Holding

The Tamil Nadu Land Acquisition Laws (Revival of Operation, Amendment and Validation) Act, 2019 is constitutionally valid under Article 254(2) and does not overrule the High Court judgment.

Summary

The Tamil Nadu legislature enacted three land‑acquisition statutes (1978, 1997 and 2001) which were later held repugnant to the Central Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. The Madras High Court declared the three state statutes void and quashed acquisitions made after 27 September 2013. To save those acquisitions, the State passed the Tamil Nadu Land Acquisition Laws (Revival of Operation, Amendment and Validation) Act, 2019, giving it retrospective effect from 26 September 2013 and obtaining presidential assent. Petitioners challenged the 2019 Act on the grounds that it exceeded the State’s legislative competence, overrode the High Court judgment and violated Article 254 and Article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court examined the scope of Article 254(2), the power of a legislature to enact retrospective validation statutes, the requirements for presidential assent and the permissibility of referential legislation. It held that the 2019 Act is a valid exercise of the State’s competence, complies with Article 254, does not nullify the High Court’s decision and therefore stands constitutional. The writ petitions were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the Tamil Nadu legislature had the constitutional competence to enact the 2019 retrospective validation Act.
Whether the 2019 Act nullifies or overrules the Madras High Court judgment declaring the three State enactments void.
Whether the retrospective commencement date of 26 September 2013 renders the 2019 Act unconstitutional under Article 254.
Whether the presidential assent was obtained in compliance with the requirements of Article 254(2).

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 111, s. Article 14, s. Article 200, s. Article 21, s. Article 254, s. Article 300A
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013s. Section 105-A (inserted by 2014 amendment)
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 2014s. Section 105-A
Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978
Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997
Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001
Tamil Nadu Land Acquisition Laws (Revival of Operation, Amendment and Validation) Act, 2019s. Section 20 of 1978 Act omitted, s. Section 2(1), s. Section 21 of 1999 Act omitted, s. Section 68 of 2002 Act omitted

Subjects

Land acquisitionArticle 254Retrospective legislationValidation ActRepugnancyConstitutional validitySeparation of powersPresidential assent

Judgment

[2021] 6 S.C.R. 281

G. MOHAN RAO & ORS.
v.
STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS.
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1411 of 2020)
JUNE 29, 2021
[A.M. KHANWILKAR AND DINESH MAHESHWARI, JJ.]
Tamil Nadu Land Acquisition Laws (Revival of Operation,
Amendment and Validation) Act, 2019:
Constitutional validity of – Held: 2019 Act is a legitimate
legislative exercise and is consistent with and within the four corners
of Art.254 – Constitution of India.
Enactment of the 2019 Act by the State legislature – Legislative
competence of – State legislature enacted three State land acquisition
statutes-the 1978 Act, the 1997 Act and the 2001 Act – Union
legislature thereafter enacted the 2013 Act for land acquisition
across the country – Repugnancy between the Union and State
enactments – In view thereof, Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
(Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 2014 was effected to the 2013 Act
whereby s. 105-A inserted in the 2013 Act, making the provisions of
the 2013 Act inapplicable to acquisition of land under the three
State enactments – Thereafter, the 2014 Act, along with the 1997
Act and 2001 Act, challenged before the High Court on the grounds
of repugnancy with the 2013 Act and violation of Article 14 – High
Court struck down and declared all three State laws to be void for
repugnancy and set aside all land acquisitions thereunder post
coming into effect of the 2013 Act – To protect the nullified State
enactments, the State legislature brought the 2019 Act – 2019 Act
was applied retrospectively from 26.09.2013 with the objective to
validate all pending acquisitions on and after that date under the
State enactments, otherwise quashed by the High Court – State
legislature enacting the 2019 Act, if transgressed the limits of its
legislative competence having the effect of nullifying/overruling the
judgment of the High Court – Held: Legislative intent behind the
2019 Act and more particularly, the assent accorded thereto by the
Governor and the President of India for overcoming repugnancy
with the Act made by the Parliament, was to revive the operation of
the State enactments declared as null and void being unconstitutional
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282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A and repugnant to the Act made by the Parliament and to amend the
same, as well as, validate the actions already taken by the State
authorities – Concerned constitutional bodies understood the
substance of what is placed before them – Concern is with the
substance of the legislature and not its form – 2019 Act is a
conscious attempt by the State legislature to bring four material
B aspects of land acquisition under the three State enactments at par
with the 2013 Act-compensation, rehabilitation, resettlement and
infrastructure facilities – Effect of the 2019 Act is to change the
law retrospectively and not to overrule the judgment of the Court –
There is no irreconcilability between the High Court judgment and
C the 2019 Act – Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Tamil
Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 –
Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997
– Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 – Constitution of India – Art.
254.
D Retrospective commencement of date of 2019 Act – Effect of
– Held: A law is said to be made on the day it obtains Presidential
assent u/Art. 111 or u/Art. 254 or of Governor u/Art. 200 –
Commencement of law, unlike making of law, is not a part of the
legislative process – For checking repugnancy, the relevant point
E of time would be the date of assent and not date of commencement
– It may appear anomalous to operationalise the 2019 Act from
26.09.2013, a day prior to the making of the 2013 Act, but it does
not make any impact on the validity thereof or its substance – Date
has been chosen by the State legislature only by way of abundant
caution and, rightly – It is relevant to overcome the repugnancy
F corresponding to the commencement of the 2013 Act – Adopting
any other interpretation would not only be unwarranted but would
also strike at the very purpose of a retrospective reviving and
validating enactment – Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013– Constitution of India – Art. 254.
G
Presidential assent u/Art. 254(2) – Requirement of – Plea that
that the actual repugnancy was not pointed out to the President
while obtaining assent and thus, requirements of Art.254(2) unfilled
– Held: Letter written by the State Government seeking presidential
assent clearly demonstrates the communication was in compliance
H with the mandate of Art. 254 – Constitution of India – Art. 254.
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 283

Retrospective operation: A
Retrospective operation of a statute – Concept of –
Held:Retrospectivity is to cure including validate certain transactions
of the past by making a law in the present and not to compete with
the laws existing in the past at that point of time.
Enactment of a retrospective validating Act – Legislative B
competence of the State legislature – Held: When voidness is a result
of repugnancy between the State law and law made by the Parliament,
the State legislature can revive of such State law by enacting a
subsequent amendment substantively changing the basis of the
voidness and applying it retrospectively from a prior date.
C
Constitution of India:Art. 254 – Concept of repugnancy and
its functioning under – Explained.
Dismissing the writ petitions, the Court
HELD: 1. The Tamil Nadu Land Acquisition Laws (Revival
of Operation, Amendment and Validation) Act, 2019 is held to be D
a legitimate legislative exercise and it is found to be consistent
with and within the four corners of Article 254 of the Constitution
of India and also of the High Court judgment. [Para 56][332-B]
2.1 The impugned Act- Tamil Nadu Land Acquisition Laws
(Revival of Operation, Amendment and Validation) Act, 2019 is E
in the nature of a validation Act i.e., an Act which validates
something invalid in the eyes of law and to make such validation
effective, it has been given a retrospective effect by the State.
[Para 27][305-G]
2.2 The power of a legislature to legislate retrospectively F
is within the constitutional bounds. It emanates from the basic
principle that a legislature is deemed to be the main protagonist
of the public interest at large. For, the legislature is the bulwark
of a democratic polity. It is also beyond debate that a legislature
can validate an invalidated law by removing the cause for such
invalidity through a legislative exercise. However, no doubt, G
there are some judicially recognised limitations to such power.
[Para 28][306-A-C]
2.3 The legislature must be having power over the subject
matter as also competence to make a validating law. There must
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A be a clear validating clause coupled with substantive change in
the earlier position. The retrospective operation must be
specified clearly. There can be no express or declaratory
overruling of the judgment of the Court. It is permissible for the
legislature to make a decision of the Court ineffective by removing
the material basis of the decision in the manner that the Court
B
would not have arrived at the same conclusion had the corrected/
modified position prevailed at the time of rendering the said
earlier decision. [Para 29][309-D-G]
2.4 When voidness is a result of repugnancy between the
State law and law made by the Parliament, that is, voidness under
C Article 254 of the Constitution, revival of such State law by
enacting a subsequent amendment substantively changing the
basis of the voidness and applying it retrospectively from
a prior date is recognised time and again by this Court.
[Para 30][310-B-C]
D National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing
Federation of India Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India &
Ors. (2003) 5 SCC 23 : [2003] 3 SCR 1; Ujagar Prints
& Ors. (II) v. Union of India & Ors. (1989) 3 SCC 488
: [1988] 3 Suppl.SCR 770; Indian Aluminium Co. &
E Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors.(1996) 7 SCC 637 : [1996]
2 SCR 23; State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala &
Anr. (2014) 12 SCC 696 : [2014] 12 SCR 875; P.L.
Mehra & Ors. v. D.R. Khanna & Ors. AIR 1971 Delhi
1 – referred to.

F 3.1 The High Court has correctly explained the concept of
repugnancy under Article 254, but did not apply it in the same
manner to identify the actual existence of repugnancy between
the State Acts and law made by the Parliament. Assuming the
presence of repugnancy as assumed by the High Court itself, the
only enquiry before the High Court was regarding the method of
G revival of repugnant State laws. While undertaking such enquiry,
it found Section 105-A of the 2014 Act to be an impermissible
method of revival and called for re-enactment as per Article 254(2)
of the Constitution. This, was the sole material basis of the
judgment of the High Court. Strikingly, the High Court did not
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G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 285

rule out revival and validation at all and grounded the enquiry on A
due compliance with Article 254(2), for that is the only way for a
State law to prevail in the face of a subsequent law made by the
Parliament on the same subject. [Para 33][313-C-F]
3.2 The concept of repugnancy is meant to prevent the
operation of two conflicting laws on the same field so as to result B
into uncertainty and inconsistency. Naturally, when a situation
like that emerges, the subjects of law cannot be expected to
approach a Court immediately and seek a resolution as to which
of the two laws would operate on them. Thus, the Constitution
provides for univocal and unambiguous solution in the form of
Article 254 which makes it clear that in such circumstances, the C
law made by the Parliament ought to prevail and the subjects
would be governed by it. However, it does not stop here. It goes
beyond this basic declaration and gives an opportunity to the
legislature to which the repugnant law belonged (State legislature)
to revive it by obtaining the Presidential assent, thereby providing D
impetus to the competency of the State legislature to meet with
the fallouts of repugnancy. Article 254 does not contemplate that
the State law and law made by the Parliament must be the same
in toto. For, to say that would render the whole objective of revival
through Presidential assent as pointless exercise as it will serve
no purpose for any State to enact a law exactly the same as the E
law made by the Parliament. In fact, any such dittoed and clichéd
law made by the State legislature would be redundant. It (State)
would rather follow the law made by the Parliament. Indubitably,
Article 254 contemplates co-existence of Union and State laws,
even if repugnant, but only after the repugnancy is assented to F
by the President. Differently put, Article 254 is a manifestation of
decentralized law-making and recognition of the competency of
the State legislature to modulate dispensation as may be expedient
to that State, upon seeking Presidential assent for such deviation.
[Para 34,35][313-F-H; 314-A-D]
G
3.3 The basic ingredients for the application of Article 254(2)
can be noted thus: (i) A law made by the legislature of the State
(the 2019 Act in this case); (ii) Such law is made on a subject
falling in the concurrent list (Entry-42 of the Concurrent List in

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286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A this case); (iii) Such law is repugnant to the provisions of an
earlier/existing law made by the Parliament (the 2013 Act in this
case); and (iv) The State law is reserved for the assent of the
President and has received the same. Upon fulfilment of the said
conditions, such State law would prevail in the State despite there
being a law made by the Parliament on the same subject and
B
despite being repugnant thereto. The most peculiar feature of
Article 254(2) is the recognition of existence of repugnancy
between the law made by the Parliament and State law and
rendering that repugnancy inconsequential upon procurement of
Presidential assent. In the instant case, the State legislature duly
C passed the 2019 Act (State law) on a subject of the concurrent
list in the presence of a law made by the Parliament (2013 Act)
and obtained the assent of the President to the same on
02.12.2019 after duly placing the State law before the President
and duly stating the reason for reserving it for his assent. A
priori, this is in compliance of Article 254(2). [Para 37][314-H;
D
315-A-E]
3.4 The whole exercise of pointing out any repugnancy after
a validating Act has obtained the assent of the President is otiose.
For, the whole purpose of Article 254(2) is to resuscitate and
operationalize a repugnant Act or repugnant provisions in such
E Act. For, the Constitution provides concurrent powers to the
states as well on subjects falling in List-III. After duly complying
with the requirements of Article 254(2), the Court is left with
nothing to achieve by identifying repugnancy between the laws
because the same has already been identified, accepted and
F validated as per the sanction of the Constitution under Article
254(2). To indulge in such an exercise would be intuitive.
Moreover, the Court ought not to nullify a law made in compliance
with Article 254(2) on the sole ground of repugnancy. For,
repugnancy, in such cases, is said to have been constitutionalized.
To put it differently, the very purpose of engaging in the exercise,
G in terms of clause (2) of Article 254, pre- supposes existence of
repugnancy and is intended to overcome such repugnancy.
Therefore, the endeavour of the petitioners in the instant matter
to highlight repugnancy, is misdirected, flimsy and
inconsequential. [Para 39][316-C-F]
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G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 287

3.5 For, the High Court judgment called for re-enactment A
for the proper fulfilment of Article 254(2). While enacting the
2019 Act, the State legislature neither individually placed the 1997
Act and 2001 Act in the form of fresh bills before the House, nor
introduced amending Acts for the said three enactments in order
to incorporate the provisions of compensation, resettlement and
B
rehabilitation. Instead, it framed one bill that sought to achieve
four purposes – first, amend the State enactments to provide for
different provisions of compensation to bring them in line with
the law made by the Parliament; second, add fresh provisions
relating to resettlement, rehabilitation and infrastructure
amenities at par with the 2013 Act; third, revive the enactments C
declared to be repugnant and void by the High Court and validate
them after passing this bill in the assembly and placing it before
the President; and fourth, restore the validity of all past
acquisitions under the State legislations, quashed by the High
Court by making the Act operative from a retrospective date.
D
[Para 40][316-F-H; 317-A-B]
3.6 The enactment or re-enactment involves introducing a
bill in the legislature, readings of the bill as mandated in the
assembly rules of conduct, passing thereof by the legislature,
placing it before the Governor or the President (if necessary).
Such a bill could either delineate all the existing and fresh E
provisions from scratch or could incorporate those provisions by
way of reference. The latter would fall in the category of referential
legislation, as done in the instant case. The submission that such
referential legislation is impermissible and re-enactment would
mean introducing fresh bills containing the same provisions of F
1997 Act and 2001 Act, is tenuous. No material difference would
result in following either of the two methods. The legislature has
made no attempt to hide the provisions as the 2019 Act is divided
into three parts and each part is specifically dedicated to
concerned State enactment. [Para 41][317-C-E]
G
3.7 To wit, the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
2019 Act depicts the background in which it was thought
appropriate to resort to such legislative tool, for the revival of
the concerned State Acts declared to be repugnant by the High

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288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A Court including to amend the same and for validating the actions
already taken thereunder. The legislative intent behind the 2019
Act and more particularly, the assent accorded thereto by the
Governor and the President of India for overcoming repugnancy
with the Act made by the Parliament, was to revive the operation
of the State enactments declared as null and void being
B
unconstitutional and repugnant to the Act made by the Parliament
and to amend the same, as well as, validate the actions already
taken by the State authorities. The overall scheme is well laid-out
and is not cryptic in any manner so as to play a fraud upon the
mandate of the Constitution. More importantly, the concerned
C constitutional bodies i.e., legislative assembly, Governor and
President have understood the substance of what is placed before
them. The concern is with the substance of the legislation, and
not its form. [Para 42, 43][317-E-F; 322-F-G; 323-B]
3.8 Referential legislation is a recognized form of legislation
D and the Constitution does not attach unconstitutionality to a
legislation for being framed in a certain manner until and unless
it violates any provision of the Constitution. [Para 44][323-C]
3.9 Plenary power of legislature is not limited to the
substance of legislation in context of the Seventh Schedule, but
E also extends to the determination of the form of legislation. To
say that a particular form of legislative activity is not permissible
would require a strong basis in the Constitution, which has not
been pointed out by the petitioners. The Constitution envisages
a judicial review of the existence of legislative competence and
use of such competence to enact something that does not violate
F Part-III or other provisions of the Constitution. It does not
envisage a review of the cosmetic characteristics of a legislation
as long as the substance of such legislation has its roots in the
Constitution. [Para 45][324-F-G; 325-A]
Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.
G (2011) 3 SCC 1 : [2011] 3 SCR 1; Krishna Chandra
Gangopadhyaya & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1975)
2 SCC 302 : [1975] Suppl. SCR 151; Ujagar Prints &

H
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 289

Ors. (II) v. Union of India & Ors.(1989) 3 SCC 488 : A
[1988] 3 Suppl.SCR 770 – relied on.
3.10 The 2019 Act is a conscious attempt by the State
legislature to bring four material aspects of land acquisition under
the three State enactments at par with the 2013 Act i.e.,
compensation, rehabilitation, resettlement and infrastructure B
facilities. No doubt, certain features of the stated law made by
the Parliament have been left out. To say that failure to import all
provisions of the law made by the Parliament in the State
enactments results into non- removal of defects pointed by the
High Court, is nothing but a palpable misreading of the judgment
of the High Court. [Para 46][325-B-D] C

3.11 Whereas, the judgment of the High Court does not
even point out the absence of compensation/rehabilitation/
resettlement/infrastructure related provisions as a defect in the
State enactments. It nowhere points out the exact provisions from
the State enactments which are repugnant to the law made by the D
Parliament. The only defect pointed out by the High Court was
the impermissibility of Section 105-A (coming into effect from
01.01.2014), as a tool for reviving the State enactments once
rendered repugnant (on 27.09.2013) due to law made by the
Parliament. The State has since been advised to accept that defect E
pointed out by the High Court and has moved on from that thought
process by devising a new legislative tool for validating the State
enactments in line with Article 254(2). Had the legislature
re-enacted Section 105-A even after the declaration of invalidity
by the High Court, it would have been a case of non- removal of
defect pointed out by the High Court. In fact, that would have F
been declaratory overruling of the judgment of the Court by the
legislature, which, is simply impermissible. The effect of the 2019
Act is to change the law retrospectively and not to overrule the
judgment of the Court. [Para 47][325-D-G]
3.12 Strikingly, the High Court nowhere issued a prohibition G
on revival and validation at all. It only disapproved one particular
way of revival. Applying the test for determining whether a
judgment is nullified is to see whether the law and the judgment

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A are inconsistent and irreconcilable so that both cannot stand
together, there is no irreconcilability between the High Court
judgment and the 2019 Act. The 2019 Act is an evolution, not
reiteration of the earlier position much less regression thereof.
Even noting the test that the ultimate query should be whether
the Court would have given the same decision had the
B
circumstances been the altered ones, there is no indication in
the High Court order that the Court would have arrived at the
same decision even today. For, the method prescribed under
Article 254(2) has been followed now. [Para 48, 49][326-B-D]
State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala & Anr. (2014) 12
C SCC 696 : [2014] 12 SCR 875; Shri Prithvi Cotton
Mills Ltd. & Anr. vs. Broach Borough Municipality &
Ors. (1969) 2 SCC 283 : [1970] 1 SCR 388 – relied
on.
State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Karnataka Pawn Brokers
D Association & Ors. (2018) 6 SCC 363 : [2018] 10 SCR
409 – distinguished.
Pt. Rishikesh & Anr. v. Salma Begum (1995) 4 SCC
718 : [1995] 3 SCR 1062 – referred to.

E 4. In the instant case, the Letter No. 13566/Rev-Dfg/2019-1
dated 25.07.2019 written by the State Government seeking assent
clearly demonstrates that the three State enactments viz. Tamil
Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978;
Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997;
and Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 were made for the purpose
F of speedy acquisitions. It further states that the law made by the
Parliament rendered the three enactments repugnant and out of
operation owing to the High Court judgment. It also states that
the State has considerable interest, having a strong bearing on
the public exchequer, in saving and reviving the three State
G enactments. It also clearly specifies the law made by the
Parliament, which could be coming in the way of the State
enactments for due consideration by the President. Suffice it to
say that the communication was in compliance with the mandate

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G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 291

of Article 254 as well as with the decision of this Court in A
Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. case. [Para 52][329-D-F]
Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. National Textile Corpn.
(Maharashtra North) Ltd. & Ors. (2002) 8 SCC 182 :
[2002] 2 Suppl.SCR 555 – relied on.
5.1 The submission that retrospectivity from 26.09.2013 B
was fatal to the 2019 Act as on that date, there was no 2013 Act in
operation and when the 2013 Act came into operation on
27.09.2013, the State enactments would again become repugnant,
is untenable. For, a law is said to be “made” on the day it obtains
Presidential assent. Throughout the chapter on federal relations, C
the word “made” or “make” is used in the Constitution while
referring to legislative activity. Making of law implies a clearly
demarcated procedure which culminates with the assent of the
President under Article 111 or under Article 254 (if legislated on
same subject matter) or of Governor under Article 200. Articles
111, 200 and 254 are part of the constitutionally prescribed D
legislative procedure itself. The other concept relevant is of
“commencement”. Commencement of law, unlike making of law,
is not a part of the legislative process. Rather, it is an offshoot of
the successful culmination of the legislative process. In other
words, commencement is a question which follows the legislative E
process and intent and does not overlap with it. The
commencement of law could be from the date of making (assent),
or from a back date or even from a future date. But it does not
affect the fact that the legislation has stepped into the statute
book and the provisions relating to repugnancy as well as other
provisions of the chapter of legislative relations between the F
Union and the State have become active from that point onwards,
as they are concerned with the date of making. Thus, for checking
repugnancy, the relevant point of time would be the date of making
i.e., date of assent and not date of commencement. [Para 53]
[329-G; 330-A-D] G
State of Kerala & Ors. v. Mar Appraem Kuri Company
Limited & Anr. (2012) 7 SCC 106 : [2012] 4 SCR 448–
relied on.

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292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A 5.2 The primary objective of retrospective application of a
law is to alter an undesirable past circumstance and it is meant to
apply to things which have already happened. The underlying
purpose of retrospectivity, therefore, is to cure including validate
certain transactions of the past by making a law in the present
and not to compete with the laws existing in the past at that point
B
of time. In this case, the objective was to save and validate past
acquisitions under the three State enactments, which were valid
until the commencement of the 2013 Act but stood quashed due
to the High Court decision. This was also for altering the basis of
the law in existence at that point of time and providing for benefits
C at par with the 2013 Act, so far as it was fit in the wisdom of the
State legislature. No doubt, it may appear anomalous to
operationalise the 2019 Act from 26.09.2013, a day prior to the
making of the 2013 Act, but it does not make any impact on the
validity thereof or its substance. The date has been chosen by
the State legislature only by way of abundant caution and, rightly.
D
It is obviously relevant to overcome the repugnancy
corresponding to the commencement of the 2013 Act. Adopting
any other interpretation would not only be unwarranted as per
the constitutional scheme but would also strike at the very
purpose of a retrospective reviving and validating enactment.
E [Para 54][330-G; 331-C-F]
Halsbury’s Laws of England – referred to.
Saghir Ahmad & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. AIR 1954
SC 728 : [1955] SCR 707; Union of India & Anr. v.
Tarsem Singh & Ors. (2019) 9 SCC 304 : [2019] 13
F SCR 49 Nagpur Improvement Trust & Anr. v. Vithal Rao
& Ors. (1973) 1 SCC 500 : [1973] 3 SCR 39; P.
Vajravelu Mudaliar & Anr. v. The Special Deputy
Collector for Land Acquisition, West Madras & Anr.
AIR 1965 SC 1017 : [1965] SCR 614; B.K. Pavitra &
G Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2019) 16 SCC 129 :
[2019] 7 SCR 1086; Jaora Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. State
of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. [1966] 1 SCR 523; M.P.V.
Sundararamier and Co. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
& Anr. [1958] 1 SCR 1422; State of Gujarat & Anr. v.

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G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 293

Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad & Anr. (1974) 4 A
SCC 656 : [1974] 3 SCR 760; Devi Das Gopal Krishnan
& Ors. v. State of Punjab [1967] 3 SCR 557; Municipal
Committee, Amritsar & Anr. v. State of Punjab [1969] 3
SCR 447; The State of Madhya Pradesh v. G.C.
Mandawar [1955] 1 SCR 599 – referred to.
B
Case Law Reference
[1955] 1 SCR 707 referred to Para 9
[2019] 13 SCR 49 referred to Para 12
[1973] 3 SCR 39 referred to Para 12 C
[1965] 1 SCR 614 referred to Para 13
[2019] 7 SCR 1086 referred to Para 16
[1966] 1 SCR 523 referred to Para 16
[1958] 1 SCR 1422 referred to Para 17 D
[1974] 3 SCR 760 referred to Para 17
[1967] 3 SCR 557 referred to Para 17
[1969] 3 SCR 447 referred to Para 17
[1955] 1 SCR 599 referred to Para 20 E
[2014] 12 SCR 875 referred to Para 28
[2003] 3 SCR 1 referred to Para 28
[1988] 3 Suppl.SCR 770 referred to Para 28
[1996] 2 SCR 23 referred to Para 28 F

AIR 1971 Delhi 1 referred to Para 30
[1995] 3 SCR 1062 referred to Para 38
[2011] 3 SCR 1 relied on Para 45
G
[1975] Suppl. SCR 151 relied on Para 45
[1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 770 relied on Para 45
[2018] 10 SCR 409 distinguished Para 48

H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A [2014] 12 SCR 875 relied on. Para 49
[1970] 1 SCR 388 relied on Para 49
[2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 555 relied on Para 52
[2012] 4 SCR 448 relied on Para 53
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTIONL Writ Petition (Civil)
B No. 1411 of 2020.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)
With
W.P. (C) Nos. 173 and 174 of 2021
C K.K.Venugopal, AG., Balaji Srinivasan, AAG., Vijay Narayan, Adv.
Gen., P. Wilson, Aman Sinha, Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Advs., M. Yogesh Kanna,
Raja Rajeshwaran S., Aditya Chadha, Ms. Uma Prasuna Bachu,
Siddhanth Kohli, Ms. Pallavi Sengupta, D. Kumanan, Richardson Wilson,
A. Mohan Raj, Ms. Charulata Chaudhary, Ms. Suhrith Parthasarathy,
Ms. Rashmi Nandakumar, Shankar Narayanan, Ms. Amritha Sathyajith,
D Ms. Ayushma Awasthi, Senthil Jagadeesan, M. Thangathurai, Ms. Mrinal
Kanwar, Ms. Sonakshi Malhan, Ms. Suriti Chowdhary, Sandeep Kumar
Mahapatra, Sugam Kumar Jha, Ms. Mrinmayee Sahu, Advs. for the
petitioners.
P. Wilson, Mukul Rohatgi, Aman Sinha, Sr. Advs., D. Kumanan,
E Richardson Wilson, Senthil Jagadeesan, M. Thangathurai, Ms. Mrinal
Kanwar, Ms. Sonakshi Malhan, Ms. Suriti Chowdhary, Pravesh Thakur,
Nikilesh Ramachandran, N. Subramaniyan, Pranav Sachdeva, Jatin
Bhardwaj, Ms. Suhrith Parthasarathy, Ms. Rashmi Nandakumar, Shankar
Narayanan, Ms. Amritha Sathyajith, Ms. Ayushma Awasthi, Sandeep
Kumar Mahapatra, Sugam Kumar Jha, Ms. Mrinmayee Sahu, V. Balaji,
F
C. Kannan, Ms. Neha Singh, Rakesh K. Sharma, Ms. Deepika
Nandakumar, Naresh Kumar, Saurabh Mishra, Onkar Singh, Ms. Neha
Tripathi. Advs. for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.
1. The Indian Constitution ordains a structure of governance
wherein the three organs of the State are entrusted with independent
functions. The Legislature legislates on the law, the Executive puts the
law into execution and the Judiciary being the sentinel on the qui vive
reviews and enforces the law in light of its primary role as the guardian
H
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 295
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

of the Constitution. Thus, we the people of India have embraced a system A
of separation of powers for securing checks and balances. Consequently,
in day-to-day functioning of the government institutions many a times a
perception emerges about the “overstepping” between three organs.
Similar grievance has been made in the case at hand. The extent and
manner in which the basis of a judicial determination of unconstitutionality
B
of a legislation could be altered by the legislature by subsequently enacting
a validating or reviving legislation, without overstepping on the jurisdiction
of the constitutional Court, is the pivotal issue in this case.
FACTS IN BRIEF
2. The present case is outcome of a long chain of proceedings at C
different forums. Traversing the entire storyline may not be relevant for
the determination of the question at hand. Thus, we are delineating only
the relevant facts in brief for a proper perspective.
3. The resource in the form of land is an essential requirement for
the development of a nation. At the same time, property rights of D
individuals have always had an important status in the hierarchy of rights.
To resolve this apparent conflict between right to property of individuals
and duty of State towards holistic development, the Land Acquisition
Act, 18941 had been enacted as a uniform law for the whole country
with the short title:
E
“An Act to amend the law for the acquisition of land for public
purposes and for Companies.”
The 1894 Act was in force throughout the country. After 1950,
when the Constitution came into force, we adopted the principle of
distribution of powers and the legislative competence of the Union and F
States. It was differentiated on the basis of the Union List (List-I), State
List (List-II) and the Concurrent List (List-III). As regards the subjects
listed in the Concurrent List, the Union and States have been given
concurrent powers to legislate. In pursuance thereof, the State of Tamil
Nadu carved out three public purposes for which a different land
acquisition law was envisioned. The three sectors were highways, G
industries and Harijan welfare schemes. Accordingly, the Tamil Nadu
legislative assembly enacted the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for
Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 19782, Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land
1
for short, “1894 Act”
2
for short, “1978 Act” H
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A for Industrial Purposes Act, 19973 and Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 20014.
Be it noted that besides the 1894 Act, the field of land acquisition was
also governed by another enactment made by the Parliament being a
special legislation, namely, the National Highways Act, 19565. This Act
was enacted to provide for the declaration of certain highways to be
national highways and for matters connected therewith including power
B
to the competent authority to acquire lands required for national highways.
Since there was a law made by the Parliament operating in the same
field regarding land acquisition, the State obtained Presidential assent as
per Article 254 to avoid repugnancy and thus, the aforementioned State
Acts prevailed in the State.
C 4. The 1894 Act was found to be inadequate on certain aspects,
including measures relating to compensation, rehabilitation and
resettlement, and thus, the Parliament enacted the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 20136. The Act received assent of the President of
D India on 27.09.2013 and came into force w.e.f. 01.01.2014. The 2013
Act carried a special provision – Section 105 – to declare that this Act
shall have no applicationto certain enactments made by the Parliament
relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule. This was
however, subject to sub-section (3) whereunder the Central Government
had been bestowed power to issue notification within one year from the
E date of commencement of the Act, to notify that the provisions of 2013
Act shall apply to the cases of land acquisition under the enactments
specified in the Fourth Schedule relating to determination of compensation,
rehabilitation and resettlement being beneficial to affected families with
such exceptions or modifications as prescribed. Thereafter, on 28.04.2015
F vide S.O. 2368 (E), the Central Government extended the provisions
relating to compensation (First Schedule), rehabilitation and resettlement
(Second Schedule) and infrastructure amenities (Third Schedule), as
provided in the 2013 Act, to the enactments placed in the Fourth Schedule
of the Act (which included 1956 Act) as well — so as to extend the
benefit of the 2013 Act to all categories of acquisitions irrespective of
G the purpose.

3
for short, “1997 Act”
4
for short, “2001 Act”
5
for short, “1956 Act”
6
H for short, “2013 Act”
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 297
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

5. On the lines of Section 105 read with the Fourth Schedule of A
the 2013 Act, the State of Tamil Nadu also sought to protect and reserve
its three State enactments — 1978 Act, 1997 Act and 2001 Act — from
the operation of the 2013 Act as it found its own legislations to be
expedient. For this purpose, a State amendment, namely, the Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
B
and Resettlement (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 20147 was effected to
the 2013 Act whereby Section 105-A came to be inserted in the 2013
Act. The purport of the State amendment in terms of the 2014 Act made
the provisions of the 2013 Act inapplicable to acquisition of land under
the three State enactments mentioned in the Fifth Schedule of the 2013
Act which also came to be inserted by the same State amendment Act, C
2014. The State legislature, thus, inserted a new Schedule — Fifth
Schedule — in the 2013 Act and placed the three State laws in that
schedule. The 2014 Act received Presidential assent on 01.01.2015 and
was applied retrospectively from 01.01.2014 onwards i.e., the date of
coming into force of the 2013 Act. The retrospective date was chosen
D
by the State legislature with the objective to protect the acquisition under
the three State enactments from being rendered void due to repugnancy
after coming into effect of the 2013 Act. However, this legislative
exercise to protect and preserve the three state enactments by way of
insertion of Section 105A and Fifth Schedule to 2013 Act turned out to
be fatal, as noticed infra. E
6. The 2014 Act, along with the 1997 Act and 2001 Act, came to
be challenged before the High Court of Judicature at Madras, primarily
on twin grounds of repugnancy with the 2013 Act and violation of Article
14 due to manifest arbitrariness and discrimination in the operation of
the State Acts. Pertinently, on 18.09.2014, the High Court vide an interim F
order in W.P. (C) 24182/2014, allowed the acquisition proceedings to go
on with the caveat that no final order shall be passed and status quo as
regards possession on the land be maintained. Thereafter, the High Court
vide judgment and order dated 03.07.2019 in a batch of petitions with
W.P.(C) No. 22448/20188 as main matter, framed four issues in the case
thus: G

“Issues:
74. The issues therefore, which arise for our consideration are:
7
for short, “2014 Act”
8
(2019) 5 MLJ 641 H
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A 1) Are the State Enactments void because of inherent
Arbitrariness?
2) Did the President of India fail to apply his mind while granting
assent to Section 105A?
3) Did the Impugned State Enactments become repugnant once
B the Parliament ‘made’ the New Land Acquisition Act. If so, did
the presidential assent to Section 105A inserted by Tamil Nadu
Act No. 1 of 2015, revive the three acts?
4) Are the provisions of Section 105A(2) and (3) mandatory, and
if so, whether non-compliance of these provisions fatal to the
C validity of these enactments.”
7. The High Court vide judgment and order dated 03.07.2019
rejected the challenge as regards the violation of Article 14 and non-
application of mind by the President while granting assent. On the point
of repugnancy, however, it found that the State enactments became
D repugnant to the 2013 Act and thus void, on 27.09.2013 itself (date of
Presidential assent to the 2013 Act). Resultantly, subsequent enactment
of 2014 Act w.e.f. 01.01.2014 would not go on to reactivate the three
enactments. The High Court held that the State enactments could only
be revived through re-enactment by the Legislative Assembly followed
by fresh assent of the President in accordance with Article 254 of the
E Constitution. As a consequential order, it also quashed all pending
acquisition proceedings under the three enactments on and after
27.09.2013. The said decision is under challenge before this Court in
connected but separate proceedings and we may advert to it at the
appropriate stage, as and when need arises for decision of the present
F case.
8. On 19.07.2019, the State Government made an attempt to revive
the three enactments held to be void and unconstitutional by the High
Court by using a legislative tool. It tabled a Bill to revive the operation of
the Tamil Nadu Acquisition for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978, the
Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997 and
G
the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 on the floor of the legislative assembly.
The bill was passed by the Assembly titled as “The Tamil Nadu Land
Acquisition Laws (Revival of Operation, Amendment and Validation)
Act, 20199”. This Act was sent for the assent of the President in terms
9
H for short, “2019 Act”
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 299
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

of Article 254(2) and the same was granted on 02.12.2019. Notably, the A
2019 Act was applied retrospectively from 26.09.2013 with the objective
to validate all pending acquisitions on and after that date under the State
enactments, otherwise quashed by the High Court. The said Act of 2019
is under challenge before us in the instant batch of petitions on grounds
delineated hereinafter.
B
CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES
9. The petitioners are landowners whose lands are sought to be
acquired under the 1997 Act and 2001 Act. The primary contention of
the petitioners is that the legislative tool adopted by the State legislature
to revive unconstitutional enactments is a direct attempt to overrule and C
nullify the judgment of the High Court and the same is impermissible in
the constitutional scheme as it violates the doctrine of separation of
powers. It is submitted that on being declared unconstitutional due to
repugnancy, the only option available to the State legislature was to re-
enact the repugnant enactments after removing the repugnant areas
and pass it afresh in the Assembly, followed by a fresh Presidential D
assent. It is further urged that the permissible method is to remove the
material basis of a judgment by correcting the anomalies pointed out by
the Court and re-enact the legislation. It is added that amending an
unconstitutional enactment cannot be a permissible method of revival
because the moment an enactment is declared as unconstitutional, there E
remains nothing to amend. To support this position, reliance has been
placed upon State of Karnataka & Ors. vs. Karnataka Pawn Brokers
Association & Ors.10, Pt. Rishikesh & Anr. vs. Salma Begum11, Saghir
Ahmad & Anr. vs. State of U.P. & Ors.12 and P.L. Mehra & Ors. vs.
D.R. Khanna & Ors.13.
F
10. To buttress the above submission, it is urged that, despite
incorporating the provisions relating to compensation, rehabilitation and
resettlement from the 2013 Act, the 2019 Act is still repugnant to the
2013 Act as it fails to incorporate material provisions relating to social
impact assessment, timelines for various steps involved in the process of
acquisition and other provisions relating to fair procedure. Thus, it cannot G
be termed as a curative legislation and would again fall foul of Article
254.
10
(2018) 6 SCC 363
11
(1995) 4 SCC 718
12
AIR 1954 SC 728
13
AIR 1971 Delhi 1 H
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A 11. The petitioners have emphasized on the meaning of the word
“made” as used in Article 254 to assert that retrospectivity in the 2019
Act is actually fatal to its own validity. It is stated that the 2019 Act was
made on 26.09.2013 (date of retrospective commencement) and not on
02.12.2019 (date of Presidential assent), whereas the 2013 Act was
made on 27.09.2013. Thus, there was no Act made by the Parliament in
B
force on 26.09.2013 and the moment the 2013 Act was made on the
next day, the 2019 Act again became repugnant.
12. The petitioners further submit that the 2019 Act has been
enacted without a determining principle as it fails to comply with the
material aspects of the 2013 Act and stands to discriminate with the
C people of the State by subjecting them to a different and less advantageous
procedure of land acquisition. To buttress, it is added that equally placed
persons cannot be subjected to two different laws as it would be violative
of Article 14 and even if this course is to be adopted, the classification
has to be duly justified in light of the settled principle of intelligible
D differentia and reasonable classification. It is further added that the State
must show special circumstances to demonstrate their inability to apply
the Act made by the Parliament in the State and without such
circumstances, the State legislature has no power to deviate and frame
its own law. Reliance has been placed on Union of India & Anr. vs.
Tarsem Singh & Ors.14 and Nagpur Improvement Trust & Anr. vs.
E Vithal Rao & Ors.15.
13. In W.P. (C) No. 173/2021 and W.P. (C) No. 174/2021, similar
arguments have been raised to assail the validity of 2019 Act and we are
not reiterating the same to avoid repetition. In addition, the petitioners in
these two petitions have also assailed the 1997 Act and 2001 Act dealing
F with industries and highways respectively. The petitioners have attempted
a comparative analysis of the State enactments and the Act made by the
Parliament to illustrate discrimination and unequal treatment with equally
placed persons merely on the basis of purpose of acquisition. It is urged
that despite incorporating provisions relating to compensation from the
G 2013 Act, the State enactments do not provide the same amount of
compensation due to absence of fixed timelines for acquisition and a
lapse provision in case of undue delay. Placing reliance upon P. Vajravelu
Mudaliar & Anr. vs. The Special Deputy Collector for Land
14
(2019) 9 SCC 304
15
H (1973) 1 SCC 500
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 301
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

Acquisition, West Madras & Anr. 16, it is submitted that the State A
enactments violate Articles 14, 19, 21 on account of unreasonable
classification between those persons whose lands are acquired for
industrial purposes and those whose lands are acquired for other purposes
thereby impacting their right to trade and occupation coupled with right
to livelihood. It is further submitted that deprivation of property without
B
complying with due procedure is also violative of Article 300A of the
Constitution.
14. As regards the Presidential assent, it is urged that the same is
vitiated as the State enactments were not placed before the President
and attention was not drawn towards the provisions which are repugnant
to the Act made by the Parliament. To buttress this submission, reliance C
has been placed upon the dictum of this Court in Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt.
Ltd. & Anr. vs. National Textile Corpn. (Maharashtra North) Ltd.
& Ors. 17.
15. Responding to the petitioners, learned Attorney General for
India advanced arguments for the State of Tamil Nadu. It is submitted D
that the 2019 Act is an acceptance on the part of the State that the
previous measure of enacting Section 105-A to do away with repugnancy
did not commend to the High Court and therefore, the State adopted
another legislative measure of enacting a validating/curative Act in
accordance with its legislative competence under List-III of the Seventh E
Schedule. Placing reliance upon State of Tamil Nadu vs. State of Kerala
& Anr.18, it is submitted that this Court has laid down twin tests for
testing the constitutionality of validating enactments, namely — presence
of legislative competence and removal of defect found by the Court.
16. The respondents have further submitted that the power of the F
State legislature is plenary in its own field and it is well within its
competence to amend a law retrospectively as well as to remove the
cause for invalidation by enacting a new law altogether. It has been
added that the 2019 Act has been enacted by the legislature in its wisdom
keeping in mind the State interest, public interest and land owners’ interest.
To support these submissions, reliance has been placed upon Karnataka G
Pawn Brokers Association19 and B.K. Pavitra & Ors. vs. Union of
16
AIR 1965 SC 1017
17
(2002) 8 SCC 182
18
(2014) 12 SCC 696
19
supra at Footnote No. 10 H
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A India & Ors.20 and Jaora Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh & Ors.21.
17. The respondents have also attacked the judgment of the High
Court stating that the judgment does not undertake any examination to
determine the repugnancy between provisions and fails to severe the
B repugnant provisions from the rest. It is submitted that Article 254 does
not contemplate striking down an entire enactment due to repugnancy
between some provisions of the Act made by the Parliament and State
enactments, and therefore, there is no need for the State legislature to
re-enact the entire legislation to rectify the repugnancy between some
provisions. To support these submissions, reliance has been placed upon
C
M.P.V. Sundararamier and Co. vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh &
Anr. 22 , State of Gujarat & Anr. vs. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd.,
Ahmedabad & Anr.23, Devi Das Gopal Krishnan & Ors. vs. State of
Punjab & Ors. 24 and Municipal Committee, Amritsar & Anr. vs.
State of Punjab & Ors.25. Furthermore, it is urged that even after the
D declaration of repugnancy, an Act does not get wiped off from the statute
book and it can be amended to remove the defect in terms of the decision
of this Court in State of Kerala & Ors. vs. Mar Appraem Kuri
Company Limited & Anr.26.
18. The respondents have submitted that the 2019 Act is an
E effective re-enactment of the State Acts, in line with the decision of the
High Court. Further, the key features of 2013 Act, including those relating
to compensation, resettlement and rehabilitation, have been introduced
in all three State enactments by way of reference vide 2019 Act. It is
added that, for the purpose of obtaining assent, there is no difference
between placing the entire 2019 Act before the President and placing
F
the three State Acts individually. Reliance has been placed upon Krishna
Chandra Gangopadhyaya & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors.27 to
support the permissibility of referential legislation.

20
(2019) 16 SCC 129
G 21
(1966) 1 SCR 523
22
(1958) 1 SCR 1422
23
(1974) 4 SCC 656
24
(1967) 3 SCR 557
25
(1969) 3 SCR 447
26
(2012) 7 SCC 106
27
H (1975) 2 SCC 302
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 303
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

19. As regards the date for deciding repugnancy, it is submitted A
by the respondents that the date of making of the State law would be
relevant. Further, it is added that the date of making would be the date of
Presidential assent i.e., 02.12.2019 in this case and merely because the
2019 Act has been applied from a retrospective date, that date would
not be referred to as the date of making the Act, for that would defeat
B
the purpose of the entire exercise behind a validating legislation. To explain
the meaning of the word “made”, as used in Article 254, support has
been drawn from the decision of this Court in Mar Appraem Kuri
Company Limited28.
20. The respondents have urged that for the purpose of determining
the constitutionality of an independent legislation, as the 2019 Act, there C
can be no comparative analysis between provisions of the Act made by
the Parliament and the impugned State Acts. It is added that the State is
well within its competence to deviate from the law made by the
Parliament and obtain assent of the President to such deviation. In support,
reliance has been placed upon the decision of this Court in The State of D
Madhya Pradesh vs. G.C. Mandawar29.
21. We have heard Shri P. Wilson, learned senior counsel and Shri
Suhrith Parthasarthy, learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri K.K.
Venugopal, learned Attorney General for India and Shri Aman Sinha,
learned senior counsel for the respondents. E
22. Before traversing the arguments on the issues involved in the
case, we deem it fit to describe the scope of enquiry at the very outset.
We had clarified during the course of the hearing that the issues relating
to the constitutional validity of the 1997 Act and 2001 Act in context of
Part-III of the Constitution have since been raised in the Special Leave F
Petitions emanating from the decision of the High Court of Judicature at
Madras, dated 03.07.2019. The same may be considered in the aftermath
of this decision, as noted in our order dated 23.02.2021.
23. Therefore, our enquiry in this case is limited to whether the
2019 Act has been validly enacted and thus, succeeds in reviving the G
State Acts declared as null and void by the High Court, for being repugnant
to the 2013 Act and amending the same including validating actions taken
thereunder.

28
supra at Footnote No. 26
29
(1955) 1 SCR 599 H
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A 24. In light of the aforesaid facts and grounds urged by the parties,
the following issues arise for our consideration:
(i) Whether the State legislature had legislative competence to
enact the 2019 Act, a retrospective validating Act?
(ii) Whether the State legislature transgressed the limits of its
B legislative competence having the effect of nullifying/overruling
the judgment of the High Court, by enacting the 2019 Act?
(iii) Whether the 1997 Act and 2001 Act again fall foul of Article
254 on account of being repugnant to the 2013 Act, owing to the
date of retrospective commencement of the 2019 Act?
C
CONSIDERATION
LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCY
25. Chapter-I titled “Legislative Relations” of Part-XI of the
Constitution provides for the distribution of legislative powers between
D the Union and the States. Article 245 talks about the territorial competence
of the Union and the States, and whereas it empowers the Parliament to
legislate for the entire territory of India (even beyond in certain
circumstances), the State legislature is empowered to legislate only for
the territory of the State. Within its territory, the States are empowered
to legislate on any of the subjects of List-II (State List) and List-III
E
(Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule. The concurrent list contains
subjects which can be legislated upon both by the Union and States.
Even within the State list, the legislative power of the State cannot be
said to be absolute and can be subjected to intervention of the Parliament
under certain circumstances such as national emergency, national interest,
F desire expressed by legislatures of two or more States etc., as delineated
by Articles 249 to 253. It is crystal clear from this constitutional scheme
that the balance of power tilts in favour of the Union in multiple
circumstances. An example of this tilt is manifested in Article 254 of the
Constitution which is a subject of debate in the present case. The same
reads thus:
G
“254. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and
laws made by the Legislatures of States. —
(1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is
repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which
H Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 305
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the A
Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the
law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law
made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the
existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of
the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.
B
(2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect
to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains
any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made
by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then,
the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has
been reserved for the consideration of the President and has C
received his assent, prevail in that State:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from
enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter
including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law
so made by the Legislature of the State.” D

26. Notably, Entry-42 of List-III enables both Parliament and State
legislature to legislate on “Acquisition and requisitioning of property”
under which the land acquisition laws are enacted. Using this entry, the
State legislature had enacted the stated Acts including the 1997 Act and
the 2001 Act. Using the same entry, the Union legislature had thereafter E
enacted the 2013 Act for land acquisition across the country. The Union
and State enactments clashed with each other and the High Court found
the State enactments to be null and void in the face of the Act made by
the Parliament. To protect the nullified State enactments, the State
legislature again resorted to Entry-42 of List-III and brought the 2019 F
Act with the objective of “revival of operation”, “amendment” and
“validation” of the State enactments.
27. As the name suggests, the impugned Act is in the nature of a
validation Act i.e., an Act which validates something invalid in the eyes
of law and to make such validation effective, it has been given a G
retrospective effect by the State. Whereas the subject-matter legislative
competence is manifest from List-III of the VII Schedule read with
Article 246. Despite that, an in-principle question has been raised on the
competence of the State legislature to pass a revival Act with retrospective
effect.
H
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A 28. The constitutional scheme and decisions of this Court on the
subject untangle a settled position that the power of a legislature to
legislate retrospectively is within the constitutional bounds. It emanates
from the basic principle that a legislature is deemed to be the main
protagonist of the public interest at large. For, the legislature is the bulwark
of a democratic polity. It is also beyond debate that a legislature can
B
validate an invalidated law by removing the cause for such invalidity
through a legislative exercise. However, no doubt, there are some judicially
recognised limitations to such power as summed up by this Court in
National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India
Ltd. & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors.30 thus:
C “15. The legislative power either to introduce enactments for the
first time or to amend the enacted law with retrospective effect,
is not only subject to the question of competence but is also subject
to several judicially recognized limitations with some of which we
are at present concerned. The first is the requirement that
D the words used must expressly provide or clearly imply
retrospective operation. 31 The second is that the
retrospectivity must be reasonable and not excessive or
harsh, otherwise it runs the risk of being struck down as
unconstitutional. 32 The third is apposite w here the
legislation is introduced to overcome a judicial decision.
E Here the power cannot be used to subvert the decision
without removing the statutory basis of the decision.33”
(emphasis supplied)
It further stated thus:
F “17. Avalidating clause coupled with a substantive statutory
change is therefore only one of the methods to leave actions
unsustainable under the unamended statute, undisturbed.
30
(2003) 5 SCC 23
31
S.S. Gadgil v. Lal and Co., AIR 1965 SC 171, 177; J.P. Jani v. Induprasad Devshanker
G Bhatt, AIR 1969 SC 778, 781.
32
Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1667 : (1964) 1 SCR 897, 915;
Jawaharmal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 764 : (1966) 1 SCR 890, 905; Ujagar
Prints (II) v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 488, 517 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 469
33
Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality, (1969) 2 SCC 283;
Lalitaben v. Gordhanbhai Bhaichandbhai, 1987 Supp SCC 750; Janapada Sabha
Chhindwara v. Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd., (1970) 1 SCC 509; Indian Aluminium
H Co. v. State of Kerala, (1996) 7 SCC 637.
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 307
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

Consequently, the absence of a validating clause would not by A
itself affect the retrospective operation of the statutory provision,
if such retrospectivity is otherwise apparent.”
(emphasis supplied)
In Ujagar Prints & Ors. (II) vs. Union of India & Ors.34, a 5-
judges bench of this Court categorically observed that retrospective B
validating statutes are permissible as follows:
“65. ...A competent legislature can always validate a law
which has been declared by courts to be invalid, provided
the infirmities and vitiating infactors noticed in the
declaratory judgment are removed or cured. Such a C
validating law can also be made retrospective. If in the light
of such validating and curative exercise made by the legislature
— granting legislative competence — the earlier judgment
becomes irrelevant and unenforceable, that cannot be called an
impermissible legislative overruling of the judicial decision. All D
that the legislature does is to usher in a valid law with
retrospective effect in the light of which earlier judgment
becomes irrelevant. (See Sri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach
Borough Municipality35).”
(emphasis supplied) E
The Court also highlighted the utility of such validating enactments
in a practical scenario thus:
“66.Such legislative expedience of validation of laws is of
particular significance and utility and is quite often applied,
in taxing statutes. It is necessary that the legislature should F
be able to cure defects in statutes. No individual can acquire
a vested right from a defect in a statute and seek a windfall
from the legislature’s mistakes. Validity of legislations
retroactively curing defects in taxing statutes is well recognised
and courts, except under extraordinary circumstances, would be
G
reluctant to override the legislative judgment as to the need for
and wisdom of the retrospective legislation. ....”
(emphasis supplied)
34
(1989) 3 SCC 488
35
(1969) 2 SCC 283 : (1970) 1 SCR 388 H
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A In Indian Aluminium Co. & Ors. vs. State of Kerala & Ors.36,
the Court again culled out certain principles and we find it useful to
reproduce the following two passages relevant to the case at hand:
“56. …
(1) to (7) …
B (8) In exercising legislative power, the legislature by mere
declaration, without anything more, cannot directly
overrule, revise or override a judicial decision. It can render
judicial decision ineffective by enacting valid law on the
topic within its legislative field fundamentally altering or
C changing its character retrospectively. The changed or
altered conditions are such that the previous decision would
not have been rendered by the court, if those conditions
had existed at the time of declaring the law as invalid. It is
also empowered to give effect to retrospective legislation
with a deeming date or with effect from a particular date.
D The legislature can change the character of the tax or duty from
impermissible to permissible tax but the tax or levy should answer
such character and the legislature is competent to recover the
invalid tax validating such a tax on removing the invalid base for
recovery from the subject or render the recovery from the State
E ineffectual. It is competent for the legislature to enact the law
with retrospective effect and authorise its agencies to levy and
collect the tax on that basis, make the imposition of levy collected
and recovery of the tax made valid, notwithstanding the declaration
by the court or the direction given for recovery thereof.
(9) The consistent thread that runs through all the decisions
F
of this Court is that the legislature cannot directly overrule
the decision or make a direction as not binding on it but
has power to make the decision ineffective by removing
the base on which the decision was rendered, consistent
with the law of the Constitution and the legislature must
G have competence to do the same.”
(emphasis supplied)
In State of Tamil Nadu37, the Court laid down twin tests for
testing validity of a validating law thus:
36
(1996) 7 SCC 637
H 37
supra at Footnote No. 18
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 309
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

“126. On deep reflection of the above discussion, in our opinion, A
the constitutional principles in the context of Indian Constitution
relating to separation of powers between the legislature, executive
and judiciary may, in brief, be summarized thus:
126.1 to 126.5 …..
126.6.If the legislature has the power over the subject- B
matter and competence to make a validating law, it can at
any time make such a validating law and make it
retrospective. The validity of a validating law, therefore,
depends upon whether the legislature possesses the
competence which it claims over the subject-matter and C
whether in making the validation law it removes the defect
which the courts had found in the existing law.”
(emphasis supplied)
29. The line of decisions discussed above reveals a settled position
as regards the competency of legislature to enact a retrospective validating D
Act, inter alia, delineated as under:
(i) The legislature must be having power over the subject matter
as also competence to make a validating law.
(ii) There must be a clear validating clause coupled with
substantive change in the earlier position. E
(iii) The retrospective operation must be specified clearly.
(iv) There can be no express or declaratory overruling of the
judgment of the Court.
(v) It is permissible for the legislature to make a decision of the
F
Court ineffective by removing the material basis of the
decision in the manner that the Court would not have arrived
at the same conclusion had the corrected/modified position
prevailed at the time of rendering the said earlier decision.
Notably, the factum of power vested in the State legislature over
G
the subject matter and its competence to make a validating law is not in
issue or disputed in the present case.
30. Relying upon the decision of Delhi High Court in P.L. Mehra38,
the petitioners have urged that the moment the Court declared the State
38
supra at Footnote No. 13 H
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A enactments as null and void, they were wiped off the statute book and
further amendment therein was simply not permissible to revive the same.
On a reading of this decision, it is clear that the Court was analysing the
effect of voidness in the light of Article 13 i.e., voidness due to violation
of any of the provisions of Part-III of the Constitution. This decision, in
our view, has no bearing on the issues involved in the present proceedings.
B
Thus, without dilating on this decision, suffice it to observe that when
voidness is a result of repugnancy between the State law and law made
by the Parliament, that is, voidness under Article 254 of the Constitution,
revival of such State law by enacting a subsequent amendment
substantively changing the basis of the voidness and applying it
C retrospectively from a prior date is recognised time and again by this
Court, as discussed above. We say no more.
DOES 2019 ACT NULLIFY THE JUDGMENT OF THE
HIGH COURT?
31. Having understood the legislative competency of the State
D
legislature in principle and in law, we may now examine whether the
legislature acted in violation of the above stated principles and thus,
exceeded its competency. For that, we must first examine the material
basis of the judgment of the High Court and see whether the substantive
changes brought about by enacting the 2019 Act result into successful
E revival of the State enactments.
32. The Madras High Court framed four issues for consideration,
as produced in the initial part of this judgment. We are not concerned
with any other issue except issue no. 3 relating to repugnancy between
the State Acts and Act made by the Parliament and permissibility of
F Section 105-A of the 2014 Act (Tamil Nadu State amendment of 2013
Act) for reviving the repugnant State Acts. Issue no. 3 is reproduced for
better appraisal thus:
“Issues:

G 74. The issues therefore, which arise for our consideration are:
1) …..
2) …..
3) Did the Impugned State Enactments become repugnant once
H the Parliament ‘made’ the New Land Acquisition Act. If so, did
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 311
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

the presidential assent to Section 105A inserted by Tamil Nadu A
Act No. 1 of 2015, revive the three acts?
….”
The High Court first examined the sweep of Article 254 and then
declared the State enactments to be repugnant from the moment
Presidential assent was obtained for the 2013 Act. It noted thus: B

“111. Applying the above principles, it is clear that both Parliament
and the State Legislature are competent to enact these laws. The
three State enactments received the assent of the President on
21.7.1978, 25.5.1999 and 16.9.2002 respectively and therefore,
prevailed in the State of Tamil Nadu even when the Old Act, 1894 C
covered the entire field. Contention of the petitioner is that when
the new Act came into force, the three state enactments have
become void. In order to save the acquisitions made under the
three State enactments, the State of Tamil Nadu brought out an
amendment to the Central Act by inserting Section 105-A in order D
to save the acquisitions made under the three State enactments
from 1.1.2014 to the insertion of 105-A. The State Government
also brought out three Government Orders dated 31.12.2014,
clearly mentioning that the acquisitions made under the three State
enactments would be saved by amendment to the new Land
Acquisition Act and for this purpose the amending Act even though E
received the assent of the President on 1.1.2015 was deemed to
have come into force on 1.1.2014. Article 254 kicks in when there
is repugnancy in any provision of the law made by the Legislature
of the State to any provision of law made by the Parliament which
the Parliament is competent to enact. Therefore, these state F
enactments are rendered void, the moment the New Act
was “made.” i.e. when it received the presidential assent,
as on 27.09.2013.”
(emphasis supplied)
G
Applying clause (2) of Article 254, it then observed that Section
105-A of the 2014 Act could not have revived the State enactments
once rendered void due to repugnancy having struck at a prior point of
time, and the only course of action for the revival of a repugnant law is
re-enactment followed by fresh presidential assent thus: H
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A “112. The only protection in this sense offered to law made by the
States in case of repugnancy is under Article 254(2). Importantly,
the repugnancy is noted only in respect of an earlier law laid down
by the Parliament. The provisions of Article 254(2) would not
apply in the case of a law already made by the State, which has
become repugnant as a result of a new enactment of Parliament.
B
Article 254(2) does not offer any protection to laws made by
States before the Central Legislation, which leads them to be
repugnant, comes into force. It requires the entire repugnant law
to be reserved for the consideration of the President, afresh, and
the President must give his consent to the entire law. This law
C which otherwise would be repugnant, is then specifically saved.
These laws must receive his assent in the present sense. Thus,
in order to bring any act within the purview of Article 254(2)
it must necessarily be re-enacted, and reconsidered by the
President afresh. Merely inserting Section 105A in the New
Act, shall not fulfil the requirements of Article 254(2), and
D the laws would remain repugnant.”
(emphasis supplied)
The High Court then recorded certain conclusions and the relevant
ones read thus:
“Conclusions:
E
158. In view of the discussion, the net result of Writ Petitions
before us is as follows:
158.1 .....
158.2 …..
F 158.3. However, the Writ Petitioners before us ultimately succeed
because, Article 254(1) by its operation rendered the impugned
Tamil Nadu Legislations repugnant, and null and void, as on the
date on which the New Act was made, i.e. 27.09.2013, the date
of making of the New Act, as held in the case of State of Kerala
G v Maar Appraem Kuri Co. (supra)39 and therefore the impugned
Acts do not survive.
158.4. By enacting Section 105-A of the New Act, the State
of Tamil Nadu could not have revived the three state Acts,
that had become repugnant as on 27.09.2013.
39
H supra at Footnote No. 26
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 313
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

158.5. In order to revive these acts, the State must re-enact A
these statutes, in accordance with Article 254(2) of the
Constitution of India, and obtain the assent of the President.
Merely, by inserting Section 105-A and the 5th Schedule, in
the new Act, these impugned enactments do not get
revived. Since this had admittedly not been done, the Acts remain
B
repugnant, and Article 254(1) renders them inoperative.
…..”
(emphasis supplied)
33. Analysing the judgment of the High Court for the limited purpose
of this case and without impinging upon the other contentions including C
the outcome of cases pending by way of special leave against the said
judgment, we note that the High Court has correctly explained the
concept of repugnancy under Article 254, but did not apply it in the same
manner to identify the actual existence of repugnancy between the State
Acts and law made by the Parliament. Assuming the presence of D
repugnancy as assumed by the High Court itself, the only enquiry before
the High Court was regarding the method of revival of repugnant State
laws. While undertaking such enquiry, it found Section 105-A of the
2014 Act to be an impermissible method of revival and called for re-
enactment as per Article 254(2) of the Constitution. This, in our view, is
the sole material basis of the judgment of the High Court. Strikingly, the E
High Court did not rule out revival and validation at all and grounded the
enquiry on due compliance with Article 254(2), for that is the only way
for a State law to prevail in the face of a subsequent law made by the
Parliament on the same subject.
34. We may briefly examine the concept of repugnancy and its F
functioning under Article 254. The concept of repugnancy is meant to
prevent the operation of two conflicting laws on the same field so as to
result into uncertainty and inconsistency. Naturally, when a situation like
that emerges, the subjects of law cannot be expected to approach a
Court immediately and seek a resolution as to which of the two laws G
would operate on them. Thus, the Constitution provides for univocal and
unambiguous solution in the form of Article 254 which makes it clear
that in such circumstances, the law made by the Parliament ought to
prevail and the subjects would be governed by it. However, it does not
stop here. It goes beyond this basic declaration and gives an opportunity
to the legislature to which the repugnant law belonged (State legislature) H
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A to revive it by obtaining the Presidential assent, thereby providing impetus
to the competency of the State legislature to meet with the fallouts of
repugnancy. It is crucial to note that Article 254 does not contemplate
that the State law and law made by the Parliament must be the same in
toto. For, to say that would render the whole objective of revival through
Presidential assent as pointless exercise as it will serve no purpose for
B
any State to enact a law exactly the same as the law made by the
Parliament. In fact, any such dittoed and clichéd law made by the State
legislature would be redundant. It (State) would rather follow the law
made by the Parliament.
35. Indubitably, Article 254 contemplates co-existence of Union
C and State laws, even if repugnant, but only after the repugnancy is assented
to by the President. Differently put, Article 254 is a manifestation of
decentralized law-making and recognition of the competency of the State
legislature to modulate dispensation as may be expedient to that State,
upon seeking Presidential assent for such deviation.
D 36. Having understood the material basis of the High Court
judgment and basic essence of the concept of repugnancy in light of
Article 254, the fundamental question now is whether the 2019 Act
qualifies as sufficient compliance of Article 254(2). For, Article 254(2) is
the only mode of revival as per the High Court judgment.
E 37. Article 254(2) is produced again for ready reference thus:
“254. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and
laws made by the Legislatures of States. —
(1) …
F (2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with
respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent
List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of
an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with
respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature
of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration
G
of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that
State:”
(emphasis supplied)
The basic ingredients for the application of Article 254(2) can be
H noted thus:
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 315
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

(i) A law made by the legislature of the State (the 2019 Act in this A
case);
(ii) Such law is made on a subject falling in the concurrent list
(Entry-42 of the Concurrent List in this case);
(iii) Such law is repugnant to the provisions of an earlier/existing
law made by the Parliament (the 2013 Act in this case); and B

(iv) The State law is reserved for the assent of the President and
has received the same.
Upon fulfilment of the above conditions, such State law would
prevail in the State despite there being a law made by the Parliament on C
the same subject and despite being repugnant thereto. The most peculiar
feature of Article 254(2) is the recognition of existence of repugnancy
between the law made by the Parliament and State law and rendering
that repugnancy inconsequential upon procurement of Presidential assent.
In this case, the State legislature duly passed the 2019 Act (State law)
on a subject of the concurrent list in the presence of a law made by the D
Parliament (2013 Act) and obtained the assent of the President to the
same on 02.12.2019 after duly placing the State law before the President
and duly stating the reason for reserving it for his assent. A priori, we
hold that this is in compliance of Article 254(2).
38. This understanding of Article 254(2) is well settled and E
reference can be usefully made to the following paragraph of Pt.
Rishikesh40:
“15.Clause (2) of Article 254 is an exception to clause (1).
If law made by the State Legislature is reserved for
consideration and receives assent of the President though F
the State law is inconsistent with the Central Act, the law
made by the Legislature of the State prevails over the
Central law and operates in that State as valid law. If
Parliament amends the law, after the amendment made by the
State Legislature has received the assent of the President, the
G
earlier amendment made by the State Legislature, if found
inconsistent with the Central amended law, both Central law and
the State Law cannot coexist without colliding with each other.
Repugnancy thereby arises and to the extent of the repugnancy
40
supra at Footnote No. 11 H
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A the State law becomes void under Article 254(1) unless the State
Legislature again makes law reserved for the consideration of
the President and receives the assent of the President. Full Bench
of the High Court held that since U.P. Act 57 of 1976 received
the assent of the President on 30-12-1976, while the Central Act
was assented on 9-9-1976, the U.P. Act made by the State
B
Legislature, later in point of time it is a valid law.”
(emphasis supplied)
39. The petitioners have advanced lengthy arguments as to how
the 2019 Act is repugnant to the 2013 Act. We are constrained to observe
that the whole exercise of pointing out any repugnancy after a validating
C Act has obtained the assent of the President is otiose. For, the whole
purpose of Article 254(2) is to resuscitate and operationalize a repugnant
Act or repugnant provisions in such Act. For, the Constitution provides
concurrent powers to the states as well on subjects falling in List-III.
After duly complying with the requirements of Article 254(2), the Court
D is left with nothing to achieve by identifying repugnancy between the
laws because the same has already been identified, accepted and validated
as per the sanction of the Constitution under Article 254(2). To indulge
in such an exercise would be intuitive. Moreover, the Court ought not to
nullify a law made in compliance with Article 254(2) on the sole ground
of repugnancy. For, repugnancy, in such cases, is said to have been
E constitutionalized. To put it differently, the very purpose of engaging in
the exercise, in terms of clause (2) of Article 254, pre-supposes existence
of repugnancy and is intended to overcome such repugnancy. Therefore,
the endeavour of the petitioners in the present matter to highlight
repugnancy, is misdirected, flimsy and inconsequential.
F 40. Having said thus, the argument that the 2019 Act could not be
said to be a “re-enactment” of the 1997 Act and 2001 Act deserves to
be addressed. For, the High Court judgment called for re-enactment for
the proper fulfilment of Article 254(2). While enacting the 2019 Act, the
State legislature neither individually placed the 1997 Act and 2001 Act in
the form of fresh bills before the House, nor introduced amending Acts
G
for the said three enactments in order to incorporate the provisions of
compensation, resettlement and rehabilitation. Instead, it framed one bill
that sought to achieve four purposes –
first, amend the State enactments to provide for different provisions
of compensation to bring them in line with the law made by the
H Parliament;
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 317
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

second, add fresh provisions relating to resettlement, rehabilitation A
and infrastructure amenities at par with the 2013 Act;
third, revive the enactments declared to be repugnant and void
by the High Court and validate them after passing this bill in the assembly
and placing it before the President; and
fourth, restore the validity of all past acquisitions under the State B
legislations, quashed by the High Court by making the Act operative
from a retrospective date.
41. Be it noted, enactment or re-enactment involves introducing a
bill in the legislature, readings of the bill as mandated in the assembly
rules of conduct, passing thereof by the legislature, placing it before the C
Governor or the President (if necessary). Such a bill could either delineate
all the existing and fresh provisions from scratch or could incorporate
those provisions by way of reference. The latter would fall in the category
of referential legislation, as done in the present case. The petitioners
have contended that such referential legislation is impermissible and re- D
enactment would mean introducing fresh bills containing the same
provisions of 1997 Act and 2001 Act. We must note that the argument is
tenuous. For, we fail to see what material difference would result in
following either of the two methods. The legislature has made no attempt
to hide the provisions as the 2019 Act is divided into three parts and each
part is specifically dedicated to concerned State enactment. E

42. To wit, the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 2019 Act
depicts the background in which it was thought appropriate to resort to
such legislative tool, for the revival of the concerned State Acts declared
to be repugnant by the High Court including to amend the same and for
validating the actions already taken thereunder. It would be useful to F
reproduce the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 2019 Act, which
reads thus: -
“In the Writ Petitions filed against the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 2014 (Tamil Nadu G
Act 1 of 2015), the Division Bench of Hon’ble High Court of
Madras in its order dated 03-07-2019 has held that Article 254(1)
of the Constitution, by its operation rendered the Tamil Nadu Land
Acquisition Acts, namely, the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for
Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 (Tamil Nadu Act 31 of 1978),
H
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act,
1997 (Tamil Nadu Act 10 of 1999) and the Tamil Nadu Highways
Act, 2001 (Tamil Nadu Act 34 of 2002) inoperative on the date on
which the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Central
Act 30 of 2013) was made, namely, 27th September 2013.
B
Consequently, the High Court has held that all the acquisitions
made under the said three Tamil Nadu Acts on or after the 27th
September 2013 as illegal and quashed them save those lands
which have already been put to use and the purpose for which the
land was acquired has been accomplished.
C 2. Under the aforesaid three Tamil Nadu Acts, on and from 26th
September 2013, though 23804 hectares of land have been
acquired, only 1,373 hectares have been actually put to use. The
acquisitions proceedings are in progress in the remaining 22,431
hectares of land. This involves an approximate value of
D Rs.1,84,778 crores and the projects are capable of generating
employment for 1.83 lakh persons. As a result, the State Exchequer
would be put to heavy monetary loss besides derailing many
developmental projects, causing significant negative impact on the
State economy.
E 3. To tide over the situation, the Government have decided
to revive the aforesaid three Tamil Nadu Acts and to apply
the provisions relating to the determination of
compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement and
infrastructure amenities as in the said Central Act 30 of
2013 to the land acquisitions made under the Tamil Nadu
F Acts and to validate the action already taken under the said
Acts. Accordingly, the Government have decided to
undertake legislation for the above said purpose.
4. The Bill seeks to give effect to the above decision.”

G (emphasis supplied)
The provisions of the 2019 Act notified in the Tamil Nadu
Government Gazette Extraordinary No. 451 (Part IV – Section 2) on
5.12.2019, as commended to the State legislature and also the Governor
and the President of India to accord assent to overcome the repugnancy
with the Act made by the Parliament, read thus: -
H
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 319
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

“The following Act of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly A
received the assent of the President on the 2nd December 2019
and is hereby published for general information: —
ACT No. 38 OF 2019.
An Act to revive the operation of the Tamil Nadu
Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978, B
the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes
Act, 1997 and the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001.
BE it enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the State of
Tamil Nadu in the Seventieth Year of the Republic of India as
follows: — C
1. (1) This Act may be called the Tamil Nadu Land
Acquisition Laws (Revival of Operation, Amendment and
Validation) Act, 2019.
(2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the
26th day of September 2013. D
2. (1) All the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of
Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred
to as the 1978 Act), except the provisions relating to the
determination of compensation, shall stand revived with effect
on and from the 26th day of September 2013. E
(2) All rules, notifications, notices, orders, directions issued
or any other proceedings initiated under the 1978 Act, except those
relating to determination of compensation, which were in force
immediately before the 26th day of September 2013 shall, for all
purposes, be deemed to have been revived on and from the F
26th day of September 2013.
(3) The provisions relating to the determination of
compensation as specified in the First Schedule, rehabilitation
and resettlement as specified in the Second Schedule and
infrastructure amenities as specified in the Third Schedule to the G
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 shall apply to the
land acquisition proceedings under the 1978 Act.
3. Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of
the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
H
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 shall
cease to apply to any land which is required for the purpose
specified in sub-section (1) of section 4 of the 1978 Act and any
such land shall be acquired by the Government only in
accordance with the provisions of the 1978 Act.
B 4. Section 20 of the 1978 Act shall be omitted.
5. Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment,
decree or order of any court, the provisions of the 1978 Act, except
the provisions relating to determination of compensation, shall be
deemed to have been in force in all material times during the
C period commencing on the 26th day of September 2013 and ending
with the date of publication of this Act in the Tamil Nadu
Government Gazette, and anything done or any action taken under
the 1978 Act, except those relating to determination of
compensation shall be deemed to have been validly done or
taken under the 1978 Act.
D
PART – II.
6. (1) All the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of
Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997 (hereinafter referred to
as the 1999 Act), except the provisions relating to the determination
of compensation, shall stand revived with effect on and from
E
the 26th day of September 2013.
(2) All rules, notifications, notices, orders, directions issued
or any other proceedings initiated under the 1999 Act, except those
relating to determination of compensation, which were in force
immediately before the 26th day of September 2013 shall, for all
F purposes, be deemed to have been revived on and from the
26th day of September 2013.
(3) The provisions relating to the determination of
compensation as specified in the First Schedule, rehabilitation
and resettlement as specified in the Second Schedule and
G infrastructure amenities as specified in the Third Schedule to the
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 shall apply to the
land acquisition proceedings under the 1999 Act.
7. Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of
H the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 321
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 shall A
cease to apply to any land which is required for the purpose
specified in sub-section (1) of section 3 of the 1999 Act and any
such land shall be acquired by the Government only in
accordance with the provisions of the 1999 Act.
8. Section 21 of the 1999 Act shall be omitted. B
9. Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment,
decree or order of any court, the provisions of the 1999 Act, except
the provisions relating to determination of compensation, shall be
deemed to have been in force in all material times during the
period commencing on the 26th day of September 2013 and ending C
with the date of publication of this Act in the Tamil Nadu
Government Gazette, and anything done or any action taken under
the 1999 Act, except those relating to determination of
compensation shall be deemed to have been validly done or
taken under the 1999 Act.
D
PART – III.
10. (1) All the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act,
2001 (hereinafter referred to as the 2002 Act), except the
provisions relating to the determination of compensation, shall
stand revived with effect on and from the 26th day of
E
September 2013.
(2) All rules, notifications, notices, orders, directions issued
or any other proceedings initiated under the 2002 Act, except those
relating to determination of compensation, which were in force
immediately before the 26th day of September 2013 shall, for all
purposes, be deemed to have been revived on and from the F
26th day of September 2013.
(3) The provisions relating to the determination of
compensation as specified in the First Schedule, rehabilitation
and resettlement as specified in the Second Schedule and
infrastructure amenities as specified in the Third Schedule to the G
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 shall apply to the
land acquisition proceedings under the 2002 Act.
11. Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions
of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land H
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 shall
cease to apply to any land which is required for the purpose
specified in sub-section (1) of section 15 of the 2002 Act and any
such land shall be acquired by the Government only in
accordance with the provisions of the 2002 Act.
B 12. Section 68 of the 2002 Act shall be omitted.
13. Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment,
decree or order of any court, the provisions of the 2002 Act, except
the provisions relating to determination of compensation, shall be
deemed to have been in force in all material times during the
C period commencing on the 26th day of September 2013 and ending
with the date of publication of this Act in the Tamil Nadu
Government Gazette, and anything done or any action taken under
the 2002 Act, except those relating to determination of
compensation shall be deemed to have been validly done or
taken under the 2002 Act.
D
(By order of the Governor)
C. GOPI RAVIKUMAR,
Secretary to Government (FAC)
Law Department.”
E
(emphasis supplied)

As aforesaid, the legislative intent behind the 2019 Act and more
particularly, the assent accorded thereto by the Governor and the President
F of India for overcoming repugnancy with the Act made by the Parliament,
was to revive the operation of the State enactments declared as null and
void being unconstitutional and repugnant to the Act made by the
Parliament and to amend the same, as well as, validate the actions already
taken by the State authorities thereunder.
G 43. For instance, Part-I of the 2019 Act talks about revival of
1978 Act in Section-2(1), revival of all the notifications, orders etc. passed
thereunder in Section-2(2), incorporation of First, Second and Third
Schedules of the 2013 Act to the 1978 Act in Section-2(3), saving clause
in Section-3 and validation of previous acts in Section-5. Similar pattern
H is followed in Parts-II and III for 1997 Act and 2001 Act respectively.
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 323
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

Notably, Section 20 of the 1978 Act, Section 21 of the 1999 Act and A
Section 68 of the 2002 Act were omitted, respectively by Sections 4, 8
and 12 of the 2019 Act. The overall scheme is well laid-out and is not
cryptic in any manner so as to play a fraud upon the mandate of the
Constitution. More importantly, the concerned constitutional bodies i.e.,
legislative assembly, Governor and President have understood the
B
substance of what is placed before them. We are concerned with the
substance of the legislation, and not its form.
44. We must note that referential legislation is a recognized form
of legislation and the Constitution does not attach unconstitutionality to a
legislation for being framed in a certain manner until and unless it violates
any provision of the Constitution. In Girnar Traders (3) vs. State of C
Maharashtra & Ors.41, this Court noted how the provisions imported in
a legislation by way of reference become a part of the legislation itself
for all practical purposes. It observed thus:
“89. With the development of law, the legislature has adopted the
common practice of referring to the provisions of the existing D
statute while enacting new laws. Reference to an earlier law
in the later law could be a simple reference of provisions of
earlier statute or a specific reference where the earlier law
is made an integral part of the new law i.e. by incorporation.
In the case of legislation by reference, it is fictionally made E
a part of the later law. …”
(emphasis supplied)
In Ujagar Prints 42,the Court while deciding the impact of
subsequent changes in a statute referred to in a legislation, promptly
noted how the reference of an Act or its provisions into another Act F
practically amounts to re-enactment of the existing provisions at the
time of such reference. It observed thus:
“93. Referential legislation is of two types. One is where an earlier
Act or some of its provisions are incorporated by reference into a
later Act. In this event, the provisions of the earlier Act or G
those so incorporated, as they stand in the earlier Act at
the time of incorporation, will be read into the later Act.
Subsequent changes in the earlier Act or the incorporated
41
(2011) 3 SCC 1
42
supra at Footnote No. 34 H
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A provisions will have to be ignored because, for all practical
purposes, the existing provisions of theearlier Act have
been re-enacted by such reference into the later one,
rendering irrelevant what happens to the earlier statute thereafter.
...”
B (emphasis supplied)
In Krishna Chandra Gangopadhyaya 43 , the Court
acknowledged that there is no constitutional inhibition to legislation by
incorporation and found it in accordance with the power accorded by
the constitutional law to instrumentalities clothed with plenary authorities
C (the State legislature in this case). The relevant paragraph reads thus:
“12. …
…
The kernel of Gwalior Rayon44 is the ambit of delegation by
D Legislatures, and the reference to legislation by adoption or
incorporation supports the competence and does not
contradict the vires of such a process — not an unusual
phenomenon in legislative systems nor counter to the
plenitude of powers constitutional law has in many
jurisdictions conceded to such instrumentalities clothed
E with plenary authority. The Indian Legislatures and courts have
never accepted any inhibition against or limitation upon enactment
by incorporation, as such.”
(emphasis supplied)
45. The authorities discussed above indicate a clear line of precept
F
that plenary power of legislature is not limited to the substance of legislation
in context of the Seventh Schedule, but also extends to the determination
of the form of legislation. To say that a particular form of legislative
activity is not permissible would require a strong basis in the Constitution,
which has not been pointed out by the petitioners. The Constitution
G envisages a judicial review of the existence of legislative competence
and use of such competence to enact something that does not violate
Part-III or other provisions of the Constitution. It does not envisage a
43
supra at Footnote No. 27
44
Gwalior Rayon Mills v. Asst. C.S.T., (1974) 4 SCC 98, 125-126 : 1974 SCC (Tax)
H 226
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 325
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

review of the cosmetic characteristics of a legislation as long as the A
substance of such legislation has its roots in the Constitution.
46. We may now consider the argument that the 2019 Act does
not remove the defects found by the High Court and thus, lacks
determinative principle thereby making it arbitrary. The 2019 Act is a
conscious attempt by the State legislature to bring four material aspects B
of land acquisition under the three State enactments at par with the 2013
Act i.e., compensation, rehabilitation, resettlement and infrastructure
facilities. No doubt, certain features of the stated law made by the
Parliament have been left out, but that debate does not fall for our
consideration as the vires of 1997 Act and 2001 Act are already under
consideration in the batch of SLPs, as already pointed above. To say C
that failure to import all provisions of the law made by the Parliament in
the State enactments results into non-removal of defects pointed by the
High Court, is nothing but a palpable misreading of the judgment of the
High Court.
47. Whereas, the judgment of the High Court does not even point D
out the absence of compensation/rehabilitation/ resettlement/
infrastructure related provisions as a defect in the State enactments. It
nowhere points out the exact provisions from the State enactments which
are repugnant to the law made by the Parliament. The only defect pointed
out by the High Court was the impermissibility of Section 105-A (coming E
into effect from 01.01.2014), as a tool for reviving the State enactments
once rendered repugnant (on 27.09.2013) due to law made by the
Parliament. The State has since been advised to accept that defect pointed
out by the High Court and has moved on from that thought process by
devising a new legislative tool for validating the State enactments in line
with Article 254(2). Had the legislature re-enacted Section 105-A even F
after the declaration of invalidity by the High Court, it would have been
a case of non-removal of defect pointed out by the High Court. In fact,
that would have been declaratory overruling of the judgment of the Court
by the legislature, which, as already discussed at length, is simply
impermissible. The effect of the 2019 Act is to change the law G
retrospectively and not to overrule the judgment of the Court.
48. The dictum of the Court in Karnataka Pawn Broker
Association45 does not apply to this case. It is based on a radically
different factual premise. In that case, the Court was considering a
45
supra at Footnote No. 10 H
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A situation of clear-cut overruling of mandamus issued by the Court. No
such thing has been done in this case because there is no resurfacing of
Section 105-A in the same form and also because revival by way of the
2019 Act is in tune with the mandate of Article 254(2). Strikingly, the
High Court nowhere issued a prohibition on revival and validation at all.
It only disapproved one particular way of revival. Notably, this Court in
B
State of Tamil Nadu46 expounded that “One of the tests for determining
whether a judgment is nullified is to see whether the law and the
judgment are inconsistent and irreconcilable so that both cannot
stand together.” Applying this test, we see no irreconcilability between
the High Court judgment and the 2019 Act. The 2019 Act is an evolution,
C not reiteration of the earlier position much less regression thereof.
49. Even noting the test in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. & Anr.
vs. Broach Borough Municipality & Ors.47, which states that the
ultimate query should be whether the Court would have given the same
decision had the circumstances been the altered ones, we see no indication
D in the High Court order that the Court would have arrived at the same
decision even today. For, the method prescribed under Article 254(2)
has been followed now.
PRESIDENTIAL ASSENT UNDER ARTICLE 254(2)
50. We may now address the contention that the actual repugnancy
E was not pointed out to the President while obtaining assent and thus,
requirements of Article 254(2) remained unfulfilled. To address this, the
respondents have placed on record Letter No. 13566/Rev-Dfg/2019-1
dated 25.07.2019 written by the State Government for obtaining the
assent of the President. The letter succinctly narrates the entire factual
position including about the failed attempt of the State to revive the State
F
enactments by enacting Section 105-A. After duly specifying the existence
of distinctive provisions in various enactments, particularly relating to
compensation, resettlement, rehabilitation and infrastructural facilities,
the letter clearly states that some provisions of the 2019 Act could be
said to be repugnant to the 2013 Act and thus, the Act is being placed for
G consideration of the President as per Article 254. The relevant paragraph
reads thus:
“7. The provisions of the Bill proposes to revive the three Tamil
Nadu Acts, namely, the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan
46
supra at Footnote No. 18
H 47
(1969) 2 SCC 283
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 327
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 (Tamil Nadu Act 31 of 1978), the A
Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997
(Tamil Nadu Act 10 of 1999) and the Tamil Nadu Highways Act,
2001 (Tamil Nadu Act 34 of 2002) with retrospective effect from
the 26th September, 2013 and the provisions of the said three
Tamil Nadu Acts may be said to be repugnant to the
B
provisions contained in the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (Central Act 30 of 2013), which is
an earlier law made by Parliament on the Concurrent
subject. Hence, the Bill is reserved for the consideration of the
President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution.” C
(emphasis supplied)
51. The petitioners’ argument stemmed from the decision in Kaiser-
I-Hind Pvt. Ltd.48 However, upon closer examination, we find that the
reliance is misplaced. In that case, the Court was considering a requisition
of assent by the State Government without specifying the exact law D
made by the Parliament which is purportedly repugnant to the State law.
In that light, the Court observed that the mandate of Article 254 requires
placing the State law before the President for his/her consideration for
permitting the State law to prevail over a specific law made by the
Parliament. In other words, there can be no general assent against all E
laws made by the Parliament operating on the subject. The Court went
on to make it clear that judicial review of assent does not permit examining
whether the assent was rightly or wrongly or erroneously given. In
paragraph 25, it noted thus:
“25. In our view, for finding out whether the assent was F
given qua the repugnancy between the State legislation and
the earlier law made by Parliament, there is no question of
deciding validity of such assent nor the assent is subjected
to any judicial review. That is to say, merely looking at the
record, for which assent was sought, would not mean that
the Court is deciding whether the assent is rightly, wrongly G
or erroneously granted. The consideration by the Court is
limited to the extent that whether the State has sought
assent qua particular earlier law or laws made by Parliament
prevailing in the State or it has sought general assent. In
48
supra at Footnote No. 17 H
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A such case, the Court is not required to decide the validity of the
“assent” granted by the President. In the present case, the assent
was given after considering the extent and nature of repugnancy
between the Bombay Rent Act and the Transfer of Property Act
as well as the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. Therefore, it
would be totally unjustified to hold that once the assent is granted
B
by the President, the State law would prevail qua earlier other
law enacted by Parliament for which no assent was sought for
nor which was reserved for the consideration of the President.”
(emphasis supplied)
C To state the limited scope of examination of assent under Article
254, the Court went on to observe that it is not even considering whether
the assent was given without considering the extent or nature of
repugnancy and noted that:
“27. In this case, we have made it clear that we are not considering
D the question that the assent of the President was rightly or wrongly
given. We are also not considering the question that — whether
“assent” given without considering the extent and the nature of
the repugnancy should be taken as no assent at all. …..”
In the concurrent opinion by Doraiswamy Raju J. in the same
E case, His Lordship has resonated the same view and even observed that
so far the assent under Article 254 is concerned, mere supply of copy of
the bill may obviate the need to pin-point provisions thereunder but the
law made by the Parliament which is sought to give way to the State law
must be clearly specified. In paragraph 74, it is noted thus:

F “74.The mere forwarding of a copy of the Bill may obviate,
if at all, only the need to refer to each one of the provisions
therein in detail in the requisition sent or the letter
forwarding it, but not obliterate the necessity to point out
specifically the particular Central law or provisions with
reference to which, the predominance is claimed or
G purported to be claimed. The deliberate use of the word
“consideration” in clause (2) of Article 254, in my view, not only
connotes that there should be an active application of mind, but
also postulates a deliberate and careful thought process before
taking a decision to accord or not to accord the assent sought for.
If the object of referring the State law for consideration is to have
H
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 329
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

the repugnancy resolved by securing predominance to the State A
law, the President has to necessarily consider the nature and extent
of repugnancy, the feasibility, practicalities and desirabilities
involved therein, though may not be obliged to write a judgment in
the same manner, the courts of law do, before arriving at a
conclusion to grant or refuse to grant or even grant partially, if the
B
repugnancy is with reference to more than one law in force made
by Parliament. Protection cannot be claimed for the State law,
when questioned before courts, taking cover under the assent,
merely asserting that it was in general form, irrespective of the
actual fact whether the State claimed for such protection against
a specific law or the attention of the President was invited to at C
least an apprehended repugnancy vis-à-vis the particular Central
law. .....”
(emphasis supplied)
52. In the present case, the letter seeking assent clearly
demonstrates that the three State enactments were made for the purpose D
of speedy acquisitions. It further states that the law made by the
Parliament rendered the three enactments repugnant and out of operation
owing to the Madras High Court judgment. It also states that the State
has considerable interest, having a strong bearing on the public exchequer,
in saving and reviving the three State enactments. It also clearly specifies E
the law made by the Parliament, which could be coming in the way of
the State enactments for due consideration by the President. Suffice it
to say that the communication was in compliance with the mandate of
Article 254 as well as with the decision of this Court in Kaiser-I-Hind
Pvt. Ltd.49 We see no reason to intervene on this ground.
F
EFFECT OF RETROSPECTIVE COMMENCEMENT
DATE OF THE 2019 ACT
53. We may now consider the argument that retrospectivity from
26.09.2013 was fatal to the 2019 Act as on that date, there was no 2013
Act in operation and when the 2013 Act came into operation on 27.09.2013, G
the State enactments would again become repugnant. In our view, even
this plea is untenable. For, a law is said to be “made” on the day it
obtains Presidential assent. Throughout the chapter on federal relations,
the word “made” or “make” is used in the Constitution while referring to
49
supra at Footnote No. 17 H
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A legislative activity. Making of law implies a clearly demarcated procedure
which culminates with the assent of the President under Article 111 or
under Article 254 (if legislated on same subject matter) or of Governor
under Article 200. Notably, Articles 111, 200 and 254 are part of the
constitutionally prescribed legislative procedure itself. The other concept
relevant for this discussion is of “commencement”. Commencement of
B
law, unlike making of law, is not a part of the legislative process. Rather,
it is an offshoot of the successful culmination of the legislative process.
In other words, commencement is a question which follows the legislative
process and intent and does not overlap with it. The commencement of
law could be from the date of making (assent), or from a back date or
C even from a future date. But it does not affect the fact that the legislation
has stepped into the statute book and the provisions relating to repugnancy
as well as other provisions of the chapter of legislative relations between
the Union and the State have become active from that point onwards, as
they are concerned with the date of making. Thus, for checking
repugnancy, the relevant point of time would be the date of making i.e.,
D
date of assent and not date of commencement. This understanding finds
approval from the decision of this Court in Mar Appraem Kuri Company
Limited50 thus:
“60. ...We have to read the word “made” in the proviso to Article
254(2) in a consistent manner.
E
61.The entire above discussion on Articles 245, 246, 250,
251 is only to indicate that the word “made” has to be read
in the context of the law-making process and, if so read, it
is clear that to test repugnancy one has to go by the making
of law and not by its commencement.”
F
(emphasis supplied)
54. The above understanding emanates from the basic concept of
retrospectivity. The primary objective of retrospective application of a
law is to alter an undesirable past circumstance and it is meant to apply
G to things which have already happened. In Halsbury’s Laws of England,
retrospectivity is defined as:
“921. Meaning of “retrospective”. It has been said that
“retrospective” is somewhat ambiguous and that a good deal of
confusion has been caused by the fact that it is used in more
50
H supra at Footnote No. 26
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. 331
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

senses than one. In general, however, the courts regard as A
retrospective any statute which operates on cases or facts
coming into existence before its commencement in the
sense that it affects, even if for the future only, the character
or consequences of transactions previously entered into
or of other past conduct. Thus a statute is not retrospective
B
merely because it affects existing rights; or is it retrospective
merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn
from a time antecedent to its passing.”
(emphasis supplied)
The underlying purpose of retrospectivity, therefore, is to cure C
including validate certain transactions of the past by making a law in the
present and not to compete with the laws existing in the past at that point
of time. In this case, the objective was to save and validate past
acquisitions under the three State enactments, which were valid until the
commencement of the 2013 Act but stood quashed due to the High
Court decision. This was also for altering the basis of the law in existence D
at that point of time and providing for benefits at par with the 2013 Act,
so far as it was fit in the wisdom of the State legislature. No doubt, it
may appear anomalous to operationalise the 2019 Act from 26.09.2013,
a day prior to the making of the 2013 Act, but it does not make any
impact on the validity thereof or its substance. The date has been chosen E
by the State legislature only by way of abundant caution and, in our
view, rightly. It is obviously relevant to overcome the repugnancy
corresponding to the commencement of the 2013 Act. Adopting any
other interpretation would not only be unwarranted as per the constitutional
scheme but would also strike at the very purpose of a retrospective
reviving and validating enactment. More so, it would open a pandora’s F
box of unforeseen conflicts.
55. During the course of hearing as well as in the written
submissions, the petitioners drew a comparative analysis between the
provisions of the three State enactments and the 2013 Act to establish a
case of violation of equality under Article 14. The respondents objected G
to the same by stating that such an approach is impermissible. Be that as
it may, we are leaving this contention open as it is beyond the limited
scope of our consideration herein. We deem it fit to desist from dilating
thereon in this judgment. The petitioners herein may raise all other issues
not dealt with in this judgment in relation to the validity of State enactments H
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.

A in the other pending cases arising from the decision of the High Court,
including by getting themselves impleaded therein.
56. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we hold the 2019 Act to be
a legitimate legislative exercise and find it to be consistent with and
within the four corners of Article 254 of the Constitution of India and
B also of the High Court judgment.
57. Thus, we dismiss the present batch of writ petitions.
58. Interlocutory applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of
in view of the aforesaid discussion. We pass no order as to costs.

C
Nidhi Jain Writ petitions dismissed.

D

E

F

G

H