Holding

Section 14-D confers a special privilege to a widow‑landlady irrespective of when she became a widow, and the provision is constitutionally valid under Article 15(3) provided the right is exercised only once and the widow proves a bona‑fide residential need.

Summary

The case concerned an appeal by EMC Steel Ltd. against a judgment granting possession of premises to a widow-landlady under Section 14‑D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The appellant argued that the provision should apply only when the widow became such after the premises were let out by her or her husband, fearing abuse of the right. The Supreme Court examined the language of Section 14‑D and held that the legislature intended to give a special privilege to a widow‑landlady regardless of when she became a widow, and that such classification is permissible under Article 15(3) of the Constitution. The Court further noted that the right may be exercised only once and the widow must demonstrate a bona‑fide need for residential occupation, with Section 19 providing procedural safeguards. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the High Court’s order and overruling the earlier decision in Dr P.P. Kapur v. Union of India.

Issues considered

Whether Section 14-D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is available to a widow‑landlady irrespective of when she became a widow relative to the letting of the premises.
Whether the classification of a widow‑landlady under Section 14-D violates the equality clause of Article 15(1) of the Constitution or is permissible under the exception in Article 15(3).
Whether the privilege under Section 14-D is susceptible to abuse and if the statutory limitation to a single use and the requirement of bona‑fide residential need are sufficient safeguards.

Legislation cited

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 14-D, s. 19

Subjects

Delhi Rent Control ActSection 14-Dwidow landlordevictionArticle 15(3)bona fide residential needlandlord‑tenant law

Judgment

EMC STEEL LIMITED, CALCUTTA
V.
UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.

FEBRUARY 13, 1991

iK. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, L.M. SHARMA AND B
P.B. SAWANT, JJ.]

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Section 14D-Landlady-A
- ---~- -- widow's right to seek eviction of tenant for own residence.

This appeal has been filed against the judgment of the Delhi High
Court whereby the High Court gave the widow-landlady the benefit of i C
section 14-D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and accordingly
granted her the possession of the premi_ses in question.

Before this Court it was inter alia contended on behalf of the
appellant that the relief under section 14-D was available only to a D
landlady who had become a widow after the premises were let out either
by herself or her husband. It was further contend~ that if the benefit
given by section 14-D was allowed to be availed by all widows, they may 1

make a business of it.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court, E

HELD: (1) The legislature wanted to give a special privilege to the
landlady who is a widow notwithstanding whether the premises were let _
out before or after she became widow. Such conferment of special
benefit on a widow-landlady is permissible even under the provisions of ;

. Article 15(3) of the Constitution which is an express exception to the ' F
provisions of sub-clauses (1) and (2) of that Article. A widow is
undoubtedly a vulnerable person in our society and requires special -
_ protection. [383H-384BJ

(2) Section 14-D can be availed of by the widow only once. That is
a sufficient guarantee against the abuse of the privilege granted by the G
section. Secondly, she has to prove her bona fide need for the occupa-
tion of the premises in question for her own residence like any other :
landlord. Thirdly, the provisions of section 19 of the Delhi Rent Control
Act come into play in her case also, when the order for possession on the ,.
ground of bona fide requirement for occupation as residence is made in :
her favour. [3s4CJ I H

381
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991] 1 S.C:R.

Dr. P.P. Kapur v. Union of India & Ors. Delhi High Court, Civil
A Writ No. 2686of1989 overruled.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 710
of 1991.

:B From the Judgme·nt and Order dated 8.5.1990 of the Delhi High
Court in Civil Writ No. 3257 of 1989.

G.L. Sanghi, Harish N. Salve, H.K. Puri, Rajeev Sharma,
Ravinder Nath, V.B. Saharya, P.K. Jain and Prem Malhotra for the
Appellants.

c Y.S. Chitale, T.S. Krishnamurthy Iyer, R.L. Jain, S.K. Tredal,
Kitty Kumarmanglam, R.P. Dave and Ashok Mathur for the Res-
pondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
SAWANT,J. SLP(C)No.12111of1990.
Leave gr·anted.
2. This appeal ·raises the question of the validity and interpreta-
tion of Section 14-D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter
E referred to as the "Act"). In companion matters, we have already
pronounced upon the validity and interpretation of Section 14-B of the
Act. Hence, it is not necessary to discuss in this judgment the points
which are common to both sections. These points will be deemed to
have been concluded by the said decision.

F 3. The only point which remains to be dealt with and is peculiar
to Section 14-D is whether to claim possession of such premises under
the said Section, the landlady must become a widow after the premises
are let out either by herself or her husband.

4. Section 14-D of the Act reads as follows:
G
"14-D. Right to recover immediate possession of premises
to accrue to a widow-( 1) Where the landlord is a widow
and the premises let out by her (2) or by her husband, are
required by her for her own residence, she may apply to the
Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such
H premises.
EMC STEEL v. U.0.1. [SAWANT, J.] 383

(2) Where the landlord referred to in sub-section (1) has
let out more than one premises, it shall be open to her to A
make an application under that sub-section in respect of
any one of the premises chosen by her.

5. The object of the Act, as stated in its preamble, is to provide
for the control of rents and evictions, and of rates of hotels and lodging B
houses, and for the lease of vacant premises to Government, in certain
."V'· areas in the Union Territory of Delhi. The original Act came into force
on February 9, 1959 having received the assent of the President on
December 31, 1958. The working of the Act disclosed certain
deficiencies, inconveniences and hardships both to the landlords and
' r the tenants. Their associations, therefore, made representations. Vari-
ous committees and commissions also recommended amendments of C
certain provisions of the Act. Considering the grievances of the land-
lords and the tenants as well as the recommendations of the commit-
.,"""' tees/commissions, the Act was amended in 1988 with the object of (a)
rationalising the law by bringing out the balance between the interests
of landlords and tenants, (b) giving a boost to house building activity D
and maintaining the existing housing stock in a reasonable state of
repairs, (c) reducing litigation between landlords and tenants and of
ensuring expeditious disposal of disputes between them. By this
amendment Sections 14-B to 14-D were added. The object of Section
.....( 14-D is obvious. It is to assist a vulnerable and needy section of the
society to recover possession of the premises as expeditiously as possi- E
ble and without the usual trials and tribulations.

6. We have already held in the accompanying judgment that
classified landlords such as the widow landlady under Section 14-D can
apply for possession of the premises under the respective provisions
even if the premises are not let for residence. It is not necessary to F
.. ~epeat the said discussion in this judgment. Section 14-D makes no
......,.._ distinction between the landladies who become widows before and
after letting out of the premises. It merely says that where the landlady
is a widow and the· premises are let out by her or by her husband, are
required by her for her own residence, she may apply to the Controller
for recovering the immediate possession of such premises. The G
language of the section in that respect is very clear. The premises
might have been let out by her as a widow or they might have been let out by
her husband or even by herself before she had become widow. The
legislature wanted to give a special privilege to the landlady who is a
widow notwithstanding whether the premises were let out before or
after she became widow. Such conferment of special benefit on a H
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 1 S.C.R.

A widow-landlady is permissible even under the provisions of Article
15(3) of the Constitution which is an express exception to the provi-
sions of sub-clauses ( 1) and (2) of that Article. It states that nothing in
the said Article shall prevent the State from making any special provi-
sion for women and children. A widow is undoubtedly a vulnerable
person in our society and requires special protection. We further see
B no merit in the contention that if the benefit given by Section 14-D is
allowed to be availed of by widows, they may make a business of it.
There is no warrant for such apprehension. For, in the first instance,
the right to recover possession under Section 14-D can be availed of by
the widow only a.nee. That is a sufficient guarantee against the abuse
of the privilege granteq by the section. Secondly, she has to prove her
C bona fide need for the occupation of the premises in question for her
own residence like any other landlord. Thirdly, the provisions of
Section 19 of the Act come into play in her case also, when the order
for possession on the ground of bona fide requirement for occupation
as residence is made in her favour.
D In this view of the matter, we find no substance in this appeal and
the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.

Writ Petition No. 902 of 1990

7. In the view that we have taken above, it is not necessary to ~ -
E admit this writ petition. The authorities under the Act while disposing
of the applications under Section 14-D will have to abide by this deci-
sion and not by the decision of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No.
2686 of 1989 in the matter of Dr. P.P. Kapur v. Union of India & Ors.
which was brought to our notice and stands overruled.

R.S.S. Appeal dismissed.