ESHWARAPPA @ MAHESHWARAPPA & ANR.versusC.S. GURUSHANTHAPPA & ANR.

                     [2010] 10 S.C.R. 362


A        ESHWARAPPA @ MAHESHWARAPPA & ANR.
                                 v.
                C.S. GURUSHANTHAPPA & ANR.
                 (Civil. Appeal No. 7049 of 2002)
                        AUGUST 18, 2010
B
             [AFTAB ALAM AND R.M. LODHA, JJ.]

       Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - ss. 140 and 166 - N9 fault
  compensation - Fatal accident - Death of driver and four
C occupants, of a private car - Surviving occupant sustained
  serious injuries - While rejection of claim petition, prayer for
  no fault compensation a/so rejected Held: Liability arising
  from s. 140 would almost invariably be passed on to insurer
  to be paid off from the vast fund created by virtue of ss. 146
D and 147 unless owner of the vehicle causing accident is guilty
  of some flagrant violation of the law - In case of death or
  permanent disablement of any person resulting from motor,
  accident, a minimum amount must be paid to the injured or
  heirs of deceased, independently of the compensation on the
E principle of fault - Thus, claimants entitled to no-fault
  compensation uls. 140 - Insurance company directed to pay
  Rs.25,0001- along with simple interest@ 6% p.a.

      A privately owned car met with a fatal accident
  resulting in the death of the driver and the four
F occupants. The fifth passenger sustained injuries. The
  heirs and legal representatives of the driver filed a claim
  for compensation uhder the Workmen's Compensation
  Act, 1923 and the same was rejected holding that the
  accident did not take place in the course of employment.
G The heirs and legal representatives of the four occupants
  and the fifth passenger sought compensation before the
  Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and the same was also
  rejected. The tribunal also rejected the express prayer
  made on behalf of the appellants and other claimants for
H                            362
 ESHWARAPPA @ MAHESHWARAPPA & ANR. v.                   363
      C.S. GURUSHANTHAPPA & ANR.

grant of the 'no fault compensation' as provided under         A
section 140 of the Act. The High Court dismissed the
appeal by a brief order. Therefore, the appellants filed the
instant appeal.

    Allowing the appeal, the Court                             B
     HELD: 1.1 The reasons assigned for denying the
appellants the 'no fault compensation' as provided under
section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by the tribunal
cannot be accepted. The tribunal was gravely in error in
taking the view that a claim for compensation under            C
section 140 of the Act can succeed only in case it is
raised at the initial stage of the proceedings and further
that the claim must fail if the accident had taken place by
using the car without the consent or knowledge of its
owner. All that is required to attract the liability under     D
section 140 is an accident arising out of the use of a
motor vehicles(s) leading to the death or permanent
disablement of any person. [Para 12) [370-F-H; 371-B]

     1.2 Chapter X of the Act deals with "Liability without E
fault" and contains ss. 140 to 144. Seen in isolation, these
provisions might appear harsh, unreasonable and
arbitrary in as much as these create the liability of the
vehicle(s) owner(s) even where the accident did not take
place due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the
                                                             F
owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned but
entirely due to the wrongful act, neglect or default of the
person in respect of whose death or permanent
disablement the claim has been made, but the said.
provisions must be seen along with certain provisions of
Chapter XI. Section 146 forbids the use of the vehicle in G-
a public place unless there is in force, in relation to the
use of the vehicle, a policy of insurance complying with
the provisions of that chapter. Section 147 contains the

                                                               H
    364      SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A provisions that are commonly referred to as 'Act only
  insurance'. The provisions of sections 146 and 147 are
  meant to create the large pool of money for making
  payments of no fault compensation. Thus, the liability
  arising from section 140 would almost invariably be
B passed on to the insurer to be paid off from the vast fund
  created by virtue of sections 146 and 147 of the Act
  unless the owner of the vehicle causing accident is guilty
  of some flagrant violation of the law. Thus, the provisions
  of chapter X together with sections 146 and 147 would
c appear to be in furtherance of the public policy that in
  case of death or permanent disablement of any person
  resulting from a motor accident a minimum amount must.
  be paid to the injured or the heirs of the deceased, as the
  case may be, without any questions being asked and
  independently of the compensation on the principle of
0
  fault. [Paras 15 and 16] [374-G-H; 375-A-D]

        1.3 The provisions of section 140 are indeed intended
  to provide immediate succor to the injured or the heirs
  and legal representatives of the deceased. Hence,
E normally a claim under section 140 is made at the
  threshold of the proceeding and the payment of
  compensation under section 140 is directed to be made
  by an interim award of the tribunal which may be adjusted
  if in the final award the claimants are held entitled to any
F larger amounts. But that does not mean, that in case a
  claim under section 140 was not made at the beginning
  of the proceedings due to the ignorance of the claimant
  or no direction to make payment of the compensation
  under section 140 was issued due to the over-sight of the
G tribunal, the door would be permanently closed. Such a
  view would be contrary to the legal provisions and would
  be opposed to the public policy. [Para 17] [375-E-G]

          1.4 The tribunal was completely wrong in denying to

H
  ESHWARAPPA @ MAHESHWARAPPA & ANR. v.                     365
       C.S. GURUSHANTHAPPA & ANR.
the appellants, the compensation in terms of section 140          A
of the Act. The appellants (as well as the other 3
claimants) were fully entitled to no fault compensation
under section 140 of the Act. The insurance company is
directed to pay to the ~ppellant Rs.25,000/- along with
simple interest @ 6% p.a.  I
                               from the date of the order of      B
the tribunal till the date of payment. The other 3 claimants
are not before this Court, but that is presumably because
they are too poor to come to this Court. Since, the claim
of the appellants is allowed, the said order should be
extended to the other three claimants as well. The                c
insurance company is directed to make the payment.
[Para 18] [375-H; 376-A-C]

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
7049 of 2002. ·
                                                                  D
    From the Judgment & Order dated 12.03.2001 of the High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in M.F.A. No. 3442 of 1996.

    G.V. Chandrashekhar (for P.P. Singh) for the Appellants.

    Manjeet Chawla, Vishnu Mehra (for B.K. Satija), Naresh        E
Kaushik, Sanjeev K. Bhardwaj (for Lalitha Kaushik) for the
Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                  F
     AFTAB ALAM,J. 1. A certain Basavaraj was the driver of
a privately owned car. In the night of October 28, 1992 he took
out the car for a joyride and along with five persons, who were
his neighbours, proceeded for the nearby Anjaneya temple for
offering pooja. On way to the temple the car met with a fatal
accident in which Basavaraj and four other occupants of the car   G
died; the fifth passenger sustained injuries but escaped death.
One of the persons dying in that motor accident was Nagaraj,
whose parents are the appellants before this Court.

                                                                  H
    366     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A      2. The heirs and legal representatives of the deceased
  driver, Basavaraj filed a claim for compensation under the
  Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. They got nothing. The
  Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act found
  and held that the accident did not take place in course of
B employment and rejected the claim for compensation.

      3. The heirs of the four occupants of the car, dying in the
  accident (including the present appellants) and the fifth
  passenger suffering injuries in the accident sought
C compensation before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal.
  Their claims proved to be equally barren.

        4. The appellants took the matter in appeal before the High
    Court where they were equally unsuccessful. They are now in
    appeal before this Court by special leave.
D
       5. The counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants
  raised a very limited issue. He submitted that in any event the
  appellants were entitled to the 'no fault compensation' as
  provided under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
E but they were denied even that by the Tribunal for reasons that
  are totally unsustainable in law.

        6. We are, therefore, required to see how and why the
  appellants were denied compensation under section 140 of the
  Act and how far the denial was justified. The appellants filed a
F claim petition (MVC 1404/92) before the District Judge and
  MACT, Chitrandurga under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles
  Act seeking compensation for the death of Nagaraj. The
  appellants' petition, along with four other claim petitions (filed
  by the heirs of the other three occupants dying in that car
G accident and the fifth occupant who suffered injuries in that
  accident), was disposed of by the Tribunal by a common order
  dated May 9, 1996. From the order of the Tribunal, it appears
  that in four of the five cases before it, including MVC 1404/92,
  IAs were filed seeking interim compensation of rupees twenty
H five thousand (Rs.25,000.00) only (as the law stood at that time)
 ESHWARAPPA @ MAHESHWARAPPA & ANR. v.       367
C.S. GURUSHANTHAPPA & ANR. [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
in terms of section 140 of the Act. For some reason, however,     A
no order was passed on the IAs and the Tribunal proceeded
to examine the claimants' claim on merits under section 166
of the Act.

      7. The Tribunal, in its order summarized the cases of each B
of the five claimants separately, noting the facts peculiar to the
four deceased and the fifth injured occupant of the ill fated car.
It also framed the issues arising in each case separately. In .
regard to Nagaraj, the son of the appellants, it noted that at the
time of his death he was eighteen years old. According to the C
appellants, he worked at a sweetmeat stall and earned rupees
eight hundred (Rs.800.00) only per month. He was going to
Anjaneya temple in the car being driven by Basavaraj and in
the accident he died on the spot. The appellants claimed
compensation of rupees one lakh (Rs.1,00,000.00) only. In his
case the Tribunal framed four issues which are as under:           D

            1.    Whether the petitioners prove that Nagaraj
                  died due to injuries sustained in a motor
                  accident that occurred on 28.10.92 at
                  11 :45pm near Bheemasamudra Cross on            E
                  Holalkere road due to rash and negligent
                  driving of the car MYG 1624 by its driver?

            2.    Whether the petitioners prove that they are
                  the legal representatives of Nagaraj, the
                                                                  F
                  deceased and are entitled to compensation?

            3.    What is the quantum of compensation to
                  which the petitioners are entitled and from
                  which of the respondents?
                                                                  G
            4.    Whether the respondents prove that the
                  accident did not occur during the course of
                  employment of the driver of the car MYG
                  1624 and that they are not vicariously liable
                  to pay compensation?
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    368       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010) 10 S.C.R.


A      8. The first two issues in the case of Nagaraj, as in all the
  other cases, were answered by the Tribunal in the affirmative.
  On issue no.3 appellant no.1, the father of the deceased
  Nagaraj stated on oath that his son was aged eighteen years
  and used to work in the hotel of one Siddappa who paid him
B rupees thirty (Rs.30.00) only per day, but the Tribunal
  disbelieved him and rejected his testimony. On the basis of the
  post mortem report, the Tribunal held that Nagaraj, at the time
  of his death, was aged about fifteen years. It further held that
  there was no evidence to show that at the time of his death
c Nagaraj earned anything, pointing out that in paragraph 22 of
  the claim petition nothing material was mentioned about the loss
  of earning due to his death. Then, rather gratuitously it fixed the
  amount of compensation at rupees thirty thousand plus two
  thousand (Rs.30,000.00 + Rs.2,000.00) observing as follows:
D         "Hence the maximum compensation that can be granted
          to the petitioner herein would be only about Rs.30,000-00
          as being just and reasonable and a sum of Rs.2,000-00
          toward funeral and obsequious expenses etc. and
          therefore the petitioners are granted sum total
E         compensation amount of Rs.32,000-00."

       9. Having, thus, put the worth of the life of Nagaraj at
  rupees thirty thousand (Rs.30,000.00) only the Tribunal
  proceeded to consider whether the appellants were entitled to
F receive even this amount from the owner of the car or the
  insurance company (second part of issue no.3 and issue no.4).
  It held that neither the owner of the car nor the insurance
  company was liable to pay anything to any of the claimants,
  including the appellants, because Basavaraj had taken out the
G car of his employer unauthorisedly and against his express
  instructions and had caused the accident by driving the car very
  rashly after consuming liquor. At the time of accident the car
  had been taken completely away from the control of its owner.
  In a sense it was stolen by the driver, even though temporarily.
  The accident was, thus, completely outside the insurance policy.
H
 ESHWARAPPA @ MAHESHWARAPPA & ANR. v. 369
C.S. GURUSHANTHAPPA & ANR. [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
No compensation was, therefore, payable to any of the                 A
claimants under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act.

      10. Up to this stage no exception can be taken to the view
taken by the Tribunal. But surprisingly the Tribunal also rejected
the express prayer made on behalf of the appellants and other B
claimants to at least grant the 'no fault compensation' as
provided under section 140 of the Act. The Tribunal discussed
the issue over six pages in its judgment before turning down
the claim. It seems to have taken the view, that had the claim
for 'no fault compensation' been made at the beginning of the
proceeding, it might have considered it favourably. But the claim C
was pressed at a belated stage when it was considering the
claim for compensation under section 166 of the Act and more
importantly had found that the owner of the car had no
responsibility for the accident. In this connection, the Tribunal
observed as follows:                                               D

     "However, in these cases as already referred to above, if
     at the initial stage itself if the learned counsel Sri. M.
     Gnana Swamy had pressed the Tribunal to pass interim
     award on I.A.I in all the four cases, then the I.A.I filed in all E
     four cases would have been definitely allowed and this
     Tribunal would have directed both the respondents 1 & 2
     and more particularly respondent No.2 to deposit the
     interim compensation amount leaving open the liability
     aspect at the fag end of these cases i.e., at the arguments F
     stage. Now that stage is already over and as such now
     this Tribunal has to consider equally as to whether at this
     stage as per the principle of no fault liability under s.140
     of the Motor 'vehicles Act, 1988, these petitioners are
     entitled for the interim in compensation amount."
                                                                       G


     "Now as regards the no fault liability as already referred
     to above, perhaps the petitioners would have been granted
     the interim compensation amount at the initial stage, but        H
    370     - SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010) 10 S.C.R.


A         now it cannot be done, since the merits of the cases are
          being dealt with after hearing the arguments at the final
          stage and the main cases are being disposed of on merits
          as such."

B
          "Hence in view of my finding that the car was being used
          totally outside the course of the employment of the driver
          of the car and totally without the knowledge and consent
          of the 1st respondent, I hold that even as regards this no
c         fault liability claim also, the 1st respondent or for the matter
          2nd respondent amount to any of the petitioner's hearing.
          Hence this being the position, I am constrained to observe
          and hold that although as per the available evidence on
          record the petitioners are entitled for compensation
D         amount as granted to them, in view of my earlier finding
          on issue No.3 in all the petitions, but all the same these
          petitions have got to be dismissed on account of the fact
          that neither the first respondent nor the second respondent
          is liable to pay compensation amount to any other
E         petitioners herein."

        11. The appellants took the matter in appeal but the High
    Court in its brief order did not at all advert to this aspect of the
    matter.

F        12. Coming back to the order passed by the Tribunal, we
    are completely unable to appreciate the reasons assigned for
    denying the appellants the 'no fault compensation' as provided
    under section 140 of the Act. The Tribunal was gravely in error
    in taking the view that a claim for compensation under section
G   140 of the Act can succeed only in case it is raised at the initial
    stage of the proceedings and further that the claim must fail if
    the accident had taken place by using the car without the
    consent or knowledge of its owner. Section 140 is the first
    section of chapter X of the Act. It is a small chapter consisting
H   of only five sections (from 140 to 144) and has the marginal
 ESHWARAPPA @ MAHESHWARAPPA & ANR. v. 371
C.S. GURUSHANTHAPPA & ANR. [AFTAB ALAM, J~]
heading "Liability without Fault in Certain_ Cases". Section 140   A
reads as under:

    "140. Liability to pay compensation in certain cases
    on the principle of no fault.

    (1) Where death or permanent disablement of any person B
    has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a
    motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle
    shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles
    shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation
    in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with C
    the provisions of this section.

    (2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable
    under sub-section ( 1) in respect of the death of any person
    shall be a fixed sum of fifty thousand rupees and the amount   0
    of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect
    of the permanent disablement of any person shall be a
    fixed sum of twenty-five thousand rupees.

    (3) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1 ),
    the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish E
    that the death or permanent disablement in respect of
    which the claim has been r 'de was due to any wrongful
    act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle
    or vehicles concerned or of any other person. ·
                                                                   F
    (4) A claim for compensation under sub-section (1) shall
    not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or
    default of the person in respect of whose death or
    permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall
    the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of G
    such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the
    basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for
    such death or permanent disablement.

    (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2)
    regarding death or bodily injury to any person, for which      H
    372       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2010] 10 S.C.R.


A         the owner of the vehicle is liable to give compensation for
          relief, he is also liable to pay compensation under any other
          law for the time being in force:

                Provided that the amount of such compensation to
          be given under any other law shall be reduced from the
B
          amount of compensation payable under this section or
          under section 163A."

    On a plain reading of the provisions it is evident that all that is
    required to attract the liability under section 140 is an accident
C   arising out of the use of a motor vehicle(s) leading to the death
    or permanent disablement of any person. Sub-section (2)
    provides for a fixed amount as compensation. (In case of death,
    currently it is rupees fifty thousand (Rs.50,000.00) only; at the
    time the accident from which the appeal arises took place the
D   fixed amount in case of death was rupees twenty five thousand
    (Rs.25,000.00) only]. Sub-section (3) provides that even though
    the death or permanent disablement resulting from the motor
    accident might not be due to any wrongful act, neglect or default
    of the owner of the vehicle, it would have no effect either on his
E   liability or on the amount of compensation. Sub-section (4)
    conversely provides that the motor accident resulting in the
    death or permanent disablement might be entirely due to the
    wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of
    whose death or permanent disablement the claim is made but
F   that too would have no effect either on the right to receive the
    compensation or the amount of compensation. Sub-section (5)
    which begins with a non obstante clause makes it further clear
    that the liability under section 140 is independent of the liability
    of the owner of the vehicle to pay compensation under any
G   other law for the time being in force. The proviso to sub-section
    (5), of course, provides that the amount of compensation under
    any other law would be reduced from the amount of
    compensation payable under section 140 or under section
    163A of the Act.

H         13. Then there is section 141 which reads as under:
 ESHWARAPPA @ MAHESHWARAPPA & ANR. v. 373
C.S. GURUSHANTHAPPA & ANR. [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
  "141. Provisions as to other right to claim                      A
  compensation for death or permanent disablement.

  (1) The right to claim compensation under section 140 in
  respect of death or permanent disablement of any person
  shall be in addition to any other right, except the right to     B
  claim under the scheme referred to in section 163A (such
  other right hereafter in this section referred to as the right
  on the principle of fault) to claim compensation in respect
  thereof under any other provision of this Act or of any other
  law for the time being in force.
                                                                   c
  (2) A claim for compensation under section 140 in respect
  of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be
  disposed of as expeditiously as possible and where
  compensation is claimed in respect of such death or
  permanent disablement under section 140 and also in              D
  pursuance of any right on the principle of fault, the claim
  for compensation under section 140 shall be disposed of
  as aforesaid in the first place.

  (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1 ),
                                                                   E
  where. in respect of the death or permanent disablement
  of any person, the person liable to pay compensation
  under section 140 is also li<..vle to pay compensation in
  accordance with the right on the principle of fault, the
  person so liable shall pay the first- mentioned
  compensation and-                                                F

                (a) if the amount of the first-mentioned
                compensation is less than the amount of the
                second-mentioned compensation, he shall
                be liable to pay (in addition to the first-        G
                mentioned compensation) only so much of
                the second-mentioned compensation as is
                equal to the amount by which it exceeds the
                first mentioned compensation;
                                                                   H
    374     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A                     (b) if the amount of the first-mentioned
                      compensation is equal to or more than the
                      amount of the second-mentioned
                      compensation, he shall not be liable to pay
                      the second-mentioned compensation."
B
  Sub-section (1) of section 141 makes the compensation under
  section 140 independent of any claim of compensation based
  on the principle of fault under any other provision of the Motor
  Vehicles Act or under any other law but subject to any claim of
  compensation under section 163A of the Act. Sub-sections (2)
C and (3) further provide that even while claiming compensation
  under the principle of fault (under section 166) one may claim
  no fault compensation under section 140 and in that case the
  claim of no fault compensation shall be disposed of in the first
  place and the amount of compensation paid under section 140
D would be later adjusted if the amount payable as compensation
  on the principle of fault is higher than it.

         14. Finally, section 144 gives overriding effect to the
    provisions of Chapter X. Section 144 reads as follows:
E
                "144. Overriding effect.·The provisions of this
                      Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding
                      anything contained in any other provision of
                      this Act or of any other law for the time being
                      in force."
F
        15. Seen in isolation the above provisions might appear
  harsh, unreasonable and arbitrary in as much as these create
  the liability of the vehicle(s) owner(s) even where the accident
  did not take place due to any wrongful act, neglect or default
G of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned but
  entirely due to the wrongful act, neglect or default of the person
  in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim
  has been made but the above provisions must be seen along
  with certain provisions of Chapter XI. Section 146 forbids the
H use of the vehicle in a public place unless there is in force, in
  ESHWARAPPA @ MAHESHWARAPPA & ANR. v.       375
 C.S. GURUSHANTHAPPA & ANR. [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
 relation to the use of the vehicle, a policy of insurance            A
 complying with the provisions of that chapter. Section 147
 contains the provisions that are commonly referred to as 'Act
 only insurance'. The provisions of sections 146 and 147 are
 meant to create the large pool of money for making payments
 of no fault compensation. Thus the liability arising from section    B
 140 would almost invariably be passed on to the insurer to be
 paid off from the vast fund created by virtue of sections 146
 and 147 ·of the Act unless the owner of the vehicle causing
 accident is guilty of some flagrant violation of the law.

      16. Seen thus, the provisions of chapter X together with        C
 sections 146 and 147 would appear to be in furtherance of the
 public policy that in case of death or permanent disablement
 of any person resulting from a motor accident a minimum
 amount must be paid to the injured or the heirs of the
 deceased, as the case may be, without any questions being            D
 asked and independently of the compensation on the principle
 of fault.

       17. The provisions of section 140 are indeed intended to
· provide immediate succour to the injured or the heirs and legal     E
  representatives of the deceased. Hence, normally a claim under
  section 140 is made at the threshold of the proceeding and the
  payment of compensation under section 140 is directed to be
  made by an interim award of the Tribunal which may be
  adjusted if in the final award the claimants are held entitled to   F
  any larger amounts. But that does not mean, that in case a claim
  under section 140 was not made at the beginning of the
  proceedings due to the ignorance of the claimant or no direction
  to make payment of the compensation under section 140 was
  issued due to the over-sight of the Tribunal, the door would be     G
  permanently closed. Such a view would be contrary to the legal
  provisions and would be opposed to the public policy.

     18. In light of the discussions made above, we are
 unhesitatingly of the view, that the Tribunal was completely
 wrong in denying to the appellant, the compensation in terms         H
    376      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A    of section 140 of the Act. We find and hold that the appellant
     (as well as the other 3 claimants) were fully entitled to no fault
     compensation under section 140 of the Act. We, accordingly,
     direct the insurance company to pay to the appellant Rs.25,000/
     - along with simple interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of the order
 B of the Tribunal till the date of payment. The other 3 claimants
     are not before this Court, but that is presumably because they
     are too poor to come to this Court. Since, we have allowed the
     claim of the appellants, there is no reason why this order should
   . not be extended to the other 3 claimants as well. We,
·c accordingly, do so. The insurance company is directed to make
     the payment as directed in this judgment within 3 months.

         19. In the result, the appeal is allowed but with no order
    as to costs.

    N.J.                                             Appeal allowed.