Holding

The High Court erred in interfering; courts should not disturb an employer's date‑of‑birth determination made in accordance with service rules, and the employee bears the burden of proving any error.

Summary

The employee, Shib Kumar Dushad, claimed that his date of birth recorded by his employer, G.M. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., was incorrect and sought correction to extend his superannuation. The employer had referred the matter to its Medical Board, which, following the company's service rules and Implementation Instruction No. 76, determined his birth date as 13‑Oct‑1936, setting retirement in 1996. The employee relied on certificates issued by the Director General of Mines Safety stating a birth date of 9‑Feb‑1946 and obtained interim orders from the Calcutta High Court directing the employer to alter his service record. The Supreme Court held that the High Court should not have interfered, as the employer had complied with the prescribed procedure and there was no evident clerical error; the burden of proof lay on the employee to produce conclusive evidence, which he failed to do. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the lower courts' judgments were set aside, and the writ petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 can interfere with an employer's determination of an employee's date of birth when the employer has followed the procedure laid down in service rules.
Whether certificates issued by the Director General of Mines Safety constitute conclusive evidence to alter the date of birth recorded in service records.
Who bears the burden of proof in a dispute over the correctness of an employee's date of birth in service records.
Whether interim relief extending service beyond the statutory retirement age should be granted in such cases.

Legislation cited

Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act

Subjects

date of birthservice recordsuperannuationArticle 226writ petitionservice rulesburden of proofinterim relief

Judgment

A G.M. BHARAT COKING COAL LTD., WEST BENGAL
v.
SHIB KUMAR DUSHAD AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 2, 2000

B [M.B. SHAH AND D.P. MOHAPATRA, JJ.]
I

Service Law:

Date of birth-Change of-Employee raised dispute over his date of
C birth long after joining service-Employer determined the correct date of
birth in accordance with procedure prescribed under Service Rules or General
Instructions-No arithmetical mistake or typographical errors-Interference
with-By High Court-Held : Under such circumstances High Court should
not interfere with the decision of employer-Constitution of India, Art 226.

D The year of birth of the respondent-employee was recorded as 1932 in
the Form B register maintaine(J by the appellant-employer under the Mines
Act, 1952. The respondent was to superannuate in 1992 on attaining the age
of 60 years.

In 1973 the respondent acquired a certificate of Gas Testing and Mining
E Sirdarship and his date of birth was mentioned as 9.2.1936 in the said
certificate. In view of the apparent discrepancy in the date of birth of the
respondent, the appellant's Medical Board determin~ the date of birth of the
respondent as 13.10.1936 under the relevant Service Rules. Accordingly,
the respondent was to superannuate on 13.10.1996.
F Thereafter, the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court .-
for a direction to change his date of birth as 9.2.1936. The High Court
allowed the writ petition. Hence his appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

G HELD : I. In a case where controversy over the date of birth of an
employee has been raised long after joining the service and the matter has
engaged the attention of the authority concerned and has been determined
by following the procedure prescribed under Service Rules or General
Instructions issued by the employer and it is not the case of the employee
H that there has been any arithmetical mistake or typographical error patent
336
G.M. BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. i•. SHIB KUMAR DUSHAD 337
on the face of the record, the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary A
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should not interfere with
. the decision of the employer. (341-F-Gl

2. Date of birth of an employee is not only important for the employee
but for the employer also. On the length of service put in by the employee
depends the quantum of retiral benefits he would be entitled to. Therefore, B .
- while determining the dispute in such matters courts should bear in mind
that a change of the date of birth long after joining service, particularly when
the employee is due to retire shortly, which will upset the date recorded in
the service, records maintained in due course of administration should not
generally be accepted. In such a case the burden is heavy on the employee
who comes to the court with the case the date of birth in the service record
c
maintained by the employer is untrue and incorrect. The burden can be
discharged only by producing acceptable evidence of a clinching nature. In
a large number of cases employees who are on the verge of retirement raise
a dispute regarding correctness of date of birth entered in the service record
and the courts are inclined to pass an interim order for continuance of such D
employees beyond the date of superannuation on the basis of the entry of date
of birth in the service record. Such a situation cannot be commended .for the
reason that the court in passing such an interim order grants a relief to the
employee even before determining the issue regarding correctness of the
date of birth entered in the service record. Such interim orders create various
complications. Anticipated vacancy for which the employee next in the line E
has been waiting does not materialise, on account of which the junior is
denied promotion which he has all along been led to believe will be his due
on the retirement of the senior. The High Court, therefore, erred in interfering
with the date of birth/age of the respondent as determined by the appellant.
(343-8-F; 349-C( F
Secretary and Commissioner, Home Department v. R. Kirubakaran,
(1994) Supp. I SCC 155; Burn Standard Co. ltd v. Dinabandhu Majumdar,
(1995( 4 SCC 172 and Union of India v. C. Ramaswamy, (l.997( 4 SCC 647,
relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6142 of G
2000.

From the Judgment and Order dated 22.2.99 of the Calcutta High Court
in A.P.O.T. No. 587of1996.

Anip Sachthey and Ms. Sandhya Rajpal for the Appellant. H
338 SUPREME COURT REPO~TS (2000] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A B. Kanta Rao and Sudha Gupta for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D.P. MOHAPATRA, J. Leave granted.

B We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., which is a Govt. Company and a subsidiary
of Coal India Ltd., was the employer of the respondent - Shri Shib Kumar
-
Dushad (hereinafter referred to as 'the respondent'). The company through
its General Manager, Chanch Victoria Area, Post Barakar, District Burdwan,
C West Bengal has filed the present appeal. The controversy raised in the case
centres round the date of birth of the respondent.

The respondent was initially employed in Chirkunda Coal Company
which was under private ownership. At the time of entry into service, the year
D of birth of the said respondent was entered in Form-'B' register maintained
under the Mines Act, 1952 as 1932. On coming into force of the Coal Mines
Nationalisation Act, 1973, the ownership of the coal mines in which the
respondent was employed, vested absolutely in the Central Govt. and thereafter
it was transferred to the appellant, free from all encumbrances. The service
of the respondent was taken over and the service records including the Form-
E 'B' register relating to the respondent were handed over by the erstwhile
management to the appellant. As the year of birth of the respondent was
entered in the Form-'B' register as 1932, he was to superannuate in 1992. The
said entry of the date of birth was carried over to the Form-'B' register
maintained by the appellant.

F In 1973 the respondent acquired certificates of Gas Testing and Mining
Sirdarship having come out successfully in the examinations conducted by
the Director General of Mines Safety. On the basis of the particulars submitted
by the said respondent, 9.2.1946 was mentioned as his date of birth in the
certificate. In 1987-88 when the appellant was in the process of preparing
G records of the employees whose services had been taken over under the Coal
Mines Nationalisation Act, the respondent, relying on the aforementioned
certificates claimed his date of birth to be 9.2.1946. In view of the apparent
discrepancy in the date of birth of the respondent entered in the Form-'B'
register maintained under the Mines Act and the date mentioned in the Gas
Testing and Mining Sirdarship certificates , the appellant as per the terms of
H the settlement arrived at between the management and the union representing
G.M. BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. v. SHIB KUMAR DUSHAD [MOHAPATRA, J.J 339

workmen of the company, requested its Medical Board to determine the A
correct age of the respondent and asked the said respondent to appear before
the Medical Board. The Medical Board, on examining the respondent,
determined his age to be 52 years as on 13.10.1988. On the basis of the report
of the Medical Board the date of birth of the respondent was taken as
13.10.1936 and the date of his superannuation as 13.l0.1996.
B
After about three years the respondent filed the writ petition bearing
No.3537 of l 991 before the Calcutta High Court seeking inter a/ia a direction
to the appellant to enter his date of birth as 9.2. l 946. He placed reliance on
the certificates of Mining Sirdarship and Overmanship granted by the Director
General of Mines Safety. The learned Single Judge of the High Court disposed C
of the writ petition by the order dated 20. l. l 994 directing the appellant to
consider the representation of the respondent for correction of his date of
birth. On 14th March, 1994 the respondent made an application for correctioh
of his date of birth as 9.2.1946. Considering the said application of the
respondent, the appellant, by the order dated 2 l/25.5.1994, communicated its
decision that there was no ground to re-open the question of the date of birth. D

The respondent filed another writ petition, Civil Writ Petition No. 2717
of 1994 before the Calcutta High Court seeking a writ/order for cancellation
and withdrawal of the order dated 21 /25 .5.1994 and to direct correction of his
date of birth as 9.2.1946. He also prayed for injuncting the appellant company E
retiring him with effect from 1.7.1996 and to allow him to work till 9.2.2006.

The appellant in its counter affidavit contended, inter alia, that as per
the Implementation Instruction No. 76 issued by the J.B.C.C.I. the decision Of

- the Board is binding and final in the matter and further contended that the
claim of the respondent (writ petitioner therein) that his date of birth is
9.2. l 946 cannot be accepted for the reason that, according to that date, his
age would have been about 14 years when he entered service in 1960 which
F

is against the minimum age, 18 years, prescribed for employment, under the
... Mines Act, l 952.

The learned single Judge allowed the writ petition and directed the
G
appellant to correct the date of birth of the respondent as 9 .2.1946 and
ordered that he was to superannuate from service in the year 2006 holding,
inter alia, that the genuineness of the certificates in which the date of birth
of the respondent was entered as 9.2. l 946 could not be questioned. The
appellant filed an appeal assailing the judgment of the single Judge. The H
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Division Bench of the High Court modified the judgment of the single Judge
to the effect that the respondent is to superannuate in the year 2004 instead
of 2006. The reason as stated in the judgment of the Division Bench is as
follows:

"It is ordered that the order made by the Trial Court and dated the
B twenty fifth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and ninety
six be and the same is hereby modified to the extent that since the
petitioner joined in the year 1960, he was at that time only 14 (fourteen)
years of age and the statutory age limit being 16 (sixteen) years and
he should not be allowed to continue up to Two thousand six but he
should continue up to Two thousand four and it shall be treated as
c if he has joined at the age of 16 (sixteen) years. And it is further
ordered that in all other respects the order made by the trial court shall
remain operative."

The said judgment is under challenge in this appeal.
D The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the dispute raised
by the respondent having been determined by the Company following the
procedure laid down in the service regulations and his date of superannuation
having been calculated on the basis of the report of the medical board, the
High Court erred in interfering with the order passed by the employer.
E The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended
that the judgment of the single Judge does not suffer from any illegality
inasmuch as he based his decision on the Gas Testing and Mining Sirdarship
Certificate which was issued in favour of the employee under the provisions
of the Mines Act. It was his further contention that the Division Bench
F should not have modified the judgment of the single Judge. He also contended
that the respondent has filed a cross objection challenging the modification
made by the Division Bench of the judgment of the single Judge which, in
the submission of the learned counsel, should be allowed by this Court.

The first question that arises for consideration in the case is whether
~ -
G the High Court, in the facts ~nd circumstances of the case, was right in
interfering with the date of birth recorded in the service records maintained
by the employer, in the proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution?

From the facts of the case discussed in the foregoing paragraphs the
position that emerges is that the respondent was an employee of a private
H colliery (Chirkunda Coal Company) before being absorbed in the service of
G.M. BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. v. SHIB KUMAR DUSHAD [MOHAPATRA, J.] 34 l

the appellant on nationalisation of the colliery under the Nationalisation Act. A
It was specifically asserted by the appellant thatthe service records received
from the previous employer showed '1932' as the year. of birth of the
respondent. Our attention has not been drawn to any pleading in which the
respondent denied aforementioned assertion nor is any contemporaneous
material placed before us to show that the factual position was otherwise. B
After about 20 years of service under the former employer and under the
appellant company, the respondent raised the claim that his date of birth was
9.2.1946 and not I 932. The appellant, following the procedure for determination
of the date of birth/age of an employee in such a case, referred the matter to
the Medical Board and instructed the respondent to appear before the Board.
The Medical Board after examining the respondent determined his age as 52 C
years in I 988. Accepting the report of the Medical Board, the appellant held
the year of birth of the respondent as I 936. Thus the respondent was given
the benefit of superannuation in I 996 instead of 1992. Being dissatisfied with
the decision of the appellant the respondent carried the matter to the High
Court in the writ petition. At the first instance, the High Court disposed of
the case with a direction to the appellant to consider the representation which D
the respondent would make. The representation was considered by the
authority concerned and was rejected. The respondent again approached the
High Court by filing another writ petition reiterating his claim that his year
of birth is 1946 and not 1936 which was dealt with in the manner noted earlier.
E
Before entering into the question of validity and sustainability of the
judgment passed by the single Judge and the Division Bench of the High
Court in this case we would like to make the observation that in a case where
the controversy over the date of birth of an employee has been raised long
after joining the service and the matter has engaged the attention of the
authority concerned and has been determined by following the procedure F
prescribed under Service Rules or General Instructions issued by the employer
and it is not the case of the employee that there has been any arithmetical
mistake or typographical error patent on the face of the record, the High Court
in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
should not interfere with the decision of the employer. G

In the present case the core question is whether the two certificates
'· subsequently obtained by the respondent on 9.6.1973 and on 3.11.1983 should
· be accepted and the date of the birth entered therein should be taken as
conclusive. This question is essentially one of fact. Determination of the
question requires detailed enquiry into relevant factual matters. Without H
342 SUPRErytE COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 4 S.C.R:

A intending to be exhaustive it can be said that some of the relevant aspects
to be considered in such a matter is whether the certificates have been issued
by an authority competent to issue the same under any statute or statutory
rules; whether the authority issuing the .certificate is required under the
statute or rules to inquire into the question of date of birth of the person
B before issuing the certificate and on such inquiry the authority has found the
date of birth to be as entered in the certificate or the entry has been made
merely on the disclosure made by the holder of the certificate. In the former
case some sanctity may be attached to the entry regarding date of birth in
the certificate though it is not conclusive, in the latter case the entry having
been based on a declaration/disclosure made by the holder of the certificate
C himself without any enquiry on the part of the authority concerned is of little
avail when a dispute regarding the date of birth arises for determination .. It
is relevant to note here that one of the objections raised on behalf of the
appellant against the certificates in question is that the certificates were not
issued by the Manager of the colliery who was the competent authority in
the matter. If the respondent was basing his case on these documents then
D it was incumbent upon him to place evidence on record materials from which
a conclusion can be reasonably drawn that the date of birth as entered in the
certificate is the correct one. Similar is the position regarding the document
purportedly issued by the Head Master of Adarsh Madhya Vidyalaya in
which the respondent is alleged to have studied. This document is stated to
E be a School Leaving Certificate in which 1946 is entered as the year of birth
of the respondent. There is no material on record to show that when this
document was issued to the respondent; he had produced a copy of the same
when he entered service in the private colliery (Chirkunda Coal Company) in
support of his age and if so why was the document not sent with the service
records when the service of the respondent was taken over by the appellant.
F These are some of the questions consideration of which will depend on the
evidence, either oral or documentary to be placed by the parties. The High
Court in writ jurisdiction is not the appropriate forum for undertaking such
enquiry into disputed questions of fact. At this stage it is relevant to state
that if the respondent's date of birth is taken to be 9.2.1946 then he would
G have been 14 years of age when he joined service in 1960. No material is
available on record that the industrial undertaking in which the respondent
joined service was legally\
permitted to employ a minor. Indeed this fact has
been taken note of by the Division Bench of the High Court in its judgment
and on that basis the Division Bench modified the judgment of the learned
single Judge and held that the respondent's date of birth should be so
H determined as to fit it with the position that the respondent was 16 years of
G.M. BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. v. SHIB KUMAR DUSHAD [MOHAPATRA, J.J 343

age at the time of joining service. Unfortunately, the judgment of the Division A
Bench does not discuss any material on the basis of which the court took
such a view. Where from the court got 16 years as the minimum prescribed
age for joining service is not indicated in the judgment.

The date of birth of an employee is not only important for employee but
for the employer also. On the length of service put in by the employee B
depends the quantum of retiral benefits he would be entitled to. Therefore,
while determining the dispute in such matters courts should bear in mind that
a change of the date of birth long after joining service, p.articularly when the
employee is due to retire shortly which will upset the date recorded in the
• service records maintained in due course of administration, should not generally C
be accepted. In such a case the burden is heavy on the employee who comes
to the court with the case that the date of birth in the service record maintained
by the employer is untrue and incorrect. The burden can be discharged only
by producing acceptable evidence of a clinching nature. We are constrained
to make this observation as we find that in a large number of cases employees
who are on the verge of retirement raise a dispute regarding correctness of D
the date of birth entered in the service record and the courts are inclined to
pass an interim order for continuance of such employee beyond the date of
superannuation on the basis of the entry of date of birth in the service record.
Such a situation cannot be commended for the reason that the court in
passing such an interim order grants a relief to the employee even before E
detennining the issue regarding correctness of the date of birth entered in the
service record. Such interim orders create various complications. Anticipated
vacancy for which the employee next in the line has been waiting does not
materialise, on account of which the junior is denied promotion which he has
all along been lead to believe will be his due on the retirement of the senior.
F
At this stage we may take note of certain instructions which were
issued by the appellant laying down the procedure for determination/
modification of date of birth of employee. The document is styled as:

....... "Implementation Instruction No. 76"
G
"Procedure for Determination"
"Verification of Age of Employees".

Its authenticity is not disputed by the parties. Indeed the respondent
employee has filed this document as Annexure R-7 to the counter affidavit
filed in this court. Under paragraph 'A' the manner of determination of age H
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A at the time of appointment is laid down. Under paragraph 'B' are laid down
the procedures to be followed in cases of determination of date of birth in
respect of existing employees. Under sub-paragraph (i) of Paragraph 'B' the
case of the existing employee having a Matriculation Certificate or Higher
Secondary Certificate issued by the recognised University or Board or Middle
Form Certificate issued by the Board of Education and/or Department of
B Public Instruction should be treated as the correct date of birth provided the
documents are issued by the University/Board prior to the date of the
employment. Under sub-paragraph (i)(b) of paragraph B it is provided that
mining sirdarship, wind up engine or similar other statutory certificate where
the Manager had to certify the date of birth will be treated as authentic.
c
Provided that where both the documents mentioned in (i)(a) and (i)(b)
above are available the date of birth in (i)(a) will be treated as authentic. In
clause (ii) of para B it is specifically stated that where ever there is no
variation in records such cases will not be re-opened unless there is a very
glaring and apparent wrong entry brought to the notice of the Management.
D The Management, after being satisfied on the merit of the case will take
appropriate steps for corrections through the Age Determination Committee/
Medical Board. In 'C', 'D' and 'E' the procedures to be followed by the Age
Determination Committee/Medical Board for determination of age of an
employee are laid down. The provisions read as follows:
E "(C) Age Determination Committee/Medical Board for the above will
be constituted by the Management. In the case of employees whose
date of birth cannot be determined in accordance with the procedure
mentioned in (B)(i)(a) or (B)(i)(b) above, the date of birth recorded in
the records of the company, namely, form B register, CMPF Record
F and Identify Cards (untempered) will be treated as final, provided that
where there is a nomination in the age recorded in the records
mentioned above, the matter will be referred to the Age Determination
Committee/Medical Board constituted by the Management for
determination of Age.

G (D) Age determination of the age, Committee/Medical Board referred
..
.

to above may consider their evidence available with the colliery
management and/or

(E) Medical Board constituted for determination of Age will be required
to manage the age in accordance with the requirement of Medical
H Jurisprudence and the Medical Board wi~I as far as possible indicate
G.M. BHARAT COKING COAL LTD.,,_ SHIB KUMAR DUSHAD [MOHAPA TRA, J.J 345

the accurate age assessed and not approximately." A
From the provisions in the instructions referred to above, it is clear that
in case of dispute over the date of birth of an existing employee who has
neither a Matriculation Certificate/Secondary School Certificate nor a statutory
certificate in which the Manager has certified the entry regarding the date of
birth to be authentic the employer is to refer the matter to the Medical Board. B
Therefore, no fault can be found with the action taken by the appellant to
refer the case of the respondent to Medical Board. The Medical Board as laid
down in the Instructions is to consider the matter on the evidence available
with the colliery management and in accordance with the requirement of
medical jurisprudence. As noted earlier, in the present case the Medical Board C
determined the age of the respondent to be 52 years in 1988 and the employer
(appellant) accepted such determination. In the circumstances there was hardly
any scope for the High Court to interfere with the date of birth as determined
by the employer (appellant herein) and issue a writ of Mandamus that the date
as claimed by the employee (the respondent herein) should be accepted.
D
In the case of Secretary and Commissioner, Home Department & Ors.
v. R. Kirubakaran, [1994] Supp. I SCC 155, this Court indicated the approach
to be made by the Tribunal or the High Court in a dispute regarding correction
of age/date of birth, made the following observations:

"An application for correction of the date of birth should not be dealt E
with by the tribunal or the High Court keeping in view only the public
servant concerned. It need not be pointed out that any such direction
for correction of the date of birth of the public servant concerned has
a chain reaction, inasmuch as others waiting for years, below him for
their respective promotions are affected in this process. Some are
likely to suffer irreparable injury, inasmuch as, because of the correction F
of the date of birth, the officer concerned, continues in office, in some
cases for years, within which time many officers who are below him
in seniority waiting for their promotion, may lose their promotions for
ever. Cases are not unknown when a person accepts appointment
keeping in view the date of retirement of his immediate senior. G
According to us, this is an important aspect, which cannot be lost
sight of by the court or the tribunal while examining the grievance of
a public servant in respect of correction of his date of birth. As such,
unless a clear case, on the basis of materials which can be held to be
conclusive in nature, is made out by the respondent, the court or the
tribunal should not issue a direction, on the basis of materials which H
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A make such claim only plausible. Before any such direction is issued
the court or the tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been
real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of
date of birth has been made in· accordance with the procedure
prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule or order. If no rule
or order has been framed or made, prescribing the period within which
B such application has to be filed, then such application must be filed
within the time, which can be held to be reasonable. The applicant has
to produce the evidence in support of such claim, which may amount
to irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth. Whenever any such
question arises, the onus is on the applicant, to prove the wrong
c recording of his date of birth, in his service book. In many cases it
is a part of the strategy on the part of such public servants to
approach the court or the tribunal on the eve of their retirement,
questioning the correctness of the entries in respect of their dates of
birth in the service books. By this process, it has come to the notice
of this Court that in many cases, e\'en if ultimately their applications
D are dismissed, by virtue of interim orders, they continue for months,

,,.
I
after the date of superannuation. The court or the tribunal must,
therefore, be slow in granting an interim relief for continuation in
service, unless prima facie evidence of unimpeachable character is
produced because if the public servant succeeds, he can always be
E compensated, but if he fails, he would have enjoyed undeserved
benefit of extended service and merely caused injustice to his immediate
junior." [para 7]

In the case of Burn Standard Co. Ltd & Ors. v. Dinabandhu Majumdar
& Ahr., [ 1995] 4 SCC 172, this Court sounded a caution regarding entertaining
F writ petitions by High Courts for correction of date of births. This Court
observed:

"Entertaining by High Courts of writ applications made by employees
of the Government or its instrumentalities at the fag end of their
services and when they are due for retirement from their services, in
G our view, is unwarranted. It would be so for the reason that no
employee can claim a right to correction of birth date and entertainment ·
of such writ applications for correction of dates of birth of some
employees of Government or its instrumentalities will mar the chances
of promotion of their juniors and prove to be an undue encouragement
H to the other employees to make similar applications at the fag end of
G.M. BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. v. SHIB KUMAR DUS HAD [M0¥APATRA, J.] 347

their service careers with the sole object of preventing their retirement~ , A
when due. Extraordinary nature of the jurisdiction vested in the High
Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution, in our considered view,
is not meant to make employees of Government or its instrumentalities
to continue in service beyond the period of their entitlement according
to dates of birth accepted by their employers, placing reliance on the B
so- called newly-found material. The fact that an employee of
Government or its instrumentality who has been in service for over
decades, with no objection whatsoever raised as to his date of birth
accepted by the employer as correct, when all of a sudden comes
forward towards the fag end of his service career with a writ application
before the High Court seeking correction of his date of birth in his C
Service Record, the very conduct of non-raising of an objection in the
matter by the employee, in our view, should be a sufficient reason for
the High Court, not to entertain such applications on grounds of
acquiescence, undue delay and !aches. Moreover, discretionary
jurisdiction of the High Court can never be said to have been
reasonably and judicially exercised if it entertains such writ application, D
for no employee, who had grievance as to his date of birth in his
"Service and Leave Record" could have genuinely waited till the fag
end of his service career to get it corrected by availing of the
extraordinary jurisdiction of a High Court. Therefore, we have no
hesitation, in holding, that ordinarily High Courts should not, in E
exercise of their discretionary writ jurisdiction, entertain a writ
application/petition filed by an employee of the Government or its
instrumentality, towards the fag end of his service, seeking correction
of his date of birth entered in his "Service and Leave Record" or
Service Register with the avowed object of continuing in service
beyond the normal period of his retirement. [para I OJ F
Prudence on the part of every High Court should, however, in our
considered view, prevent it from granting interim relief in a petition for
correction of the date of birth filed under Article 226 of the Constitution
by an employee in relation to his employment, because of the well- G
settled legal position governing such correction of date of birth,
which precisely stated, is the following: [para 11]

When a person seeks employment, he impliedly agrees with the
tenns and conditions on which employment is offered. For every post
in the service of the Government or any other instrumentality there is H
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 4 S.C.R .

.A the minimum age of entry prescribed depending on the functional
requirements of the post. In order to verify that the person concerned
is not below that prescribed age he is required to disclose his date
of birth. The date of birth is verified and if found to be correct is
entered in the service record. It is ordinarily presumed that the birth
date disclosed by the incumbent is accurate. The situation then is that
B the incumbent gives the date of birth and the employer accepts it as
true and accurate before it is entered in the service record. This entry
in the service record made on the basis of the employee's statement
cannot be changed unilaterally at the sweet will of the employee
except in the manner permitted by service conditions or the relevant
c rules. Here again considerations for a change in the date of birth may
be diverse and the employer would be entitled to view it not merely
from the angle of there being a genuine mistake but also from the
point of its impact on the service in the establishment. It is common
knowledge that every establishment has its own set of service
conditions governed by rules. It is equally known that practically
D every establishment prescribes a minimum age for entry into service
at different levels in the establishment. The first thing to consider is
whether on the date of entry into service would the employee have
been eligible for entry into service on the revised date of birth.
Secondly, would revision of his date of birth after a long lapse of time
E upset the promotional cha.nces of others in the establishment who
may have joined on the basis that the incumbent would retire on a
given date opening up promotional avenues for others. If that be so
and if permitting a change in the date of birth is likely to cause
frustration down the line resulting in causing an adverse effect on
efficiency in functioning, the employer may refuse to permit correction
F in the date at a belated stage. It must be remembered that such a
sudden and belated change may upset the legitimate expectation of
others who may have joined service hoping that on the retirement of
the senior on the due date there would be an upward movement in
the hierarchy. In any case in such cases interim injunction for
G continuance in service should not be granted as it visits the juniors
0 with irreparable injury, in that, they would be denied promotions, a
damage which cannot be repaired if the claim is ultimately found to
be unacceptable. On the other hand, if no interim relief for continuance
in service is granted and ultimately his claim for correction of birth
date is found to be acceptable, the damage can be repaired by granting
H him all those monetary benefits which he would have received had he
G.M. BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. v. SHIB KUMAR DUS HAD [MOHAPATRA, J.J 349

continued in service. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in such A
cases it would be imprudent to grant interim relief." [para t2)

In the case of Union of India v. C. Ramaswamy & Ors., [ 1997) 4 SCC
647, interpreting Rule 16-A of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement
Benefits) Rules, 1958, this Court held that the date of birth as recorded in the
service book and the date as declared by an officer in the application for B
recruitment has to be accepted as correct by the Central Govt. and this can
be altered only if under sub-rule (4) it is established that a bona fide clerical
.J mistake had been committed in accepting the date of birth (See para 12).

On the analysis and the discussions in the foregoing paragraphs, we
have no hesitation to hold that the High Court erred in interfering with the C
date of birth/age of the respondent as determined by the appellant. Accordingly,
the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the single Judge in writ petition
No.2717 of 1994 and the judgment of the Division Bench, confi~ming the
judgment of the single Judge with a modification, are set aside. Wtit petition
stands dismissed. Consequentially the respondent shall not be entitled to any D
service benefit on the basis of the service beyond the date/year of
superannuation as determined by the appellant, except the salary/wage already
received by him. No costs.

v.s.s. Appeal allowed.