Holding

The convictions under Sections 148, 302/149, 323, 324 and 326/149 IPC are upheld as the prosecution evidence, especially the injured eye‑witnesses, reliably establishes an unlawful assembly with a common object, and the alibi plea is untenable.

Summary

The case arose from a violent incident on 03‑03‑2001 at the Barnala Court Complex where seven accused, including Manjit Singh and Sukhwinder Singh, attacked members of a complainant party, causing grievous injuries and the death of Dalip Singh. The prosecution relied primarily on the testimony of two injured eye‑witnesses (PW‑5 and PW‑6) and medical evidence, while the defence raised alibi, lack of independent witnesses, and non‑recovery of the weapon as grounds for acquittal. The trial court convicted all seven under Sections 148, 302/149, 323, 324 and 326/149 IPC; the High Court upheld the convictions of five and gave benefit of doubt to two acquitted co‑accused, also setting aside a gubernatorial pardon. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the eye‑witness testimony was reliable, the common object of an unlawful assembly was established, the alibi plea was untenable, and the acquittal of co‑accused does not affect the liability of the others. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed and the convictions affirmed.

Issues considered

The adequacy of the injured eye‑witness testimony without independent corroboration.
Whether the accused formed an unlawful assembly with a common object under Sections 141 and 149 IPC.
Whether the plea of alibi raised by Manjit Singh is sustainable.
The effect of the acquittal of co‑accused on the conviction of the remaining accused.
The relevance of non‑recovery of the weapon of offence to the prosecution case.
The validity of the gubernatorial pardon under Article 161 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313, s. 319, s. 321
Constitution of Indias. 161
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 141, s. 148, s. 149, s. 302, s. 323, s. 324, s. 326

Subjects

unlawful assemblycommon objectSection 149 IPCeye‑witness testimonyalibi defenceconstructive liabilitycriminal appealpardon under Article 161

Judgment

554 [2019]
SUPREME COURT 11 S.C.R. 554
REPORTS [2019] 11 S.C.R.

A MANJIT SINGH
v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
(Criminal Appeal No. 1079 of 2011)
B SEPTEMBER 3, 2019
[A. M. KHANWILKAR AND DINESH MAHESHWARI, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860: ss. 148, 302/149, 323, 324 and
326/149 – Prosecution under – Of seven accused (including
appellant-accused ‘M’ and appellant-accused ‘S’) – Initially
C
charges were not framed by police against appellant-accused ‘M’
and two accused ‘P’ and ‘N’ – After application u/s. 319 Cr.P.C.
charges were framed against them – An application u/s. 321 Cr.P.C.
to withdraw the case against them was declined by the Court –
Trial Court relying on the testimony of injured eye-witnesses PWs 5
D and 6; medical evidence and rejecting the defence plea of alibi and
false implication convicted all the seven accused – Appeal to High
court – During pendency of the appeal, the Governor granted
pardon u/Art. 161 of the Constitution to the appellant-accused ‘M’
and two accused ‘P’ and ‘N’ – Grant of pardon also challenged –
High Court granted benefit of doubt to two accused ‘P’ and ‘N’,
E
while upholding conviction of other five accused persons – Order
granting pardon was also set aside – Appeal to Supreme Court by
two of the convicted accused – Held: The prosecution case is
supported by two injured eye-witnesses whose testimony has been
concurrently found reliable by courts below – Their testimony is
F consistent with the version in FIR and is further corroborated by
the medical evidence – Their evidence cannot be discarded merely
for the reason that no independent witness was examined – Factor
of enmity, pleaded by accused alleging their false implication in the
case, rather supports the prosecution case in proving motive for
commission of the offence – Plea of alibi is hollow and after-thought
G
– In the facts of the case it is proved that the accused persons
acted in concert with a common object and did constitute unlawful
assembly, indulging in rioting with deadly weapons and causing
grievous bodily injuries to members of the complainant party –

H
554
MANJIT SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 555

Acquittal of the two accused will not have any mitigating effect A
leading to acquittal of other accused.
ss. 141 and 149 – Unlawful assembly – Held: Important
ingredients of an unlawful assembly are number of persons forming
it i.e. 5 and their common object.
Criminal Law: B

Common Object – Determination of – Held: The course of
conduct adopted by members of unlawful assembly; their behaviour
and the arms carried by them are a few basic and relevant factors
to determine the common object.
C
Criminal Trial:
Acquittal of co-accused – Affect of – Held: Acquittal of co-
accused per se is not sufficient to result in acquittal of other accused.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
D
HELD : 1. Though in the present case, the 2 acquitted
accused were alleged to be empty handed and were not assigned
the role of causing any injury on any person but, the Trial Court
found it to be a case of common object and these two accused
persons were held guilty of the offence under Section 148 IPC as
also of other offences with the aid of Section 149 IPC. The High E
Court, though agreed with the Trial Court after thorough
examination of the material on record on all the material aspects
but, as regards these two accused persons, in the concluding
part of its discussion, proceeded to extend them the benefit of
doubt. Though the aforesaid accused persons were acquitted
F
with benefit of doubt and their acquittal has not been challenged
but then, this fact, by itself, will not have any mitigating effect on
the prosecution case against the other five accused persons,
including the appellants. It remains trite that acquittal of co-
accused per se is not sufficient to result in acquittal of the other
accused. Even if the material evidence against all the accused G
persons is the same, acquittal of some of them does not lead to a
corollary that the other accused also need to be acquitted. Even
if the involvement of the acquitted accused is considered doubtful
in view of the uncertain role assigned to them, it cannot be said
H
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 11 S.C.R.

A that entire substratum of the prosecution case is lost, or even
whittled down. [Paras 9 and 9.1] [571-D-E; G-H; 572-A-C]
Yanob Sheikh alias Gagu v. State of West Bengal (2013)
6 SCC 428 : [2012] 13 SCR 115 ; Dalbir Singh v. State
of Haryana (2008) 11 SCC 425 : [2008] 8 SCR 1026
B – relied on.
2. The case of the prosecution on material accusations
pivots around the testimony of injured eye-witnesses PW-5 and
PW-6. PW-5 has deposed in conformity with the initial version of
the complainant on the basis whereof, the FIR in question came
C to be registered. This witness has testified to the role of each of
the accused in the incident in question. Nothing material has come
out in the cross-examination to discredit this witness. PW5 had
also been one of the injured persons in the incident, having
received the blows from the appellant-accused ‘M’. In the face
of such a fact situation, the suggestion by the defence, that this
D witness offered support to them for unlawful consideration, could
only be rejected as baseless. The Trial Court and the High Court
have concurrently found his testimony reliable; and there is no
reason to take any different view of the matter. The narration of
the incident by PW-6 has also been consistent with the version
E occurring in the FIR as also that occurring in the statement of
PW-5. He had also been an injured person in the same incident
and there is nothing on record to disbelieve or discredit this
witness. [Paras 10.1 and 10.2] [572-E-F; H; 573-A-C]
3. So far as the medico-legal aspect of the matter is
F concerned, PW-1, the doctor who had examined the injured
person immediately after the incident, has proved the respective
injury reports. The facts stand established that the deceased and
the other members of the complainant party received many and
multiple injuries, including those on the vital body parts from
sharp-edged weapons (as also blunt objects). It is also established
G that the deceased died due to the grievous head injury. Though
he died after 9 days from the date of the incident but continuously
remained hospitalised and was never in a position to make any
statement. The fact that the injuries in question were inflicted by

H
MANJIT SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 557

the accused party, with calculated and determined assault on the A
complainant party, has also been duly established on record. The
concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the High Court against
the accused persons remain proper and do not appear suffering
from any infirmity. [Paras 10.3 and 10.4] [573-C; F-G]
4.1 According to the defence witness, DW 5, a complaint B
was filed before him to the effect that appellant-accused ‘M’ and
the acquitted accused were not present on the spot during the
incident in question. This testimony had not only been irrelevant
but had also been totally unwarranted. The Trial Court did
exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC for proceeding
against these persons. The prosecution even endeavoured to C
withdraw the case against the appellant and the acquitted accused
persons, but the prayer was declined by the Trial Court, and the
attempts to challenge this order of the Trial Court also failed
right upto this Court. In such a position, where the opinion stated
in the investigation result qua these persons stood overruled by D
the judicial order, it had been absolutely unwarranted that such
an overruled opinion was sought to be relied upon by way of the
testimony of DW-5. Even if this opinion and whatever stated in
the report sent by this witness [Ex. DA] are taken on their
face value, nothing whatsoever turns upon them. [Para 11.2]
[574-D-G] E

4.2 The Trial Court, after thorough appreciation of entire
record has rejected the suggestion that the appellant was not
present at the scene of crime. The High Court has also observed
that there was no reliable evidence on record to accept the plea
of alibi. The Trial Court and the High Court have rightly rejected F
such a baseless plea after proper appreciation of the evidence on
record. [Para 12] [575-B-C]
4.3 There are two fundamental, and rather fatal,
shortcomings in the plea of alibi of the appellant-accused ‘M’
First, that such a plea was not even put in suggestion to the G
relevant prosecution witnesses including the injured eye-
witnesses PW-5 and PW-6. Secondly, and significantly, in his own
statement under Section 313 CrPC, the appellant-accused ‘M’

H
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 11 S.C.R.

A even while making elaborate assertions that he was falsely
implicated for having stood against the complainant party in
relation to the rape and murder case, and while also relying upon
the earlier police report where he was sought to be exonerated
and earlier attempt on the part of the prosecution to withdraw
the case against him, not even remotely stated that he was not
B
present at the site and that, at the relevant point of time, he was
present somewhere else. [Para 12.1] [575-D-F]
4.4 The conduct of witness DW-9 and most of the other
witnesses examined in defence in relation to the plea of alibi, had
been queer and too unnatural to inspire any confidence. Mere
C suggestion in the negative by defence witnesses that they did
not see the three accused persons [appellant-accused ‘M’ and 2
acquitted accused] on the spot does not displace the cogent and
trustworthy evidence adduced by the prosecution. The Trial Court
and High Court have rightly discarded these witnesses as being
D wholly unreliable. The plea of alibi, in the facts of the case could
only be rejected as a crude afterthought and nothing else. Thus,
viewed from any angle, the plea of alibi, as put forward by
appellant-accused ‘M’ remains hollow and could only be rejected.
[Paras 12.3, 12.4 and 12.5] [577-E; 578-C, D, G]
E 5. It is not correct to say that the crime is not established
against appellant-accused ‘M’ for want of recovery of weapon of
offence. The IO in the first place did make recoveries on the
disclosure statements of other four accused persons. As regards
the appellant, the IO chose to proceed in the direction that he
was innocent and was falsely implicated. That seems to be the
F fundamental reason for the IO not making any attempt for
recovery of the weapon of offence used by the appellant-accused
‘M’. However, this omission has no adverse bearing on the
prosecution case, where involvement of the appellant rather as
the leader of the assembly, who started the assault with
G exhortation and then participated in the assault, stands established
beyond doubt. [Para 13] [578-H; 579-A-B]
6. The appellant-accused ‘M’ cannot be said to have been
falsely implicated due to enmity. In the circumstances of the
present case, if anything of so-called enmity is to be taken into
H
MANJIT SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 559

consideration, the same equally operates against the appellant- A
accused ‘M’ and his companions, as admittedly, the appellant-
accused ‘M’ was keenly pursuing the case of rape and murder of
a village girl and the complainant party was comprising of the
persons related with the accused in the said case. The factor of
enmity would only lend support to the prosecution case towards
B
the object and motive of the assembly to attack, assault and cause
hurt to the members of the complainant party. [Para 13.1]
[579-C-D]
7. In the present case, the reliable evidence of the injured
eye-witnesses cannot be discarded merely for the reason that no
independent witness was examined. There is no rule that in every C
criminal case, the testimony of an injured eye-witness needs
corroboration from the so-called independent witness(es). When
the statement of injured eye-witness is found trustworthy and
reliable, the conviction on that basis could always be recorded,
having regard to all the facts and surrounding factors. [Para 13.2] D
[579-E-F]
8.1 The important ingredients of an unlawful assembly are
the number of persons forming it i.e., five; and their common
object. Common object of the persons composing that assembly
could be formed on the spur of the moment and does not require E
prior deliberations. The course of conduct adopted by the
members of such assembly; their behaviour before, during, and
after the incident; and the arms carried by them are a few basic
and relevant factors to determine the common object. [Para 14.5]
[584-D-E]
F
8.2 The facts of the present case, as established by the
prosecution, makes it clear that on the relevant date and at the
relevant time, at least five of the accused persons, including the
present appellants were present at the place of the incident i.e.
Court Complex. The members of the complainant party
purportedly came to the very same Court Complex to attend the G
hearing of the rape and murder case of the village girl in which,
their kiths and relatives were the accused persons and the case
was being pursued by appellant-accused ‘M’. It is also established
that when the persons related with the complainant party were
about to board their vehicle, the accused persons attacked them H
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 11 S.C.R.

A with weapons. Significantly, the attack on the complainant party
was triggered with exhortation by appellant-accused ‘M’. This
clearly brings out the motive for the attack as also the object of
the assembly. It is beyond the pale of doubt that the accused
persons had acted in concert and the object had clearly been to
ensure causalities amongst the members of the complainant party.
B
On the applicable principles, it is concluded that the accused
persons did constitute an unlawful assembly; did indulge in rioting
in the Court Complex with deadly weapons; and did cause
grievous bodily injuries to members of the complainant party.
The deceased was attacked rather repeatedly by the members of
C this unlawful assembly and he sustained grievous injury on the
head that proved fatal. The background aspects as also the conduct
of the accused persons at and during the incident leaves nothing
to doubt that each of the member of this assembly remains liable
for the offence committed by himself as also by every other
member of the assembly. [Para 14.6] [584-F-H; 585-A, C-E]
D
Govind Singh v. State of Chattisgarh (2019) 7 SCALE
20 – distinguished.
Sikandar Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar (2010) 7 SCC
477 : [2010] 8 SCR 373 ; Subal Ghorai v. State of West
E Bengal (2013) 4 SCC 607 ; Sahabuddin & Ors. v. State
of Assam (2012) 13 SCC 213 : [2012] 13 SCR 1067
– referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2010] 8 SCR 373 referred to Para 6.1
F
(2013) 4 SCC 607 referred to Para 6.1
(2019) 7 SCALE 20 distinguished Para 6.2
[2012] 13 SCR 1067 referred to Para 7
[2012] 13 SCR 115 relied on Para 9.1
G
[2008] 8 SCR 1026 relied on Para 9.1

H
MANJIT SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 561

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal A
No. 1079 of 2011.
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.03.2008 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 373 DB
of 2005.
With B

Criminal Appeal No. 1076 of 2011.
Kamini Jaiswal, Jatinderpal Singh, Ms. Rani Mishra, Vijay
Panjwani, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ms. Jaspreet Gogia, Ms. Mandakini Singh, Ms. Ashima Mandla, C
Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.
1. These two appeals by special leave are directed against the D
common judgment and order dated 11.03.2008, as passed by the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal Nos.
373 DB of 2005 and 350 DB of 2005 with other connected matters
whereby, the High Court has upheld the judgment and order dated 28/
30.03.2005 by the Sessions Judge, Barnala in Sessions Case No. 21 of
E
2001, convicting and sentencing the accused-appellants for multiple
offences, including those punishable under Sections 148, 302/149, 323,
324 and 326/149 of the Indian Penal Code (‘IPC’).
2. Put in brief, the relevant background aspects of the matter are
as follows:
F
2.1. The prosecution case has been that on 03.03.2001, the
deceased Dalip Singh, Rajinder Pal Singh (PW-5), Gurnam Singh (PW-
6) and the complainant Beant Singh1, all residents of Village Mehal Kalan
had gone to Barnala Court Complex in connection with the hearing in a
criminal case pertaining to FIR No. 67 of 1997, Police Station Mehal
Kalan, that was adjourned. That very day, the accused persons Manjit G
Singh2, Labh Singh, Avtar Singh, Bakhtaur Singh, Sukhwinder Singh 3,
1
The complainant Beant Singh was examined as the first witness in the trial but he
expired before completion of his statement.
2
The appellant of Cr. A. No. 1079 of 2011
3
The appellant of Cr. A. No. 1076 of 2011 H
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 11 S.C.R.

A Prem Kumar, and Narain Datt, had also been to the same Court Complex
to attend the proceedings in a complaint case of the appellant Manjit
Singh, that was also adjourned. At about 11.15 a.m., when Gurnam Singh,
Beant Singh, Rajinder Pal Singh and Dalip Singh were about to board
their car near the cabin of typists in the Court Complex, they were
attacked by the accused persons.
B
2.2. It was alleged that for carrying out the assault in question,
five of the accused persons carried different weapons, where the
appellant Sukhwinder Singh as also Labh Singh and Avtar Singh were
armed with kirpans; Bakhtaur Singh was armed with kirpan and ghop;
and the appellant Manjit Singh was armed with kirch whereas Prem
C Kumar and Narain Datt were empty handed. According to the allegations,
with exhortation by the appellant Manjit Singh, the accused persons
carried out the assault in the manner that Labh Singh gave kirpan blow
aiming at the head of Beant Singh, who raised his hands and the blow hit
his right hand; the appellant Sukhwinder Singh aimed his kirpan blow
D on the head of Dalip Singh but since he raised his hands, the blow hit his
right hand; Bakhtaur Singh gave a blow of ghop on the head of Dalip
Singh; Prem Kumar and Narain Datt caught hold of the arms of Dalip
Singh and Bakhtaur Singh gave another ghop blow on the head of Dalip
Singh; Avtar Singh gave a blow of his kirpan on the left leg of Gurnam
Singh; Bakhtaur Singh also gave three blows of ghop on the left cheek,
E back of the chest and left thigh of Gurnam Singh; the appellant Manjit
Singh gave the blows of his kirch, hitting Rajinder Pal Singh on the right
hand and on the left hand thumb; and the appellant Sukhwinder Singh hit
Gurnam Singh on the back by the handle of his kirpan.
2.3. It was further alleged that upon such an assault, the injured
F raised alarm whereupon, Amarjit Singh, Balbir Singh, Jit Singh and
Gurdeep Singh reached the spot. The injured were taken to the hospital.
Upon receiving a message from the hospital, Surinder Pal Singh (PW-
9), SHO, P.S. Kotwali went to the hospital and sought the opinion of
doctor about fitness of the injured for taking their statements; the injured
G Beant Singh was declared fit and his statement was recorded at 2.30
p.m., which led to the registration of FIR No. 56 of 2001 for the offences
punishable under Sections 307, 148, 149, 120-B IPC. The statements of
the injured Rajinder Pal Singh and Gurnam Singh were also recorded.
However, the injured Dalip Singh was not found fit for making any
statement; he was referred to Rajindra Hospital, Patiala; and he was,
H
MANJIT SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 563
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

thereafter, shifted to Dayanand College and Hospital, Ludhiana. He A
remained hospitalised until 12.03.2001 but the attempts by ASI Gulab
Singh (PW-11) to record his statement did not materialise. The injured
Dalip Singh, ultimately, expired on 12.03.2001 at 4.30 p.m.; the post
mortem of his dead body was conducted on 13.03.2001 at Civil Hospital,
Ludhiana. In sequel, the offence punishable under Section 302 was added
B
to the FIR.
2.4. On 08.03.2001, the accused persons Bakhtaur Singh, Labh
Singh and Avtar Singh were arrested. The weapon ghop was recovered
in pursuance of the disclosure statement of Bakhtaur Singh whereas
one kirpan was recovered on the disclosure statement of Labh Singh
and another kirpan was recovered on the disclosure statement of Avtar C
Singh. On 14.03.2001, the appellant Sukhwinder Singh was arrested and
in pursuance of his disclosure statement, yet another kirpan was
recovered.
2.5. In the course of investigation, the soil splattered with blood
was collected from the place of occurrence; site plan was prepared; D
and statements of other witnesses were recorded. As per the FSL report,
the ghop, three kirpans and soil recovered from the place of occurrence
were found to be stained with human blood.
2.6. On 24.03.2001, while the other accused persons were charge-
sheeted for various offences but, the present appellant Manjit Singh as E
also Prem Kumar and Narain Datt were allegedly found not involved in
the crime and they were kept in column No.2 by the Investigating Officer
(‘IO’). After committal of the case to the Sessions Court and after
framing of charges, the complainant Beant Singh was examined as the
first witness of the prosecution on 11.09.2001 but his deposition remained F
incomplete. This very day, the complainant Beant Singh moved an
application under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (‘CrPC’)
for proceeding against the appellant Manjit Singh as also against the said
Prem Kumar and Narain Datt, who were summoned by the Trial Court
by its order dated 19.09.2001. Thereafter, charges were framed against
all the accused persons, inter alia, for the offences under Sections 302, G
148, 326, 325, 323 IPC. The prosecution sought leave under Section
321 CrPC to withdraw the case against the appellant Manjit Singh and
the said Prem Kumar and Narain Datt but this prayer was declined by
the Trial Court by its order dated 09.11.2002 against which, Cr.R. No.
2413 of 2002 and C.M. No. 2248 of 2002 were filed before the High H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 11 S.C.R.

A Court that were also dismissed by the order dated 14.10.2003. Further,
the petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 5740 of 2003 filed in this
Court was also dismissed by the order dated 17.01.2004.
3. In the trial, the prosecution examined several witnesses,
including the injured eye-witnesses Rajinder Pal Singh as PW-5 and
B Gurnam Singh as PW-6; the medical officer Dr. Subhash Singla, who
had initially examined the injured persons and had prepared the injury
reports, as PW-1; and Dr. Jasbir Singh, who had conducted post-mortem
on the dead body of Dalip Singh, as PW-7.
3.1. The eye-witnesses, Rajinder Pal Singh and Gurnam Singh,
C PW-5 and PW-6 respectively, gave the ocular account of the entire
incident. PW-5 Rajinder Pal Singh categorically stated that the assault
commenced when the appellant Manjit Singh instigated the other accused
persons to attack the complainant and his companions. This witness
provided a detailed description of participation and involvement of each
of the accused in conformity with the version occurring in the FIR. His
D testimony was corroborated on all the material particulars by PW-6
Gurnam Singh. As noticed, the testimony of the informant Beant Singh
remained incomplete due to his demise.
3.2. The appellant Manjit Singh, while denying the allegations in
his statement under Section 313 CrPC, gave a purportedly detailed
E account that the complainants were annoyed with Prem Kumar, Narain
Datt and himself for the reason that they had given evidence in the case
of rape and murder of a co-village girl KK*4, where the offence was
allegedly committed by the relatives of the complainant and the injured
witnesses. We shall refer to the relevant part of the statement made by
F the appellant Manjit Singh under Section 313 CrPC hereafter a little
later.
3.3. In defence evidence, the accused persons got examined as
many as 13 witnesses. These had been as follows: DW-1 Dr. A.K.
Singla, the handwriting and fingerprint expert in relation to the signatures
G of Rajinder Pal Singh on the court summons and jail records; DW-2,
Head Constable Jaswinder Singh in relation to the fact that DW-3 was
deployed as driver of the vehicle in which the undertrials were brought
to the Court Complex; DW-3 Head Constable Jora Singh, as the alleged

4
The name of the said victim girl is not required to be mentioned and she is referred as
H KK* herein.
MANJIT SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 565
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

eye-witness to the incident; DW-4 Gurcharan Singh Dhaliwal, Advocate A
who was allegedly present near the scene of crime; DW-5 Lakhwinder
Singh, the then Superintendent of Police (D) at Barnala; DW-6 Constable
Amarjit Singh, another alleged eye-witness who had intervened in the
fight that had occurred between the two groups; DW-7 Head Constable
Gurcharan Singh; DW-8 J.N. Sharma, Advocate; DW-9 Kulwant Singh,
B
Member Panchayat of Village Dhaner; DW-10 Manjit Singh, teacher in
Govt. High School, Wazidke Khurd; DW-11 Rajinder Kumar ALM, PSEB
Mehar Kalan; DW-12 Darshan Kumar, Head Warden, Sub-Jail, Barnala;
and DW-13 Santokh Singh, Maths Teacher in Govt. High School, Wazidke
Khurd.
4. In its judgment and order dated 28/30.03.2005 in Sessions Case C
No. 21 of 2001, the Trial Court carried out in-depth analysis of the
prosecution evidence, including the testimony of injured eye-witnesses
PW-5 and PW-6 and the medical officers, PW-1 and PW-7. The Trial
Court also carried out an equally thorough analysis of the evidence
adduced by the accused and, after finding that the defence witnesses D
were either irrelevant or unreliable, rejected the defence theories and
found it proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused joined together
and attacked the complainant Beant Singh and his companions, causing
various injuries to several persons and fatal injury to Dalip Singh. The
conclusion of the Trial Court in relation to the present appellants as also
cumulatively in relation to all the accused persons, as occurring in E
paragraphs 45 to 48 of the judgment dated 28.03.2005, could be usefully
reproduced as under:-
“45. Accused Manjit Singh as per PW1 is proved to have
caused two injuries on the person of Rajinder Pal Singh by
means of Kirch and which M.L.R. Ex. PD and X-ray report F
Ex. PD/2 shows that both these injuries No. 1 & 2 are by
sharp means and injury No. 3 which is reddish contusion is
not attributed to any of the accused.
46. Accused Sukhwinder Singh is opined to have caused a
blunt injury by the handle of the Kirpan on the person of G
Gurnam Singh on the back of the chest opined to be abraded
contusion ad that Sukhwinder Singh is also proved to have
caused injury to Dalip Singh on right hand by means of a
Kripan and which injury as per M.L.R. Ex. PA which is incised
H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 11 S.C.R.

A wound, caused by sharp edged weapon is deemed to be simple
in view of lack of evidence in this regard.
47. That there is abundant evidence to show that accused
persons with a common object armed with deadly weapons
have rioted while assaulting the complainant side.
B 48. So, from the overall evidence of the prosecution by way
of ocular evidence of the eye-witnesses account, the medical
evidence coupled with circumstantial evidence overwhelmingly
point out towards the guilt of the accused in the commission
of the offence for which they have been charged. The accused
C are thus held guilty and convicted as detailed below:-
i) All the accused U/S 148 of IPC
ii) Accused Bakhtaur Singh U/S 302 and 323 IPC
iii) All the co-accused (Numb 6) of U/S 302/149 IPC and
D accused Bakhtaur Singh U/S 323/149 IPC
iv) Accused Sukhwinder Singh U/S 324 IPC & 323
IPC
v) All six co-accused of accused U/S 324/149 IPC and
Sukhwinder Singh U/S 323/149 IPC
E vi) Accused Labha Singh U/S 324 IPC
vii) All the six co-accused U/S 324/149 IPC
viii) Accused Avtar Singh U/S 326 IPC
ix) All the six co-accused of accused U/S 326/149 IPC
F Avtar Singh
x) Accused Manjit Singh U/S 324 IPC
xi) All the six co-accused of accused U/S 324/149 IPC
Manjit Singh”
G 4.1. In accordance with the conclusion aforesaid, the accused
persons were awarded varying sentences, including that of life
imprisonment.
5. Against the order of conviction, the appellants and the co-
accused preferred separate appeals before the High Court and pending
H
MANJIT SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 567
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

disposal of appeals, the sentence awarded to the appellant Manjit Singh A
as also Prem Kumar and Narain Datt were suspended. Thereafter, by
an order dated 24.07.2007, the then Hon’ble Governor of Punjab, in
exercise of his power under Article 161 of the Constitution of India,
granted pardon to the appellant Manjit Singh as also to the two co-accused
persons Prem Kumar and Narain Datt; and directed that they be released
B
with immediate effect. This order granting pardon was also challenged
before the High Court by way of writ petition bearing No. 2147 of 2008
that was taken up for consideration together with the appeals filed against
conviction. While passing the final common judgment and order dated
11.03.2008, the High Court, after dealing with the contentions urged on
behalf of the appellants herein and the co-accused, while extended benefit C
of doubt to Prem Kumar and Narain Datt but, affirmed the conviction of
the other five accused persons, including the appellants herein and also
set aside the order granting pardon5 while observing, inter alia, as under:-
“23. We are of the view that case of the prosecution stands
fully established against Sukhwinder Singh, Labh Singh, D
Bakhtaur Singh, Avtar Singh and Manjit Singh, while Narain
Datt and Prem Kumar are entitled to benefit of doubt.
24. PW5 Rajinder Pal Singh has fully supported the version
given in the statement of Beant Singh on the basis of which,
FIR was recorded. He has confirmed the role of all the accused. E
Occurrence took place in the broad day light. Identity of the
accused was known to the witnesses. Rajinder Pal Singh is
nephew of the deceased Dalip Singh. FIR was prompt. There
is no improbability in the accused assaulting the deceased
and the witnesses in the manner alleged. There is no serious
infirmity in the evidence of PW5 Rajinder Pal Singh. His F
version is consistent and reliable. The assault was clearly re-
mediated as five of the accused came with weapons. His

5
This part of the common judgment dated 11.03.2008, setting aside the order passed
by the Hon’ble Governor of Punjab granting pardon to the appellant Manjit Singh, was
separately challenged in this Court in C.A. Nos. 2058-59 of 2011 [arising out of SLP
G
(C) No. 11544 of 2008]. On 24.02.2011, this Court remanded the matter to the
Governor of Punjab for fresh consideration in accordance with law. We were informed
during the course of hearing that no fresh decision has been taken after such remand. Be
that as it may, in view of the fact that the subject matter of the present appeals relates
to the conviction and sentencing of the appellants, no further dilation on the matter
relating to the grant of pardon is requisite herein. H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 11 S.C.R.

A version is fully supported by PW6 Gurnam Singh. Though,
cross-examined at length, their testimony remained unshaken.
The version of the said witnesses is duly corroborated by
medical evidence. We are not in agreement with the
observation of the trial Court that evidence of Beant Singh
could be relied upon. Excluding evidence of Beant Singh,
B
who died before cross-examination, does not in any way affect
the case of the prosecution.
25. Reference to the statement of PW5 Rajinder Pal Singh
shows that Manjit Singh raised an exhortation to the co-
accused to take revenge. He was armed with a ‘kirch’. Mere
C non-recovery of ‘kirch’ is not by itself of any consequence
once his participation in giving exhortation and causing
assault is established….His role is established by medical
evidence of examination of Rajinder Pal Singh PW5, who
had two injuries with a sharp-edged weapon. Manjit Singh
D not only gave one blow but also repeated the blow to Rajinder
Pal Singh. PW-5 Rajinder Pal Singh could not have made
any mistake in implicating Manjit Singh. Contention that
Manjit Singh was implicated on account of enmity, cannot be
accepted. It is well known that enmity is a doubled edged
weapon and the same reason could have provided motive to
E Manjit Singh. His role is specific and is duly corroborated.
He was the first to initiate the assault.”
5.1. The High Court, after examining the defence evidence as
also other material on record, rejected the defence contentions, including
the plea of alibi of the appellant Manjit Singh, in the following:
F
“32. We do not find any merit in the contention that the death
of Dalip Singh was not on account of injuries caused by
Bakhtaur Singh but only on account of surgical injuries or
that the injuries were not sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death of Dalip Singh. It is clear that the
G death of Dalip Singh was on account of injuries caused by
the accused Bakhtaur Singh. Intention of causing death can
be clearly inferred. Sukhwinder Singh also assaulted Dalip
Singh but he received injuries on the hand instead of on the
head. Though, Labh Singh and Avtar Singh caused injuries
H
MANJIT SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 569
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

to Beant Singh and Gurnam Singh respectively, they cannot A
avoid responsibility for the consequences, which could easily
be foreseen by them in respect of injuries caused to Dalip
Singh. Same is the position with regard to accused Manjit
Singh. There is no reliable evidence to accept the plea of
alibi raised by Manjit Singh. We have thus no hesitation in
B
upholding conviction of Sukhwinder Singh, Labh Singh, Avtar
Singh, Bakhtaur Singh and Manjit Singh.”
5.2. After upholding the conviction and the sentence of five of the
accused persons including the appellants, the High Court also examined
the question of validity of the order granting pardon to the appellant
Manjit Singh and in that regard, after a detailed survey of the case law C
relating to the power to grant pardon/remission and its judicial review,
found that in the present case, the power was exercised only on the
perceived public opinion that was clearly impermissible. However, as
observed hereinbefore, this aspect of the matter needs no further dilation
herein. D
6. Assailing the judgment and order aforesaid, affirming their
conviction and upholding the sentence as awarded, the appellants have
preferred the present appeals.
6.1. Learned counsel for the appellant Manjit Singh has strenuously
argued that so far this appellant is concerned, it is amply established in E
evidence that he was not present at the scene of the incident in question;
and has particularly referred to the statement of DW-9 to submit that on
the date of incident, the appellant Manjit Singh was present before the
said witness at 11.30 a.m. at village Dhaner, that was about 25 kms from
the Barnala Court Complex and hence, his presence at the scene of F
crime at 11.15 a.m. is totally ruled out. Learned counsel has contended
that the Trial Court as also the High Court have rejected the plea of alibi
without assigning cogent reasons and the same has resulted in serious
miscarriage of justice. The learned counsel has argued that the High
Court has failed to appreciate the fact that there existed previous enmity
between the family of the deceased and the appellant herein because of G
which, he has been implicated in the said case. In this regard, learned
counsel has particularly referred to the fact that PW-5 Rajinder Singh is
the brother of Jagraj, who was involved in the aforesaid rape and murder
case, that was keenly pursued by the appellant Manjit Singh. The learned
H
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 11 S.C.R.

A counsel has yet further argued that there has not been any evidence as
regards common object of the accused persons; no independent witness
has been examined; and then, no weapon of offence was recovered at
the instance of the appellant. Therefore, according to the learned counsel,
conviction of the appellant is not justified. The learned counsel has
referred to the decisions in Sikandar Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar:
B
(2010) 7 SCC 477 and Subal Ghorai v. State of West Bengal: (2013)
4 SCC 607.
6.2. Learned counsel for appellant Sukhwinder Singh has submitted
that there are material contradictions in the medical evidence as also the
ocular version and in any case, the essential ingredients of Section 141
C IPC, for formation of an unlawful assembly are not established and,
therefore, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 with the aid
of Section 149 IPC is not justified. According to the learned counsel, the
only accusation against this appellant is that he had caused simple injury
on the little finger of the deceased Dalip Singh and had used the handle
D of the kirpan to cause injury to PW-5 Rajinder Pal Singh and, on these
accusations, the case against this appellant cannot travel beyond the
offences of Sections 324 and 323 IPC for which, he has already
undergone imprisonment for a period of over 4 years and 10 months.
The learned counsel has referred to the decision in Govind Singh v.
State of Chattisgarh: (2019) 7 SCALE 20.
E
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the State has supported the
conviction of appellants with the submissions that the Trial Court and the
High Court have dealt with each and every argument raised by the
appellants and the impugned judgments do not suffer from any infirmity
so as to call for interference. The learned counsel has submitted that the
F appellant Manjit Singh not only caused injuries on the person of Rajinder
Pal Singh but, in fact, instigated the accused party with exhortation prior
to the assault and, in the face of clear evidence on record, mere want of
recovery of kirch used by the appellant Manjit Singh would not exonerate
him. The learned counsel has also contended that when the accused
G persons, at least five of them, were armed with deadly weapons and
assaulted the injured persons simultaneously, all the necessary ingredients
of formation of an unlawful assembly with common object stand
established. As regards the plea of alibi, the learned counsel has submitted
that this plea was never suggested to the prosecution witnesses nor was

H
MANJIT SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 571
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

taken in the statement under Section 313 CrPC; and the made up A
witnesses produced in that regard have been duly considered and discarded
by the Trial Court and the High Court after thorough appreciation. The
learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon a few decisions,
including that in Sahabuddin & Ors. v. State of Assam: (2012) 13
SCC 213.
B
8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused
the material placed on record, we are clearly of the view that both these
appeals remain bereft of substance and no case for interference at the
instance of the appellants is made out.
Acquittal of two of the accused persons C
9. Before taking up other aspects of the matter for consideration,
apposite it would be to take note of one of the relevant factors that
though in this case, the accused Prem Kumar and Narain Datt were
alleged to be empty handed and were not assigned the role of causing
any injury on any person but, the Trial Court found it to be a case of D
common object and these two accused persons were held guilty of the
offence under Section 148 IPC as also of other offences with the aid of
Section 149 IPC. The High Court, though agreed with the Trial Court
after thorough examination of the material on record on all the material
aspects but, as regards these two accused persons, in the concluding
part of its discussion, proceeded to extend them the benefit of doubt E
while observing as under:-
“38. As regards Prem Kumar and Narain Datt, who were empty
handed, they have been given the role of having caught hold
of the deceased. If It can be held that they were members of
the unlawful assembly, even if no overt-act is proved against F
them, they will be liable for the murder. However, we are of
the view that in absence of tangible evidence, they ought to
be given benefit of doubt.”
9.1. Though the aforesaid accused persons Prem Kumar and
Narain Datt were acquitted with benefit of doubt and their acquittal has G
not been challenged but then, this fact, by itself, will not have any mitigating
effect on the prosecution case against the other five accused persons,
including the appellants. It remains trite that acquittal of co-accused per

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572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 11 S.C.R.

A se is not sufficient to result in acquittal of the other accused. Even if the
material evidence against all the accused persons is the same, acquittal
of some of them does not lead to a corollary that the other accused also
need to be acquitted [vide Yanob Sheikh alias Gagu v. State of West
Bengal: (2013) 6 SCC 428 and Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana:
(2008) 11 SCC 425]. If after taking the evidence as a whole, the case
B
in relation to the acquitted accused could be segregated from that against
the other, such other accused could nevertheless be convicted. Noticeable
it is that even as regards the said accused Prem Kumar and Narain
Datt, the High Court has not recorded a clean acquittal but has only
extended them the benefit of doubt, for no overt act of assault having
C been assigned to them and they being not armed with any weapon. Even
if the involvement of Prem Kumar and Narain Datt is considered doubtful
in view of the uncertain role assigned to them, it cannot be said that
entire substratum of the prosecution case is lost, or even whittled down.
Prosecution Case
D 10. We may now take note of salient features of the relevant
evidence on record.
10.1. The case of the prosecution on material accusations pivots
around the testimony of injured eye-witnesses PW-5 Rajinder Pal Singh
and PW-6 Gurnam Singh. PW-5 Rajinder Pal Singh has deposed in
E conformity with the initial version of Beant Singh on the basis whereof,
the FIR in question came to be registered. This witness has testified to
the role of each of the accused in the incident in question. Nothing material
has come out in the cross-examination to discredit this witness. Of course,
a suggestion was made in the cross-examination that he had gone to
F sub-jail Barnala on 30.09.2002 and demanded Rs. 20,000/- from the
accused persons to depose in their favour, which he denied. A few
witnesses were examined in defence evidence to prove that this witness
PW-5 did visit sub-jail Barnala. However, it is too remote to accept that
because of such a visit, the witness might have offered false depositions
by taking unlawful consideration. In fact, this very witness is otherwise
G sought to be discredited by the appellants as an interested witness, for
being the brother of one of the accused persons in the said rape and
murder case, which was being pursued by the appellant Manjit Singh.
This witness had also been one of the injured persons in the incident,

H
MANJIT SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 573
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

having received the blows from the appellant Manjit Singh. In the face A
of such a fact situation, the suggestion by the defence, that this witness
offered support to them for unlawful consideration, could only be rejected
as baseless. The Trial Court and the High Court have concurrently
found his testimony reliable; and we find no reason to take any different
view of the matter.
B
10.2. The narration of the incident by PW-6 Gurnam Singh has
also been consistent with the version occurring in the FIR as also that
occurring in the statement of PW-5 Rajinder Pal Singh. He had also
been an injured person in the same incident and there is nothing on record
to disbelieve or discredit this witness.
C
10.3. So far as the medico-legal aspect of the matter is concerned,
PW-1 Dr. Subhash Singla, who had examined the injured person
immediately after the incident, has proved the respective injury reports,
inter alia, making out that there were multiple injuries on the person of
the deceased Dalip Singh including three injuries from blunt weapon and
one from sharp-edged weapon. He also testified about Gurnam Singh D
having received one injury from a sharp-edged weapon apart from other
injuries; and about Rajinder Pal Singh having sustained three injuries,
two of them being from sharp-edged weapon. PW-7 Dr. Jasbir Singh
conducted post-mortem on the dead body of Dalip Singh and found
haemotoma below the scalp; and on clearing haemotoma, found a E
fracture. This witness testified that as per his examination, the cause of
death was haemorrhage and shock as a result of the head injury.
10.4. The facts stand established that the deceased and the other
members of the complainant party received many and multiple injuries,
including those on the vital body parts from sharp-edged weapons (as F
also blunt objects). It is also established that Dalip Singh died due to the
grievous head injury. Though he died after 9 days from the date of the
incident but continuously remained hospitalised and was never in a position
to make any statement. The fact that the injuries in question were inflicted
by the accused party, with calculated and determined assault on the
complainant party, has also been duly established on record. The G
concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the High Court against the
accused persons remain proper and do not appear suffering from any
infirmity.

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574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 11 S.C.R.

A Defence Version and Evidence
11. It would also be appropriate to take note of the features
emanating from the defence evidence. In all 13 witnesses were examined
in defence. Before taking up the relevant witnesses concerning the plea
of alibi of the appellant Manjit Singh, we may briefly refer to the other
B defence witnesses.
11.1. In defence, DW-1 Dr. Atul K. Singh and DW-12 Darshan
Kumar were examined in support of the assertion that the witness
Rajender Singh visited sub-jail Barnala as per the entries occurring in
Mulakat register; and DW-7 Gurcharan Singh was examined in proof
C of the signatures of the witness Rajender Pal Singh on the summons
EX-D-11. As noticed, nothing turns upon this part of defence evidence.
11.2. There had been another defence witness DW-5 Lakhwinder
Singh who was, at the relevant time, posted as Superintendent of Police
(D) Barnala. According to this witness, a complaint was filed before
D him to the effect that Manjit Singh, Prem Kumar and Narain Datt were
not present on the spot during the incident in question. This witness sent
a report, Ex. DA, stating the fact that in the investigation carried out by
Surendra Pal Singh, SHO Police Station Barnala, Manjit Singh, Prem
Kumar and Narain Datt were found not present at the time of occurrence.
This testimony had not only been irrelevant but had also been totally
E unwarranted. As noticed, initially, the investigating agency attempted to
exonerate the appellant Manjit Singh as also the said accused Prem
Kumar and Narain Datt but the Trial Court, by its order dated 19.09.2001,
did exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC for proceeding against
these persons. The prosecution even endeavoured to withdraw the case
F against the appellant Manjit Singh and the said Prem Kumar and Narain
Datt but the prayer was declined by the Trial Court by its order dated
09.11.2002; and the attempts to challenge this order of the Trial Court
also failed right upto this Court. In such a position, where the opinion
stated in the investigation result qua these persons stood overruled by
the judicial order, it had been absolutely unwarranted that such an
G overruled opinion was sought to be relied upon by way of the testimony
of DW-5. Even if this opinion and whatever stated in the report sent by
this witness [Ex. DA] are taken on their face value, nothing whatsoever
turns upon them.

H
MANJIT SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 575
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

11.3. The testimony of three other witnesses [DW- 10, DW-11 A
and DW-13] examined by the defence in relation to the plea of alibi of
the accused Prem Kumar and Narain Datt is not relevant for the present
purpose.
Plea of alibi of the appellant Manjit Singh
12. The main plank of the contentions on behalf of the appellant B
Manjit Singh is that he was not present at the scene of crime i.e., within
Barnala Court Complex on 03.03.2001 at 11.15 a.m.; and in fact, he was
with the witness DW-9 at village Dhaner on the relevant date at 11.30
a.m. The Trial Court, after thorough appreciation of entire record has
rejected this suggestion. The High Court has also observed that there C
was no reliable evidence on record to accept this plea of alibi. Having
examined the record, we are satisfied that the Trial Court and the High
Court have rightly rejected such a baseless plea after proper appreciation
of the evidence on record.
12.1 There are two fundamental, and rather fatal, shortcomings D
in the plea of alibi of the appellant Manjit Singh: First, that such a plea
was not even put in suggestion to the relevant prosecution witnesses
including the injured eye-witnesses PW-5 and PW-6. Secondly, and
significantly, in his own statement under Section 313 CrPC, the appellant
Manjit Singh, even while making elaborate assertions that he was falsely
implicated for having stood against the complainant party in relation to E
the said rape and murder case of the daughter of Darshan Singh; and
while also relying upon the earlier police report where he was sought to
be exonerated and earlier attempt on the part of the prosecution to
withdraw the case against him, not even remotely stated that he was not
present at the site and that, at the relevant point of time, he was present F
somewhere else. The relevant part of the statement made by the appellant
Manjit Singh under Section 313 CrPC is reproduced as under: -
“Q.19. Anything else to say?
Ans. I am innocent. An enquiry in this regard was conducted
by the SHO/PS kotwali, Barnala and other high officers of G
the police and they all agreed that the present case has falsely
been got registered against me and I was placed in Column
No.2. The Addl. P.P. for the State had moved an application

H
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 11 S.C.R.

A U/s 321 Cr.P.C. for withdrawal of the case against me as the
said case has been falsely registered against me but Sh. S. S.
Gupta, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Barnala, dismissed
the same and against the said order the State has filed an
appeal in the Hon’ble High Court which is still pending there
and the proceedings have been stayed.
B
The complainant party is the biggest landlord party, of Mehal
Kalan town, where a police station is also there. They had
murdered a girl namely KK* after raping her. Said KK* was
the daughter of Darshan Singh, who was a handicapped
Teacher and was a poor person. I was the eye witness in the
C said case and was also cited as a defence witness by the
complainant party but he did not depose according to them
and had spoken the truth as such, the complainant party got
annoyed against him. I and Prem kumar and Narain Dutt had
been pursuing the case of said KK*, who was not having any
D heir and in that case some persons of the complainant party
were sentenced to life imprisonment. The complainant party
being the big landlords have got the present false case
registered against us. There was not need to catch hold an
old person aged about 80 years. As per the Doctor he would
have fallen on receipt of one injury only being of old age
E and weak physique. There was no need of catching hold him
by two persons. We have no friendship or enmity with the
other accused. I am innocent and have been falsely implicated
in the present case, by the complainant party on the strength
of much money and land. I am having separate residence
F than the other four accused and of separate occupation.”
12.2. In defence evidence, DW-2 Sukhwinder Singh was examined
to testify that DW-3 Jora Singh was posted as driver on the vehicle in
which, the undertrials were brought to the Barnala Court Complex. The
witness DW-3 stated that on 03.03.2001, he was deputed as driver on
G the said vehicle; that about 11 a.m., he heard commotion and reached
the spot where 4/5 persons were causing injuries to 4/5 persons; and
that the accused Narain Datt, Prem Kumar and Manjit Singh were known
to him and they were not present on the spot. DW-6 Amarjit Singh

H
MANJIT SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 577
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

stated that he was also on duty in the Court Complex Barnala; that there A
was a fight between the parties whereupon, he separated the parties
and collected the kripans; that the accused Manjit Singh, Prem Kumar
and Narain were known to him and these persons were not present on
the spot where the fight took place. DW-4 Gurcharan Singh Dhaliwal,
Advocate, claiming himself to be an eye-witness stated that 3/4 persons
B
caused injuries to 3/4 persons; and that he had not seen the accused
Prem Kumar, Narain Datt and Manjit Singh causing injuries to the victims.
DW-8 J.N. Sharma, Advocate stated that a letter of appreciation on the
role of the Constable Amarjeet Singh was sent to the SSP Barnala from
the Bar but he did not verify the correctness of the incident.
12.3. As regards plea of alibi of the appellant Manjit Singh, the C
direct witness examined in the matter had been DW-9 Kulwant Singh,
said to be a member of the Panchayat. This witness stated that on
03.03.2001, at 11.30 a.m., the appellant Manjit Singh came to his house
in village Dhaner along with a lady member regarding the level of a
street, and he had gone with them to the spot. According to the witness, D
the appellant Manjit Singh was not perplexed at that time. This witness
expressed ignorance if on 03.03.2001, Manjit Singh had appeared in a
case pending in the Court of JMFC Barnala. This witness did not make
any application to the Panchayat or to the higher authority regarding the
alleged false implication of the appellant Manjit Singh. The conduct of
this witness DW-9 and most of the other witnesses examined in defence E
in relation to the plea of alibi, to say the very least, had been queer and
too unnatural to inspire any confidence.
12.4 The witnesses DW-3 Jora Singh and DW-6 Amarjit Singh
were admittedly serving in police establishment as Head Constable and
Constable respectively. From their testimony, this much is apparent that F
an occurrence indeed took place on the given date, at the given time,
and at the specified place i.e., the Court Complex Barnala. They allegedly
intervened in the fight between two factions. It sounds rather strange
that despite being the eye-witnesses to the incident and being the police
personnel themselves, neither they took care to report the matter to the G
police station immediately nor the IO could take their statements and
cite them as prosecution witnesses. The conduct of DW-4 Gurcharan
Singh Dhaliwal, Advocate had been equally unnatural. If he was the

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578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 11 S.C.R.

A eye-witness to the incident in the Court Complex, there was no reason
that being a law professional, he would not have reported the matter or
would not have been examined by the IO. Curiously, DW-4 attempted to
suggest that 3/4 persons caused injuries to 3/4 persons while DW-6 stated
that 4/5 persons were causing injuries to 4/5 persons. This discrepancy
in the number of persons involved is not without significance. The intention
B
of DW-4 had clearly been to tone down the gravity of offence and to
avoid the figure of “5” so as to take the case away from Section 149
IPC. In any case, mere suggestion in the negative by these persons that
they did not see the three accused persons Manjit Singh, Prem Kumar
and Narain Datt on the spot does not displace the cogent and trustworthy
C evidence adduced by the prosecution. The Trial Court and High Court
have rightly discarded these witnesses as being wholly unreliable.
12.5. In the given set of facts and circumstances, where the plea
of alibi was not put in suggestion to the relevant prosecution witnesses;
and, in his own statement under Section 313 CrPC, the appellant Manjit
D Singh, did not state that he was not present at the site at the relevant
point of time and he was present somewhere else, this plea could only
be rejected as a crude afterthought and nothing else. In the given
circumstances, the witness DW-9, Kulwant Singh could only be said to
be a made-up witness, who was lately introduced to somehow make out
a case of the presence of the appellant Manjit Singh at a different place
E at the relevant point of time. Such a witness could not have been accepted
for want of the basis of such a plea by way of cross-examination of the
prosecution witnesses as also by way of specific assertion in the plea of
the appellant Manjit Singh in his statement under Section 313 CrPC.
Apart that there is no supporting material in relation to the assertion so
F made by this witness, it is also noteworthy that when the appellant was
keenly pursuing the said rape and murder case of the village girl and the
matter was fixed in the Court on 03.03.2001, there was every reason for
him to be present in the Court Complex where the hearing was to take
place. Viewed from any angle, the plea of alibi, as put forward by the
appellant Manjit Singh, remains hollow and could only be rejected.
G
Other contentions
13. The other contention on behalf of the appellant Manjit Singh
that his connectivity with the crime is not established for want of recovery

H
MANJIT SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 579
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

of weapon of offence has only been noted to be rejected. As noticed, A
the IO in the first place did make recoveries on the disclosure statements
of other four accused persons. As regards the appellant Manjit Singh,
the IO chose to proceed in the direction that he was innocent and was
falsely implicated. That seems to be the fundamental reason for the IO
not making any attempt for recovery of the weapon of offence used by
B
the appellant Manjit Singh. However, this omission has no adverse bearing
on the prosecution case, where involvement of the appellant Manjit Singh
rather as the leader of the assembly, who started the assault with
exhortation and then participated in the assault, stands established beyond
doubt.
13.1. Further, there is hardly any force in the suggestion that the C
appellant Manjit Singh was falsely implicated for enmity. In the
circumstances of this case, if anything of so-called enmity is to be taken
into consideration, the same equally operates against the appellant and
his companions, as admittedly, the appellant was keenly pursuing the
aforesaid case of rape and murder and the complainant party was D
comprising of the persons related with the accused in the said case. The
factor of enmity would only lend support to the prosecution case towards
the object and motive of the assembly to attack, assault and cause hurt
to the members of the complainant party.
13.2. Likewise, the submission about want of independent E
witnesses in support of prosecution case is also baseless. There is no
rule that in every criminal case, the testimony of an injured eye-witness
needs corroboration from the so-called independent witness(es). When
the statement of injured eye-witness is found trustworthy and reliable,
the conviction on that basis could always be recorded, of course, having
regard to all the facts and surrounding factors. In the present case, the F
reliable evidence of the injured eye-witnesses cannot be discarded merely
for the reason that no independent witness was examined.
Unlawful assembly and rioting with deadly weapons
14. It has been vehemently argued on behalf of both the appellants G
that the essential ingredients of Section 141 IPC for the formation of
unlawful assembly with the common object having not been established,
the conviction of the appellants with the aid of Section 149 IPC is not
justified.

H
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 11 S.C.R.

A 14.1. The relevant part of Section 141 IPC could be usefully
extracted as under:-
“141. Unlawful assembly.- An assembly of five or more
persons to designated an “unlawful assembly”, if the common
object of the persons composing that assembly is-
B
xxx xxx xxx
Third.- To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other
offence; or
xxx xxx xxx
C
Explanation.- An assembly which was not unlawful when it
assembled, may subsequently become an unlawful assembly.”
14.2. Section 149, rendering every member of unlawful assembly
guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object reads as
D under:-
“149. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence
committed in prosecution of common object.- If an offence is
committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in
prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such
E as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be
committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at
the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the
same assembly, is guilty of that offence.”
14.3. We may also take note of the principles enunciated and
F explained by this Court as regards the ingredients of an unlawful assembly
and the vicarious/constructive liability of every member of such an
assembly. In the case of Sikander Singh (supra), this Court observed
as under:-
“15. The provision has essentially two ingredients viz. (i) the
G commission of an offence by any member of an unlawful
assembly, and (ii) such offence must be committed in
prosecution of the common object of the assembly or must be
such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be

H
MANJIT SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 581
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

committed in prosecution of the common object. Once it is A
established that the unlawful assembly had common object, it
is not necessary that all persons forming the unlawful assembly
must be shown to have committed some overt act. For the
purpose of incurring the vicarious liability for the offence
committed by a member of such unlawful assembly under the B
provision, the liability of other members of the unlawful
assembly for the offence committed during the continuance
of the occurrence, rests upon the fact whether the other
members knew beforehand that the offence actually committed
was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object.
C
*** *** ***
17. A “common object” does not require a prior concert and
a common meeting of minds before the attack. It is enough if
each member of the unlawful assembly has the same object in
view and their number is five or more and that they act as an D
assembly to achieve that object. The “common object” of an
assembly is to be ascertained from the acts and language of
the members composing it, and from a consideration of all
the surrounding circumstances. It may be gathered from the
course of conduct adopted by the members of the assembly. E
For determination of the common object of the unlawful
assembly, the conduct of each of the members of the unlawful
assembly, before and at the time of attack and thereafter, the
motive for the crime, are some of the relevant considerations.
What the common object of the unlawful assembly is at a
particular stage of the incident is essentially a question of F
fact to be determined, keeping in view the nature of the
assembly, the arms carried by the members, and the behaviour
of the members at or near the scene of the incident. It is not
necessary under law that in all cases of unlawful assembly,
with an unlawful common object, the same must be translated G
into action or be successful.

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582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 11 S.C.R.

A 18. In Masalti v. State of U.P.: AIR 1965 SC 202 a Constitution
Bench of this Court had observed that: (AIR p. 211, para 17)
“17. … Section 149 makes it clear that if an offence is
committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in
prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such
B as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be
committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at
the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the
same assembly, is guilty of that offence; and that emphatically
brings out the principle that the punishment prescribed by
C Section 149 is in a sense vicarious and does not always
proceed on the basis that the offence has been actually
committed by every member of the unlawful assembly.”
14.4. In the case of Subal Ghoral (supra), this Court, after a
survey of leading cases, summed up the principles as follows:-
D
“52. The above judgments outline the scope of Section 149
IPC. We need to sum up the principles so as to examine the
present case in their light. Section 141 IPC defines unlawful
assembly to be an assembly of five or more persons. They
E must have common object to commit an offence. Section 142
IPC postulates that whoever being aware of facts which render
any assembly an unlawful one intentionally joins the same
would be a member thereof. Section 143 IPC provides for
punishment for being a member of unlawful assembly. Section
149 IPC provides for constructive liability of every person of
F
an unlawful assembly if an offence is committed by any
member thereof in prosecution of the common object of that
assembly or such of the members of that assembly who knew
to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. The
most important ingredient of unlawful assembly is common
G object. Common object of the persons composing that
assembly is to do any act or acts stated in clauses “First”,

H
MANJIT SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 583
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

“Second”, “Third”, “Fourth” and “Fifth” of that section. A
Common object can be formed on the spur of the moment.
Course of conduct adopted by the members of common
assembly is a relevant factor. At what point of time common
object of unlawful assembly was formed would depend upon
the facts and circumstances of each case. Once the case of B
the person falls within the ingredients of Section 149 IPC,
the question that he did nothing with his own hands would be
immaterial. If an offence is committed by a member of the
unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object, any
member of the unlawful assembly who was present at the time C
of commission of offence and who shared the common object
of that assembly would be liable for the commission of that
offence even if no overt act was committed by him. If a large
crowd of persons armed with weapons assaults intended
victims, all may not take part in the actual assault. If weapons
D
carried by some members were not used, that would not absolve
them of liability for the offence with the aid of Section 149
IPC if they shared common object of the unlawful assembly.
53. But this concept of constructive liability must not be so
stretched as to lead to false implication of innocent bystanders. E
Quite often, people gather at the scene of offence out of
curiosity. They do not share common object of the unlawful
assembly. If a general allegation is made against large number
of people, the court has to be cautious. It must guard against
the possibility of convicting mere passive onlookers who did
F
not share the common object of the unlawful assembly. Unless
reasonable direct or indirect circumstances lend assurance
to the prosecution case that they shared common object of
the unlawful assembly, they cannot be convicted with the aid
of Section 149 IPC. It must be proved in each case that the
person concerned was not only a member of the unlawful G
assembly at some stage, but at all the crucial stages and shared
the common object of the assembly at all stages. The court

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584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 11 S.C.R.

A must have before it some materials to form an opinion that
the accused shared common object. What the common object
of the unlawful assembly is at a particular stage has to be
determined keeping in view the course of conduct of the
members of the unlawful assembly before and at the time of
B attack, their behaviour at or near the scene of offence, the
motive for the crime, the arms carried by them and such other
relevant considerations. The criminal court has to conduct
this difficult and meticulous exercise of assessing evidence to
avoid roping innocent people in the crime. These principles
C laid down by this Court do not dilute the concept of
constructive liability. They embody a rule of caution.”
14.5. We need not expand on the other cited decisions because
the basic principles remain that the important ingredients of an unlawful
assembly are the number of persons forming it i.e., five; and their common
D object. Common object of the persons composing that assembly could
be formed on the spur of the moment and does not require prior
deliberations. The course of conduct adopted by the members of such
assembly; their behaviour before, during, and after the incident; and the
arms carried by them are a few basic and relevant factors to determine
E the common object.
14.6. The facts of the present case, as established by the
prosecution, makes it clear that on the relevant date i.e., 03.03.2001 and
at the relevant time i.e., 11.15 a.m., at least five of the accused persons,
including the present appellants were present at the Barnala Court
F Complex. The members of the complainant party purportedly came to
the very same Court Complex to attend the hearing of the aforesaid
rape and murder case of the village girl in which, their kiths and relatives
were the accused persons and the case was being pursued by the
appellant Manjit Singh. It is also established that when the persons related
G with the complainant party were about to board their vehicle, the accused
persons attacked them with weapons. Significantly, the attack on the
complainant party was triggered with exhortation by the appellant Manjit
Singh to avenge the rape and murder of the village girl in the expressions
“Aj Eh Bach Ke Naa Jaan KK* Da Badla Lai Kay Rahenge”6. This
H
MANJIT SINGH v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB 585
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

clearly brings out the motive for the attack as also the object of the A
assembly. Moreover, the blows hurled by the accused persons on the
members of the complainant party had been of wide range, sufficient
force and chosen aims. The appellant Manjit Singh himself had given
two blows to the witness PW-5 on either of his hands. Labh Singh gave
kirpan blow on the head of Beant Singh. The appellant Sukhwinder B
Singh aimed the first blow on Dalip Singh but hit the right hand of the
victim. The appellant Sukhvinder Singh caused yet another injury to PW-
6 Gurnam Singh by the handle of his kirpan. These were apart from the
repeated blows by the accused Bakhtaur Singh on the head of the
deceased Dalip Singh with his ghop and then three blows to PW-6 C
Gurnam Singh. That apart, Bakhtaur Singh also gave the blow of his
kirpan on the left leg of Gurnam Singh. It is beyond the pale of doubt
that the accused persons had acted in concert and the object had clearly
been to ensure causalities amongst the members of the complainant
party. On the applicable principles, we have no hesitation in concluding
D
that the accused persons did constitute an unlawful assembly; did indulge
in rioting in the Court Complex with deadly weapons; and did cause
grievous bodily injuries to members of the complainant party. The
deceased Dalip Singh was attacked rather repeatedly by the members
of this unlawful assembly and he sustained grievous injury on the head
that proved fatal. The background aspects as also the conduct of the E
accused persons at and during the incident leaves nothing to doubt that
each of the member of this assembly remains liable for the offence
committed by himself as also by every other member of the assembly.
15. Before concluding, we may point out that in the case of Govind
F
Singh (supra), as relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant
Sukhwinder Singh, the incident occurred in the sudden quarrel and in
spur of moment where the appellant picked up chimney lamp and threw
it on his daughter who died because of burn injuries sustained in the
incident. In the given fact situation, this Court converted the conviction
from Section 302 IPC to that under Section 304 Part-II IPC and reduced G
the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone. We are
unable to find any applicability of this decision to the facts of the present
case.
6
That would translate nearly as: “Let them not escape today; KK* shall be avenged.” H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 11 S.C.R.

A Conclusion
16. Accordingly, and in view of the above, these appeals fail and
are, therefore, dismissed. The appellants shall surrender before the Court
concerned within a period of four weeks from today and shall serve out
the remaining part of their respective sentence(s).
B

Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals dismissed.

C

D

E

F

G

H