FRANK VITUSversusNARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU & ORS.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 479
- Decided
- 8 July 2024
- Bench
- ABHAY S OKA
Holding
The Supreme Court held that both the condition of dropping a Google Maps PIN and the requirement of an embassy certificate exceed the permissible scope of bail conditions and violate the accused’s right to privacy, and therefore must be deleted.
Summary
Frank Vitus, a Nigerian national, was charged under Sections 8, 22, 23 and 29 of the NDPS Act. The Special Judge granted him bail but imposed two conditions: a certificate of assurance from the High Commission of Nigeria that he would not leave India and a requirement to drop a PIN on Google Maps to disclose his location to investigators. The appellant challenged these conditions as violative of his right to privacy and as beyond the permissible scope of bail conditions. The Supreme Court examined the statutory framework of the NDPS Act, Section 437(3) of the CrPC and the concept of "interest of justice", and considered technical evidence from Google LLC showing that a PIN does not enable real‑time tracking. The Court held that both conditions were unnecessary, infringed Article 21, and therefore ordered them deleted, leaving the bail order intact and listing the case for final orders.
Issues considered
- Whether a bail condition requiring the accused to drop a PIN on Google Maps violates the right to privacy under Article 21 and is permissible under Section 437(3) CrPC.
- Whether the requirement of a certificate of assurance from the foreigner's embassy/high commission is a mandatory condition for bail of a foreign national under the NDPS Act.
- Whether the court may dispense with an embassy certificate condition if the embassy fails to issue it within a reasonable time.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 437(3), s. 438(2)(iv), s. 439, s. 441
- Constitution of Indias. Article 21
- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985s. 22, s. 23, s. 29, s. 37, s. 52, s. 8
Subjects
Judgment
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 97 : 2024 INSC 479
Frank Vitus
v.
Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2814-2815 of 2024)
08 July 2024
[Abhay S. Oka* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
The appellant was ordered to be enlarged on bail subject to various
terms and conditions incorporated in the said order. The petitioner
is aggrieved by the two conditions imposed while granting bail.
The two conditions are as follows: (i) A certificate of assurance
from the High Commission of Nigeria is to be placed on record
that the applicants/accused shall not leave the country and shall
appear before the Special Judge as and when required; (ii) Accuse
shall drop a PIN on the google map to ensure that their location
is available to the Investigation Officer of the case.
Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Art. 21 – Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 –
Terms and conditions in a bail – A condition of dropping pin
on Google Map:
Held: In an affidavit, Google LLC stated that the user has full control
over sharing PINs with other users – It does not impinge on the
user’s privacy, as the user retains full control – Most importantly,
it is stated that the PIN location does not enable real-time tracking
of the user or the user’s device – Therefore, the condition of the
accused dropping a pin on Google Maps, as it stands, is completely
redundant as the same does not help the first respondent-Narcotics
Control Bureau (NCB) – Imposing any bail condition which enables
the Police/Investigation Agency to track every movement of the
accused released on bail by using any technology or otherwise
would undoubtedly violate the right to privacy guaranteed under
Article 21 – In the instant case, the condition of dropping a PIN on
Google Maps has been incorporated without even considering the
technical effect of dropping a PIN and the relevance of the said
condition as a condition of bail – This cannot be a condition of
* Author
98 [2024] 7 S.C.R.
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bail – Accordingly, the condition is ordered to be deleted. [Paras
10.1, 10.2]
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 –
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Terms and conditions in
a bail – A condition of furnishing certificate of the Embassy:
Held: It is not necessary that in every case where bail is granted
to an accused in an NDPS case who is a foreign national on the
ground of long incarceration of more than 50% of the minimum
sentence, the condition of obtaining a ‘certificate of assurance’
from the Embassy/High Commission should be incorporated – It
will depend on the facts of each case – Even if such a condition
is incorporated, on an application made by the accused, the
concerned Embassy/High Commission declines or fails to issue
the certificate within a reasonable time, say within a period of
seven days, the Court always has the power to dispense with
the said condition – Grant of such a certificate by the Embassy/
High Commission is beyond the control of the accused to whom
bail is granted – Therefore, when the Embassy/High Commission
does not grant such a certificate within a reasonable time, as
explained above, the accused, who is otherwise held entitled to
bail, cannot be denied bail on the ground that such a condition,
which is impossible for the accused to comply with, has not been
complied with – Hence, the Court will have to delete the condition –
Instead of the condition of obtaining such a certificate, the condition
of surrendering the passport and regularly reporting to the local
police station/Trial Court can always be imposed, depending upon
the facts of each case – Accordingly, in the instant case, the said
condition of furnishing certificate of the Embassy is ordered to be
deleted. [Paras 11.1, 12]
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – s.37
and s.52 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.437(3) –
Application of CrPC to the arrests made under NDPS:
Held: Under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, the Court’s power to
grant bail is constrained by Sub-section 1(b)(ii) – However, once
a case is made out for a grant of bail in accordance with Section
37, the conditions of bail will have to be in terms of Section 437(3)
of the CrPC – The reason is that because of Section 52 of the
NDPS Act, the provisions of the CrPC apply to the arrests made
under the NDPS Act insofar as they are not inconsistent with the
NDPS Act. [Para 4.1]
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 99
Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.437(3) – Meaning of the
words “interest of justice”:
Held: A broader meaning cannot be assigned to the words “interest
of justice” in Section 437(3) of CrPC – By borrowing the language
used by the Supreme Court in its earlier decisions, it is clear that
the bail conditions cannot be fanciful, arbitrary or freakish – The
object of imposing conditions of bail is to ensure that the accused
does not interfere or obstruct the investigation in any manner,
remains available for the investigation, does not tamper with or
destroy evidence, does not commit any offence, remains regularly
present before the Trial Court, and does not create obstacles in the
expeditious conclusion of the trial – The conditions incorporated in
the order granting bail must be within the four corners of Section
437(3) – The bail conditions must be consistent with the object
of imposing conditions – While imposing bail conditions, the
Constitutional rights of an accused, who is ordered to be released
on bail, can be curtailed only to the minimum extent required –
Even an accused convicted by a competent Court and undergoing
a sentence in prison is not deprived of all his rights guaranteed
by Article 21 of the Constitution. [Para 7]
Case Law Cited
Kunal Kumar Tiwari v. State of Bihar (2018) 16 SCC 74; Munish
Bhasin v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2009] 2 SCR 806 : (2009) 4 SCC
45; State of A.P. v. Challa Ramkrishna Reddy [2000] 3 SCR 644 :
(2000) 5 SCC 712 – relied on.
Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Representing Undertrial
Prisoners v. Union of India & Ors. [1994] Supp. 4 SCR 386 :
(1994) 6 SCC 731; Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu [2020] 12
SCR 583 : (2021) 4 SCC 1 – referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
Act, 1985; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords
Bail; Terms and conditions in a bail; Section 437(3) of Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 37 of Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 52 of Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Meaning of the
100 [2024] 7 S.C.R.
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words “interest of justice” in section 437(3) of Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973; A condition of dropping pin on Google Map in a
bail; A condition of furnishing certificate of the Embassy in a bail;
Article 21 in the Constitution of India; Right to privacy.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.
2814-2815 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 31.05.2022 and 18.08.2022 of
the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in BA No. 4187 of 2020
Appearances for Parties
Varun Mishra, Adv. for the Appellant.
Vinay Navare, Sr. Adv., Amicus Curiae.
Vikramjit Banerjee, A.S.G., Venkata Raghu Vamsy Dasika, Upendra
Mishra, Rahul G Tanwani, Prasenjeet Mohapatra, Arvind Kumar
Sharma, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Prashant Rawat, Advitiya Awasthi,
Annirudh Sharma-ii, Ashok Panigrahi, Raj Bahadur Yadav, Abhishek
Singh, M/S. Trilegal Advocates On Record, Lzafeer Ahmad B. F.,
Anuj Berry, Ms. Anusha Ramesh, Ms. Karishma Sundara, Aparajita
Sen, Ms. Muskan Wadhwa, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Order
Abhay S. Oka, J.
1. Leave granted.
FACTUAL ASPECTS
2. The appellant is being prosecuted for the offences punishable under
Sections 8, 22, 23, and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 (short ‘NDPS Act’). The appellant was arrested
on 21st May 2014. By the first impugned order dated 31st May 2022,
the appellant was ordered to be enlarged on bail subject to various
terms and conditions incorporated in the said order. The terms and
conditions incorporated were in terms of the directions issued by
this Court in paragraph no.15 of its decision in the case of Supreme
Court Legal Aid Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners v.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 101
Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors.
Union of India & Ors.1. The appellant was ordered to be enlarged
on bail on his furnishing a bail bond in the sum of Rs.1,00,000/- with
two sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned
Special Judge under the NDPS.
3. The grievances in this appeal have been summed up in the order
dated 21st July 2023 passed by this Court, which reads thus:
“The petitioner is aggrieved by the following condition
imposed while granting bail:
“.. the learned Special Judge, NDPS seized of the
trial in SC No.27/14 shall ensure that the certificate
of assurance from the High Commission of Nigeria
is placed on record that the applicants/accused shall
not leave the country and shall appear before the
learned Special Judge as and when required, in as
much as, the complaint filed by the Narcotics Control
Bureau under Sections 8/22/23/29 of the NDPS Act,
1985 indicates that the appellants are residents of
Nigeria..”
In the case of Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee
vs. vs Union Of India [ (1994) 6 SCC 731] Clause (iv)
reads as under:
“(iv)in the case of undertrial accused who are
foreigners, the Special Judge shall, besides
impounding their passports, insist on a certificate of
assurance from the Embassy/High Commission of
the country to which the foreigner-accused belongs,
that the said accused shall not leave the country and
shall appear before the Special Court as and when
required;”
Prima facie, we are of the view that none of the Embassies/
High Commissions may be able to give assurances as
mentioned in Clause (iv). The question is whether we need
to refer this case to a larger Bench for re-consideration
of Clause (iv).
1 [1994] Supp. 4 SCR 386 : (1994) 6 SCC 731
102 [2024] 7 S.C.R.
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Another condition imposed by the High Court reads thus:
“… they shall drop a PIN on the google map to ensure
that their location is available to the Investigation
Officer of the case;...”
The question is whether this condition will offend rights of
the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
We request Mr. Vinay Navare, learned Senior Advocate
to assist us as amicus curiae on both the issues. Registry
to provide a complete set of paper book to the learned
Senior Counsel as well as a copy of this order.
List on 14.08.2023.”
3.1 We have heard Shri Vinay Navare, the learned senior counsel
appointed as Amicus Curiae, Shri Varun Mishra, the learned
counsel appearing for the appellant and Shri Vikramjeet
Banerjee, the learned Additional Solicitor General of India for
the first respondent-Narcotics Control Bureau.
CONDITIONS OF BAIL
4. Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (for short, ‘the
CrPC’) deals with the power of a Court of Sessions or a High Court
to grant bail in non-bailable offences. We are reproducing Section
439 for ready reference:
“439. Special powers of High Court or Court of Session
regarding bail.—(1) A High Court or Court of Session
may direct—
(a) that any person accused of an offence and in
custody be released on bail, and if the offence is of the
nature specified in sub-section (3) of Section 437, may
impose any condition which it considers necessary
for the purposes mentioned in that sub-section;
(b) that any condition imposed by a Magistrate when
releasing any person on bail be set aside or modified:
Provided that the High Court or the Court of Session
shall, before granting bail to a person who is accused
of an offence which is triable exclusively by the Court of
Session or which, though not so triable, is punishable
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 103
Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors.
with imprisonment for life, give notice of the application
for bail to the Public Prosecutor unless it is, for reasons to
be recorded in writing, of opinion that it is not practicable
to give such notice:
[Provided further that the High Court or the Court of Session
shall, before granting bail to a person who is accused of
an offence triable under sub-section (3) of Section 376
or Section 376-AB or Section 376-DA or Section 376-DB
of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), give notice of the
application for bail to the Public Prosecutor within a period
of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice of
such application.]
[(1-A) The presence of the informant or any person
authorised by him shall be obligatory at the time of hearing
of the application for bail to the person under sub-section
(3) of Section 376 or Section 376-AB or Section 376-DA
or Section 376-DB of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)].
(2) A High Court or Court of Session may direct that any
person who has been released on bail under this Chapter
be arrested and commit him to custody.”
Section 437(3) reads thus:
“437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable
offence.—
(1) …………………………………………………
(2)…………………………………………………
(3) When a person accused or suspected of the commission
of an offence punishable with imprisonment which may
extend to seven years or more or of an offence under
Chapter VI, Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860) or abetment of, or conspiracy
or attempt to commit, any such offence, is released on
bail under sub-section (1), the [Court shall impose the
conditions,—
(a) that such person shall attend in accordance with the
conditions of the bond executed under this Chapter,
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(b) that such person shall not commit an offence similar
to the offence of which he is accused, or suspected,
of the commission of which he is suspected, and
(c) that such person shall not directly or indirectly
make any inducement, threat or promise to any person
acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade
him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any
police officer or tamper with the evidence,
and may also impose, in the interests of justice, such
other conditions as it considers necessary.]
(4) …………………………………………”
4.1 In this case, we are concerned with the offences under the
NDPS Act which are punishable with imprisonment of seven
years or more. The provision relating to bail is contained in
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which reads thus:
“37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable.—
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be
cognizable;
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for
[offences under Section 19 or Section 24 or Section
27-A and also for offences involving commercial
quantity] shall be released on bail or on his own
bond unless—
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity
to oppose the application for such release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty
of such offence and that he is not likely to commit
any offence while on bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in
clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the
limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 105
Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors.
1973 (2 of 1974), or any other law for the time being
in force on granting of bail]”
Under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, the Court’s power to grant bail is
constrained by Sub-section 1(b)(ii). However, once a case is made
out for a grant of bail in accordance with Section 37, the conditions
of bail will have to be in terms of Section 437(3) of the CrPC. The
reason is that because of Section 52 of the NDPS Act, the provisions
of the CrPC apply to the arrests made under the NDPS Act insofar
as they are not inconsistent with the NDPS Act.
5. Apart from conditions (a) to (c) in Section 437(3) of the CrPC, there
is a power to impose additional conditions “in the interest of justice”.
The scope of the concept of “interest of justice” in Section 437(3) of
the CrPC has been considered by this Court in the case of Kunal
Kumar Tiwari v. State of Bihar2. In paragraph 9, this Court held thus:
“9. There is no dispute that clause (c) of Section 437(3)
allows courts to impose such conditions in the interest
of justice. We are aware that palpably such wordings
are capable of accepting broader meaning. But such
conditions cannot be arbitrary, fanciful or extend
beyond the ends of the provision. The phrase “interest
of justice” as used under the clause (c) of Section
437(3) means “good administration of justice” or
“advancing the trial process” and inclusion of broader
meaning should be shunned because of purposive
interpretation.”
(emphasis added)
6. In view of Section 438(2)(iv) of the CrPC, while granting anticipatory
bail, the Court is empowered to impose the conditions as provided
in Section 437(3) of the Cr. PC. While dealing with the condition
which can be imposed while granting anticipatory bail, this Court,
in the case of Munish Bhasin v. State (NCT of Delhi)3, held thus:
“10. It is well settled that while exercising discretion
to release an accused under Section 438 of the Code
2 (2018) 16 SCC 74
3 [2009] 2 SCR 806 : (2009) 4 SCC 45
106 [2024] 7 S.C.R.
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neither the High Court nor the Sessions Court would
be justified in imposing freakish conditions. There is no
manner of doubt that the court having regard to the facts
and circumstances of the case can impose necessary, just
and efficacious conditions while enlarging an accused on
bail under Section 438 of the Code. However, the accused
cannot be subjected to any irrelevant condition at all.”
(emphasis added)
7. A broader meaning cannot be assigned to the words “interest of
justice” in Section 437(3) of Cr. PC. By borrowing the language
used by this Court in the above decisions, we can say that the bail
conditions cannot be fanciful, arbitrary or freakish. The object of
imposing conditions of bail is to ensure that the accused does not
interfere or obstruct the investigation in any manner, remains available
for the investigation, does not tamper with or destroy evidence, does
not commit any offence, remains regularly present before the Trial
Court, and does not create obstacles in the expeditious conclusion
of the trial. The Courts have imposed a condition that the accused
should cooperate with the investigation when bail is granted before
filing the final report or chargesheet. Cooperating with the investigation
does not mean that the accused must confess. The conditions
incorporated in the order granting bail must be within the four corners
of Section 437(3). The bail conditions must be consistent with the
object of imposing conditions. While imposing bail conditions, the
Constitutional rights of an accused, who is ordered to be released
on bail, can be curtailed only to the minimum extent required. Even
an accused convicted by a competent Court and undergoing a
sentence in prison is not deprived of all his rights guaranteed by
Article 21 of the Constitution. This Court, in the case of State of
A.P. v. Challa Ramkrishna Reddy,4 reiterated the settled position
by holding as follows:
“22. Right to life is one of the basic human rights. It is
guaranteed to every person by Article 21 of the Constitution
and not even the State has the authority to violate that
right. A prisoner, be he a convict or undertrial or a detenu,
does not cease to be a human being. Even when lodged
4 [2000] 3 SCR 644 : (2000) 5 SCC 712
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 107
Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors.
in the jail, he continues to enjoy all his fundamental
rights including the right to life guaranteed to him
under the Constitution. On being convicted of crime
and deprived of their liberty in accordance with the
procedure established by law, prisoners still retain
the residue of constitutional rights.”
(emphasis added)
7.1. We are dealing with a case of the accused whose guilt is
yet to be established. So long as he is not held guilty, the
presumption of innocence is applicable. He cannot be deprived
of all his rights guaranteed under Article 21. The Courts must
show restraint while imposing bail conditions. Therefore,
while granting bail, the Courts can curtail the freedom of
the accused only to the extent required for imposing the bail
conditions warranted by law. Bail conditions cannot be so
onerous as to frustrate the order of bail itself. For example,
the Court may impose a condition of periodically reporting to
the police station/Court or not travelling abroad without prior
permission. Where circumstances require, the Court may
impose a condition restraining an accused from entering a
particular area to protect the prosecution witnesses or the
victims. But the Court cannot impose a condition on the
accused to keep the Police constantly informed about his
movement from one place to another. The object of the bail
condition cannot be to keep a constant vigil on the movements
of the accused enlarged on bail. The investigating agency
cannot be permitted to continuously peep into the private
life of the accused enlarged on bail, by imposing arbitrary
conditions since that will violate the right of privacy of the
accused, as guaranteed by Article 21. If a constant vigil is
kept on every movement of the accused released on bail by
the use of technology or otherwise, it will infringe the rights of
the accused guaranteed under Article 21, including the right to
privacy. The reason is that the effect of keeping such constant
vigil on the accused by imposing drastic bail conditions will
amount to keeping the accused in some kind of confinement
even after he is released on bail. Such a condition cannot
be a condition of bail.
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8. In view of sub-section (2) of Section 441 of the CrPC, the conditions
imposed by the Court while granting bail always stand incorporated
in the bail bond executed by the accused. Therefore, the accused is
bound by the conditions imposed while granting bail. If the accused,
after being enlarged on bail, commits a breach of bail conditions or
commits any offence, the Courts always have the power to cancel
the bail.
9. A condition cannot be imposed while granting bail which is impossible
for the accused to comply with. If such a condition is imposed, it
will deprive an accused of bail, though he is otherwise entitled to it.
CONDITION OF DROPPING PIN ON GOOGLE MAP
10. Firstly, we will deal with the issue of the condition of dropping a PIN
on Google Maps. The condition imposed on the appellant of dropping
a PIN on Google Map gives an impression that the condition will
enable the first respondent Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) to monitor
the movements of the accused on a real-time basis, which will be
violative of the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. To understand the technical aspects of “dropping
a PIN on Google Map”, we issued a notice to Google LLC, having
its office in the USA. Accordingly, Shri R. Suresh Babu, authorised
signatory of Google LLC, has filed an affidavit. Paragraphs 5 to 10
of his affidavit read thus:
“5. Google Maps is a web and app-based service that
enables users to search for and navigate to local places.
It inter alia offers real-time traffic conditions, and route
planning for travelling by foot, car, bike, air, and public
transportation. Google Maps can be accessed through the
Google Maps application available on mobiles or through
a web browser at www.google.com/maps.
6. One of the features available to users on Google
Maps is the ability of users to drop a ‘PIN’ on a
location of their choosing on the map. Dropping a
PIN, allows the user to mark or identify a location on
the map without necessarily requiring access to the
user’s location data. Users may drop a PIN either on
the mobile application or on the web browser. To drop a
PIN, a user may either:
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 109
Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors.
a. press and hold the desired location where the
PIN is to be dropped on the map on the mobile
application; or
b. click on the desired location on the map on a
web browser.
7. Upon dropping the PIN, the user dropping the PIN can
identify the specific coordinates of the location on the map.
Through the Google Maps app or through a web browser,
the user dropping the PIN may opt to get directions to the
location, mark the location with a label, add a business
address to the location, or share the location with another
user.
8. The PIN identifies and marks a specific location of the
user’s choosing on Google Maps. The PIN need not be
dropped at the location where the user/the user’s device
is located at the time of sharing the PIN. The PIN dropped
and shared need not be the real-time location of the user
sharing the PIN.
9. Google Maps allows users to share information, such
as the PIN, with third parties. This is explained in Google’s
privacy policy, which is available at https:policies.google.
com/privacy?hI=en-US, and shares as follows: “Many of
our services let you share information with other people,
and you have control over how you share [emphasis
supplied]”. Users consent to the privacy policy when they
create a Google Account. In this case, if a user wants to
share a PIN, they can do so by clicking on the ‘share’
button. This generates a link to Google Maps that the
user can share with others through messaging platforms
or other modes of online communication. When clicked,
the link directs users (having access to the link) to the
location where the PIN was dropped on the map.
10. The Google Maps PIN feature, which includes the
creation of a PIN or the sharing of such a PIN with another
user, does not impinge on the user’s privacy as the user
has full control over sharing of such information. The
user with access to the link can only access the static
110 [2024] 7 S.C.R.
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location pinned and shared on Google Maps. The pinned
location does not enable real-time tracking of the user
or their device. Even if the PIN were to coincide with a
user’s location at a given time, this would (a) be the static
location pinned by the user; and (b) only be accessible to
others when a user affirmatively shares the PIN with them
by clicking on the share button.”
(emphasis added)
10.1. In paragraph 10 of the affidavit, Google LLC stated that the user
has full control over sharing PINs with other users. Moreover,
it does not impinge on the user’s privacy, as the user retains
full control. Most importantly, it is stated that the PIN location
does not enable real-time tracking of the user or the user’s
device. Therefore, the condition of the accused dropping a pin
on Google Maps, as it stands, is completely redundant as the
same does not help the first respondent.
10.2. Imposing any bail condition which enables the Police/
Investigation Agency to track every movement of the accused
released on bail by using any technology or otherwise would
undoubtedly violate the right to privacy guaranteed under
Article 21. In this case, the condition of dropping a PIN on
Google Maps has been incorporated without even considering
the technical effect of dropping a PIN and the relevance of
the said condition as a condition of bail. This cannot be a
condition of bail. The condition deserves to be deleted and
ordered accordingly. In some cases, this Court may have
imposed a similar condition. But in those cases, this Court was
not called upon to decide the issue of the effect and legality
of such a condition.
THE CONDITION OF FURNISHING CERTIFICATE OF THE
EMBASSY
11. Now, we come to the decision of the Supreme Court Legal Aid
Committee1 relied upon by the High Court. In the first part of
paragraph 15, the prayers made in the petition filed before this Court
have been set out. We are quoting the relevant part of paragraph
15, which reads thus:
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 111
Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors.
“15. But the main reason which motivated the Supreme
Court Legal Aid Society to file this petition under
Article 32 of the Constitution was the delay in the
disposal of cases under the Act involving foreigners.
The reliefs claimed included a direction to treat further
detention of foreigners, who were languishing in jails
as undertrials under the Act for a period exceeding two
years, as void or in any case they be released on bail
and it was further submitted by counsel that their cases
be given priority over others. When the petition came up
for admission it was pointed out to counsel that such an
invidious distinction between similarly situate undertrials
who are citizens of this country and who are foreigners
may not be permissible under the Constitution and even if
priority is accorded to the cases of foreigners it may have
the effect of foreigners being permitted to jump the queue
and slide down cases of citizens even if their cases are
old and pending since long. Counsel immediately realised
that such a distinction if drawn would result in cases of
Indian citizens being further delayed at the behest of
foreigners, a procedure which may not be consistent with
law. He, therefore, rightly sought permission to amend
the cause-title and prayer clauses of the petition which
was permitted. In substance the petitioner now prays that
all undertrials who are in jail for the commission of any
offence or offences under the Act for a period exceeding
two years on account of the delay in the disposal of cases
lodged against them should be forthwith released from jail
declaring their further detention to be illegal and void and
pending decision of this Court on the said larger issue,
they should in any case be released on bail. ………….”
(emphasis added)
In the same paragraph 15, directions have been issued which read
thus:
“We, therefore, direct as under:
(i) Where the undertrial is accused of an
offence(s) under the Act prescribing a
punishment of imprisonment of five years
112 [2024] 7 S.C.R.
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or less and fine, such an undertrial shall
be released on bail if he has been in jail
for a period which is not less than half the
punishment provided for the offence with
which he is charged and where he is charged
with more than one offence, the offence
providing the highest punishment. If the
offence with which he is charged prescribes
the maximum fine, the bail amount shall be
50% of the said amount with two sureties
for like amount. If the maximum fine is not
prescribed bail shall be to the satisfaction
of the Special Judge concerned with two
sureties for like amount.
(ii) Where the undertrial accused is charged
with an offence(s) under the Act providing for
punishment exceeding five years and fine, such
an undertrial shall be released on bail on the
term set out in (i) above provided that his bail
amount shall in no case be less than Rs 50,000
with two sureties for like amount.
(iii) Where the undertrial accused is charged
with an offence(s) under the Act punishable
with minimum imprisonment of ten years and
a minimum fine of Rupees one lakh, such
an undertrial shall be released on bail if he
has been in jail for not less than five years
provided, he furnishes bail in the sum of
Rupees one lakh with two sureties for like
amount.
(iv) Where an undertrial accused is charged for the
commission of an offence punishable under
Sections 31 and 31-A of the Act, such an
undertrial shall not be entitled to be released
on bail by virtue of this order.
The directives in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) above shall
be subject to the following general conditions:
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 113
Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors.
(i) The undertrial accused entitled to be
released on bail shall deposit his passport
with the learned Judge of the Special Court
concerned and if he does not hold a passport,
he shall file an affidavit to that effect in the
form that may be prescribed by the learned
Special Judge. In the latter case the learned
Special Judge will, if he has reason to doubt the
accuracy of the statement, write to the Passport
Officer concerned to verify the statement and
the Passport Officer shall verify his record and
send a reply within three weeks. If he fails to
reply within the said time, the learned Special
Judge will be entitled to act on the statement
of the undertrial accused;
(ii) the undertrial accused shall on being released
on bail present himself at the police station which
has prosecuted him at least once in a month
in the case of those covered under clause (i),
once in a fortnight in the case of those covered
under clause (ii) and once in a week in the case
of those covered by clause (iii), unless leave of
absence is obtained in advance from the Special
Judge concerned;
(iii) the benefit of the direction in clauses (ii) and
(iii) shall not be available to those accused
persons who are, in the opinion of the learned
Special Judge, for reasons to be stated in
writing, likely to tamper with evidence or
influence the prosecution witnesses;
(iv) in the case of undertrial accused who are
foreigners, the Special Judge shall, besides
impounding their passports, insist on a
certificate of assurance from the Embassy/
High Commission of the country to which
the foreigner-accused belongs, that the said
accused shall not leave the country and
shall appear before the Special Court as and
when required;
114 [2024] 7 S.C.R.
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(v) the undertrial accused shall not leave the
area in relation to which the Special Court
is constituted except with the permission of
the learned Special Judge;
(vi) the undertrial accused may furnish bail by
depositing cash equal to the bail amount;
(vii) the Special Judge will be at liberty to cancel
bail if any of the above conditions are
violated or a case for cancellation of bail is
otherwise made out; and
(viii) after the release of the undertrial accused
pursuant to this order, the cases of those
undertrials who have not been released
and are in jail will be accorded priority and
the Special Court will proceed with them as
provided in Section 309 of the Code.”
(emphasis added)
However, paragraph 16 is relevant, which reads thus:
“16. We may state that the above are intended to
operate as one-time directions for cases in which the
accused persons are in jail and their trials are delayed.
They are not intended to interfere with the Special
Court’s power to grant bail under Section 37 of the Act.
The Special Court will be free to exercise that power
keeping in view the complaint of inordinate delay in
the disposal of the pending cases. The Special Court
will, notwithstanding the directions, be free to cancel bail
if the accused is found to be misusing it and grounds for
cancellation of bail exist. Lastly, we grant liberty to apply in
case of any difficulty in the implementation of this order.”
(emphasis added)
11.1. The directions contained in paragraph 15 were to operate
as one-time directions applicable only to the pending cases
of the accused who were in jail on the date of the judgment.
These conditions were required to be incorporated in the order
while releasing an accused on bail as a one-time measure.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 115
Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau & Ors.
Paragraph 16 clarifies that if a bail application is made to the
Special Court with a grievance regarding inordinate delay
in the disposal of pending cases, the Special Court will be
empowered to exercise power to grant bail in light of what is
held in paragraph 15. Therefore, it is not necessary that in every
case where bail is granted to an accused in an NDPS case
who is a foreign national on the ground of long incarceration
of more than 50% of the minimum sentence, the condition of
obtaining a ‘certificate of assurance’ from the Embassy/High
Commission should be incorporated. It will depend on the
facts of each case.
12. Even if such a condition is incorporated, on an application made by
the accused, the concerned Embassy/High Commission declines or
fails to issue the certificate within a reasonable time, say within a
period of seven days, the Court always has the power to dispense
with the said condition. Grant of such a certificate by the Embassy/
High Commission is beyond the control of the accused to whom bail
is granted. Therefore, when the Embassy/High Commission does
not grant such a certificate within a reasonable time, as explained
above, the accused, who is otherwise held entitled to bail, cannot be
denied bail on the ground that such a condition, which is impossible
for the accused to comply with, has not been complied with. Hence,
the Court will have to delete the condition. If the Embassy/High
Commission records reasons for denying the certificate and the
reasons are based on the adverse conduct of the accused based
on material, the Court can always consider the reasons recorded
while considering an application for dispensing with the condition.
However, the Courts must remember that the accused has no right
to compel the Embassy/High Commission to issue such a certificate.
There can be very many reasons for recording adversely which again
cannot be the basis to deny bail already granted. In such a case,
instead of the condition of obtaining such a certificate, the condition
of surrendering the passport and regularly reporting to the local
police station/Trial Court can always be imposed, depending upon
the facts of each case.
13. Coming to the facts of the case, bail has been granted to the appellant
firstly on the ground that the appellant has been implicated based
on statements recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, and that
such statements are entirely inadmissible in view of the decision
116 [2024] 7 S.C.R.
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of this Court in the case of Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu 5.
So, bail has been granted on merits as well. Secondly, the bail has
also been granted relying upon what is held in paragraph 15 of the
decision in the case of Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee 1. As
the bail was granted on merits by relying upon the decision of this
Court in the case of Tofan Singh 2, there was no reason for the High
Court to have imposed all the onerous conditions incorporated in
paragraph 15 of the decision in the case of Supreme Court Legal
Aid Committee 1.
14. Therefore, in view of the above discussion, we are of the view that it is
not necessary to refer the case to a larger Bench for reconsideration
of condition No. (iv) in paragraph 15 of the decision in the case of
Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee1.
15. Based on our findings on the two issues mentioned above, we direct
that the two conditions in the order granting bail to the appellant,
namely, obtaining a certificate from the Embassy/High Commission
and dropping a pin of Google Maps, shall stand deleted.
16. The case shall be listed on 15 July 2024 for passing final orders after
considering the compliances made by the appellant so far.
Result of the case: Listed for final orders.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
5 [2020] 12 SCR 583 : (2021) 4 SCC 1
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