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Supreme Court of India

ESKAYEF (NOW KNOWN AS SMITHKLINE BEECHAM PHARMACEUTICALS (INDIA) LTD. ETC.versusCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, KARNATAKA-II, BANGALORE

Citation
2000 INSC 346
Decided
20 July 2000
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

The Court held that surtax liability is not deductible under section 37 and that distribution of free samples to doctors is deemed advertisement/publicity/sales promotion falling within section 37(3A), rendering such expenditure non‑deductible.

Summary

The appellant, a pharmaceutical company, claimed deduction for the liability to pay surtax and for expenditure incurred on distributing free samples of prescription drugs to doctors. The Revenue argued that surtax liability is not deductible under section 37 and that the sample distribution is a form of advertisement, publicity or sales promotion covered by the restrictive clause of section 37(3A). The Court affirmed the earlier rulings that surtax cannot be deducted and held that the purpose of supplying free samples is to create awareness among doctors and persuade them to prescribe the drugs, which amounts to publicity and sales promotion. Consequently, the expenditure on the samples falls within section 37(3A) and is not allowable as a deduction. The Court also clarified that the prohibition in the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954 applies only to publication, not to the distribution of physician's samples. Both appeals were dismissed with costs.

Issues considered

  • Whether liability to pay surtax is an admissible deduction under section 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
  • Whether expenditure incurred on distribution of free samples of prescription drugs to doctors constitutes advertisement, publicity or sales promotion within the ambit of section 37(3A).

Legislation cited

Subjects

Income TaxDeductionSurtaxSection 37Section 37(3A)AdvertisementPublicitySales promotionPhysician's samplesPharmaceuticalsDrugs and Magic Remedies Act

Judgment

A          ESKA YEF (NOW KNOWN AS SMITHKLINE BEECHAM
                 PHARMACEUTICALS (INDIA) LTD. ETC.
                               v.
           COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, KARNA TAKA-11,
                           BANGALORE.

B                                  JULY 20, 2000

                  [S.P. BHARUCHA AND MS. RUMA PAL, JJ.]


C        Income Tax Act, 1961-Section 37-Liability to pay surtax-Whether
    an admissible deduction in computing total income-Held, not deductible.

          Section 37(3A)-Expenditure incurred on distribution of free samples
    of prescription drugs to doctors-Whether in the nature of advertisement or
    publicity or sales promotion falling within the restrictive provisions of the
D   section-Held yes.

          Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954-
    Section 3-Prohibition of publication of advertisement of a drug-Held,
    prohibition not applicable to physician's samples.

E         In these appeals, the following two questions were raised:

           I.   Whether the surtax liability is an admissible deduction under
                section 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1961?

           2.   Whether ex.penditure incurred on distribution of free samples of
                prescription drugs to doctors is in nature of advertisement falling
F               within the restrictive provisions of section 37(3A) of the Act?

          Appellant-assessee contended that the expenditure incurred on
    distribution of free samples of prescription drugs to doctors did not amount
    to advertisement or publicity or sales promotion and thereby not subjected to
G   restrictions under sub-section 3A of section 37. The Income Tax Appellate
    Tribunal and the High Court rejected the contention of the assessee.

           In appeal to this Court, the assessee submitted that the purpose of the
    distribution of drugs was to obtain a feedback from the medical profession as
    to the efficacy of the distributed drugs. The assessee further submitted that
H   section 3 of the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements)
                                        634
  ESKA YEF (NOW KNOWN AS SMITHKLINE BEECHAM PHARMACEUTICALS(INDIA) LTD. ETC."· C.I. T.   635
 Act, 1954, prohibits the publication of any advertisement of the drugs.                       A
       Dismissing the appeals, this Court

        HELD: 1. With regard to the first question, i.e. whether the surtax
 liability is an admissible deduction, the master is no longer res integra.
                                                                       1636-GI                 B
       Smith Kline and French (India) ltd & Ors. v. Commissioner of Income
 Tax, (1996) 219 ITR 581, relied on.

       2. The target for any advertisement or publicity or sales promotion of                  C
 the drugs could only be the doctors who would prescribe them. The object of
 distribution of the samples of the drugs to the doctors is to make them aware
 that such drugs are available in the market in relation to the cure of a
 particular affliction and therefore to persuade them to prescribe the same in
 appropriate cases. So doing is tantamount to publicity and sales promotion.
 The assessee has not produced filled up questionnaires or letters from doctors                D
 in support of its claim that the free samples of prescription drugs were
 distributed to doctors for obtaining feedback from them. 1639-D-El

        3. The prohibition under the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable
. Advertisements) Act, 1954 is not applicable to physician's samples. What is
  barred thereby is publication and that is amply clear when one refers to the                 E
  definition of"advertisement" in the Act.1639-H; 640-AI

      Smith Kline and French (India). Ltd v. Commissioner of Income Tax,
 (1992) 193 ITR 582, approved.

      Commissioner of Income Tax v. J & J Dechane laboratories (P) ltd.,                       F
 (1996) 222 ITR 11, distinguished.

      Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ampro Food Products, (1995) 215 ITR
904, referred to.

      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2717of1996.                               G
        From the Judgment and Order dated 11.3.91 of the Kamataka High Court
 in l.T.R.C. No. 182of1985.

                                         WITH
      Civil Appeal Nos. 4545-4577/1996.                                                        H
    636                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A       D.A. Dave, Ms. Pratibha M. Singh, Ms. Kavita Wadia, Ramesh Singh,
    Maninder Singh and S. Syal for the Appellant.

          M.L. Venna, G. Venkatesh Rao and Ms. Sushma Suri for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B         BHARUCHA, J. Civil Appeal No. 2717 of 1996 :

           The appeal relates to the Assessment year 1980-81. It is on a certificate
    of fitness to appeal granted by the High Court. The certification was only in
    respect of one question which read thus:

C           "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the
            liability to pay surtax is an admissible deduction in computing the
            total income?"

          The answer to this question is covered against the assessee by the
    decision of this court in the assessee's own case, 2191.T.R. 581. The question
D   is, accordingly, answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue.

          The civil appeal is dismissed.

          No order as to <:osts.

E Civil Appeal Nos. 4545-4547 of 1996:
          These are appeals from the judgment and order of the Division Bench
    of the Kamataka High Court in Income Tax References. The questions that
    the High Court was called upon to answer read thus:

F           "Question of law in ITRC 144 of 1993

           (a) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the
           liability to pay surtax is an admissible deduction in computing the
           total income?

           (b) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the
G          expenditure incurred on physician's samples is in the nature of
           advertisement expenditure falling within the restrictive provisions of
           Section 37 (3A) of the Income Tax Act?

           Question of law in ITRC 143 of 1993.
H          (a) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the
 ESKAYEF(NOW KNOWN AS SMITHKLINE BEECHAM PHARMACEUTICALS(INDIA) LTD. ETC. v. C.l.T. (BHARUCHA. J. I   637

          liability to pay surtax is an admissible deduction in computing the                               A
          total income?

          Question of law in ITRC 171 of 1994.

          Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the
          Tribunal was right in holding that the applicant was not entitled to the                          B
          deduction of surtax levied while computing the total income of the
          applicant?"

     It is common ground that the questions that relate to surtax must be
answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue by reason of the
judgment of this Court in the case of Smith Kline and French (India) Ltd                                    C
and Ors. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1996) 219 !TR 581. They are so
answered.

      The issue that is canvassed at the bar relates to the physician's samples
that the assessee, a pharmaceutical company, distributes to the medical
profession. It is the assessee's case that these are all samples of prescription                            D
drugs, and we proceed upon that basis. Learned counsel for the assessee
submitted that the distribution of physician's samples to doctors did not
amount to advertisement or publicity or sales promotion and, therefore, all the
expenditure incurred by the appellants on such distribution was exempt,
under the provisions of section 37 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 (for short 'the                              E
Act') as expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the
appellants business and not subject to the restrictions on allowability contained
in sub-section (3A) thereof.

      The submission did not find favour with the Income-Tax Appellate
Tribunal and with the High Court. The High Court, in the order under appeal,
followed its earlier judgment in the case of Smith Kline and French (India)                                 F
ltd v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 193 !TR 582, (which also concerned the
assessee). The High Court there had said :

              "We do not think that we should discuss the principle pertaining
         to the interpretation of statutes referred to above in detail because the                          G
         idea behind the contention is to convey that advertisement, publicity
         or sales promotion should be confined to the act of media propaganda
         and a direct approach to the consumers by publicising the product
         through newspaper advertisements, posters or some other similar
         methods. We do not think that such a limited meaning should be
         given to the three words. The nature of the advertisement or publicity                             H
    638                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A         depends upon the nature and quality of the article in question. An
          inducement to the public to buy a particular commodity. may be
          formulated in a mode most suitable to the article in question.

               The members of the public would not buy a drug just because it
          is advertised repeatedly or publicised through posters or announced
B         on the T. V. etc. The members of the public should have confidence
          about the curativ1: value of the drug and such confidence could be
          created mainly by the medical practitioners prescribing the said drug
          or when the medical practitioners give the same to patients towards
          treatment. The media through which the drug could get publicised and
          earn goodwill will be the media of prescription by the medical
c         practitioner. Further, the real persons who could create a market for a
          particular drug are the medical practitioners themselves having regard
          to the nature of th1: drug, when compared to other industrial products.
          A drug is not an ordinary article of consumption. It is consumed only
          to get rid of some ailment. Before the drug gets circulated, its reputation
D         will have to be confirmed to the medical practitioners and that is why
          free samples are supplied to them.

              If the object of supplying free samples is only to find out the
          reaction of the medical practitioners about the efficacy or curative
          value of the drug, the supply of free samples would have been
E         confmed during the initial stages of production of a new drug. However,
          that is not the case of the assessee here. The assessee nowhere
          contends that free samples were given to the medical practitioners
          only at the time when a drug is introduced for the first time.

              Learned counsel for the Revenue also pointed out that the assessee
F         in its original return of income has included these sums under the
          head "Advertisement, publicity and sales promotion". Therefore, the
          assessee's first impression about the nature of the free samples was
          the correct approach and the assessee has properly disclosed the
          same under an appropriate head in the return. Subsequently, the
          assessee sent a letter modifying the original return of income and
G         offered to confine the claim under this head to a part of the expenditure.

              Learned counsel for the Revenue is justified in pointing out the
          above circumstance as an additional factor in support of the conclusion
          arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal.

H             Each of thP. three words "advertisement, publicity and sales
 ESKAYEFtNOW KNOWN AS SMITHKLINE BEECHAM PHARMACEUTICALS{INDIA) LTD. ETC v C.1.T. (BHARUCHA.   J.1639

         promotion" cannot always be confined to distinct and different                                 A
         concepts. Some aspects of one word could naturally overlap with the
         meaning attributed to the other word. No doubt, in a commercial
         sense, the purpose of these activities is to gain goodwill and a market
         but the mode of achieving this object cannot be confined to the
         limited meaning attributed to them by learned counsel for the assessee."                       B
       Learned counsel for the assessee submitted that the physician's samples
were distributed only to doctors and, therefore, the expenditure incurred
thereon could not be said to be for advertisement or publicity or sales
promotion. He submitted that the purpose of such distribution was to obtain
a feedback from the medical profession as to the efficacy of the distributed                            C
drugs. As to the first point, we are entirely in agreement with the view taken
in the judgment under appeal. Having regard to the fact that these are
prescription drugs, the target for any advertisement or publicity or sales
promotion thereof could only be the doctors who would prescribe them. The
object, we have no doubt, of distribution of the samples of the drugs to the
doctors is to make them aware that such drugs are available in the market in                            D
relation to the cure of a particular affliction and therefore, to persuade them
to prescribe the same in appropriate cases. So doing is, in our view tantamount
to publicity and sales promotion. Regarding the submission that the
distribution of the physician's samples of the drugs is meant only for obtaining
feedback from the doctors, we should have thought that the assessee would                               E
have backed it up by the production of such feedback in the form of filled
up questionnaires or letters as it might have received from doctors in the past,
if any. It is an eloquent answer to the submission that there has been no such
production.

       Learned counsel for the assessee drew our attention to the provisions                            F
of the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954.
Sec 3 thereof prohibits the publication of any advertisement referring to any
drug the terms of which suggest or are calculated to lead to the use of that
drug for "(d) the diagnosis, cure, mitigation treatment or prevention of any
disease, disorder or condition specified in the Schedule, or any other disease,                         G
disorder or condition .......". Learned counsel's submission was that we should
not decide in a manner which would lead to the conclusion that the assessee
had advertised by means of physician's samples, drugs contrary to the
prohibition under the Drugs and Magic (Objectionable Advertisements) Act
1954. We do not read the prohibition therein as applicable to physician's
samples. What is barred thereby is publication and that is amply clear when                             H
        640                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A       one refers to the definition of "advertisement" in that Act.

    '      Learned counsel for the assessee cited the judgment of a division
    Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Commissioner of
    Income-Tax v. Ampro Food Products, 215 !TR 904. The judgment, substantially,
    takes the view the kamataka High Court had taken in the assessee's case
B   cited above except that it said "Expenditure of the nature which is essential
    to the running of the business-a bare minimum to carry on the trade-would
    not fall within the meaning of the three expressions, i.e., advertisement publicity
    and sales promotion. The other expenditure, incurred under any of the three
    heads, would be within the mischief of the provisions of sub-section (3A) of
C   sec 37 of the Act and therefore, will have to be scaled down." The judgment
    in Ampro Food Products (supra) was followed by the Andhra Pradesh High
    Court in Commissioner of Income-Tax v. J & J Dechane Laboratories (P)
    ltd, (1996) 222 !TR 11. This was a case that related to physician's samples.
    The High Court said :

D              "In the instant ca.se, the assessee claimed expenditure on distribution
               of physicians, samples under sec 37 general head. In view of the
               principles settled by this court in the aforesaid decision, if the
               expenditure falls within the bare minimum it will not be caught by sub-
               section (3A) of sec 37, but if it is of the nature which is not essential
E             to the carrying of the business, it will be within the net of sub-section
              (3A). Physicians' samples are necessary to ascertain the efficacy of
              the medicine and to introduce it in the market for circulation and it is
              only by this method the purpose is achieved. In such cases giving
              physicians samples for a reasonable period is essential to the business
              of n1anufacture and sales of the medicine. But if a particular medicine
F             has been introduced into the_ market and its uses are established,
              giving of free samples could only be as a measure of sales promotion
              and advertisement and would thus be hit by sub-section (3A). As in
              this case there is a finding of the Commissioner (Appeals) and
              confirmed by the Tribunal that the expenditure was incurred to test
              the efficacy of the drug, the expenditure would be within the ambit of
G
              bare minimum to carry on the business. For these reasons, it has to
              be held that the expenditure on physicians' samples distributed to
              doctors is outside the scope of sub-section (3A) of section 37 of the
              Act. Therefore, the appellate authority as well as the Tribunal are right
              in directing the exclusion of the expenditure on free samples supplied
H             to the doctors in working out disallowance under section 37 (3A) of
      ESKAYEF (NOW KNOWN AS SMITHKLINE BEECHAM PHARMACEUTICALS(INDIA) l TD. ETC. v. C.l.T. (BHARUCHA. J.I   641
J
               the Act."                                                                                          A
             We find it difficult to draw the distinction that the Andhra Pradesh High
     Court made between expenditure that is essential to the running of the
     business and other expenditure, all this expenditure being incurred for the
     same purpose. If all this expenditure on distribution of physician's samples
     is incurred for the purposes of publicity or sales promotion as we think it is                               B
     it falls within the scope of Section 3 7 (3A) of the Act and would be subject
     to the limitations as to allowability therein contained. Further, it should be
     noted that in the case of J & J Dechane laboratories (P) ltd (supra), the
     Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal had found as a fact that some
     expenditure had been incurred to test the efficacy of the concerned drug.                                    C
     There is no such finding in the case_ before us.

           In the result, we are not persuaded to take a view other than that taken
     by the High Court. The question relating to physician's samples is therefore,
     answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. The appeals are
     dismissed with costs.                                                                                        D
     B.S.                                                                          Appeals dismissed.


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