FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIAversusRIMJHIM

                        [2019] 6 S.C.R. 897                             897


                FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA                               A
                                 v.
                             RIMJHIM
                  (Civil Appeal No. 3600 of 2019)
                          APRIL 09, 2019                                B
      [L. NAGESWARA RAO AND M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
      Service Law – Appointment – Appellant invited applications
for the post of Assistant Grade-II (Hindi) by publishing
advertisement – Respondent applied – Short-listed – However, she
                                                                        C
did not receive the final letter of appointment – Writ petition filed
by the respondent – Dismissed – Division Bench allowed the appeal
– Plea of appellant that the respondent was not finally selected as
she did not produce the certificate of one year’s experience of
translation from English to Hindi and vice-versa – Held: In the
advertisement there was no such requirement – What was provided         D
in the advertisement was that a candidate must have one year’s
experience of translation from English to Hindi and vice-versa along
with the other qualifications – Advertisement did not provide that a
candidate shall produce the certificate of experience along with
the application – Division Bench rightly observed that non-
                                                                        E
production of the certificate along with the application cannot be
said to be fatal to the case of the respondent and on that ground
she could not have been denied the appointment, if otherwise found
meritorious – Management at the time of verification of the
documents, did not thought it fit to call upon the respondent to
produce any additional documentary evidence in support of her           F
experience – If the management would have called for such
additional documentary evidence, the respondent would have
produced the certificates, which she subsequently did produce before
the High Court – Appellant has not doubted the certificates dated.
14.01.2015 and 18.07.2016 issued by the erstwhile employer of
                                                                        G
the respondent – Division Bench rightly held, considering the
aforesaid two certificates, that the respondent was having one year’s
experience of translation from English to Hindi and vice-versa and
therefore fulfilled all the requisite essential requirements/
qualifications and therefore was required to be considered for
                                                                        H
                                 897
898            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A     appointment on merits – Appellant to consider the case of the
      respondent for appointment on merits, if all other conditions stand
      satisfied.
            Dismissing the appeal, the Court
             HELD: 1.1 The FCI have not doubted the certificates dated
B     14.01.2015 and 18.07.2016 issued by the erstwhile employer of
      the original writ petitioner. In the advertisement there was no
      requirement to produce the certificate of one year’s experience
      along with the application. What was provided in the
      advertisement is that a candidate must have one year’s experience
C     of translation from English to Hindi and vice-versa along with
      the other qualifications. The advertisement does not provide
      specifically and/or provide that a candidate shall produce the
      certificate of experience along with the application. Therefore,
      the Division Bench of the High Court has rightly observed that
      non-production of one year’s experience certificate along with
D     the application cannot be said to be fatal to the case of the original
      writ petitioner and on that ground the original writ petitioner could
      not have been denied the appointment, if otherwise she is found
      to be meritorious. [Paras 8, 9][905-C-G]
             1.2 At the time of verification of the documents, the original
E     writ petitioner was not informed/told that the relieving-cum-
      experience letter dated 27.08.2014 is not sufficient to establish
      the essential requirement of one year’s experience. The original
      writ petitioner was also not told/informed at the time of verification
      of documents on 18.01.2016 that certificate of one year’s
F     experience is lacking. Clause 33 of the advertisement, which was
      also considered by the Division Bench of the High Court, provides
      that the management reserves the right to call for any additional
      documentary evidence in support of educational qualification &
      experience of the applicant. The management at the time of
      verification of the documents, did not thought it fit to call upon
G     the applicant to produce any additional documentary evidence in
      support of her experience. The management could have called
      for any additional documentary evidence in support of experience
      of the applicant. If the management would have called for the
      additional documentary evidence in support of experience of the
H
           FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA v. RIMJHIM                            899


applicant, in that case, the original writ petitioner would have           A
produced the certificates, which were subsequently produced
before the High Court. The FCI has not doubted the certificates
dated 14.01.2015 and 18.07.2016 issued by the erstwhile employer
of the original writ petitioner. Therefore, the Division Bench of
the High Court has rightly observed and held considering the
                                                                           B
aforesaid two certificates that the original writ petitioner was
having one year’s experience of translation from English to Hindi
and vice-versa and therefore fulfilled all the requisite essential
requirements/qualifications and therefore she was required to
be considered for appointment on merits. [Paras 10 and
10.1][906-B-G]                                                             C
       1.3 The Division Bench has rightly set aside the action of
the FCI in rejecting the case of the original writ petitioner and
rightly directed the FCI to consider the case of the original writ
petitioner for appointment on merits, if all other conditions stand
satisfied. [Para 12][909-D-E]                                              D
        Charles K. Skaria v. Dr. C. Mathew (1980) 2 SCC
        752 : [1980] 3 SCR 71 ; Dolly Chhanda v. Chairman,
        Jee and Others (2005) 9 SCC 779 : [2004] 5 Suppl.
        SCR 79 – referred to.
                           Case Law Reference                              E

        [1980] 3 SCR 71              referred to          Para 11
        [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 79       referred to          Para 11

                                                                           F
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.3600 of
2019.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 03.08.2018 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in LPA No. 383 of 2018.
       N. K. Kaul, Sr. Adv., Ajit Pudussery, K. Vijay Kumar, Ajeet Singh   G
Verma, Chanan Parwani, Ms. Divya Kapur, Ram Ramachandran, Advs.
for the Appellant.
     R. K. Raizada, Sr. Adv., Santosh Kumar, Ms. Ankita Chaudhary,
Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, Advs. for the Respondent.
                                                                           H
900             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            M. R. SHAH, J. 1. Leave granted.
            2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
      and order dated 03.08.2018 passed by the Division Bench of the High
      Court of Delhi at New Delhi in L.P.A. No. 383 of 2018, by which the
B     Division Bench has allowed the said appeal preferred by the respondent
      herein – the original writ petitioner and has quashed and set aside the
      judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High
      Court, dismissing the writ petition preferred by the original writ petitioner
      and consequently quashed and set aside the action of the Food Corporation
C     of India (hereinafter referred to as the ‘FCI’) rejecting the case of the
      original writ petitioner for appointment on the post of Assistant Grade-
      II(Hindi), the original respondent – the appellant herein has preferred
      the present appeal.
            3. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as under:
D            That the appellant herein – the original respondent – FCI invited
      applications for the post of Assistant Grade-II (Hindi) by publishing an
      advertisement on 14.02.2015. The original writ petitioner applied for the
      said post on 16.03.2015. Her application form was accepted and she
      was issued an admitted card for the written test to be conducted by the
E     FCI. The written test was held on 4.10.2015. The original writ petitioner
      was short-listed. She was ranked sixth in the merit list. A call letter was
      issued to her on 31.12.2015. She was asked to report at the Zonal office
      of the FCI and produce her original documents, which were retained by
      the FCI and after verification, the same were returned. However, she
      did not receive the final letter of appointment. The list of selected
F     candidates was published on the website of the FCI on 2.5.2016, in
      which her name did not figure. Therefore, a representation was submitted
      by her on 6.5.2016, which was not considered favourably. Therefore,
      the original writ petitioner approached the High Court by way of a writ
      petition. Before the learned Single Judge, it was the case on behalf of
G     the FCI that the original writ petitioner was not finally selected as she
      did not produce any experience certificate to show that she had one
      year’s experience of translation from English to Hindi and vice-versa.
      It should be noted that before the learned Single Judge, the original writ
      petitioner produced the certificates issued by her erstwhile employer in
      support of her case that she had an experience of translation from English
H     to Hindi and vice-versa.
           FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA v. RIMJHIM                                 901
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       3.1 The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition holding         A
that since the original writ petitioner did not have requisite experience of
one year for translation work from English to Hindi and vice-versa, the
FCI was justified in denying her employment.
       4. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order
passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition, the original   B
writ petitioner preferred Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench
of the High Court. By the impugned judgment and order, the Division
Bench has allowed the appeal preferred by the original writ petitioner
and has quashed and set aside the judgment and order passed by the
learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition and consequently has
set aside the action of the FCI rejecting the case of the original writ         C
petitioner. While passing the impugned judgment and order, the Division
Bench has observed and held that considering the certificates produced
by the original writ petitioner dated 14.01.2015 and 18.07.2016, the original
writ petitioner can be said to have the requisite experience of translation
from English to Hindi and vice-versa, and considering the fact that the         D
original writ petitioner ranked 6th in the merit list, therefore otherwise
was found to be meritorious, the Division Bench of the High Court held
that FCI was not justified in denying the appointment to the original writ
petitioner.
      5. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment          E
and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, the FCI has
preferred the present appeal.
      5.1 Shri N.K. Kaul, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on
behalf of the FCI and Shri R.K. Raizada, learned Senior Advocate has
appeared on behalf of the respondent herein – the original writ petitioner.     F
       5.2 Shri N.K. Kaul, learned senior advocate appearing on behalf
of the appellant – FCI has vehemently submitted that the Division Bench
of the High Court has materially erred in setting aside the action of the
FCI in rejecting the case of the original writ petitioner.
       5.3 It is vehemently submitted by Shri N.K. Kaul, learned Senior         G
Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant – FCI that it is an admitted
position that as per the advertisement, one of the essential requirements
was that the candidate must have one year’s experience of translation
from English to Hindi and vice-versa. It is submitted that therefore a
candidate was required to submit the one year’s experience certificate/
                                                                                H
902             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A     proof of translation from English to Hindi and vice-versa at the time of
      submitting the application. It is submitted that admittedly the original
      writ petitioner did not produce any certificate of her having one year’s
      experience of translation from English to Hindi and vice-versa.
             5.4 It is vehemently submitted by Shri N.K. Kaul, learned Senior
B     Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant – FCI that certificate
      which was produced by the original writ petitioner dated 27.08.2014,
      which was produced along with the application, by no stretch of
      imagination, can be said to be a certificate of one year’s experience of
      translation from English to Hindi and vice-versa, as required. It is
      submitted that what was produced by the original writ petitioner was a
C     relieving-cum-experience letter. It is submitted that therefore the FCI
      was justified in not appointing the original writ petitioner as the original
      writ petitioner did not produce any experience certificate to fulfil the
      eligibility criteria. Relying upon clauses 28, 32, 33, 35 and 37 of the
      advertisement, it is submitted by Shri Kaul, learned Senior Advocate
D     appearing on behalf of the FCI that the FCI was justified in not appointing
      the original writ petitioner.
             5.5 It is further submitted by Shri N.K. Kaul, learned Senior
      Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant – FCI that the Division
      Bench of the High Court has materially erred in considering the
E     certificates produced subsequently, namely, certificates dated 14.01.2015
      and 18.07.2016. It is submitted that as such the experience certificate
      was required to be produced at the time of submitting the application
      and/or at least at the time of verification of documents. It is submitted
      that the certificates dated 14.01.2015 and 18.07.2016 upon which the
      reliance has been placed by the original writ petitioner were neither
F     produced by the original writ petitioner along with the application form
      nor even at the time of verification of the documents. It is submitted
      that therefore the Division Bench of the High Court has materially erred
      in considering those certificates while holding that the original writ
      petitioner was having one year’s experience of translation from English
G     to Hindi and vice-versa, as required as per the advertisement.
             5.6 It is vehemently submitted by Shri N.K. Kaul, learned Senior
      Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant – FCI that if the impugned
      judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is
      accepted, in that case, there shall not be any sanctity of the requirement
H     as per the advertisement. It is submitted that if the candidate is permitted
           FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA v. RIMJHIM                                 903
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

to produce the relevant experience certificate subsequently and that too        A
after the selection process is over, in that case, there shall not be any
sanctity of the relevant clauses of the advertisement and/or the procedure
which is required to be followed as per the advertisement and there shall
not be any end to the selection process.
       5.7 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to allow the present      B
appeal and quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed
by the Division Bench of the High Court.
      6. The present appeal is opposed by Shri R.K. Raizada, learned
Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the original writ petitioner.
       6.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned Counsel appearing          C
on behalf of the original writ petitioner that in the facts and circumstances
of the case and considering the fact that the original writ petitioner was,
in fact, having the requisite experience of translation from English to
Hindi and vice-versa, and considering the fact that on merits even the
original writ petitioner ranked 6th in the merit list, the Division Bench of    D
the High Court has not committed any error in quashing and setting
aside the action of the FCI in rejecting the case of the original writ
petitioner.
       6.2 It is vehemently submitted by the learned Counsel appearing
on behalf of the original writ petitioner that as rightly observed by the       E
Division Bench, at the most, non-production of the requisite experience
certificate can be said to be mere irregular which shall not defeat the
case of a meritorious candidate. It is submitted that as such in the
present case in the advertisement it was not specifically mentioned that
a candidate has to produce the experience certificate along with the
application. It is submitted that the advertisement speaks about the            F
essential eligibility criteria. It is submitted that therefore when in the
advertisement it was not specifically mentioned that a candidate has to
produce the certificate/experience certificate along with the application,
non-production of the experience certificate along with the application
cannot be said to be fatal so as to deny the legitimate right of the original   G
writ petitioner to consider her case for appointment on merits.
       6.3 It is submitted by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of
the original writ petitioner that as such in the counter affidavit filed by
the FCI before the High Court, the FCI did not specifically disputed and/
or doubted the certificates dated 14.01.2015 and 18.07.2016.
                                                                                H
904             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                               [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A            6.4 It is further submitted by the learned Counsel appearing on
      behalf of the original writ petitioner that as rightly observed by the Division
      Bench of the High Court, when the original writ petitioner appeared
      before the authority for verification of the documents, if the FCI would
      have any doubt about the original writ petitioner having not fulfilled any
      eligibility criteria, more particularly one year’s experience, considering
B
      clause 33 of the advertisement, the FCI/authority could have called for
      any additional documentary evidence in support of educational qualification
      and experience of the applicant. It is submitted that therefore in the
      facts and circumstances of the case and after having been satisfied that
      the original writ petitioner was fulfilling all the eligibility criteria including
C     one year’s experience of translation from English to Hindi and vice-
      versa and having found that the original writ petitioner ranked 6th in the
      merit list and therefore otherwise found to be meritorious, the Division
      Bench of the High Court has rightly set aside the action of the FCI in
      rejecting the case of the original writ petitioner.
D           6.5 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the
      present appeal.
             7. We have heard learned Senior Advocates appearing on behalf
      of the respective parties at length.
             7.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that the original writ
E     petitioner was denied the appointment on the post of Assistant Grade-II
      (Hindi) on the ground that the original writ petitioner did not produce the
      certificate of one year’s experience of translation from English to Hindi
      and vice-versa along with the application and/or even at the time of
      verification of documents. According to the FCI, one year’s experience
F     of translation from English to Hindi and vice-versa was essential to
      become a candidate eligible for the post in question. It is required to be
      noted that the aforesaid stand was taken by the FCI for the first time
      before the learned Single Judge in a writ petition filed by the original writ
      petitioner. Therefore, the original writ petitioner produced the certificates
      dated 14.01.2015 and 18.07.2016 issued by her erstwhile employer, in
G     support of her case that she was having one year’s experience of
      translation from English to Hindi and vice-versa.
             8. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition solely
      relying upon and/or considering the document produced by the original
      writ petitioner as relieving-cum-experience letter dated 27.08.2014 and
H
            FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA v. RIMJHIM                                      905
                      [M. R. SHAH, J.]

opined that from the said letter, it cannot be said that the original writ            A
petitioner had one year’s experience of translation from English to Hindi
and vice-versa, which was the essential requirement to become a
candidate eligible. However, the learned Single Judge did not consider
the certificates dated 14.01.2015 and 18.07.2016 issued by the erstwhile
employer of the original writ petitioner. If the aforesaid two certificates
                                                                                      B
are considered, in that case, it can safely be said that the original writ
petitioner was having one year’s experience of translation from English
to Hindi and vice-versa and therefore fulfilled all the essential
requirements/eligibility criteria. As observed hereinabove, and it can be
seen from the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the FCI, filed before
the High Court, the FCI have not doubted the aforesaid two certificates.              C
Their only contention seems to be that as the original writ petitioner did
not produce the certificate of one year’s experience of translation from
English to Hindi and vice-versa either along with the application or even
at the time of verification of documents, the aforesaid certificates cannot
be considered at all and therefore in absence of those certificates and/or
                                                                                      D
any certificate of having one year’s experience in translation from English
to Hindi and vice-versa, which was the essential requirement, the original
writ petitioner cannot be said to have fulfilled the eligibility criteria/essential
requirement of having one year’s experience.
       9. So far as the case on behalf of the FCI that as the original writ
petitioner did not produce the certificate of one year’s experience along             E
with the application is concerned, it is required to be noted that in the
advertisement there was no such requirement. What is provided in the
advertisement is that a candidate must have one year’s experience of
translation from English to Hindi and vice-versa along with the other
qualifications. The advertisement does not provide specifically and/or                F
provide that a candidate shall produce the certificate of experience along
with the application. Therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court
has rightly observed that non-production of one year’s experience
certificate along with the application cannot be said to be fatal to the
case of the original writ petitioner and on that ground the original writ
petitioner could not have been denied the appointment, if otherwise she               G
is found to be meritorious. We are in complete agreement with the view
taken by the Division Bench of the High Court.
      10. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the FCI that the
original writ petitioner did not produce the certificate of one year’s
                                                                                      H
906             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A     experience even at the time of verification of documents and what was
      produced was the relieving-cum-experience letter dated 27.08.2014 along
      with the application and on the basis of which it cannot be said that the
      original writ petitioner was having one year’s experience is concerned,
      it is required to be noted that at the time of verification of the documents,
      the original writ petitioner was not informed/told that the letter dated
B
      27.08.2014 is not sufficient to establish the essential requirement of one
      year’s experience. The original writ petitioner was also not told/informed
      at the time of verification of documents on 18.01.2016 that certificate of
      one year’s experience is lacking.
               10.1 Clause 33 of the advertisement, which is also considered by
C     the Division Bench of the High Court, provides that the management
      reserves the right to call for any additional documentary evidence in
      support of educational qualification & experience of the applicant. As
      found from the record and even as observed by the Division Bench, the
      management at the time of verification of the documents, did not thought
D     it fit to call upon the applicant to produce any additional documentary
      evidence in support of her experience. The management could have
      called for any additional documentary evidence in support of experience
      of the applicant. If the management would have called for the additional
      documentary evidence in support of experience of the applicant, in that
      case, the original writ petitioner would have produced the certificates,
E     which are subsequently produced before the High Court. At the cost of
      the repetition, it is to be noted that the FCI has not doubted the certificates
      dated 14.01.2015 and 18.07.2016 issued by the erstwhile employer of
      the original writ petitioner. Therefore, the Division Bench of the High
      Court has rightly observed and held considering the aforesaid two
F     certificates that the original writ petitioner was having one year’s
      experience of translation from English to Hindi and vice-versa and
      therefore fulfilled all the requisite essential requirements/qualifications
      and therefore she was required to be considered for appointment on
      merits.
G           11. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the FCI that a
      candidate must and/or ought to have produced the experience certificate
      along with the application is concerned, at this stage, a decision of this
      Court in the case of Charles K. Skaria v. Dr. C. Mathew (1980) 2
      SCC 752 and the subsequent decision of this Court in the case of Dolly
      Chhanda v. Chairman, Jee and others (2005) 9 SCC 779 are required
H
           FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA v. RIMJHIM                                 907
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

to be referred to. In the case of Charles K. Skaria (supra), this Court         A
had an occasion to consider the distinction between the essential
requirements and the proof/mode of proof. In the aforesaid case, this
Court had an occasion to consider the distinction between a fact and its
proof. In the aforesaid case before this Court, a candidate/student was
entitled to extra 10% marks for holders of a diploma and the diploma
                                                                                B
must be obtained on or before the last date of the application, not later.
In the aforesaid case, a candidate secured diploma before the final date
of application, but did not produce the evidence of diploma along with
the application. Therefore, he was not allowed extra 10% marks and
therefore denied the admission. Dealing with such a situation, this Court
observed and held that what was essential requirement was that a                C
candidate must have obtained the diploma on or before the last date of
application but not later, and that is the primary requirement and to submit
the proof that the diploma is obtained on or before a particular date as
per the essential requirement is secondary. This Court specifically
observed and held that “what is essential is the possession of a diploma
                                                                                D
before the given date; what is ancillary is the safe mode of proof of the
qualification”. This Court specifically observed and held that “to confuse
between a fact and its proof is blurred perspicacity”. This Court further
observed and held that “to make mandatory the date of acquiring the
additional qualification before the last date for application makes sense.
But if it is unshakeably shown that the qualification has been acquired         E
before the relevant date, to invalidate the merit factor because proof,
though indubitable, was adduced a few days later but before the selection
or in a manner not mentioned in the prospectus, but still above board, is
to make procedure not the handmaid but the mistress and form not as
subservient to substance but as superior to the essence. While observing
                                                                                F
and holding so, in paragraphs 20 & 24, this Court observed and held as
under:
      “20. There is nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in adding 10 marks
      for holders of a diploma. But to earn these extra 10 marks, the
      diploma must be obtained at least on or before the last date for
      application, not later. Proof of having obtained a diploma is different   G
      from the factum of having got it. Has the candidate, in fact, secured
      a diploma before the final date of application for admission to the
      degree course? That is the primary question. It is prudent to
      produce evidence of the diploma along with the application, but
                                                                                H
908      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 6 S.C.R.


A     that is secondary. Relaxation of the date on the first is illegal, not
      so on the second. Academic excellence, through a diploma for
      which extra mark is granted, cannot be denuded because proof is
      produced only later, yet before the date of actual selection. The
      emphasis is on the diploma; the proof thereof subserves the factum
      of possession of the diploma and is not an independent factor.....
B
      Mode of proof is geared to the goal of the qualification in question.
      It is subversive of sound interpretation and realistic decoding of
      the prescription to telescope the two and make both mandatory in
      point of time. What is essential is the possession of a diploma
      before the given date; what is ancillary is the safe mode of proof
C     of the qualification. To confuse between a fact and its proof is
      blurred perspicacity. To make mandatory the date of acquiring
      the additional qualification before the last date for application makes
      sense. But if it is unshakeably shown that the qualification has
      been acquired before the relevant date, as is the case here, to
      invalidate this merit factor because proof, though indubitable, was
D
      adduced a few days later but before the selection or in a manner
      not mentioned in the prospectus, but still above-board, is to make
      procedure not the handmaid but the mistress and form not as
      subservient to substance but as superior to the essence.
      xxx                xxx                xxx
E
      24. It is notorious that this formalistic, ritualistic, approach is
      unrealistic and is unwittingly traumatic, unjust and subversive of
      the purpose of the exercise. This way of viewing problems
      dehumanises the administrative, judicial and even legislative
      processes in the wider perspective of law for man and not man
F     for law. Much of hardship and harassment in administration flows
      from over-emphasis on the external rather than the essential. We
      think the government and the selection committee rightly treated
      as directory (not mandatory) the mode of proving the holding of
      diplomas and as mandatory the actual possession of the diploma.
G     In actual life, we know how exasperatingly dilatory it is to get
      copies of degrees, decrees and deeds, not to speak of other
      authenticated documents like mark-lists from universities, why,
      even bail orders from courts and Government Orders from public
      offices. This frustrating delay was by-passed by the State
      Government in the present case by two steps. Government
H
           FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA v. RIMJHIM                               909
                     [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      informed the selection committee that even if they got proof of         A
      marks only after the last date for applications but before the date
      for selections they could be taken note of and secondly the
      Registrars of the Universities informed officially which of the
      candidates had passed in the diploma course. The selection
      committee did not violate any mandatory rule nor act arbitrarily
                                                                              B
      by accepting and acting upon these steps. Had there been anything
      dubious, shady or unfair about the procedure or any mala fide
      move in the official exercises we would never have tolerated
      deviations. But a prospectus is not scripture and common sense is
      not inimical to interpreting and applying the guide-lines therein.
      Once this position is plain the addition of special marks was basic     C
      justice to proficiency measured by marks.”
      11.1 A similar view is taken by this Court subsequently in the
case of Dolly Chhanda (supra), relying upon the aforesaid decision of
this Court in the case of Charles K. Skaria (supra).
       12. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid two      D
cases to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, we are of the
opinion that the Division Bench has rightly set aside the action of the
FCI in rejecting the case of the original writ petitioner and has rightly
directed the FCI to consider the case of the original writ petitioner for
appointment on merits, if all other conditions stand satisfied.               E
       13. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
present appeal fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is
accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the
case, there shall be no order as to costs.
                                                                              F
Divya Pandey                                              Appeal dismissed.




                                                                              G




                                                                              H