Holding

The Supreme Court held that the Gafar judgment is a binding precedent, res judicata does not apply, and the appeals are dismissed with respondents restrained from recovering the compensation already paid.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined appeals by land owners from the villages of Harthala and Mukkarrabpur who sought enhancement of compensation awarded under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Land Acquisition Officer had fixed modest rates, which were later enhanced by a reference court, but the High Court restored the original awards based on the earlier Supreme Court decision in Gafar v. Moradabad Development Authority. The appellants argued that the Gafar judgment was not binding, that res judicata did not apply, and that procedural irregularities (non‑listing of cases, illness slips, and pending substitution applications) violated natural justice. The Court held that the Gafar decision constitutes a binding precedent under Article 141, that res judicata does not apply here, and that the High Court’s procedure was acceptable. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed and the respondents were restrained from recovering the compensation already paid.

Issues considered

The extent to which the judgment in Gafar v. Moradabad Development Authority binds subsequent appeals under Article 141.
Whether the principle of res judicata applies to the present batch of appeals.
Whether procedural irregularities (non‑listing, illness slips, substitution of legal heirs) violated the right to a fair hearing.
Whether the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer should be enhanced based on the evidence presented.
Whether the respondents can recover the compensation paid pursuant to the reference court’s order.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 133, s. Article 136, s. Article 141
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 17, s. 4, s. 6

Subjects

Land acquisitionCompensationPrecedentArticle 141Res judicataNatural justiceProcedural fairnessValuationReference courtHigh Court

Judgment

[2011] 9 S.C.R. 290
~-~

A FIDA HUSSAIN & ORS.
v.
MORADABAD DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 5448 of 2006)
JULY 19, 2011
B '
[D.K. JAIN AND H.L. DATTU, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894:

c ss. 4 and 11 -Acquisition of land in two villages - Award
by Land Acquisition Officer upheld by High Court and finally
by Supreme Court in Gafar~ case - Appeals by some other
land owners of both the r villages for enhancement of
compensation - HELD: The question of adequacy of
"
D compensation for the lands acquired in these two villages
under the same notifications has been gone into by Supreme
Court in the case of Gafar wherein the Court after meticulously
examining all the legal contentions canvassed by the parties
to the /is, took the view that the evidences relied upon by the
E reference court while enhancing the compensation were not
reliable, and, therefore, the High Court was justified in setting
aside the order passed by the reference court and restoring
the award passed by the LAO - The judgment in Gafar's case
does not require reconsideration - Therefore, it would not be .,
proper for the Court to take a different view, on the ground that -
'

F
what was considered in Gafar's case was on a different fact
situation - Res judicata - Precedent.

Recovery of differential compensation amount from land
owners - Amount of compensation enhanced by reference
G court - High Court restoring the award of Land Acquisition
• .
Officer - Supreme Court upholding the order of High Court -
Plea that the amount paid by way of compensation pursuant
to judgment of reference court be not recovered - HELD: The
land acquisition in question is of two decades old, and it is
H 290
FIDA HUSSAIN & ORS. v. MORADABAD 291
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANR .
....., plausible that the landowners have utilized the compensation A
· amount paid for one purpose or the other - In the peculiar
facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of
justice, it is clarified that the respondents are restrained from
recovering the amounts paid as compensation or enforcing
security offered while withdrawing the compensation amount B
~
pursuant to order passed by the reference court.

Constitution of India, 1950:

Article 141 - Law declared by Supreme Court- Binding
. effect of- Land acquisition - Compensation awarded by Land c
Acquisition Officer upheld by Supreme Court in Gafar's case
- Appeals by other land owners of the same villages whose
lands were acquired under the same notifications whereunder
..,. the land were acquired of claimants in Gafar's case - HELD:
Only the principles of law that emanate from a judgment of D
Supreme Court, which have aided in reaching a conclusion
of the problem, are binding precedents within the meaning of
Article 141 - However, if the question of law before the Court
· is the same as in the previous case, the judgment of the
Court in the former is binding in the latter, for the reason that E
the question of law before the Court is already settled - Thus,
if the Court determines a certain issue for a certain set of facts,
then, that issue stands determined for any other matter on the
same set of facts - Precedent.

" NATURAL JUSTICE."
F

Opportunity of hearing - In some of the appeals before
the High Court, award of Land Acquisition Officer was upheld
- Decision of High Court upheld by Supreme Court in Gafar's
case - Subsequent appeals by other claimants on the G
r grounds that in some cases their counsel were not heard
while in some others applications for substitution of L. Rs. of
deceased appellants were not considered before the High
Court - HELD: On perusal of the appeal paper books of the
instant appeals, it is evident that in some of the appeals the H
I .
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A presence of the counsel before the High Court is recorded -
.....
It is settled position that the Court speaks through its order
and whatever stated therein has to be read as correct -
Therefore, it cannot be said that counsel were not heard in
all the matters against which the appeals are filed - As regards
B applications for substitution, the Court would have remitted the
matter back to the High Court to give an opportunity of hearing
to the legal representatives concerned and decide the
appeals on merits - That, however, would only be a formality
because having regard to the law laid down by the Court in
c Gafar's case, the High Court is be,· ind to follow that decision,
since the notification for acquiring ft, q lands in respect of the
villages are the same.

Notification u/s 4 read with s. 17 of the Land ,.
Acquisition Act, 1894 dated 20.09.1990 was issued in
D respect of the lands of Harthala village. The Land
Acquisition Officer awarded compensation by the award
dated 18.09.1993 assessing the market value of the
acquired lands at Rs. 80 per sq. meter. The reference
court enhanced the compensation by assessing the
E market value of the lands to Rs. 270 per sq. meter. In
respect of lands of village Mukkabpur, pursuant to the
Notification uls 4 published on 20.08.1992, the LAO fixed
the compensation at the rate of Rs.92.59 per sq. meter.
The reference court enhanced the compensation to Rs.
F 350 per sq. meter. The appeals filed by the State having ,,
been allowed by the High Court, the land owners filed the
instant appeals.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
G HELD: 1. In the instant appeals, the challenge is for y
'
the compensation assessed for the lands notified and
acquired under the notifications pertaining to the two
villages. The question of adequacy of compensation for
the lands acquired in these two villages under the same
H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A passed by a Court having no jurisdiction thereof and/or
involving a pure question of law. The principle of res
judicata will, therefore, have no application in the facts of
the instant case. [para 15) [303-F-G)

8 2.2 As regards the plea that the judgment in the case
of Gafar did not operate as a precedent for the present
batch of cases as no point of law was decided, it is now
well settled that a decision of this Court based on specific
facts does not operate as a precedent for future cases.
C Only the principles of law that emanate from a judgment
of Supreme Court, which have aided in reaching a
conclusion of the problem, are binding precedents within
the meaning of Article 141. However, if the question of law
before the Court is the same as in the previous case, the
judgment of the Court in the former is binding in the latter,
D for the reason that the question of law before the Court
-
is already settled. Thus, if the Court determines a certain
issue for a certain set of facts, then, that issue stands
determined for any other matter on the same set of facts.
[para 20) [309-C-E]
E
Shenoy & Co. v. CTO, 1985 ( 3) SCR 659 = (1985) 2
SCC 512,; Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M.R. Apparao,
=
2002 ( 2 ) SCR 661 (2002) 4 SCC 638,; Union of India v.
Krishan Lal Arneja, 2004 (1 ) Suppl. SCR 801 = (2004) 8
F sec 453 - relied on.

3.1 So far as the plea of not affording of an
opportunity of hearing because of non-listing of some
appeals, disposal of some appeals in absence of the
counsel for the appellants who had sent illness slips and
G in some others, substitution applications being pending,
it is pertinent to note in the factual matrix of the case, the
issue of adequacy of compensation for the acquisition of
land, in the two villages, is now settled by this Court in
the case of Gafar. The decision of co-equal Bench is
H
FIDA HUSSAIN & ORS. v. MORADABAD 295
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANR.
_..;
binding on this Court. Judicial decorum and certainty of A
law require a Division Bench to follow the decision of
another Division Bench and of a larger Bench. [para 21-
22] [309-F-H; 310-A-C]

Union of India vs. Raghubir Singh (1989) 178 ITR 548 -
~
B
relied on.

3.2 However, on perusal of the appeal paper books
of the thirty appeals before this Court, it is evident that
in some of the appeals the presence of the learned
counsel is recorded. It is settled position that the Court c
speaks through its order and whatever stated therein has
to be read as correct. Therefore, it cannot be said that
· counsel were not heard in all the matters against which
the appeals are filed. [para 26] [311-E-H]
D
3.3 Having regard to the submissions urged on
behalf of the appellants in so far as not considering the
applications for substitution of the L.Rs. of deceased
appellants, this Court would have remitted the matter
back to the High Court to give an opportunity of hearing E
to the legal representatives of some of the deceased
appellants and decide the appeals on merits. That,
however, would only be a formality because having
regard to the law laid down by this Court in Gafar's case,
the High Court is bound to follow that decision, since the
., F
notification for acquiring the lands in respect of the
villages are the same. [para 27] [312-A-C]

4. As regards the prayer for a direction that the
amounts paid by way of compensation pursuant to the
1
judgment of the reference court need not be recovered G
and the securities furnished by some of the appellants
need not be enforced, it is significant to note that the land
acquisition in question is of two decades old, and it is
plausible. that the landowners have utilized the
compensation amount paid for one purpose or the other. H
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and
in the interest of justice, it is clarified that the respondents
are restrained from recovering the amounts paid as
compensation or enforcing security offered while
withdrawing the compensation amount pursuant to order
B passed by the reference court. [para 28] [312-D-F]
Case Law Reference:
2007 (9 ) SCR 32 relied on paar 6
(1970) 2 sec 267 relied on para 14
c
1985 (3) SCR 659 relied on para 17
2002 (2) SCR 661 relied on para 18
2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 801 relied on para 19
D
(1989) 178 ITR 548 relied on para 22
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
5448 of 2006.

E From the Judgment & Order dated 05.03.2004 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in First Appeal No. 538 of
1998.
WITH
F C.A. Nos. 5382, 5387, 5388, 5389, 5391, 5394, 5395, 5397, •.
5412,5421,5428,5429,5432.5436,5444,5445,5446,5455,
5457, 5499,5501, 5502,5504, 5506,5507, 5508, 5511, 5533
& 5452 of 2006.

M.L. Varma, Rudreshwar Singh, Raju Sultana, Kaushik
G Poddar, Gopal Jha, Satya Mitra, Jitendra Mohan Sharma for r ~
the Appellants.

M.P. Shorawala, Jyoti Saxena, Shashi Kiran, Ajay K.
Agrawal, T. Mahipaf for the Respondents.
H
FIDA HUSSAIN & ORS. v. MORADABAD 297
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANR.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
H.L. DATTU, J. 1. This batch of appeals is directed
against the separate orders passed by the High Court of
Allahabad in Regular First Appeals filed by land owners for
enhancement of compensation awarded by the Reference
8
Court for the lands acquired under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, [hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'] in the villages of
Harthala and Mukkarrabpur. There are in all 30 appeals before
us, out of which, 23 are in relation to the village of Harthala and
7 in relation to the village of Mukkarrabpur.
c
2. In view of the orders we propose to pass in all these
appeals, we deem it unnecessary to state the facts giving rise
to the present appeals in greater details and a brief reference
thereto would suffice to appreciate the controversy.
D
3. Lands in Village of Hartha/a:- There are twenty three
appeals relating to this village. Under Section 4 read with
Section 17 of the Act, Notification dated 20.09.1990 was
issued and published by the State Government for the
acquisition of the lands of the appellants. Subsequently, a E
declaration dated 10.06.1991 was published in the Gazette,
under Section 6 of the Act. The lands acquired were taken
.\ ' physical possession by the State Government. In accordance
with Section 11 of the Act, the Land Acquisition Officer
[hereinafter referred to as 'the LAO'] assessed t~e market value F
. d lands at Rs 80 per sq. meter v1de order dated
of the acquire · . fi d ·th the award of
18 09 1993 as compensation. Dissat1s ie ".'1 . . .
th~ LAO, the land owners filed objections •. mter-alla cla1mmg
that the market value of th~ a.cquired lands I~ R~. 1~0~ ~~~ s~f
meter due to the prox1m1ty of the. Ian s o G
Morad,abad After scrutinizing the evidence on record, the
Reference Court had come to the conclusion that the market
value of the nearby land was Rs. 550 per sq. met~r, ~owever,
taking into consideration the location and potentiality ~f the
lands and also proximity of the lands from the city of H
Moradabad and oth~r relevant factors, enhanced the
'<
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A compensation awarded to Rs. 270 per sq. meter. The State
preferred appeals against the enhancement so made by the
Reference Court and the High Court has allowed the same in
the light of the judgment of the Court in First Appeal No. 247
of 1997 dated 05.03.2004.
B
4. Lands in village of Mukkarabbpur:- Seven of the
present appeals relate to the village of Mukkarabbpur. A
Notification for acquisition of the lands under the Act was
issued and published on 20.08.1992. In pursuance of the
Notification, the State took possession of the said lands on
C 06.05.1997 by paying 80% of the estimated compensation at
the rate of Rs. 150 per sq. meter. However, vide order dated
29.08.1997, the LAO fixed the compensation at the rate of Rs.
92.59 per sq. meter. Aggrieved by the same, the appellants
moved the Reference Court and produced evidence in support
D of their claim that the prevailing rates of land in that village and
its roundabouts were much '1igher. After giving due
consideration to the claim made and the evidence on record,
the Reference Court enhanced the compensation to Rs. 350
per sq. meter. The respondents preferred appeals to the High
E Court, and the same came to be allowed, reviving the award
passed by the LAO.

5. Shri. M.L. Varma, learned senior counsel, appears for
the appellants, and Shri. M.P. Shorawala, learned counsel,
F holds the brief for the respondents.

6. At the outset, it is relevant to note that the question of
adequacy of compensation for the lands acquired in these two
villages under the same notification has been gone into by this
Court in the case of Gafar and Ors. v. Moradabad
G Development Authority, (2007) 7 SCC 614. In that case, this •
Court made a detailed enquiry into the method of valuation
adopted by the LAO and the enhancement of compensation
by the Reference Court. This Court took the view that the
evidence relied_ upon by the Reference Court while enhancing
H the compensation were not reliable, and, therefore, the High
FIDA HUSSAIN & ORS. v. MORADABAD 299
,,,/ DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANR. [H.L. DATTU, J.]
Court was justified in setting aside the order passed by the A
Reference Court and restoring the award passed by the LAO.
"
7. In Gafar's case for the lands acquired in the village of .
Harthala under Notification dated 13.09.1991, after a detailed
-· consideration of the compensation awarded by the LAO, this
8
Court held:

"15. We find that the Awarding Officer had taken note of a
sale deed, which· was at a time proximate to the date of
notifications in these cases and it related to a piece of land,
though a small extent, which was not distant from the c
acquired lands, to borrow the language of the Awarding
Officer. We are inclined to see some force in the stand
adopted by the High Court that the Awarding Officer
himself had been generous in his award. Since he has
adopted such a rate, the question is whether this Court D
should interfere with the decision of the High Court
~- restoring that Award or award any further compensation.

~
16. The scope of interference by this Court was delineated
by the decision in Kanta Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar E
) wherein this Court held that there was an element of guess '
'- work inherent in most cases involving determination of the
market value of the acquired land. If the judgment of the
High Court revealed that it had taken into consideration the
., relevant factors prescribed by the Act, in appeal under
Article 133 of the Constitution of India, assessment of F
market value thus made should not be disturbed by the
Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding whether we
should interfere, we have taken note of the position
! adopted by the Awarding Officer, the stand adopted by the
Reference Court and the relevant aspects discussed by the G
High Court. On such appreciation of the facts and
circumstances of the case as a whole, we are of the view
that the sum of Rs. 80 per square meter awa'.ded ~s
compensation in these cases is just compenstt1ond P~~ H
to the \and owners. Once we have thus oun
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

"
A compensation to be just, there arises no occasion for this
Court to interfere with the decision of the High Court
restoring the award of the Land Acquisition Officer.

17. In view of our conclusion as above. all the appeals
relating to Harthala have only to be dismissed."
8
8. In respect to the lands acquired in village of
Mukkarabbpur, this Court, in Gafar's case, held:

"18. In respect of the lands at Mukkarrabpur, the claim for
c enhancement was allowed by the Reference Court in spite
of the finding that the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 adduced
on behalf of the claimants was unreliable. It also found that
the two sale deeds relied on by the claimant in support of
the claim for enhancement were also not comparable or
D reliable in the light of the evidence of the claimant himself
and that it has not been shown that the lands involved
therein were comparable to the lands acquired. In spite of
it, the Reference Court granted an enhancement only
..
based on its award in L.A.R. No. 134of1988 and on that
basis the award was made at Rs. 192/- per square meter.
E
Obviously, the award in L.A.R. No. 134 of 1988 was set !
aside by the High Court. Hence, the award of the
Reference Court in the case on hand became untenable.
Once no reliance could be placed on that award to
enhance the compensation, it is clear that even on the •'
F finding of the Reference Court, no claim for enhancement
has been made out by the claimants. In that situation, the
High Court was fully justified in setting aside the award of
the Reference Court and in restoring the award of the Land
Acquisition Officer. •
G
19. We may incidentally notice that the lands were
agricultural lands being used for cultivation and even the
method of valuing it on the basis of price per square meter
does not appear to be justified. All the same, the award
H has adopted that method and the State cannot go back
FIDA HUSSAIN & ORS. v. MORADABAD 301
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANR. [H.L. DATTU, J.]
on it. In the absence of any acceptable legal evidence to A
support the claim for enhancement, no grounds are made
out for interference with the decision of the High Court in
the appeals relating to village Mukkarrabpur."

, 9. This Court also held that it could not be said that the
High Court had adopted an erroneous approach or employed B
the wrong principles in regard to the claim for enhancement of
compensation, or that, it has so erred as to warrant interference
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

10. A review petition filed by the appellants therein was c
also dismissed by tliis Court.

11. Shri. M.L. Varma, learned senior counsel, submits that
the findings and the conclusions in the judgment of this Court
in the case of Gafar are flawed for the reason that the o·
exemplars relied on for deciding the compensation was for
inundated land, and hence, the same could not reflect the true
value of the land. He further submits that relevant sale deeds
were not taken into consideration by the Court while concluding
that the Reference Court had erred in enhancing the
E
compensation and that the High Court was correct in setting
aside the same. The learned senior counsel also submits that
this Court should have remanded the matters to the High Court
.:7;~,the case of Gafar, as the High Court, being the first appellate
., Court, was required to give a reasoned judgment while allowing
appeals against the order of the Reference Court enhancing F
the compensation. In the alternative, Shri. Varma contends that
the decision in Gafar's case does not operate as a binding
precedent on the present set of appeals, since this Court has
not decided any legal issue. It is also stated that the decision
does not operate as a res judicata, as the parties were G
different. It is further argued that out of the thirty appeals that
are listed before us, in the seven appeals relating to the
acquisition of lands in the village of Mukkarrbpur, the matters
were not shown on the cause list on the day they were disposed
of. He further states that in some other cases (six appeals), the H
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.CR. ,

A learned counsel appearing for the respondents before the High
Court (appellants before us) had submitted an "illness slip" and
had not appeared on the day, the matters were disposed of.
Shri. Varma further contends that in as many as seventeen
appeals before us, the Development Authority had filed
8 applications for substitution to bring on record the legal
representatives of the deceased land owners and without
considering and deciding the applications, the High Court could
not have passed the impugned orders. Despite all these
procedural infirmities, the High Court could not have allowed
C the Regular First Appeals filed by the State, is the contention
of learned senior counsel Shri Varma.

12. Pursuant to the direction issped by this Court, an
affidavit has been filed by Shri. V.P. Rai, learned counsel, who
had appeared before the High Court, in support of factual
D assertion made by Sri Varma. Learned counsel in his affidavit
has stated that seven appeals before the High Court (listed as
C.A. No. 5502/2006, C.A. No. 5499/2006, C.A. No. 5501/2006,
C.A. No. 5404/2006, C.A. No. 5507/2006, C.A. No. 5508/2006
and 5511/2006 before us, all relating to the village of
E Mukkarrabpur) were not shown on the cause list of the High
Court on the day they were disposed of, and hence, he had no
knowledge about the hearing of the appeals. Shri. Rai, has
further stated, that as many six appeals (listed as C.A. No.
5448/2006, C.A. No. 5391/2006, C.A. No. 5397/2006, C.A. No.
F 5445/2006, C.A. No. 5452/2006 and C.A. No. 5455/2006
before us) in which he was appearing, were disposed of on the
day, he had submitted an "illness slip" due to his ill health.

13. Per contra, Shri. M.P. Shorawala, learned counsel, has
argued that there is no legal or factual infirmity in the judgment
G of this Court in the case of Gafar. He submits that this Court
has already dealt with the merits of the matter at length in the
case of Gafar and the same need not be gone into, once over,
again by this Court. With regard to the point of non-listing of
cases, the learned counsel contends that the cause lists are
H prepared under the authority of Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the
FIDA HUSSAIN & ORS. v. MORADABAD 303
~ '' DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANR. [H.L. DATIU, J.] .
High Court, and it was not the practice of the Court to send the A
files of matters that were not listed, to the Court Hall, let alone
hear them and dispose them of.

14. Having carefully considered the submissions of the
,. -i
learned senior counsel Shri Varma, we are of the view that the
B
judgment in Gafar's case does not require reconsideration by
this Court. In Gafar's case, this Court had meticulously
examined all the legal contentions canvassed by the parties to
the lis and had come to the conclusion that the High Court has
not committed any error which warrants interference. In the
present appeals, the challenge is for the compensation c
assessed for the lands notified and acquired under the same
notification pertaining to the same villages. Therefore, it would
not be proper for us to take a different view, on the ground that
)
what was considered by this Court was on a different fact
situation. This view of ours is fortified by the Judgment of this D
Court in the case of B.M. Lakhani v. Municipal Committee,
(1970) 2 sec 267, wherein it is held that a decision of this
Court is binding when the same question is raised again before
this Court, and reconsideration cannot be pleaded on the
ground that relevant provisions, etc., were not considered by E
the Court in the former case.

.. ....
15. With regard to the contention that the decision of the
Court in the case of Gafar did not operate as res judicata for
the present batch of cases, we are of the view that the F
principles of Resjudicata would apply only when the lis was
inter-parties and had attained finality of the issues involved. The
said Principles will, however, have no application interalia in a
case where the Judgment and/or order had been passed by a
.,. Court having no jurisdiction thereof and/or involving a pure
G
question of law. The principle of Resjudicata will, therefore, have
no application in the facts of the present case.
16. To examine the other limb of the contention of the
learned senior counsel that the judgment in the case of Gafar
did not operate as a precedent for the present batch of cases, H
I ,
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A as no point of law was decided, this issue requires to be ·
considered in the light of the judicial pronouncement of this
Court.

17. In the case of Shenoy & Co. v. CTO, (1985) 2 SCC
512, a number of writ petitions were allowed by the High Court.
8
However, the State chose to file appeal only in one case, which
came to be allowed by this Court in the said case. In this fact
situation, this Court took the view that the decision of this Court
was binding on all the writ petitioners before the High Court,
C even though they were not respondents in the appeal before
this Court. It was held:

"22. Though a large number of writ petitions were filed
challenging the Act, all those writ petitions were grouped
together, heard together and were disposed of by the High
D Court by a common judgment. No petitioner advanced any
contention peculiar or individual to his petition, not common
to others. To be precise, the dispute in the cause .or
controversy between the State and each petitioner had no
personal or individual element in it or anything personal or
E peculiar to each petitioner. The challenge to the
constitutional validity of 1979 Act proceeded on identical
grounds common to all petitioners. This challenge was
accepted by the High Court by a common judgment and it
was this common judgment that was the subject-matter of
F appeal before this Court in Hansa Corporation case. When
the Supreme Court repelled the challenge and held the Act
constitutionally valid, it in terms disposed of not the appeal
in Hansa Corporation case alone, but petitions in which
the High Court issued mandamus on the non-existent
ground that the 1979 Act was constitutionally invalid. It is, •
G
therefore, idle to contend that the law laid down by this
Court in that judgment would bind only the Hansa
Corporation and not the other petitioners against whom the
State of Karnataka had not filed any appeal. To do so is
to ignore the binding nature of a judgment of this Court
H
FIDA HUSSAIN & ORS. v. MORADABAD 305
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANR. [H.L. DATTU, J.]
I
under Article 141 of the Constitution. Article 141 reads as A
follows:

'The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be
binding on all courts within the territory of India. A
mere reading of this article brings into sharp focus
8
its expanse and its all pervasive nature. In cases
like this, where numerous petitions are disposed of
by a common judgment and only one appeal is filed,
the parties to the common judgment could very well
have and should have intervened and could have
requested the Court to hear them also. They cannot C
be heard to say that the decision was taken by this
Court behind their back or profess ignorance of the
fact that an appeal had been filed by the State
against the common judgment. We would like to
observe that, in the fitness of things, it would be D
desirable that the State Government also took out
publication in such cases to alert parties bound by
the judgment, of the fact that an appeal had been
preferred before this Court by them. We do not find
fault with the State for having filed only one appeal. E
It is, of course, an economising procedure."

23. The judgment in Hansa Corporation case rendered by
one of us (Desai, J.) concludes as follows:

"As we are not able to uphold the contentions which F
found favour with the High Court in striking down the
impugned Act and the notification issued
thereunder and as we find no merit in other
contentions canvassed on behalf of the respondent
for sustain-ing the judgment of the High Co1Jrt, this G
appeal must succeed. Accordingly, this appeal is
allowed and the judgment of the High Court is
quashed and set aside and the petition filed by the
respondent in the High Court is dismissed with
costs throughout." · H
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 9 S.C.R.
,.._
A To contend that this conclusion applies only to the party
before this Court is to destroy the efficacy and integrity of
the judgment and to make the mandate of Article 141
illusory. But setting aside the common judgment of the High
Court, the mandamus issued by the High Court is rendered
B ineffective not only in one case but in all cases. r

24. A writ or an order in the nature of mandamus has
always been understood to mean a command issuing from
the Court, competent to do the same, to a public servant
amongst others, to perform a duty attaching to the office,
c failure to perform which leads to the initiation of action. In
this case, the petitioners-appellants assert that the
mandamus in their case was issued by the High Court
commanding the authority to desist or forbear from
enforcing the provisions of an Act which was not validly
D enacted. In other words, a writ of mandamus was
predicated upon the view that the High Court took that the
1979 Act was constitutionally invalid. Consequently the
Court directed the authorities under the said Act to forbear
from enforcing the provisions of the Act qua the petitioners.
E The Act was subsequently declared constitutionally valid
by this Court. The Act, therefore, was under an eclipse, for
a short duration; but with the declaration of the law by this
Court, the temporary shadow cast on it by the mandamus
disappeared and the Act revived with its full vigour, the
constitutional invalidity held by the High Court having been
,,, =
F
removed by the judgment of this Court. If the law so
declared invalid is held constitutionally valid, effective and
binding by the Supreme Court, the mandamus forbearing
the authorities from enforcing its provisions would become
G ineffective and the authorities cannot be compelled to -.;;...
perform a negative duty. The declaration of the law is
binding on everyone and it is therefore, futile to contend
that the mandamus would survive in favour of those parties
against whom appeals were not filed.
H 25.. The fallacy of the argument can be better illustrated
FIDA HUSSAIN & ORS. v. MORADABAD 307
_'/
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANR. [H.L. DATTU, J.]
by looking at the submissions made from a slightly A
different angle. Assume for argument's sake that the
mandamus in favour of the appellants survived
notwithstanding the judgment of this Courl. How do they
enforce the mandamus? The normal procedure is to
l move the Courl in contempt when the patties against B
whom mandamus is issued disrespect it. Supposing
contempt petitions are filed and notices are issued to the
State. The State's answer to the Courl will be: "Can I be
punished for disrespecting the mandamus, when the. law
of the land has been laid down by the Supreme Courl c
against .the mandamus issued, which Jaw is equally
binding on me and on you?" Which Courl can punish a
party for contempt under these circumstances? The
answer can be only in the negative because the
-~ mandamus issued by the High Court becomes
D
ineffective and unenforceable when the basis on which it
was issued falls, by the declaration by the Supreme
Courl, of the validity of 1979 Act.

26. In view of this conclusion of ours, we do not think it
necessary to refer to the other arguments raised before E
the High Court and. which the learned counsel for the
appellants attempted to raise before us also. The appeals
can be disposed of on this short point stated above. The
judgment of this Court in Hansa Corporation case is
binding on all concerned whether they were parties to the- F
judgment or not. We would like to make it clear that there
is no inconsistency in the finding of this Court in Joginder
Singh case and Makhanlal Waza case. The ratio is the
same and the appellants cannot take advantage of certain
., observations made by this Court in Joginder Singh case G
for the reasons indicated above."
18. In the case of Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M.R.
Apparao, (2002) 4 SCC 638, this Court held:

"7. So far as the first question is concerned, Article 141 H
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A of the Constitution unequivocally indicates that the law
declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all
courts within the territory of India. The aforesaid Article
empowers the Supreme Court to declare the· law. It is,
therefore, an essential function of the Court to interpret a
B legislation. The statements of the Court on matters other r

than law like facts may have no binding force as the facts
of two cases may not be similar. But what is binding is the
ratio of the decision and not any finding of facts. It is the
principle found out upon a reading of a judgment as a
whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that
c forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence ...
A judgment of the Court has to be read in the context of
questions which arose for consideration in the case in
which the judgment was delivered .... The law which will
be binding under Article 141 would, therefore, extend to
D
all observations of points raised and decided by the Court
in a given case ... "

19. The position was made clear by the decision of this
Court in the case of Union of India v. Krishan Lal Ameja,
E (2004) 8 sec 453. In this case, 14 properties were notified
for acquisition under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,
1898. Only two persons, namely Banwari Lal & Sons and
Shakuntala Gupta, had previously challenged the validity of the
acquisition by filing writ petitions before the High Court and
F having the cases decided in their favour finally by this Court.
This Court held that the decisions in the earlier cases were a
binding precedent for this subsequent appeal that was
preferred by the Union of India. This Court held:
"12 .... The decision in Banwari Lal and Shakuntala Gupta
G of this Court in relation to the same notification may not
be binding on the principle of res judicata. The argument,
however, cannot be accepted that those decisions are not
binding being "property-specific" in those cases. In our
considered opinion, the decisions are binding as
H precedents on the question of validity of the notification,
FIDA HUSSAIN & ORS. v. MORADABAD 309
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANR. [H.L. DATTU, J.]
which invokes urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act. A
We find ourselves in full agreement with the ratio of the
decisions in those cases that urgency clause, on the facts
and circumstances, which are similar to the present cases,
could not have been invoked. The two decisions are,
; therefore, binding as precedents of this Court. We are not B
able to find any distinction or difference as to the ground
of urgency in regard to the properties covered by these
appeals."
20. It is now well settled that a decision of this Court based
on specific facts does not operate as a precedent for future
c
cases. Only the principles of law that emanate from a judgment
of this Court, which have aided in reaching a conclusion of the
problem, are binding precedents within the meaning of Article
141. However, if the question of law before the Court is same
""\
as in the previous case, the judgment of the Court in the former D
is binding in the latter, for the reason that the question of law
before the Court is already settled. In other words, if the Court
determines a certain issue for a certain set of facts, then, that
issue stands determined for any other matter on the same set
of facts. E
21. The other reasons given by Shri. M.L. Varma, learned
senior counsel, for contending that the case of Gafardoes not
apply as a precedent in other cases are threefold: (a) that seven
·'. of the present appeals relating to Mukkarrabpur were not heard
F
due to non-listing; (b) in six matters relating to Harthala, the
matters were disposed of in the absence of the counsel, who
was absent due to his ill health and submission of "illness slip";
and (c) in some of the cases, the applications for substitution
was pending before the High Court, and these matters could
not be disposed of by allowing the appeal against the dead . G
'9

persons. We are not impressed by these contentions.
_,,...
22. In the factual matrix of the present case, the adequacy
of compensation for the acquisition of land, in the aforesaid
villages, was the issue before this Court in the case of Gafar H
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A and in these appeals also. The issue is now settled by this Court
in the case of Gafar and Ors. (supra). The decision of co-equal
Bench is binding on this Court. We may usefully note the
decision of this Court in the case of Union of India vs. Raghubir
Singh (1989) 178 ITR 548. The Court observed that the
B pronouncement of law by a Division Bench of this Court is r
binding on a subsequent Division Bench of the same or a
smaller number of Judges and in order that such decision be
binding, it is not necessary that it should be a decision rendered
by the Full Court or a Constitution Bench of this Court. Judicial
c decorum and certainty of law require a Division Bench to follow
the decision of another Division Bench and of a larger Bench
and, even if, the reasons to be stated, a different view was
necessitated, the matter should be only referred to Hon'ble The
Chief Justice for referring the question to a larger Bench.
D 23. The learned senior counsel emphasizes the fact that
the present appellants were not heard when the appeals were
decided by the High Court, due to non-listing or disposal of the
matters when their counsel had submitted "illness slip" and was
not present in Court. He further states that in several cases, the
E appellants had died, and the applications for substitution of legal
heirs were filed by the Development Authority, which were
pending in all but in one case. In the one case [presently
numbered as C.A. No. 5421/2006], Shri. Varma states that the
application was dismissed by the Court. He contends that the
F rules of natural justice of providing a fair hearing have not been ,,
followed. He states that it would be in the interest of justice to
remand the matters back to the High Court to decide the
appeals on merits, keeping in view the parameters while
disposing of the first appeals by the High Court. Shri.
G Shorawala, learned counsel for the respondent, does not /'
,.
seriously dispute the issue of non-listing raised by the
appellants, except stating that the cause list was published
under the authority of Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the High
Court, and it was not the practice of any Court to dispose of a
H matter without it being listed.

_L
FIDA HUSSAIN & ORS. v. MORADABAD 311
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANR. [H.L. DATTU, J.]
j(

24. We have considered the contention canvassed by A
Shri. Varma, learned senior counsel and the affidavit filed by
Shri. V.P. Rai in this regard. It is possible that due to the same
nature of the matters, the learned Division Bench sitting in
appeal may have considered it proper to dispose of the
l matters though they were not listed on the said day or the B
advocate for the appellants was not present. This issue is
raised only in thirteen appeals filed before us. With regard to
seventeen appeals, the appellants have contended that the
substitution of legal heirs had not happened, and that the matter
had abated. c
25. It is in C.A. No. 5421 of 2006, in which the appellants
have contended that the application for substitution was
rejected, and by that order, the appeal had abated. We have
perused the appeal paper books, and do' not find any ground
... D
taken in this regard. Even the order dated 7/1/2004, by which
the application for substitution was supposedly rejected.by the
High Court, has not been annexed. In the light of this, we are
not inclined to accept the argument that the appeal had abated.
26. On perusal of the appeal paper books of the thirty E
appeals before us, we find that in some of the appeals [namely
C.A. Nos. 5429/2006 and 5457/2006], the presence of the
learned counsel is recorded Though some of the appellants
before us may not have been heard by the High Court due to
non-listing of the matter or disposal in the absence of the
F
advocate, it is clear from the impugned orders enclosed in
some of the appeal paper books that the learned counsel for
some of the appellants have been heard. It is settled position
that the Court speaks through its order and whatever stated
therein has to be read as correct and, therefore, we will go by
__, G
' what is recorded in the impugned judgment, rather than what
the counsel have stated at the time of hearing of these appeals.
In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to accept that the
learned counsel were not heard in all the matters against which
appeals are filed.
H
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 9 S.C.R.

A 27. Having regard to the submissions urged on behalf of
the appellants in so far as not considering the application for
substitution of the L.Rs. of deceased appellants, we would have
remitted the matter back to the High Court to give an
opportunity to the appellants herein, who are the legal
B representatives of some of the deceased appellants to afford
an opportunity of hearing and decide the appeals on merits.
That, however, would only be a formality because having regard
to the law laid down by this Court in Gafar's case, the High
Court is bound to follow that decision, since the notification for
c acquiring the lands in respect of the villages are one and the
same.

28. The learned senior counsel may be, as a last salvo,
submits that in the event, we are not inclined to grant any of
the reliefs that he has asked for, then we may direct that the
D amounts paid by way of compensation pursuant to the
judgment of the Reference Court need not be recovered and
the securities furnished by some of the appellants need not be
enforced. This prayer is contested by the learned counsel for
the respondents. This request of Shri. Varma appears to be
E reasonable. The land acquisition in question is of two decades
old, and it is plausible that the landowners have utilized the
compensation amount paid for one purpose or the other. In
such circumstances, we are not inclined to put an extra burden
of repayment on them. Therefore, while dismissing the appeals,
F we clarify that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case and in the interest of justice, we restrain the respondents
from recovering the amounts paid as compensation or
enforcing security offered while withdrawing the compensation
amount pursuant to order passed by the Reference Court.
G
29. In light of the above, the appeals are dismissed with
the rider as indicated by us at paragraph 28 of the judgment.
Costs are made easy.

R.P. Appeals dismissed.
H