EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, ROAD DEVELOPMENT DIVISION NO.ILL, PANVEL & ANR.versusATLANTA LIMITED

                      [2014] 1 S.C.R. 507


     EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, ROAD DEVELOPMENT                              A
           DIVISION NO.Ill, PANVEL & ANR.
                                V.
                       ATLANTA LIMITED
                (Civil Appeal No. 673 of 2014)
                                                                       B
                      JANUARY 16, 2014

  [A.K. PATNAIK AND JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, JJ.]

      Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: ss.2(1)(e), 42 -
Jurisdiction to determine the controversy emerging out of the          C
award of the arbitral tribunal - Division of litigation between
High Court exercising 'ordinary original civil jurisdiction' and
the 'Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction' in a District -
Held: s.42 mandates, that the court wherein the first
application arising out of such a challenge is filed, shall alone      D
have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute(s), which
are filed later in point of time - This legislative intent must
also be understood as mandating, that disputes arising out
of the same arbitration agreement, arbitral proceeding or
arbitral award, would not be adjudicated upon by more than             E
one court, even though jurisdiction to raise such disputes may
legitimately lie before two or more courts - s.42 is not of any
assistance in the instant case as the challenge was made in
different court on the same day - In view of facts and
circumstances of the case, reliance placed on ss. 15 and 16            F
CPC was a/so misplaced - By virtue of s.2(1)(e), if choice is
between the High Court (in exercise of its "ordinary original
civil jurisdiction'? on the one hand, and the "principal civil
court of original jurisdiction" in the District i.e. the District
Judge on the other, choice is made in favour of the High               G
                                     ,.
Court - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - ss.15, 16.

    A contract was awarded on 12.07 .2007 by the
respondent-State to the respondent for the construction

                               507                                     H
    508      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A of Mumbra Byepass. Dispute arose between the parties
  and matter was referred to arbitration and an award was
  passed on 12.5.2012.0n 7 .8.2012, the respondent as
  also the appellant both questioned the award of the
  arbitral tribunal. While the appellant questioned the same
8 before the District Judge, Thane, the respondent filed
  Arbitration Petition before the High Court for setting aside
  some of the directions issued by the arbitral tribunal in
  its award dated 12.5.2012.

      Since the same award was subject matter of
C challenge before the two different courts, the respondent
  prayed for transfer of the applications filed by appellant
  before the District Court to the original side of the High
  Court for being heard along with its Arbitration Petition.

D     The High Court while noticing that the State-appellant
  had not raised objection as to consolidation of the
  proceedings so as to avoid conflicting decisions or
  simultaneous trial held that since Arbitration Petition has
  already been placed before the Single Judge, it is proper
E if proceedings before the District Court, Thane are
  brought and are heard along with the Arbitration Petition.
  The said order has been challenged in the instant appeal.
  The appellants had placed reliance on Section 2(1 )(e) of
  the Arbitration Act read with the provisions of Code of
F Civil Procedure to contend, that the District Judge,
  Thane, alone would have the jurisdiction in the matter.

          Disposing of the appeal, the Court
      HELD: 1. The appellants had in the reply affidavit filed
G before the High Court, clearly acknowledged the legal
  position, that both the High Court as also the District
  Judge, Thane, in so far as the instant controversy is
  concerned, fall within the definition of the term "Court"
  under Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act. The High
H Court in impugned expressly noticed that it was admitted
 EXE. ENGR., ROAD DEV. DIVISION NO.Ill, PANVEL 509
               v. ATLANTA LTD.
by the rival parties that the High Court on the original      A
side, as also the District Judge, Thane, had the
jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter. It was,
therefore, not open to the appellants to canvass that the
High Court of Bombay in exercise of its "ordinary original
civil jurisdiction" could not adjudicate upon the instant     B
controversy, on account of lack of jurisdiction. [Paras 12
and 13] (525-C-D & G-H; 526-D]

     Bharat Aluminium Company and Ors. vs. Kaiser                   •
Aluminium Technical Services Inc and Ors. (2012) 9 SCC 559    C
- referred to.

     2. In terms of the mandate of Section 15 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, the initiation of action within the
jurisdiction of Greater Mumbai had to be "in the Court of
lowest grade competent to try it". However, within the D
area of jurisdiction of Principal District Judge, Greater
Mumbai, only the High Court of Bombay was exclusively
the competent Court (under its "ordinary original civil
jurisdiction") to adjudicate upon the matter. This
conclusion is imperative from the definition of the term E
"Court" in Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act. Firstly, the
very inclusion of the High Court "in exercise of its
ordinary original civil jurisdiction, within the definition of
the term "Court", will be rendered nugatory, if the above
conclusion was not to be accepted. Because, the F
"principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district"
namely the District Judge concerned, being a court lower
in grade than the High Court, the District Judge
concerned would always exclude the High Court from
 adjudicating upon the matter. Accordingly, the principle G
enshrined in Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure
 cannot be invoked whilst interpreting Section 2(1)(e) of
 the Arbitration Act. Secondly, the provisions of the
 Arbitration Act, leave no room for any doubt, that it is the
 superior most court exercising original civil jurisdiction,
                                                                H
    510    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 1 S.C.R.

A which had been chosen to adjudicate disputes arising
  out of arbitration agreements, arbitral proceedings and
  arbitral awards. Undoubtedly, a "principal Civil Court of
  original jurisdiction in a district", is the superior most
  court exercising original civil jurisdiction in the district
B over which its jurisdiction extends. It is clear, that Section
  2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act having vested jurisdiction in
  the "principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a
  district", did not rest the choice of jurisdiction on courts
  subordinate to that of the District Judge. Likewise, "the
c High Court in exercise of its ordinary original
  jurisdiction", is the superior most court exercising
  original civil jurisdiction, within the ambit of its original
  civil jurisdiction. On the same analogy and for the same
  reasons, the choice of jurisdiction, will clearly fall in the
  realm of the High Court, wherever a High Court exercises
0
  "ordinary original civil jurisdiction". Under the Arbitration
  Act, therefore, the legislature has clearly expressed a
  legislative intent, different from the one expressed in
  Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
E respondent had chosen to initiate proceedings within the
  area of Greater Mumbai, it could have done so only
  before the High Court of Bombay. There was no other
  court within the jurisdiction of Greater Mumbai, where the
  respondent could have raised their challenge.
  Consequently, the respondent by initiating proceedings
F under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, before the original
  side of the High Court of Bombay, had not violated the
  mandate of Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act. Thus
  viewed, reliance on Section 15 of the Code of Civil
  Procedure was wholly irrelevant. [Para 18] [530-G-H; 531-
G A-G]

       3. Reliance placed on Section 16 of the Code of Civil
  Procedure, by the appellants, for the ouster the
  jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay is equally
H misplaced. The controversy between the parties did not
EXE. ENGR., ROAD DEV. DIVISION NO.Ill, PANVEL              511
              v. ATLANTA LTD.
pertain to recovery of immoveable property, partition of           A
immoveable property, foreclosure sale or redemption of
immoveable property, determination of any other right to
immoveable property, for determination of compensation
for wrong to immoveable property and/or for the recovery
of moveable property under distraint or attachment. It is          B
only in the said exigencies that Section 16 of the Code
of Civil Procedure could have been invoked. The
construction of the Mumbra byepass, would only entitle
the respondent to payments contemplated under the
contract dated 12.7.2007, and no more. Since none of the           c
above exigencies contemplated in Section 16 prevailed
in the dispute between the rival parties, reliance on
Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure was clearly
misplaced. [Para 19] [531-G-H; 532-A-D]

      4. Insofar as the jurisdiction within the District Thane,    D
is concerned, the "principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction" is the court of the District Judge, Thane.
Consequently, within the territorial jurisdiction of District
Thane, in terms of Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act,
the challenge could have only been raised before the               E
"principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction" of the
district, namely, before the District Judge, Thane. There
was no other court within the jurisdiction of District
Thane, wherein the instant matters could have been
agitated. Therefore, the appellants having chosen to               F
initiate the proceedings before the District Judge, Thane,
i.e., in respect of a cause of action falling in the territorial
jurisdiction of the District Thane, they too must be
deemed to have chosen the rightful court i.e., the District
Judge, Thane. [Para 20] [532-E-G]                                  G

     5. A perusal of Section 42 of Arbitration Act reveals
a clear acknowledgment by the legislature, that the
jurisdiction for raising a challenge to the same arbitration
agreement, arbitral proceeding or arbitral award, could
                                                                   H
    512     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 1 S.C.R.

A most definitely arise in more than one court
  simultaneously. To remedy such a situation Section 42
  of the Arbitration Act mandates, that the court wherein
  the first application arising out of such a challenge is filed,
  shall alone have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the
B dispute(s), which are filed later in point of time. This
  legislative intent must also be understood as mandating,
  that disputes arising out of the same arbitration
  agreement, arbitral proceeding or arbitral award, would
  not be adjudicated upon by more than one court, even
c though jurisdiction to raise such disputes may
  legitimately lie before two or more courts. Ordinarily
  Section 42 of the Arbitration Act would be sufficient to
  resolve such a controversy. For the determination of the
  instant controversy, however, reliance is not placed on
  Section 42 of the Arbitration Act, because the State of
0
  Maharashtra had moved applications under Section 34 of
  the Arbitration Act before the District Judge, Thane, on
  the same day as the respondent had filed Arbitration
  Petition before the High Court. Both the parties had
  approached the courts on 7.8.2012. The answer to the
E jurisdictional question, arising out in the facts and
  circumstances of this case, will therefore not emerge
  from Section 42 of the Arbitration Act. There can be no
  doubt, that adjudication of a controversy by different
  courts, can easily give rise to different conclusions and
F determinations. Therefore, logic and common sense also
  require, the determination of all such matters, by one
  jurisdictional court alone. [Paras 22 to 24] [534-D-H; 535-
  A-B and D-E]

G      6. The High Court of Bombay is vested with
  "ordinary original civil jurisdiction" over the same area,
  over which jurisdiction is also exercised by the "principal
  Civil Court of original jurisdiction" for the District of
  Greater Mumbai (i.e. the Principal District Judge, Greater
H Mumbai). Jurisdiction of the above two courts on the
  EXE. ENGR., ROAD DEV. DIVISION NO.Ill, PANVEL 513
                v. ATLANTA LTD.
   "ordinary original civil side" is over the area of Greater A
  Mumbai. The choice of jurisdiction has been expressed .
  in Section 2(1 )(e) of the Arbitration Act, without any fetters
  whatsoever. It is not the case of the appellants that
   because of pecuniary dimensions, and/or any other
   consideration(s), jurisdiction in the two alternatives B
   mentioned above, would lie with the Principal District
   Judge, Greater Mumbai. Under the scheme of the·
   provisions of the Arbitration Act therefore, if the choice
   is between the High Court (in exercise of its "ordinary
   original civil jurisdiction") on the one hand, and the c
   "principal civil court of original jurisdiction" in the District
   i.e. the District Judge on the other; Sectior:i 2(1 )(e) of the
   Arbitration Act has made the choice in favour of the High
   Court. This in fact impliedly discloses a legislative intent.
   Therefore, _it makes no difference, if the "principal civil D
   court of original jurisdiction", is in the same district over
   which the High Court exercises original jurisdiction, or
   some other district. In case an option is to be exercised
   between a High Court (under its "ordinary original civil
· jurisdiction") on the one hand, and a District Court (as
   "principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction") on the E
   other, the choice under the Arbitration Act has to be
 · exercised in favour of the High Court. Legislative choice
   is clearly in favour of the High Court. The matters in hand
   would have to be adjudicated upon by the High Court of
   Bombay alone. [Para 25 and 26] [536-B-H; 537-A and C] F

     7.The order passed by the High Court requiring the
 matters to be adjudicated on the "ordinary original civil
 side" by the High Court of Bombay is upheld however the
 reasons recorded by the High Court, for the conclusion, G
 were different. The Arbitration Petition filed by the
 respondent before the High Court of Judicature at
 Bombay, and Applications filed by the appellants before
 the District Judge, Thane, shall be heard and disposed
 of by the High Court of Bombay. The District Judge, H
    514      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2014] 1 S.C.R.


A Thane is directed to transfer the files of Miscellaneous
  Applications to the High Court, for disposal in
  accordance with law. [Para 27) [537-0-G]

                          Case law reference:
B         (2012) 9 sec 559        referred to          Para 10

          CIVIL APP ELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 673
    of 2014.

       From the Judgment and Order dated 15.03.2013 the High
C Court of Judicature at Bombay in Miscellaneous Civil
  Application No. 162 of 2012.

        Uday U. Lalit, Vinay Navare, Styajeet Kumar Keshav
    Ranjan, Ms. Abha R. Sharma for the Appellants.
D
         Dushyant A. Dave, Chirag M. Shroff, Abhishek Singh,
    Aniruddha Deshmukh for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

E      JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J. 1. State of Maharashtra,
  through its Public Works Department, awarded a contract dated
  12.7.2000 to the respondent-Atlanta Limited (a public limited
  company) for the construction of the Mumbra byepass. On
  11.5.2005, a supplementary agreement for additional work was
F executed between the parties. It would be relevant to mention,
  that the Mumbra byepass falls on National highway no. 4. The
  construction envisaged in the contract awarded to the
  respondent-Atlanta Limited was, from kilometer 133/800 to
  kilometer 138/200. The contract under reference envisaged,
G settlement of disputes between the parties, through arbitration.
  Atlanta Limited raised some disputes through a communication
  dated 1.10.2009. It also invoked the arbitration clause for
  resolution of the said disputes. The State of Maharashtra as
  also Atlanta Limited nominated their respective arbitrators, who
H in turn, appointed the presiding arbitrator. On the culmination
EXE. ENGR., ROAD DEV. DIVISION NO.Ill, PANVEL 515
 v. ATLANTA LTD. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
of proceedings before the arbitral tribunal, an award was             A
rendered on 12.5.2012. Almost all the claims raised by Atlanta
Limited were granted. In sum and substance, Atlanta Limited
was awarded a sum of Rs.58,59,31,595/- along with the
contracted rate of interest (of 20 per cent per annum), with effect
from 1.10.2009. Atlanta Limited was also awarded a sum of             B
Rs.41,00,000/- towards costs. All the counter claims raised by
the State of Maharashtra, before the arbitral tribunal, were
simultaneously rejected.

     2. On 7.8.2012, the State of Maharashtra moved
Miscellaneous Application no. 229 of 2012 and Miscellaneous           C
Application no. 230 of 2012 under Section 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the
'Arbitration Act') before the District Judge, Thane. The State
of Maharashtra through the aforesaid Miscellaneous
Applications sought quashing and setting aside of the arbitral        D
award dated 12.5.2012.

     3. On the same day, i.e., 7.8.2012, Atlanta Limited filed
Arbitration Petition no.1158 of 2012 before the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay (hereinafter referred to as the 'High            E
Court'), for the setting aside of some of the directions issued
by the arbitral tribunal (in its award dated 12.5.2012). Atlanta
Limited also claimed further compensation, which according to
the respondent, had wrongfully not been considered by the
arbitral tribunal.                                                    F

    4. A perusal of the averments made in the foregoing two
paragraphs reveal, that on the same day i.e., on 7.8.2012, the
State of Maharashtra as also Atlanta Limited questioned the
award of the arbitral tribunal dated 12.5.2012. Whilst the State
of Maharashtra questioned the same before the District Judge,         G
Thane; Atlanta Limited raised its challenge before the High
Court. Since the same award dated 12.5.2012 was subject
matter of challenge before two different courts, Atlanta Limited
preferred Miscellaneous Civil Application no. 162 of 2012
under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 praying         H
    516       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A for transfer of Miscellaneous Application no. 229 of 2012, as
  also, Miscellaneous Application No.230 of 2012 (both filed by
  the State of Maharashtra) before the District Court, Thane, to
  the original side of the High Court, for being heard along with
  Arbitration Petition No .1158 of 2012. The aforestated
B Miscellaneous Civil Application No.162 of 2012 was allowed
  by the High Court on 15.3.2013. The operative part of the order
  passed by the High Court is being extracted hereunder:

          "32. In the light of the above conclusion, the argument that
          this Court can only direct consolidation of both Petitions
c         without passing any order with regard to their transfer,
          need not be considered in this case. Apart therefrom, once
          I find that the Respondents have no objection to
          consolidation of the proceedings so as to avoid conflicting
          decisions or simultaneous trial/hearing, then, all the more,
D         the powers to transfer needs to be exercised in this case.
          It is undisputed that the parties are common to both
          matters. In both matters the same Award is under scrutiny.
          In such circumstances, the argument that both Petitions
          need to be consolidated but before the District Court at
E         Thane cannot be accepted. That would mean two Courts
          render decisions and more or less on the same issue and
          may be at the same time. The arbitration petition filed by
          the Petitioners in this Court is already placed before the
          Single Judge of this Court and is now adjourned. It would
F         be proper if the proceedings before the District Court,
          Thane are brought and are heard along with the Petition
          filed by the Petitioners in this Court.

          33. As a result of the above discussion, this application
          succeeds. It is made absolute in terms of prayer clause
G
          (a) with no order as to costs."
        The above determination by the High Court, vide its order
    dated 15.3.2013, is the subject matter of challenge through
    Special leave Petition (C) No.18980 of 2013.
H
 EXE. ENGR., ROAD DEV. DIVISION NO.Ill, PANVEL 517
  v. ATLANTA LTD. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
    5. Leave granted.                                                A

      6. The contention advanced,at the hands of the learned
counsel for the State of Maharashtra; while assailing the
impugned order of the High Court dated 15.3.2013 was, that it
was improper for the High Court to transfer the proceedings          8
initiated by the appellant through Miscellaneous Application
No.229 of 2012 and Miscellaneous Application No.230 of 2012
under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the Court of the
District Judge, Thane to the High Court. In this behalf, the
pointed submission of the learned counsel for the appellant was,     C
that only the District Judge, Thane, had the jurisdiction to
determine the controversy emerging out of the award of the
arbitral tribunal dated 12.5.2012. It was also submitted, that the
proceedings initiated by Atlanta Limited through Arbitration
Petition no. 1158 of 2012, ought to have been transferred from
the High Court to the District Judge, Thane. In order to make        D
good the aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the
appellant placed reliance on the definition of the term "Court"
expressed in Section 2(1 )(e) of the Arbitration Act. Section
2(1)(e) aforementioned is being reproduced hereunder:
                                                                     E
     "2 - Definitions- (1) In this Part, unless the context
     otherwise requires,-

     (e) "Court" means the principal Civil Court of original
     jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in
                                                                     F
     exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having
     jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-
     matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-
     matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a
     grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of
     Small Causes."                                                  G

Drawing the court's pointed attention to the definition of the
term "Court", it was the vehement contention of the learned
counsel for the appellant, that to determine which court would
have jurisdiction to decide the subject matter of an arbitral        H
    518          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A dispute, it was essential to find out the particular court which
  would have had jurisdiction in the matter, had the dispute been
  agitated through a civil suit. According to learned counsel, the
  latter determination, would answer the jurisdictional avenue of
  the arbitral dispute, in terms of Section 2(1 )(e) extracted above.
B In this behalf it was submitted, that in the absence of any
  express exclusion clause between the parties, on the subject
  matter under reference, in order to settle the dispute inter-
  parties, it would have been imperative for the parties to raise
  their respective challenges only before the District Judge,
c Thane.

       7. For the above submission, learned counsel also placed
  reliance on Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section
  16, according to learned counsel, would be relevant to
  determine the jurisdictional court, if the dispute had been
D agitated through a civil suit. Section 16 aforementioned is being
  extracted hereunder:

          "16. Suits to be instituted where subject-matter
          situate.-Subject to the pecuniary or other limitations
E         prescribed by any law, suits,-

           (a)     for the recovery of immovable property with or
                   without rent or profits,

           (b)     for the partition of immovable property,
F
           (c)     for foreclosure, sale or redemption in the case of a
                   mortgage of or charge upon immovable property,

           (d)     for the determination of any other right to or interest
                   in immovable property,
G
           (e)     for compensation for wreng to immovable property,

           (f)     for the recovery of movable property actually under
                   distraint or attachment,
H
 EXE. ENGR., ROAD DEV. DIVISION NO.Ill, PANVEL 519
  v. ATLANTA LTD. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, JJ
     shall be instituted in the Court within the local limits of        A
     whose jurisdiction the property is situate:

     Provided that a suit to obtain relief respecting, or
     compensation for wrong to, immovable properly held by or
     on behalf of the defendant may, where the relief sought can
                                                                        B
     be entirely obtained through hi s personal obedience, be
     instituted either in the Court within the local limits of whose
     jurisdiction the property is situate, or in the Court within the
     local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant actually and
     voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally         C
     works for gain.

     Explanation .-In this section "property" means property
     situate in India."

     Relying on Section 16 extracted above, it was asserted D
by learned counsel, that the original agreement between the
parties dated 12.7.2000, and the supplementary agreement
dated 11.5.2005, related to the construction of the Mumbra
byepass. The said construction is from Kilometer 133/800 to
Kilometer 138/200. The aforesaid location of construction,
                                                                         E
according to the undisputed position between the parties, is
within Thane District, and as such, within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Sessions Division, Thane. Therefore,
according to learned counsel for the appellant, only the
"principal civil court of original jurisdiction" in District Thane i.e.,
the District Judge, Thane, would have jurisdiction in the matter. F
It was also the submission of the learned counsel for the
appellant, that the toll stations for collecting toll constructed by
the respondent-Atlanta Limited, are also located at the venue
of the Mumbra byepass. Thus viewed, according to the learned .          ~


counsel for the appellant, the collection of toll (which inter alia \:I
constitutes the subject of dispute, between the parties) is also
carried on by the respondents within District Thane, i.e., within
the territorial jurisdiction of the District Judge, Thane. Based
on Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and more
particularly of clause (d) thereof, it was the pointed-submission H
    520       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 1 S.C.R.

A of the learned counsel for the appellant, that only the District
  Judge, Thane has the jurisdiction to entertain an arbitral dispute,
  arising between the rival parties to the present' appeal.

       8. In order to further support his contention, that the District
  Judge, Thane alone would have jurisdiction in the matter,
B learned counsel for the appellant, also placed emphatic reliance
  on Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is being
  reproduced hereunder:

          "20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside
c         or cause of action arises.-Subject to the limitations
          aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the
          local limits of whose jurisdiction -
           (a)   the defendant, or each of the defendants where
                 there are more than one, at l .~ time of the
D                commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily
                 resides, or carries on business, or personally works
                 for gain; or
           (b)   any of the defendants, where there are more than
E                one, at the time of the commencement of the suit,
                 actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on
                 business, or personally works for gain, provided that
                 in such case either the leave of the Court is given,
                 or the defendants who do not reside, or carry or
                 business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid,
F
                 acquiesce in such institution ; or

           (c)   the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.

      Explanation .-A corporation shall be deemed to carry on
G business at its sole or principal office in India or, in respect of
  any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a
  subordinate office, at such place.

                                  Illustrations

H         (a) A is a tradesman in Calcutta, B carries on business in
 EXE. ENGR., ROAD DEV. DIVISION NO.Ill, PANVEL 521
  v. ATLANTA LTD. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
     Delhi. 8 , by his agent in Calcutta, buys goods of A and         A
     requests A to deliver them to the East Indian Railway
     Company. A delivers the goods accordingly in Calcutta.
     A may sue 8 for the price of the goods either in Calcutta,
     where the cause of action has arisen or in Delhi, where 8
     carries on business.                                             B

     (b) A resides at Simla, 8 at Calcutta and C at Delhi, A, B
     and C being together at Benaras, B and C make a joint
     promissory note payable on demand, and deliver it to A.
     A may sue 8 and C at Benaras, where the cause of action          C
     arose. He may also sue them at Calcutta, where B resides,
     or at Delhi, where C resides; but in each of these cases,
     if the non-resident defendant objects, the suit cannot
     proceed without the leave of the Court."

     Relying on the above provision, it was asserted, that a          D
reading of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure shows,
that a preference has been postulated for certain provisions
including Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was
evident from the opening words of Section 20 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, which clearly denoted, that the issue of             E
jurisdiction expressed in Section 20 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, would be subject to the overriding effect in the
matter of jurisdiction, expressed in the provisions preceding
Section 20 (i.e. including Section 16).
                                                                      F
      9. Learned counsel for the respondent-Atlanta Limited,
however, strongly opposed the submissions advanced at the
hands of the learned counsel for the appellant, on the issue of
jurisdiction. In this behalf, learned counsel for the respondent
invited our attention to the reply affidavit filed on behalf of the
State of Maharashtra, to Miscellaneous Civil Application No.162       G
of 2012 (filed.by Atlanta Limited before the High Court), para
8 of the reply affidavit which was pointedly brought to our notice
 is being extracted hereunder :

     "8. In fact it is an admitted position and common ground         H
    522       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A         that both; this Hon'ble Court and the District Court at Thane
          have jurisdiction in respect of the subject-matter in issue.
          Peculiarly this Hon'ble Court falls within the definition of the
          term "Court" under Section 2(e) of the Arbitration Act by
          virtue of being a High Court in the Mumbai District having
B         Original Jurisdiction. and on the other hand the District
          Court at Thane being the Principal Civil Court of original
          jurisdiction in the Thane District also falls within the same
          definition."

                                                     (emphasis is ours)
c
         In view of the stand adopted in writing by the appellants,
    in response Miscellaneous Civil Application no. 162 of 2012,
    it was sought to be asserted, that the appellants had no right
    to raise the issue of jurisdiction before this C011rt.
D
       10. Despite the objection noticed in the aforegoing
  paragraphs, it was the vehement contention of the learned
  counsel for the respondent, that the High Court and not the
  District Judge, Thane, had the jurisdiction to adjudicate the
  controversy raised by the rival parties with reference to the
E award of the arbitral tribunal dated 12.5.2012. In order to make
  good the aforesaid submission, it was asserted, that the
  contractual agreement dated 12.7.2000, as also, the
  supplementary agreement dated 11.5.2005, were executed at
  Mumbai. Additionally, it was submitted that the parties had
F mutually agreed, that the seat of arbitration in case of any
  disputes arising between the parties, would be at Mumbai.
  Relying on the aforesaid undisputed factual position, learned
  counsel for the respondent invited our attention to the
  determination rendered by this Court in Bharat Aluminium
G Company & Ors. vs. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc
  & Ors. (2012) 9 sec 559, and made pointed reliance to the
  following observations recorded therein:

          "96.   xxx xxxxxxxxx
H
EXE. ENGR., ROAD DEV. DIVISION NO.Ill, PANVEL            523
 v. ATLANTA LTD. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)
   We are of the opinion, the term "subject matter of the A
   arbitration" cannot be confused with "subject matter of the
   suif'. The term "subject matter" in Section 2(1 )(e) is
   confined to Part I. It has ~ reference and connection with
   the process of dispute resolution. Its purpose is to identify
   the courts having supervisory control over the arbitration B
   proceedings. Hence, it refers to a court which would
   essentially be a court of the seat of the arbitration process.
   In our opinion. the provision in Section 2(1)(e) has to be
   construed keeping in view the provisions in Section 20
   which give recognition to party autonomy. Accepting the c
   narrow construction as projected by the Learned Counsel
   for the Appellants would, in fact. render Section 20
    nugatory. In our view. the legislature has intentionally given
   jurisdiction to two courts i.e. the court which would have
    jurisdiction where the cause of action is located and the D
   courts where the arbitration takes place. This was
    necessary as on many occasions the agreement may
    provide for a seat of arbitration at a place which would be
    neutral to both the parties. Therefore. the courts where the
    arbitration takes place would be required to exercise
    supervisory control over the arbitral process. For example. E
    if the arbitration is held in Delhi, where neither of the
    parties are from Delhi. (Delhi having been chosen as a
    neutral place as between a party from Mumbai and the
    other from Kolkata) and the tribunal sitting in Delhi passes
    an interim order Under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. F
    1996. the appeal against such an interim order under
    Section 37 must lie to the Courts of Delhi being the Courts
    having supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration
    proceedings and the tribunal. This would be irrespective
    of the fact that the obligations to be performed under the G
    contract were to be performed either at Mumbai or at
     Kolkata. and only arbitration is to take place in Delhi. In
    such circumstances. both the Courts would have
     jurisdiction. i.e .. the Court within whose iurisdiction the
    subject matter of the suit is situated and the courts within H
    524       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A         the jurisdiction of which the dispute resolution. i.e ..
          arbitration is located.

          97. The definition of Section 2(1 )(e) includes "subject
          matter of the arbitration" to give jurisdiction to the courts
          where the arbitration takes place, which otherwise would
B
          not exist. On the other hand, Section 47 which is in Part II
          of the Arbitration Act, 1996 dealing with enforcement of
          certain foreign awards has defined the term "courf' as a
          court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the
          award. This has a clear reference to a court within whose
c         jurisdiction the asset/person is located, against which/
          whom the enforcement of the international arbitral award
          is sought. The provisions contained in Section 2(1 )(e)
          being purely jurisdictional in nature can have no relevance
          to the question whether Part I applies to arbitrations which
D         take place outside India.

          98. We now come to Section 20, which is as under:

          "20. Place of arbitration-(1) The parties are free to agree
          on the place of arbitration.
E
          (2) Failing any agreement referred to in Sub-section (1 ),
          the place of arbitration shall be determined by the arbitral
          tribunal having regard to the circumstances of the case,
          including the convenience of the parties.
F
          (3) Notwithstanding Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2), the
          arbitral tribunal may, unless otherwise agreed by the
          parties, meet at any place it considers appropriate for
          consultation among its members, for hearing witnesses,
          experts or the parties, or for inspection of documents, good
G
          or other property."
          A plain reading of Section 20 leaves no room for doubt
          that where the place of arbitration is in India, the parties
          are free to agree to any "place" or "seat" within India, be it
H         Delhi, Mumbai etc. In the absence of the parties'
 EXE. ENGR., ROAD DEV. DIVISION NO.Ill, PANVEL 525
  v. ATLANTA LTD. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
    agreement thereto, Section 20(2) authorizes the tribunal           A
    to determine the place/seat of such arbitration. Section
    20(3) enables the tribunal to meet at any place for
    conducting hearings at a place of convenience in matters
    such as consultations among its members for hearing
    witnesses, experts or the parties."                                B

                                               (emphasis is ours)

     11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

     12. we: have recorded hereinabove the foundation, on the          C
basis whereof, the present controversy was adjudicated before
the High Court. As noticed above, the challenge to the
impugned order passed by the High Court, is based on the
question of jurisdiction. While the learned counsel for the
appellants has placed reliance on Section 2(1 )(e) of the              D
Arbitration Act read with the provisions of Code of Civil
Procedure to contend, that the District Judge, Thane, alone
would have the jurisdiction in the matter; the contention raised
on behalf of the respondent is, that the High Court alone in
exercise of its "ordinary original civil jurisdiction", has the        E
jurisdiction to determine the controversy arising out of the
impugned award dated 12.5.2012.

      13. In our view, it is not open to the appellants to advance
such submission before this Court. Firstly, because the
appellants had in paragraph 8 of the reply affidavit filed before      F
the High Court, clearly acknowledged the legal position, that
both the High Court as also the District Judge, Thane, in so far
as the present controversy is concerned, fall within the definition
of the term "Court" under Section 2(1 )(e) of the Arbitration Act.
And secondly, because the impugned order passed by the High            G
Court expressly notices in paragraph 10, that it was admitted
by the rival parties before the High Court, that the High Court
on the original side, as also the District Judge, Thane, had the
jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter. Relevant part of para
10 of the impugned judgment of the High Court is being                 H
    526      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 1 S.C.R.

A extracted hereunder:-

          "10. Mr. Vashi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
          Petitioner submitted that in the Affidavit-in-Reply which has
          been filed in this petition, it is admitted by the Respondents
          that the place of arbitration in terms of the arbitration
B
          clause in the contract was Mumbai. It is also admitted that
          both. this Court on the Original Side and the District Court
          at Thane have jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter
          in issue."
c                                                  (emphasis is ours)

        It was therefore not open to the appellants to canvass
  before this Court that the High Court of Bombay in exercise of
  its "ordinary original civil jurisdiction" could not adjudicate upon
D the present controversy, on account of lack of jurisdiction. We
  shall therefore proceed in the first instance, on the premise that
  both the courts referred to above had jurisdiction in the matter.
  We shall independently record our reasons for the same, while
  dealing with the submissions advanced before us. We have
E chosen to do so, because we are of the view, that an important
  jurisdictional issue has been raised, which needs to be settled,
  one way or the other. We shall therefore, decide the controversy
  on merits, irrespective of the position expressed by the
  appellant, on the issue of jurisdiction.

F       14. During the course of hearing before us, learned
  counsel for the appellant had highlighted for our consideration,
  the factual/legal controversy which was agitated by the rival
  parties before the High Court. In this behalf it was further pointed
  out, firstly, that the respondent's case before the High Court
G was, that since the arbitral tribunal had its seat at Mumbai, and
  the works contract was executed at Mumbai, the original side
  of the High Court of Bombay was competent to entertain the
  controversy. On the other hand, the appellants before the High
  Court had pointed out, that since the works contract relating to
H the construction and maintenance of the Mumbra byepass on
 EXE. ENGR., ROAD DEV. DIVISION NO.Ill, PANVEL 527
  v. ATLANTA LTD. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
the Mumbai-Pune road (located on national highway no. 4), and A
the toll collection site were situated within Thane District, the
District Judge, Thane, was the "more suitable" court for
determining the controversies raised by the rival parties.
Secondly, it was pointed out, that before the High Court an
application under Section 24 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure B
was filed in the matter pending before the High Court, for
transfer of proceedings filed by the respondents. It was
 submitted, that through the above application, it was not open
to the High Court to have transferred the proceedings pending
 before the District Judge, Thane. It was further pointed out, that c
 before the High Court the appellants had orally submitted, that
 if the High Court was inclined to invoke its jurisdiction under
 Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the proceedings
 filed by the respondent before the High Court should have been
 transferred to the District Judge, Thane, and not the other way
                                                                    0
 around. According to the learned counsel, the instant
 submission has been duly noticed in the impugned judgment.
 Lastly, it was contended, that Section 24 of the Code of Civil
 Procedure could not be invoked in a petition filed under Section
 34 of the Arbitration Act, and therefore, Section 24 of the Code E
 of Civil Procedure ought not to have been relied upon by the
 High Court for transferring the proceedings from the Court of
  District Judge, Thane, to the High Court of Bombay.

      15. The following submissions were advanced before us.
Firstly, considering clause (c) of the operative part of the award,   F
according to learned counsel it was clear, that enforcement of
such a clause in the award was site-specific, since Mumbra
byepass is located on the Mumbai-Pune road (on national
highway no. 4) and falls in Thane District, the District Judge,
Thane, ought to be "natural choice" for consideration of the          G
issues advanced by the appellants, as also the respondent.
Secondly, according to the learned counsel for the appellants,
the definition of the term "Court" expressed in Section 2(1 ){e)
of the Arbitration Act uses the expression "subject matter" and
not "cause of action". While "cause of action" can be referable       H
    528      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A to places where the works contract is executed, or where
  arbitration proceedings were conducted; the term "subject
  matter" used in Section 2(1 )(e) of the Arbitration Act is only
  referable to the subject matter of the works contract, with
  respect to which the dispute is raised (with respect to which,
B there was a direction for extension of the concession period,
  under the award). Accordingly it was submitted, that although
  the High Court may also have jurisdiction, the District Court
  Thane is "more natural", "more suitable" and "more appropriate"
  for the adjudication of the claims, raised by the rival parties.
c Thirdly it was contended, that the original side of the High Court
  of Bombay, vis-a-vis, the District Judge, Thane, is a "superior"
  Court. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, even
  if it is acknowledged that the "ordinary original civil side" of the
  High Court of Bombay as also the "principal Civil Court of
D original jurisdiction" for the District Thane i.e., the District Judge,
  Thane, both have jurisdiction in the matter, there were many
  attributes on the basis of which it could be clearly established,
  that the original side of the High Court of Bombay, is superior
  to the Court of the District Judge, Thane. In this behalf it was
  sought to be pointed out, that the High Court could take
E cognizance of contempt of its own orders, and furthermore, a
  judgment delivered by the original side of a High Court operated
  as a binding precedent. It was submitted, that the District Court,
  Thane, does not have any such attributes. In the above view of
  the matter it was submitted, that reliance could be placed on
F Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to determine which
  of the two courts should adjudicate upon the matter. Section
  15 is being extracted hereunder:-

          "15. Court in which suits to be instituted-
G
        Every suit shall be instituted in the Court of the lowest
    grade competent to try it."

       Based on Section 15 extracted above it was submitted,
  that in case jurisdiction could be exercised by two Courts, it
H was imperative to choose the Court of the lowest grade
EXr=--ENGR., ROAD DEV. DIVISION NO.Ill, PANVEL 529
 v. ATLANTA LTD. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
competent to try the suit. Accordingly, it was contended, that     A
from amongst the original side of the High Court of Bombay
and the District Court, Thane, in terms of the mandate of
Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the District Court,
Thane, being the Court lower in grade than the original side of
the High Court of Bombay, ought to have been chosen to             B
adjudicate upon the matters. It was also pointed out, that the
choice of District Court, Thane, would even otherwise be
beneficial to the rival parties on account of the fact, that the
determination by the said Court, would be. open for re-
examination before the High Court of Bombay, which exercises       c
supervisory jurisdiction over it.

       16. Additionally, it was contended, that the choice would
fall in favour of the District Judge, Thane, even on account of
the likely expeditious disposal of the matter by the District
Judge, Thane, in comparison with the "original side of the High D
Court of Bombay". In this behalf it was submitted, that there
were only 42 petitions filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration
Act before the District Judge, Thane, during the entire year
2012, whereas, there were 1317 petitions filed under Section
34· before the High Court of Bombay, under its "ordinary original E
civil jurisdiction", during the year 2012. Referring to the
preceding three years, namely, 2009, 2010 and 2011 it was
submitted, whereas a very few petitions were filed under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the District Judge,
Thane, as many as, 1033, 1443 and 1081 petitions respectively F
(were filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act) were filed
during the three years before the High Court of Bombay. Based
on the above factual position it was submitted, that it could be
expected that the District Judge, Thane, would dispose of the
matters under reference .within a short period of about five G
years, whereas it was likely that the disposal of the said matters
will take more than two decades if the matters are required to
 be adjudicated by the original side of the High Court of
 Bombay. On the instant aspect of the matter also, referring to
 available data it was submitted, that it takes more than 20 H
    530      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 1 S.C.R.

A years for a suit to be heard and decided by the High Court of
  Bombay under its "ordinary original civil jurisdiction", whereas,
  it does not take more than 5 years for a suit filed before the
  District Judge, Thane, to be disposed of. Accordingly it was
  contended, that keeping in view the burden of litigation, the
B "natural choice" for adjudication of the matters under reference
  ought to be the District Judge, Thane, rather than the High Court
  of Bombay.

        17. Besides the above submissions, no other contention
    was advanced before us.
c
        18. We shall first endeavour to address the submissions
  advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants,
  with reference to Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In
  terms of the mandate of Section 15 of the Code of Civil
D Procedure, the initiation of action within the jurisdiction of
  Greater Mumbai had to be "in the Court of lowest grade
  competent to try it". We are, however, satisfied, that within the
  area of jurisdiction of Principal District Judge, Greater Mumbai,
  only the High Court of Bombay was exclusively the competent
E Court (under its "ordinary original civil jurisdiction") to adjudicate
  upon the matter. The above conclusion is imperative from the
  definition of the term "Court" in Section 2(1 )(e) of the Arbitration
  Act. Firstly, the very inclusion of the High Court "in exercise of
  its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, within the definition of the
F term "Court", will be rendered nugatory, if the above conclusion
  was not to be accepted. Because, the "principal Civil Court of
  original jurisdiction in a district" namely the District Judge
  concerned, being a court lower in grade than the High Court,
  the District Judge concerned would always exclude the High
G Court from adjudicating upon the matter. The submission
  advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant cannot
  therefore be accepted, also to ensure the inclusion of "the High
  Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction" is given
  its due meaning. Accordingly, the principle enshrined in Section
  15 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be invoked whilst
H interpreting Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act. Secondly, the
   EXE. ENGR., ROAD DEV. DIVISION_N0.111, PANVEL 531
    v. ATLANTA LTD. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
  provisions of the Arbitration Act, leave no room for any doubt,           A
  that it is the superior most court exercising original civil
  jurisdiction, which had been chosen to adjudicate disputes
  arising out of arbitration agreements, arbitral proceedings and
  arbitral awards. Undoubtedly, a "principal Civil Court of original
  jurisdiction in a district", is the superior most court exercising        B
- original civil jurisdiction in the district over which its jurisdiction
  extends. It is clear, that Section 2(1 )(e) of the Arl::litration Act
  having vested jurisdiction in the "principal Civil Court of original
  jurisdiction in a district", did not rest the choice of jurisdiction
  on courts subordinate to that of the District Judge. Likewise,            c
  "the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original jurisdiction",
   is the superior most court exercising original civil jurisdiction,
  within the ambit of its original civil jurisdiction. On the same
  analogy and for the same reasons, the choice of jurisdiction,
  will clearly fall in the realm of the High Court, wherever a High
                                                                            0
   Court exercises "ordinary original civil jurisdiction". Under the
   Arbitration Act, therefore, the legislature has clearly expressed
   a legislative intent, different from the one expressed in Section
   15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The respondent had chosen
   to initiate proceedings within the area of Greater Mumbai, it            E
   could have done so only before the High Court of Bombay.
   There was no other court within the jurisdiction of Greater
   Mumbai, where the responderit could have raised their
   challenge. Consequently, we have no hesitation in concluding,
  that the respondent by initiating proceedings under Section 34
   of the Arbitration Act, before the original side of the High Court       F
   of Bombay, had not violated the mandate of Section 2(1)(e) of
   the Arbitration Act. Thus viewed, we find the submission
   advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants,
   by placing reliance on Section 15 of the Code of Civil
    Procedure, wholly irrelevant.                                           G

      19. Reliance placed on Section 16 of the Code of Civil
  Procedure, by the learned counsel for the appellants, for the
  ouster the jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay is equally
  misplaced. All that needs to be stated while dealing with the             H
    532     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014) 1 S.C.R.


A aforesaid contention is, that the controversy between the parties
  does not pertain to recovery of immoveable property, partition
  of immoveable property, foreclosure sale or redemption of
  immoveable property, determination of any other right to
  immoveable property, for determination of compensation for
B wrong to immoveable property and/or for the recovery of
  moveable property under distraint or attachment. It is only in the
  aforesaid exigencies that Section 16 of the Code of Civil
  Procedure could have been invoked. The construction of the
  Mumbra byepass, would only entitle Atlanta Limited to
c payments contemplated under the contract dated 12.7.2007,
  and no more. A brief description of the reliefs sought by the
  rival parties, in the separate proceedings initiated by them,
  does not indicate that either of the parties were claiming any
  right to or interest in any immovable property. Since none of
D the above exigencies contemplated in Section 16 prevail in the
  dispute between the rival parties, reliance on Section 16 of the
  Code of Civil Procedure is clearly misplaced.

        20. Insofar as the jurisdiction within the District Thane, is
  concerned, the "principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction" is
E the court of the District Judge, Thane. Consequently, within the
  territorial jurisdiction of District Thane, in terms of Section
  2(1 )(e) of the Arbitration Act, the challenge could have only
  been raised before the "principal Civil Court of original
  jurisdiction" of the district, namely, before the District Judge,
F Thane. There was no other court within the jurisdiction of District
  Thane, wherein the instant matters could have been agitated.
  Therefore, the appellants having chosen to initiate the
  proceedings before the District Judge, Thane, i.e., in respect
  of a cause of action falling in the territorial jurisdiction of the
G District Thane, they too must be deemed to have chosen the
   rightful court i.e., the District Judge, Thane.
       21. Shorn of the aforesaid determination, our only
  understanding of the submission advanced at the hands of the
  learned counsel for the appellants would be, that as a matter
H of "natural choice", as a matter of "suitable choice", as also, as
 EXE. ENGR., ROAD DEV. DIVISION NO.Ill, PANVEL 533
  v. ATLANTA LTD. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

a matter of "more appropriate choice", the controversies raised        A
by the rival parties ought to be collectively determined by the
District Court, Thane, and not by the High Court of Bombay (in
exercise of its "ordinary original civil jurisdiction"). In order to
supplement the aforesaid contention, learned !'.:OUnsel for the
appellant had depicted the quantum of filing of stmilar petitions      B
before the High Court, as also, before the District Court Thane,
and the time likely to be taken for the disposal of such matters
by the Courts under reference. There is no statutory provision
to our knowledge, wherein the determination of jurisdiction, is-
based on such considerations. No such provision was brought            c
to our notice by learned counsel. The question of jurisdiction,
is a pure question of law, and needs to be adjudicated only on
the basis of statutory provisions. In view of the deliberations
recorded hereinabove, it may not be wrong to observe, that the
submissions advanced at the behest of the learned counsel for          [}
the appellants on the issue of jurisdiction, are submissions
without reference to any principles known to law. To the credit
of the learned counsel for the appellants, it may however be
observed, that_the above considerations may constitute a
relevant basis for transfer of proceedings from one court to the       E
other. Before the above considerations can be examined, there
would be one pre-condition, namely, that the above
considerations could be applied for transfer of a case, where
statutory provisions (express or implied) do not provide for the
exercise of a definite choice. As a matter of expressing
ourselves clearly, it may be stated, that inference of legislative     F
intent from statutory provisions, would exclude from the realm
of consideration, submissions of the nature relied upon by the
learned counsel for the appellant.

     22. The first issue which needs to be examined is, whether        G
a challenge to an arbitration award (or arbitral agreement, or
arbitral proceeding), wherein jurisdiction lies with more than
one court, can be permitted to proceed simultaneously in two
different courts. For the above determination, it is necessary
                                                                       H
    534      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A   to make a reference to Section 42 of the Arbitration Act. The
    aforesaid provision accordingly is being extracted hereunder:

          "42. Jurisdiction - Notwithstanding anything contained
          elsewhere in this Part or in any other law for the time being
B         in force, where with respect to an arbitration agreement
          any application under this Part has been made in a Court,
          that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral
          proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out
          of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be
          made in that Court and in no other Court."
c
          A perusal of Section 42 of Arbitration Act reveals a clear
    acknowledgment by the legislature, that the jurisdiction for
    raising a challenge to the same arbitration agreement, arbitral
    proceeding or arbitral award, could most definitely arise in
D   more than one court simultaneously. To remedy such a situation
    Section 42 of the Arbitration Act mandates, that the court
    wherein the first application arising out of such a challenge is
    filed, shall alone have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the
    dispute(s), which are filed later in point of time. The above
E   legislative intent must also be understood as mandating, that
    disputes arising out of the same arbitration agreement, arbitral
    proceeding or arbitral award, would not be adjudicated upon
    by more than one court, even though jurisdiction to raise such
    disputes may legitimately lie before two or more courts.
F        23. Ordinarily Section 42 of the Arbitration Act would be
    sufficient to resolve such a controversy. For the determination
    of the present controversy, however, reliance cannot be placed
    on Section 42 of the Arbitration Act, because the State of
    Maharashtra had moved Miscellaneous Civil Application No.
G   229 and Miscellaneous Civil Application No 230 of 2012 under
    Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the District Judge,
    Thane, on the same day as Atlanta Limited had filed Arbitration
    Petition No. 1158 of 2012 before the High Court. In this behalf
    it may be mentioned, that both the parties had approached the
H   courts referred to hereinabove on 7.8.2012. The answer to the
EXE. ENGR., ROAD DEV. DIVISION NO.Ill, PANVEL                  535
 v. ATLANTA LTD. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
jurisdictional question, arising out in the facts and circumstances    A
of this case, will therefore not emerge from Section 42 of the
Arbitration Act. All the same it is imperative for us to give effect
to the legislative intent recorded under Section 42
aforementioned, namely, that all disputes arising out of a
common arbitration agreement, arbitral proceeding or arbitral          B
 award, would lie only before one court.

     24. The very fact that the appellants before this Court, have
chosen to initiate proceedings against the arbitral award before
"principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district" i.e.,   C
before the District Judge, Thane, and the respondent before
this Court, has raised a challenge to the same arbitral award
before the "ordinary original civil side" of the High Court of
Bombay, clearly demonstrates, that the underlying principle
contained in Section 42 of the Arbitration /\ct would stand
breached, if two different courts would adjudicate upon disputes       D
arising out of the same arbitral award. There can be no doubt,
that adjudication of a controversy by different courts, can easily
give rise to different conclusions and determinations. Therefore,
logic and common sense also require, the determination of all
such matters, by one jurisdictional court alone. In the present        E
case, the complication in the matter has arisen only because,
the proceedings initiated by the appellants before the District
Judge, Thane, and proceedings initiated by the respondent on
the "ordinary original civil side" of the High Court of Bombay,
were filed on the same day (i.e. on 7.8.2012). Therefore,              F
Section 42 of the Arbitration Act, cannot be of any assistance
in the matter in hand.

      25. All the same, it is imperative for us to determine, which
of the above two courts which have been approached by the              G
rival parties, should be the one, to adjudicate upon the disputes
raised. For an answer to the controversy in hand, recourse ought
to be made first of all to the provisions of the Arbitration Act.
On the failure to reach a positive conclusion, other principles
of law, may have to be relied upon. Having given out thoughtful
                                                                       H
    536      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 1 S.C.R.


A consideration to the issue in hand, we are of the view, that the
  rightful answer can be determined from Section 2(1)(e) of the
  Arbitration Act, which defines the term "Court". We shall
  endeavour to determine this issue, by examining how litigation
  is divided between a High Court exercising "ordinary original
s civil jurisdiction", and the "principal civil court of original
  jurisdiction" in a district. What needs to be kept in mind is, that
  the High Court of Bombay is vested with "ordinary original civil
  jurisdiction" over the same area, over which jurisdiction is also
  exercised by the "principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction"
c for the District of Greater Mumbai (i.e. the Principal District
  Judge, Greater Mumbai). Jurisdiction of the above two courts
  on the "ordinary original civil side" is over the area of Greater
  Mumbai. Whilst examining the submissions advanced by the
  learned counsel for the appellant under Section 15 of the Code
D of Civil Procedure, we have already concli.: :zd. that in the
   above situation, jurisdiction will vest with the High Court and not
  with the District Judge. The aforesaid choice of jurisdiction has
  been expressed in Section 2(1 )(e) of the Arbitration Act, without
   any fetters whatsoever. It is not the case of the appellants before
   us, that because of pecuniary dimensions, and/or any other
E consideration(s). jurisdiction in the two alternatives mentioned
   above, would lie with the Principal District Judge, Greater
   Mumbai. Under the scheme of the provisions of the Arbitration
   Act therefore, if the choice is between the High Court (in
   exercise of its "ordinary original civil jurisdiction") on the one
F hand, and the "principal civil court of original jurisdiction" in the
   District i.e. the District Judge on the other; Section 2(1 )(e) of
   the Arbitration Act has made the choice in favour of the High
   Court. This in fact impliedly discloses a legislative intent. To our
   mind therefore, it makes no difference, if the "pr:ncipal civil court
G of original jurisdiction", is in the same district over which the
   High Court exercises original jurisdiction, or some other district.
   In case an option is to be exercised between a High Court
   (under its "ordinary original civil jurisdiction") on the one hand,
   and a District Court (as "principal Civil Court of original
H
 EXE. ENGR., ROAD DEV. DIVISION NO.Ill, PANVEL 537
  v. ATLANTA LTD. [JAG DISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
jurisdiction") on the other, the choice under the Arbitration Act           A
has to be exercised in favour of the High Court.

       26. In the present controversy also, we must choose the
jurisdiction of one of two courts i.e. either the "ordinary original
civil jurisdiction" of the High Court of Bombay; or the "principal          B
civil court of original jurisdiction" in District Thane i.e. the District
Judge, Thane. In view of the inferences drawn by us, based on
the legislative intent emerging out of Section 2(1 )(e) of the
Arbitration Act, we are of the considered view, that legislative
choice is clearly in favour of the High Court. We are, therefore            C
of the view, that the matters in hand would have to be
adjudicated upon by the High Court of Bombay alone.

     27. In view of the conclusions drawn by us above, we
uphold the order passed by the High Court requiring the matters
to be adjudicated on the "ordinary original civil side" by the High         D
Court of Bombay. The reasons recorded by the High Court, for
the above conclusion, were different. The reasons for our
consideration have already been notice above. In view of the
above, we dispose of the instant appeal, with a direction that
Arbitration Petition No. 1158 of 2012 filed by the Atlanta                  E
Limited (the respondent herein) before the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay, and Miscellaneous Application No. 229
of 2012 and Miscellaneous Application No. 230 of 2012 filed
by the appellants before the District Judge, Thane, shall be
heard and disposed of by the High Court of Bombay. We                       F
accordingly hereby direct the District Judge, Thane, to transfer
the files of Miscellaneous Application No. 229 of 2012 and
Miscellaneous Application No. 230 of 2012 to the High Court,
for disposal in accordance with law.

D.G.                                            Appeal disposed of.         G