Supreme Court of India
FULJIT KAURversusSTATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 338
- Decided
- 3 June 2010
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- B S CHAUHAN
Holding
The demand for additional price is valid, the tentative price can be demanded after provisional price, and dismissal of a Special Leave Petition does not merge the lower court’s decision.
Summary
Fuljit Kaur applied for a residential plot in Punjab Urban Estates and was asked to pay a provisional price. After the tentative price was later determined, the authorities issued a demand for an additional price, which she challenged as arbitrary. The High Court upheld the demand, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Preeta Singh. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the meanings of "provisional price", "tentative price", "additional price" and "sale price" under the Punjab Urban Estate (Sale of Sites) Rules, 1965 and the Punjab Urban Estates (Development and Regulation) Act, 1964, and held that the tentative price is distinct from the provisional price and can be demanded later. The Court also clarified that dismissal of a Special Leave Petition in limine does not merge the lower court’s judgment, and that Article 14 cannot be invoked to claim a negative equality based on the haste of allotment. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court’s order.
Issues considered
- The distinction between "provisional price" and "tentative price" under the Punjab Urban Estate (Sale of Sites) Rules, 1965.
- Whether the demand for additional price is arbitrary or unreasonable.
- Whether the dismissal of a Special Leave Petition in limine merges the High Court judgment (doctrine of merger).
- The applicability of Article 14 (equality before law) to a hasty allotment of land.
- The relevance of the D.S. Laungia judgment to the present case.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 136, s. Article 14, s. Article 141
- Land Acquisition Acts. 1894, s. Section 18
- Punjab Urban Estate (Sale of Sites) Ruless. 2(aa), s. 2(e), s. 4, s. 5-A
- Punjab Urban Estates (Development and Regulation) Acts. 1964
Subjects
Punjab Urban Estate (Sale of Sites) Rulesadditional pricetentative priceprovisional pricesale priceArticle 14doctrine of mergerspecial leave petitionland acquisitionurban developmentequality before law
Judgment
(2010] 7 S.C.R. 317
FULJIT KAUR A
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 5292 of 2004)
JUNE 3, 2010
B
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]
. Punjab Urban Estate (Sale of Sites) Rules, 1965:
rr. 2(aaj, 2(e), 4, 5-A - 'Additional price', 'tentative price', c
'sale price' and 'liability to pay additional price' - 'Provisional
. price' and 'tentative price' - Connotation of - Allotment of plot
in haste - Allottee asked. to deposit 'provisional price' -
Subsequently, demand raised for additional price - High
Court upholding the demand notice - HELD: There is a 0
difference between 'provisional price' and 'tentative price' and
it may take a long time for the State to determine the tentative
price - There is nothing in the scheme of the Act or the Rules
indicating that a person to whom the plot has been allotted
· cannot be aske.d to pay the 'tentative price'"""'. Further, the sale E
. price in the cases covered by the land acquisition Act is the
aggregate of the tentative price and, the 'additional price'
which is attributable to the enhanced compensation awarded
by the reference court - High Court has rightly relied upon
the case of Preeta Singh wherein Supreme Court upheld the
'sale price' as determined under r.4 F
· Punjab Urban Estates (Development and Regulation)
Act, 1964:
Urban Development - Housing - Constitution of India, G
1950 - Articles 14 and 136.
Constitution of India, 1950:
Article 136 - Dismissal of SLP in limine - HELD: Does
317 H
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 7 S.C.R.
A not operate as res judicata - Nor does it mean that the
judgment of High Court has been affirmed - Nor can the
impugned judgment be said to have merged with such a
dismissal order passed by Supreme Court - An order
rejecting a special leave petition at the threshold without
B detailed reasons therefor does not constitute any declaration
of law or a binding precedent - Punjab Urban Estate (Sale of
Sites) Rules, 1965 - Doctrine of merger - Precedents.
Article 14 - Equality before law - HELD: Is a trite, which
C cannot be claimed in illegality and, therefore, cannot be
claimed by a citizen or enforced by a court in a negative
manner - A wrong decision in favour of any particular party
does not entitle any other party to claim its benefits - Punjab
Urban Estate (Sale of Sites) Rules, 1965.
D The appellant applied on 23.2.1987 for allotment of a
residential plot in an urban area. On 25.2.1987, an
allotment letter allotting a 400 sq. yard plot was issued
to the appellant asking her to deposit the "provisional
price". Subsequently, by letter dated 25.3.1992 the
E additional demand was made. The allottee filed a writ
petition before the High Court challenging the additional
demand as arbitrary and unreasonable. The High Court
upheld the demand notice.
F In the instant appeal filed by the allottee, it was
contended for the appellant that the High Court
committed an error in dismissing the writ petition of the
appellant and relying upon the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Preeta Singh's case1. It was submitted that in the
case of D.S. Laungia 2 such unreasonable and arbitrary
G demand was quashed by the High Court and the said
judgment attained finality as the special leave petition
1. Preeta Singh & Ors. vs. Haryana Urban Development Authority & Ors. 1996
(1) Suppl. scR 621 = (1996) a sec 756.
2. D.S. Laungia & Anr. vs. The State of Punjab & Ors. AIR 1993 Pub. & Har.
H 54.
FULJIT KAUR v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 319
preferred by the State against the said judgment was A
withdrawn; that pursuant to the direction of the Supreme
Court, though the additional price was determined, but
no recovery was made from D.S. Laungia and, therefore,
the appeal deserved to be allowed.
B
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
1.1. There is a difference between the "provisional
price" and the "tentative price" and it may take a long time
for the State to determine the tentative price. A perusal
of rr. 2(aa), 2(e), 4 and 5-A of the Punjab Urban Estate C
(Sale of Sites) Rules, 1965 shows that the "tentative price"
means the price determined by the State Government
from time to time in respect of a sale of site by allotment
and while doing so, the Government has to ,take into
consideration various factors including the a~ount paid D
as compensation; the phrase "additional price" has been
defined as the price determined by the State Government
having regard to the enhanced compensation payable to
:lhe iand owners in pursuance of the award passed by the
<tourt on a reference made u/s 18 or further appeal under E
ihe Land Acquisition Act 1894; and the "sale price" is the
. price payable in respect of an allotment of site, which is
th~ aggregate of the tentative price and the additional
price, in case the land has been acquired under the 1894
Act. There is nothing in the scheme of the Punjab Urban F
·Estates (Development and Regulation) Act 1964 or the
· 1965 Rules from which it can be inferred that tentative
price is synonymous with the provisional price, and that
a person, to whom the plot has been allotted on
provisional price, cannot be asked to pay the tentative G
price determined by the government. (para 18-19] (335-
A-G]
1.2. In the instant case, the calculations were
furnished by the respondents as to on what basis
tentative price had been determined. There is nothing on H
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 7 S.C.R.
A record to show that the tentative price determined by the
State was unreasonable or arbitrary nor is it the case of
the allottee that the market value of the land has not been
enhanced while deciding the reference under the 1894
Act. While deciding this case, the High Court placed
B heavy reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Preeta
Singh, wherein, after taking note of various statutory
provisions of Act of 1964 and the 1965 Rules, particularly,
r.2(aa), the Court upheld the sale price as determined in
Rule 4. The High Court has taken into consideration all
c statutory provisions, the calculations made by the
respondents as to under what circumstances the
"tentative- price" had been fixed, and reached the
conclusion that the demand was justified. The High Court
also rejected the plea that judgment in D.S. Laungia was
0 an authority on the issue. [para 16, 20 and 22] [335-H;
338-B-C; 333-B-C]
Preeta Singh & Ors. Vs. Haryana Urban Development
Authority & Ors. 1996 (1) Suppl. SCR 621-= {1996) 8 SCC
756; Bangalore Development Authority Vs. Syndicate Bank
E (2007) 6 $CC 711; Tamil Nadu Housing Board & Ors. Vs.
Sea Shore Apartments Owners' Welfare Association 2008 (1)
SCR 370 =(2008) 3 SCC 21, relied on.
D.S. Laungia & Anr. Vs. The State of Punjab & Ors.
F AIR1993 Pub.&Har. 54, disapproved.
1.3. It may be pertinent to mention here that the
allotment had been made to the appellant within 48 hours
of submission of her application though in ordinary
cases, it takes about a year. The appellant was further
G favoured to pay the provisional price in four instalments
in two years, as is evident from the letter dated 8.4.1987.
Making the allotment in such a hasty manner itself is
arbitrary and unreasonable and is hit by Article 14 of the
Constitution. This Court has consistently held that "when
H a thing is done in a post-haste manner, malafide would
FULJIT KAUR v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 321
be presumed." Anything done in undue haste can also A
be termed as "arbitrary and cannot be condoned in law."
Thus, such an allotment in favour of the appellant is liable
to be declared to have been made in arbitrary and
unreasonable manner. However, the Court is not inclined
to take such drastic steps as the appellant has developed B
the land subsequent to allotment. [para 26) (340-8-F]
Dr. S.P. Kapoor Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
1982 ( 1 ) SCR 1043 =AIR 1981 SC 2181; Madhya Pradesh
Hasta Shi/pa Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs. Devendra Kumar Jain & C
Ors. 1994 ( 6 ) Suppl. SCR 344 = (1995) 1 SCC 638;
Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohif, Vs. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia
& Ors. 2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 1023 =AIR 2004 SC 1159; and
Zenit Matap/ast P. LTd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2009
(14) SCR 403 = (2009)10 sec 388, relied on
D
2.1. Ther~ is no dispute to the settled proposition of
law tha.t dismissal of.a special leave petition in limine by
this Court does not mean that the reasoning of the
judgment of the Hi~h Court j:lgainst which the special
leave· petition has been filed stands affirmed or the E
judgment and orper impugned merges with such order
of this Court on dismissal qtthe petition. It simply means
that this Court did not consider the case worth examining
for the reason, which may be other than merit of the case.
Nor such an order of this Court operates as res judicata. F
An order rejecting the special leave petition at the
threshold without detailed reasons therefor does not
constitute any declaration of law nor a binding precedent.
[para 8) [328-8-D)
Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kera/a & Anr. 2000 (1) G
Suppl. SCR 538 = AIR 2000 SC 2587; The Workmen of
Cochin Port Trust Vs. The Board of Trustees of .the Cochin
Port Trust & Anr. 1978 ( 3) SCR 971 =AIR 1978 SC 1283;
Ahmedabad Manufacturing & Calico Printing Co. Ltd. Vs. The
Workmen
. .
& Anr. 1981 ( 3 ) SCR 213 =AIR 1981. SC 960; H
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 120101 1 s.~.R.
A Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. 1986 ( 3
) SCR 553 =AIR 1986 SC 1780; Supreme Court Employees'
Welfare Association Vs. Union of India & Ors. 1989 ( 3 ) SCR
488 = AIR 1990 SC 334; Yogendra Narayan Chowdhury &
Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. 1995 ( 6 ) Suppl. SCR
B 17 =Al~ 1996 SC 751; Union of India & Anr. Vs. Sher Singh
~..Ors. 1997 ( 1 ) SCR 1048·= AIR 1997 SC 1796; V.M.
Safgaocar & Bros. (P) Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax
2000 ( 2 ) SCR 1169 =AIR 2000 SC 1623; Saurashtra Oil
Mills Assn., Gujrat Vs. State of Gujrat & Anr. 2002 ( 1 )
c SCR 1099 =AIR 2002 SC 1130; Union of India & Ors. Vs.
Jaipa/ Singh 2003 (5) Suppl. SCR 115 = (2004) 1 SCC
121; and Y. Satyanarayan Reddy Vs. Manda/ Revenue
Officer, Andhra Pradesh 2009 (13 ) SCR 872 = (2009) 9 SCC
447, relied on.
D State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar 1995 ( 1 ) Suppl.
SCR 492 = AIR 1995 SC 1991, referred to. .
2.2. In the fact-situation of the case in D.S. Laungia,
the question of application of doctrine of merger did not
E arise and even by no stretch of imagination it can be held
that this Court has approved the judgment in D.S.
Laungia, rather a different view is required to be taken in
view of the fact that this Court had expressed doubts
about the correctness of the said impugned Judgment.
F [para 12] [331-D]
2.3. The ·respondent cannot claim parity with D.S.
Laungia in view of the settled legal proposition that Article
14 of the Constitution of India does not envisage for.
negative equality. Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate
G illegality or fraud. It has a positive concept. Eq•1ality is a
trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and, therefore,
cannot be claimed by a citizen or enforced by a court in
a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has
been committed in favour of an individual or a group of
H
. FULJIT KAUR v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. · 323
individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a A
judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the
same irregularity or illegality or for passing wrong order.
A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party
does not entitle any other party to claim the benefits on B
the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise Art.14
cannot be stretched too far, otherwise it would make
function of the administration impossible. Thus, even if
some other similarly situated persons have been granted
some benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such order c
does not confer any legal right on the appellant to get the
same relief. [para 13-14) [332-A-F]
Coromande/' Fertilizers Ltd. ·Vs. Union of India & Ors.
1985 SCR 523 =AIR 1984 SC 1772; Panchi Devi Vs. State
of Rajasthan & Ors. 2008 (17) SCR 1325 = (2009) 2 SCC D
589; and Shanti Sports Club & Anr. Vs. Union of India· & Ors.
2009 (13) SCR 710 = (2009) 15 SCC 705; Chandigarh
Administration & Anr Vs. Jagjit Singh & Anr. 1995 ( 1 ) SCR
126 =AIR 1995 SC 705; Smt Sneh Prabha Vs. State of UP.
& Ors., AIR 1996 SC 540; Jalandhar Improvement Trust Vs. E
Sampuran Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1347; State of Bihar & Ors.
Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh & Anr., 2000 ( 3 ) SCR
764 =AIR 2000 SC 2306; Union of India & Ors. Vs. Rakesh
Kumar, 2001 ( 2) SCR 927 =AIR 2001 SC 1877; Yogesh
Kumar & Ors. Vs. Government of NCT Delhi & Ors., 2003 ( 2 F
) SCR 662 = AIR 2003 SC 1241; Union of India & Anr. Vs.
International Trading Company & Anr., 2003 (1) Suppl.
SCR 55 = AIR 2003 SC 3983; Mis Anand Button Ltd. Vs.
State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 565; K.K. Bhalla Vs.
State of M.P. & Ors., 2006 SCR 342 =AIR 2006 SC 898; G
and Maharaj Krishan Bhatt & Anr. Vs. State of Jammu &
Kashmir & Ors., 2008 (11) SCR 670' = (2008) 9 SCC 24,
relied on.
2.4. It cannot be said that the State could not make
H
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.
A any recovery from D.S. Laungia. This Court, vide order
dated 20.05.2010, asked the respondents to explain this
, aspect and file an affidavit of the Administrator of the
Authori~y. In response thereto, an Affidavit was filed
explaining the entire position in respect of the allotment
B and recovery of dues furnishing all details and according
to the said affidavit, the money is being recovered from
all defaulters including D.S. Laungia along with interest.
[para 27] [340-G-H; 341-A-B]
Case Law Reference
c
1996 (1) Suppl. SCR 621 relied on para 4
AIR1993 Pub.&Har. 54 disapproved para 4
1978 ( 3 ) SCR 971 relied on para 8
D
1981 ( 3 ) SCR 213 relied on para 8
1986 ( 3) SCR 553 relied on para 8
1989 ( 3 ) SCR 488 relied on para 8
E 1995 ( 6 ) Suppl. SCR 17 relied on para 8
1997 ( 1 ) SCR 1048 relied on para 8
2000 ( 2 ) SCR 1169 relied on para 8
F 2002 ( 1 ) SCR 1099 relied on para 8
2003 (5) Suppl. SCR 11.5. Felie~. on para 8
2009 (13 ) SCR 872 relied on para 8
1995 ( 1 ) Suppl. SCR 492 referred to para 9
G
2000 ( 1 ) Suppl. SCR 538 relied on para 10
(1985) SCR 523 relied on para 13
2008 (17) SCR 1325 relied on para 13
H
FULJIT KAUR v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 325
2009 (13) SCR 710 relied on para 13 A
1995 ( 1 ) SCR 126 relied on para 14
AIR 1996 SC 540 relied on para 14
AIR 1999 SC 1347 relied on para 14 8
Anr., 2000 ( 3 ) SCR 764 relied on para 14
2001 ( 2 ) SCR 927 relied on para 14
2003 ( 2 ) SCR 662 relied on para 14
c
,'
2003 (1 ) Suppl. SCR 55 relied on para 14
AIR 2005 SC 565 relied on para 14
2006 SCR342 relied on para 14
2008 (11) SCR 670 relied on para 14 D
2001) 6 sec 111 relied on para 23
2008 (1 ) SCR 370 relied on para 24
1982 ( 1 ) SCR 1043 relied on para 26 E
1994 ( 6 ) Suppl. SCR 344 relied on para 26
2003 (6 ) Suppl. SCR 1023 relied on para 26
2009 (14) SCR 403 relied on para 26
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
5292 of 2004.
From the Judgment and Order date 21.12 .1999 of the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Writ
Petition No. 4763 of 1992. G
Sanjay Sarin and Ashok Mathur for the Appellant.
Rachana Joshi lssar and Stiailendra Kumar for the
Respondents.
~
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.
A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This is a unique case which
reveals that an influential person can have allotment of a
residential plot in discretionary quota. within 48 hours of
8 submission of application and then assert in Court that she has
a right to have a land on a throwaway price and not to deposit
the sale price for quarter of a century.
2. This appeal has been preferred against a Judgment and
Order dated 21.12.1999 in Writ Petition No. 4763 of 1992 of
C the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh, dismissing
the petition against the Demand Notice of additional price for
residential plot.
3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that
D the appellant made an application on 23.02.1987 for allotment
of a residential plot in Urban Estates, SAS Nagar, Punjab. The
Administration, vide letter dated 25.02.1987, issued the ·
allotment letter in favour of the appellant in respect of plot No.
702, measuring 400 sq. yards in Sector 70 Urban Estate SAS
E Nagar, making it clear that as the proper calculation could not
be made and tentative price had not been determined, the
allottee has to deposit provisional price of Rs. 93000/- in four
installments upto 15.10.1989. Subsequently, vide letter dated
25.03.1992, additional demand of Rs. 2,19,000/- was made,
however, instead of depositing the said amount, appellant
F challenged the said Demand Notice by filing Writ Petition No.
4763 of 1992 before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana
contending that the additional demand was arbitrary and
unreasonable. A large number of similar cases were also
pending before the High Court and some had earlier been
G disposed of. However, the Writ Petition filed by the appellant
has been dismissed by the High Court vide impugned Judgment
and Order dated 21.12.1999 upholding the demand dated
25.03.1992. Hence this appeal.
H 4. Sh. Vijay Hansaria, learned senior counsel appearing
FULJIT KAUR v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 327
[DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
for the appellant, has submitted that the High Court committed A
an error in dismissing the said Writ Petition relying upon the
Judgment of this Court in Preeta Singh & Ors. Vs. Haryana
Urban Development Authority & Ors. (1996) 8 SCC 756. In
D.S. Laungia & Anr. Vs. The State of Punjab & Ors. AIR 1993
Pub.&Har. 54, such unreasonable and arbitrary demand had 8
been quashed by the High Court and the State Government was
issued direction to re-determine the amount taking into
consideration the provisions of the Punjab Urban Estate (Sale
of Sites) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter called as, "the Rules") and
provisions of Punjab Urban Estates (Development and C
Regulation) Act, 1964 (hereinafter called as, "the Act"). The said
Judgment has attained finality as the State had preferred
Special Leave Petition against the said Judgment & Order
before this Court but later on, it was withdrawn. After re-
determining the additional price, no recovery has been rr;iade D
from Sh. D.S. Laungia till date. Therefore, the appeal deserves
to be allowed.
5. On the other hand, Ms. Rachna Joshi lssar, learned
counsel appearing for the respondent vehemently opposed the
appeal contending that the High Court has rightly relied upon E
the Judgment in Preeta Singh (supra). In D.S. Laungia (supra),
the State Government, being aggrieved, had challenged the
said Judgment and Order before this Court by filing the Special
Leave Petition but it was withdra·wn for. certain reasons.
Therefore, it cannot be held that the Judgment in D.S. Laungia F
(supra) stood approved by this Court. Calculations had been
made strictly in consonance with the Statutory provisions of the
Act and the Rules, particularly taking note of Rule 2(aa) and 2(e)
of the Rules and it is to be recovered from D.S. Laungia also.
The High Court was fully satisfied regarding determination of G
the additional price and therefore, no fault can be found with
impugned Judgment and Order. Hence, the appeal is liable to
be dismissed.
6. We have considered the rival submissions made by
learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. H
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.
A 7. -:-he questions do arise as to whether such an order of
withdrawal passed by this Court amounts to confirmation/
approval of the judgment and order of the High Court and as
to whether appellant could be treated differently.
8. There is no dispute to the settled proposition of law that
8
dismissal of the Special Leave Petition in limine by this Court
does not mean that the reasoning of the judgment of the High
Court against which the Special Leave Petition has been filed
before this Court stands affirmed or the judgment and order
impugned merges with such order of this Court on dismissal
C of the petition. It simply means that this Court did not consider
the case worth examining for the reason, which may be other
than merit of the case. Nor such an order of this Court operates
as res judicata. An order rejecting the Special Leave Petition
at the threshold without detailed reasons therefore does not
D constitute any declaration of law or a binding precedent. [Vide
The Workmen of Cochin Port Trust Vs. The Board of Trustees
of the Cochin Port Trust & Anr. AIR 1978 SC 1283;
Ahmedabad Manufacturing & Calico Printing Co. Ltd. Vs. The
Workmen & Anr. AIR 1981 SC 960; Indian Oil Corporation
E Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. AIR 1986 SC 1780; Supreme
Court Employees' Welfare Association Vs. Union of India &
Ors. AIR 1990 SC 334; Yogendra Narayan Chowdhury & Ors.
Vs. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 751; Union of India &
Anr. Vs. Sher Singh & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 1796; V.M.
F Sa/gaocar & Bros. (P) Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax
AIR 2000 SC 1623; Saurashtra Oil Mills Assn., Gujrat Vs.
State of Gujrat & Anr. AIR 2002 SC 1130; Union of India &
Ors. Vs. Jaipa/ Singh (2004) 1SCC121; and Y. Satyanarayan
Reddy Vs. Manda/ Revenue Officer, Andhra Pradesh (2009)
G 9 sec 447].
9. In State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar AIR 1995 SC
1991, this Court considered a case wherein against the
judgment and order of the High Court, special leave petition
was not filed but when other matters were disposed of by the
H
FULJIT KAUR v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 329
[DR. 8.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
High Court in terms of its earlier judgment, the Authorities A
approached this Court challenging the correctness of the same.
It was submitted in that case that if the State Authorities had
accepted the earlier judgment and given effect to it, it was not
permissible for the Authority to challenge the subsequent
judgments/orders passed in terms of the earlier judgment which B
had attained finality. This Court repealed the contention
observing that the circumstances for non-filing the appeals in
some other or similar matters or rejection of the SLP against
such Judgment in limine by this Court, in some other similar
matters by itself, would not preclude the State Authorities to c
challenge the other orders for the reason that non-filing of such
SLP and pursuing them may seriously jeopardize the interest
, of the State or public interest.
10. In Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kera/a & Anr.
, AIR 2000 SC 2587, this Court reconsidered the issue and D
some of the above referred judgments and came to the
conclusion that dismissal of special leave petition in limine by
a non-speaking order may not be a bar for further
reconsideration of the case for the reason that this Court might
not have been inclined to exercise its discretion under Article E
136 of the Constitution. The declaration of law will be governed
by Article 141 where the matter has been decided on merit by
a speaking judgment as in that case doctrine of merger would
come into play. This Court laid down the following principles:-
F
"(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an
order passed by a court, tribunal or any other authority
before superior forum and such superior forum modifies,
reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the
· decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision G
by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists,
remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the
eye of law.
(ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the
Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first stage is H
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.
A upto the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an
appeal. The second stage commences if and Vfhen the
leave to appeal is granted and the special leave petition
is converted into an appeal.
(iii) Doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or
B
unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of
jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content
or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid
shall b"e determinative of the applicability of merger. The
superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing,
c modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it.
Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court
may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order
appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction
and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction
D disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The
doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former
and not to the latter.
(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a
E non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it .
does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing
special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place
of the ord_er under challenge. All that it means is that the
Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to
F allow the appeal being filed.
(v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order,
i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the
order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law
contained in the order is a declaration of law by the
G Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the
Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law,
whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded
by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto
and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings
H subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the
FULJIT KAUR v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 331
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, A
this does not amount to saying that the order of the COL•rt,
tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order
of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition
or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order
binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings B
between the parties."
11. The Court came to the conclusion that where the matter
has been decided by a non-speaking order in limine the party
may approach the Court for reconsideration of the case in- C
exceptional circumstances.
12. In view of the above, in the fact-situation of the case in.
D.S. Laungia (supra), question of application of doctrine of
merger did not arise and even by no stretch of imagination it
can be held that this Court has approved the judgment in D.S. D
Laungia (supra), rather a different view is required to be taken
in view of the fact that this Court had expressed doubts about
the correctness of the impugned Judgment by making the
following observations :-
"In the instant matter as also in the matters enumerated in E
the letter of Mr. G.K. Bansal, Advocate for the petitioners
dated January 25, 1994, seeking withdrawal of all these
matters, we are constrained to remark that no reasons
have been assigned as to why the State of Punjab is
submitting to the impugned orders of the High Court which f
prima facie appear to us to be unsustainable. The direct
result of the withdrawal would not only be compounding to
an illegality but would otherwise cause tremendous loss to
the State exchequer. We, therefore, direct that the reasons
which impelled the State to seek withdrawal of these G
matters be placed before us in the form of an affidavit 'by
the Chief Secretary, Punjab or the Secretary of the
Department concerned justifying the step for seeking
withdrawal." (Emphasis added)
H
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.
A 13. The respondent cannot claim parity with D.S. Laungia
(supra) in view of the settled legal proposition that Article 14
of the! Constitution of India does not envisage for negative
equality. Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud.
Article 14 of the Constitution has a positive concept. Equality
B is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore,
·cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner.
If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of
an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has
been passed by a Judicial Forum, others cannot invoke the
c jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or
multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing wrong
order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party
does riot entitle any other party to claim the benefits on the
basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise Art.14 cannot be
stretched too far otherwise it would make function of the
0
administration impossible. [vide Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd.
Vs. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1984 SC 1772; Panchi Devi
Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2009) 2 SCC 589; and Shanti
Spo1ts Club & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (2009) 15 SCC
E 705].
14. Thus, even if some other similarly situated persons
have been granted some benefit inadvertently or by mistake,
such order does not confer any legal right on the petitioner to
get the same relief. (Vide Chandigarh Administration & Anr
F Vs. Jagjit Singh & Anr., AIR 1995 SC 705; Smt Sneh Prabha
Vs. State of UP. & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 540; Jalandhar
Improvement Trust Vs. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1347;
State of Bihar & Ors. Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh & Anr.,
AIR 2000 SC 2306; Union of India & Ors. Vs. Rakesh Kumar,
G AIR 2001 SC 1877; Yogesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. Government
of NCT Delhi & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 1241; Union of India &
Anr. Vs. International Trading Company & Anr., AIR 2003 SC
3983; M/s Anand Button Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR
2005 SC 565; K.K. Bhalla Vs. State of MP. & Ors., AIR 2006
H
FULJIT KAUR v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 333
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
SC 898; and Maharaj Krishan Bhatt & Anr. Vs. State of A
Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 24).
15. In view of the above, the submissions made by Shri
Hansaria, Amicus Curiae in this regard are preposterous and
not worth consideration. B
16. In the instant case, tbe High Court has taken into
consideration all statutory provisions and calculations made by
the respondents as under what circumstances the "tentative-
price" had been fixed and reached the conclusion that the
demand was justified. The Court also rejected the submissions C
made on behalf of the allottees that judgment in D.S. Laungia
1
(supra) was an authority on the issue.
17. Rules 2(aa), 2(e), 4 and 5 of the Rules which have ·
direct bearing on the questions raised in this appeal read as o
under:
"2(aa)- 'Additional Price' means such sum of money as
may be determined by the State Government, in respect
of the sale of a site by allotment, having regard to the
amount of compensation by which the compensation E
awarded by the Collector for the land acquired by the
State Government of which the site sold forms a part, is
enhanced by the Court on a reference made under
Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the
amount of cost incurred by the State Government in F
respect of such reference.
2(e)- 'tentative price' means such sum of money as may
be determined by the State Government from time to time,
in respect of the sale of a site by allotment, having regard G
among other matters, to the amount of compensation
awarded by the Collector under Land Acquisition Act,.
1894 for the land acquired by the State Govetnrnent of
which the site sold forms a part.
H
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.
A 4. Sale Price:- In the case of sale of a site by allotment
the sale price shall be:
(a) where such site forms part of the land acquired by the
State Government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894;
and
B
(i) no reference under Section 18 thereof is made against
the award of the Collector of such reference having been
made has failed, the tentative price.
c (ii) On a reference made under Section 18 thereof the
compensation awarded by the Collector is enhanced by
the Court. The aggregate of the tentative price and the
additional price;
(b) in any other case, such. final price as may be
D
determined by the State Government from time to time.
· (2) In case of sale of site by auction the sale price shall
be such reserve price as may be recommended by the
State Government from time to time or any higher price
E determined as a result of bidding in an open auction. ·
5-A: Liability to pay additional price.
(1) In the case of sale of site by allotment the transferee
shall be liable to pay to the State Government in addition
F to the tentative price, the additional price, if any determined
in respect thereto under these rules.
(2) The additional price shall be payable by the transferee
within a period ofthirty days ofthe date of demand made
G in this behalf by the Estate Officer.
Provided that the Chief Administrator may in a
particular case, and for reasons to be recorded in writing
allow the applicant to make payment of the said amount
within a further period not exceeding thirty days."
H
FULJIT KAUR v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 335
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
18. A perusal of the above quoted rules shows that the A
"tentative price" means the price determined by the State
Government from time to time in respect of a sale of site by
allotment and while doing so, the Government has to take into
consideration various factors including the amount paid as
compensation. B
19. The phrase 'additional price' has been defined as the
price determined by the State Government having regard to the
enhanced compensation payable to the land owners in
pursuance of the award passed by the court on a reference C
made under Section 18 or further appeal under the Act 1894.
The sale price is the price payable in respect of an allotment
of site. If the site sold by the competent authority forms part of
the land acquired by the State Government under the Act 1894
and no reference under Section 18 thereof is made against the
award of the Collector or such reference having been made D
has failed, the sale price is the tentative pfice as defined in Rule
2(e) of the Rules but if the compensation awarded by the
Collector is enhanced by the court on a reference made under
Section 18 of the Act 1894, then the sale price means the
aggregate of the tentative price and the additional price. If the E
site allotted by .the competent authority does not form part of
the land acquired by the State Government under the Act 1894,
then the sale price would mean such final price as may be
determined by the State Government. However, there is nothing
in the scheme of the Act 1964 and the rules from which it can F
be inferred that tentative price is synonymous with the
provisional price, and that a person, to whom the plot has been
allotted on provisional price, cannot be asked to pay the
tentative price determined by the government. There is a
difference between the "provisional price" and the "tentative G
price" and it may take a long time for the State to determine
the tentative price.
20. In the instant case, the calculations had bee1' furnished
by the respondents as on what basis tentative price had been H
determined.
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.
A A. Cost of land
1. Cost of land per acre of Sector Rs.90,000/-
70 SAS Nagar
2. Solatium charges @30% Rs.27,000/-
B
3. Interest charges from the Rs.43,000/-
date of Notification till th!3
date of Award @12% from
1980 to 1984 for 4 Years
c 4. Interest charges 15% from 1984 to
1990 for 6 years on the cost of land Rs.1,44, 180/-
Rs.3,04,380/-
D
B. Cost of Internal and External Development
1. Water Supply @ Rs.1.35 lacs. Rs.1,35,000/- ·
2. Sewerage @ Rs.59,000/- Rs. 59,000/-
E
3. Sterm Water @iRs.1,32,000/- Rs. 1,32,000/-
4. Roads @ Rs.55,000/- per acre Rs. 55,000/-
5. Bridges & Others @Rs.11,000/- per acre Rs. t1 ,000/-
F
6. Horticulture @ Rs.36,000/- per acre Rs. 36,000/-
7. Street lightening @Rs.15,000/-per acre Rs. 15,000/-
8. Electrification @Rs.15,000/-per acre Rs. 15,000/-
G
9. Conservancy charges @Rs.9,000/-per acre Rs. 9,000/-
10. Utility servi~es @Rs.20,000/-per acre
.. Rs. 20,000/-
11. Maintenance & Re-surfacing of roads
H for 5 years @ Rs.63,000/- per acre Rs. 63,000/-
FULJIT KAUR v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 337
. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
12. Maintenance of Public Health service A
@ Rs.39,000/- per acre Rs. 39,000/-
13. Maintenance & Re-surfacing of roads
·Beyond 5 years @RsA5,000/- per acre Rs. 45,000/-
14. Division of H.T. Line@ Rs.7,000/- per acre. Rs. 7,000/- B
15. Earth Filling @Rs.10,000/- per acre Rs. 10,000/-
Rs.6,51,000/- .
c. (i) Establishment charges@14% + 3% c
on the cost of land. Rs. 51,745/-
(ii) Interest charges @1% for plotable
area(55%) Rs. 2,662/-
(iii) Interest charges for 3 years @10%
each Year on development charges Rs.1,51,200/- D
(iv) Unforeseen charges as well as escalation
Charges @10% Rs.1,16,098/-
Total expenditure per acre Rs.12, 77,064/-
Total Expenditure of 306.59 acres of land E
Acquired for Sector 70 SAS Nagar Rs.39, 15,34,824/-
Saleable area 6,74,233 Sq.yds.
Reite per sq.yd. 39,15,34,824 =Rs.580/-
6,74,233 F
21. The plots measuring 100 sq.yds. were to be allotted
at tentative price calculated at subsidized rate of 10% less than
the reserve price while plots measuring 150, 200 and 250
sq.yds. were to be allotted· at tentative price equal to the
reserve price. The plots measuring 300 and 400 sq.yds. area G
are to be allotted at tentative price equal to 1-1/2 times of the
reserve price and plots measuring 500 sq.yds. were to be
anotted at tentative price equal to double the reserve price.
Taking the overall position into account, the Government fixed
the reserve price at Rs.520/- per sq.yd. for calculating the H
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
..
'
[20'10] 7 S.C.R.
A tentative prices, in the above manner, for plots of various sizes.
22. There is nothing on record to show that the tentative
price determined by the State could be unreasonable or
arbitrary and it is not the case of the~allottee that the market
8 value of the land has not been enhanced while deciding the
reference under the Act 1894. While deciding this case, the
High Court placed heavy reliance upon the judgment of this
Court in Preeta Singh (supr,a) wherein after taking note of
various statutory provisions of Act 1964 and Rules 1965,
C particularly, Rule 2(aa) and sale price as determined in Rule
4, this Court came to the following conclusion:
"7. A conjoint reading of the above Rules would clearly
indicate that the allottee is liable to pay a sale price
including the additional price and the cost incurred and also
D the cost of improvement of the sites. It is to be remembered
that the respondent HUDA is only a statutory body for
catering to the housing requirement of the persons eligible
to claim for allotment. They acquire the land, develop it and
construct buildings and allot the buildings or the sites, as
E the case may be. Under these circumstances, the entire
expenditure incurred in connection with the acquisition of
the land and development thereon is required to be borne
by the allottees when the sites or the buildings sold after
the development are offered on the date of the sale in
accordance with the regulations and also conditions of
sale. It is seen that in the notice dated 9-8-1990, the total
area, net area, the payable amount for the gross acreage,
the acreage left for the developmental purpose, balance
recoverable from the plot-holders, plot-table area h~ve
been given for each of the areas and recovery rate also
G
has been mentioned under the said notice. Under these
circumstances, there is no ambiguity left in the calculations.
If, at all, the appellants had got any doubt, they would have
approached the authority and sought for further information.
It is not the case that they had sought the information and
H
FULJIT KAUR v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 339
[DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
the same was withheld. Under these circumstances, we do. A
not find any illegality in the action taken by the respondents ..
The High Court; therefore, was right in refusing to interfer~
with the order."
23. In Bangalore Development Authority Vs. Syndicate 8
Bank (2007) 6 SCC 711, this Court, while considering a similar
issue, laid down large number of principles including the
following : -
"Where the plot/flat/house has been allotted at a tentative
or provisional price, subject to final determination of price C
on completion of the project (that is acquisition
proceedings and development activities), the development
authority will be entitled to revise or increase the price. But
where the allotment is at a fixed price, and a higher price
or extra payments are illegally or unjustifiably demanded D
and collected, the allottee will be entitled to refund of such
excess with such interest, as may be determined with
reference to the facts of the case."
24. In Tamil Nadu Housing Board & Ors. Vs. Sea Shore E
Apartments Owners' Welfare Association (2008) 3 SCC 21,
while deciding the similar issue, this Court held as under :-
"So far as price is concerned, in 1991, when the names
of applicants were registered, it was clarified that the priee
indicated was 'tentative price' and it was subject to 'final F
price' being fixed by the Board. In any case when the
scheme was altered from seven types to fifteen types flats,
it was stated that the amount shown was merely tentative
selling price. The intending purchasers, therefore, were
aware of the fact that the final price was to be fixed by the G
. Board. In fact an agreement to that effect was executed
.·"by all prospective allottees wherein they agreed that they
would pay the amount which would be finally fixed by the
Board ................ In the circumstances, it cannot be said
that the allottees were not aware of the above condition H
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 7 S.C.R.
A and they were compelled to make payment and thus were
treated unfairly or unreasonably by the Board."
25. The instant case is squarely covered by the aforesaid
Judgments of this Court and particularly, Preeta Singh (supra)
B and in view thereof, the appeal is liable to be disr;nissed.
26. Before parting with the case, it may be pertinent to
mention here that the allotment had been made to the appellant
within 48 hours of submission of her application though in
ordinary cases, it takes about a year. Appellant had further been
C favoured to pay the aforesaid provisional price of Rs. 93,000/
- in four installments in two years, as is evident from the letter
dated 8.4.1987. Making the allotment in such a hasty manner
itself is arbitrary and unreasonable and is hit by Article 14 of
the Constitution. This Court has consistently held that "when a
D thing is done in a post-haste manner, ma/afide would be
presumed." Anything done in undue haste can also be termed
as "arbitrary and cannot be condoned in law." [vide Dr. S. P.
Kapoor Vs. State of Himacha/ Pradesh & Ors. AIR 1981 SC
2181; Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shi/pa Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs.
E Devendra Kumar Jain & Ors. (1995) 1 SCC 638; Bahadursinh
Lakhubhai Gohil Vs. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia & Ors. AIR 2004
SC 1159; and Zenit Matap/ast P. LTd. Vs. State of
Maharashtra & Ors. (2009)10 SCC 388].
Thus, such an allotment in favour of the appellant is liable
F to be declared to have been made in arbitrary and
unreasonable manner. However, we are not inclined to take
such drastic steps as the appellant has developed the land
subsequent to allotment.
G 27. We further find no force in s4bmission made by Sh.
Vijay Hansaria, Sr. Advocate, that in spite of making
recalculation in view of the directions issued by the High Court
in the case ofD.S. Laungia (supra), State could not make any
recovery from Sh. Laungia. This Court, vide order dated
H
FULJIT KAUR v. STATE OF. PUNJAB & ORS. 341
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
20.05.2010, ~sk~ the respondents to explain this aspect and A
file an affidavit olthe AdministratGI' of the Authority. In response
th~reto, an Affidavit had been filed by the Chief Administrator,
Great~r Mohall Development Authority, explaining the entire
position in respect of the allotment and recovery of dues
furnishing all details and according to this Affidavit, the money B
is being recovered from all defaulters including Shri D.S.
Laungia along with interest.
28. In view of the above, we find.no force in the appeal, it
lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to C
costs.
R.P. Appeal dismissed.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "Punjab Urban Estate (Sale of Sites) Rules"Sign in to search