Holding

Seniority of temporary Assistant Engineers is to be reckoned from the date they became members of the service under Rule 3(b), i.e., the date of their substantive appointment, regardless of whether the post was permanent or temporary.

Summary

The case concerned the seniority of temporary Assistant Engineers in the United Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch) Class II. The petitioners, appointed temporarily between 1947‑1950 and later confirmed, claimed that their seniority should be measured from the date they became members of the service under Rule 3(b), not from the later confirmation dates used for the appellants who were appointed to guaranteed posts. The Supreme Court examined the service rules, especially Rule 23, and held that an employee appointed substantively to a temporary post becomes a member of the service and his seniority is fixed from that appointment date. The Court also ruled that the High Court could not grant relief after an inordinate delay and laches, and that the earlier Division Bench decision was binding under stare decisis. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the High Court’s order quashing the seniority list was set aside.

Issues considered

The proper yardstick for determining seniority of temporary Assistant Engineers under the United Provinces Service of Engineers Rules.
Whether Rule 23 requires seniority to be counted from the date of substantive appointment (Rule 3(b)) irrespective of the nature of the post.
Whether relief under Article 226 can be granted after a delay of more than a decade (laches and inordinate delay).
Whether the doctrine of stare decisis bars a later Division Bench from revisiting an earlier decision on the same matter.

Legislation cited

Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930s. Rule 40
Constitution of Indias. Article 136, s. Article 226
United Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch) Class II Rules, 1936s. Rule 17, s. Rule 19, s. Rule 23, s. Rule 3(b), s. Rule 4, s. Rule 5(i), s. Rule 6

Subjects

senioritytemporary appointmentsubstantive capacityRule 23lachesinordinate delayservice lawpublic service rulesstare decisisArticle 226engineering service

Judgment

G.C. GUPTA & ORS. A
v.
N.K. PANDEY & ORS.

APRIL 30, 1987, DECEMBER 8, 1987
B
[A.P. SEN AND B.C. RAY, JJ.]

United Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads
Branch) Class II Rules 1936: Rules 3(b), 5(ii), 17 and 13-
)-._ . Engineers-Seniority and promotion-'Member of service'-Who
is-Seniority to be determined from date employee becomes 'member C
of service'.

Constitution of India 1950: Articles 226 and 136-Service
matters-Inordinate and· unexplained delay-Relief not to be gran-
ted-Division Bench deciding that case was barred by /aches and D
delay-Such decision cannot be reversed by another Division Bench
of same High Court treating the matier as res integra-Doctrine of
stare decisis-Applicability of.

From the year 1942-43, two vacancies in the United Provinces
Service of Engineers, both in the Buildings and Roads as well as in E

- the Irrigation Department, were reserved for students of the
Thomson College of Civil Engineering, Roorkee who stood first and
second in order of merit in the final examination of the degree
course_ These two guaranteed posts were reserved by a Notification
....(
dated August 31, 1942 issued by the then Provincial Government F
under Rule 6 of the United Provinces of Engineers Buildings and
Roads Branch Class II Rules, 1936. This reserved quota of two
guaranteed posts was later on increased by the Government to four
posts each year in each of the two branches. This system of direct
recruitment of merit scholars was, however, discontinued by another
.... ' Notification dated June 22, 1950. G

By a G.O. dated April 19, 1950 the State Government settled
the principle that persons appointed to the guaranteed posts every
year as Engineer students would take their seniority over persons
appointed as temporary Assistant Engineers in that year. By a subse- H

185
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.
•
)--.
A quent G.O. dated June 22, 1950 the Government intimated the Chief
Engineer, Building and Roads, that engineer students who were
appointed to the guaranteed posts of temporary Assistant Engineers '
and working in the Buildings and Roads Branch be absorbed. In the
existing permanent vacancies or those which might arise in the
B future. By an Office Memorandum dated December 7, 1961 the State
Government brought a change in the method of recruitment of
Assistant Engineers in the U.P. Service of Engineers Building and )
Roads Branch, i.e. direct recruitment by competitive examination
through a Public Service Commission from the year 1961.
..J, .
c The respondents in the appeal (petitioners in the writ petition)
were initially appointed as temporary Assistant Engineers in the U.P.
Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch) by the Chief ,,I,
Engineer, PWD between 1947-48 subject to the final approval of the
Government. These were subsequently approved by the Government
during 1948-49 in accordance with the provisions of Rule 5(i) of the
.
D
Rules. Thereafter, on January 20, 1950 the Government in consul-
tation with the Public Service Commission confirmed these provi-
sional appointments and these respondents also passed the requisite
test held by the Government. They were confirmed as permanent
Assistant Engineers in permanent posts in the cadre during 1956-58
E and the date of their confirmation was fIXed as April 1, 1956. 1
The appellants in the appeal (respondent Nos. 3-5 and 7 in the

F
writ petition) were appointed between 1951-52 as temporary Assis-
taut Engineers against the guaranteed posts and after completion of
the probationary period were confirmed in 1955, vide Gazette Notifi-
lr
-•
cation dated October 11, 1955. .,, I
Seniority of Appellants 1 to 4 was fixed earlier from April 1,
1955 whereas seniority of Respondents 1 to 12 was fixed below them·
from 1956 treating the date of confirmation in the service as the date
G of their becoming members of the se~vice. . ..
The respondents filed representations before the Government
in 1959-60 for re-determination of the confirmation as well as conse· ,;,.
quential determination of seniority of the petitioners vis-a-vis the
H respondents. Their· claim was they having been appointed as Assis-
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY 187
..... tant Engineers, though temporarily, they became 'members of the A
Service' earlier than the appellants and as such they were entitled to
>
, be placed above the appellants in the seniority list. In 1960·6J the
appellants bad been promoted as Officiating Encutiv1PEnglneers on
the basis of seniority and record of service. However,, respondents
Nos. I to 12 who later on were also promoted as Officiating Executive B
Engineers never filed any representations qua Executive Engineers
and the seniority of the appellants as Executive Engineers remained
unchallenged.

It was only on May 4, 1970 after a lapse of 15 years that the
respondents filed a petition under Art. 226 challenging the order c
dated October 11, 1955 by which the appellants were confirmed with
effect fr!'m April 1, 1955 and the consequential determination of the
inter se seniority between direct recruits and promotees by tbe orders
dated July 20, 1956 and May 29, 1961.
D
A Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the petition holding
that the petitioners were guilty of !aches and this was upheld by a
Division Bench in appeal by its Judgment dated October 26, 1971.
The Division Bench, however, under an impression that the re·
presentations made by the petitioners In regard to their seniority
E
were still pending, observed that there was no reason to think that
the Government will not decide them fairly and in accodance with
law.

Factually there was no representations except one (by D.K.
Laraiya a temporary Assistant Engineer appointed to a guaranteed F
post) that was pending but pursuant to the observations of the
Division Bench, the Government invited representations from all the
aggrieved persons.

The petitioners accordingly made representations In the matter
+' of refixation of their inter se seniority and the Government by its G
order dated June 29, 1973 rejected all the representations stating
that the question of inter se seniority of Assistant Engineers had been
,\.. finally settled and could not be reopened.

The respondents thereupon filed a fresh writ petition before the H
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.

A High Court and a Division Bench of the High Court this time by its )

judgment dated May 6, 1981 directed issuance of a writ in the nature
of certiorari quashing the impugned seniority list and a writ in the
nature of mandamus directing the State Government to redetermine
the inter se seniority of Assistant Engineers in the U.P. Servke of
B Engineers Buildings and Roads Branch Class II.

Allowing the Appeal, the Court,

HELD: !Per A.P. Sen, J. Concurring] Temporary Assistant ~
Engineers were entitled to the benefit of their seniority reckoned ,
C according to the date of the order of appointment to the Service in.
terms of r. 23 of the United Provinces Service of Engineers (Build-
ings and Roads Branch) Rules, 1936, w.e.f. the date of their absorp- /
lion into the Service by the Government in consultation with the
Public Service Commission i.e. from the date from which they ~
D became 'Members of the Service' within the meaning ofr. 3(b) of the
Rules. 1221 C-D]

Ashok Gulati v. B.S. Jain, [1986] Supp. SCC 597 followed.
Baleshwar Das v. State of U.P. (1981] 1 SCR 449-1980 4 SCC 226;
E N. K. Chauhan c. State of Gujarat, [1977] I SCR 1037 and S.B.
Patvardhan v. State of Maharashtra, (1977] 3 SCR 775, referred to.

2(a) When the decision of the earlier Division Bench was
arrived at keeping in view all the aspects and it was held that the
F claim for re-determination of inter se seniority between direct
recruits and promotees could not be agitated after a lapse of 16 years
the later Division Bench erred in proceeding upon the basis that the
matter was still res integra. [230FJ

2(b) Inordinate delay is not merely a factor for the Court to
G refuse appropriate relief but also a relevant consideration for not
unsettling settled things. [23 lB)

Malcom Lawrence Cecil D'Souza v. Union of India & Ors.,
(1975] Sopp. SCR 409; R.S. Makashi & Ors. v. I.M. Menon & Ors.,
H (1982] 2 SCR 69; K.R. Mudgal v. R.P. Singh, 1986 4 SCC 531 and
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY 189

Rabindra Nath Bose v. Union of India, [1970] 2 SCR 697, referred A
to.

3. Respondents Nos. 1 to 12 were diseutitled to any relief under
Art. 226 of the Constitution due to inordinate delay and !aches. If the
judgmeut of the High Court were to be sustained after a lapse of B
nearly 32 years, it cannot be gainsaid that the entire structure of the
administrative set-up of the U.P. Service of Engineers, Buildings &
Roads Brauch would be upset. [232EJ

4. It is still open to the Government to grant the necessary re-
lief to the sole respondent at present in the service others having C
retired. If be is found suitable for promotion to a higher post, with-
" out disturbing the appointment, promotion and confirmation of the
appellants, by creation of a supernumerary post. [232G-H]

D
5. In legal matters, some degree of certainty is as valuable a
part of justice as perfection. One reason for consistency is that
people often regulate their conduct with reference to existing rules,
which makes it important for Judges to abide by them. Innovations
can be unsettling and lead to a loss of confidence. [230EI
E
Dias Jurisprudence 4th Edition p. 286.

6. An earlier decision may be over ruled if the Court comes to
) the conclusion that it is manifestly wrong and not upon a mere sug-

~··
gestion that ifthe matter was res integra, the Court on a later occa-
sion would come to a different conclusion. [230G I F

7. It cannot be doubted that an unlimited and perpetual threat
of litigation leads to disorder, sense of insecurity· and uncertainty.
May be, there may have been isolated cases of hardship, but there
must be some reservations about limitation on the Court's power in G
the public interest. Obvious considerations of public policy make it a
first importance that the person aggrieved must take action requisite
effectively t11 assert his right to that end so that if the contention can
be justified, the Government service may be disturbed as little as
possible. [230H; 23IA-B] H
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.

A Per B.C. Ray, J: The date of confirmation of the petitioners
Nos. 1 to 12 as permanent Assistant Engineers in the permanent
posts of Assistant Engineer in the United Provinces Service of I

Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch), Class II, was fixed at
1.4.1956. Vide G.O. dated 29.5.1961, the orders for inter se seniority
B exclusively of the petitioners Nos. 1 to 12 vis-a-vis 39 others including
the opposite parties Nos. 8 to 13 who were all confirmed as perma-
nent Assistant Engineers, were issued by the Government. [198A-BJ

The Government, by a Gazette Notification dated 11.10.1955,
confirmed the appointments of the opposite parties Nos. 3 to 5 and 7
c in the permanent posts of Assistant Engineer with effect from Ar.>ril
1, 1955. By office memorandum dated 20.7.1956, the Government
fixed the inter se seniority of opposite parties Nos. 2 to 7 alongwith 18
other officers who were confirmed as Assistant Engineers. I199E-F]

D Aggrieved by the order of confirmation of the resp'ondents
Nos. 2 to 7, petitioners Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7 and 11 made representations to
the Government for re-determination of the confirmation and conse-
quential determination of the seniority of the petitioners vis-a-vis the
respondents. As no action was taken by the Government on the
representations above-said, the petitioners Nos. 6, 7 and 11 filed a
E writ petition in the High Court in 1970, challenging the order of con-
firmation of the respondents and consequential fixation of seniority
on its basis. The writ petition was dismissed on the sole ground of
inordinate delay and laches. Special Appeal against the order of the
High Court filed before a Division Bench of the High Court was also
F dismissed with observations and a direction to the Government to
dispose of the representations of the petitioners. The Government by
its order dated 29.6.1973, rejected, on the ground of delay and
laches, all the representations against fixation of seniority,
whereupon the petitioners filed another writ petition, claiming relief
of re-determination of their seniority in accordance with the rules,
G governing the services of the United Provinces Service of Engineers
Class II (Buildings and Roads Branch), as there .had been no
determination of inte,. se seniority of the petitioners and the respon-
dents according to rule 23 of the United Provinces Service of
Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch) Class II Rules, 1936. The
H High Court, by its judgment and order dated May 6, 1981, allowed
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY 191

the writ petition in part, issuing a writ in the natnre of Certiorari A
quashing the gradation or seniority lists (annexures 1, 2 and 28 to the
• i writ petition), and a writ in the nature of mandamus, commanding
the opposite party No. 1, the State Government, to prepare a fresh
seniority list in accordance with law in the light of the obser.vations
made in the judgment, and to take consequential steps thereafter. B
Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the appellants appealed
--{ to this Court by special leave. Il99G-H; 200A-G I

The vital question that required to be considered in this appeal
was what was the yardstick or standard or norm for determination of
the seniority of the respondents who had been appointed temporary C
or officiating Assistant Engineers against temporary posts of the
United Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch)
Class II, as well as toppers from the Thomson College of Civil
Engineering who were directly appointed some time in 1950 and 1951
on probation against the reserved temporary posts and confirmed D
immediately after the expiry of the period of probation against the
)I permanent posts before the confirmation of the temporary Assistant
Engineers recruited from the Thomson College of Engineering some
time between 1948 and 1950. [205B-D]

The petitioners in the writ petition who were respondents in the E
appeal, were initially appointed temporary Assistant Engineers sub-
- ject to the final approval of the Government by the Chief Engineer,
P.W.D., between 1947 and 1948. Undoubtedly, these appointments
were approved by the Government between 1948 and 1949 in accord-
ance with the provisions of Rule 5(i) of the United Provinces Service F
of Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch) Class II Rules 1936.
Thereafter, the Government, in consultation with the Public Service
Commission, confirmed the provisional appointments of the petition-
ers as temporary Assistant Engineers and these petitioners had also
passed the requisite tests held by the Government. They were
confirmed vide notifications dated 7.11.1956, 19.4.1957 and G
14.5.1958. The date of confirmation of all these petitioners was fixed
as 1.4.1956. The respondents Nos. 3 to 5 and 7, appellants in
the appeal, were appointed between 1951 and 1952 as temporary
Assistant Engineers against guaranteed posts on probation and after
completion of the probationary period they were confirmed in 1955. H
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] 2 S.C.R.

A Seniority of these appellants Nos. 1 to 4 was fixed earlier from
1.4.1955, whereas the seniority of the respondents Nos. 1 to 12
I _..
was fixed below them from 1956, treating the date of confirmation
in the service as the date of their becoming members of the
service. [206FH; 207A-C)
B
On a consideration of the letters of provisional appointments
issued by the Chief Engineer, P. W.D., as well as the sanctions
accorded to such appointments by the Government thereafter and
confirmation of the service of the temporary Assistant Engineers in \
1950 after obtaining the approval of the Public Service Commission _ J .-
c and also after the passing of the tests by the respondents as provided
in Rule 18 of the said Rules, it could not but be held that they had
become appointed in a substantive capacity against temporary posts
of the cadre of Assistant Engineers and as such they had become
members of the service since that date in accordance with the provi·
sions of Rule 3(b) of the said Rules. The argument that their appoint·
D ment being made against temporary posts and not against permanent
posts and not on probation as well as their not being confirmed and
their confirmation not being notified in the United Provisions
Gazette before 1956, they were not entitled to be treated as members
of the service, being appointed in the substantive capacity, could not
be sustained under any circumstances. Rule 4 of the Service Rules
E clearly states that the cadre of Assistant Engineers will comprise
both permanent and temporary posts and as such the argument that
unless and until the respondents were appointed on probation against
·--.
/
'
permanent posts and unless they were confirmed, they could not be
treated as members of the service, is wholly untenable. One can be a
member of the service if one is appointed in a substantive capacity as
F distinguished from a fortuitous appointment or on appointment for a
fixed tenure or on a purely temporary basis against a temporary post
of an Assistant Engineer in the cadre. Rule 4 of the Rules provides
that the Government may, subject to the provisions of Rule 40 of the
Civil Services (classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1930, in-
crease the strength of the cadre by creating permanent or temporary
G posts from time to time as may be found necessary. So, a cadre post
may be either permanent or temporary and if an engineer is
appointed substantively to a temporary post or a permanent post, he
becomes a member of the service. Therefore, merely because a
Government servant has been appointed to a temporary post after
fulfilment of all the requirements of the Rules for regular appoint·
H ment, including consultation with the Public Service Commission, he
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY 193

cannot be said to be appointed substantively in the temporary post of A
the cadre and he cannot be said to be treated to be not a member of
the service under Rule 3(b) of the Rules for the purpose of determi-
nation of seniority under Rule 23 of the Rules on the mere plea that
he has .not been appointed against a permanent post on probation;
such a contention is not tenable. In this case, as already stated, B
though initially the appointments of these respondents were not
appointments in accordance with the Rules as they were appointed
not by the Government but by tbe Chief Engineer, yet, after the

~
approval of their appointments by the Government, and also confir-
-. matioo of their provisional appointments by the Government after
_.. the respondents had passed all the requisite tests for confirmation,
it could not be questioned that these respondents had not been c
appointed in a substantive capacity as they had not been confirmed
by the Government prior to 1961 and their confirmations had not
been published in the U.P. Gazette. It is pertinent to mention that
for an appointment to be an appointment in a substantive capacity, it
is not necessary that the appointment should be made to a permanent D
post. If the appointment is made to a temporary post of long dura-
tion in a department, having both permanent and temporary posts of
a quasi-permanent nature, there is nothing to distinguish the quality
of service between the two. [208F-H; 209A-C; 2108-H; 21 IA-B)

r There was no rational or legal justification for preventing the E
respondents from having their services, rendered from the date they
were appointed in the cadre of Assistant Engineers in a substantive
capacity, reckoned for determination of their seniority in service, on
the mere ground that no order of confirmation had been issued by
the Government, as required under Rule 19 of the Rules even though
all the essential requirements for being confirmed had been clearly F
fulfilled by the respondents; the respondents had been duly appoin-
ted in a substantive capacity in the cadre of the service by the
Government in consultation with the United Provinces Public Service
Commission, as required under Rule S(iii) of the said Rules as well as
after fulfilling the other requirements stipulated in Rule 19 of the
Rules in 1950. The point from which service is to be counted is the G
commencement of the service by the Assistant Engineer which might
not have been a permanent appointment in the beginning, and, in
that sense, might still be temporary but for all other purposes has
been regularised and is fit to be absorbed into permanent post as and
when it is vacant. [21tG-H;212A, D-EI
H
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [!988) 2 S.C.R.

A The cadre of the service of the Engineers, as already held, con-
sisted of both temporary and permanent posts and as such there can
I
be substantive appointment against a temporary post of the cadre in
accordance with provisions of the service Rules. Once a Government
servant is appointed in a substantive capacity against a temporary
post of the cadre after due observance of the requirements as
B
provided in the Rules, he will be deemed to be a member of the
Service in accordance with the provisions of Rule 3(b) and his
seniority .in service shall be determined from the date of the order of
appointment to the service notwithstanding that no order of con-
firmation has been made and there has been no publication of the )-
order of confirmation in the official gazette. The respondents had -.~ \
c been appointed temporarily in an officiating capacity as Assistant
Engineers against temporary posts and those temporary posts had
been continued for years together and the Government had duly
sanctioned their appointments. The respondents had thus become
members of the United Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and
Roads Branch) Class II at least from the date they had been
D
confirmed in the service by the Government order issued in
May, 1950, and they were entitled to have their seniority reckoned
from that date when they had become regular members of the service
after fulfilling all the requirements of Rules 18 and 19 of the
said Rules. There is the specific Rule 23, said to be the "mariner's
compass" in determining the seniority of the members of the
E service, which provides for determination of seniority from the
date a person has been substantively appointed and has become
a member of the cadre of service of Assistant Engineers in the
United Provinces Engineering Service (Buildings and Roads Branch)
Class II. [214B-G; 217F-G)
F On a due consideration of the relevant Rules, particularly,
Rules 3 (b) and 23 of the Rules, it bas already been held that when an
employee has been appointed substantively to a temporary post in
the cadre of service and has become a member of the service of the
Assistant Engineers in the United Provinces Engineers Service under
the United Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads
G Branch) Class II Rules, his seniority will be counted from the date of t
his becoming a member of the service. It does not matter whether he
has been appointed against the permanent post and has been duly ~
confirmed in that post. However the respondents (Petitioners in the
writ petition) could no.t be given any relief by directing; re-
H determination of the seniority of the respondents as well as the
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY 195

appellants on the ground of unusual laches and delay. The appellants A
Nos. 1 to 4 were confirmed in 1955 and their seniority was deter-
mined hy the Government Order of July 20, 1956. The writ petition
which gave rise to this appeal was moved in 1973, challenging the
determination of the seniority of the appellants. At that time, the
appellants Nos. 1 to 4 were officiating as Superintending Engineers B
and the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were officiating as Superintending
Engineers hut were junior to all the four appellants, and respondents
1 and 4 to 12 were then Executive Engineers. At present, the appel-
,.lants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are permanent Superintending Engineers and
officiating as Additional Chief Engineers. The Appellant No. 4 is also
a permanent Superintending Engineer. At this juncture, if the
seniority of these appellants vis-a-vis the respondents in the appeal is C
directed to he determined, it will create much administrative
difficulties and would amount to depriving the appellants of their
valuable rights which have accrued to them. This Court in Rabindra
Nath Bose and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [1970] 2 SCR 697
observed that the attack on the seniority list prepared on the basis of D
the 1952 rules 15 years after the rules were promulgated and effect
given to the seniority list prepared on August 1, 1953, should not be
allowed because of the inordinate delay and laches in challenging the
roles. Similar otservations have been made by this Court in many
other cases. 12188-H; 219A-D I
E
The challenge to the seniority of the appellants in this case,
determined by order dated July 20, 1956, was made and relief sought
of re-determination of the seniority in 1973 i.e. after nearly 17 years.
This could not be permitted as it would amount to unjust deprivation
of the rights of the appellants which have accrued to them in the
meantime. Considering all the aspects, it would be just and proper F
not to give any relief to the respondents on the ground of inordinate
r delay and Iaches in challenging in 1973 the seniority list made in
July, 1956. Out of the 12 respondents, 11 were reported to have
already retired. Only one respondent was in service. In these
circumstances, the cause of justice would be served if the authorities
considered the case of the said remaining respondent for promotion G
in accordance with law. [220C-D, E, F-G]

Henceforth, the seniority of the employees in the service in
question would be determined from the date when an employee be-
• came a member of the service being appointed substantively to a post
in the cadre of service, no matter whether the said post was p_erma- H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.H..
A
nent or temporary, as held in this case. Appeal allowed. Judgment of
the High Court set aside. [220H; 221A)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 1717 of l.'981.
B
Froift the Judgment and Order dated 6.5.1981 of the Allaha-
bad High Court in W.P. No. 1080 of 1973.

S.N. Kacker, G.L. Sanghi and R.B. Mehrotra for the
Appellants.
c Shanti Bhushan, A.K. Gupta, Brij Bhushan, K.C. Dua, Gopal
Subramaniam, Pradeep Misra, Mrs. S. Dikshit and Sudhir Kul-
shreshthafor"the Respondents.

S.S. Khanduja, S,K. Passi, Yashpal Dhingra and Mrs. Urmila
D Kapoor for the Inte!'.Veners.

The following Judgments were delivered:

RAY, J. This appeal by special leave arises out of the
judgment and order passed in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition
E No. 1080 of 1973 by the High Court of Allahabad delivered on 6th
May, 1981. While the writ petition was allowed in part a writ in the
nature of certiorari quashing the gradation or seniority list annexu-
res 1, .2 and 28 to the writ petition, was directed to be issued. There
was a further direction for the issue of a writ of mandamus com-
manding the opposite party No. 1, the State Government to prepare
F a fresh seniority list in accordance with law in the light of the obser-
vations made in the said judgment, within a period of three months
and thereafter to take other consequential steps. l

The crucial question of controversy in this appeal relates to
the determination of seniority between the respondents i.e. peti-
G tioners in writ petition who are all appointed as temporary Assistant
Engineers in the United Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings
& Roads Branch) and subsequently made permanent therein and
the appellants appointed on probation in the permanent posts of
Assistant Engineers reserved for toppers of the Thomson College of
Civil Engineering later incorporated in Roorkee University and
H made permanent after expiry of period of probation. The respon-
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY [RAY, J.J 197
..--" dents Nos. 2 and 3 who passed the final Civil Engineering Examina· A
tion of Thomson College, Roorkee in 1946 were appointed as
temporary and officiating Assistant Engineers by the Chief
"' 1 Engineer subject to final approval of the Government vide CE-P/
W/D/ C.M. No. 2736-E/8E-1947 dated 2.6.1947. This provisional
appointment as temporary Assistant Engineers was approved by the B
Government vide G.O. No. 89-EBR/2-1947 dated 20.2.1948. There-
after on the advice of the Public Service Commission the Govern-
ment confirmed their provisional appointment as temporary
Assistant Engineers vide G.O. No. 1427/EBR 2 EBR-1947 dated
16.10.1948.

The petitioners Nos. 1 and 4 to 12 passed the final Civil C
Engineering Examination of the Thomson College, Rporkee in the
year 1948. They were appointed by Chief Engineer as temporary
Assistant Engineers subject to the final approval of the Government
vide Chief Engineer, P.W.D. O.M. dated 10.8.1949. These appoint-
ments were made subject to the final approval of the Government D
and on their being declared medically.fit by the Medical Board. The
appointment of these temporary Assistant Engineers was sanctioned
by the government by its order dated 15.10.1949. These appoint-
ments were made in accordance with Rule S(i)of the United Pro-
vinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch), Class II
Rules, 1936. Thereafter on 20th January, 1950, vide G.O. No. 3968 E
EBR/2-1949 the Government on the advice of the Public Service
Commission confirmed the provisional appointments of the said

' petitioners as temporary Assistant Engineers in the Buildings and
Roads Branch of United Provinces Service of Engineers. The
petitioners were examined by the State Medical Board and all of
them were declared fit. By Gazette Notification dated 7. 11.1956 the F
Government was pleased to issue orders of confirmation of the
appointment of petitioners Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 as permanent
Assistant Engineers in permanent posts, in the cadre of United
Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch),
Class II. By this Notification the Government reserved the right to
determine the seniority subsequently. Similarly, the petitioners G
Nos. 5, 6, 9 and 10 were confirmed as permanent Assistant
Engineers in permanent posts by Gazette Notification dated
9.4.1957. The petitioners Nos. 11 and 12 were also confirmed as
permanent Assistant Engineers in permanent posts in the cadre of
United Provinces Service of engineers (Buildings and Roads
Branch) Class II by Notification dated 14.5.1958. It is specifically H
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] 2 S.C.R.

A mentioned therein that the government reserved the right to
determine the seniority subsequently. Thus the date of confirmation
of the petitioners Nos. 1 to lZ as permanent Assistant Engineers
in the p(}rmanent posts of Assistant Engineers in United Provinces
Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch), Class II
B was fixed at 1.4.1956. Vide G.O. dated 29.5.1961 the orders for
inter se seniority exclusively of petitioners Nos. I to 12 vis-a-vis 39
others including opposite. parties Nos. 8 to 13 who were all
confirmed as permanent Assistant Engineers, were issued by the
Government.

c
Rule 6 of the said Rules i.e. United Provinces Service of
Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch), Class II Rules, 1936
··~
empowers the Government to decide in each case the source from
which the vacancy in the cadre has to be filled up. Under these
powers the Government by G .0. dated 31.8.1942 provided that
with effect from 1942-43, two vacancies in the Provincial Service of
D Engineers shall be reserved for ·the two students of Thomson
College of Civil Engineering, Roorkee who passed out highest in
the order of merit in the final examination of the civil engineering.
This quota was increased by G.O. dated 1.7.1944 from two to four
posts each year (two for the P.W.D. (Buildings and Roads B~anch)
and two for the Irrigation Branch). This reservation was also
E guaranteed each year to the top students. The Government however
by G.0. dated 22.6.1950 abolished the system of guaranteed posts
with effect from the batch which was to enter the civil engineering
class of the Roorkee University in October !950. It was specifically
mentioned therein that no reservations were to be made in the
cadre of the U .P .S.E. (Junior Scale) B & R and Irrigation Branches
F for students who passed out highest in the final examination of the
Civil Engineering Class in 195:i and subsequent years. It was also
mentioned therein that the guaranteed Civil Engineer students who
passed from Thomson College of Engineering, Roorkee/Roorkee
University and who had been working in the Buildings and Roads
Branch should be absorbed in the existing permanent vacancies
G which might arise in future. In accordance with the Government
orders the opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 who passed out from the
Roorkee University in the year 1949 securing top positions were
appointed in Janu~ry 1951 as Temporary Assistant Engineers. The
opposite parties Nos. 4 and 5 namely Shri G.C. Gupta and Shri S.P.
Goel who passed out from the Roorkee University in 1950 were
H appointed in 1951 as temporary Assistant Engineers in two tern-
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY [RAY, J.) 199

porary posts. The opposite party No. 6 namely Shri S.K. Ojha who A
was one of the toppers passing out from Roorkee University in J952
was appointed in October 1953 as a temporary Assistant Engineer.
The opposite party No. 7 namely Shri Brijendra Singh who passed
out from Roorkee University Civil Engineering Examination in
1952 was first appointed as a temporary Assistant Engineer on a B
provisional basis but subsequently as he secured Fourth position in
Civil Engineering final examination in 1952 from the Roorkee
University he was appointed to the guaranteed post of temporary
Assistant Engineer in 1954. The opposite party No. 8 who passed
the departmental qualifying examination for promotion to the
Service was appointed to a temporary post of Assistant Engineer on
16.4.1949. Similarly, the opposite parties Nos. 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 C
who passed the qualifying departmental examination were appoin-
ted under Rule 5(IV) and 6(a) to the temporary post of Assistant
Engineers in 1955.

In accordance with the provisions of regulation 3(i) of the Un- D
ited Provinces Public Service Commission (Limitation of Fune-
" tion) Regulations, 1941 made by the Provisional Government. The
.appointment of opposite parties Nos. 3 to 5 and 7 (appellants in this
appeal) who had been appointed to the guaranteed posts reserved
for toppers of Thomson Engineering College, Roorkee did not

r require consultation with the Public Service Commission. The E
Government by Gazette Notification No. 2205-EBR/XXIII-PWD-
16EB-53 dated 11.10.1955 confirmed the appointment of the
' , opposite parties Nos. 3 to 5 and 7 in the permanent post of
_ \Assistant Engineers with effect from April 1, 1955. By Office
. Memorandum No. 1933 EBR/XXIII-PWD/55 dated 20.7.1956, the
Government fixed the inter se seniority of opposite parties Nos. 2 to F
T 7 alongwith 18 other officers who were confirmed as Assistant
Engineers.

Aggrieved by the order of confirmation of the respondents
Nos. 2 to 7, the petitioner No. 4 made representation to the
Government for re-determination of the confirmation as well as G
consequential determination of seniority of the petitioner vis-a-vis
the respondents. This representation was made on 15.7.1959 and a
A reminder was also given on 9.8.1960. Similarly, petitioner Nos. 6, 7
and 11 also made representations on 19.8.1959, 5.8.1959 and
23.7.1959 respectively. The petitioner No. 6 gave reminder in June
1965 and April, 1970. The petitioner No. 7 also sent reminders on H

•
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] 2 S.C.R.
A
2.3.1960 and ·3.7,l960. The petitioner No. I also sent a represen·
tation on 12.9.1963. As no steps were taken to consider the
representations and to re-determine the date of confirmation of the I
petitioners, the petitioners Nos. 6, 7 and 11 filed writ petition
No. 2254 of 1970 in the Allahabad High Court challenging the order
B of confirmation of the respondents and also the consequential fixa·
tion of seniority on its basis. The said petition was dismissed by
order dat!!d 16.4.1971 on the sole ground that the petition wasj
highly belated and the petitioners were guilty of !aches and delay in
challenging the impugned notification dated 11. 10. 1955 and
20.7.1956 regarding confirmation and fixation of seniority. Against
the said order Special Appeal No. 287 of 1971 was filed before the
c Division Bench of Allahabad High Court. The said appeal was also ' .
dismissed. It was observed that though the petitioners could not be J
permitted to question the propriety of confirmation orders yet they·
were entitled to claim seniority over the respondents as per rules ,,.
regulating the service of engineers. The claim of'the petitioners was
D that they being appointed as Assistant Engineers though tern·
porarily became members of the Service earlier than the res·
pondents and as such they were entitled to claim seniority over the
respondents. The representations made by the petitioners as far
back as in 1959 were still pending and as such the relief regarding
determination of seniority in accordance with rules was not barred
E by delay. It was observed further that the Government would
consider and dispose of the representations fairly and in accordance
l
with law.

The Government by their order dated 29.6.1973 rejected all \ .
the representations against fixation of seniority as permanent y
F Assistant Engineers. Hence the writ petition was filed by the (
petitioners claiming the relief of re-determination of their seniority -i;.
in ac~ordance with the rules governing the services of United r
Provinces Service of Engineers Class II (Buildings and Roads
Branch) as there had been no determination of inter se seniority of
the petitioners and the respondents according to Rule 23 of the said
G Rules.

It is pertinent to note in this connection that in spite of the
observations of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in ,A
special appeal No. 287 of 1971 that so far as the claim of the appel·
!ants for consideration of their representations regarding determi·
H nation of seniority in accordance with the Service Rules, was not
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY [RAY, J.J 201

barred by the rejection of the writ petition on.the ground of delay A
and observations were made for consideration of those representa-
;;... -, tions by the' opposite party No. 1, i.e. the Government instead of
considering and disposing of the said representations in accordance
with law dismissed the same merely on the ground of delay and
!aches. B

~ Before proceeding to consider the merits of the controversy
raised in this case, it is pertinent to refer to the relevant rules i.e.
United Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads
Branch) Class II Rules, 1936 which regulate the appointment and
...__ conditions of service of United Provinces Service of Engineers
9 ·(Buildings and Roads Branch). The relevant Rules are quoted C
herein below:- .

Rule 3(b) "Members of the Service" means a Govern-
• ment servant appointed in a substantive
capacity, under the provision of these rules or D
of rules in force previous to the introduction
of these rules, to a post in the cadre of the
service.

Rule 4 The sanctioned strength of the cadre is 24 assis-
tant engineers, provided that subject to the pro- E
visions of rule 40 of the Civil Services (Classifica-
tion, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930, the
.. ,
Government may

-J
• (ii) increase the cadre by creating permanent or
F

temporary posts from time to time as may be
found necessary.
G
Rule 5 Recruitment to the Services shall by made by the
Government

(i) by direct appointment from amongst engineer
students who have passed out of the Thomson
Civil Engineering College, Roorkee, and who H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] 2 S.C.R.

.A have completed a course of training in the Build-
ings and Roads Branch as Engineer Students
after consulting the Public Service Commission,
U.P.
' .
B (ii) by direct appointment after advertisement
and after consulting the Public Service Commis-
sion, U.P.

(iii) by the appointment of officers in the
temporary service of the United Provinces Publi". · •
Works Department (Buildings and Roads _ .
c Braue~),. after consulting the Public Service _ r ~
Comm1ss10n, U.P.: ;
!
provided that it will not be necessary to
consult the Commission in the case of appoint-
D ment of a tempQ_rary officer to a permanent
vacancy if he has already been appointed to a
temporary post in the cadre of th& service after
consultation with the Commission.

(iv) by promotion of members of the United
E Provinces Subordinate Engineering Service or of
Upper Subordinates in the Public Works Depart-
ment, Buildings and Roads Branch, who have
shown exceptional merit. •
(v) by promotion of computors m the Public
F Works Department, Buildings and Roads
Branch, who have shown exceptional merit and
who are technically qualified.
\
Rule 16 TRAINING AND PROBATION --
G Engineer students who pass from .the Thomson
College shall be required to undergo a course of
training for one year. This period may be exten-
ded by the Government for one more year in
the case of candidates who are not selected for
appointment at the end of their first year of
H training, but who are considered to have
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY [RAY, J.) 203

justified their retention in training for one more A
year.

Rule 17 All persons appointed to the Service, who are
not already in the permanent employ of the
Buildings and Roads Branch of the United B
Provinces Government, shall be placed on pro-
bation for four years, provided that such of
·them as have undergone training as Engineer
students, or have served as temporary engineers
in the Buildings and Roads Branch of the
United Provinces Government, may be permit-
ted to count the period of such training and C
service respectively towards this period of pro-
bation. The Government may extend the period
of probation fixed in any case. At any time dur-
ing ihe probationary period the Government
may dispense with the services of an officer at D
one month's notice. '

Rule 19 (i) A probationer shall be confirmed in his
appointment when-

(a) he has completed the prescribed period of
r probation;
E

(b) he has passed all the tests prescribed in the
last preceding rule; and

(c) the Government are satisfied that he is fit F
for confirmation.

(ii) All confirmations under the rule shall be
notified in the United Provinces Gazette.

Rule 23 Seniority in the service shall be determined G
• according to the date of the order of appoint-
ment to it, provided that if the order of
appointment of two or more candidates bears
the same date, their seniority inter-se shall be
determined according to the order in which
their appointment has been notified. H
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1988] 2 S.C.R.
A Two preliminary objections were raised on behalf of the
J
petitioners about the maintainability of the writ petition before the
High Court. The first objection was regarding the delay in making
the application challenging the determination of seniority of the
petitioners vis-a-vis the respondents which were determined as early
B as in 1956, in 1973 i.e. after 17 years. This objection was duly
considered by the Court below and it was over-ruled. In 1959 re-
presentations had been made against the determination of seniority
in contravention of the provisions of Rule 23 of the United
Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch),
Class II Rules, 1936. These representations were kept pending by
the government and they were not disposed of. Secondly, in 1970 a
c challenge was thrown in writ petition No. 2254 of 1970 by Shri R.C.
Mangal and two others i.e. respondent Nos. 6, 7 and 11 challenging
the order of confirmation of the petitioners Nos. I to 4 who were
appointed long after the appointment of the petitioners and the con-
sequent determination of seniority. This writ petition, however, was
D unsuccessful as ,the writ petition as well as the Special Appeal were
dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay and !aches in moving
the Court for redress against the order of confirmation of the
petitioner Nos. 1 to 4 which was made by the Government vide
notification dated 11. JO. 1955. But in that case the question of
determination of seniority in derogation of the provisions of Rules
E did not arise nor it was considered and. determined. It was further
observed that the Government would decide these representations
fairly and in accordance with law. These observations were made in
the Special Appeal No. 287 of 1971 decided in October 1971. The
High Court while disposing of the civil Writ Petition No. 1080 of
1973 observed that the petition did not suffer from delay and !aches ~
F and the question of determination of seniority was required to be
considered by the Court. It was further observed that the plea of
wrong fixation in the cadre was not raised in the earlier writ
petition. As such there was no determination on the question of
seniority in the cadre itself in the said writ petition and the princi-
ples of res judicata were not attracted.
G
The other preliminary objection raised was that if the question
of seniority was considered it might seriously prejudice the rights of
the opposite parties. On this point it was observed by the High )
Court that the matter 0f seniority of the opposite parties vis-a-vis
the petitioners was never settled and as such no question arises as to
H the accrual of any right legal or equitable in favour of the opposite
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY [RAY, J.] 205

parties because of lapse of time. A

It is a well established principle that where there are no
specific rules for determination of seniority in service the length of
continuous service is the yardstick for determining the seniority of
the members of service. The vital question that requires to be B
considered in this appeal is what is the yardstick or standard or
norm for determination of seniority of the respondents who have
been appointed as temporary or officiating Assistant Engineers
against temporary posts of United Provinces Service of Engineers
(Buildings and Roads Branch) Class II, as well as the toppers from
Thomson College of Civil Engineering who.were directly appointed
sometime in 1950 and 1951 on probation against reserved temporary C
posts and confirmed immediately after the expiry of the period of
l probation against permanent posts before the confirmation of the
temporary Assistant Engineers recruited.from the Thomson College
of Engineering sometime between 1948 to 1950. 'fo decide this
question it is very relevant to consider the Service rules as in the D
instant case there are admittedly the Service Rules namely United
Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch) Class
II rules, 1936 which regulate the appointments and conditions of
service of United Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and
Roads Branch). Rule 23 of the said Rules which is said to be the
mariners' compass in determining the seniority of the members of E
the service provides that seniority in service shall be determined
"according to the date of order of appointmentto it" provided that
if the order of appointment of two or. more candidates bears the
) same date their seniority inter-se shall be determined according to
the order in which their appointment has been notified. Therefore,
it is evident from this Rule that the touchstone of determination of F
seniority in service is the date of order of appointment to the service
or in other words the date when an appointee becomes a member of
the service after fulfilling all the necessary requjrements provided in
the various provisions of the said Rules. Rule 3(b) defines further
that "Member of the Service" means a Government servant
appointed in a substanfr1e capacity under the provisions of these G
• rules or of rules in force prior to the introduction of these rules to a
post in the cadre of this service. In other words, it states categori-
cally that an appointee to be a member of the service has to be
appointed in a substantive capacity in the cadre of the service. The
cadre of the service in Rule 4(ii) clearly provides that it consists of
both permanent and temporary posts and the strength of the cadre H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988) 2 S.C.R.

A may be increased by the Government by creating permanent and
temporary posts from time to time as may be found necessary. The
sanctioned strength of the cadre of Assistant Engineers though
originally was 24 yet the said strength of the cadre could be
increased by creation of both permanent and temporary posts. Rule
B' 5 specifically lays down the sources of recruitment to the service.
There are five sources for recruitment to the service. The'se sources
have been stated hereinbefore and as such it is not necessary to
reiterate them once again here. Rule 16 enjoins that engineer stu-
dents who pass from the Thomson College are to undergo a course
of training for one year. This period of training may be extended by
the Government by one more year in the case of candidates who are
c not selected for appointment at the end of their first year of training
but who are considered to have justified their retention in training
for one more year. Rule 17 provides that all persons appointed to
the service who are already in the permanent employment of Build-
ings and Roads Branch of the United Provinces Government shall
D be placed on probation for four years provided that such of them as
have undergone training as engineer students, or have served as
temporary engineers in the Buildings and Roads Branch of United
Provinces Government, may be permitted to count the period of
such training and service respectively towards the period of proba-
tion. Rule 19 deals with confirmation of a probationer when the
E requirements provided therein have been fulfilled or completed
namely the completion of the prescribed probation period, the pas-
sing of all the tests prescribed in Rule 18 and the Government is
l
satisfied that the probationer is fit for confirmation. It has also been
provided therein that all confirmations under the Rules shall be
notified in the United Provinces Gazette.
F
The petitioners in the writ petition who are respondents in this
appeal were initially appointed as temporary Assistant engineers
subject to the final approval of the Government by the Chief
Engineer, P.W.D. between 1947 and 1948. Undoubtedly, these
appointments were subsequently approved by the Government bet-
q ween 1948 and 1949 in accordance with the provisions of Rule 5(i)
of the United Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and Road~ •
Branch) Class II Rules, 1936. Thereafter on January 20, 1950 the
Government in consultation with the Public Service Commission
confirmed the provisional appointments of the petitioners as
)I
temporary Assistant Engineers and these petitioners have also
I-I passed the requisite tests held by the government. They were con-
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY [RAY, J.] 207

firmed vide Gazette Notifications dated 7.11.1956, 19.4.1957 and A
14.5.1958. The date of confirmation of all these petitioners was
fixed as 1.4.1956 (vide G.O. dated 29.5.1961). The respondents
Nos. 3 to 5 and 7 who are appellants in this appeal were appointed
between 1951 and 1952 as temporary Assistant Engineers. against
guaranteed posts on probation and after competition of the pro- B
bationary period they were confirmed in 1955 vide Gazette Notifica-
tion dated 11.10.1955. Seniority of these appellants Nos. 1 to 4 was
fixed earlier from 1.4. 1955 whereas the seniority of the Respon-
dents Nos. 1 to 12 of this appeal was fixed below them from 1956
treating the date of confirmation in the service as the date of their
becoming member of the service.
c
It has been urged on behalf of the appellants as well as by the
State that unless a person is appointed as temporary Assistant
Engineer against a permanent post on probation and thereafter un-
less he becomes confirmed after successful completion of the period
of probation and passing of all the tests mentioned in Rule 19(b) of D
the said rules and he is considered to be fit for confirmation by
government he cannot be considered to be appointed to the service
and he does not become a member of the service. The seniority of
an Assistant Engineer will be reckoned only from the date when an
Assistant Engineer is substantively appointed against a. permanent
post and duly confirmed in the post in accordance with provisions of E
r Rule 19 and thereby becomes a member of the service. In other
words, it was tried to be contended before this Court that the provi-
sional, fortuitous, temporary or officiating appointment of the
respondents as Assistant Engineers will not be taken into considera-
tion in determining their seniority in service unless and until they
are duly appointed against permanent posts on probation and are F
confirmed after the successful completion of the probation period
and on passing of the requisite tests and after their confirmation is
notified by the Government in the United Provinces Gazette. Rely-
ing on these contentions it has been urged that the services of the
respondent Nos. 1 to 12 were confirmed and duly notified in the
Gazette in 1961 and accordingly by office memo dated May 29, 1961
their inter-se seniority was fixed. As they were confirmed much later G
than the appellants so their seniority was fixed below that of the
appellants.

It was on the other hand, urged on behalf of the respondents
who passed civil engineering examination from Thomson College of
H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] 2 S.C.R. ·

A Engineering between 1947 and 1948 that the appellants did not
enter into the Thomson College of Engineering when they were
appointed as officiating temporary Assistant Engineers subject to
final approval of the Government by the Chief Engineer, P.W.D.
between 1947 and 1948. Thereafter the Government duly sane·
B tioned their appointment by order made between 1948 and 1949,
subject to the final approval of the United Provinces Public Service
Commission. These provisional appointments were ultimately made
final by the Government after the receipt of the approval of the
U .P. Public Service Commission in 1950. It has been urged on
behalf of the respondents that from 1950 at least these respondents
should be deemed or treated to be substantively appointed in
C accordance with the provisions of Rule 3(b) of the said Service
Rules. As they have become members of the service in as much as
their appointments have been duly approved by the Government
and the Public Service Commission and on their passing the medical
test and other tests the Government has confirmed their provisional
0 appointments and the period of service these temporary Assistant
Engineers rendered previously was counted towards their probation
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 17 of these Rules, they
are entitled to have their senionty reckoned at least from the date
of their confirmation in the service by the Government in 1950
i.e. from the date of their substantive appointment in the service.
E The seniority list that has been published is wholly arbitrary, ille-
gal and in utter contravention of the provisions of Rule 23 of the
Rules.

On a consideration of the letters of provisional appointment
issued by the Chief Engineer, P.W.D. (Buildings and Roads
F Branch) as well as the sanctions accorded to such appointments by
the Government thereafter and the confirmation of the service of
the temporary Assistant Engineers in 1950 after obtaining the 'j
approval of the Public Service Commission and also after passing of
the tests by the respondents as provided in Rule 18 of the said
Rules, I cannot but hold that they have become appointed in a sub-
G' stantive capacity against temporary posts of the cadre of Assistant
Engineers and as such they have become members of the service I
since that date in accordance with the provisions of Rule 3(b) of the
said Rules. The argument that their appointment being made A
against temporary posts and not against perm·anent posts and not on
probation as well as they being not confirmed and their confirma·
H tion being not notified in the United Provinces Gazette before 1956,
G.C. GUPTA v. N.((. PANDEY (RAY, J.] 209

they are not entitled to be treated as members of the service being A
appointed in the substantive capacity, cannot be sustained under
any circumstances. Rule 4 of the Service Rules clearly states that
the cadre of Assistant Engineers will comprise of both permanent
and temporary posts and as such the argument that unless and until
the respondents are appointed on probation against permanent B
posts and unless they are confirmed they cannot be treated as mem-
bers of the service is wholly untenable. One can be a member of
service if he is appointed in a substantive capacity as distinguished
from a fortuitous appointment or an appointment for a fixed tenure
or on a purely temporary basis against a temporary post of Assistant
Engineer in the cadre. This Court in the case of Parshotam Lal
Dhlngra v. Union of India, [1958] S.C.R. 828 at 842 has held that an C
appointment fo a temporary post in Government service may
be substantive or on probation or on an officiating basis. Similar
observation has been made by this Court in the case of Baleshwar
Dass & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 449 wherein
this very rule came to be considered in the case of a similar dispute o
regarding the seniority amongst the engineers in the Irrigation
Department of the Uttar Pradesh Government. It has been
observed as follows:-

"It is not correct to say that when Engineers are

r appointed to temporary posts but after fulfilling all the E
tests for regular appointment they are not appointed in a
substantive capacity ............................. ,.
That is to say although tbey are temporary appointees, if
)
their probation was completed and other formalities
fulfilled, theyi become members of the service.· Merely
because the person is a temporary appointee it cannot be F
said that he is not substantively appointed if he fulfills
the necessary conditions for regular appointment such as
probation and consultation with the Public Service
Coffimission. ''

It has been further observed: G
"Rule 23 is the relevant rule when a question of seniority
.\. arises. The order of appointment in a substantive
capacity is the significant starting point for reckoning
seniority. The appointment in a substantive capacity
need not necessarily be to a permanent post. It is H
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988) 2 S.C.R.
A significant even if it is to a temporary post of long
duration."
'
Rule 4 prescribes the sanctioned strength of a cadre. It pro-
vides that the Government may subject to the provisions of Rule 40
B of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
1930 increase the strength of the cadre by creating permanent or
temporary posts from time to time as may be found necessary. So a -,--
cadre post may be either permanent or temporary and if an engineer
is appointed substantively to a temporary post or permanent post he
becomes a member of the .service. Therefore merely because a ~
Gotemment servant has been appointed to a temporary post after
C fulfilment of all the requirements of the rules for regular appoint-
ment including consultation with the Public Service Commission, he
cannot be said to be appointed substantively in the temporary post
of the cadre and he cannot be said to be treated to be not a member
of the service under Rule 3(b) of the Rules for the purpose of
D determination of seniority under Rule 23 of the Rules on the mere
plea that he has not been appointed against a permanent post on
probation. Such a contention is not tenable. This point has been
very clearly settled by this Court in the case of Baleshwar Dass &
Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., (supra). It has been observed in this
case as follows:-
E
"We see no reason to hold that when engineers are
appointed to temporary posts but after fulfilment of all
the tests for regular appointments, including consultation
with the Public Service Commission, they are not
appointments in a substantive capacity." I'
F
In the instant case as I have stated hereinbefore that though initially
the appointments of these respondents were not appointments in
y
accordance with the Rules as they were appointed not by the
Government but by the Chief Engineer, P.W.D. but after approval
of their appointments by the Government and also confirmation of
G their pro\\isonal appointments by the Government in consultation
with the Public Service Commission and after the respondents had
passed all the requisite tests for confirmation, it cannot ·be
questioned that these respondents have not been appointed in a
substantive capacity as they were not confirmed by the Government
H _prior to 1961 and their confirmations were not published in the U.P.
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY [RAY, J.) 211

Gazette. It is pertinent to mention that for an appointment in order A
to be an appointment in a substantive capacity it is not necessary
that the appointment should be made to a permanent post. If the
appointment is made to a temporary post of long duration in a
department having both permanent and temporary posts of a quasi-
permanent nature, there is nothing to distinguish the quality of B
service as between the two.

It is pertinent to refer in this connection the observations of
this Court in S.B.Patwardhan and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and
Ors., AIR 1977 SC 2051 = [ 1977] 3 SCR 775 where it has been
observed: C
I
~
"There is no universal rule either that a· cadre cannot
consist of both permanent and temporary employees or
that it must consist of both. That is primarily a matter of
rules and regulations govertlfng the particular service in D
relation to which the question regarding the composition
of the cadre arises."

It has been further observed that confirmation cannot be the
sole touchstone of seniority as that will be indefensible. "Confirma-

r tion is one of the inglorious uncertainties of Government service
depending neither on efficiency of the incumbent nor on the availa-
bility of the substantive vacancies."
E

It does not show that confirmation has to conform to any set
of rules and whether an employee should be confirmed or not F
depends on the sweet will and pleasure of the govenment. I do not
find any rational or legal justification for preventing the respon-
dents to have their services rendered from the date they are
appointed in the cadre of Assistant Engineers in a substantive
capacity reckoned for determination of their seniority in service on
G
' • the mere ground that no order of confirmation has been issued by
the Government as required under Rule 19 of the Rules even
~ thongh all the essential requirements for being confirmed have been
clearly fulfilled by the respondents. The respondents, as has been
stated herein before, have been duly appointed in a substantive
capacity in the cadre of the Service by the Government in consulta- H
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1988] 2 S.C.R.

A tion with the United Provinces Public Service Commission as )._
required under Rule S(iii) of the said Rules as well as after fulfilling
the other requirements as provided in Rule 19 of the said Rules in ~
1950. It will be relevant to mention in this connection that this
Court in the case of Baleshwar Dass & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors.,
B (supra) while considering the identical rules so far as the determina-
tion of seniority of the U.P. Engineers in the Irrigation Department
has observed that substantive capacity referred to the capacity in
which a person holds the post and not necessarily to the nature and
character of the post. A person is said to hold a post in a substantive ~-
capacity when he holds it for an indefinite period especially of long .
c duration, in contradistinction to a person who holds it for a definite
J: .
or temporary pe_riod or holds it on probation subject to confir-
mation. It has also been observed that an official in service even
...,I
before confirmation in service has a relevancy to seniority if even-
tually no infirmities in the way of confirmation exist. There is
D nothing in the scheme of rules contrary to that principle. Therefore
the point from which service is to be counted is the commencement
of the seryice by the Assistant Engineer which might not have been
permanent appointment in the beginning and in that sense may
still be temporary but for all other purposes has been regularised
E and is fit to be absorbed into permanent post as and when it is
vacant.

The decision in the case of A.K. Subraman & Ors. v. Union of
India &: Ors., AIR 1975 SC 483 which was cited before us is not
relevant inasmuch as in that case there was no statutory rule for
F determination of seniority unlike the instant case where there are
specific rules for the determination of seniority. "De method of
filling up of the post of Executive Engineers Class I was by pro-
motion of Assistant Executive Engineers Class I as well as by
promotion on selection by Departmental Promotion Comniittee of
Assistant Engineers in Central Engineering Service Class II accord-
G
ing to prescribed quota. In the seniority list published in 1971 the
petitioners were shown junior to respondents who were appointed
to the service of Central Engineers long after the petitioners were
appointed in the grade of Executive Engineer, Class I. The peti-
tioners were promoted to officiate as Executive Engineer Class I by
H the Departmental Promotion Committee between December 1956
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY [RAY, J.) 213
-~
' and September 1959 whereas respondents were promoted to the A
posts of Executive Engineers Class I between March 1957 and
> February 1966. It-was held that once the Assistant Engineers are
regularly appointed to officiate as Executive Engineers within their
quota they will be entitled to consideration in their own rights as
Class I Officers to further promotion. It was· also held therein that B
Assistant Engineers (Class II) who are initially appointed ·iri a regu-
lar manner in accordance with the rules to officiate as Assistant
Engineers, their seniority in service in Grade I will count from the
date of their initial officiating appointment in Class I provided their
initial appointment as Assistant Engineer was within their quota.
Their seniority will not count from the date of their future confirma- c
tion in the service.

In G.P. Doval and Ors. v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of U.P.
> & Ors., AIR 1984 SC 1527 this Court has observed that it is
well settled that if there was no binding rule of seniority, the D
length of continuous officiation prescribed a valid principle of
.... seniority.

Where officiating appointment is followed by confirmation
unless a contrary rule is shown, the service rendered as officiating
E
appointment cannot be ignored for reckoning length of _continuous
officiation for determining the place in the seniority list. This
decision which runs contrary to the decision cited herein is disting-
uishable as this decision was rendered on the peculiar facts of that
case.
F
Due to exigencies of service the Khandsari Inspectors were
recruited to that post pending regular selection through Public
Service Commission. A provisional seniority list of the Khandsari
Inspectors was <;lrawn on the principle of length of continuous

.. '
officiation reckoned from the date of selection/approval by Public G
Service Commission in respect of each employee belonging to the
cadre. All officiating service rendered by the Inspectors prior to
their confirmation by Public Service Commission was totally
ignored while determining seniority. It was held that seniority list
prepared of Khandsari Inspectors without considering their offi-
ciating service prior to confirmation by the Public Service Com- H
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] 2 S.C.R.

A mission was violative of Article 16 and the list drawn up on this )-
basis must be quashed. In that case there was no specific statutory
rule laying down the conditions of service governing the cadre as <
well as for the determination of seniority of the members of the
service.
B
I have already held hereinbefore after due consideration of the
said Rules governing the appointment and conditions of service of
United Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads
Branch) Class II that the cadre of the service of Engineers consists
of both temporary and permanent posts and as such there can be
c; substantive appointment against a temporary post of the cadre in
accordance with the provisions of the Service Rules. Once a
Government servant is appointed in a substantive capacity against a
temporary post of the cadre after due observance of the require-
ments as provided in the Rules he will be deemed to be a member of '
D ·the service in accordance with the provisions of Rule 3(b) and his
seniority in service shall be determined from the date of order of
appointment to the service notwithstanding that no order of confir-
mation has been made and there has been no publication of order of
confirmation in the Official Gazette. The respondents were appoin-
E; ted temporarily in an officiating capacity as Assistant Engineers
against temporary posts and these temporary appointments were
continued for years together and the Government duly sanctioned
their appointment after consultation with the Public Service Com-
mission. The respondents thus have become members of the United
Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch) Class
F II at least from the date when they have been confirmed in the
Service by the Government order issued in May 1950 after comply-
ing with all the tests prescribed and they are entitled to have their
seniority reckoned from that date when they have become regular
Members of the Service after fulfilling all the requirements provided
in Rule 18 and 19 of the said Rules. The decisions in Baleshwar
G Dass & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., (supra) as well as in Ashok
Gulati & Ors. v. B.S. Jain & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 424 clearly go to
establish that as soon as a Government servant becomes a member
of the Service fulfilling all the requirements specified under the
Rules governing the terms and conditions of service as well as of
H seniority in service, the seniority of the Government servant has to
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY [RAY, J.] 215

.J., be computed and reckoned from the date when he becomes a A
member of the Service. As I have held already that confirmation
> has nothing to do with the Government servant's becoming a
member of the Service eligible to have his service reckoned for the
purpose of determination of his seniority in service iµ accordance
with Rule 3(b) read with Rule 23 of the said Rules. In Ashok B
Gulati's case (in which one of us Justice A.P. Sen-was a party)
the following five yardsticks have been laid down for reckoning
seniority:-

~-~
"The date from which seniority is to be reckoned may be c
laid down by rules or instructions
~- (i) on the basis of the date of appointment;
)
(ii) on the basis of confirmation; D

(iii) on the basis of regularisation of service;

(iv) on the basis of length of service; or

,, \
(v) on any other reasonable basis.

Apropos to mention in this connection that the decision
rendered by this Court in the case of N.K. Chauhan & Ors. v. State
E I

,
of Gujarat & Ors., [1977] 1 SCR 1037 is not applicable as the facts
of that case are different from the facts of this case. In that case the F
dispute arose regarding the claim of the direct recruits to the posts
of Deputy Collectors to be declared senior to the appellants who
were promotees from Mamlatdars to the post of Deputy Collectors.
In the State of Bombay prior to bifurcation the source of recruit-
ment to the post of Deputy Collector was two-fold i.e. ( 1) by
G
promotion from Mamlatdar and (2) by direct recruitment to the
' I
. post of Deputy Collector. A resolution was adopted by the Bombay
Government on 30.7.1959 laying down the method of recruitment to
4" the post of Deputy Collectors. tt is in the following terms:-

"Appointment to the posts of Deputy Collector shall be H
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.
A made either by nomination or by promotion of suitable
Mamlatdars:

Provided that the ratio of appointment by nomination
B and by promotion shall, as far as practicable, be 50: 50".

The question arose whether the direct recruits who were recruited r
subsequent to the promotees can claim seniority over the promotees
as the quota of direct recruits was not fulfilled. It was held that
k~
since the rule was that as far as possible the quota system must be A
c. kept and if not practicable, promotees in the place of direct recruits
or direct recruits in the place of promotees may be inducted by
applying the regular procedure without suffering the seats to lie ~
indefinitely vacant. It was further held that the quota rule does not,
inevitably, invoke the application of the rota rule. The impact of ..
D this position is that if sufficient number of direct recruits have not
been forthcoming in the years since 1960 to fill in the ratio due to
them and those deficient vacancies have been filled up by promo- •
tees, later direct recruits cannot claim 'deemed' dates of appoint-
meat for seniority in service with effect from the time, according to
the rota or turn the direct recruits' vacancy arose. Seniority will
E

1
depend on the length of continuous officiating service and cannot be
upset by later arrivals from the open market save to the extent to
which any excess promotees may have to be pushed down as indi-
cated earlier. It was also held that normally seniority is measured by
length of continuous officiating service-actually is easily accep-
F table as the legal. It do~s not preclude a different prescription
constitutional tests being satisfied. It has also been observed that
the decision in the case of S.C. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, [1967]
2 S.C.R. 703 at 718 as well as the decision in the case of B.S. Gupta
v. Union of India, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 104 cannot be considered to hold
,
·-
the field in as much a~ in case where recruitment is from two inde-
G pendent sources subject to prescribed quota and power is conferred
' •
on the Government to make recruitment in relaxation of the rules
any recruitment made contrary to the quota rule could not be held
to be invalid unless it is shown that the power of relaxation was ' v J.
exercised ma/a fide. Similar observation has been made in the case
H of A. Janardhana v. Union of India, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 936 at 956,
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY [RAY, J.] 217

where it has been observed that in a system governed by rule of law A
discretion when conferred upon executive authority must be
confined within clearly defined limits. In this case rule (3) of the
Military Engineering Service (RTS) Rule provides method of
recruitment indicating the source from which the recruitment can be
made. There were two sources of recruitment to the service cme by B
direct recruitment another by promotion, according to quota
prescribed by the said rule. The question arises whether promotees
in excess of quota provided for promotion on the basis of power of
relaxation rule can be pushed down as such filling up of the quota
~ by promotion would be illegal and the excess recruits unless they
find their place by adjustment in subsequent years in the quota C
would not be members of the service. It was held that even though
the rule prescribed the method of recruitment and quota and if the
very rule simultaneously confers power on the government to
recruit in relaxation of the rules unless mala fide are alleged and
attributed ·such excess recruitments by promotion could not be D
illegal and the said promotees cannot be pushed down where the
rule confers a discretion on the Government to relax rules to meet
exigencies of service. Any recruitment made cpmrary to quota rule
would not be invalid unless it is shown that the power of relaxation
was exercised ma la fide. This decision thus followed the observation

r made m the Chauhan's case referred to earlier. These two
decisions, of course, have no application to the instant case in
as much as no such question does arise for decision in this
E

case.

F
In the instant case there is a specific rule i.e. Rule 23 provid-
ing for determination of seniority from the date a person has been
substantively appointed and has become a member of the cadre of
service of Assistant Engineer in the United Provinces Engineering
Service (Buildings and Roads Branch) Class II. Therefore in this
case there is no quota for recruitment to the service and as such the G
decision in Chauhan's case is not applicable.

I have already decided hereinbefore that when an employee has
been appointed substantively to a temporary post in the cadre of
service and ha& become a member of service of Assistant Engineers H
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.
A )'
in the United Provinces Engineers Service under the United Pro-
vinces Service of Engineers (Buildings and Roads Branch) Class II
Rules, his seniority in service will be counted from the date of his ~
becoming member of the service. It does not matter whether he has
been appointed against the permanent post and has been duly con-
B firmed in that post. I have come to this finding on a due considera-
tion of the provisions of the aforesaid rules more particularly Rules
·3(b) and 23 of the said rules which lay down the mode of determi-
nation of seniority in service.

In the instant case, however, I am not inclined to give any relief
C to the respondents (petitioners in the writ petition) by directing re-
determination of the seniority of the respondents as well as the
appellants on the ground of unusual ]aches and delay. The appellant
Nos. to 4 were confirmed in 1955 and their seniority was deter-
mined by Government Order of 20th July, 1956. Out of the peti-
D tioners of the writ petition, the petitioner Nos. 4 and 5 made
representations in 1959 against ,the aforesaid seniority list. Subse-
quently, petitioner No. 6 filed another representation. Petitioner
Nos. 6, 7 and 4 made their representation in 1959 and petitioner
No. 6 gave a reminder in June 1965 and April 1970. The other
petitioner Nos. 2, 3, 9 and 10 did not make any representation in the
E matter of seniority. It is only in 1970 that the writ petition No. 2254
of !970 was moved challenging the confirmation of the petitioner
Nos. l to 4 (appellants in the instant appeal). This challenge was
negatived on the ground of ]aches and delay. An appeal being Special
Appeal No. 287 of 197 ! was also dismissed on the ground of ]aches
and delay as regards the confirmation of the appellants was con-
F cerned. Of course, it had been observed that the seniority in service
of these appellants was not questioned in the said writ petition and
the Government would consider the representation made by the
petitioners of the writ petition (appellants in the instant appeal) as far
I
back as in 1959, which were pending before the Government. The
writ petition No. 1080 of 1973 which gave rise to the Civil Appeal was
moved in 1973 challenging the determination of seniority of the
G appellants in the instant appeal. It appears from the affidavit-in-
opposition sworn by one of the appellants Shri G.C. Gupta that at
the time when the writ petition was moved the appellant Nos. 1 to 4
were officiating as Superintending Engineers and the respondent
Nos. 2 and 3 were officiating as Superintending Engineers but junior
H to all the four appellants and the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 to 12 were
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY (RAY. J.] 219

then Executive Engineers. At present the appellant Nos. -1, 2 and 3 A
are permanent Superintending Engineers and officiating as Addi-
tional Chief Engineers. The appellant No. 4 is also a permanent
Superintending Engineer. At thi~ juncture if the seniority of these
appellants vis-a-vis the respondents of this appeal is directed to be
determined it will create much administrative difficulties and would B
amount to deprive the appellants of their valuable rights which have
accrued to them. It is pertinent to refer in this connection to the
observation made by this Court in the case of Rabindra Nath Bose &
Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [ 1970) 2 SCR 697. It has been
observed that the attack to the seniority list prepared on the basis of
1952 rules 15 years after the rules were promulgated and effect given
to the seniority list prepared on August !, 1953 should not be allowed c
because of the inordinate delay and !aches in challenging the said
rule.

>
Similar observations have been made by this Court in the case
of State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray & Ors., I 1977) 3 SCC D
396; State of M.P. & Ors. etc. etc. v. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors., AIR
!987 SC 251; Ramanna Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport
Authority of India, [1979) 3 SCR 1014; Ashok Kumar v. Collector,
Raipur, AIR (1980) (SC) ! 12: 1980 1 SCR 491; K.R. Mudgal v. R.P.
Singh, [ 1986) 4 SCC 531 and R.S. Makashi & Ors. v. J.M. Menon &
Ors., [ 1982) ( !) SCC 379 where relief was refused on the ground of E
laehes in moving the Court for redress of the grievances after lapse of
a period of years after the cause of action arose. It has been observed
in State ofM.P. & Ors., v. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors., (supra):-

"Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court F
to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is
discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does
not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquioscent and
the lethargbic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the peti-
tioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily
explained, the High Court may decline to intervence and grant relief G
in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of
!aches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High
Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary
remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause
confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new in jus-
tices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the w'rit H
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 119881 2 s.c.~:
A
jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable
delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and
inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled
with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an impor-
B tant factor which always weighs with the High Court in deciding
whether.or not to exercise such jurisdiction."

In this case the challenge to the seniority of the appellants
which was detennined by order dated 20th July, 1956 was made in
1973 i.e. after nearly 17 years and they have sought relief for redeter-
c mination of the seniority in accordance with the provisions of the.
aforesaid service rules. This cannot be pennitted as it would amount
to unjust deprivation of the rights of the appellants which had·
accrued to them in the meantime. The observation that 'Every person
ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and
promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the
D lapse of a number of years' as made in the above case Rabindra Nath
Bose & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. will be applicable to this case.
Considering all th.ese aspects it would be just and proper not to give
any relief to the respondents on the ground of inordinate !aches and
delay in challenging the seniority list made in July, 1956. I have
already mentioned hereinbefore that at the time of moving the writ
E petition in 1973 all the appellants had been confirmed as Superin-
tending Engineers in the United Provinces Service of Engineers and
the appellant Nos. 1 to 3 had been officiating as Additional Chief
1
Engineers. The appellant No. 4 who was also a permanent Superin-
tending Engineer we were told by the parties at the time of hearing of
this appeal, had been promoted and appointed as Additional Chief
F Engineer. Whereas out of the 12 respondents 10 have already retired
from services as it appears from the affidavit sworn by appellant
No. 1 Mr. G.C. Gupta in ·accordance with the directions of this
Court. We are also told that out of the remaining 2 respondents, 1 ·
has already retired from service. So, only 1 respondent is at present
in service. In these circumstances I think that the cause of justice will
G be served if the authorities concerned consider the case of the said
respondent for promotion in accordance with law.

For the reasons aforesaid the appeal is allowed and the judg-
ment and order of the High Court is set aside. There will be no order
H as to costs.
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY [SEN. J.I 221

I also make it clear that henceforth seniority of the employees A
in service in question will be determined from the date when an
employee has become a member of the service being appointed
substantively to a post in the cadre of service, no matter whether the.
said post is permanent or temporary as I have held herein before.

B
SEN J. I have had the benefit of going through the ju_dgment
prepared by my learned brother Ray, J. and I agree with the order
proposed to be made. In view of the importance of the questions
involved, I would however like to add a few words.

I have no doubt in my mind that temporary Assistant Engineers C
were entitled to the benefit of their seniority reckoned according to
the date of the order of appointment to the Service in terms of r. 23
of the United Provinces Service of Engineers (Buildings & Roads
Branch) Rules, 1936, w .e.f. the date of their absorption into the
Service by the Government in consultation with the Public Service
Commission i.e. from the date from which they became 'Members of D
the Service' within the meaning of r. 3(b) of the Rules. I had
expressed the same view in Ashok Gulati & Ors. v. B.S. Jain & Ors.,
[ 1986] Suppl. SCC 597 and I still adhere to it.

As a matter of policy, the then Provincial Government by a E
i notification dated August 3 !, !942 directed under r. 6 of the Rules
that from the year !942-43, two vacancies in the United Provinces
Service of Engineers, both in the Buildings and Roads as well as in
)

,
the Irrigation Departments, shall be reserved for two students of
Thomson College of Civil Engineering, Roorkee who stood first and
second in order of merit in the final examination of the Degree F
Course of Engineering i.e. to the guaranteed posts. The reserved
quota of guaranteed posts was later increased by the Government
from two to four posts each year in each of the two Branches. The
system of direct recruitment of such Engineer Students to the two
guaranteed posts was however discontinued by its notification dated
Ju-ne 22, 1950, w.e.f. the year 1953 i.e. the system of direct recruit- G
men! of merit scholars to the guaranteed posts was abolished in
respect of the batch of students who joined the Thomson College of
Civil Engineering, Roorkee University of Roorkee from the month
of October :950, i.e. after the inauguration of the Constitution.

,Again, as a matter of policy, the State Govef11111ent by an office_ H
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1988] 2 S.C.R.
A ~
memorandum dated December 7, 1961 \irought about a change in the
method of recruitment of Assistant Engineers in the U. P. Service of
Engineers, Buildings & Roads Branch. It provided for direct recruit- '
ment of such Assistant Engineer> hy competitive examination
through the Public Service Commission from the year '96 1 • Para-
B graphs l and 2 of the said memorandum read as follows:

··The principles regulating selection for recruitment to
permanent and temporary posts of Assistant Engineer in
the various State Engineering Services have been under
the consideration of Government for some time past and
c after thorough consideration, the Governor is pleased to
order that in future direct recruitment to both permanent
and temporary vacancies of Assistant Engineers (Civil,
Electric and Mechanical) in the Public Works, Irrigation
and Local Self Government Engineering Departments,
will be made on the results of competitive examination to
D be conducted by the Public Service Commission. Candi-
dates possessing technical and other qualifications pres-
cribed in the rules for the United Provinces Service of
Engineers in the Departments concerned will be eligible
to apear at the examination for that particular service."
E
"(2) Successful candidates in order of merit will subject to "'
the relevant rules regarding physical fitness and other
matters, be appointed directly on probation against vacant
permanent posts and those following will be appointed
against temporary posts."
F
By a G.O. dated April !9, 1950, the State Government settled
the principle that persons appointed to the guaranteed posts every
year as Engineer Students would take their seniority over persons
appointed as temporary Assistant Engineers in that year. A person
G appointed to a guaranteed post in a particular year however was
made junior to all those who were appointed as Assistant Engineers
in earlier years, irrespective of whether they were appointed to
guaranteed or to non-guaranteed posts. By a subsequent G.O. dated
June 22, !950 the Government intimated the Chief Engineer, Buil-
dings & Roads that Engineer Students who were appointed to the
H guaranteed posts of temporary Assistant Engineers and working in
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY [SEN, J.J 223

the Buildings & Roads Branch be absorbed in the existing permanent A
vacancies or those which might arise in future.

Thus, the appellants who were appointed to the guaranteed
posts of temporary Assistant Engineers, as reserved for the top
students of Thomson College of Civil Engineering, Roorkee/Univer- B
sity of Roorkee, constituted a class apart. One D.K. Laroiya who had
been appointed as a temporary Assistant Engineer to one of the
guaranteed posts in !945 and confirmed in the year 1949 made a
representation dated April !5, !955 claiming seniority over all the
Assistant Engineers appointed to guaranteed or non-guaranteed
posts, irrespective of the order of appointment. While this represen- c
tation was pending, the State Government passed an order dated
October 11, 1955 confirming the appellants i.e. holders of guaranteed
posts w.e.f. April 1, 1955 in the permanent posts of Assistant
Engineers, and later on by order dated July 20, 1956 determined their
order of seniority. Subsequently, the Government by orders dated
November 7, 1956, April 9, 1957 and May 14, 1958 confirmed the D
temporary Assistant Engineers i.e. persons appointed to non-guaran-
teed posts as permanent Assistant Engineers, all w.e.f. April 1, 1956.
By order dated May 29, 1961 the Government determined the
seniority of respondents nos. l- le and 39 others referable to the date
of their substantive appointment. On a combined reading of the

r impugned orders dated July 20, 1956 and the subsequent order dated E
May 29, 1961, the appellants i.e. the ·directly recruited Engineer
Students who had passed out from the Thomson College of Civil
Engineering, RoorkeeiUniversity of Roorkee in order of merit i.e. to
the guaranteed posts, were placed above respondents nos. 1- 12 and
39 others i.e. the temporary' Assistant Engineers. On the basis of
their seniority and in view of their record of service, the appellants F
had in the meanwhile been promoted as Offg. Executive Engineers in
the years 1960 and 196 !. Admittedly, respondents nos. !-12 who later
on were promoted as Offg. Executive Engineers never filed any
representation qua Executive Engineers and the seniority of the
appellants as Executive Engineers remained unchallenged throughout
the period of !4 years. G

j, It was not till May 4, 1970 i.e. after a lapse of 15 years that
respondents nos. 6,7, and ! ! viz. I.P. Gupta, R.C. Mangal and R.K.
Mathur filed a.petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High
Court challenging the impugned order dated October ! !, 1955 by H
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] 2 S.C.R.
A
which the appellants were confirmed w.e.f. April !, 1955 and the
consequential determination of the inter-se seniority between direct
recruits and promotees vide orders dated July 20, 1956 and May 29,
:96 ! assigning them higher seniority. The writ petition came to be
heard by Broome,J. and the learned Judge by his judgment and order
B dated April 16, 1971 dismissed the writ petition holding that the
petitioners were guilty of ]aches. That judgment of his was upheld in
appeal by a Division Bench consisting of R.S. Pathak and H.N. Seth,
JJ. by its judgment dated October 26, 197 !. The Devision Bench
following the decision of this Court in Rabindra Nath Bose & Ors. v.
Union of India & Ors., [ 1970] 2 SCR 697 held that the learned Single
C Judge was fully justified in holding that no relief could be granted to
the petitioners who, without any reasonable explanation, approached
the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution after inordinate
delay. It was also observed relying upon the decision of this Court in
S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India & Ors., [ !967] 2 SCR 703 that it
would be highly unjust to deprive the appellants of the rights which
D had accrued to them as such. The learned Judges firmly repelled the
contention that even if the petitioners could not be permitted to
question the legality and propriety of the impugned order of confir-
mation, they were still entitled to claim seniority over the directly
recruited Engineer Students as per rules regulating seniority. obser-
ving that:
E

"Since the petitioners cannot be allowed to re-agitate and
question the propriety of the confirmation order passed
long time back, it would not be desirable to go into the
question of consequential determination of seniority
F either."

In the concluding part of the judgment, there is a direction in the
following terms:

G
"Moreover, representations made by the petitioners, as
admitted in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the
State Government, are still pending. The State Govern-
ment has taken up the stand that these representations ):::
have not been decided as writ petitions had been filed by
Sri K.C. Agarwal and the petitioners before this Court
and the matter became sub-judice. We have no reason to
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY [SEN. J.J :'25
A
think that after disposal of the petitions the State
Government will not decide the representations fairly and
> in accordance with law. In the circumstances, we are not
inclined to examine the correctness of this submission
made by the petitioners in this petition."
B
If the sentence was read in the context, it meant 'Left to themselves,
they would not have interfered'. Misconstruing this direction, the
State Government afforded an opportunity to the temporary
Assistant Engineers to make their representations, if any. Factually,
there were no representations pending except the one filed by
Laroiya. Eventually, the State Government realised the mistake and C
by its order dated June 29, 1973 rejected the representation stating
that the question of inter-se seniority of Assistant Engineers had been
finally settled and could not be reopened.

It is somewhat strange that the Division Bench (T.S. Misra and D
U.S. Srivastava, JJ) by its judgement dated May 6, 1981 should have,
after a lapse of nearly 26 years, thought that merely because of the
fact that the State Government erroneously invited representations
afresh, 'the matter of inter-se seniority was still alive and not a closed
chapter'. Upon that wrongful assumption, the High Court has fallen

r into an error in directing the issuance of a writ in the nature of E
certiorari quashing the impugned seniority list and a writ in the
nature of mandamus directing the State government to re-determine
the inter-se seniority of Assistant Engineers in the U.P. Service of
Engineers, Buildings & Roads Branch, Class II .

•
F
There can be no doubt whatever that it was not a proper
exercise of jurisdiction on the part of the High Court to have
interfered with the impugned seniority list after nearly three decades.
When way back in the year 1971 Broome, J. had declined to interfere
with the inter-se seniority between the appellants i.e. the direct
recruits and respondents nos. 1-12 and 39 others i.e. the promotees G
on a similar petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the ground
of inordinate delay and !aches and that judgment of his was upheld
by a Division Bench which observed that it would be unjust to
deprive the appellants of the rights which had accrued to them as
they were entitled to consider that their appointments to the
promotional posts would not be set aside after a lapse of so many H
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 19881 2 S.C.R.

A years, there was no occasion for the later Division Bench to have
interfered with the impugned orders and given a direction to the
State Government to re-determine the. inter-se seniority between the
'
appellants and respondents nos. 1- 12 and 39 others under r. 23 of the
Rules afresh, with advertence to the observations made by it.

B
My learned brother Ray, J. has taken immense pain in discer-
ning the principles emerging from all the relevant authorities on the
subject, including those of N.K. Chauhan v. State of Gujarat [ 1977] I
SCR 1037; S.B. Patwardhan v. State of Maharashtra, [1977] 3 SCR
775 and-the subsequent decision in Baleshwar Dass v. State of U.P.
[ 1981] 1 SCR 449 and I do not wish to traverse the ground over again
)
c except to touch upon certain aspects. The principle deducible from
the two well-known decisions of N.K. Chauhan and S.B. Patwardhan
is that in the absence of a seniority rule, the promotees within the
quota are entitled to the benefit of the period of continuous officia-
tion in reckoning their seniority vis-a-vis direct recruits. The impor-
D tance of the decision in Baleshwar Dass' case lies in the meaningful
interpretation of the words 'substantive capacity'.

The question must turn on a proper construction of the
unamended r. 23 of the Rules which provided:

E "23. Seniority in the service shall be determined according
to the date of the order of appointment to it, provided
1l__
that if the order of appointment of two or more candidates
bears the same date, their seniority inter-se shall be
determined according to the order in which their appoint-
ment has been notified."
F
It is plain upon the language of r. 23 that it docs not in terms use the
words 'substantive capacity' but speaks of 'the date of order of
appointment to it' i.e. the Service which brings in the concept of
'substantive capacity' as those words are used in the definition of the
G expression 'Members of the Service' as contained in r. 3(b) of the • •
Rules.

_In Baleshwar Dass' case, the seniority list challenged before the
High Court was the one relating to Assistant .Engiileers belonging io
the Irrigation Department prepared in December 1965 under r. 23 of
H the Rules prior to the amendme.nt, but after the issuance of the
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY [SEN, J.J 227

aforesaid memorandum dated December 7, 1961 by which a new A
method of recruitment was introduced. The Court referred to Rules
> for recruitment in particular to rr. 5, 6, 17 and 19 as well as the
aforesaid office memorandum dated December 7, 1961. The Court in
Baleshwar Dass' case firmly repelled the contention that the afore-
said office memorandum incorporating a change in the method of B
recruitment had no statutory force, not being expressed in the name
of the Governor, on the ground that it had been published under
Government authority, acted upon for two decades when recruit-
ments were made by the Public Service Commission and universally

- ·" accepted as binding. It held that the office memorandum was rela-
table to a statutory source, namely, rr. 5 and 6 of the rules· as 'filling
up the gaps and not flouting the provisions'. It was observed: C

"Two vital factors must guide us in this interpretative
.,
. exercise. If a dated rule of colonial times is to be applied
today, that meaning which sustains it as constitutionally
valid must be preferred to another which may be appeal- D
ing, going by officialise or literal sense. We have to regard
it as a case of 'new wine in old bottle'. We must re-
interpret the rules to comport with Arts. 14 and 16 by

,
constitutionally acceptable construction, not rigid conno-
tation given to expressions in the vintage vocabulary of
British Indian days." E

Acting upon the basis that the aforesaid office memorandum dated
December 7, 1961 was constitutionally valid, the Court went into the
intent and effect of rr. 23, 3, 4, 5, 6, 17 and 18 and their impact on
r. 23 read in the context of the memorandum of 1961 with a view to
F
rationalise the scheme of recruitment, classification, seniority and
promotion and held that there was nothing arbitrary in the !961
memorandum bringing ~bout a change in the method of recruitment
by competitive examination through Public Service Commission, and
observed:
G
"(A)lthough in its application, we have to remember the
prior Rules and when the two are woven into each other
or, rather, when the later 1961 Memorandum is dovetailed
to the 1936 Rules the results that may follow will have to
be ascertained with care and consistently with the ratio of
the decisions of this Court in cognate situations." H
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
, [1988] 2 S.C.lt

A Further that:

"(T)he Government decided in !961 to resort to direct ,
recruitment of Assistant Engineers through competitive
examinations held by the Public Service Commission. It
was, however, alive to the fact that massive appointments
B had already been made, in the years gone by, to the posts
of Assistant Engineers from among graduates in enginee- ·-,
ring by. direct selection and later approval by the Public
Service Commisssion ....... "

·The importance of the decision in Baleshwar Dass' case lies in )
C the meaningful interpretation of the words 'substantive capacity'.
Krishna Iyer, J. affirming the principle in his own charismatic and ...
,.
picturesque language, observed·: j
"We must emphasise that while temporary and permanent f
posts have great relevancy in regard to the career of \.
D government servants, keeping posts temporary for long,
sometimes by annual renewals for several years, and deny-
ing the claims of the incumbents on the score that their

1
posts are temporary makes no sense and strikes us as
arbitrary, especially when both temporary and permanent
appointees are functionally identified. If, in the normal
E course, a post is temporary in the real sense and the
appointee knows that his tenure cannot exceed the post in ,.,.-
longevity, there cannot be anything unfair or capricious in t
clothing him with no rights. Not so, if the post is, for\ ,-
certain departmental or like purposes, declared tempo- /
rary, but it is within the ken of both the government and
F the appointee that the temporary posts are virtually long-
lived. It is irrational to reject the claim of the 'temporary'
appointee on the nominal score of the terminology of the
post. We must also express emphatically that the principle
which has received the sanction of this Court's pronounce-
ments is that officiating service in a post is for all practical
G purposes of seniority as good as service on a regular basis.
It may be permissible, within limits, for government to
ignore officiating service and count only regular service
when claims of seniority come before it, provided the
rules in that regard are clear and categoric and do not
admit of any ambiguity and cruelly arbitrary cut-off of
H long years of service does not take place or tliere is func-
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY [SEN. J.l 229

tionally and qualitatively, substantial difference in the
service rendered in two types of posts. While rules A
)
regulating conditions of service are within the executive
power of the State or its lagislative power under proviso
to Art. 309, even so, such rules have to be reasonable, fair
and not grossly unjust if they are to survive the test of
Arts. 14 and 16." [3
i
Adverting to the oft-quoted observations of Chandrachud, CJ in
S.B. Pathwardhan's case that 'seniority cannot depend on the
~ inglorious uncertainties of confirmation' and to his own in N. K.
Chauhan's case that 'seniority, normally, is measured by length of
continuous officiating service' the learned Judge observed that
although an appointee to a permanent post acquires certain rights c
which one who fills a temporary post cannot claim, nevertheless.
when the post is not purely temporary or ad-hoe or of short duration
or of an adventitious nature, the holder of such temporary posfcannot
be degraded to the position of one who by accident of circumstances,
or for a fugitive tenure occupies the temporary post for a fleeting D
term. The learned Judge while accepting that there was a distinction
between permanent and temporary posts inasmuch as permanency
carries with it other rights than mere seniority and promotion,
brought out the 'propinquity in status' of permanent and temporary
Assistant Engineers in the special conspectus of the facts before him
and found no justification to hold that when Engineers were appoin- E
ted to temporary posts but after fulfilment of the tests for regular
appointment, including cons.ultation with the Public Service Commis-
sion, they were not appointed in a substantive capacity.
\ The ultimate ratio of the decision in• Baleshwar Dass' case is
) best brought out in the words of Krishna Iyer, J in the following F
passage:

"Substantive capacity refers to the capacity in which a
person holds the post and not necessarily to the nature or
character of the post ......... A person is said to hold a
post in a substantive capacity when he holds it for an inde- G
finite period especially of long duration in contradistinc-
tion to a person who holds it for a definite or temporary
period or holds it on probation subject to confirmation
....... Once we understand 'substantive capacity' in the
above sense, we may be able to rationalise the situation.
If the appointment is to a post and the capacity in which H
230 SUPREME COURT REPOR\fS (1988] 2 ~.C.R.

A the appointment is made is of indefinite duration, if the
Public Service Commission has been consulted and has
approved, if the tests prescribed have been taken and (

passed, if probation has been prescribed and has been
approved, one may well say that the post was held by the
incumbent in a substantive capacity."
B
It is to be emphasised that the court in Baleshwar Dass' case did not
take upon itself the task of determining whether the temporary
Assistant Engineers were entitled to have the benefit of their entire
period of service in reckoning seniority under r. 23 of the rules, but
left it to the Government to ascertain the facts and determine the )
C question in the light of the principles laid down whether the capacity
in which the posts had been held was substantive or temporary. The
emerging principle is that the temporary Assistant Engineers were
entitled to the benefit of their seniority reckoned according to the
date or order of appointment to the Servce in terms of r. 23 of the
rules w.e.f. the date of their absorption into the Service by the
D Government in consultation with the Public Service Commission i.e.
from the date from which they became 'Members of the Service'
within the meaning of r. 3(b) of the Rules.

In legal matters, some degree of certainty is as valuable a part
of justice as perfection. One reason for consistency is that people
E often regulate their conduct with reference to existing rules, which
makes it important for Judges to abide by them. Innovations can be
unsettling and lead to a loss of confidence: Dias' Jurisprudence, 4th
edn., p. 286. In the present case, the High Court was obviously
1
wrong in proceeding upon the basis that the matter was still res /
integra. The decision of the earlier Division Bench was arrived at ,
F keeping in view all the aspects and it was held that the claim for
re-determination of inter-se seniority between direct recruits and
y
promotees could not be agitated after a lapse of 16 years. It is
sufficient for invoking the rule of stare decisis that a certain decision
was arrived at on a question or was argued, no matter on what reas\)n
the decision rests or what is the basis of the decision. In other words,
~
G an earlier decision may be overruled if the Court comes to the con-
clusion that it is manifestly wrong and not upon a mere suggestion
that if the matter was res integra, the Court on a later occasion could }.
come to a different conclusion. It cannot be doubted that an unlimi-
ted and perpetual threat of litigation leads to disorder, sense of
insecurity and uncertainty. May be, there may have been isolated
H cases of hardship but there must be some reservation about limitation
G.C. GUPTA v. N.K. PANDEY [SEN, J.] 231
.A.
on the Court's power in the public interest. Obvious considerations A
of public policy make it a first importance that the person aggrieved
must take action requisite effectively to assert his right to that end so
that if the contention can be justified, the Government service may
be disturbed as little as possible.

Inordinate delay is not merely a factor for the Court to refuse B
-{ apropriate relief but also a relevant consideration it be so minded not
to unsettle settled things. As observed by Khanna, J. in delivering
the judgrnent of the Court in Maloon Lawrence Cecil D'Souza v.
Union of India & Ors., [1975] Suppl. SCR 409:
'
"(B)y and large one of the essential requirements of
contentment and efficiency in public service is a feeling of
c
).._
security. It is difficult no doubt to guarantee such security
in all its varied aspects, it should at least be possible to
ensure that matters like one's position in the seniority list
after having been settled for once should not be liable to
be reopened after lapse of many years at the instance of a D
party who has during the intervening period chosen to
keep quiet. Raking up old matters like seniority after a
long time is likely to result in administrative complications
and difficulties. It would, therefore, appear to be in the

r interest of smoothness and efficiency of service that such
matter should be given a quietus after lapse of some
time."
E

So also in R.S. Makashi & Ors. v. J.M. Menon & Ors., [ 1982] 2 SCR
69; Eradi, J. speaking for a three~Judge Bench stated that belated
\ petitions cannot be entertained under Art. 32 of the Constitution. See
also: K.R. Mudgal & Ors. v. R.P. Singh & Ors., [1986] 4 SCC 531. It F
1' would clearly be unjust, as observed by Sikri, J. in Rabindra Nath
Bose' case to deprive the appellants of the rights which have accrued
to them. As a result of the G.O. of April 19, 1950, although initially
the guarantee to the merit scholars who had passed out from the
Thomson College of Civil Engineering, Roorkee in order of merit was
\
in regard to .appointment to the guaranteed post, but later it was G
amplified into assuring to the holders of such guaranteed posts like
A the appellants preference in the matter of permanency and seniority.
This necessarily perpetuated some amount of injustice, as brought
out in the Report of Lal Committee, to the holders of non-guaran-
teed posts i.e. the temporary Assistant Engineers, due to permanent
appointments having been given to the holders of guaranteed posts H
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] 2 S.C.R ..

A i.e. directly recruited engineer students in preference to them,
though they joined service earlier. There is, however, nothing that
can be done for the Court is faced with a fait accompli. At times, the
court is overtaken by the events. As a matter of policy, the Govern-
ment of the day thought that it would bring greater efficiency and
merit to the Service if certain number of posts were kept reserved for
B the merit scholars graduating from the Thomson College of Civil
Engineering, Roorkee, which in those days was the most prestigeous
institution of its kind in the country and was later incorporated into
the University of Roorkee. The evidence about relevant considera-
tion which prompted the then Government into taking such a policy
decision a long time back may have been lost by passage of time but ,,.<
C there is always a presumption that every official act is done in good
faith. Although Krishna Iyer, J. in Baleshwar Dass's case calls the j
directly recruited Engineer Students to be a 'relic of the Imperial
days', nevertheless the system of reservation of posts for the engineer
Students served its own purpose in attracting persons of undoubted
talent and outstanding merit to the Service and thereby promoted
D efficiency, and it has also withstood the test of time.

In view of these considerations, I agree with my learned brother
Ray, J. that respondents nos. 1-12 were disentitled to any relief
under Art. 226 of the Constitution due to inordinate delay and

E
!aches. If the judgment of the High Court were to be sustained after a
lapse of nearly 32 years, it cannot be gainsaid that the entire
structure of the administrative set-up of the U.P. Service of f
,l
Engineers, Buildings & Roads Branch would be upset. We are
informed that the four appellants before us by reason of their
seniority and record of service, have reached the higher echelons of /
service. One of them has been the Offg. Engineer-in-Chief i.e. Head
F of the Public Works Department, Buildings & Roads Branch, and the
remaining three are Offg. Chief Engineers. As against this, eleven of
the 12 respondents have since retired, leaving only one of them. It is
always open to the State Government to reconsider the case of the
remaining respondent in the light of the principles settled by this
judgment that the temporary Assistant Engineers on absorption were
G entitled to the benefit of their seniority from the date from which
their services were regularised i.e. the date from which they became
'Members of the Service' within the meaning of r. 3{b) of the Rules.
It is still open to the Government to grant him the necessary relief, if
he is found suitable for promotion to a higher post, without disturb-
ing the appointment, promotion and confirmation of the appellants,
H by the creation of a supernumerary post.
G.C. GUITA v. N.K. PANDEY [SEN, J.] 233

.._ I would, for these reasons, allow the appeal and set aside the A
judgment and order passed by the High Court quashing the seniority
list. without any order as to costs.

N.V.K. Appeal allowed
S.L.

' \