G H BAJRANGA (DEAD) BY LRS.versusTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.

130                       [2021]
               SUPREME COURT     1 S.C.R. 130
                              REPORTS                         [2021] 1 S.C.R.


A                        BAJRANGA (DEAD) BY LRS.
                                         v.
                THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.
                          (Civil Appeal No. 6209 of 2010)
B                              JANUARY 19, 2021
        [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, DINESH MAHESHWARI AND
                     HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]
             Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960
      – s.11(3) and s.11(4) – Surplus land under the Act – Predecessor-
C
      in-interest of appellant was bhumiswami of agricultural dry land –
      He was stated to be holding land in excess of the prescribed ceiling
      limit – Such excess land declared to be surplus land, whereafter,
      respondents initiated proceedings for taking over possession and
      eviction u/s.248 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code –
D     Appellant filed suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction
      contending that the land recovery proceedings were illegal since
      he was actually left with land within the prescribed ceiling limit
      since a part of the land had been decreed in favour of his mother-
      in-law, ‘J’, after she filed a civil suit against him – Suit of appellant
      dismissed by trial court – First Appellate Court however held that
E
      the competent authority had failed to comply with the statutory
      provisions u/s.11(3) and s.11(4) and restrained the respondents from
      interfering with possession of such land – High Court set aside the
      judgment of Appellate Court – On appeal, held: Right to property
      is still a constitutional right under Art.300A of the Constitution
F     though not a fundamental right – Deprivation of the right can only
      be in accordance with the procedure established by law – On facts,
      once a disclosure was made (that ‘J’ had filed a suit against
      appellant), the matter had to be dealt with under sub-section (4) of
      s.11 and in view of the pending suit proceedings between appellant
      and ‘J’, the proviso to sub-section (4) of s.11 came into play which
G
      required the respondent authorities to await the decision of the court
      – However, the very scheme of the Act was breached by the
      respondents in not complying with the statutory provisions – Even
      notice was not issued to ‘J’ – She could have clarified the position
      further – The effect of the decree in favour of ‘J’ is that the appellant
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                                        130
  BAJRANGA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA                         131
                PRADESH & ORS.

loses the right to hold that land and his total land holding comes       A
within the ceiling limit – If there is no surplus land there can be no
question of any proceedings for takeover of the surplus land under
the Act – Judgment of first Appellate Court accordingly restored –
Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 – s.248.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court                                     B
      HELD : 1. The factual matrix of the instant case is to be
examined in the context of the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh
Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960. The preparation of
the statement of land held in excess of ceiling limit under Section
11 of the said Act has to be on the basis of information given in        C
the return under Section 9 of the said Act, or the information
obtained by the competent authority under Section 10 of the said
Act after making an enquiry. In terms of Section 11(3), the draft
statement is to be published and served on the holder, the creditor
and “all other persons interested in the land to which it relates.”
Once a disclosure is there that ‘J’ had filed a suit, there has to be    D
mandatorily a notice to her as otherwise any decision would be
behind her back and would, thus, violate the principles of natural
justice. [Para 22][141-B-D]
      2. There is little ambiguity about the aforesaid position as
in Section 11(4) it has been stated that in case the competent           E
authority finds that any question has arisen regarding the title of
a particular holder, which has not been determined by the
competent court, the competent authority shall proceed to
enquire summarily into merits of such question and pass such
orders as it thinks fit. Thus, the power is vested with the              F
competent authority to determine such conflict of the land holding.
This is, however, subject to a proviso. The proviso clearly
stipulates that if such a question is already pending for decision
before the competent court, the competent authority shall await
the decision of the court. [Para 23][141-D-F]
                                                                         G
     3. The embargo came there and then as once the disclosure
was made the proceedings should have been kept in abeyance to
await the decision in those proceedings. The occasion to pass
orders under sub-section (5) and sub-section (6) of Section 11 of

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132            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2021] 1 S.C.R.


A     the said Act did not arise in the present case in view of the
      disclosure of J’s suit. Further proceedings should have been kept
      in abeyance to await the verdict in the suit as per proviso to sub-
      section (4) and notice should have been issued to ‘J’. All this has
      been observed to be in breach by the respondents. Thus, the
      findings of the appellate court in constructions of these provisions
B
      reflects the correct position of law in the given facts of the case.
      [Para 24][141-F-H]
             4. The legal position has to be appreciated in the factual
      context. Thus, though there may be a process provided for
      redressal under the scheme of the Act, it is this very scheme of
C     the Act which has been breached by the respondents in not
      complying with the statutory provisions. It can be nobody’s say
      that ‘J’ cannot file a title suit against the appellant. That suit being
      maintainable and pending, and the factum of that suit being
      disclosed in the return, the provisions of Section 11 had to be
D     strictly complied with. This is so as the right to property is still a
      constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India
      though not a fundamental right. The deprivation of the right can
      only be in accordance with the procedure established by law. The
      law in this case is the said Act. Thus, the provisions of the said
      Act had to be complied with to deprive a person of the land being
E     surplus. [Para 28][142-F-H; 143-A-D]
             5. The provisions of the said Act are very clear as to what
      has to be done at each stage. Once a disclosure was made, the
      matter had to be dealt with under sub-section (4) of Section 11 of
      the said Act and in view of the pending suit proceedings between
F     the appellant and ‘J’, the proviso came into play which required
      the respondent authorities to await the decision of the court. Sub-
      section 5 and thereafter sub-section 6 would kick in only after
      the mandate of subsection 4 was fulfilled. In the present case it
      was not so. Even notice was not issued to ‘J’. She could have
G     clarified the position further. The effect of the decree in favour of
      ‘J’ is that the appellant loses the right to hold that land and his
      total land holding comes within the ceiling limit. If there is no
      surplus land there can be no question of any proceedings for take
      over of the surplus land under the said Act. Thus, the impugned

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   BAJRANGA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA                                 133
                 PRADESH & ORS.

order of the High Court is liable to be set aside and the order of                A
the first appellate court is restored. [Paras 29, 30][143-B-E]
       Competent Authority, Tarana District, Ujjain (M.P.) v.
       Vijay Gupta & Ors., (1991) Supp 2 SCC 631 and State
       of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Dungaji (Dead)
       Represented by Legal Representatives & Anr., (2019) 7                      B
       SCC 465 : [2019] 9 SCR 979 – referred to.
                          Case Law Reference
(1991) Supp 2 SCC 631               referred to                Para 15
[2019] 9 SCR 979                    referred to                Para 17            C
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6209
of 2010.
       From the Judgment and Order dated 08.05.2008 and the decree
of the High Court for Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior in Second Appeal
No. 644 of 1998.                                                                  D
       Saurabh Moishra, AAG, Ms. Christi Jain, Harsh Jain, Harshit
Khanduja, Akshat Maheshwari, Harshvardhan Sharma, Ms. Pratibha
Jain, Sunny Choudhary, Advs. for the appearing parties.
       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                                  E
       SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
       1. The social objective of providing land to the tiller and the landless
post independence was sought to be subserved by bringing in ceiling in
agricultural holdings in different States. It is towards this objective that
the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960                     F
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Act’) was brought into force in
1960. The said Act, inter alia, provided for acquisition as well as
disposal of surplus land.
      2. The predecessor-in-interest of the appellant (now
represented by the LRs) was the bhumiswami of agricultural dry land               G
measuring 64.438 acres situated in Village Bagadua, Paragna
Sheopur Kala, District Morena, Madhya Pradesh. He was, thus,
stated to be holding land in excess of the ceiling limit prescribed as
per Section 7(b) of the said Act, whereby a holder along with his
family of five members or less could hold a maximum amount of 54
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134            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 1 S.C.R.


A     acres of land. As a sequitur thereto the competent authority/competent
      officer (respondent No.2 herein) initiated the process to acquire the
      surplus land and issued a draft statement in Land Ceiling Case
      No.180/75-76/A-90(B) for acquisition of 10.436 acres of dry land from
      Survey Nos.755, 756, 780 and 881/1 (for short ‘surplus land’). A final
      order dated 30.3.1979 was published declaring such land as surplus.
B
      In furtherance of the aforesaid, the respondents herein initiated the
      process of taking over possession and eviction under Section 248 of the
      Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter referred to
      as the ‘said Code’) (the provision has since been deleted).
             3. The appellant being aggrieved by the final order dated 30.3.1979
C     filed a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction before the
      Court of Civil Judge Class-II, Sheopur Kala, District Morena. It is the
      say of the appellant, as per averments in the plaint, that the proceedings
      to recover land from him were illegal as he was actually left with only 54
      acres of land which was within the prescribed ceiling limit in view of the
D     fact that the land measuring 17 bighas and 7 biswa in Survey No.77 had
      been decreed in favour of one Jenobai, who was in kabza kasht
      (possession by cultivation) of the land for about 20 years. She had filed
      a civil suit, being Civil Suit No.319/75A O.C. on 15.10.1975 against
      the appellant seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction
      with respect to the aforementioned land. There had been an admission
E     of the ground position by the appellant and thus, the suit was
      decreed on 5.3.1979 declaring Jenobai to be the owner in possession of
      the said land. We may note that Jenobai is actually the mother-in-law of
      the appellant and according to her, this land was being cultivated by her
      on the basis of half and half of the land proceeds. However, subsequently
F     the appellant developed improper intent and taking advantage of her
      being a widow and an old woman, had colluded with the Patwari
      to get this disputed land mutated in his name.
             4. The suit filed by the appellant was contested by the respondents
      herein and they took a defence in the written statement that the possession
G     of the surplus land had been taken over and allotted to other cultivators.
      There was, however, an admission that the appellant in the return, filed
      as per Section 9 of the said Act, mentioned the aspect of the pending
      suit qua Survey No. 77. However, it was contended that the appellant
      had neither submitted a copy of the suit nor any proof of pendency
      of the suit. The suit was alleged to be collusive inasmuch as Jenobai, in
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  BAJRANGA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA                             135
      PRADESH & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

fact, was the mother-in-law of the appellant and the endeavour was to        A
prevent the surplus land from being acquired. It was pleaded that Jenobai,
if she had title or possession of the land in survey No.77, would have
submitted a claim before the competent authority after the draft statement
was issued. The appellant was also alleged to not have submitted any
objection to the draft statement and the remedy of the appellant was
                                                                             B
stated to be by way of an appeal before the competent court which was
not pursued. The order of the competent authority was stated to have
become final and, thus, the action for taking over possession of surplus
land and allotment thereof was lawful.
       5. The trial court decided the suit post trial vide judgment and
decree dated 7.10.1997. The trial court held that the appellant              C
was the bhumiswami in respect of the survey number in question and
the suit was collusive with Jenobai having knowledge of the ceiling
proceedings. These findings resulted in a dismissal of the suit.
       6. The appellant filed an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CPC’) before the      D
Court of Additional District Judge, Sheopur Kala, District Morena.
The appellant’s say was that in view of the pendency of the suit
filed by Jenobai, the proceedings under the said Act should have
been kept in abeyance in view of the provisions of Section 11(4) of the
said Act. The relevant provisions of Section 11 read as under:               E
      “11. Preparation of statement of land held in excess of
      the ceiling area. - (1) On the basis of information given in the
      return under Section 9 or the information obtained by the
      competent authority under Section 10, the said authority shall
      after making such enquiry as it may deem fit, prepare a separate       F
      draft statement in respect of each person holding land in excess
      of the ceiling area, containing the following particulars:
      (3) The draft statement shall be published at such place and in
      such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof shall be
      served on the holder or holders concerned, the creditors and all       G
      other persons interested in the land to which it relates. Any
      objection to the draft statement received within thirty days of
      the publication thereof shall be duly considered by the
      competent authority who after giving the objector an opportunity
      of being heard shall pass such order as it deems fit.
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136             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 1 S.C.R.


A           (4) If while considering the objections received under sub-section
            (3) or otherwise, the competent authority finds that any
            question has arisen regarding the title of a particular holder
            and such question has not already been determined by a Court of
            competent jurisdiction, the competent authority shall proceed
            to enquire summarily into the merits of such question and pass
B
            such orders as it thinks fit.
            Provided that if such question is already pending for decision
            before a competent court, the competent authority shall await the
            decision of the court.
C           (5) The order of the competent authority under sub-section
            (4) shall subject to appeal or revision, but any party may, within
            three months from the date of such order, institute a suit in the
            civil court to have the order set aside, and the decision of such
            court shall be binding on the competent authority, but subject to
            the result of such suit, if any, the order of the competent authority
D           shall be final and conclusive.]
            [(6) After all such objections, have been disposed of, the competent
            authority shall, subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules
            made thereunder, make necessary alterations in the draft statement
            in accordance with the orders passed on objections and shall
E           declare the surplus land held by each holder. The competent
            authority shall, thereafter, publish a final statement specifying
            therein the entire land held by the holder, the land to be retained
            by him and the land declared to be surplus and send a copy thereof
            the holder concerned. Such a statement shall be published in
F           such manner as may be prescribed and shall be conclusive
            evidence of the facts stated therein.]”
             7. The information about the pendency of the suit between
      Jenobai and the appellant had been furnished to the competent authority,
      and post decree of the suit the appellant had been left with only 54 acres
G     of land. Thus, there was no reason to initiate proceedings to take
      possession of the disputed land. The appellate court noted the admission
      in the written statement filed by the respondents herein, that in the return
      filed by the appellant there was disclosure of the factum of
      Jenobai being in possession of Survey No.77 land as also of the
      pendency of the suit, being Suit No.319A/75 between her and the
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   BAJRANGA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA                             137
       PRADESH & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

appellant. That being the factual position, Section 11(3) of the said Act     A
mandated that the copy of the draft statement ought to have been served
on Jenobai as she was an ‘interested person’ in the land. The
acquisition proceedings had to be kept in abeyance in view of the
proviso to Section 11(4) of the said Act till the disposal of the suit, and
that such a judgment of the civil court was binding on the competent
                                                                              B
authority. The suit was stated to have been decreed for 3.306
hectares out of 17.715 hectares of land recorded in the name of the
appellant, resultantly leaving 14.399 hectares of land, which was within
the prescribed limited under Section 7 of the said Act. On the basis of
these findings, the appeal was allowed and the judgment of the trial
court was set aside on the ground that the competent authority had failed     C
to comply with the statutory provisions under Section 11(3) and
11(4) of the said Act. The appellant was declared as the bhumiswami
of the surplus land and the respondents were restrained from
interfering with his possession of the land.
      8. It is now the turn of the respondents herein to prefer an            D
appeal under Section 100 of the CPC before the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, Gwalior Bench in Second Appeal No.644 of 1998. The High
Court vide order dated 8.5.2008 framed two substantive questions of
law, which read as under:
      “i. Whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court challenging the         E
      order of the Competent Officer is barred under Section 46 of the
      said Act?
      ii. Whether the judgment and decree of the first appellate court is
      sustainable under the provisions of the said Act?”
       9. On a conspectus of the matter, the High Court allowed the           F
appeal. The rationale for the same was that after the publication of
the draft statement neither the appellant nor Jenobai had filed objections.
In the revenue records the appellant’s name was recorded as holder of
the entire agricultural land in question. No information was stated
to have been provided to the competent authority giving particulars           G
of the suit of Jenobai. The competent authority was found not at fault
in the alleged breach of Sections 11(3) and 11(4) of the said Act as
the information germane for the same had not been disclosed.
      10. The appellant at that stage, thus, approached this Court
by the present Special Leave Petition and on 2.3.2009, notice was
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138            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 1 S.C.R.


A     issued and status quo was directed to be maintained. Subsequently,
      leave was granted on 26.7.2010 and ad interim order was made
      absolute till the disposal of the appeal.
             11. On the appeal being taken up for hearing on 16.1.2020
      an order was passed recording the factual controversy as to whether
B     the appellant had filed objections giving particulars of the pendency of
      the civil suit. This was so as in terms of Section 9(iv) of the said
      Act that such particulars were required to be stated. Even on
      the question of maintainability of the suit, it was mentioned that it
      was necessary to peruse the objections filed by the appellant to
      determine whether the requirement of Section 9 of the said Act had
C     been fulfilled, Thus, records of the last ceiling case were directed to be
      produced by the respondents herein. The records were, however, not
      produced and, thus, on 9.9.2020, an order was passed giving further
      time but directing that failure to produce the record would result in
      an adverse inference being drawn against the respondents herein.
D            12. The respondents filed an affidavit on 26.9.2020 stating
      that the records were untraceable including the objections filed by the
      appellant. It appears that due to carving out of some districts the records
      could not be traced out. The son of the appellant had stated that he did
      not have the record either.
E           13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, albeit in the
      absence of the aforesaid record, which was not produced right till
      the date of hearing.
            14. The appellant canvassed that the civil suit filed was
      maintainable as the bar of jurisdiction of the civil court did not
F     come into play as specified in Section 46 of the said Act in view
      of the provisions of Sections 11(4) and 11(5) of the said Act read
      together. Section 46 of the said Act reads as under:
            “46. Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts. – Save as
            expressly provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall have any
G           jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by
            or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by
            the competent authority.”
            15. The plea, thus, was that the Section begins with a saving
      clause qua the bar of civil court – “Save as expressly provided in this
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     BAJRANGA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA                               139
         PRADESH & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

Act…..” The provisions of Section 46 were pleaded to be expressly                 A
subject to the provisions of Section 11(5) of the said Act and the
observations in Competent Authority, Tarana District, Ujjain (M.P.)
v. Vijay Gupta & Ors.1 were relied upon, opining that a suit can be
filed in a civil court within three months of passing of an order by
the competent authority under Section 11(4) of the said Act in view of
                                                                                  B
the provisions of Section 11(5) of the said Act. There was pleaded to be
an admission about the disclosure of the appellant regarding the factum
of the suit filed by Jenobai in the returns and, thus, the respondents
herein were required to wait for the outcome of the suit and should have
also invited objections from Jenobai. The decree in the civil suit
between the appellant and Jenobai was, thus, submitted to be binding              C
on the competent authority.
       16. On the other hand, the respondents herein reiterated that
the suit filed by Jenobai was a collusive one and the object of the institution
was to circumvent the provisions of the said Act. In this behalf,
it was submitted that the suit under Section 11(5) of the said Act can            D
only be instituted within three months from the date of Section 11(4)
order, the date of which is not mentioned. However, even if the
date of the subsequent order under Section 11(6) passed on 31.3.1979
is considered, the period of three months elapsed as the suit
was filed on 31.8.1979/3.9.1979 (there is some discrepancy qua the dates
as recorded in different proceedings). Further under Section 11(5) of             E
the said Act, a suit can only be filed for setting aside the order under
Section 11(4) of the said Act but no such prayer was made.
       17. It was urged that after the order under Section 11(6) of the
said Act is passed, the land vests with the State under Section 12 of the
said Act and, thus, a suit for declaration of title was not maintainable.         F
There was no challenge to the order under Section 11(6) of the said Act
and, thus, the suit was not maintainable. It was also urged that no suit
lies against an order under Section 11(6) of the said Act in view of the
judgment of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v.
Dungaji (Dead) Represented by Legal Representatives & Anr. 2                      G
Learned counsel for the respondents herein pleaded that though the
appellant raised the issue about the pendency of the suit with
Jenobai in the return filed under Section 9 of the said Act, the
1
    1991 Supp (2) SCC 631.
2
    (2019) 7 SCC 465.                                                             H
140             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2021] 1 S.C.R.


A     documents were not produced and exhibited in this behalf even before
      the trial court. The possession of Jenobai as reflected in the revenue
      records was not proved by any evidence led in that behalf. And, in fact,
      no such objections were filed before the trial court.
             18. On the aspect of this Court observing that an adverse inference
B     will be drawn as per the orders dated 16.1.2020 and 9.9.2020, it
      was submitted that the copy of the objections were never placed
      before the trial court, the first appellate court and the High Court
      and, thus, the appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving
      the case. There should, thus, be no occasion to draw the adverse
      inference against the respondents herein.
C
             19. We have given a thought to the matter in the conspectus of
      what has been urged before us on the different dates and the proceedings
      that had been recorded. The matter was taken up on 16.1.2020 and in
      view of the submissions advanced by the parties, the Court required
      perusal of the record. Thus, in the proceedings it was recorded that
D     there was a factual controversy as to whether the appellant in
      pursuance of the draft statement in the objections filed had given the
      particulars of the pending civil suit filed by the mother-in-law of the
      appellant claiming part of the land held by the appellant. This was
      considered to be relevant as in terms of Section 9(iv) of the said Act
E     such particulars are mandated to be given and, thus, the respondents
      herein being in breach or not of the other succeeding provisions of
      the Act would depend on this important aspect. We also took note of
      the fact that as per the respondents herein no particulars had been
      given and the suit was alleged to be collusive. In order to determine
      the question it was opined that this Court found it necessary to
F     peruse the objections filed by the appellant to come to a conclusion.
              20. On the said date itself, this Court also required the pleadings
      in the civil suit filed by the mother-in-law, Jenobai, to be placed on record
      as also the judgment.

G             21. The appellant complied with the order dated 16.1.2020 by
      filing these additional documents but the respondents herein did not
      do the needful. It is in these circumstances that on 9.9.2020 this Court
      made it clear that in case the records are not filed adverse inference
      will be drawn. The natural sequitur to this is that the failure to
      place the aforementioned documents on record shows that there
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   BAJRANGA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA                                 141
       PRADESH & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

had been proper disclosure about the suit in the return filed under               A
Section 9 of the said Act. The factum of disclosure of the suit could
not really be doubted by the respondents herein in view of their own
pleadings (admitted in the pleadings before the trial court, as perused
by us). However, the records are alleged not to have been located.
       22. The aforesaid factual matrix is, thus, to be examined in the           B
context of the provisions of the said Act. The preparation of the statement
of land held in excess of ceiling limit under Section 11 of the said Act has
to be on the basis of information given in the return under Section
9 of the said Act, or the information obtained by the competent
authority under Section 10 of the said Act after making an enquiry. In
terms of Section 11(3), the draft statement is to be published and served         C
on the holder, the creditor and “all other persons interested in the land to
which it relates.” Once a disclosure is there that Jenobai had filed a suit,
there has to be mandatorily a notice to her as otherwise any decision
would be behind her back and would, thus, violate the principles of natural
justice.                                                                          D
       23. There is little ambiguity about the aforesaid position as in Section
11(4) it has been stated that in case the competent authority finds that
any question has arisen regarding the title of a particular holder, which
has not been determined by the competent court, the competent
authority shall proceed to enquire summarily into merits of such question         E
and pass such orders as it thinks fit. Thus, the power is vested with the
competent authority to determine such conflict of the land holding.
This is, however, subject to a proviso. The proviso clearly stipulates that
if such a question is already pending for decision before the competent
court, the competent authority shall await the decision of the court.
                                                                                  F
       24. In our view, the embargo came there and then as once the
disclosure was made the proceedings should have been kept in abeyance
to await the decision in those proceedings. The occasion to pass orders
under sub-section (5) and sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the said Act
did not arise in the present case as in view of the disclosure of Jenobai’s
suit. Further proceedings should have been kept in abeyance to                    G
await the verdict in the suit as per proviso to sub-section (4) and notice
should have been issued to Jenobai. All this has been observed to be in
breach by the respondents herein. We are, thus, of the view that the
findings of the appellate court in constructions of these provisions
reflects the correct position of law in the given facts of the case.              H
142                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 1 S.C.R.


A            25. The issue of jurisdiction of civil court is no more res
      integra in view of the judgment in Competent Authority, Tarana
      District, Ujjain (M.P.).3 where it has been observed in para 4 as
      under:
                “4. So far as the other question regarding the maintainability of
B               the suit in a civil court is concerned, suffice to say that sub-section
                (5) of Section 11 of the Act itself provides that any party may
                within three months from the date of any order passed by the
                Competent Authority under sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the
                Act institute a suit in the civil court to have the order set aside.
                Thus the above provision itself permits the filing of a suit in a civil
C               court and any decision of such court has been made binding
                on the Competent Authority under the above provision of sub-
                section (5) of Section 11 of the Act. It is not in dispute that the suit
                in the present case was filed within three months as provided
                under sub-section (5) of Section 11 of the Act. In the result, we
D               do not find any force in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed
                with no order as to costs.”
             26. We have taken note of the latter proceedings of this Court in
      State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Dungaji (Dead) Represented
      by Legal Representatives & Anr.4 discussing the scheme of the
E     Act and the requirement of taking recourse to the provisions of appeal
      and revision under the said Act.
             27. We have also considered the plea of limitation advanced by
      learned counsel for the respondents albeit no specific issue being framed
      in respect of the same.
F             28. In our view the legal position has to be appreciated in the
      factual context. Thus, though there may be a process provided for
      redressal under the scheme of the Act, it is this very scheme of the Act
      which has been breached by the respondents herein in not complying
      with the statutory provisions. It can be nobody’s say that Jenobai cannot
G     file a title suit against the appellant. That suit being maintainable and
      pending, and the factum of that suit being disclosed in the return (if the
      nature of disclosure being the reason we wanted to peruse the record,
      which were not made available), the provisions of Section 11 had to
      3
          (supra).
      4
H         (supra).
   BAJRANGA (DEAD) BY LRS. v. THE STATE OF MADHYA                               143
       PRADESH & ORS. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

be strictly complied with. We say so as the right to property is still a        A
constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India
though not a fundamental right. The deprivation of the right can only be
in accordance with the procedure established by law. The law in this
case is the said Act. Thus, the provisions of the said Act had to be
complied with to deprive a person of the land being surplus.
                                                                                B
       29. The provisions of the said Act are very clear as to what has to
be done at each stage. In our view once a disclosure was made, the
matter had to be dealt with under sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the
said Act and in view of the pending suit proceedings between the
appellant and Jenobai, the proviso came into play which required
the respondent authorities to await the decision of the court. Sub-             C
section 5 and thereafter sub-section 6 would kick in only after the
mandate of sub- section 4 was fulfilled. In the present case it was not
so. Even notice was not issued to Jenobai. She could have clarified the
position further. The effect of the decree in favour of Jenobai is that the
appellant loses the right to hold that land and his total land holding comes    D
within the ceiling limit. If there is no surplus land there can be no
question of any proceedings for take over of the surplus land under the
said Act.
       30. We are, thus, of the view that the impugned order is liable to
be set aside and the order of the first appellate court is restored.            E
       31. The appeal is accordingly allowed leaving the parties to bear
their own costs.


Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                                          Appeal allowed.
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