appeal questions legality
 . of judgment dated December 17, 2004, rendered by High Court
   of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No. 1427 of
F 2003 by which judgment dated September 1, 2003 delivered
   by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Bellary in S.C. No.
   91/93 convicting the appellant under Sections 302 and 201 IPC
   and sentencing him to undergo RI for life and fine of Rs.5,000/
   - in default RI for six months for commission of offence
G punishable under Section 302 IPC as well as RI for one year
   and fine of Rs.2,000/- in default RI for two months for
   commission of offence punishable under Section 201 IPC, is
   confirmed.

     2. The facts emerging from the record of the case are as
H under:-
    G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                     387
              [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
         Deceased Chethana was daughter of Jwalnaiah and Smt.        A
  Radhamma. The parents of the deceased were residents of
  Bangalore. Marriage of deceased Chethana took place with t; 1tl
  appellant in the year 1987. After marriage the deceased started
  residing at Bellary because the appellant and his family were
  residents of Bellary. In the year 1988 the deceased gave birth     B
  to a male child, who was named Mahaveer. Initially the relations
  between the appellant and the deceased were cordial, but, after
  sometime bickering started taking place between the two of
  them. As the days passed by, this bickering grew into
  discordiality resulting in the harassment and cruelty to the       c
  deceased by the appellant. The deceased used to complain
  about harassment and cruelty meted out to her, to her father,
  mother and sister when she had occasion to meet them. The
  deceased Chethana had mentioned before her sister Ranjana
  Jain that the appellant was treating her cruelly and was           D
  harassing her because he was having a doubt that the male
  child was not born through him and that the appellant was having
  illicit relationship with one girl named Asha of Bangalore. The
  harassment meted out to the deceased reached such a peak
  that one day the deceased had to call her parents to Bellaiy       E
  and the parents had to take help ofpolice to take back the
  deceased to their house at Bangalore. Obviously, the appellant
. was annoyed and, therefore, lite appellant filed a petition for
  divorce. During the time when thedeceased was staying with
   her parents at Bangalore and when the divorce petition was
  pending, efforts were made to settle the disputes between          F
   husband and wife amicably. The result of those efforts was that
  the appellant had withdrawn the divorce petition whereas the
  deceased had started living with the appellant at Bellary. On
  the surface, the differences appeared to have cooled down for
  some time but nevertheless ill treatment of the deceased. by the   G
  appellant and ill feelings between the appellant and his family
  on one hand and the deceased on the other continued.

      On May 13, 1993 around 1.45 P.M. the neighbours of the
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   388      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010) 10 S.C.R.


A appellant noticed smoke and fumes emitting from the house of
  the appellant, which was situated at Ganesh Temple Street,
  Bellary. One of the neighbours summoned fire brigade service
  and also informed police. Papaiah and Neelakanat, who were
  then fire brigade officials, rushed to the house along with their
B team. They had to break open the front door of the house. When
  they entered the house, they noticed two completely burnt and
  charred bodies of a woman and child in one of the rooms. They
  found that the appellant was not present in the house. They also
  noticed that the appellant had come back to his house only after
c the information about the fire having taken place in his house
  was conveyed to him.

       On receiving a phone call in the police station, ASI on duty
  went to the spot and made enquiry with the appellant, who by
  that time had come back to his house. On the basis of the
D statement made by the appellant the ASI registered a case as
  UDR No. 9/93 and sent requisition to the Executive Magistrate
  to draw inquest proceedings. Accordingly Mr. Mahmood, who
  was Taluka Executive Magistrate, went to the spot and held
  inquest on the dead bodies of the two deceased. When the
E inquest proceedings were being held, the father of the
  deceased, i.e., Jwalnaiah arrived at the scene along with Smt.
  Jayashanti, who was one of the neighbours of the appellant. The
  statements of the father of the deceased and Smt. Jayashanti
  were recorded and photographs of the dead bodies were
F taken. The dead bodies were, thereafter, sent for post mortem
  examination.

       When the Executive Magistrate was holding inquest
  proceedings, he suspected that the deaths of the two deceased
  were unnatural ahd seemed more to be a case of their murder.
G Therefore, he sent intimation to the ASI. On receipt of the
  intimation the ASI registered a case as Crime No. 121/93 for
  the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 IPC
  against the appellant alone. After registration of the FIR, the
  same was sent to the jurisdictional Magistrate as well as to the
H
   G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                      389
             [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

higher officials. Because of the gravity of the incident and         A
offences involved, the investigation was taken over by
Somashekar, who was then Inspector of Police. The Police
Inspector recorded statements of the neighbours, close relatives
and others, who were found to be conversant with the facts of
the case. The Police Inspector suspected that the appellant was      B
responsible for the murders of the deceased and, therefore, he
arrested the appellant at about 8.00 P.M. Necessary mahazars
were drawn and certain incriminating articles as well as
documents were seized. During the investigation, it transpired
that over and above the complicity of the appellant in two           C
murders, Radhabai, who was mother of the appellant and
Jaishree, who was sister of the appellant, were also involved
in the murders of the deceased. Therefore, they were also
arrested. On conclusion of investigation the appellant, his
mother and his sister were charge-sheeted in the court of            o
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bellary for commission of
offences punishable under Sections 498A, 302 and 201 IPC.

      3. After the case was committed to the Court of learned
Sessions Judge, Bellary for trial, necessary charges were
framed against the appellant, his mother and his sister. The         E
charges were read over and explained to them. They pleaded
not guilty to the same and clailnad to be tried. Therefore, the
prosecution examined 32 witnesses and produced certain
documents in support of their case against the three accused.
After recording of evidence of prosecution witnesses was over,       F
the learned Judge explained to the three accused the
circumstances appearing against them in the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses and recorded their further statements as
required by Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The
appellant filed a detailed written statement inter alia mentioning   G
that his father-in-law, who was a former MLA and influential
person, had falsely implicated him and his family. It was stated
by the appellant that his father-in-law had neither regular income
nor properties except one house, which was given by him on
rent to tenants, who were paying meager rent of Rs.1,500/- per       H
    390     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 10 S.C.R.

\   month and thus he was totally dependant upon the income of
    his daughter ....; deceased Chethana - who was working as
    computer engineer at Bangalore before her marriage and
    supporting the family. What was claimed by the appellant was
    that because of financial crunch from which his father-in-law
B was suffering, his father-in-law was insisting the appellant to
    come and stay at Bangalore with him as a "Ghar-Jamai", which
    was opposed by the appellant and since then his father-in-law
    was nurturing a grudge against him. According to the appellant,
    he was a man of an independent nature and had more
c responsibilities towards his family. According to him, he had
    the responsibility of running the school established by his family
    and, in such circumstances, he had refused to accept the offer
    of his father-in-law and decided to stay at Bellary only. It was
    mentioned by the appellant that feeling let down, his father-in-
D law had started pressurizing the deceased to desert the
  . appellant and come back and stay with him at Bangalore and
    to continue her computer career. The appellant had claimed in
    his written statement that after the first Deepawali the deceased
    was forcibly taken from Bellary to Bangalore by his father-in-
E law with the help of police. It was further stated that when the
    deceased was pregnant and had delivered the first child, the
    appellant had requested his father-in-law and mother-in-law to
    send the deceased to Bellary to enable him and his family to
    perform some religious ceremonies, but his father-in-law had
    refused to send the deceased and when he had gone to bring
F his wife to Bellary, an attempt was made by his father-in-law to
    assault him through his son. It was also mentioned in the written
    statement that after the delivery of child Mahaveer, the
    deceased with the child had come back to Bellary and was
    living happily with him, but, again her parents had taken away
G her with the child forcibly and that is why he had to file a divorce
    petition on the ground of desertion by his wife with a fond hope
    that his wife and child would be sent back. According to him,
    he was never serious about the divorce and that is why he had
    not taken any further steps to pursue the petition and that is why
H the divorce petition was dismissed for non-prosecution. What
    G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                     391
                   [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

was stated by the appellant was that when the divorce                A
proceedings were pending, his wife, i.e., the deceased used
to write love letters to him .and no complaints were made in
those letters about the so-called harassment and cruelty by him
to her. It was asserted that due to decline in the income of his
father-in-law, the parents of the deceased were pestering the        B
deceased to stay with them whereas the deceased was inclined
to stay with the appellant and, therefore, out of frustration the
deceased with minor son Mahaveer committed suicide. The
explanation offered in his written statement further proceeded
to state that on May 13, 1993, he was at home till 1.00 P.M.         c
and as it was a summer holiday for the schools run by him and
the deceased was insisting to get the refrigerator back from
the repair shop, he had gone to the shop of Sattar Hussein at
whose shop the refrigerator was sent for repairs and informed
Sattar Hussein that the refrigerator should be sent to his home      D
immediately. It was mentioned by him that thereafter he had
proceeded to his school where someone had informed about
the fire having taken place in his house and, therefore, he had
rushed back on his motorcycle and found that his wife and son
were dead. According to him, the PSI had arrested him, taken         E
his signatures on blank paper and after deliberations with his
father-in-law, concocted the present case falsely not only against
 him but also against his mother and sister, who were totally
innocent and this was done only with a view to harassing him
 and seeking vengeance. In his written statement the appellant       F
 had made attempt to point out certain discrepancies appearing
in the investigation and had ultimately prayed to acquit him of
 all the charges.

     4. It may be mentioned that though the appellant had
submitted a detailed written statement, he had not examined          G
any witness in support of his case pleaded in the written
statement. During the trial the original accused No. 2, i.e., Smt
Radhabai, who was mother of the appellant, expired and,
therefore, the appellant and his sister Jaishree were tried by
the learned Sessions Judge.                                          H
    392      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A       5. On appreciation of the evidence adduced by the
  prosecution and certain documents brought on record by the
  appellant, the learned judge held that no case either against
  the appellant or his sister was made out by the prosecution
  under Section 498A IPC. The learned Judge thereafter
B proceeded to consider the question whether any case was
  made out against the appellant and his sister for commission
  of the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 IPC.
  The learned judge noticed that the case against the appellant
  and his sister was solely based or 1 circumstantial evidence and
c that no circumstances could be brought on record to suggest
  that the sister of the appellant was responsible for the death of
  the two deceased. However, the learned Judge came to the
  conclusion that case against the appellant for commission of
  offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 IPC was
D proved beyond pale of doubt and sentenced him as noticed
  earlier.

        6. Feeling aggrieved the appellant preferred appeal, which
    has been dismissed by the High Court, giving rise to the present
    appeal.
E
         7. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties
    at length and considered the documents forming part of the
    appeal.

        8. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
F appellant had left his house at about 1.00 P.M. to bring back a
  refrigerator, which was given for repair in the shop belonging
  to PW-15, who has spoken about the presence of the appellant
  in his shop at the relevant time and, therefore, the High Court
  erred in holding that the appellant had left his house at about
G 1.00 P.M. after committing murders of the deceased and had
  come back only after he was informed about the fire having
  taken place in his house. It was pointed out by the learned
  counsel for the appellant that the ASI PW-23 had recorded the
  statement of the appellant on the basis of which the said ASI
H had registered a case as UDR 9/93 under Section 174 of the
   G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                  393
             [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

Criminal Procedure Code regarding unnatural death of the two A
deceased and, therefore, the whole case built up against the
appellant on the basis of some suspicion shown by the
Tehsildar, should have been disbelieved by the High Court.
According to the learned counsel, the inquest report was a
suspicious document because as per the inquest report, which B
was prepared between 4.00 P.M. and 6.00 P.M. on May 13,
1993, when the inquest proceedings were being held, the father
of the deceased had come to the spot and identified the two
dead bodies, which was highly doubtful because the father-in-
law of the appellant, who was staying at Bangalore, was c
informed by one PT Master at about 2.00 P.M. that the
deceased were dead and distance between Bellary and
Bangalore being about 300 Kms., it was not possible for the
father of the deceased Chethana to be present at Bellary at the
time when inquest proceedings were held and, therefore, 0
inquest report should have been ignored by the High Court.
What was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant was
that in the inquest report the Tehsildar had recorded that there
were 100% burn injuries on the deceased and that her clothes
were also burnt and that there were no clothes on the dead body E
except a small piece of cloth, which was stuck between the
thighs and as Tehsildar had not noticed any other clothes on
the deceased, the suspicion entertained by the Tehsildar that
the case was of murder should not have been acted upon by
the police. The learned counsel pointed out the testimony of
doctor, examined as PW-31, who had conducted autopsy on F
the dead bodies of the deceased Chethana and Mahaveer and
contended that the report indicated at the best that the child had
died a homicidal death but as far as deceased Chethana was
concerned in the opinion of the doctor, he was not able to state
whether the death of Chethana was suicidal or homicidal and, G
therefore, the High Court erred in holding that it was proved by
the prosecution that the deceased Chethana and her son
Mahaveer had died homicidal deaths. What was highlighted
was that the trial court did not find any material against the
appellant for convicting him under Section 498A IPC whereas H
    394     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A   the sister of the appellant came to be acquitted of all the
    charges levelled against her and as evidence of prosecution
    witnesses is not reliable at all, the appellant should have been
    granted benefit of doubt to which he is entitled to. The learned
    counsel emphasized that the circumstances on which the
B   prosecution proposes to rely are not firmly established nor they
    form a chain to indicate that it was the appellant and appellant
    alone who had committed murders of the two deceased and,
    therefore, the appeal should be accepted.

         9. The learned counsel for the State argued that it was
C   sufficiently proved by the prosecution that death of the
    deceased Chethana and Mahaveer were homicidal deaths
    whereas motive and conduct of the appellant towards the
    deceased when they were alive is also proved and if the above
    mentioned circumstances are viewed with false explanation
D   given by the appellant with reference to the incident in question,
    it becomes at once clear that the appellant was the only person
    responsible for murders of the two deceased. The learned
    counsel emphasized that on appreciation of evidence the trial
    court has recorded conviction of the appellant under Sections
E   302 and 201 IPC, which finding on re-appreciation of the
    evidence has been confirmed by the High Court and, therefore,
    the concurrent findings of facts should not be interfered with by
    this Court while exercising powers under Article 136 of the
    Constitution.
F
       10. It is not in dispute that the case against the appellant
  rests on circumstantial evidence and, therefore, before
  adverting to the prosecution evidence against the appellant it
  would be advantageous to recall to the memory, law relating
G to appreciation of evidence in a case based on circumstantial
  evidence.

          11. The evidence tendered in a court of law is either direct
    or circumstantial. Evidence is said to be direct if it consists of
    an eye-witness account of the facts in issue in a criminal case.
H   On the other hand, circumstantial evidence is evidence of
   G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                       395
             [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

relevant facts from which, one can, by process of intuitive           A
reasoning, infer about the existence of facts in issue or factum
probandum. In dealing with circumstantial evidence there is
always a danger that conjecture or suspicion lingering on mind
may take place of proof. Suspicion, however, strong cannot be
allowed to take place of proof and, therefore, the Court has to       B
be watchful and ensure that conjectures and suspicions do not
take place of legal proof. However, it is not derogation of
evidence to say that it is circumstantial. Human agency may be
faulty in expressing picturisation of actual incident, but the
circumstances cannot fail. Therefore, many a times it is aptly        C
said that "men may tell lies, but circumstances do not". In cases
where evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances
from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should, in the
first instance, be fully established. Each fact sought to be relied
upon must be proved individually. However, in applying this           D
principle a distinction must be made between facts called
primary or basic on the one hand and inference of facts to be
drawn from them on the other. In regard to proof of primary
facts, the court has to judge the evidence and decide whether
that evidence proves a particular fact and if that fact is proved,    E
the question whether that fact leads to an inference of guilt of
the accused person should be considered. In dealing with this
aspect of the problem, the doctrine of benefit of doubt applies.
Although there should not be any missing links in the case, yet
it is not essential that each of the links must appear on the
                                                                      F
surface of the evidence adduced and some of these links may
have to be inferred from the proved facts. In drawing these
inferences, the court must have regard to the common course
of natural events and to human conduct and their relations to
the facts of the particular case. The Court thereafter has to
consider the effect of proved facts. In deciding the sufficiency      G
of the circumstantial evidence for the purpose of conviction, the
court has to consider the total cumulative effect of all the proved
facts, each one of which reinforces the conclusion of guilt and
if the combined effect of all these facts taken together is
conclusive in establishing the guilt of the accused, the conviction   H
    396      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A would be justified even though it may be that one or more of
  these facts by itself or themselves is/are not decisive. The facts
  established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the
  guilt of the accused and should exclude every hypothesis except
  the one sought to be proved. But this does net mean that before
B the prosecution can succeed in a case resting upon
  circumstantial evidence alone, it must exclude each and every
  hypothesis suggested by the accused, howsoever, extravagant
  and fanciful it might be. There must be a chain of evidence so
  complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the
C conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and
  must show that in all human probability the act must have been
  done by the accused, where various links in chain are in
  themselves complete, then the false plea or false defence may
  be called into aid only to lend assurance to the court.

D       12. Having noticed the principles governing the case
    based on the circumstantial evidence this Court proposes to
    consider the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution.

        13. The first circumstance relied upon by the prosecution
E is that both the deceased were residing with the appellant and
  that the incident in question had taken place in the house of
  the appellant. The fact that the incident in question had taken
  place in the house of the appellant is not disputed by the
  appellant. This fact also stands proved by the inquest
F panchnama prepared after holding inquest on the dead bodies
  of the deceased. The fact that incident in question had taken
  place in the house of the appellant also stands firmly proved
  by the evidence of PW-12 who is mother of the deceased as
  well as by other evidence on the record. Thus, it stands proved
G that at the time of the incident deceased with her child was
  residing with the appellant.

      14. The second circumstance relied upon by the
  prosecution is that deceased Chethana had telephoned her
  parents on the date of the incident and complained about
H harassment meted out to her by the appellant. It may be
    G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                   397
                   [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

mentioned that the contention of the appellant that Chethana
                                                                   A
had not telephoned her parents on the date of the incident is
not accepted either by the trial court or by the High Court. The
evidence of mother of the deceased is recorded as PW-12.
She has specifically stated that on the date of the incident her
daughter had phoned at her residence and receiver was picked       B
up by her husband, i.e., father of the deceased. It was asserted
by PW-12 that on telephone the deceased had recounted the
harassment to which she was subjected by the appellant. It was
the case of PW-12 that after narrating distress and persecution
the deceased had put down the receiver saying that she would       C
again telephone later on. According to this witness no phone
call from her daughter was received and, therefore, at about
 1.00 P.M. she herself had telephoned her daughter, which was
attended by her daughter at her residence. What was
mentioned by the witness was that as soon as the receiver was      D
picked up by her daughter the door bell of the house of the
deceased rang and, therefore, the deceased had put down the.
receiver on the cradle saying that her husband had come and
that she would telephone her, i.e., PW-12 at 2.00 P.M. The
record of the case shows that PW-12 was searchingly cross-         E
examined at length by the learned advocates for the defence
on different dates. Her cross-examination had begun on April
20, 1999 and concluded on June 3, 1999. However, the
assertion made by the witness that on the day of incident at
about 11.00 A.M. the deceased had reported cruelty meted out
                                                                   F
to her over the telephone to her father, could not be demolished
at all. Nor anything could be brought on record to doubt the
version given out by her. It is relevani to mention that the
appellant was son-in-law of PW-12. It was suggested by the
appellant himself to PW-12 that PW-12 had told Chethana over       G
telephone that Ranjana who is sister of the deceased and
examined as PW-1 in the case .would be coming to Bellary to
take the deceased to Bangalore. It was also suggested that
since Chethana was not willing to go to Bangalore she had told
PW-12 over telephone that PW-1 should not come to her
residence to take her to Bangalore. These suggestions indicate     H
    398     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A that indirectly it was admitted by the appellant that there was a
  conversation between the deceased Chethana and her mother
  over telephone from the house of the appellant on the date of
  the incident. The claim .made by this witness that she had
  telephoned her deceased daughter at about 1.00 P.M. but as
B soon as the conversation began, the deceased had put down
  the receiver saying that her husband had come was not
  challenged at all during her cross-examination. Thus her
  evidence establishes beyond shadow of doubt that at about
  1.00 P.M. the appellant had visited his house and left the same
c and subsequently at about 2.00 P.M. one Mr. P.T. Master had
  telephoned the parents of the deceased informing them about
  the death of Chethana and her child at the residence of the
  appellant. Her evidence also makes clear that the incident in
  question had taken place between 1.00 P.M and 2.00 P.M.
D      15. The third circumstance relied upon by the prosecution
  is that the appellant who had visited his house at about 1.00
  P.M. had left the same and come back when the fire fighters
  were extinguishing the fire. As mentioned above, the appellant
  had visited his house at about 1 P.M. According to the
E appellant himself, he had left his house in order to give
  instructions to the shopkeeper Sattar Hussain, at whose shop
  the refrigerator was given for repair. It is neither the case of the
  appellant nor there is evidence to show that any other person
  had visited his house between 1.00 P.M. to 2.00 P.M.
F Therefore, the only reasonable inference that can be drawn
  would be that after the appellant had left the house, no other
  person had entered the house of the appellant.

       PW-4 Papaiah, fireman in the fire brigade was asked a
G crucial question as to where from the door of the house was
  closed. In reply, it was stated by him that he was not able to
  say whether the door was bolted from inside or locked from
  outside. In his police statement recorded under Section 161 of
  the Code, he had stated that the door was locked from outside
  and, therefore, it was broken. As he tried to plead ignorance
H about the fact whether door was bolted from inside or locked
    G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                       399
                    [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]

from outside, he was treated as hostile to the prosecution. It is     A
settled law that just because a witness turns hostile his entire
evidence need not be rejected by Court. The cross-examination
of this witness by the prosecution shows that he had admitted
that in his statement before the police, it was stated by him that
the door was locked from outside. The learned Judge of the            B
trial court who had the advantage of observing demeanour of
the witnesses relied upon testimony of this witness for the
purpose of coming to the conclusion that the main door of the
house of the appellant was locked from outside. This finding
has been approved by the High Court on re-appreciation of the         c
entire evidence. As discussed earlier, the appellant had visited
his house at 1.00 P .M, and left the same to give some
 instructions to the shopkeeper for repair of the refrigerator.
Thus, the appellant could have been the only person who could
have locked his house from outside. This circumstance was put
                                                                      D
to the appellant when his statement under Section 313 of the
Criminal Procedure Code was recorded. But no explanation
worth the name could be offered by him as to how the door of
the house was found locked from outside. In addition to this
 admittedly UDR proceedings initiated on the statement of the
 appellant have been produced on the record of the case. Those
                                                                      E
 proceedings indicate that the proceedings under Section 174
 of the Criminal Procedure Code were initiated at the instance
 of the appellant and the appellant had mentioned therein that
 he had locked the door from outside while going out to bring
 the repaired refrigerator. On the facts and in the circumstance      F
 of the case, this finding recorded by the trial court and affirmed
 by the High Court deserves to be accepted by this Court. Once
 the conclusion is reached that the door was locked from outside
 unpleasant inference would have to be drawn that the door was
 locked only with the intention to see that the deceased, who         G
were set on fire, were not able to come out from the house nor
any outsider was in a position to enter the house and make
attempt to rescue the deceased.

     16. The fourth circumstance relied upon by the prosecution       H
    400       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A   is that kerosene was found by the Doctor who had conducted
    autopsy on the two dead bodies. The evidence of Dr.
    Ravichandran PW-21 makes it clear that he had found
    presence of kerosene on both the dead bodies. The opinion
    of this Doctor had been sought as to whether the death was
8   homicidal or suicidal but the Doctor could not give clear
    opinion. However, the fact that presence of Kerosene was
    found on the dead bodies stands amply proved by the evidence
    of PW-21.

       17. The another circumstance sought to be relied upon by
C the prosecution is that the deceased wife was alive and
  conscious when she was set on fire and it was not probablized
  by the appellant that when the house caught fire the deceased
  inhaled carbon monoxide due to which the deceased had died
  and subsequently they were burnt in the fire which had engulfed
D the house. The post-mortem report of deceased Chethana
  shows the following important features -

          "Body is in a pugilistic attitude, (ii) smell of Kerosene
          emanating from the body, (iii) swollen tongue protruding
E
          out of the mouth. (iii) blood stained find oozing from
          nostrils, (iv) head hair is almost singed over the left half of
          the head and some short hair is left over the right half of
          the head and back, (v) heat ruptures over the abdomen
          at places have exposed the peritoneum, (vi) skull,
          vertebrae and brain congested, (vii) larynx & trachea
F         congested with presence of soot, (viii) pericardium & heart
          contains current jelly blood clot, (ix) Large contains bright
          red blood (x) Peritoneum congested. (xi) stomach is
          empty, (xii) Liver is congested, (xiii) ~th degree burn
          present on face, back of trunk and lower half of left leg
G         whereas 5th degree burn on the trunk and limbs."

  It is also important to note here the statement of Taluka
  Magistrate made on 15.5.1993 wherein he had categorically
  stated that "at the time of investigation, and from the
H circumstances of the spot and from the report of the medical
    G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                     401
                   [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
                                                                     A
examination of the bodies, it is revealed that both the deceased
were made to stop breathing and thereafter, kerosene was
poured on them and they were burnt."

    The post-mortem report of deceased child Mahaveer
reveals the following important features-                            B

    A. i) Body is in a pugilistic attitude, (ii) smell of kerosene
    emanating from the body, (iii) intestine protruding out, (iii)
    heat ruptures present over the trunk and limbs, (iv) head
    hair is almost singed, (v) skull, vertebrae and brain            C
    congested (vii) larynx & trachea congested with presence
    of soot, (viii) pericardium & heart contains current jelly
    blood clot, (ix) Large contains bright red blood (x)
    Peritoneum congested, (xi) stomach is empty, (xii) Liver
    is congested, (xiii) 5th degree burn present on body
                                                                     0
    except on back of trunk whereas 6th degree burn on both
    the knees, wrist & right ankle.

     B. Opinion in post mortem regarding death of Mahaveer
     is;- " ... burns are homicidal in nature, precipitated by
     Kerosene"                                                       E

In the report made under Section 174 Criminal Procedure Code
following facts were noticed regarding position of the dead
bodies, extent of burns and materials recovered from the
scene of incident -
                                                                     F
     "(i) Re' position of bodies:-

     Dead bodies were found in dressing room (first room).
     Child's head was resting towards Chethana. Head of the
     body was resting on half filled wheat bag. Fingers of the       G
     body was burnt.

    (ii) Re' Extent of burn in the room:-

     The investigation report shows that the northern, eastern
     and southern side of the room had the impact of flames.         H
    402       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A         The bodies were found near the southern side of room.
          Western side of the room did not have any impact. An iron
          bucket and steel mug were found near the bodies, which
          were smelling of kerosene oil.

          (iii) Re' items seized during investigation:-
B
          Apart from other things a bucket and mug smelling of
          kerosene, a used matchstick found near the main door
          of house, door planks, near the main door'outside, a brass
          and steel door latch on which the words Phillips/Lever is
c         written and appeared to have been broken by pressure."

          18. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to Medical
    Jurisprudence and Toxicology by H.W.V. Cox wherein burns
    inflicted before or after death is dealt with at Page 322. The
0   learned author has made following pertinent comments on the
    said page -

          "Were the Burns inflicted before or after Death? - This
          primary decision is of great forensic importance, because
          of the possibility of the disposal of a criminal death in a
E         fire. The differentiation between antemortem and post-
          mortem burns must be attempted in every examination of
          a fatal burning. Although this may be difficult or even
          impossible in some cases, it must be uppermost in the
          mind of the medical examiner.
F
                 The most important criterion is the presence or
          absence of a vital reaction at the margin of the burns.
          Where part of the body surface is burnt during life, there
          will almost inevitably be a zone of hyperemia at the edge
G         of the burn area, except when death follows very soon
          afterwards. While the person is still alive, there may be
          reddening of the skin even beyond this zone, but this may
          fade after death leaving only the marginal zone of erythema
          at the edge of the burn. This may vary in width but is usually
          a centimetre or so unless death supervened very soon. It
H
G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                     403
               [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
is due to oedema of the tissues and capillary dilatation and     A
merges with the edge of the burn which may show
blistering or charring. Unfortunately, where death occurs
very rapidly (within a few moments) then the erythematous
margin of an ante-mortem burn may be indistinct or even
absent. However, wherever survival persists for more than        B
a few moments it is almost invariably found.

The presence of a vital reaction is absolute proof that the
person was alive during the fire as this cannot be
simulated in a post-mortem burn. Blistering and reddening        C
of the actual burned area can occur in a post-mortem burn
but not the peripheral zone of vital reaction.

       Difficulty arises where the body is completely
covered with burns so that no unburnt skin remains to
display a vital reaction. Where the body is actually charred     D
or incinerated then naturally this aspect of determining the
time of the burn is impossible."

 "The next important matter is the presence of carbon
 monoxide in the body, which may be obvious even                 E
 externally by the pinkness of the post-mortem hypostasis.
 In many fire victims, the first incision at autopsy reveals a
 cherry-pink colour of the blood and muscles which can
 be confirmed by simple spectroscopic examination to be
 due to carboxyhaemoglobin. Even in rapid fires such as
 in automobiles, considerable quantities of carbon               F
 monoxide may be released and be respired even though
 life only survives for a moment or two.

       However, great caution must be used in interpreting
 carboxyhaemoglobin in fire victims. The following two rules     G
 are of first importance:-

        (a) If the tissues of a deceased victim contain a
 significant quantity of carbon monoxide (say more than
 10% saturation) then the victim must have been alive H
 during the fire.
    404        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2010] 10 S.C.R.


A         (b) However, if the .tissues contain no carbon monoxide,
          this does not mean that he must have been dead during
          the fire."

    Again Modi in his Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology has
    made following relevant observations at Page 212A -
8
          (a) External

          The face is either calm and pale in slow asphyxia or
          distorted, congested and cyanosed in cases of sudden
c         asphyxia. The lips and nails are livid. Cadaveric lividity is
          more marked and best seen within few hours of death.
          The tongue is protruded in most cases and the frothy and
          bloody mucus comes from the mouth and nostrils. Rigor
          mortis is usually slow to commence, but may be rapid in
D         some cases.

          (b) Internal

          The mucous membrane of the trachea and the larynx is
          cinnabar-red due to its injection and contains froth. The
E         lungs are dark and purple in colour and gorged with dark
          venous blood. On being cut, they exude frothy, dark, blood
          stained fluid. The air-cells are distended or even ruptured
          due to emphysema. The right cavity of the heart is full
          containing dark coloured, imperfectly clotted blood, and
F         so are the pulmonary artery and the venae cavae. The
          left cavity, the aorta and the pulmonary veins are empty. In
          many cases, both sides of the heart are found to be full. If
          examined soon after death but after rigor mortis has set
          in, the heart is found contracted and empty or the tension
          in the abdomen presses on the inferior vena cava and
G
          drives blood up into the heart. Similarly, the lungs are
          found heavier with the blood collected in the dependent
          parts if examined sometime after death, or the tension in
          the abdomen or contraction of the heart muscle will drive
H
   G. PARSHWANATH. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                     405
             [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
    more blood into the lungs, irrespective of the cause of          A
    death.

    The brain is congested, but not so much as in death from
    coma. The abdominal organs are found congested.
    Numerous small petechial haemorrhages or ecchymoses
                                                                 8
    known as Tardieu Spots are seen under the serous
    membranes of various organs due to rupture of the
    capillaries caused by increased pressure in them. These
    are usually round, dark and well-defined, varying in size
    from a pin's head to a small lentil. They are found under
    the visceral pleurae, pericardium, endocardium, thymus, C
    meninges of the brain and the cord, conjunctivae, epiglottis
    and even under the skin of the face, neck and eyelids. They
    are sometimes seen in deaths occurring from scurvy,
    pupura, haemophilia, bacterial endocardities or coronary
    thrombosis. These must be distinguished from small post- D
    mortem haemorrhages in the conjunctivae or the skin of
    dependent parts due to gravity; usually they are more.
    diffuse and even larger".

     19. The comments made by the learned author read with           E
the contents of the post-mortem reports of the deceased would
enable the court to conclude that both the deceased were alive
when they had received the burn injuries and, therefore, the trial
court as well as the High Court were justified in rejecting the
contention of the appellant that both the deceased had received      F
burn injuries after they were already dead.

      20. The sixth circumstance on which the prosecution has
 relied upon is that the death of Chethana and death of her son
Mahaveer were homicidal and not suicidal. There is not much
dispute that the deceased and her son had died of extensive G
burn injuries. This fact stands amply proved even otherwise by
the contents of the post-rnortem reports produced at Exhibit P-
10 and Exhibit P-31 coupled with the evidence of the Doctor
who had conducted autopsy on the dead bodies. The evidence
of fire brigade personnel i.e. PW-4 and PW-5 who were the H
    406      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A   first to enter the house and the photographer PW-14 clearly
    establishes that both the deceased had died unnatural death
    due to excessive burn injuries. On perusal of the photographs
    produced on the record of the case, it has been noticed that
    the dead bodies were found lying inside a room next to each
B   other. The scene of offence sketched clearly indicates that the
    house of the appellant is a big one, having a large courtyard
    behind the living rooms etc. It is to be noted that if the deceased
    had tried to commit suicide after setting herself on fire she
    could not have slept peacefully on the floor as is indicated in
c   the photograph because of the intensive heat. Further, the
    burning process would make her run around and not only in the
    room but in the entire house. However, the photograph Exhibit
    P-24 clearly indicates otherwise. The trial court and the High
    Court have rightly held that the suicide theory put forth by the
    defence is not only improbable but also impossible.
0
         21. The contention of the appellant that because of the
    mental pressure on the deceased, she had committed suicide
    is not supported by any material evidence on the record. It is
    true that the evidence shows that Jwalnaiah who was father of
E   the deceased was an active politician and an MLA and he used
    to have lots of visitors at his house everyday. It is also true that
    he had let out a portion of his house on rent. However, these
    facts would not show that he was welcoming and entertaining
    the visitors of his house from the income of his deceased
F   daughter Chethana. The evidence of witness Ranjana PW-1
    who is sister of the deceased shows that Chethana had taken
    up the job only after her marriage and not before her marriage.
    To contend that the deceased committed suicide because of
    the mental pressure exerted on her by her parents is to ignore
G   the realities of life.

         22. The argument that in absence of motive on the part of
    the appellant to kill the deceased benefit of reasonable doubt
    should be given, cannot be accepted. First of all every suspicion
    is not a doubt. Only reasonable doubt gives benefit to the
H
   G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                       407
             [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
accused and not the doubt of a vacillating judge. Very often a        A
motive is alleged to indicate the high degree of probability that
the offence was committed by the person who was prompted
by the motive. In a case when the motive alleged against
accused is fully established, it provides foundational material
to connect the chain of circumstances. It affords a key on a          B
pointer to scan the evidence in the case in that perspective and
as a satisfactory circumstance of corroboration. However, in a
case based on circumstantial evidence where proved
circumstances complete the chain of evidence, it cannot be said
that in absence of motive, the other proved circumstances are         c
of no consequence. The absence of motive, however, puts the
court on its guard to scrutinize the circumstances more carefully
to ensure that suspicion and conjecture do not take place of
 legal proof There is no absolute legal proposition of law that
 in the absence of any motive an accused cannot be convicted
                                                                      0
 under Section 302 IPC. Effect of absence of motive would
depend on the facts of each case. Therefore, this Court
 proposes to examine the question of motive which prompted
the appellant to commit the crime in question. The prosecution
 has alleged that the appellant had dislike for his deceased wife
 as he was suspecting that he had not fathered the child and          E
 he was contemplating to marry another girl. Some of the letters
  produced by the prosecution would indicate that the deceased
 was suffering a lot because of unnatural conduct of the appellant
  towards her. The evidence of mother of the deceased would
  also show that the deceased was subjected to harassment. The        F
  finding recorded by the High Court that from a letter relied upon
  by the defence i.e. Exhibit D-2 it transpires that the appellant
 was harassing the deceased and treating her with cruelty
  because he was desirous of marrying some other girl cannot
  be ignored. The contents of other letters produced by the           G
 defence namely Exhibit D-5, D-6 and D-9 indicate that there
 was definitely something wrong between the appellant and his
 wife. They also indicate that the appellant was suspecting
  character of the deceased and definitely causing mental cruelty
  to her. This constitutes sufficient motive on the part of the       H
    408      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2010) 10 S.C.R.


A appellant to kill his wife and child. It may be mentioned thatthe
  appellant had initiated divorce proceedings against deceased.
  Those proceedings were dismissed for default. No doubt,
  these are letters prior to divorce proceedings but they definitely
  give indication as to the _character and conduct of the appellant
8 towards deceased. The testimony of Sushila Gogi recorded as
  PW-17 shows that the appellant was the son of her mother
  through her second husband. It was claimed by her that the
  deceased used to write letters to her stating that the appellant
  was subjecting her to ill-treatment saying that the child was not
c born through him. Her testimony would indicate that she had
  given reply to the letter of Chethana and one such reply was
  produced at Exh. P-25. She informed the Court that the
  appellant was intending to contract second marriage and,
  therefore, she had written Exh. P-25 to Chethana and informed
  Chethana that she would give suggestions to her to avoid such
0
  an eventuality if she was inclined to meet her. Though this
  witness was also cross-examined searchingly, nothing could be
  brought on record to impeach her credibility. It is relevant to
  mention that the suggestion made by the defence that this
  witness had demanded money and on refusal by the accused
E she was deposing against them was emphatically denied by
  her. At the time of tendering evidence before the Court she was
  serving in Karnataka University. She was serving the University
  since 1982 and her husband was working as Clerk in a bank.
  She had four children, who were studying. There is nothing on
F record to probablize the case of defence that this witness had
  made any attempt to blackmail the appellant. It is well settled
  that suggestion made but assertively denied does not constitute
  evidence. Thus her evidence also establishes the motive on the
  part of the appellant for commission of crime in question.
G
       23. If all the circumstances mentioned above are taken
  together coupled with the absence of any material to indicate
  that Chethana had committed suicide with the child, they lead
  to only one inference that in all human probability the murders
H of the deceased were committed by the appellant alone and
   G. PARSHWANATH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                        409
                    [J.M. PANCHAL, J.]
none else. From the evidence of PW-3 ASI Nagaraj, it is clear          A
that the appellant knowing fully well that he had committed
murders of his wife and child gave false opinion to the police
on the basis of which UDR proceedings were initiated. By
examining the refrigerator repairer it was sought to be
suggested by the appellant that he was not present in his house        B
when the incident had taken place. Thus, the defence of the
appellant was that a fire had taken place in his house and both
the deceased had died because of inhaling of carbon
monoxide after which their bodies were burnt because the
house was engulfed in fire. However, at another stage the              c
defence of the appellant was that his deceased wife with his
child had committed suicide because her parents were
pressurizing her to leave matrimonial home for their selfish
purpose of having income of the deceased. Whereas, the
deceased was not inclined to leave her matrimonial home, thus          0
more than one and totally inconsistent defences have been
taken by the appellant. All the defences were false to the
knowledge of the appellant. Not a single defence was found to
be probable or plausible either by the trial court or by the High
Court. The appellant could not explain satisfactorily the
                                                                       E
 circumstances in which his wife and child met violent deaths.
 Therefore, offering of false explanation by the appellant
 regarding death of his wife and child will have to be regarded
 as an additional circumstance against him strengthening the
 chain of circumstances already firmly found.
                                                                       F
     24. The evidence on record has been rightly appreciated
by the trial court and the High Court. On appreciation of
evidence, the appellant is found guilty. Neither the reasons given
by the trial court nor given by the High Court can be termed as
perverse so as to call for interference of this court in the instant   G
appeal. The appeal lacks merits and is, therefore, liable to be
dismissed.

     25. Hence, the appeal is dismissed.

B.B.B                                         Appeal dismissed.        H